hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

This patch moves the meta_immutable check after the check for the EVM status. Even if IMA would continue appraisal verification when the status is not good (e.g. INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN), this patch refuses any status different from INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE if the meta_immutable requirement was specified.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index c6376ec28ccd..2f77f086df36 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -229,14 +229,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: - if (iint->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED && - status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { - status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; - cause = "metadata-modifiable"; - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, - filename, op, cause, rc, 0); - goto out; - } break; case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: if (ima_appraise_req_evm && @@ -264,6 +256,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status); }

+ if ((iint->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) && + status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { + status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + cause = "metadata-modifiable"; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, + filename, op, cause, rc, 0); + goto out; + } + switch (xattr_value->type) { case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags);

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Without resetting the status when security.evm is modified, IMA appraisal would continue to use the cached result and wouldn't detect whether the meta_immutable requirement is still satisfied.

This patch calls evm_reset_status() in the post hooks when security.evm is modified.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index ece39b80ca9c..5762336b5513 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -180,7 +180,6 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } - digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &digest); @@ -562,12 +561,17 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode, int bit) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { + int is_evm = !strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM); + if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) - && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name) && !is_evm)) return;

evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode, IMA_CHANGE_XATTR);

+ if (is_evm) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); }

@@ -583,11 +587,16 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + int is_evm = !strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM); + + if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !is_evm)) return;

evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode, IMA_CHANGE_XATTR);

+ if (is_evm) + return; + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); }

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

In some cases digest lists already exists (e.g. RPM headers) and only their content is signed.

Allowing appraisal of digest lists without metadata won't be an issue as they must be immutable and even if corrupted metadata allow unauthorized read, system integrity won't be compromised, as the integrity of digest lists is assumed to be good.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index bd00611b3cec..78b7f2fcd7d8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -244,6 +244,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, */ if (ima_appraise_no_metadata && found_digest) break; + /* Allow access to digest lists without metadata, only if they + * are signed or found in a digest list (immutable) + */ + if (func == DIGEST_LIST_CHECK) { + if (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + break; + if (found_digest && + ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest)) + break; + } cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE:

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Introduce the new function to get the number of bits and bytes from an MPI.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- include/linux/mpi.h | 2 ++ lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/mpi.h b/include/linux/mpi.h index 7cd1473c64a4..56187bb57c78 100644 --- a/include/linux/mpi.h +++ b/include/linux/mpi.h @@ -61,6 +61,8 @@ int mpi_resize(MPI a, unsigned nlimbs);

/*-- mpicoder.c --*/ MPI mpi_read_raw_data(const void *xbuffer, size_t nbytes); +int mpi_key_length(const void *xbuffer, unsigned int ret_nread, + unsigned int *nbits_arg, unsigned int *nbytes_arg); MPI mpi_read_from_buffer(const void *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread); MPI mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(struct scatterlist *sgl, unsigned int len); void *mpi_get_buffer(MPI a, unsigned *nbytes, int *sign); diff --git a/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c b/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c index eead4b339466..207cb3b91a51 100644 --- a/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c +++ b/lib/mpi/mpicoder.c @@ -78,22 +78,41 @@ MPI mpi_read_raw_data(const void *xbuffer, size_t nbytes) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_read_raw_data);

-MPI mpi_read_from_buffer(const void *xbuffer, unsigned *ret_nread) +int mpi_key_length(const void *xbuffer, unsigned int ret_nread, + unsigned int *nbits_arg, unsigned int *nbytes_arg) { const uint8_t *buffer = xbuffer; - unsigned int nbits, nbytes; - MPI val; + unsigned int nbits;

- if (*ret_nread < 2) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + if (ret_nread < 2) + return -EINVAL; nbits = buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1];

if (nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS) { pr_info("MPI: mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + return -EINVAL; }

- nbytes = DIV_ROUND_UP(nbits, 8); + if (nbits_arg) + *nbits_arg = nbits; + if (nbytes_arg) + *nbytes_arg = DIV_ROUND_UP(nbits, 8); + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mpi_key_length); + +MPI mpi_read_from_buffer(const void *xbuffer, unsigned *ret_nread) +{ + const uint8_t *buffer = xbuffer; + unsigned int nbytes; + MPI val; + int ret; + + ret = mpi_key_length(xbuffer, *ret_nread, NULL, &nbytes); + if (ret < 0) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + if (nbytes + 2 > *ret_nread) { pr_info("MPI: mpi larger than buffer nbytes=%u ret_nread=%u\n", nbytes, *ret_nread);

From: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Provide some useful PGP definitions from RFC 4880. These describe details of public key crypto as used by crypto keys for things like signature verification.

Changelog:

v0: - fix style issues (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- include/linux/pgp.h | 216 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 216 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h

diff --git a/include/linux/pgp.h b/include/linux/pgp.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..71186ac3128b --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/pgp.h @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* PGP definitions (RFC 4880) + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_PGP_H +#define _LINUX_PGP_H + +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct pgp_key_ID { + u8 id[8]; +} __packed; + +struct pgp_time { + u8 time[4]; +} __packed; + +/* + * PGP public-key algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.1] + */ +enum pgp_pubkey_algo { + PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_OR_SIG = 1, + PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_ONLY = 2, + PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_SIG_ONLY = 3, + PGP_PUBKEY_ELGAMAL = 16, + PGP_PUBKEY_DSA = 17, + PGP_PUBKEY__LAST +}; + +/* + * PGP symmetric-key algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.2] + */ +enum pgp_symkey_algo { + PGP_SYMKEY_PLAINTEXT = 0, + PGP_SYMKEY_IDEA = 1, + PGP_SYMKEY_3DES = 2, + PGP_SYMKEY_CAST5 = 3, + PGP_SYMKEY_BLOWFISH = 4, + PGP_SYMKEY_AES_128KEY = 7, + PGP_SYMKEY_AES_192KEY = 8, + PGP_SYMKEY_AES_256KEY = 9, + PGP_SYMKEY_TWOFISH_256KEY = 10, +}; + +/* + * PGP compression algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.3] + */ +enum pgp_compr_algo { + PGP_COMPR_UNCOMPRESSED = 0, + PGP_COMPR_ZIP = 1, + PGP_COMPR_ZLIB = 2, + PGP_COMPR_BZIP2 = 3, +}; + +/* + * PGP hash algorithm identifiers [RFC4880: 9.4] + */ +enum pgp_hash_algo { + PGP_HASH_MD5 = 1, + PGP_HASH_SHA1 = 2, + PGP_HASH_RIPE_MD_160 = 3, + PGP_HASH_SHA256 = 8, + PGP_HASH_SHA384 = 9, + PGP_HASH_SHA512 = 10, + PGP_HASH_SHA224 = 11, + PGP_HASH__LAST +}; + +extern const char *const pgp_hash_algorithms[PGP_HASH__LAST]; + +/* + * PGP packet type tags [RFC4880: 4.3]. + */ +enum pgp_packet_tag { + PGP_PKT_RESERVED = 0, + PGP_PKT_PUBKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY = 1, + PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE = 2, + PGP_PKT_SYMKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY = 3, + PGP_PKT_ONEPASS_SIGNATURE = 4, + PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY = 5, + PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY = 6, + PGP_PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY = 7, + PGP_PKT_COMPRESSED_DATA = 8, + PGP_PKT_SYM_ENC_DATA = 9, + PGP_PKT_MARKER = 10, + PGP_PKT_LITERAL_DATA = 11, + PGP_PKT_TRUST = 12, + PGP_PKT_USER_ID = 13, + PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY = 14, + PGP_PKT_USER_ATTRIBUTE = 17, + PGP_PKT_SYM_ENC_AND_INTEG_DATA = 18, + PGP_PKT_MODIFY_DETECT_CODE = 19, + PGP_PKT_PRIVATE_0 = 60, + PGP_PKT_PRIVATE_3 = 63, + PGP_PKT__HIGHEST = 63 +}; + +/* + * Signature (tag 2) packet [RFC4880: 5.2]. + */ +enum pgp_signature_version { + PGP_SIG_VERSION_3 = 3, + PGP_SIG_VERSION_4 = 4, +}; + +enum pgp_signature_type { + PGP_SIG_BINARY_DOCUMENT_SIG = 0x00, + PGP_SIG_CANONICAL_TEXT_DOCUMENT_SIG = 0x01, + PGP_SIG_STANDALONE_SIG = 0x02, + PGP_SIG_GENERAL_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x10, + PGP_SIG_PERSONAL_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x11, + PGP_SIG_CASUAL_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x12, + PGP_SIG_POSTITIVE_CERT_OF_UID_PUBKEY = 0x13, + PGP_SIG_SUBKEY_BINDING_SIG = 0x18, + PGP_SIG_PRIMARY_KEY_BINDING_SIG = 0x19, + PGP_SIG_DIRECTLY_ON_KEY = 0x1F, + PGP_SIG_KEY_REVOCATION_SIG = 0x20, + PGP_SIG_SUBKEY_REVOCATION_SIG = 0x28, + PGP_SIG_CERT_REVOCATION_SIG = 0x30, + PGP_SIG_TIMESTAMP_SIG = 0x40, + PGP_SIG_THIRD_PARTY_CONFIRM_SIG = 0x50, +}; + +struct pgp_signature_v3_packet { + enum pgp_signature_version version : 8; /* == PGP_SIG_VERSION_3 */ + u8 length_of_hashed; /* == 5 */ + struct { + enum pgp_signature_type signature_type : 8; + struct pgp_time creation_time; + } __packed hashed; + struct pgp_key_ID issuer; + enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; + enum pgp_hash_algo hash_algo : 8; +} __packed; + +struct pgp_signature_v4_packet { + enum pgp_signature_version version : 8; /* == PGP_SIG_VERSION_4 */ + enum pgp_signature_type signature_type : 8; + enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; + enum pgp_hash_algo hash_algo : 8; +} __packed; + +/* + * V4 signature subpacket types [RFC4880: 5.2.3.1]. + */ +enum pgp_sig_subpkt_type { + PGP_SIG_CREATION_TIME = 2, + PGP_SIG_EXPIRATION_TIME = 3, + PGP_SIG_EXPORTABLE_CERT = 4, + PGP_SIG_TRUST_SIG = 5, + PGP_SIG_REGEXP = 6, + PGP_SIG_REVOCABLE = 7, + PGP_SIG_KEY_EXPIRATION_TIME = 9, + PGP_SIG_PREF_SYM_ALGO = 11, + PGP_SIG_REVOCATION_KEY = 12, + PGP_SIG_ISSUER = 16, + PGP_SIG_NOTATION_DATA = 20, + PGP_SIG_PREF_HASH_ALGO = 21, + PGP_SIG_PREF_COMPR_ALGO = 22, + PGP_SIG_KEY_SERVER_PREFS = 23, + PGP_SIG_PREF_KEY_SERVER = 24, + PGP_SIG_PRIMARY_USER_ID = 25, + PGP_SIG_POLICY_URI = 26, + PGP_SIG_KEY_FLAGS = 27, + PGP_SIG_SIGNERS_USER_ID = 28, + PGP_SIG_REASON_FOR_REVOCATION = 29, + PGP_SIG_FEATURES = 30, + PGP_SIG_TARGET = 31, + PGP_SIG_EMBEDDED_SIG = 32, + PGP_SIG__LAST +}; + +#define PGP_SIG_SUBPKT_TYPE_CRITICAL_MASK 0x80 + +/* + * Key (tag 5, 6, 7 and 14) packet + */ +enum pgp_key_version { + PGP_KEY_VERSION_2 = 2, + PGP_KEY_VERSION_3 = 3, + PGP_KEY_VERSION_4 = 4, +}; + +struct pgp_key_v3_packet { + enum pgp_key_version version : 8; + struct pgp_time creation_time; + u8 expiry[2]; /* 0 or time in days till expiry */ + enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; + u8 key_material[0]; +} __packed; + +struct pgp_key_v4_packet { + enum pgp_key_version version : 8; + struct pgp_time creation_time; + enum pgp_pubkey_algo pubkey_algo : 8; + u8 key_material[0]; +} __packed; + +/* + * Literal Data (tag 11) packet + */ +enum pgp_literal_data_format { + PGP_LIT_FORMAT_BINARY = 0x62, + PGP_LIT_FORMAT_TEXT = 0x74, + PGP_LIT_FORMAT_TEXT_UTF8 = 0x75, +}; + +#endif /* _LINUX_PGP_H */

From: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Implement a PGP data parser for the crypto key type to use when instantiating a key.

This parser attempts to parse the instantiation data as a PGP packet sequence (RFC 4880) and if it parses okay, attempts to extract a public-key algorithm key or subkey from it.

If it finds such a key, it will set up a public_key subtype payload with appropriate handler routines (DSA or RSA) and attach it to the key.

Thanks to Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp for pointing out some errors.

Changelog

v0: - remove declaration of pgp_to_public_key_algo (Roberto Sassu) - replace prep->type_data with prep->payload.data (Roberto Sassu) - replace public_key_destroy() with public_key_free() (Roberto Sassu) - use asymmetric_key_generate_id() to generate the key identifiers (Roberto Sassu) - add raw_fingerprint to pgp_key_data_parse_context structure (Roberto Sassu) - replace algorithm identifiers with strings (Roberto Sassu) - don't parse MPIs (Roberto Sassu) - don't process Public-Subkey packets (only one key will be created) (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 11 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 4 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 339 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 354 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 37b3bb7d59f0..8ba0e6ac084f 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -71,4 +71,15 @@ config PGP_LIBRARY This option enables a library that provides a number of simple utility functions for parsing PGP (RFC 4880) packet-based messages.

+config PGP_KEY_PARSER + tristate "PGP key parser" + depends on ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE + select PGP_LIBRARY + select MD5 # V3 fingerprint generation + select SHA1 # V4 fingerprint generation + help + This option provides support for parsing PGP (RFC 4880) format blobs + for key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key + from a public key packet found inside the blob. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 966b67409ec3..6a5256f64723 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -66,3 +66,7 @@ $(obj)/mscode.asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.c $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h # PGP handling # obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o + +obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_KEY_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o +pgp_key_parser-y := \ + pgp_public_key.o diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2845b5d1a765 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* Instantiate a public key crypto key from PGP format data [RFC 4880] + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "PGP: "fmt +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/mpi.h> +#include <linux/pgplib.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-parser.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> +#include "pgp_parser.h" + +#define MAX_MPI 5 + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); + +static inline void digest_putc(struct shash_desc *digest, uint8_t ch) +{ + crypto_shash_update(digest, &ch, 1); +} + +struct pgp_key_data_parse_context { + struct pgp_parse_context pgp; + struct public_key *pub; + unsigned char *raw_fingerprint; + char *fingerprint; +}; + +/* + * Calculate the public key ID (RFC4880 12.2) + */ +static int pgp_calc_pkey_keyid(struct shash_desc *digest, + struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pgp, + struct public_key *pub) +{ + unsigned int nb[MAX_MPI]; + unsigned int nn[MAX_MPI]; + unsigned int n; + size_t keylen = pub->keylen; + u8 *key_ptr = pub->key; + u8 *pp[MAX_MPI]; + u32 a32; + int npkey; + int i, ret; + + kenter(""); + + n = (pgp->version < PGP_KEY_VERSION_4) ? 8 : 6; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_MPI && keylen > 0; i++) { + ret = mpi_key_length(key_ptr, keylen, nb + i, nn + i); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + pp[i] = key_ptr + 2; + key_ptr += 2 + nn[i]; + keylen -= 2 + nn[i]; + n += 2 + nn[i]; + } + + if (keylen != 0) { + pr_debug("excess %zu\n", keylen); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + npkey = i; + + digest_putc(digest, 0x99); /* ctb */ + digest_putc(digest, n >> 8); /* 16-bit header length */ + digest_putc(digest, n); + digest_putc(digest, pgp->version); + + a32 = pgp->creation_time; + digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 24); + digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 16); + digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 8); + digest_putc(digest, a32 >> 0); + + if (pgp->version < PGP_KEY_VERSION_4) { + u16 a16; + + if (pgp->expires_at) + a16 = (pgp->expires_at - pgp->creation_time) / 86400UL; + else + a16 = 0; + digest_putc(digest, a16 >> 8); + digest_putc(digest, a16 >> 0); + } + + digest_putc(digest, pgp->pubkey_algo); + + for (i = 0; i < npkey; i++) { + digest_putc(digest, nb[i] >> 8); + digest_putc(digest, nb[i]); + crypto_shash_update(digest, pp[i], nn[i]); + } + ret = 0; + + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Calculate the public key ID fingerprint + */ +static int pgp_generate_fingerprint(struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx, + struct pgp_parse_pubkey *pgp, + struct public_key *pub) +{ + struct crypto_shash *tfm; + struct shash_desc *digest; + char *fingerprint; + u8 *raw_fingerprint; + int digest_size, offset; + int ret, i; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pgp->version < PGP_KEY_VERSION_4 ? + "md5" : "sha1", 0, 0); + if (!tfm) + goto cleanup; + + digest = kmalloc(sizeof(*digest) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!digest) + goto cleanup_tfm; + + digest->tfm = tfm; + digest->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + ret = crypto_shash_init(digest); + if (ret < 0) + goto cleanup_hash; + + ret = pgp_calc_pkey_keyid(digest, pgp, pub); + if (ret < 0) + goto cleanup_hash; + + digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm); + + raw_fingerprint = kmalloc(digest_size, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!raw_fingerprint) + goto cleanup_hash; + + ret = crypto_shash_final(digest, raw_fingerprint); + if (ret < 0) + goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; + + fingerprint = kmalloc(digest_size * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!fingerprint) + goto cleanup_raw_fingerprint; + + offset = digest_size - 8; + pr_debug("offset %u/%u\n", offset, digest_size); + + for (i = 0; i < digest_size; i++) + sprintf(fingerprint + i * 2, "%02x", raw_fingerprint[i]); + pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", fingerprint); + + ctx->raw_fingerprint = raw_fingerprint; + ctx->fingerprint = fingerprint; + ret = 0; +cleanup_raw_fingerprint: + if (ret < 0) + kfree(raw_fingerprint); +cleanup_hash: + kfree(digest); +cleanup_tfm: + crypto_free_shash(tfm); +cleanup: + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Extract a public key or public subkey from the PGP stream. + */ +static int pgp_process_public_key(struct pgp_parse_context *context, + enum pgp_packet_tag type, + u8 headerlen, + const u8 *data, + size_t datalen) +{ + const char *algo; + struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx = + container_of(context, struct pgp_key_data_parse_context, pgp); + struct pgp_parse_pubkey pgp; + struct public_key *pub; + int ret; + + kenter(",%u,%u,,%zu", type, headerlen, datalen); + + if (ctx->fingerprint) { + kleave(" = -ENOKEY [already]"); + return -EBADMSG; + } + + pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pub) + return -ENOMEM; + pub->id_type = "PGP"; + + ret = pgp_parse_public_key(&data, &datalen, &pgp); + if (ret < 0) + goto cleanup; + + if (pgp.pubkey_algo >= PGP_PUBKEY__LAST) + goto cleanup_unsupported_pkey_algo; + algo = pgp_to_public_key_algo[pgp.pubkey_algo]; + if (!algo) + goto cleanup_unsupported_pkey_algo; + pub->pkey_algo = algo; + + pub->key = kmemdup(data, datalen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pub->key) + goto cleanup_nomem; + + pub->keylen = datalen; + + ret = pgp_generate_fingerprint(ctx, &pgp, pub); + if (ret < 0) + goto cleanup; + + ctx->pub = pub; + kleave(" = 0 [use]"); + return 0; + +cleanup_unsupported_pkey_algo: + pr_debug("Unsupported public key algorithm %u\n", + pgp.pubkey_algo); + ret = -ENOPKG; + goto cleanup; +cleanup_nomem: + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto cleanup; +cleanup: + pr_devel("cleanup"); + kfree(pub->key); + kfree(pub); + kleave(" = %d", ret); + return ret; +} + +static struct asymmetric_key_ids *pgp_key_generate_id( + struct pgp_key_data_parse_context *ctx) +{ + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids; + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; + int fingerprint_len = strlen(ctx->fingerprint) / 2; + + kids = kzalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kids) + return kids; + + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_fingerprint, fingerprint_len, + NULL, 0); + if (IS_ERR(kid)) + goto error; + + kids->id[0] = kid; + kids->id[1] = kmemdup(kid, sizeof(kid) + fingerprint_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!kids->id[1]) + goto error; + + return kids; +error: + kfree(kids->id[0]); + kfree(kids); + + return NULL; +} + +/* + * Attempt to parse the instantiation data blob for a key as a PGP packet + * message holding a key. + */ +static int pgp_key_parse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct pgp_key_data_parse_context ctx; + int ret; + + kenter(""); + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); + ctx.pgp.process_packet = pgp_process_public_key; + + ret = pgp_parse_packets(prep->data, prep->datalen, &ctx.pgp); + if (ret < 0) + goto error; + + /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */ + __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner); + prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype; + prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = pgp_key_generate_id(&ctx); + prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = ctx.pub; + prep->quotalen = 100; + kfree(ctx.fingerprint); + kfree(ctx.raw_fingerprint); + return 0; + +error: + public_key_free(ctx.pub); + kfree(ctx.fingerprint); + kfree(ctx.raw_fingerprint); + return ret; +} + +static struct asymmetric_key_parser pgp_key_parser = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .name = "pgp", + .parse = pgp_key_parse, +}; + +/* + * Module stuff + */ +static int __init pgp_key_init(void) +{ + return register_asymmetric_key_parser(&pgp_key_parser); +} + +static void __exit pgp_key_exit(void) +{ + unregister_asymmetric_key_parser(&pgp_key_parser); +} + +module_init(pgp_key_init); +module_exit(pgp_key_exit);

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob for use in initialising the module signing key keyring:

int preload_pgp_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, struct key *keyring);

Descriptions are generated from user ID notes and key fingerprints. The keys will actually be identified by the ID calculated from the PGP data rather than by the description, so this shouldn't be a problem.

The keys are attached to the keyring supplied.

Looking as root in /proc/keys after the module signing keyring has been loaded:

383a00c1 I------ 1 perm 1f030000 0 0 asymmetri \ Red Hat, Inc. dbeca166: PGP.DSA dbeca166 []

Thanks to Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp for some pointing out some errors.

Changelog

v0: - avoid Kconfig circular dependency (Roberto Sassu) - modify flags passed to key_create_or_update() (Roberto Sassu) - don't process Public-Subkey packets (Roberto Sassu)

Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Co-developed-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 8 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 1 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/pgp.h | 4 + 4 files changed, 132 insertions(+) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c

diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig index 8ba0e6ac084f..180c07d1ef5b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig @@ -82,4 +82,12 @@ config PGP_KEY_PARSER for key data and provides the ability to instantiate a crypto key from a public key packet found inside the blob.

+config PGP_PRELOAD + bool "PGP public key preloading facility" + select PGP_KEY_PARSER + help + This option provides a facility for the kernel to preload PGP-wrapped + bundles of keys during boot. It is used by module signing to load + the module signing keys for example. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index 6a5256f64723..bc61fc0cf46e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ $(obj)/mscode.asn1.o: $(obj)/mscode.asn1.c $(obj)/mscode.asn1.h # PGP handling # obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY) += pgp_library.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_PRELOAD) += pgp_preload.o

obj-$(CONFIG_PGP_KEY_PARSER) += pgp_key_parser.o pgp_key_parser-y := \ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d029caec3601 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* Cryptographic key request handling + * + * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version + * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * See Documentation/security/keys-crypto.txt + */ + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/pgplib.h> +#include <linux/pgp.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> + +struct preload_pgp_keys_context { + struct pgp_parse_context pgp; + key_ref_t keyring; + const u8 *key_start; + const u8 *key_end; + bool found_key; +}; + +/* + * Create a key. + */ +static int __init create_pgp_key(struct preload_pgp_keys_context *ctx) +{ + key_ref_t key; + + key = key_create_or_update(ctx->keyring, + "asymmetric", + NULL, + ctx->key_start, + ctx->key_end - ctx->key_start, + ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | + KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN | + KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION); + if (IS_ERR(key)) + return PTR_ERR(key); + + pr_notice("Loaded PGP key '%s'\n", + key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description); + + key_ref_put(key); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Extract a public key or subkey from the PGP stream. + */ +static int __init found_pgp_key(struct pgp_parse_context *context, + enum pgp_packet_tag type, u8 headerlen, + const u8 *data, size_t datalen) +{ + struct preload_pgp_keys_context *ctx = + container_of(context, struct preload_pgp_keys_context, pgp); + int ret; + + if (ctx->found_key) { + ctx->key_end = data - headerlen; + ret = create_pgp_key(ctx); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + } + + ctx->key_start = data - headerlen; + ctx->found_key = true; + return 0; +} + +/** + * preload_pgp_keys - Load keys from a PGP keyring blob + * @pgpdata: The PGP keyring blob containing the keys. + * @pgpdatalen: The size of the @pgpdata blob. + * @keyring: The keyring to add the new keys to. + * + * Preload a pack of keys from a PGP keyring blob. + * + * The keys have their descriptions generated from the user ID and fingerprint + * in the PGP stream. Since keys can be matched on their key IDs independently + * of the key description, the description is mostly irrelevant apart from the + * fact that keys of the same description displace one another from a keyring. + * + * The caller should override the current creds if they want the keys to be + * owned by someone other than the current process's owner. Keys will not be + * accounted towards the owner's quota. + * + * This function may only be called whilst the kernel is booting. + */ +int __init preload_pgp_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, + struct key *keyring) +{ + struct preload_pgp_keys_context ctx; + int ret; + + ctx.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY); + ctx.pgp.process_packet = found_pgp_key; + ctx.keyring = make_key_ref(keyring, 1); + ctx.found_key = false; + + ret = pgp_parse_packets(pgpdata, pgpdatalen, &ctx.pgp); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (ctx.found_key) { + ctx.key_end = pgpdata + pgpdatalen; + return create_pgp_key(&ctx); + } + return 0; +} diff --git a/include/linux/pgp.h b/include/linux/pgp.h index 71186ac3128b..9104939c4770 100644 --- a/include/linux/pgp.h +++ b/include/linux/pgp.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #define _LINUX_PGP_H

#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/key.h>

struct pgp_key_ID { u8 id[8]; @@ -213,4 +214,7 @@ enum pgp_literal_data_format { PGP_LIT_FORMAT_TEXT_UTF8 = 0x75, };

+int __init preload_pgp_keys(const u8 *pgpdata, size_t pgpdatalen, + struct key *keyring); + #endif /* _LINUX_PGP_H */

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Introduce search_trusted_key() to extend the key search to the primary or secondary built-in keyrings.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- certs/system_keyring.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/verification.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c index bf118f34dc5c..33ddd8ce1c97 100644 --- a/certs/system_keyring.c +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c @@ -287,4 +287,26 @@ int verify_pkcs7_signature(const void *data, size_t len, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(verify_pkcs7_signature);

+struct key *search_trusted_key(struct key *trusted_keys, struct key_type *type, + char *name) +{ + key_ref_t kref; + + if (!trusted_keys) { + trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; + } else if (trusted_keys == VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING) { +#ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING + trusted_keys = secondary_trusted_keys; +#else + trusted_keys = builtin_trusted_keys; +#endif + } + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(trusted_keys, 1), type, name); + if (IS_ERR(kref)) + return ERR_CAST(kref); + + return key_ref_to_ptr(kref); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(search_trusted_key); + #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ diff --git a/include/linux/verification.h b/include/linux/verification.h index cfa4730d607a..6aaf06c83daa 100644 --- a/include/linux/verification.h +++ b/include/linux/verification.h @@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H #define _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H

+#include <linux/key.h> + /* * Indicate that both builtin trusted keys and secondary trusted keys * should be used. @@ -51,5 +53,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage); #endif

+struct key *search_trusted_key(struct key *trusted_keys, struct key_type *type, + char *name); + #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

This patch allows direct upload of digest lists by user space parsers. This operation is possible if the digest of the process's executable is found in the digest lists and its type is COMPACT_PARSER.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 5 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 12 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c index c7610d9d603c..fbcc3d8a58a6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> +#include <linux/magic.h>

#include "ima.h" #include "ima_digest_list.h" @@ -215,6 +217,10 @@ void ima_check_measured_appraised(struct file *file) if (!ima_digest_list_actions) return;

+ if (file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_magic == SECURITYFS_MAGIC || + S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode)) + return; + iint = integrity_iint_find(file_inode(file)); if (!iint) { pr_err("%s not processed, disabling digest lists lookup\n", @@ -322,3 +328,36 @@ void __init ima_load_digest_lists(void) out: path_put(&path); } + +/**************** + * Parser check * + ****************/ +bool ima_check_current_is_parser(void) +{ + struct integrity_iint_cache *parser_iint; + struct file *parser_file; + struct mm_struct *mm; + + mm = get_task_mm(current); + if (!mm) + return false; + + parser_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm); + mmput(mm); + + if (!parser_file) + return false; + + parser_iint = integrity_iint_find(file_inode(parser_file)); + fput(parser_file); + + if (!parser_iint) + return false; + + /* flag cannot be cleared due to write protection of executables */ + if (!(parser_iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) + return false; + + return ima_lookup_digest(parser_iint->ima_hash->digest, + parser_iint->ima_hash->algo, COMPACT_PARSER); +} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h index f587e9ab8f75..f102530324a5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ extern struct ima_h_table ima_digests_htable;

int ima_parse_compact_list(loff_t size, void *buf, int op); void ima_check_measured_appraised(struct file *file); +bool ima_check_current_is_parser(void); #else static inline int ima_parse_compact_list(loff_t size, void *buf, int op) { @@ -32,5 +33,9 @@ static inline int ima_parse_compact_list(loff_t size, void *buf, int op) static inline void ima_check_measured_appraised(struct file *file) { } +static inline bool ima_check_current_is_parser(void) +{ + return false; +} #endif /*CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST*/ #endif /*LINUX_IMA_DIGEST_LIST_H*/ diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 895e242066ac..804e7183a908 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -392,6 +392,18 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_data(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, } else { result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); } + } else if (dentry == digest_list_data) { + if (!ima_check_current_is_parser()) + result = -EACCES; + else + result = ima_parse_compact_list(datalen, data, + DIGEST_LIST_OP_ADD); + } else if (dentry == digest_list_data_del) { + if (!ima_check_current_is_parser()) + result = -EACCES; + else + result = ima_parse_compact_list(datalen, data, + DIGEST_LIST_OP_DEL); } else { pr_err("Unknown data type\n"); result = -EINVAL;

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

This patch limits the digest lists processed by the kernel. It excludes digest lists not in the compact format, and those without security.evm or without IMA signature.

ima_check_measured_appraised() is called at the end of ima_file_check() to verify that everything accessed by the user space parser (except for directories and securityfs) has been processed by IMA. If a digest list was not processed by an IMA submodule, digest list lookup is disabled for that submodule.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 7 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 ++++-- 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 5fe5f67b2e18..00486c2d7090 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -305,3 +305,10 @@ config IMA_DIGEST_LISTS_DIR help This option defines the path of the directory containing digest lists. + +config IMA_PARSER_BINARY_PATH + string "Path of the parser binary" + depends on IMA_DIGEST_LIST + default "/usr/bin/upload_digest_lists" + help + This option defines the path of the parser binary. diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c index 11d00fe63ffb..cbb55d58cdb2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/sched/mm.h> #include <linux/magic.h>

@@ -271,6 +272,8 @@ static int __init load_digest_list(struct dir_context *__ctx, const char *name, struct readdir_callback *ctx = container_of(__ctx, typeof(*ctx), ctx); struct path *dir = ctx->path; struct file *file; + u8 *xattr_value = NULL; + char *type_start, *format_start, *format_end; void *datap; loff_t size; int ret; @@ -278,12 +281,36 @@ static int __init load_digest_list(struct dir_context *__ctx, const char *name, if (!strcmp(name, ".") || !strcmp(name, "..")) return 0;

+ type_start = strchr(name, '-'); + if (!type_start) + return 0; + + format_start = strchr(type_start + 1, '-'); + if (!format_start) + return 0; + + format_end = strchr(format_start + 1, '-'); + if (!format_end) + return 0; + + if (format_end - format_start - 1 != strlen("compact") || + strncmp(format_start + 1, "compact", format_end - format_start - 1)) + return 0; + file = file_open_root(dir->dentry, dir->mnt, name, O_RDONLY, 0); if (IS_ERR(file)) { pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%ld)", name, PTR_ERR(file)); return 0; }

+ size = vfs_getxattr(file_dentry(file), XATTR_NAME_EVM, NULL, 0); + if (size < 0) { + size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(file_dentry(file), XATTR_NAME_IMA, + (char **)&xattr_value, 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (size < 0 || xattr_value[0] != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + goto out; + } + ret = kernel_read_file(file, &datap, &size, 0, READING_DIGEST_LIST); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("Unable to read file: %s (%d)", name, ret); @@ -299,9 +326,21 @@ static int __init load_digest_list(struct dir_context *__ctx, const char *name, vfree(datap); out: fput(file); + kfree(xattr_value); return 0; }

+static void ima_exec_parser(void) +{ + char *argv[4] = {NULL}, *envp[1] = {NULL}; + + argv[0] = (char *)CONFIG_IMA_PARSER_BINARY_PATH; + argv[1] = "add"; + argv[2] = (char *)CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LISTS_DIR; + + call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, UMH_WAIT_PROC); +} + void __init ima_load_digest_lists(void) { struct path path; @@ -327,6 +366,8 @@ void __init ima_load_digest_lists(void) fput(file); out: path_put(&path); + + ima_exec_parser(); }

/**************** diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a386a5bf1ed9..4875c6db7793 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -460,11 +460,15 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; + int rc;

security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); - return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); + rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); + if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) + ima_check_measured_appraised(file); + return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);

hulk inclusion category: feature feature: digest-lists

---------------------------

Enable digest lists and PGP keys preload.

Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu roberto.sassu@huawei.com --- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig index 37c7c8893e3b..9cc2ec703fb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ CONFIG_RD_LZMA=y CONFIG_RD_XZ=y CONFIG_RD_LZO=y CONFIG_RD_LZ4=y +CONFIG_INITRAMFS_FILE_METADATA="" CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y # CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE is not set CONFIG_SYSCTL=y @@ -6927,21 +6928,27 @@ CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=y CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=y # CONFIG_IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE is not set CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng" -CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1=y -# CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 is not set -CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha1" +# CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1 is not set +CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256=y +CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha256" # CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY is not set -# CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY is not set +CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y # CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BUILD_POLICY is not set CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM=y CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y # CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING is not set -# CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is not set +CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509=y +CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH="/etc/keys/x509_ima.der" +# CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT is not set +CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST=y +CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LISTS_DIR="/etc/ima/digest_lists" +CONFIG_IMA_PARSER_BINARY_PATH="/usr/bin/upload_digest_lists" CONFIG_EVM=y CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID=y # CONFIG_EVM_ADD_XATTRS is not set -# CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 is not set +CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509=y +CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH="/etc/keys/x509_evm.der" CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX=y # CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR is not set # CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC is not set @@ -7159,6 +7166,9 @@ CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y # CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY is not set CONFIG_SIGNED_PE_FILE_VERIFICATION=y +CONFIG_PGP_LIBRARY=y +CONFIG_PGP_KEY_PARSER=y +CONFIG_PGP_PRELOAD=y

# # Certificates for signature checking @@ -7170,6 +7180,7 @@ CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS="" # CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is not set CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING=y CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="" +CONFIG_PGP_PRELOAD_PUBLIC_KEYS=y CONFIG_BINARY_PRINTF=y

#