From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.12 commit 28131e9d933339a92f78e7ab6429f4aaaa07061c category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
syzbot reported a shift-out-of-bounds that KUBSAN observed in the interpreter:
[...] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/core.c:1420:2 shift exponent 255 is too large for 64-bit type 'long long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 11097 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 ___bpf_prog_run.cold+0x19/0x56c kernel/bpf/core.c:1420 __bpf_prog_run32+0x8f/0xd0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1735 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:644 [inline] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline] bpf_prog_run_clear_cb include/linux/filter.h:755 [inline] run_filter+0x1a1/0x470 net/packet/af_packet.c:2031 packet_rcv+0x313/0x13e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:2104 dev_queue_xmit_nit+0x7c2/0xa90 net/core/dev.c:2387 xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3588 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xad/0x920 net/core/dev.c:3609 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2121/0x2e00 net/core/dev.c:4182 __bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2116 [inline] __bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2141 [inline] __bpf_redirect+0x548/0xc80 net/core/filter.c:2164 ____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2448 [inline] bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2420 ___bpf_prog_run+0x34e1/0x77d0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1523 __bpf_prog_run512+0x99/0xe0 kernel/bpf/core.c:1737 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:644 [inline] bpf_test_run+0x3ed/0xc50 net/bpf/test_run.c:50 bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xabc/0x1c50 net/bpf/test_run.c:582 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3127 [inline] __do_sys_bpf+0x1ea9/0x4f00 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4406 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [...]
Generally speaking, KUBSAN reports from the kernel should be fixed. However, in case of BPF, this particular report caused concerns since the large shift is not wrong from BPF point of view, just undefined. In the verifier, K-based shifts that are >= {64,32} (depending on the bitwidth of the instruction) are already rejected. The register-based cases were not given their content might not be known at verification time. Ideas such as verifier instruction rewrite with an additional AND instruction for the source register were brought up, but regularly rejected due to the additional runtime overhead they incur.
As Edward Cree rightly put it:
Shifts by more than insn bitness are legal in the BPF ISA; they are implementation-defined behaviour [of the underlying architecture], rather than UB, and have been made legal for performance reasons. Each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF shift operations to machine instructions which produce implementation-defined results in such a case; the resulting contents of the register may be arbitrary but program behaviour as a whole remains defined.
Guard checks in the fast path (i.e. affecting JITted code) will thus not be accepted.
The case of division by zero is not truly analogous here, as division instructions on many of the JIT-targeted architectures will raise a machine exception / fault on division by zero, whereas (to the best of my knowledge) none will do so on an out-of-bounds shift.
Given the KUBSAN report only affects the BPF interpreter, but not JITs, one solution is to add the ANDs with 63 or 31 into ___bpf_prog_run(). That would make the shifts defined, and thus shuts up KUBSAN, and the compiler would optimize out the AND on any CPU that interprets the shift amounts modulo the width anyway (e.g., confirmed from disassembly that on x86-64 and arm64 the generated interpreter code is the same before and after this fix).
The BPF interpreter is slow path, and most likely compiled out anyway as distros select BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON to avoid speculative execution of BPF instructions by the interpreter. Given the main argument was to avoid sacrificing performance, the fact that the AND is optimized away from compiler for mainstream archs helps as well as a solution moving forward. Also add a comment on LSH/RSH/ARSH translation for JIT authors to provide guidance when they see the ___bpf_prog_run() interpreter code and use it as a model for a new JIT backend.
Reported-by: syzbot+bed360704c521841c85d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Kurt Manucredo fuzzybritches0@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@kernel.org Co-developed-by: Eric Biggers ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andrii@kernel.org Tested-by: syzbot+bed360704c521841c85d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Edward Cree ecree.xilinx@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/0000000000008f912605bd30d5d7@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/bac16d8d-c174-bdc4-91bd-bfa62b410190@gmail.com conflicts: kernel/bpf/core.c Signed-off-by: He Fengqing hefengqing@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- kernel/bpf/core.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c index 641622b65de44..625edbc8360de 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c @@ -1100,29 +1100,54 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 *stack) select_insn: goto *jumptable[insn->code];
- /* ALU */ -#define ALU(OPCODE, OP) \ - ALU64_##OPCODE##_X: \ - DST = DST OP SRC; \ - CONT; \ - ALU_##OPCODE##_X: \ - DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) SRC; \ - CONT; \ - ALU64_##OPCODE##_K: \ - DST = DST OP IMM; \ - CONT; \ - ALU_##OPCODE##_K: \ - DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) IMM; \ + /* Explicitly mask the register-based shift amounts with 63 or 31 + * to avoid undefined behavior. Normally this won't affect the + * generated code, for example, in case of native 64 bit archs such + * as x86-64 or arm64, the compiler is optimizing the AND away for + * the interpreter. In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles + * the BPF shift operations to machine instructions which produce + * implementation-defined results in such a case; the resulting + * contents of the register may be arbitrary, but program behaviour + * as a whole remains defined. In other words, in case of JIT backends, + * the AND must /not/ be added to the emitted LSH/RSH/ARSH translation. + */ + /* ALU (shifts) */ +#define SHT(OPCODE, OP) \ + ALU64_##OPCODE##_X: \ + DST = DST OP (SRC & 63); \ + CONT; \ + ALU_##OPCODE##_X: \ + DST = (u32) DST OP ((u32) SRC & 31); \ + CONT; \ + ALU64_##OPCODE##_K: \ + DST = DST OP IMM; \ + CONT; \ + ALU_##OPCODE##_K: \ + DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) IMM; \ + CONT; + /* ALU (rest) */ +#define ALU(OPCODE, OP) \ + ALU64_##OPCODE##_X: \ + DST = DST OP SRC; \ + CONT; \ + ALU_##OPCODE##_X: \ + DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) SRC; \ + CONT; \ + ALU64_##OPCODE##_K: \ + DST = DST OP IMM; \ + CONT; \ + ALU_##OPCODE##_K: \ + DST = (u32) DST OP (u32) IMM; \ CONT; - ALU(ADD, +) ALU(SUB, -) ALU(AND, &) ALU(OR, |) - ALU(LSH, <<) - ALU(RSH, >>) ALU(XOR, ^) ALU(MUL, *) + SHT(LSH, <<) + SHT(RSH, >>) +#undef SHT #undef ALU ALU_NEG: DST = (u32) -DST; @@ -1147,7 +1172,7 @@ static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 *stack) insn++; CONT; ALU64_ARSH_X: - (*(s64 *) &DST) >>= SRC; + (*(s64 *) &DST) >>= (SRC & 63); CONT; ALU64_ARSH_K: (*(s64 *) &DST) >>= IMM;
From: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NI6R CVE: NA
--------------------------------
BPF program call helper functions according to bpf_func_id. Misorder id of helper function will destroy the consistency of BPF program, making it unusable in other versions. Let's backport __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER and the corresponding annotation from mainline.
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 599 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 599 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 1116 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 9a347aefbb40a..075487d409704 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -2039,52 +2039,52 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_rc_keydown(void *ctx, u32 protocol, u64 scancode, u32 toggle) + * int bpf_rc_repeat(void *ctx) * Description * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to - * report a successfully decoded key press with *scancode*, - * *toggle* value in the given *protocol*. The scancode will be - * translated to a keycode using the rc keymap, and reported as - * an input key down event. After a period a key up event is - * generated. This period can be extended by calling either - * **bpf_rc_keydown** () again with the same values, or calling - * **bpf_rc_repeat** (). + * report a successfully decoded repeat key message. This delays + * the generation of a key up event for previously generated + * key down event. * - * Some protocols include a toggle bit, in case the button was - * released and pressed again between consecutive scancodes. + * Some IR protocols like NEC have a special IR message for + * repeating last button, for when a button is held down. * * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into * the program. * - * The *protocol* is the decoded protocol number (see - * **enum rc_proto** for some predefined values). - * * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to * "**y**". * Return * 0 * - * int bpf_rc_repeat(void *ctx) + * int bpf_rc_keydown(void *ctx, u32 protocol, u64 scancode, u32 toggle) * Description * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to - * report a successfully decoded repeat key message. This delays - * the generation of a key up event for previously generated - * key down event. + * report a successfully decoded key press with *scancode*, + * *toggle* value in the given *protocol*. The scancode will be + * translated to a keycode using the rc keymap, and reported as + * an input key down event. After a period a key up event is + * generated. This period can be extended by calling either + * **bpf_rc_keydown**\ () again with the same values, or calling + * **bpf_rc_repeat**\ (). * - * Some IR protocols like NEC have a special IR message for - * repeating last button, for when a button is held down. + * Some protocols include a toggle bit, in case the button was + * released and pressed again between consecutive scancodes. * * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into * the program. * + * The *protocol* is the decoded protocol number (see + * **enum rc_proto** for some predefined values). + * * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to * "**y**". * Return * 0 * - * uint64_t bpf_skb_cgroup_id(struct sk_buff *skb) + * u64 bpf_skb_cgroup_id(struct sk_buff *skb) * Description * Return the cgroup v2 id of the socket associated with the *skb*. * This is roughly similar to the **bpf_get_cgroup_classid**\ () @@ -2100,6 +2100,38 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. * + * u64 bpf_get_current_cgroup_id(void) + * Return + * A 64-bit integer containing the current cgroup id based + * on the cgroup within which the current task is running. + * + * void *bpf_get_local_storage(void *map, u64 flags) + * Description + * Get the pointer to the local storage area. + * The type and the size of the local storage is defined + * by the *map* argument. + * The *flags* meaning is specific for each map type, + * and has to be 0 for cgroup local storage. + * + * Depending on the BPF program type, a local storage area + * can be shared between multiple instances of the BPF program, + * running simultaneously. + * + * A user should care about the synchronization by himself. + * For example, by using the **BPF_STX_XADD** instruction to alter + * the shared data. + * Return + * A pointer to the local storage area. + * + * int bpf_sk_select_reuseport(struct sk_reuseport_md *reuse, struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u64 flags) + * Description + * Select a **SO_REUSEPORT** socket from a + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY** *map*. + * It checks the selected socket is matching the incoming + * request in the socket buffer. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * * u64 bpf_skb_ancestor_cgroup_id(struct sk_buff *skb, int ancestor_level) * Description * Return id of cgroup v2 that is ancestor of cgroup associated @@ -2118,36 +2150,492 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. * - * u64 bpf_get_current_cgroup_id(void) + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags) + * Description + * Look for TCP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * The *ctx* should point to the context of the program, such as + * the skb or socket (depending on the hook in use). This is used + * to determine the base network namespace for the lookup. + * + * *tuple_size* must be one of: + * + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv4**) + * Look for an IPv4 socket. + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv6**) + * Look for an IPv6 socket. + * + * If the *netns* is a negative signed 32-bit integer, then the + * socket lookup table in the netns associated with the *ctx* will + * will be used. For the TC hooks, this is the netns of the device + * in the skb. For socket hooks, this is the netns of the socket. + * If *netns* is any other signed 32-bit value greater than or + * equal to zero then it specifies the ID of the netns relative to + * the netns associated with the *ctx*. *netns* values beyond the + * range of 32-bit integers are reserved for future use. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * Return + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_lookup_udp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags) + * Description + * Look for UDP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * The *ctx* should point to the context of the program, such as + * the skb or socket (depending on the hook in use). This is used + * to determine the base network namespace for the lookup. + * + * *tuple_size* must be one of: + * + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv4**) + * Look for an IPv4 socket. + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv6**) + * Look for an IPv6 socket. + * + * If the *netns* is a negative signed 32-bit integer, then the + * socket lookup table in the netns associated with the *ctx* will + * will be used. For the TC hooks, this is the netns of the device + * in the skb. For socket hooks, this is the netns of the socket. + * If *netns* is any other signed 32-bit value greater than or + * equal to zero then it specifies the ID of the netns relative to + * the netns associated with the *ctx*. *netns* values beyond the + * range of 32-bit integers are reserved for future use. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * Return + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + * + * int bpf_sk_release(struct bpf_sock *sock) + * Description + * Release the reference held by *sock*. *sock* must be a + * non-**NULL** pointer that was returned from + * **bpf_sk_lookup_xxx**\ (). + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_map_push_elem(struct bpf_map *map, const void *value, u64 flags) + * Description + * Push an element *value* in *map*. *flags* is one of: + * + * **BPF_EXIST** + * If the queue/stack is full, the oldest element is + * removed to make room for this. * Return - * A 64-bit integer containing the current cgroup id based - * on the cgroup within which the current task is running. + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_map_pop_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *value) + * Description + * Pop an element from *map*. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * void* get_local_storage(void *map, u64 flags) + * int bpf_map_peek_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *value) + * Description + * Get an element from *map* without removing it. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_msg_push_data(struct sk_msg_buff *msg, u32 start, u32 len, u64 flags) * Description - * Get the pointer to the local storage area. - * The type and the size of the local storage is defined - * by the *map* argument. - * The *flags* meaning is specific for each map type, - * and has to be 0 for cgroup local storage. + * For socket policies, insert *len* bytes into *msg* at offset + * *start*. * - * Depending on the bpf program type, a local storage area - * can be shared between multiple instances of the bpf program, - * running simultaneously. + * If a program of type **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG** is run on a + * *msg* it may want to insert metadata or options into the *msg*. + * This can later be read and used by any of the lower layer BPF + * hooks. * - * A user should care about the synchronization by himself. - * For example, by using the BPF_STX_XADD instruction to alter - * the shared data. + * This helper may fail if under memory pressure (a malloc + * fails) in these cases BPF programs will get an appropriate + * error and BPF programs will need to handle them. * Return - * Pointer to the local storage area. + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_sk_select_reuseport(struct sk_reuseport_md *reuse, struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u64 flags) + * int bpf_msg_pop_data(struct sk_msg_buff *msg, u32 start, u32 len, u64 flags) * Description - * Select a SO_REUSEPORT sk from a BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY map - * It checks the selected sk is matching the incoming - * request in the skb. + * Will remove *len* bytes from a *msg* starting at byte *start*. + * This may result in **ENOMEM** errors under certain situations if + * an allocation and copy are required due to a full ring buffer. + * However, the helper will try to avoid doing the allocation + * if possible. Other errors can occur if input parameters are + * invalid either due to *start* byte not being valid part of *msg* + * payload and/or *pop* value being to large. * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_rc_pointer_rel(void *ctx, s32 rel_x, s32 rel_y) + * Description + * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to + * report a successfully decoded pointer movement. + * + * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into + * the program. + * + * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to + * "**y**". + * Return + * 0 + * + * int bpf_spin_lock(struct bpf_spin_lock *lock) + * Description + * Acquire a spinlock represented by the pointer *lock*, which is + * stored as part of a value of a map. Taking the lock allows to + * safely update the rest of the fields in that value. The + * spinlock can (and must) later be released with a call to + * **bpf_spin_unlock**\ (\ *lock*\ ). + * + * Spinlocks in BPF programs come with a number of restrictions + * and constraints: + * + * * **bpf_spin_lock** objects are only allowed inside maps of + * types **BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH** and **BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY** (this + * list could be extended in the future). + * * BTF description of the map is mandatory. + * * The BPF program can take ONE lock at a time, since taking two + * or more could cause dead locks. + * * Only one **struct bpf_spin_lock** is allowed per map element. + * * When the lock is taken, calls (either BPF to BPF or helpers) + * are not allowed. + * * The **BPF_LD_ABS** and **BPF_LD_IND** instructions are not + * allowed inside a spinlock-ed region. + * * The BPF program MUST call **bpf_spin_unlock**\ () to release + * the lock, on all execution paths, before it returns. + * * The BPF program can access **struct bpf_spin_lock** only via + * the **bpf_spin_lock**\ () and **bpf_spin_unlock**\ () + * helpers. Loading or storing data into the **struct + * bpf_spin_lock** *lock*\ **;** field of a map is not allowed. + * * To use the **bpf_spin_lock**\ () helper, the BTF description + * of the map value must be a struct and have **struct + * bpf_spin_lock** *anyname*\ **;** field at the top level. + * Nested lock inside another struct is not allowed. + * * The **struct bpf_spin_lock** *lock* field in a map value must + * be aligned on a multiple of 4 bytes in that value. + * * Syscall with command **BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM** does not copy + * the **bpf_spin_lock** field to user space. + * * Syscall with command **BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM**, or update from + * a BPF program, do not update the **bpf_spin_lock** field. + * * **bpf_spin_lock** cannot be on the stack or inside a + * networking packet (it can only be inside of a map values). + * * **bpf_spin_lock** is available to root only. + * * Tracing programs and socket filter programs cannot use + * **bpf_spin_lock**\ () due to insufficient preemption checks + * (but this may change in the future). + * * **bpf_spin_lock** is not allowed in inner maps of map-in-map. + * Return + * 0 + * + * int bpf_spin_unlock(struct bpf_spin_lock *lock) + * Description + * Release the *lock* previously locked by a call to + * **bpf_spin_lock**\ (\ *lock*\ ). + * Return + * 0 + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_fullsock(struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * This helper gets a **struct bpf_sock** pointer such + * that all the fields in this **bpf_sock** can be accessed. + * Return + * A **struct bpf_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + * + * struct bpf_tcp_sock *bpf_tcp_sock(struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * This helper gets a **struct bpf_tcp_sock** pointer from a + * **struct bpf_sock** pointer. + * Return + * A **struct bpf_tcp_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + * + * int bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce(struct sk_buff *skb) + * Description + * Set ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) field of IP header + * to **CE** (Congestion Encountered) if current value is **ECT** + * (ECN Capable Transport). Otherwise, do nothing. Works with IPv6 + * and IPv4. + * Return + * 1 if the **CE** flag is set (either by the current helper call + * or because it was already present), 0 if it is not set. + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_get_listener_sock(struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * Return a **struct bpf_sock** pointer in **TCP_LISTEN** state. + * **bpf_sk_release**\ () is unnecessary and not allowed. + * Return + * A **struct bpf_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_skc_lookup_tcp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags) + * Description + * Look for TCP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * This function is identical to **bpf_sk_lookup_tcp**\ (), except + * that it also returns timewait or request sockets. Use + * **bpf_sk_fullsock**\ () or **bpf_tcp_sock**\ () to access the + * full structure. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * Return + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + * + * int bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * Description + * Check whether *iph* and *th* contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for + * the listening socket in *sk*. + * + * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while + * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or + * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**). + * + * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len* + * contains **sizeof**\ (**struct tcphdr**). + * + * Return + * 0 if *iph* and *th* are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative + * error otherwise. + * + * int bpf_sysctl_get_name(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags) + * Description + * Get name of sysctl in /proc/sys/ and copy it into provided by + * program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * + * If *flags* is zero, full name (e.g. "net/ipv4/tcp_mem") is + * copied. Use **BPF_F_SYSCTL_BASE_NAME** flag to copy base name + * only (e.g. "tcp_mem"). + * Return + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * int bpf_sysctl_get_current_value(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len) + * Description + * Get current value of sysctl as it is presented in /proc/sys + * (incl. newline, etc), and copy it as a string into provided + * by program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * The whole value is copied, no matter what file position user + * space issued e.g. sys_read at. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * Return + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * **-EINVAL** if current value was unavailable, e.g. because + * sysctl is uninitialized and read returns -EIO for it. + * + * int bpf_sysctl_get_new_value(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len) + * Description + * Get new value being written by user space to sysctl (before + * the actual write happens) and copy it as a string into + * provided by program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * User space may write new value at file position > 0. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * Return + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * **-EINVAL** if sysctl is being read. + * + * int bpf_sysctl_set_new_value(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) + * Description + * Override new value being written by user space to sysctl with + * value provided by program in buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * *buf* should contain a string in same form as provided by user + * space on sysctl write. + * + * User space may write new value at file position > 0. To override + * the whole sysctl value file position should be set to zero. + * Return + * 0 on success. + * + * **-E2BIG** if the *buf_len* is too big. + * + * **-EINVAL** if sysctl is being read. + * + * int bpf_strtol(const char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags, long *res) + * Description + * Convert the initial part of the string from buffer *buf* of + * size *buf_len* to a long integer according to the given base + * and save the result in *res*. + * + * The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space + * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)) followed by a single + * optional '**-**' sign. + * + * Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits + * are currently unused. + * + * Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically + * similar to user space **strtol**\ (3). + * Return + * Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but + * no more than *buf_len*. + * + * **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base + * was provided. + * + * **-ERANGE** if resulting value was out of range. + * + * int bpf_strtoul(const char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags, unsigned long *res) + * Description + * Convert the initial part of the string from buffer *buf* of + * size *buf_len* to an unsigned long integer according to the + * given base and save the result in *res*. + * + * The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space + * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)). + * + * Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits + * are currently unused. + * + * Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically + * similar to user space **strtoul**\ (3). + * Return + * Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but + * no more than *buf_len*. + * + * **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base + * was provided. + * + * **-ERANGE** if resulting value was out of range. + * + * void *bpf_sk_storage_get(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_sock *sk, void *value, u64 flags) + * Description + * Get a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*. + * + * Logically, it could be thought of getting the value from + * a *map* with *sk* as the **key**. From this + * perspective, the usage is not much different from + * **bpf_map_lookup_elem**\ (*map*, **&**\ *sk*) except this + * helper enforces the key must be a full socket and the map must + * be a **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE** also. + * + * Underneath, the value is stored locally at *sk* instead of + * the *map*. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage + * "type". The bpf-local-storage "type" (i.e. the *map*) is + * searched against all bpf-local-storages residing at *sk*. + * + * An optional *flags* (**BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE**) can be + * used such that a new bpf-local-storage will be + * created if one does not exist. *value* can be used + * together with **BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE** to specify + * the initial value of a bpf-local-storage. If *value* is + * **NULL**, the new bpf-local-storage will be zero initialized. + * Return + * A bpf-local-storage pointer is returned on success. + * + * **NULL** if not found or there was an error in adding + * a new bpf-local-storage. + * + * int bpf_sk_storage_delete(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * Delete a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*. + * Return + * 0 on success. + * + * **-ENOENT** if the bpf-local-storage cannot be found. + * + * int bpf_send_signal(u32 sig) + * Description + * Send signal *sig* to the current task. + * Return + * 0 on success or successfully queued. + * + * **-EBUSY** if work queue under nmi is full. + * + * **-EINVAL** if *sig* is invalid. + * + * **-EPERM** if no permission to send the *sig*. + * + * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. + * + * s64 bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * Description + * Try to issue a SYN cookie for the packet with corresponding + * IP/TCP headers, *iph* and *th*, on the listening socket in *sk*. + * + * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while + * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or + * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**). + * + * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len* + * contains the length of the TCP header. + * + * Return + * On success, lower 32 bits hold the generated SYN cookie in + * followed by 16 bits which hold the MSS value for that cookie, + * and the top 16 bits are unused. + * + * On failure, the returned value is one of the following: + * + * **-EINVAL** SYN cookie cannot be issued due to error + * + * **-ENOENT** SYN cookie should not be issued (no SYN flood) + * + * **-EOPNOTSUPP** kernel configuration does not enable SYN cookies + * + * **-EPROTONOSUPPORT** IP packet version is not 4 or 6 + * + * int bpf_skb_output(void *ctx, struct bpf_map *map, u64 flags, void *data, u64 size) + * Description + * Write raw *data* blob into a special BPF perf event held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. This perf + * event must have the following attributes: **PERF_SAMPLE_RAW** + * as **sample_type**, **PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE** as **type**, and + * **PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUTPUT** as **config**. + * + * The *flags* are used to indicate the index in *map* for which + * the value must be put, masked with **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. + * Alternatively, *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** + * to indicate that the index of the current CPU core should be + * used. + * + * The value to write, of *size*, is passed through eBPF stack and + * pointed by *data*. + * + * *ctx* is a pointer to in-kernel struct sk_buff. + * + * This helper is similar to **bpf_perf_event_output**\ () but + * restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -2233,7 +2721,36 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(get_current_cgroup_id), \ FN(get_local_storage), \ FN(sk_select_reuseport), \ - FN(skb_ancestor_cgroup_id), + FN(skb_ancestor_cgroup_id), \ + FN(sk_lookup_tcp), \ + FN(sk_lookup_udp), \ + FN(sk_release), \ + FN(map_push_elem), \ + FN(map_pop_elem), \ + FN(map_peek_elem), \ + FN(msg_push_data), \ + FN(msg_pop_data), \ + FN(rc_pointer_rel), \ + FN(spin_lock), \ + FN(spin_unlock), \ + FN(sk_fullsock), \ + FN(tcp_sock), \ + FN(skb_ecn_set_ce), \ + FN(get_listener_sock), \ + FN(skc_lookup_tcp), \ + FN(tcp_check_syncookie), \ + FN(sysctl_get_name), \ + FN(sysctl_get_current_value), \ + FN(sysctl_get_new_value), \ + FN(sysctl_set_new_value), \ + FN(strtol), \ + FN(strtoul), \ + FN(sk_storage_get), \ + FN(sk_storage_delete), \ + FN(send_signal), \ + FN(tcp_gen_syncookie), \ + FN(skb_output), + /* For BPF prog consistency, Don't add it casually */
/* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper * function eBPF program intends to call diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 58454e7693f43..abfb085d61c5a 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -2042,52 +2042,52 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_rc_keydown(void *ctx, u32 protocol, u64 scancode, u32 toggle) + * int bpf_rc_repeat(void *ctx) * Description * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to - * report a successfully decoded key press with *scancode*, - * *toggle* value in the given *protocol*. The scancode will be - * translated to a keycode using the rc keymap, and reported as - * an input key down event. After a period a key up event is - * generated. This period can be extended by calling either - * **bpf_rc_keydown** () again with the same values, or calling - * **bpf_rc_repeat** (). + * report a successfully decoded repeat key message. This delays + * the generation of a key up event for previously generated + * key down event. * - * Some protocols include a toggle bit, in case the button was - * released and pressed again between consecutive scancodes. + * Some IR protocols like NEC have a special IR message for + * repeating last button, for when a button is held down. * * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into * the program. * - * The *protocol* is the decoded protocol number (see - * **enum rc_proto** for some predefined values). - * * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to * "**y**". * Return * 0 * - * int bpf_rc_repeat(void *ctx) + * int bpf_rc_keydown(void *ctx, u32 protocol, u64 scancode, u32 toggle) * Description * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to - * report a successfully decoded repeat key message. This delays - * the generation of a key up event for previously generated - * key down event. + * report a successfully decoded key press with *scancode*, + * *toggle* value in the given *protocol*. The scancode will be + * translated to a keycode using the rc keymap, and reported as + * an input key down event. After a period a key up event is + * generated. This period can be extended by calling either + * **bpf_rc_keydown**\ () again with the same values, or calling + * **bpf_rc_repeat**\ (). * - * Some IR protocols like NEC have a special IR message for - * repeating last button, for when a button is held down. + * Some protocols include a toggle bit, in case the button was + * released and pressed again between consecutive scancodes. * * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into * the program. * + * The *protocol* is the decoded protocol number (see + * **enum rc_proto** for some predefined values). + * * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to * "**y**". * Return * 0 * - * uint64_t bpf_skb_cgroup_id(struct sk_buff *skb) + * u64 bpf_skb_cgroup_id(struct sk_buff *skb) * Description * Return the cgroup v2 id of the socket associated with the *skb*. * This is roughly similar to the **bpf_get_cgroup_classid**\ () @@ -2103,6 +2103,38 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. * + * u64 bpf_get_current_cgroup_id(void) + * Return + * A 64-bit integer containing the current cgroup id based + * on the cgroup within which the current task is running. + * + * void *bpf_get_local_storage(void *map, u64 flags) + * Description + * Get the pointer to the local storage area. + * The type and the size of the local storage is defined + * by the *map* argument. + * The *flags* meaning is specific for each map type, + * and has to be 0 for cgroup local storage. + * + * Depending on the BPF program type, a local storage area + * can be shared between multiple instances of the BPF program, + * running simultaneously. + * + * A user should care about the synchronization by himself. + * For example, by using the **BPF_STX_XADD** instruction to alter + * the shared data. + * Return + * A pointer to the local storage area. + * + * int bpf_sk_select_reuseport(struct sk_reuseport_md *reuse, struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u64 flags) + * Description + * Select a **SO_REUSEPORT** socket from a + * **BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY** *map*. + * It checks the selected socket is matching the incoming + * request in the socket buffer. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * * u64 bpf_skb_ancestor_cgroup_id(struct sk_buff *skb, int ancestor_level) * Description * Return id of cgroup v2 that is ancestor of cgroup associated @@ -2121,36 +2153,492 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * The id is returned or 0 in case the id could not be retrieved. * - * u64 bpf_get_current_cgroup_id(void) + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags) + * Description + * Look for TCP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * The *ctx* should point to the context of the program, such as + * the skb or socket (depending on the hook in use). This is used + * to determine the base network namespace for the lookup. + * + * *tuple_size* must be one of: + * + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv4**) + * Look for an IPv4 socket. + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv6**) + * Look for an IPv6 socket. + * + * If the *netns* is a negative signed 32-bit integer, then the + * socket lookup table in the netns associated with the *ctx* will + * will be used. For the TC hooks, this is the netns of the device + * in the skb. For socket hooks, this is the netns of the socket. + * If *netns* is any other signed 32-bit value greater than or + * equal to zero then it specifies the ID of the netns relative to + * the netns associated with the *ctx*. *netns* values beyond the + * range of 32-bit integers are reserved for future use. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * Return + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_lookup_udp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags) + * Description + * Look for UDP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * The *ctx* should point to the context of the program, such as + * the skb or socket (depending on the hook in use). This is used + * to determine the base network namespace for the lookup. + * + * *tuple_size* must be one of: + * + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv4**) + * Look for an IPv4 socket. + * **sizeof**\ (*tuple*\ **->ipv6**) + * Look for an IPv6 socket. + * + * If the *netns* is a negative signed 32-bit integer, then the + * socket lookup table in the netns associated with the *ctx* will + * will be used. For the TC hooks, this is the netns of the device + * in the skb. For socket hooks, this is the netns of the socket. + * If *netns* is any other signed 32-bit value greater than or + * equal to zero then it specifies the ID of the netns relative to + * the netns associated with the *ctx*. *netns* values beyond the + * range of 32-bit integers are reserved for future use. + * + * All values for *flags* are reserved for future usage, and must + * be left at zero. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * Return + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + * + * int bpf_sk_release(struct bpf_sock *sock) + * Description + * Release the reference held by *sock*. *sock* must be a + * non-**NULL** pointer that was returned from + * **bpf_sk_lookup_xxx**\ (). + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_map_push_elem(struct bpf_map *map, const void *value, u64 flags) + * Description + * Push an element *value* in *map*. *flags* is one of: + * + * **BPF_EXIST** + * If the queue/stack is full, the oldest element is + * removed to make room for this. * Return - * A 64-bit integer containing the current cgroup id based - * on the cgroup within which the current task is running. + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_map_pop_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *value) + * Description + * Pop an element from *map*. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * void* get_local_storage(void *map, u64 flags) + * int bpf_map_peek_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *value) + * Description + * Get an element from *map* without removing it. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_msg_push_data(struct sk_msg_buff *msg, u32 start, u32 len, u64 flags) * Description - * Get the pointer to the local storage area. - * The type and the size of the local storage is defined - * by the *map* argument. - * The *flags* meaning is specific for each map type, - * and has to be 0 for cgroup local storage. + * For socket policies, insert *len* bytes into *msg* at offset + * *start*. * - * Depending on the bpf program type, a local storage area - * can be shared between multiple instances of the bpf program, - * running simultaneously. + * If a program of type **BPF_PROG_TYPE_SK_MSG** is run on a + * *msg* it may want to insert metadata or options into the *msg*. + * This can later be read and used by any of the lower layer BPF + * hooks. * - * A user should care about the synchronization by himself. - * For example, by using the BPF_STX_XADD instruction to alter - * the shared data. + * This helper may fail if under memory pressure (a malloc + * fails) in these cases BPF programs will get an appropriate + * error and BPF programs will need to handle them. * Return - * Pointer to the local storage area. + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_sk_select_reuseport(struct sk_reuseport_md *reuse, struct bpf_map *map, void *key, u64 flags) + * int bpf_msg_pop_data(struct sk_msg_buff *msg, u32 start, u32 len, u64 flags) * Description - * Select a SO_REUSEPORT sk from a BPF_MAP_TYPE_REUSEPORT_ARRAY map - * It checks the selected sk is matching the incoming - * request in the skb. + * Will remove *len* bytes from a *msg* starting at byte *start*. + * This may result in **ENOMEM** errors under certain situations if + * an allocation and copy are required due to a full ring buffer. + * However, the helper will try to avoid doing the allocation + * if possible. Other errors can occur if input parameters are + * invalid either due to *start* byte not being valid part of *msg* + * payload and/or *pop* value being to large. * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_rc_pointer_rel(void *ctx, s32 rel_x, s32 rel_y) + * Description + * This helper is used in programs implementing IR decoding, to + * report a successfully decoded pointer movement. + * + * The *ctx* should point to the lirc sample as passed into + * the program. + * + * This helper is only available is the kernel was compiled with + * the **CONFIG_BPF_LIRC_MODE2** configuration option set to + * "**y**". + * Return + * 0 + * + * int bpf_spin_lock(struct bpf_spin_lock *lock) + * Description + * Acquire a spinlock represented by the pointer *lock*, which is + * stored as part of a value of a map. Taking the lock allows to + * safely update the rest of the fields in that value. The + * spinlock can (and must) later be released with a call to + * **bpf_spin_unlock**\ (\ *lock*\ ). + * + * Spinlocks in BPF programs come with a number of restrictions + * and constraints: + * + * * **bpf_spin_lock** objects are only allowed inside maps of + * types **BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH** and **BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY** (this + * list could be extended in the future). + * * BTF description of the map is mandatory. + * * The BPF program can take ONE lock at a time, since taking two + * or more could cause dead locks. + * * Only one **struct bpf_spin_lock** is allowed per map element. + * * When the lock is taken, calls (either BPF to BPF or helpers) + * are not allowed. + * * The **BPF_LD_ABS** and **BPF_LD_IND** instructions are not + * allowed inside a spinlock-ed region. + * * The BPF program MUST call **bpf_spin_unlock**\ () to release + * the lock, on all execution paths, before it returns. + * * The BPF program can access **struct bpf_spin_lock** only via + * the **bpf_spin_lock**\ () and **bpf_spin_unlock**\ () + * helpers. Loading or storing data into the **struct + * bpf_spin_lock** *lock*\ **;** field of a map is not allowed. + * * To use the **bpf_spin_lock**\ () helper, the BTF description + * of the map value must be a struct and have **struct + * bpf_spin_lock** *anyname*\ **;** field at the top level. + * Nested lock inside another struct is not allowed. + * * The **struct bpf_spin_lock** *lock* field in a map value must + * be aligned on a multiple of 4 bytes in that value. + * * Syscall with command **BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM** does not copy + * the **bpf_spin_lock** field to user space. + * * Syscall with command **BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM**, or update from + * a BPF program, do not update the **bpf_spin_lock** field. + * * **bpf_spin_lock** cannot be on the stack or inside a + * networking packet (it can only be inside of a map values). + * * **bpf_spin_lock** is available to root only. + * * Tracing programs and socket filter programs cannot use + * **bpf_spin_lock**\ () due to insufficient preemption checks + * (but this may change in the future). + * * **bpf_spin_lock** is not allowed in inner maps of map-in-map. + * Return + * 0 + * + * int bpf_spin_unlock(struct bpf_spin_lock *lock) + * Description + * Release the *lock* previously locked by a call to + * **bpf_spin_lock**\ (\ *lock*\ ). + * Return + * 0 + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_sk_fullsock(struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * This helper gets a **struct bpf_sock** pointer such + * that all the fields in this **bpf_sock** can be accessed. + * Return + * A **struct bpf_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + * + * struct bpf_tcp_sock *bpf_tcp_sock(struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * This helper gets a **struct bpf_tcp_sock** pointer from a + * **struct bpf_sock** pointer. + * Return + * A **struct bpf_tcp_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + * + * int bpf_skb_ecn_set_ce(struct sk_buff *skb) + * Description + * Set ECN (Explicit Congestion Notification) field of IP header + * to **CE** (Congestion Encountered) if current value is **ECT** + * (ECN Capable Transport). Otherwise, do nothing. Works with IPv6 + * and IPv4. + * Return + * 1 if the **CE** flag is set (either by the current helper call + * or because it was already present), 0 if it is not set. + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_get_listener_sock(struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * Return a **struct bpf_sock** pointer in **TCP_LISTEN** state. + * **bpf_sk_release**\ () is unnecessary and not allowed. + * Return + * A **struct bpf_sock** pointer on success, or **NULL** in + * case of failure. + * + * struct bpf_sock *bpf_skc_lookup_tcp(void *ctx, struct bpf_sock_tuple *tuple, u32 tuple_size, u64 netns, u64 flags) + * Description + * Look for TCP socket matching *tuple*, optionally in a child + * network namespace *netns*. The return value must be checked, + * and if non-**NULL**, released via **bpf_sk_release**\ (). + * + * This function is identical to **bpf_sk_lookup_tcp**\ (), except + * that it also returns timewait or request sockets. Use + * **bpf_sk_fullsock**\ () or **bpf_tcp_sock**\ () to access the + * full structure. + * + * This helper is available only if the kernel was compiled with + * **CONFIG_NET** configuration option. + * Return + * Pointer to **struct bpf_sock**, or **NULL** in case of failure. + * For sockets with reuseport option, the **struct bpf_sock** + * result is from *reuse*\ **->socks**\ [] using the hash of the + * tuple. + * + * int bpf_tcp_check_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * Description + * Check whether *iph* and *th* contain a valid SYN cookie ACK for + * the listening socket in *sk*. + * + * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while + * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or + * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**). + * + * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len* + * contains **sizeof**\ (**struct tcphdr**). + * + * Return + * 0 if *iph* and *th* are a valid SYN cookie ACK, or a negative + * error otherwise. + * + * int bpf_sysctl_get_name(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags) + * Description + * Get name of sysctl in /proc/sys/ and copy it into provided by + * program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * + * If *flags* is zero, full name (e.g. "net/ipv4/tcp_mem") is + * copied. Use **BPF_F_SYSCTL_BASE_NAME** flag to copy base name + * only (e.g. "tcp_mem"). + * Return + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * int bpf_sysctl_get_current_value(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len) + * Description + * Get current value of sysctl as it is presented in /proc/sys + * (incl. newline, etc), and copy it as a string into provided + * by program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * The whole value is copied, no matter what file position user + * space issued e.g. sys_read at. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * Return + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * **-EINVAL** if current value was unavailable, e.g. because + * sysctl is uninitialized and read returns -EIO for it. + * + * int bpf_sysctl_get_new_value(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, char *buf, size_t buf_len) + * Description + * Get new value being written by user space to sysctl (before + * the actual write happens) and copy it as a string into + * provided by program buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * User space may write new value at file position > 0. + * + * The buffer is always NUL terminated, unless it's zero-sized. + * Return + * Number of character copied (not including the trailing NUL). + * + * **-E2BIG** if the buffer wasn't big enough (*buf* will contain + * truncated name in this case). + * + * **-EINVAL** if sysctl is being read. + * + * int bpf_sysctl_set_new_value(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx, const char *buf, size_t buf_len) + * Description + * Override new value being written by user space to sysctl with + * value provided by program in buffer *buf* of size *buf_len*. + * + * *buf* should contain a string in same form as provided by user + * space on sysctl write. + * + * User space may write new value at file position > 0. To override + * the whole sysctl value file position should be set to zero. + * Return + * 0 on success. + * + * **-E2BIG** if the *buf_len* is too big. + * + * **-EINVAL** if sysctl is being read. + * + * int bpf_strtol(const char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags, long *res) + * Description + * Convert the initial part of the string from buffer *buf* of + * size *buf_len* to a long integer according to the given base + * and save the result in *res*. + * + * The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space + * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)) followed by a single + * optional '**-**' sign. + * + * Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits + * are currently unused. + * + * Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically + * similar to user space **strtol**\ (3). + * Return + * Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but + * no more than *buf_len*. + * + * **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base + * was provided. + * + * **-ERANGE** if resulting value was out of range. + * + * int bpf_strtoul(const char *buf, size_t buf_len, u64 flags, unsigned long *res) + * Description + * Convert the initial part of the string from buffer *buf* of + * size *buf_len* to an unsigned long integer according to the + * given base and save the result in *res*. + * + * The string may begin with an arbitrary amount of white space + * (as determined by **isspace**\ (3)). + * + * Five least significant bits of *flags* encode base, other bits + * are currently unused. + * + * Base must be either 8, 10, 16 or 0 to detect it automatically + * similar to user space **strtoul**\ (3). + * Return + * Number of characters consumed on success. Must be positive but + * no more than *buf_len*. + * + * **-EINVAL** if no valid digits were found or unsupported base + * was provided. + * + * **-ERANGE** if resulting value was out of range. + * + * void *bpf_sk_storage_get(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_sock *sk, void *value, u64 flags) + * Description + * Get a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*. + * + * Logically, it could be thought of getting the value from + * a *map* with *sk* as the **key**. From this + * perspective, the usage is not much different from + * **bpf_map_lookup_elem**\ (*map*, **&**\ *sk*) except this + * helper enforces the key must be a full socket and the map must + * be a **BPF_MAP_TYPE_SK_STORAGE** also. + * + * Underneath, the value is stored locally at *sk* instead of + * the *map*. The *map* is used as the bpf-local-storage + * "type". The bpf-local-storage "type" (i.e. the *map*) is + * searched against all bpf-local-storages residing at *sk*. + * + * An optional *flags* (**BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE**) can be + * used such that a new bpf-local-storage will be + * created if one does not exist. *value* can be used + * together with **BPF_SK_STORAGE_GET_F_CREATE** to specify + * the initial value of a bpf-local-storage. If *value* is + * **NULL**, the new bpf-local-storage will be zero initialized. + * Return + * A bpf-local-storage pointer is returned on success. + * + * **NULL** if not found or there was an error in adding + * a new bpf-local-storage. + * + * int bpf_sk_storage_delete(struct bpf_map *map, struct bpf_sock *sk) + * Description + * Delete a bpf-local-storage from a *sk*. + * Return + * 0 on success. + * + * **-ENOENT** if the bpf-local-storage cannot be found. + * + * int bpf_send_signal(u32 sig) + * Description + * Send signal *sig* to the current task. + * Return + * 0 on success or successfully queued. + * + * **-EBUSY** if work queue under nmi is full. + * + * **-EINVAL** if *sig* is invalid. + * + * **-EPERM** if no permission to send the *sig*. + * + * **-EAGAIN** if bpf program can try again. + * + * s64 bpf_tcp_gen_syncookie(struct bpf_sock *sk, void *iph, u32 iph_len, struct tcphdr *th, u32 th_len) + * Description + * Try to issue a SYN cookie for the packet with corresponding + * IP/TCP headers, *iph* and *th*, on the listening socket in *sk*. + * + * *iph* points to the start of the IPv4 or IPv6 header, while + * *iph_len* contains **sizeof**\ (**struct iphdr**) or + * **sizeof**\ (**struct ip6hdr**). + * + * *th* points to the start of the TCP header, while *th_len* + * contains the length of the TCP header. + * + * Return + * On success, lower 32 bits hold the generated SYN cookie in + * followed by 16 bits which hold the MSS value for that cookie, + * and the top 16 bits are unused. + * + * On failure, the returned value is one of the following: + * + * **-EINVAL** SYN cookie cannot be issued due to error + * + * **-ENOENT** SYN cookie should not be issued (no SYN flood) + * + * **-EOPNOTSUPP** kernel configuration does not enable SYN cookies + * + * **-EPROTONOSUPPORT** IP packet version is not 4 or 6 + * + * int bpf_skb_output(void *ctx, struct bpf_map *map, u64 flags, void *data, u64 size) + * Description + * Write raw *data* blob into a special BPF perf event held by + * *map* of type **BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY**. This perf + * event must have the following attributes: **PERF_SAMPLE_RAW** + * as **sample_type**, **PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE** as **type**, and + * **PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUTPUT** as **config**. + * + * The *flags* are used to indicate the index in *map* for which + * the value must be put, masked with **BPF_F_INDEX_MASK**. + * Alternatively, *flags* can be set to **BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU** + * to indicate that the index of the current CPU core should be + * used. + * + * The value to write, of *size*, is passed through eBPF stack and + * pointed by *data*. + * + * *ctx* is a pointer to in-kernel struct sk_buff. + * + * This helper is similar to **bpf_perf_event_output**\ () but + * restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -2236,7 +2724,36 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(get_current_cgroup_id), \ FN(get_local_storage), \ FN(sk_select_reuseport), \ - FN(skb_ancestor_cgroup_id), + FN(skb_ancestor_cgroup_id), \ + FN(sk_lookup_tcp), \ + FN(sk_lookup_udp), \ + FN(sk_release), \ + FN(map_push_elem), \ + FN(map_pop_elem), \ + FN(map_peek_elem), \ + FN(msg_push_data), \ + FN(msg_pop_data), \ + FN(rc_pointer_rel), \ + FN(spin_lock), \ + FN(spin_unlock), \ + FN(sk_fullsock), \ + FN(tcp_sock), \ + FN(skb_ecn_set_ce), \ + FN(get_listener_sock), \ + FN(skc_lookup_tcp), \ + FN(tcp_check_syncookie), \ + FN(sysctl_get_name), \ + FN(sysctl_get_current_value), \ + FN(sysctl_get_new_value), \ + FN(sysctl_set_new_value), \ + FN(strtol), \ + FN(strtoul), \ + FN(sk_storage_get), \ + FN(sk_storage_delete), \ + FN(send_signal), \ + FN(tcp_gen_syncookie), \ + FN(skb_output), + /* For BPF prog consistency, Don't add it casually */
/* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper * function eBPF program intends to call
From: Quentin Monnet quentin.monnet@netronome.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.2-rc1 commit 748c7c821aca5e32fab5676193365fc2705af366 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NI6R CVE: NA
--------------------------------
The script broke on parsing function prototype for bpf_strtoul(). This is because the last argument for the function is a pointer to an "unsigned long". The current version of the script only accepts "const" and "struct", but not "unsigned", at the beginning of argument types made of several words.
One solution could be to add "unsigned" to the list, but the issue could come up again in the future (what about "long int"?). It turns out we do not need to have such restrictions on the words: so let's simply accept any series of words instead.
Reported-by: Yonghong Song yhs@fb.com Signed-off-by: Quentin Monnet quentin.monnet@netronome.com Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski jakub.kicinski@netronome.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py b/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py index 5010a4d5bfbab..894cc58c1a034 100755 --- a/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py +++ b/scripts/bpf_helpers_doc.py @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/usr/bin/python3 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only # -# Copyright (C) 2018 Netronome Systems, Inc. +# Copyright (C) 2018-2019 Netronome Systems, Inc.
# In case user attempts to run with Python 2. from __future__ import print_function @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ class Helper(object): Break down helper function protocol into smaller chunks: return type, name, distincts arguments. """ - arg_re = re.compile('((const )?(struct )?(\w+|...))( (**)(\w+))?$') + arg_re = re.compile('((\w+ )*?(\w+|...))( (**)(\w+))?$') res = {} proto_re = re.compile('(.+) (**)(\w+)(((([^,]+)(, )?){1,5}))$')
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ class Helper(object): capture = arg_re.match(a) res['args'].append({ 'type' : capture.group(1), - 'star' : capture.group(6), - 'name' : capture.group(7) + 'star' : capture.group(5), + 'name' : capture.group(6) })
return res
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.5-rc1 commit 75a1a607bb7e6d918be3aca11ec2214a275392f4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NI6R CVE: NA
--------------------------------
Add two new probe_kernel_read_strict() and strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() helpers which by default alias to the __probe_kernel_read() and the __strncpy_from_unsafe(), respectively, but can be overridden by archs which have non-overlapping address ranges for kernel space and user space in order to bail out with -EFAULT when attempting to probe user memory including non-canonical user access addresses [0]:
4-level page tables: user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00007fffffffffff non-canonical: 0x0000800000000000 - 0xffff7fffffffffff
5-level page tables: user-space mem: 0x0000000000000000 - 0x00ffffffffffffff non-canonical: 0x0100000000000000 - 0xfeffffffffffffff
The idea is that these helpers are complementary to the probe_user_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe_user() which probe user-only memory. Both added helpers here do the same, but for kernel-only addresses.
Both set of helpers are going to be used for BPF tracing. They also explicitly avoid throwing the splat for non-canonical user addresses from 00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address dereferences").
For compat, the current probe_kernel_read() and strncpy_from_unsafe() are left as-is.
[0] Documentation/x86/x86_64/mm.txt
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Cc: x86@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/eefeefd769aa5a013531f491a71f0936779e916b.1572649... Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/maccess.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/uaccess.h | 4 ++++ mm/maccess.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/mm/maccess.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile index 4b101dd6e52f3..14623619df2e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile +++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_mem_encrypt_identity.o = -pg endif
obj-y := init.o init_$(BITS).o fault.o ioremap.o extable.o pageattr.o mmap.o \ - pat.o pgtable.o physaddr.o setup_nx.o tlb.o cpu_entry_area.o + pat.o pgtable.o physaddr.o setup_nx.o tlb.o cpu_entry_area.o maccess.o
# Make sure __phys_addr has no stackprotector nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000..f5b85bdc0535c --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/mm/maccess.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +static __always_inline u64 canonical_address(u64 vaddr, u8 vaddr_bits) +{ + return ((s64)vaddr << (64 - vaddr_bits)) >> (64 - vaddr_bits); +} + +static __always_inline bool invalid_probe_range(u64 vaddr) +{ + /* + * Range covering the highest possible canonical userspace address + * as well as non-canonical address range. For the canonical range + * we also need to include the userspace guard page. + */ + return vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX + PAGE_SIZE || + canonical_address(vaddr, boot_cpu_data.x86_virt_bits) != vaddr; +} +#else +static __always_inline bool invalid_probe_range(u64 vaddr) +{ + return vaddr < TASK_SIZE_MAX; +} +#endif + +long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) +{ + if (unlikely(invalid_probe_range((unsigned long)src))) + return -EFAULT; + + return __probe_kernel_read(dst, src, size); +} + +long strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count) +{ + if (unlikely(invalid_probe_range((unsigned long)unsafe_addr))) + return -EFAULT; + + return __strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_addr, count); +} diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h index 29ebf7f1e47cb..a0061e018ce8a 100644 --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ static inline unsigned long __copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *to, * happens, handle that and return -EFAULT. */ extern long probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size); +extern long probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size); extern long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
/* @@ -275,6 +276,9 @@ extern long notrace probe_user_write(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t s extern long notrace __probe_user_write(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size);
extern long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count); +extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, + long count); +extern long __strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count); extern long strncpy_from_unsafe_user(char *dst, const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count); extern long strnlen_unsafe_user(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count); diff --git a/mm/maccess.c b/mm/maccess.c index 35381585318f6..bafa89a9fbc79 100644 --- a/mm/maccess.c +++ b/mm/maccess.c @@ -42,11 +42,20 @@ probe_write_common(void __user *dst, const void *src, size_t size) * do_page_fault() doesn't attempt to take mmap_sem. This makes * probe_kernel_read() suitable for use within regions where the caller * already holds mmap_sem, or other locks which nest inside mmap_sem. + * + * probe_kernel_read_strict() is the same as probe_kernel_read() except for + * the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address + * ranges: probe_kernel_read_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for + * probing memory on a user address range where probe_user_read() is supposed + * to be used instead. */
long __weak probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read")));
+long __weak probe_kernel_read_strict(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) + __attribute__((alias("__probe_kernel_read"))); + long __probe_kernel_read(void *dst, const void *src, size_t size) { long ret; @@ -156,8 +165,22 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(probe_user_write); * * If @count is smaller than the length of the string, copies @count-1 bytes, * sets the last byte of @dst buffer to NUL and returns @count. + * + * strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() is the same as strncpy_from_unsafe() except + * for the case where architectures have non-overlapping user and kernel address + * ranges: strncpy_from_unsafe_strict() will additionally return -EFAULT for + * probing memory on a user address range where strncpy_from_unsafe_user() is + * supposed to be used instead. */ -long strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count) + +long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count) + __attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe"))); + +long __weak strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, + long count) + __attribute__((alias("__strncpy_from_unsafe"))); + +long __strncpy_from_unsafe(char *dst, const void *unsafe_addr, long count) { mm_segment_t old_fs = get_fs(); const void *src = unsafe_addr;
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.5-rc1 commit eb1b66887472eaa7342305b7890ae510dd9d1a79 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NI6R CVE: NA
--------------------------------
Convert the bpf_probe_write_user() helper to probe_user_write() such that writes are not attempted under KERNEL_DS anymore which is buggy as kernel and user space pointers can have overlapping addresses. Also, given we have the access_ok() check inside probe_user_write(), the helper doesn't need to do it twice.
Fixes: 96ae52279594 ("bpf: Add bpf_probe_write_user BPF helper to be called in tracers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andriin@fb.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/841c461781874c07a0ee404a454c3bc0459eed30.1572649... Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index b8726b8a46022..daa5e74bee70b 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_proto = { .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, };
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src, +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void __user *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src, u32, size) { /* @@ -170,10 +170,8 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src, return -EPERM; if (unlikely(uaccess_kernel())) return -EPERM; - if (!access_ok(unsafe_ptr, size)) - return -EPERM;
- return probe_kernel_write(unsafe_ptr, src, size); + return probe_user_write(unsafe_ptr, src, size); }
static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_write_user_proto = {
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.5-rc1 commit 6ae08ae3dea2cfa03dd3665a3c8475c2d429ef47 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NI6R CVE: NA
--------------------------------
The current bpf_probe_read() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers are broken in that they assume they can be used for probing memory access for kernel space addresses /as well as/ user space addresses.
However, plain use of probe_kernel_read() for both cases will attempt to always access kernel space address space given access is performed under KERNEL_DS and some archs in-fact have overlapping address spaces where a kernel pointer and user pointer would have the /same/ address value and therefore accessing application memory via bpf_probe_read{,_str}() would read garbage values.
Lets fix BPF side by making use of recently added 3d7081822f7f ("uaccess: Add non-pagefault user-space read functions"). Unfortunately, the only way to fix this status quo is to add dedicated bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}() and bpf_probe_read_{user,kernel}_str() helpers. The bpf_probe_read{,_str}() helpers are kept as-is to retain their current behavior.
The two *_user() variants attempt the access always under USER_DS set, the two *_kernel() variants will -EFAULT when accessing user memory if the underlying architecture has non-overlapping address ranges, also avoiding throwing the kernel warning via 00c42373d397 ("x86-64: add warning for non-canonical user access address dereferences").
Fixes: a5e8c07059d0 ("bpf: add bpf_probe_read_str helper") Fixes: 2541517c32be ("tracing, perf: Implement BPF programs attached to kprobes") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko andriin@fb.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/796ee46e948bc808d54891a1108435f8652c6ca4.1572649... Conflicts: kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 122 +++++++++++----- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 169 +++++++++++++++++----- tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 122 +++++++++++----- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h | 8 + 4 files changed, 304 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index 075487d409704..a2d71d15ff3c3 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -466,10 +466,13 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_probe_read(void *dst, u32 size, const void *src) + * int bpf_probe_read(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) * Description * For tracing programs, safely attempt to read *size* bytes from - * address *src* and store the data in *dst*. + * kernel space address *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * + * Generally, use bpf_probe_read_user() or bpf_probe_read_kernel() + * instead. * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * @@ -1329,45 +1332,14 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_probe_read_str(void *dst, int size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * int bpf_probe_read_str(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) * Description - * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe address - * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the - * terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than - * *size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the - * string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are - * copied and the last byte is set to NUL. - * - * On success, the length of the copied string is returned. This - * makes this helper useful in tracing programs for reading - * strings, and more importantly to get its length at runtime. See - * the following snippet: - * - * :: - * - * SEC("kprobe/sys_open") - * void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) - * { - * char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256 - * int res = bpf_probe_read_str(buf, sizeof(buf), - * ctx->di); - * - * // Consume buf, for example push it to - * // userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we - * // can use res (the string length) as event - * // size, after checking its boundaries. - * } - * - * In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read()** helper here instead - * to read the string would require to estimate the length at - * compile time, and would often result in copying more memory - * than necessary. + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address + * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. See bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() for + * more details. * - * Another useful use case is when parsing individual process - * arguments or individual environment variables navigating - * *current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\ - * **->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value, - * one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area. + * Generally, use bpf_probe_read_user_str() or bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() + * instead. * Return * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative @@ -2636,6 +2608,72 @@ union bpf_attr { * restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs. * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_user(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from user space address + * *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_kernel(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from kernel space address + * *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_user_str(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe user address + * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the + * terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than + * *size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the + * string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are + * copied and the last byte is set to NUL. + * + * On success, the length of the copied string is returned. This + * makes this helper useful in tracing programs for reading + * strings, and more importantly to get its length at runtime. See + * the following snippet: + * + * :: + * + * SEC("kprobe/sys_open") + * void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) + * { + * char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256 + * int res = bpf_probe_read_user_str(buf, sizeof(buf), + * ctx->di); + * + * // Consume buf, for example push it to + * // userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we + * // can use res (the string length) as event + * // size, after checking its boundaries. + * } + * + * In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read_user()** helper here + * instead to read the string would require to estimate the length + * at compile time, and would often result in copying more memory + * than necessary. + * + * Another useful use case is when parsing individual process + * arguments or individual environment variables navigating + * *current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\ + * **->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value, + * one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area. + * Return + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, + * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative + * value. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address *unsafe_ptr* + * to *dst*. Same semantics as with bpf_probe_read_user_str() apply. + * Return + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, including + * the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative value. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -2749,7 +2787,11 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(sk_storage_delete), \ FN(send_signal), \ FN(tcp_gen_syncookie), \ - FN(skb_output), + FN(skb_output), \ + FN(probe_read_user), \ + FN(probe_read_kernel), \ + FN(probe_read_user_str), \ + FN(probe_read_kernel_str), /* For BPF prog consistency, Don't add it casually */
/* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index daa5e74bee70b..9a53096b79a01 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -133,19 +133,136 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_override_return_proto = { }; #endif
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const void *, unsafe_ptr) +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user, void *, dst, u32, size, + const void __user *, unsafe_ptr) +{ + int ret = probe_user_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); + + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + memset(dst, 0, size); + + return ret; +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_proto = { + .func = bpf_probe_read_user, + .gpl_only = true, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, + .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; + +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user_str, void *, dst, u32, size, + const void __user *, unsafe_ptr) +{ + int ret = strncpy_from_unsafe_user(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); + + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + memset(dst, 0, size); + + return ret; +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto = { + .func = bpf_probe_read_user_str, + .gpl_only = true, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, + .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; + +static __always_inline int +bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr, + const bool compat) { int ret;
- ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); + ret = compat ? probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size) : + probe_kernel_read_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) memset(dst, 0, size);
return ret; }
-static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_proto = { - .func = bpf_probe_read, +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_kernel, void *, dst, u32, size, + const void *, unsafe_ptr) +{ + return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, false); +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto = { + .func = bpf_probe_read_kernel, + .gpl_only = true, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, + .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; + +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat, void *, dst, u32, size, + const void *, unsafe_ptr) +{ + return bpf_probe_read_kernel_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, true); +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_proto = { + .func = bpf_probe_read_compat, + .gpl_only = true, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, + .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; + +static __always_inline int +bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr, + const bool compat) +{ + int ret; + + /* + * The strncpy_from_unsafe_*() call will likely not fill the entire + * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing + * arbitrary memory anyway similar to bpf_probe_read_*() and might + * as well probe the stack. Thus, memory is explicitly cleared + * only in error case, so that improper users ignoring return + * code altogether don't copy garbage; otherwise length of string + * is returned that can be used for bpf_perf_event_output() et al. + */ + ret = compat ? strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size) : + strncpy_from_unsafe_strict(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + memset(dst, 0, size); + + return ret; +} + +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_kernel_str, void *, dst, u32, size, + const void *, unsafe_ptr) +{ + return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, false); +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto = { + .func = bpf_probe_read_kernel_str, + .gpl_only = true, + .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, + .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, + .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, + .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, +}; + +BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_compat_str, void *, dst, u32, size, + const void *, unsafe_ptr) +{ + return bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_common(dst, size, unsafe_ptr, true); +} + +static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto = { + .func = bpf_probe_read_compat_str, .gpl_only = true, .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, @@ -552,36 +669,6 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_current_task_under_cgroup_proto = { .arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING, };
-BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size, - const void *, unsafe_ptr) -{ - int ret; - - /* - * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire - * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing - * arbitrary memory anyway similar to bpf_probe_read() and might - * as well probe the stack. Thus, memory is explicitly cleared - * only in error case, so that improper users ignoring return - * code altogether don't copy garbage; otherwise length of string - * is returned that can be used for bpf_perf_event_output() et al. - */ - ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size); - if (unlikely(ret < 0)) - memset(dst, 0, size); - - return ret; -} - -static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_str_proto = { - .func = bpf_probe_read_str, - .gpl_only = true, - .ret_type = RET_INTEGER, - .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, - .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, - .arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING, -}; - static const struct bpf_func_proto * tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) { @@ -592,8 +679,6 @@ tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_map_update_elem_proto; case BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem: return &bpf_map_delete_elem_proto; - case BPF_FUNC_probe_read: - return &bpf_probe_read_proto; case BPF_FUNC_ktime_get_ns: return &bpf_ktime_get_ns_proto; case BPF_FUNC_tail_call: @@ -620,8 +705,18 @@ tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog) return &bpf_current_task_under_cgroup_proto; case BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32: return &bpf_get_prandom_u32_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user: + return &bpf_probe_read_user_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel: + return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_probe_read: + return &bpf_probe_read_compat_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str: + return &bpf_probe_read_user_str_proto; + case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str: + return &bpf_probe_read_kernel_str_proto; case BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str: - return &bpf_probe_read_str_proto; + return &bpf_probe_read_compat_str_proto; #ifdef CONFIG_CGROUPS case BPF_FUNC_get_current_cgroup_id: return &bpf_get_current_cgroup_id_proto; diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h index abfb085d61c5a..5aec1766c2cd7 100644 --- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h +++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h @@ -462,10 +462,13 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_probe_read(void *dst, u32 size, const void *src) + * int bpf_probe_read(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) * Description * For tracing programs, safely attempt to read *size* bytes from - * address *src* and store the data in *dst*. + * kernel space address *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * + * Generally, use bpf_probe_read_user() or bpf_probe_read_kernel() + * instead. * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * @@ -1325,45 +1328,14 @@ union bpf_attr { * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. * - * int bpf_probe_read_str(void *dst, int size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * int bpf_probe_read_str(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) * Description - * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe address - * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the - * terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than - * *size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the - * string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are - * copied and the last byte is set to NUL. - * - * On success, the length of the copied string is returned. This - * makes this helper useful in tracing programs for reading - * strings, and more importantly to get its length at runtime. See - * the following snippet: - * - * :: - * - * SEC("kprobe/sys_open") - * void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) - * { - * char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256 - * int res = bpf_probe_read_str(buf, sizeof(buf), - * ctx->di); - * - * // Consume buf, for example push it to - * // userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we - * // can use res (the string length) as event - * // size, after checking its boundaries. - * } - * - * In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read()** helper here instead - * to read the string would require to estimate the length at - * compile time, and would often result in copying more memory - * than necessary. + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address + * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. See bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() for + * more details. * - * Another useful use case is when parsing individual process - * arguments or individual environment variables navigating - * *current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\ - * **->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value, - * one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area. + * Generally, use bpf_probe_read_user_str() or bpf_probe_read_kernel_str() + * instead. * Return * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative @@ -2639,6 +2611,72 @@ union bpf_attr { * restricted to raw_tracepoint bpf programs. * Return * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_user(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from user space address + * *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_kernel(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Safely attempt to read *size* bytes from kernel space address + * *unsafe_ptr* and store the data in *dst*. + * Return + * 0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_user_str(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe user address + * *unsafe_ptr* to *dst*. The *size* should include the + * terminating NUL byte. In case the string length is smaller than + * *size*, the target is not padded with further NUL bytes. If the + * string length is larger than *size*, just *size*-1 bytes are + * copied and the last byte is set to NUL. + * + * On success, the length of the copied string is returned. This + * makes this helper useful in tracing programs for reading + * strings, and more importantly to get its length at runtime. See + * the following snippet: + * + * :: + * + * SEC("kprobe/sys_open") + * void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx) + * { + * char buf[PATHLEN]; // PATHLEN is defined to 256 + * int res = bpf_probe_read_user_str(buf, sizeof(buf), + * ctx->di); + * + * // Consume buf, for example push it to + * // userspace via bpf_perf_event_output(); we + * // can use res (the string length) as event + * // size, after checking its boundaries. + * } + * + * In comparison, using **bpf_probe_read_user()** helper here + * instead to read the string would require to estimate the length + * at compile time, and would often result in copying more memory + * than necessary. + * + * Another useful use case is when parsing individual process + * arguments or individual environment variables navigating + * *current*\ **->mm->arg_start** and *current*\ + * **->mm->env_start**: using this helper and the return value, + * one can quickly iterate at the right offset of the memory area. + * Return + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, + * including the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative + * value. + * + * int bpf_probe_read_kernel_str(void *dst, u32 size, const void *unsafe_ptr) + * Description + * Copy a NUL terminated string from an unsafe kernel address *unsafe_ptr* + * to *dst*. Same semantics as with bpf_probe_read_user_str() apply. + * Return + * On success, the strictly positive length of the string, including + * the trailing NUL character. On error, a negative value. */ #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN) \ FN(unspec), \ @@ -2752,7 +2790,11 @@ union bpf_attr { FN(sk_storage_delete), \ FN(send_signal), \ FN(tcp_gen_syncookie), \ - FN(skb_output), + FN(skb_output), \ + FN(probe_read_user), \ + FN(probe_read_kernel), \ + FN(probe_read_user_str), \ + FN(probe_read_kernel_str), /* For BPF prog consistency, Don't add it casually */
/* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which helper diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h index 556688e820264..29610a656350b 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_helpers.h @@ -145,6 +145,14 @@ static unsigned long long (*bpf_skb_cgroup_id)(void *ctx) = (void *) BPF_FUNC_skb_cgroup_id; static unsigned long long (*bpf_skb_ancestor_cgroup_id)(void *ctx, int level) = (void *) BPF_FUNC_skb_ancestor_cgroup_id; +static int (*bpf_probe_read_user)(void *dst, int size, void *unsafe_ptr) = + (void *) BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user; +static int (*bpf_probe_read_kernel)(void *dst, int size, void *unsafe_ptr) = + (void *) BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel; +static int (*bpf_probe_read_user_str)(void *dst, int size, void *unsafe_ptr) = + (void *) BPF_FUNC_probe_read_user_str; +static int (*bpf_probe_read_kernel_str)(void *dst, int size, void *unsafe_ptr) = + (void *) BPF_FUNC_probe_read_kernel_str;
/* llvm builtin functions that eBPF C program may use to * emit BPF_LD_ABS and BPF_LD_IND instructions
From: Daniel Xu dxu@dxuuu.xyz
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.10-rc5 commit 6fa6d28051e9fcaa1570e69648ea13a353a5d218 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NI6R CVE: NA
--------------------------------
do_strncpy_from_user() may copy some extra bytes after the NUL terminator into the destination buffer. This usually does not matter for normal string operations. However, when BPF programs key BPF maps with strings, this matters a lot.
A BPF program may read strings from user memory by calling the bpf_probe_read_user_str() helper which eventually calls do_strncpy_from_user(). The program can then key a map with the destination buffer. BPF map keys are fixed-width and string-agnostic, meaning that map keys are treated as a set of bytes.
The issue is when do_strncpy_from_user() overcopies bytes after the NUL terminator, it can result in seemingly identical strings occupying multiple slots in a BPF map. This behavior is subtle and totally unexpected by the user.
This commit masks out the bytes following the NUL while preserving long-sized stride in the fast path.
Fixes: 6ae08ae3dea2 ("bpf: Add probe_read_{user, kernel} and probe_read_{user, kernel}_str helpers") Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu dxu@dxuuu.xyz Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/21efc982b3e9f2f7b0379eed642294caaa0c27a7.1605642... Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kuohai Xu xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 10 ++++++++++ lib/strncpy_from_user.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index 9a53096b79a01..e0b0e921f1ab7 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -156,6 +156,16 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_user_proto = { BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_user_str, void *, dst, u32, size, const void __user *, unsafe_ptr) { + /* + * NB: We rely on strncpy_from_user() not copying junk past the NUL + * terminator into `dst`. + * + * strncpy_from_user() does long-sized strides in the fast path. If the + * strncpy does not mask out the bytes after the NUL in `unsafe_ptr`, + * then there could be junk after the NUL in `dst`. If user takes `dst` + * and keys a hash map with it, then semantically identical strings can + * occupy multiple entries in the map. + */ int ret = strncpy_from_unsafe_user(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) diff --git a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c index 10af8be1cace6..4b467659c1488 100644 --- a/lib/strncpy_from_user.c +++ b/lib/strncpy_from_user.c @@ -33,17 +33,32 @@ static inline long do_strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, goto byte_at_a_time;
while (max >= sizeof(unsigned long)) { - unsigned long c, data; + unsigned long c, data, mask;
/* Fall back to byte-at-a-time if we get a page fault */ unsafe_get_user(c, (unsigned long __user *)(src+res), byte_at_a_time);
- *(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c; + /* + * Note that we mask out the bytes following the NUL. This is + * important to do because string oblivious code may read past + * the NUL. For those routines, we don't want to give them + * potentially random bytes after the NUL in `src`. + * + * One example of such code is BPF map keys. BPF treats map keys + * as an opaque set of bytes. Without the post-NUL mask, any BPF + * maps keyed by strings returned from strncpy_from_user() may + * have multiple entries for semantically identical strings. + */ if (has_zero(c, &data, &constants)) { data = prep_zero_mask(c, data, &constants); data = create_zero_mask(data); + mask = zero_bytemask(data); + *(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c & mask; return res + find_zero(data); } + + *(unsigned long *)(dst+res) = c; + res += sizeof(unsigned long); max -= sizeof(unsigned long); }