From: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.245 commit 047794b3cfaff4313f379d0cb0509f1c0b972e26 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 3cfb3019979666bdf33a1010147363cf05e0f17b ]

In Thumb2, 'b . + 4' produces a branch instruction that uses a narrow encoding, and so it does not jump to the following instruction as expected. So use W(b) instead.

Fixes: 6c7cb60bff7a ("ARM: fix Thumb2 regression with Spectre BHB") Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S index c2d36d31e908..8de1e1da9144 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/entry-armv.S @@ -1076,7 +1076,7 @@ vector_bhb_loop8_\name:

@ bhb workaround mov r0, #8 -3: b . + 4 +3: W(b) . + 4 subs r0, r0, #1 bne 3b dsb

From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.246 commit 06293f7d7b7c1dcb2b744d0ac53571b6ff53010a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

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commit 7e0815b3e09986d2fe651199363e135b9358132a upstream.

When a XEN_HVM guest uses the XEN PIRQ/Eventchannel mechanism, then PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely controlled by the hypervisor, but contrary to XEN_PV guests this does not disable PCI/MSI[-X] masking in the PCI/MSI layer.

This can lead to a situation where the PCI/MSI layer masks an MSI[-X] interrupt and the hypervisor grants the write despite the fact that it already requested the interrupt. As a consequence interrupt delivery on the affected device is not happening ever.

Set pci_msi_ignore_mask to prevent that like it's done for XEN_PV guests already.

Fixes: 809f9267bbab ("xen: map MSIs into pirqs") Reported-by: Jeremi Piotrowski jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com Reported-by: Dusty Mabe dustymabe@redhat.com Reported-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso carnil@debian.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Tested-by: Noah Meyerhans noahm@debian.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87tuaduxj5.ffs@tglx [nmeyerha@amazon.com: backported to 4.19] Signed-off-by: Noah Meyerhans nmeyerha@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- arch/x86/pci/xen.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c index 9112d1cb397b..910ffe04fb99 100644 --- a/arch/x86/pci/xen.c +++ b/arch/x86/pci/xen.c @@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ void __init xen_msi_init(void)

x86_msi.setup_msi_irqs = xen_hvm_setup_msi_irqs; x86_msi.teardown_msi_irq = xen_teardown_msi_irq; + /* + * With XEN PIRQ/Eventchannels in use PCI/MSI[-X] masking is solely + * controlled by the hypervisor. + */ + pci_msi_ignore_mask = 1; } #endif

From: Stephen Brennan stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.246 commit 5b18856296423473cf0d8a6af8aef5df66ae1075 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit d1dc87763f406d4e67caf16dbe438a5647692395 upstream.

A rare BUG_ON triggered in assoc_array_gc:

[3430308.818153] kernel BUG at lib/assoc_array.c:1609!

Which corresponded to the statement currently at line 1593 upstream:

BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));

Using the data from the core dump, I was able to generate a userspace reproducer[1] and determine the cause of the bug.

[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/assoc_array_gc

After running the iterator on the entire branch, an internal tree node looked like the following:

NODE (nr_leaves_on_branch: 3) SLOT [0] NODE (2 leaves) SLOT [1] NODE (1 leaf) SLOT [2..f] NODE (empty)

In the userspace reproducer, the pr_devel output when compressing this node was:

-- compress node 0x5607cc089380 -- free=0, leaves=0 [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0] [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0] [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2] [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2] [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2] [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2] [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2] [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2] [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2] [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2] [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2] [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2] [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2] [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2] [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2] [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2] after: 3

At slot 0, an internal node with 2 leaves could not be folded into the node, because there was only one available slot (slot 0). Thus, the internal node was retained. At slot 1, the node had one leaf, and was able to be folded in successfully. The remaining nodes had no leaves, and so were removed. By the end of the compression stage, there were 14 free slots, and only 3 leaf nodes. The tree was ascended and then its parent node was compressed. When this node was seen, it could not be folded, due to the internal node it contained.

The invariant for compression in this function is: whenever nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT, the node should contain all leaf nodes. The compression step currently cannot guarantee this, given the corner case shown above.

To fix this issue, retry compression whenever we have retained a node, and yet nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT. This second compression will then allow the node in slot 1 to be folded in, satisfying the invariant. Below is the output of the reproducer once the fix is applied:

-- compress node 0x560e9c562380 -- free=0, leaves=0 [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0] [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0] [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2] [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2] [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2] [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2] [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2] [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2] [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2] [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2] [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2] [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2] [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2] [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2] [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2] [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2] internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 -- free=14, leaves=1 [0] fold node 2/15 [nx 0] after: 3

Changes

======= DH: - Use false instead of 0. - Reorder the inserted lines in a couple of places to put retained before next_slot.

ver #2) - Fix typo in pr_devel, correct comparison to "<="

Fixes: 3cb989501c26 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com cc: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511225517.407935-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.c... # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512215045.489140-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.c... # v2 Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- lib/assoc_array.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/assoc_array.c b/lib/assoc_array.c index 59875eb278ea..3b1ff063ceca 100644 --- a/lib/assoc_array.c +++ b/lib/assoc_array.c @@ -1465,6 +1465,7 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array, struct assoc_array_ptr *cursor, *ptr; struct assoc_array_ptr *new_root, *new_parent, **new_ptr_pp; unsigned long nr_leaves_on_tree; + bool retained; int keylen, slot, nr_free, next_slot, i;

pr_devel("-->%s()\n", __func__); @@ -1541,6 +1542,7 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array, goto descend; }

+retry_compress: pr_devel("-- compress node %p --\n", new_n);

/* Count up the number of empty slots in this node and work out the @@ -1558,6 +1560,7 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array, pr_devel("free=%d, leaves=%lu\n", nr_free, new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);

/* See what we can fold in */ + retained = false; next_slot = 0; for (slot = 0; slot < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT; slot++) { struct assoc_array_shortcut *s; @@ -1607,9 +1610,14 @@ int assoc_array_gc(struct assoc_array *array, pr_devel("[%d] retain node %lu/%d [nx %d]\n", slot, child->nr_leaves_on_branch, nr_free + 1, next_slot); + retained = true; } }

+ if (retained && new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch <= ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT) { + pr_devel("internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying\n"); + goto retry_compress; + } pr_devel("after: %lu\n", new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch);

nr_leaves_on_tree = new_n->nr_leaves_on_branch;

From: Sultan Alsawaf sultan@kerneltoast.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.246 commit 645996efc2ae391246d595832aaa6f9d3cc338c7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 2505a981114dcb715f8977b8433f7540854851d8 upstream.

The asynchronous zspage free worker tries to lock a zspage's entire page list without defending against page migration. Since pages which haven't yet been locked can concurrently migrate off the zspage page list while lock_zspage() churns away, lock_zspage() can suffer from a few different lethal races.

It can lock a page which no longer belongs to the zspage and unsafely dereference page_private(), it can unsafely dereference a torn pointer to the next page (since there's a data race), and it can observe a spurious NULL pointer to the next page and thus not lock all of the zspage's pages (since a single page migration will reconstruct the entire page list, and create_page_chain() unconditionally zeroes out each list pointer in the process).

Fix the races by using migrate_read_lock() in lock_zspage() to synchronize with page migration.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220509024703.243847-1-sultan@kerneltoast.com Fixes: 77ff465799c602 ("zsmalloc: zs_page_migrate: skip unnecessary loops but not return -EBUSY if zspage is not inuse") Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf sultan@kerneltoast.com Acked-by: Minchan Kim minchan@kernel.org Cc: Nitin Gupta ngupta@vflare.org Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky senozhatsky@chromium.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- mm/zsmalloc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/zsmalloc.c b/mm/zsmalloc.c index 05d3d587209b..e0ac8b80a6ac 100644 --- a/mm/zsmalloc.c +++ b/mm/zsmalloc.c @@ -1814,11 +1814,40 @@ static enum fullness_group putback_zspage(struct size_class *class, */ static void lock_zspage(struct zspage *zspage) { - struct page *page = get_first_page(zspage); + struct page *curr_page, *page;

- do { - lock_page(page); - } while ((page = get_next_page(page)) != NULL); + /* + * Pages we haven't locked yet can be migrated off the list while we're + * trying to lock them, so we need to be careful and only attempt to + * lock each page under migrate_read_lock(). Otherwise, the page we lock + * may no longer belong to the zspage. This means that we may wait for + * the wrong page to unlock, so we must take a reference to the page + * prior to waiting for it to unlock outside migrate_read_lock(). + */ + while (1) { + migrate_read_lock(zspage); + page = get_first_page(zspage); + if (trylock_page(page)) + break; + get_page(page); + migrate_read_unlock(zspage); + wait_on_page_locked(page); + put_page(page); + } + + curr_page = page; + while ((page = get_next_page(curr_page))) { + if (trylock_page(page)) { + curr_page = page; + } else { + get_page(page); + migrate_read_unlock(zspage); + wait_on_page_locked(page); + put_page(page); + migrate_read_lock(zspage); + } + } + migrate_read_unlock(zspage); }

static struct dentry *zs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,

From: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.246 commit 22771d3095deeca0d2aefd55999fa8a50caea3cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

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commit 45969b4152c1752089351cd6836a42a566d49bcf upstream.

The data length of skb frags + frag_list may be greater than 0xffff, and skb_header_pointer can not handle negative offset. So, here INT_MAX is used to check the validity of offset. Add the same change to the related function skb_store_bytes.

Fixes: 05c74e5e53f6 ("bpf: add bpf_skb_load_bytes helper") Signed-off-by: Liu Jian liujian56@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Song Liu songliubraving@fb.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220416105801.88708-2-liujian56@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- net/core/filter.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 0730395918e0..7a3655e14764 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -1666,7 +1666,7 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_store_bytes, struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, offset,

if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_F_RECOMPUTE_CSUM | BPF_F_INVALIDATE_HASH))) return -EINVAL; - if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff)) + if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX)) return -EFAULT; if (unlikely(bpf_try_make_writable(skb, offset + len))) return -EFAULT; @@ -1701,7 +1701,7 @@ BPF_CALL_4(bpf_skb_load_bytes, const struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, offset, { void *ptr;

- if (unlikely(offset > 0xffff)) + if (unlikely(offset > INT_MAX)) goto err_clear;

ptr = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, len, to);

From: OGAWA Hirofumi hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 2d03231e5cc5f1baf97090d82eac81fd53ab1b32 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

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[ Upstream commit 183c3237c928109d2008c0456dff508baf692b20 ]

fat*_ent_bread() can be the cause of too many report on I/O error path. So use fat_msg_ratelimit() instead.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87bkxogfeq.fsf@mail.parknet.co.jp Signed-off-by: OGAWA Hirofumi hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp Reported-by: qianfan qianfanguijin@163.com Tested-by: qianfan qianfanguijin@163.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- fs/fat/fatent.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/fat/fatent.c b/fs/fat/fatent.c index 4c6c635bc8aa..5e35307a3d6b 100644 --- a/fs/fat/fatent.c +++ b/fs/fat/fatent.c @@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ static int fat12_ent_bread(struct super_block *sb, struct fat_entry *fatent, err_brelse: brelse(bhs[0]); err: - fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", (llu)blocknr); + fat_msg_ratelimit(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", + (llu)blocknr); return -EIO; }

@@ -106,8 +107,8 @@ static int fat_ent_bread(struct super_block *sb, struct fat_entry *fatent, fatent->fat_inode = MSDOS_SB(sb)->fat_inode; fatent->bhs[0] = sb_bread(sb, blocknr); if (!fatent->bhs[0]) { - fat_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", - (llu)blocknr); + fat_msg_ratelimit(sb, KERN_ERR, "FAT read failed (blocknr %llu)", + (llu)blocknr); return -EIO; } fatent->nr_bhs = 1;

From: Amir Goldstein amir73il@gmail.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 72632015277b56d5f8fd666ccd24cb0ed7ef1d72 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

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[ Upstream commit 623af4f538b5df9b416e1b82f720af7371b4c771 ]

Commit 6960b0d909cd ("fsnotify: change locking order") changed some of the mark_mutex locks in direct reclaim path to use: mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);

This change is explained: "...It uses nested locking to avoid deadlock in case we do the final iput() on an inode which still holds marks and thus would take the mutex again when calling fsnotify_inode_delete() in destroy_inode()."

The problem is that the mutex_lock_nested() is not a nested lock at all. In fact, it has the opposite effect of preventing lockdep from warning about a very possible deadlock.

Due to these wrong annotations, a deadlock that was introduced with nfsd filecache in kernel v5.4 went unnoticed in v5.4.y for over two years until it was reported recently by Khazhismel Kumykov, only to find out that the deadlock was already fixed in kernel v5.5.

Fix the wrong lockdep annotations.

Cc: Khazhismel Kumykov khazhy@google.com Fixes: 6960b0d909cd ("fsnotify: change locking order") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220321112310.vpr7oxro2xkz5llh@quack3.lan/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220422120327.3459282-4-amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein amir73il@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- fs/notify/mark.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/notify/mark.c b/fs/notify/mark.c index 09535f6423fc..3afd58170984 100644 --- a/fs/notify/mark.c +++ b/fs/notify/mark.c @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ void fsnotify_free_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark) void fsnotify_destroy_mark(struct fsnotify_mark *mark, struct fsnotify_group *group) { - mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex); fsnotify_detach_mark(mark); mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex); fsnotify_free_mark(mark); @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ void fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group(struct fsnotify_group *group, * move marks to free to to_free list in one go and then free marks in * to_free list one by one. */ - mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex); list_for_each_entry_safe(mark, lmark, &group->marks_list, g_list) { if ((1U << mark->connector->type) & type_mask) list_move(&mark->g_list, &to_free); @@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ void fsnotify_clear_marks_by_group(struct fsnotify_group *group,

clear: while (1) { - mutex_lock_nested(&group->mark_mutex, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING); + mutex_lock(&group->mark_mutex); if (list_empty(head)) { mutex_unlock(&group->mark_mutex); break;

From: Alexey Dobriyan adobriyan@gmail.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 22b5a48ac899a138552fa05b3fc69a3a0588fdbc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

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[ Upstream commit 7055197705709c59b8ab77e6a5c7d46d61edd96e ]

When a process exits, /proc/${pid}, and /proc/${pid}/net dentries are flushed. However some leaf dentries like /proc/${pid}/net/arp_cache aren't. That's because respective PDEs have proc_misc_d_revalidate() hook which returns 1 and leaves dentries/inodes in the LRU.

Force revalidation/lookup on everything under /proc/${pid}/net by inheriting proc_net_dentry_ops.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YjdVHgildbWO7diJ@localhost.localdomain Fixes: c6c75deda813 ("proc: fix lookup in /proc/net subdirectories after setns(2)") Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan adobriyan@gmail.com Reported-by: hui li juanfengpy@gmail.com Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- fs/proc/generic.c | 3 +++ fs/proc/proc_net.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/proc/generic.c b/fs/proc/generic.c index bab10368a04d..d8b3c6a7173f 100644 --- a/fs/proc/generic.c +++ b/fs/proc/generic.c @@ -445,6 +445,9 @@ static struct proc_dir_entry *__proc_create(struct proc_dir_entry **parent, proc_set_user(ent, (*parent)->uid, (*parent)->gid);

ent->proc_dops = &proc_misc_dentry_ops; + /* Revalidate everything under /proc/${pid}/net */ + if ((*parent)->proc_dops == &proc_net_dentry_ops) + pde_force_lookup(ent);

out: return ent; diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_net.c b/fs/proc/proc_net.c index 096bcc1e7a8a..68ce173d5590 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_net.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_net.c @@ -342,6 +342,9 @@ static __net_init int proc_net_ns_init(struct net *net)

proc_set_user(netd, uid, gid);

+ /* Seed dentry revalidation for /proc/${pid}/net */ + pde_force_lookup(netd); + err = -EEXIST; net_statd = proc_net_mkdir(net, "stat", netd); if (!net_statd)

From: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit b3ad9ff6f06c1dc6abf7437691c88ca3d6da3ac0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 3ba733f879c2a88910744647e41edeefbc0d92b2 upstream.

A maliciously corrupted filesystem can contain cycles in the h-tree stored inside a directory. That can easily lead to the kernel corrupting tree nodes that were already verified under its hands while doing a node split and consequently accessing unallocated memory. Fix the problem by verifying traversed block numbers are unique.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518093332.13986-2-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 4bdf87567467..6d7a44213464 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -750,12 +750,14 @@ static struct dx_frame * dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, struct dx_hash_info *hinfo, struct dx_frame *frame_in) { - unsigned count, indirect; + unsigned count, indirect, level, i; struct dx_entry *at, *entries, *p, *q, *m; struct dx_root *root; struct dx_frame *frame = frame_in; struct dx_frame *ret_err = ERR_PTR(ERR_BAD_DX_DIR); u32 hash; + ext4_lblk_t block; + ext4_lblk_t blocks[EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL];

memset(frame_in, 0, EXT4_HTREE_LEVEL * sizeof(frame_in[0])); frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, 0, INDEX); @@ -811,6 +813,8 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, }

dxtrace(printk("Look up %x", hash)); + level = 0; + blocks[0] = 0; while (1) { count = dx_get_count(entries); if (!count || count > dx_get_limit(entries)) { @@ -852,15 +856,27 @@ dx_probe(struct ext4_filename *fname, struct inode *dir, dx_get_block(at))); frame->entries = entries; frame->at = at; - if (!indirect--) + + block = dx_get_block(at); + for (i = 0; i <= level; i++) { + if (blocks[i] == block) { + ext4_warning_inode(dir, + "dx entry: tree cycle block %u points back to block %u", + blocks[level], block); + goto fail; + } + } + if (++level > indirect) return frame; + blocks[level] = block; frame++; - frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, dx_get_block(at), INDEX); + frame->bh = ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, INDEX); if (IS_ERR(frame->bh)) { ret_err = (struct dx_frame *) frame->bh; frame->bh = NULL; goto fail; } + entries = ((struct dx_node *) frame->bh->b_data)->entries;

if (dx_get_limit(entries) != dx_node_limit(dir)) {

From: Xiaomeng Tong xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 3a18aa6faa4c3b9b84d56188ac94099ba22a4f11 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 64c54d9244a4efe9bc6e9c98e13c4bbb8bb39083 upstream.

The bug is here: if (!rdev || rdev->desc_nr != nr) {

The list iterator value 'rdev' will *always* be set and non-NULL by rdev_for_each_rcu(), so it is incorrect to assume that the iterator value will be NULL if the list is empty or no element found (In fact, it will be a bogus pointer to an invalid struct object containing the HEAD). Otherwise it will bypass the check and lead to invalid memory access passing the check.

To fix the bug, use a new variable 'iter' as the list iterator, while using the original variable 'pdev' as a dedicated pointer to point to the found element.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 70bcecdb1534 ("md-cluster: Improve md_reload_sb to be less error prone") Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Tong xiam0nd.tong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Song Liu song@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- drivers/md/md.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c index 1aa40509f90e..9c94190769b8 100644 --- a/drivers/md/md.c +++ b/drivers/md/md.c @@ -9402,16 +9402,18 @@ static int read_rdev(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)

void md_reload_sb(struct mddev *mddev, int nr) { - struct md_rdev *rdev; + struct md_rdev *rdev = NULL, *iter; int err;

/* Find the rdev */ - rdev_for_each_rcu(rdev, mddev) { - if (rdev->desc_nr == nr) + rdev_for_each_rcu(iter, mddev) { + if (iter->desc_nr == nr) { + rdev = iter; break; + } }

- if (!rdev || rdev->desc_nr != nr) { + if (!rdev) { pr_warn("%s: %d Could not find rdev with nr %d\n", __func__, __LINE__, nr); return; }

From: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 58bd38cbc961fd799842b7be8c5222310f04b908 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 0a375c822497ed6ad6b5da0792a12a6f1af10c0b ]

Laurent reported the enclosed report [1]

This bug triggers with following coditions:

0) Kernel built with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT=y

1) A new passive FastOpen TCP socket is created. This FO socket waits for an ACK coming from client to be a complete ESTABLISHED one. 2) A socket operation on this socket goes through lock_sock() release_sock() dance. 3) While the socket is owned by the user in step 2), a retransmit of the SYN is received and stored in socket backlog. 4) At release_sock() time, the socket backlog is processed while in process context. 5) A SYNACK packet is cooked in response of the SYN retransmit. 6) -> tcp_rtx_synack() is called in process context.

Before blamed commit, tcp_rtx_synack() was always called from BH handler, from a timer handler.

Fix this by using TCP_INC_STATS() & NET_INC_STATS() which do not assume caller is in non preemptible context.

[1] BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: epollpep/2180 caller is tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0 CPU: 10 PID: 2180 Comm: epollpep Tainted: G OE 5.16.0-0.bpo.4-amd64 #1 Debian 5.16.12-1~bpo11+1 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5039MC-H8TRF/X11SCD-F, BIOS 1.7 11/23/2021 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x5e check_preemption_disabled+0xde/0xe0 tcp_rtx_synack.part.0+0x36/0xc0 tcp_rtx_synack+0x8d/0xa0 ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x2e0/0x3e0 ? apparmor_file_alloc_security+0x3b/0x1f0 inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x16/0x30 tcp_check_req+0x367/0x610 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x91/0xf60 ? get_nohz_timer_target+0x18/0x1a0 ? lock_timer_base+0x61/0x80 ? preempt_count_add+0x68/0xa0 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbd/0x270 __release_sock+0x6d/0xb0 release_sock+0x2b/0x90 sock_setsockopt+0x138/0x1140 ? __sys_getsockname+0x7e/0xc0 ? aa_sk_perm+0x3e/0x1a0 __sys_setsockopt+0x198/0x1e0 __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x21/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x38/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Fixes: 168a8f58059a ("tcp: TCP Fast Open Server - main code path") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Reported-by: Laurent Fasnacht laurent.fasnacht@proton.ch Acked-by: Neal Cardwell ncardwell@google.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220530213713.601888-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 0cd1386d45b5..c9d02047852d 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3858,8 +3858,8 @@ int tcp_rtx_synack(const struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req) tcp_rsk(req)->txhash = net_tx_rndhash(); res = af_ops->send_synack(sk, NULL, &fl, req, NULL, TCP_SYNACK_NORMAL); if (!res) { - __TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS); - __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPSYNRETRANS); + TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_RETRANSSEGS); + NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPSYNRETRANS); if (unlikely(tcp_passive_fastopen(sk))) tcp_sk(sk)->total_retrans++; trace_tcp_retransmit_synack(sk, req);

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 95f0ba806277733bf6024e23e27e1be773701cca category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 662a80946ce13633ae90a55379f1346c10f0c432 ]

unix_dgram_poll() calls unix_dgram_peer_wake_me() without `other`'s lock held and check if its receive queue is full. Here we need to use unix_recvq_full_lockless() instead of unix_recvq_full(), otherwise KCSAN will report a data-race.

Fixes: 7d267278a9ec ("unix: avoid use-after-free in ep_remove_wait_queue") Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220605232325.11804-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni pabeni@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- net/unix/af_unix.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c index 82279dbd2f62..e79c32942796 100644 --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c @@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_peer_wake_me(struct sock *sk, struct sock *other) * -ECONNREFUSED. Otherwise, if we haven't queued any skbs * to other and its full, we will hang waiting for POLLOUT. */ - if (unix_recvq_full(other) && !sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) + if (unix_recvq_full_lockless(other) && !sock_flag(other, SOCK_DEAD)) return 1;

if (connected)

From: Masahiro Yamada masahiroy@kernel.org

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 31f3c6a4dcd3260a386e62cef2d5b36e902600a1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 4a388f08d8784af48f352193d2b72aaf167a57a1 ]

EXPORT_SYMBOL and __init is a bad combination because the .init.text section is freed up after the initialization. Hence, modules cannot use symbols annotated __init. The access to a freed symbol may end up with kernel panic.

modpost used to detect it, but it has been broken for a decade.

Recently, I fixed modpost so it started to warn it again, then this showed up in linux-next builds.

There are two ways to fix it:

- Remove __init - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL

I chose the latter for this case because the only in-tree call-site, net/ipv4/xfrm4_policy.c is never compiled as modular. (CONFIG_XFRM is boolean)

Fixes: 2f32b51b609f ("xfrm: Introduce xfrm_input_afinfo to access the the callbacks properly") Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell sfr@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada masahiroy@kernel.org Acked-by: Steffen Klassert steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c index 8dd0e6ab8606..0e1f5dc2766b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c +++ b/net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c @@ -297,4 +297,3 @@ void __init xfrm4_protocol_init(void) { xfrm_input_register_afinfo(&xfrm4_input_afinfo); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm4_protocol_init);

From: Yu Kuai yukuai3@huawei.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 013a79f1b5c89290e2e97f1ebf14b14e0cf5fe5c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 06c4da89c24e7023ea448cadf8e9daf06a0aae6e ]

Otherwise there may be race between module removal and the handling of netlink command, which can lead to the oops as shown below:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000098 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 31299 Comm: nbd-client Tainted: G E 5.14.0-rc4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996) RIP: 0010:down_write+0x1a/0x50 Call Trace: start_creating+0x89/0x130 debugfs_create_dir+0x1b/0x130 nbd_start_device+0x13d/0x390 [nbd] nbd_genl_connect+0x42f/0x748 [nbd] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0xec/0x150 genl_rcv_msg+0xe5/0x1e0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x55/0x100 genl_rcv+0x29/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x1a8/0x250 netlink_sendmsg+0x21b/0x430 ____sys_sendmsg+0x2a4/0x2d0 ___sys_sendmsg+0x81/0xc0 __sys_sendmsg+0x62/0xb0 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Modules linked in: nbd(E-)

Signed-off-by: Hou Tao houtao1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai yukuai3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-2-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index 43a9acaa2e86..09e9379e47c0 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -2461,6 +2461,12 @@ static void __exit nbd_cleanup(void) struct nbd_device *nbd; LIST_HEAD(del_list);

+ /* + * Unregister netlink interface prior to waiting + * for the completion of netlink commands. + */ + genl_unregister_family(&nbd_genl_family); + nbd_dbg_close();

mutex_lock(&nbd_index_mutex); @@ -2476,7 +2482,6 @@ static void __exit nbd_cleanup(void) }

idr_destroy(&nbd_index_idr); - genl_unregister_family(&nbd_genl_family); unregister_blkdev(NBD_MAJOR, "nbd"); }

From: Yu Kuai yukuai3@huawei.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 62d227f67a8c25d5e16f40e5290607f9306d2188 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 09dadb5985023e27d4740ebd17e6fea4640110e5 ]

In our tests, "qemu-nbd" triggers a io hung:

INFO: task qemu-nbd:11445 blocked for more than 368 seconds. Not tainted 5.18.0-rc3-next-20220422-00003-g2176915513ca #884 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:qemu-nbd state:D stack: 0 pid:11445 ppid: 1 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x480/0x1050 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3e/0xb0 schedule+0x9c/0x1b0 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x9d/0xf0 ? ipi_rseq+0x70/0x70 blk_mq_freeze_queue+0x2b/0x40 nbd_add_socket+0x6b/0x270 [nbd] nbd_ioctl+0x383/0x510 [nbd] blkdev_ioctl+0x18e/0x3e0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7fd8ff706577 RSP: 002b:00007fd8fcdfebf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000040000000 RCX: 00007fd8ff706577 RDX: 000000000000000d RSI: 000000000000ab00 RDI: 000000000000000f RBP: 000000000000000f R08: 000000000000fbe8 R09: 000055fe497c62b0 R10: 00000002aff20000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000000006d R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe82dc5e70 R15: 00007fd8fcdff9c0

"qemu-ndb -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_DISCONNECT' first, however, following message was found:

block nbd0: Send disconnect failed -32

Which indicate that something is wrong with the server. Then, "qemu-nbd -d" will call ioctl 'NBD_CLEAR_SOCK', however ioctl can't clear requests after commit 2516ab1543fd("nbd: only clear the queue on device teardown"). And in the meantime, request can't complete through timeout because nbd_xmit_timeout() will always return 'BLK_EH_RESET_TIMER', which means such request will never be completed in this situation.

Now that the flag 'NBD_CMD_INFLIGHT' can make sure requests won't complete multiple times, switch back to call nbd_clear_sock() in nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(), so that inflight requests can be cleared.

Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai yukuai3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220521073749.3146892-5-yukuai3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index 568debcfc0bb..833525f41005 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct block_device *b static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct block_device *bdev) { - sock_shutdown(nbd); + nbd_clear_sock(nbd); __invalidate_device(bdev, true); nbd_bdev_reset(bdev); if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_CONFIG_REF,

From: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit b322e833697c61a1ee1c239dd4a42b38f6ad531 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

commit 1bbc21785b7336619fb6a67f1fff5afdaf229acc upstream.

Currently the sysfs interface maps the BERT error region as "memory" (through acpi_os_map_memory()) in order to copy the error records into memory buffers through memory operations (eg memory_read_from_buffer()).

The OS system cannot detect whether the BERT error region is part of system RAM or it is "device memory" (eg BMC memory) and therefore it cannot detect which memory attributes the bus to memory support (and corresponding kernel mapping, unless firmware provides the required information).

The acpi_os_map_memory() arch backend implementation determines the mapping attributes. On arm64, if the BERT error region is not present in the EFI memory map, the error region is mapped as device-nGnRnE; this triggers alignment faults since memcpy unaligned accesses are not allowed in device-nGnRnE regions.

The ACPI sysfs code cannot therefore map by default the BERT error region with memory semantics but should use a safer default.

Change the sysfs code to map the BERT error region as MMIO (through acpi_os_map_iomem()) and use the memcpy_fromio() interface to read the error region into the kernel buffer.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/31ffe8fc-f5ee-2858-26c5-0fd8bdd6870... Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-acpi/CAJZ5v0g+OVbhuUUDrLUCfX_mVqY_e8ubgLTU98=j... Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com Tested-by: Veronika Kabatova vkabatov@redhat.com Tested-by: Aristeu Rozanski aris@redhat.com Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com

Conflicts: drivers/acpi/sysfs.c [wangxiongfeng: fix conflicts caused by commit bdd56d7d89 ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use] Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo guohanjun@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- drivers/acpi/sysfs.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c index 0a8eb8961770..f0c64b6837d3 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c @@ -439,18 +439,29 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, { struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr; void __iomem *base; - ssize_t rc; + ssize_t size;

data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr); + size = data_attr->attr.size; + + if (offset < 0) + return -EINVAL; + + if (offset >= size) + return 0;

- base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size); + if (count > size - offset) + count = size - offset; + + base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size); if (!base) return -ENOMEM; - rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base, - data_attr->attr.size); - acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);

- return rc; + memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count); + + acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size); + + return count; }

static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)

From: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org

stable inclusion from stable-4.19.247 commit 61967ac7ba2814fefd033eb3979058057a18edc1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5FNPY CVE: NA

--------------------------------

[ Upstream commit 12441ccdf5e2f5a01a46e344976cbbd3d46845c9 ]

__setup() handlers should return 1 to obsolete_checksetup() in init/main.c to indicate that the boot option has been handled. A return of 0 causes the boot option/value to be listed as an Unknown kernel parameter and added to init's (limited) argument (no '=') or environment (with '=') strings. So return 1 from these x86 __setup handlers.

Examples:

Unknown kernel command line parameters "apicpmtimer BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable", will be passed to user space.

Run /sbin/init as init process with arguments: /sbin/init apicpmtimer with environment: HOME=/ TERM=linux BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/bzImage-517rc8 vdso=1 ring3mwait=disable

Fixes: 2aae950b21e4 ("x86_64: Add vDSO for x86-64 with gettimeofday/clock_gettime/getcpu") Fixes: 77b52b4c5c66 ("x86: add "debugpat" boot option") Fixes: e16fd002afe2 ("x86/cpufeature: Enable RING3MWAIT for Knights Landing") Fixes: b8ce33590687 ("x86_64: convert to clock events") Reported-by: Igor Zhbanov i.zhbanov@omprussia.ru Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/64644a2f-4a20-bab3-1e15-3b2cdd0defe3@omprussia.ru Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220314012725.26661-1-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com --- arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/pat.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c index 46caca4d9141..a1c31bb23170 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c @@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp) static __init int vdso_setup(char *s) { vdso64_enabled = simple_strtoul(s, NULL, 0); - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("vdso=", vdso_setup); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c index cfe893ccd6ab..4bb3c2abab92 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c @@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static __init int setup_apicpmtimer(char *s) { apic_calibrate_pmtmr = 1; notsc_setup(NULL); - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("apicpmtimer", setup_apicpmtimer); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c index a5287b18a63f..76692590eff8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static bool ring3mwait_disabled __read_mostly; static int __init ring3mwait_disable(char *__unused) { ring3mwait_disabled = true; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("ring3mwait=disable", ring3mwait_disable);

diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c index 324e26d0607b..b33304c0042a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int pat_debug_enable; static int __init pat_debug_setup(char *str) { pat_debug_enable = 1; - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("debugpat", pat_debug_setup);