From: Michał Mirosław mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl

[ Upstream commit cf1ad559a20d1930aa7b47a52f54e1f8718de301 ]

regulator_get_voltage_rdev() is called in regulator probe() when applying machine constraints. The "fixed" commit exposed the problem that non-bypassed regulators can forward the request to its parent (like bypassed ones) supply. Return -EPROBE_DEFER when the supply is expected but not resolved yet.

Fixes: aea6cb99703e ("regulator: resolve supply after creating regulator") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michał Mirosław mirq-linux@rere.qmqm.pl Reported-by: Ondřej Jirman megous@megous.com Reported-by: Corentin Labbe clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com Tested-by: Ondřej Jirman megous@megous.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a9041d68b4d35e4a2dd71629c8a6422662acb5ee.160435193... Signed-off-by: Mark Brown broonie@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/regulator/core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/regulator/core.c b/drivers/regulator/core.c index c290c8942131..ad5235ca8e4e 100644 --- a/drivers/regulator/core.c +++ b/drivers/regulator/core.c @@ -3405,6 +3405,8 @@ static int _regulator_get_voltage(struct regulator_dev *rdev) ret = rdev->desc->fixed_uV; } else if (rdev->supply) { ret = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev->supply->rdev); + } else if (rdev->supply_name) { + return -EPROBE_DEFER; } else { return -EINVAL; }

From: Thinh Nguyen Thinh.Nguyen@synopsys.com

[ Upstream commit d9feef974e0d8cb6842533c92476a1b32a41ba31 ]

If there are still pending requests because no TRB was available, prepare more when started requests are completed.

Introduce dwc3_gadget_ep_should_continue() to check for incomplete and pending requests to resume updating new TRBs to the controller's TRB cache.

Signed-off-by: Thinh Nguyen thinhn@synopsys.com Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi balbi@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c index f0d2f0a4e990..f24cfb3a6907 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c @@ -2403,10 +2403,8 @@ static int dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_request(struct dwc3_ep *dep,

req->request.actual = req->request.length - req->remaining;

- if (!dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req)) { - __dwc3_gadget_kick_transfer(dep); + if (!dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req)) goto out; - }

dwc3_gadget_giveback(dep, req, status);

@@ -2430,6 +2428,24 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_ep_cleanup_completed_requests(struct dwc3_ep *dep, } }

+static bool dwc3_gadget_ep_should_continue(struct dwc3_ep *dep) +{ + struct dwc3_request *req; + + if (!list_empty(&dep->pending_list)) + return true; + + /* + * We only need to check the first entry of the started list. We can + * assume the completed requests are removed from the started list. + */ + req = next_request(&dep->started_list); + if (!req) + return false; + + return !dwc3_gadget_ep_request_completed(req); +} + static void dwc3_gadget_endpoint_frame_from_event(struct dwc3_ep *dep, const struct dwc3_event_depevt *event) { @@ -2459,6 +2475,8 @@ static void dwc3_gadget_endpoint_transfer_in_progress(struct dwc3_ep *dep,

if (stop) dwc3_stop_active_transfer(dep, true, true); + else if (dwc3_gadget_ep_should_continue(dep)) + __dwc3_gadget_kick_transfer(dep);

/* * WORKAROUND: This is the 2nd half of U1/U2 -> U0 workaround.

From: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com

[ Upstream commit ca10845a56856fff4de3804c85e6424d0f6d0cde ]

While running btrfs/061, btrfs/073, btrfs/078, or btrfs/178 we hit the following lockdep splat:

====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.9.0-rc3+ #4 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/100 is trying to acquire lock: ffff96ecc22ef4a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330

but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x65/0x80 slab_pre_alloc_hook.constprop.0+0x20/0x200 kmem_cache_alloc+0x37/0x270 alloc_inode+0x82/0xb0 iget_locked+0x10d/0x2c0 kernfs_get_inode+0x1b/0x130 kernfs_get_tree+0x136/0x240 sysfs_get_tree+0x16/0x40 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 path_mount+0x434/0xc00 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #2 (kernfs_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 kernfs_add_one+0x23/0x150 kernfs_create_link+0x63/0xa0 sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x5e/0xd0 btrfs_sysfs_add_devices_dir+0x81/0x130 btrfs_init_new_device+0x67f/0x1250 btrfs_ioctl+0x1ef/0x2e20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x125/0x3a0 find_free_extent+0xdf6/0x1210 btrfs_reserve_extent+0xb3/0x1b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xb0/0x310 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 __btrfs_cow_block+0x11a/0x530 btrfs_cow_block+0x104/0x220 btrfs_search_slot+0x52e/0x9d0 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x64/0xb0 btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x90/0x4f0 btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0x93/0x140 btrfs_log_inode+0x5de/0x2020 btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x429/0xc90 btrfs_log_new_name+0x95/0x9b btrfs_rename2+0xbb9/0x1800 vfs_rename+0x64f/0x9f0 do_renameat2+0x320/0x4e0 __x64_sys_rename+0x1f/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500 evict+0xcf/0x1f0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0 kthread+0x138/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of: &delayed_node->mutex --> kernfs_mutex --> fs_reclaim

Possible unsafe locking scenario:

CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(kernfs_mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

*** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kswapd0/100: #0: ffffffff8dd74700 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8dd65c50 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}, at: shrink_slab+0x115/0x290 #2: ffff96ed2ade30e0 (&type->s_umount_key#36){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x38/0x1e0

stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 100 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc3+ #4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x8b/0xb8 check_noncircular+0x12d/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x119c/0x1fc0 lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7e0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 ? lock_acquire+0xa7/0x3d0 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0x3f/0x330 btrfs_evict_inode+0x24c/0x500 evict+0xcf/0x1f0 dispose_list+0x48/0x70 prune_icache_sb+0x44/0x50 super_cache_scan+0x161/0x1e0 do_shrink_slab+0x178/0x3c0 shrink_slab+0x17c/0x290 shrink_node+0x2b2/0x6d0 balance_pgdat+0x30a/0x670 kswapd+0x213/0x4c0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x41/0x50 ? add_wait_queue_exclusive+0x70/0x70 ? balance_pgdat+0x670/0x670 kthread+0x138/0x160 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x40/0x40 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

This happens because we are holding the chunk_mutex at the time of adding in a new device. However we only need to hold the device_list_mutex, as we're going to iterate over the fs_devices devices. Move the sysfs init stuff outside of the chunk_mutex to get rid of this lockdep splat.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x: f3cd2c58110dad14e: btrfs: sysfs, rename device_link add/remove functions CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4.x Reported-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index d4a35b625864..58be80e8c61d 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -2459,9 +2459,6 @@ int btrfs_init_new_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path btrfs_set_super_num_devices(fs_info->super_copy, orig_super_num_devices + 1);

- /* add sysfs device entry */ - btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link(fs_devices, device); - /* * we've got more storage, clear any full flags on the space * infos @@ -2469,6 +2466,10 @@ int btrfs_init_new_device(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, const char *device_path btrfs_clear_space_info_full(fs_info);

mutex_unlock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); + + /* Add sysfs device entry */ + btrfs_sysfs_add_device_link(fs_devices, device); + mutex_unlock(&fs_devices->device_list_mutex);

if (seeding_dev) {

From: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org

[ Upstream commit 151a535171be6ff824a0a3875553ea38570f4c05 ]

kernel/irq/ipi.c otherwise fails to compile if nothing else selects it.

Fixes: 379b656446a3 ("genirq: Add GENERIC_IRQ_IPI Kconfig symbol") Reported-by: Pavel Machek pavel@ucw.cz Tested-by: Pavel Machek pavel@ucw.cz Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201015101222.GA32747@amd Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/irq/Kconfig | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/kernel/irq/Kconfig b/kernel/irq/Kconfig index 5f3e2baefca9..d532bf0c5a67 100644 --- a/kernel/irq/Kconfig +++ b/kernel/irq/Kconfig @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ config IRQ_FASTEOI_HIERARCHY_HANDLERS # Generic IRQ IPI support config GENERIC_IRQ_IPI bool + select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY

# Generic MSI interrupt support config GENERIC_MSI_IRQ

From: zhuoliang zhang zhuoliang.zhang@mediatek.com

[ Upstream commit a779d91314ca7208b7feb3ad817b62904397c56d ]

we found that the following race condition exists in xfrm_alloc_userspi flow:

user thread state_hash_work thread ---- ---- xfrm_alloc_userspi() __find_acq_core() /*alloc new xfrm_state:x*/ xfrm_state_alloc() /*schedule state_hash_work thread*/ xfrm_hash_grow_check() xfrm_hash_resize() xfrm_alloc_spi /*hold lock*/ x->id.spi = htonl(spi) spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) /*waiting lock release*/ xfrm_hash_transfer() spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) /*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi*/ hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi) spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock)

/*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi 2 times*/ hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi)

1. a new state x is alloced in xfrm_state_alloc() and added into the bydst hlist in __find_acq_core() on the LHS; 2. on the RHS, state_hash_work thread travels the old bydst and tranfers every xfrm_state (include x) into the new bydst hlist and new byspi hlist; 3. user thread on the LHS gets the lock and adds x into the new byspi hlist again.

So the same xfrm_state (x) is added into the same list_hash (net->xfrm.state_byspi) 2 times that makes the list_hash become an inifite loop.

To fix the race, x->id.spi = htonl(spi) in the xfrm_alloc_spi() is moved to the back of spin_lock_bh, sothat state_hash_work thread no longer add x which id.spi is zero into the hash_list.

Fixes: f034b5d4efdf ("[XFRM]: Dynamic xfrm_state hash table sizing.") Signed-off-by: zhuoliang zhang zhuoliang.zhang@mediatek.com Acked-by: Herbert Xu herbert@gondor.apana.org.au Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert steffen.klassert@secunet.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index a649d7c2f48c..84dea0ad1666 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -1825,6 +1825,7 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high) int err = -ENOENT; __be32 minspi = htonl(low); __be32 maxspi = htonl(high); + __be32 newspi = 0; u32 mark = x->mark.v & x->mark.m;

spin_lock_bh(&x->lock); @@ -1843,21 +1844,22 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high) xfrm_state_put(x0); goto unlock; } - x->id.spi = minspi; + newspi = minspi; } else { u32 spi = 0; for (h = 0; h < high-low+1; h++) { spi = low + prandom_u32()%(high-low+1); x0 = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr, htonl(spi), x->id.proto, x->props.family); if (x0 == NULL) { - x->id.spi = htonl(spi); + newspi = htonl(spi); break; } xfrm_state_put(x0); } } - if (x->id.spi) { + if (newspi) { spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); + x->id.spi = newspi; h = xfrm_spi_hash(net, &x->id.daddr, x->id.spi, x->id.proto, x->props.family); hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi, net->xfrm.state_byspi + h); spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);

From: Stefano Brivio sbrivio@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 7d10e62c2ff8e084c136c94d32d9a94de4d31248 ]

In ip_set_match_extensions(), for sets with counters, we take care of updating counters themselves by calling ip_set_update_counter(), and of checking if the given comparison and values match, by calling ip_set_match_counter() if needed.

However, if a given comparison on counters doesn't match the configured values, that doesn't mean the set entry itself isn't matching.

This fix restores the behaviour we had before commit 4750005a85f7 ("netfilter: ipset: Fix "don't update counters" mode when counters used at the matching"), without reintroducing the issue fixed there: back then, mtype_data_match() first updated counters in any case, and then took care of matching on counters.

Now, if the IPSET_FLAG_SKIP_COUNTER_UPDATE flag is set, ip_set_update_counter() will anyway skip counter updates if desired.

The issue observed is illustrated by this reproducer:

ipset create c hash:ip counters ipset add c 192.0.2.1 iptables -I INPUT -m set --match-set c src --bytes-gt 800 -j DROP

if we now send packets from 192.0.2.1, bytes and packets counters for the entry as shown by 'ipset list' are always zero, and, no matter how many bytes we send, the rule will never match, because counters themselves are not updated.

Reported-by: Mithil Mhatre mmhatre@redhat.com Fixes: 4750005a85f7 ("netfilter: ipset: Fix "don't update counters" mode when counters used at the matching") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio sbrivio@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik kadlec@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c index ea42c40213aa..1916cd39190c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c @@ -488,13 +488,14 @@ ip_set_match_extensions(struct ip_set *set, const struct ip_set_ext *ext, if (SET_WITH_COUNTER(set)) { struct ip_set_counter *counter = ext_counter(data, set);

+ ip_set_update_counter(counter, ext, flags); + if (flags & IPSET_FLAG_MATCH_COUNTERS && !(ip_set_match_counter(ip_set_get_packets(counter), mext->packets, mext->packets_op) && ip_set_match_counter(ip_set_get_bytes(counter), mext->bytes, mext->bytes_op))) return false; - ip_set_update_counter(counter, ext, flags); } if (SET_WITH_SKBINFO(set)) ip_set_get_skbinfo(ext_skbinfo(data, set),

From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 158e1886b6262c1d1c96a18c85fac5219b8bf804 ]

This is harmless, but the "addr" comes from the user and it could lead to a negative shift or to shift wrapping if it's too high.

Fixes: 0b00a5615dc4 ("ALSA: hdac_ext: add hdac extended controller") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201103101807.GC1127762@mwanda Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c b/sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c index 84b44cdae28a..b96abebcfd1a 100644 --- a/sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c +++ b/sound/hda/ext/hdac_ext_controller.c @@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ struct hdac_ext_link *snd_hdac_ext_bus_get_link(struct hdac_bus *bus, return NULL; if (bus->idx != bus_idx) return NULL; + if (addr < 0 || addr > 31) + return NULL;

list_for_each_entry(hlink, &bus->hlink_list, list) { for (i = 0; i < HDA_MAX_CODECS; i++) {

From: Vincent Mailhol mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr

[ Upstream commit 2283f79b22684d2812e5c76fc2280aae00390365 ]

If a driver calls can_get_echo_skb() during a hardware IRQ (which is often, but not always, the case), the 'WARN_ON(in_irq)' in net/core/skbuff.c#skb_release_head_state() might be triggered, under network congestion circumstances, together with the potential risk of a NULL pointer dereference.

The root cause of this issue is the call to kfree_skb() instead of dev_kfree_skb_irq() in net/core/dev.c#enqueue_to_backlog().

This patch prevents the skb to be freed within the call to netif_rx() by incrementing its reference count with skb_get(). The skb is finally freed by one of the in-irq-context safe functions: dev_consume_skb_any() or dev_kfree_skb_any(). The "any" version is used because some drivers might call can_get_echo_skb() in a normal context.

The reason for this issue to occur is that initially, in the core network stack, loopback skb were not supposed to be received in hardware IRQ context. The CAN stack is an exeption.

This bug was previously reported back in 2017 in [1] but the proposed patch never got accepted.

While [1] directly modifies net/core/dev.c, we try to propose here a smoother modification local to CAN network stack (the assumption behind is that only CAN devices are affected by this issue).

[1] http://lore.kernel.org/r/57a3ffb6-3309-3ad5-5a34-e93c3fe3614d@cetitec.com

Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201002154219.4887-2-mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr Fixes: 39549eef3587 ("can: CAN Network device driver and Netlink interface") Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/can/dev.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/dev.c b/drivers/net/can/dev.c index d9f6baa80e64..75a551d88c9b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/dev.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/dev.c @@ -521,7 +521,11 @@ unsigned int can_get_echo_skb(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int idx) if (!skb) return 0;

- netif_rx(skb); + skb_get(skb); + if (netif_rx(skb) == NET_RX_SUCCESS) + dev_consume_skb_any(skb); + else + dev_kfree_skb_any(skb);

return len; }

From: Oleksij Rempel o.rempel@pengutronix.de

[ Upstream commit 286228d382ba6320f04fa2e7c6fc8d4d92e428f4 ]

All user space generated SKBs are owned by a socket (unless injected into the key via AF_PACKET). If a socket is closed, all associated skbs will be cleaned up.

This leads to a problem when a CAN driver calls can_put_echo_skb() on a unshared SKB. If the socket is closed prior to the TX complete handler, can_get_echo_skb() and the subsequent delivering of the echo SKB to all registered callbacks, a SKB with a refcount of 0 is delivered.

To avoid the problem, in can_get_echo_skb() the original SKB is now always cloned, regardless of shared SKB or not. If the process exists it can now safely discard its SKBs, without disturbing the delivery of the echo SKB.

The problem shows up in the j1939 stack, when it clones the incoming skb, which detects the already 0 refcount.

We can easily reproduce this with following example:

testj1939 -B -r can0: & cansend can0 1823ff40#0123

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 293 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: coda_vpu imx_vdoa videobuf2_vmalloc dw_hdmi_ahb_audio vcan CPU: 0 PID: 293 Comm: cansend Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-00376-g9e20dcb7040d #1 Hardware name: Freescale i.MX6 Quad/DualLite (Device Tree) Backtrace: [<c010f570>] (dump_backtrace) from [<c010f90c>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [<c010f8ec>] (show_stack) from [<c0c3e1a4>] (dump_stack+0x8c/0xa0) [<c0c3e118>] (dump_stack) from [<c0127fec>] (__warn+0xe0/0x108) [<c0127f0c>] (__warn) from [<c01283c8>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0xa8/0xcc) [<c0128324>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0539c0c>] (refcount_warn_saturate+0x108/0x174) [<c0539b04>] (refcount_warn_saturate) from [<c0ad2cac>] (j1939_can_recv+0x20c/0x210) [<c0ad2aa0>] (j1939_can_recv) from [<c0ac9dc8>] (can_rcv_filter+0xb4/0x268) [<c0ac9d14>] (can_rcv_filter) from [<c0aca2cc>] (can_receive+0xb0/0xe4) [<c0aca21c>] (can_receive) from [<c0aca348>] (can_rcv+0x48/0x98) [<c0aca300>] (can_rcv) from [<c09b1fdc>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0x88) [<c09b1f78>] (__netif_receive_skb_one_core) from [<c09b2070>] (__netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x94) [<c09b2038>] (__netif_receive_skb) from [<c09b2130>] (netif_receive_skb_internal+0x64/0xf8) [<c09b20cc>] (netif_receive_skb_internal) from [<c09b21f8>] (netif_receive_skb+0x34/0x19c) [<c09b21c4>] (netif_receive_skb) from [<c0791278>] (can_rx_offload_napi_poll+0x58/0xb4)

Fixes: 0ae89beb283a ("can: add destructor for self generated skbs") Signed-off-by: Oleksij Rempel o.rempel@pengutronix.de Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20200124132656.22156-1-o.rempel@pengutronix.de Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp socketcan@hartkopp.net Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/can/skb.h | 20 ++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/can/skb.h b/include/linux/can/skb.h index b3379a97245c..a34694e675c9 100644 --- a/include/linux/can/skb.h +++ b/include/linux/can/skb.h @@ -61,21 +61,17 @@ static inline void can_skb_set_owner(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk) */ static inline struct sk_buff *can_create_echo_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) { - if (skb_shared(skb)) { - struct sk_buff *nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + struct sk_buff *nskb;

- if (likely(nskb)) { - can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk); - consume_skb(skb); - return nskb; - } else { - kfree_skb(skb); - return NULL; - } + nskb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (unlikely(!nskb)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return NULL; }

- /* we can assume to have an unshared skb with proper owner */ - return skb; + can_skb_set_owner(nskb, skb->sk); + consume_skb(skb); + return nskb; }

#endif /* !_CAN_SKB_H */

From: Stephane Grosjean s.grosjean@peak-system.com

[ Upstream commit ecc7b4187dd388549544195fb13a11b4ea8e6a84 ]

Fabian Inostroza fabianinostrozap@gmail.com has discovered a potential problem in the hardware timestamp reporting from the PCAN-USB USB CAN interface (only), related to the fact that a timestamp of an event may precede the timestamp used for synchronization when both records are part of the same USB packet. However, this case was used to detect the wrapping of the time counter.

This patch details and fixes the two identified cases where this problem can occur.

Reported-by: Fabian Inostroza fabianinostrozap@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Stephane Grosjean s.grosjean@peak-system.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201014085631.15128-1-s.grosjean@peak-system.com Fixes: bb4785551f64 ("can: usb: PEAK-System Technik USB adapters driver core") Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c index afc8d978124e..db156a11e6db 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c @@ -138,14 +138,55 @@ void peak_usb_get_ts_time(struct peak_time_ref *time_ref, u32 ts, ktime_t *time) /* protect from getting time before setting now */ if (ktime_to_ns(time_ref->tv_host)) { u64 delta_us; + s64 delta_ts = 0; + + /* General case: dev_ts_1 < dev_ts_2 < ts, with: + * + * - dev_ts_1 = previous sync timestamp + * - dev_ts_2 = last sync timestamp + * - ts = event timestamp + * - ts_period = known sync period (theoretical) + * ~ dev_ts2 - dev_ts1 + * *but*: + * + * - time counters wrap (see adapter->ts_used_bits) + * - sometimes, dev_ts_1 < ts < dev_ts2 + * + * "normal" case (sync time counters increase): + * must take into account case when ts wraps (tsw) + * + * < ts_period > < > + * | | | + * ---+--------+----+-------0-+--+--> + * ts_dev_1 | ts_dev_2 | + * ts tsw + */ + if (time_ref->ts_dev_1 < time_ref->ts_dev_2) { + /* case when event time (tsw) wraps */ + if (ts < time_ref->ts_dev_1) + delta_ts = 1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits; + + /* Otherwise, sync time counter (ts_dev_2) has wrapped: + * handle case when event time (tsn) hasn't. + * + * < ts_period > < > + * | | | + * ---+--------+--0-+---------+--+--> + * ts_dev_1 | ts_dev_2 | + * tsn ts + */ + } else if (time_ref->ts_dev_1 < ts) { + delta_ts = -(1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits); + }

- delta_us = ts - time_ref->ts_dev_2; - if (ts < time_ref->ts_dev_2) - delta_us &= (1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits) - 1; + /* add delay between last sync and event timestamps */ + delta_ts += (signed int)(ts - time_ref->ts_dev_2);

- delta_us += time_ref->ts_total; + /* add time from beginning to last sync */ + delta_ts += time_ref->ts_total;

- delta_us *= time_ref->adapter->us_per_ts_scale; + /* convert ticks number into microseconds */ + delta_us = delta_ts * time_ref->adapter->us_per_ts_scale; delta_us >>= time_ref->adapter->us_per_ts_shift;

*time = ktime_add_us(time_ref->tv_host_0, delta_us);

From: Joakim Zhang qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com

[ Upstream commit 018799649071a1638c0c130526af36747df4355a ]

After double check with Layerscape CAN owner (Pankaj Bansal), confirm that LS1021A doesn't support ECC feature, so remove FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_MECR quirk.

Fixes: 99b7668c04b27 ("can: flexcan: adding platform specific details for LS1021A") Cc: Pankaj Bansal pankaj.bansal@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Joakim Zhang qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201020155402.30318-4-qiangqing.zhang@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c index 0be8db6ab319..92fe345e48ab 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/flexcan.c @@ -301,8 +301,7 @@ static const struct flexcan_devtype_data fsl_vf610_devtype_data = {

static const struct flexcan_devtype_data fsl_ls1021a_r2_devtype_data = { .quirks = FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_RXFG | FLEXCAN_QUIRK_ENABLE_EACEN_RRS | - FLEXCAN_QUIRK_DISABLE_MECR | FLEXCAN_QUIRK_BROKEN_PERR_STATE | - FLEXCAN_QUIRK_USE_OFF_TIMESTAMP, + FLEXCAN_QUIRK_BROKEN_PERR_STATE | FLEXCAN_QUIRK_USE_OFF_TIMESTAMP, };

static const struct can_bittiming_const flexcan_bittiming_const = {

From: "Darrick J. Wong" darrick.wong@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit c1f6b1ac00756a7108e5fcb849a2f8230c0b62a5 ]

The kernel has always allowed directories to have the rtinherit flag set, even if there is no rt device, so this check is wrong.

Fixes: 80e4e1268802 ("xfs: scrub inodes") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c b/fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c index e386c9b0b4ab..8d45d60832db 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c +++ b/fs/xfs/scrub/inode.c @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ xchk_inode_flags( goto bad;

/* rt flags require rt device */ - if ((flags & (XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME | XFS_DIFLAG_RTINHERIT)) && - !mp->m_rtdev_targp) + if ((flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME) && !mp->m_rtdev_targp) goto bad;

/* new rt bitmap flag only valid for rbmino */

From: Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com

[ Upstream commit 0607eb1d452d45c5ac4c745a9e9e0d95152ea9d0 ]

If lock_extent_buffer_for_io() fails, it returns a negative value, but its caller btree_write_cache_pages() ignores such error. This means that a call to flush_write_bio(), from lock_extent_buffer_for_io(), might have failed. We should make btree_write_cache_pages() notice such error values and stop immediatelly, making sure filemap_fdatawrite_range() returns an error to the transaction commit path. A failure from flush_write_bio() should also result in the endio callback end_bio_extent_buffer_writepage() being invoked, which sets the BTRFS_FS_*_ERR bits appropriately, so that there's no risk a transaction or log commit doesn't catch a writeback failure.

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana fdmanana@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index f6fe551357be..4cddbe5aefe6 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -3913,6 +3913,10 @@ int btree_write_cache_pages(struct address_space *mapping, if (!ret) { free_extent_buffer(eb); continue; + } else if (ret < 0) { + done = 1; + free_extent_buffer(eb); + break; }

ret = write_one_eb(eb, fs_info, wbc, &epd);

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Jason@zx2c4.com

commit 46d6c5ae953cc0be38efd0e469284df7c4328cf8 upstream.

If netfilter changes the packet mark when mangling, the packet is rerouted using the route_me_harder set of functions. Prior to this commit, there's one big difference between route_me_harder and the ordinary initial routing functions, described in the comment above __ip_queue_xmit():

/* Note: skb->sk can be different from sk, in case of tunnels */ int __ip_queue_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl,

That function goes on to correctly make use of sk->sk_bound_dev_if, rather than skb->sk->sk_bound_dev_if. And indeed the comment is true: a tunnel will receive a packet in ndo_start_xmit with an initial skb->sk. It will make some transformations to that packet, and then it will send the encapsulated packet out of a *new* socket. That new socket will basically always have a different sk_bound_dev_if (otherwise there'd be a routing loop). So for the purposes of routing the encapsulated packet, the routing information as it pertains to the socket should come from that socket's sk, rather than the packet's original skb->sk. For that reason __ip_queue_xmit() and related functions all do the right thing.

One might argue that all tunnels should just call skb_orphan(skb) before transmitting the encapsulated packet into the new socket. But tunnels do *not* do this -- and this is wisely avoided in skb_scrub_packet() too -- because features like TSQ rely on skb->destructor() being called when that buffer space is truely available again. Calling skb_orphan(skb) too early would result in buffers filling up unnecessarily and accounting info being all wrong. Instead, additional routing must take into account the new sk, just as __ip_queue_xmit() notes.

So, this commit addresses the problem by fishing the correct sk out of state->sk -- it's already set properly in the call to nf_hook() in __ip_local_out(), which receives the sk as part of its normal functionality. So we make sure to plumb state->sk through the various route_me_harder functions, and then make correct use of it following the example of __ip_queue_xmit().

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org [Jason: backported to 4.19 from Sasha's 5.4 backport] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h | 2 +- include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter.c | 12 +++++++----- net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/netfilter.c | 6 +++--- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 2 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c | 4 ++-- 13 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h index 95ab5cc64422..45ff1330b339 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv4.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct ip_rt_info { u_int32_t mark; };

-int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned addr_type); +int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned addr_type);

struct nf_queue_entry;

diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h index c0dc4dd78887..47a2de582f57 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter_ipv6.h @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct nf_ipv6_ops { };

#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER -int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb); +int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb); __sum16 nf_ip6_checksum(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hook, unsigned int dataoff, u_int8_t protocol);

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter.c index 8d2e5dc9a827..3d670d5aea34 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter.c @@ -17,17 +17,19 @@ #include <net/netfilter/nf_queue.h>

/* route_me_harder function, used by iptable_nat, iptable_mangle + ip_queue */ -int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int addr_type) +int ip_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int addr_type) { const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb); struct rtable *rt; struct flowi4 fl4 = {}; __be32 saddr = iph->saddr; - const struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); - __u8 flags = sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0; + __u8 flags; struct net_device *dev = skb_dst(skb)->dev; unsigned int hh_len;

+ sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk); + flags = sk ? inet_sk_flowi_flags(sk) : 0; + if (addr_type == RTN_UNSPEC) addr_type = inet_addr_type_dev_table(net, dev, saddr); if (addr_type == RTN_LOCAL || addr_type == RTN_UNICAST) @@ -91,8 +93,8 @@ int nf_ip_reroute(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_queue_entry *entry) skb->mark == rt_info->mark && iph->daddr == rt_info->daddr && iph->saddr == rt_info->saddr)) - return ip_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, skb, - RTN_UNSPEC); + return ip_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, entry->state.sk, + skb, RTN_UNSPEC); } return 0; } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c index 690b17ef6a44..d64b1ef43c10 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ipt_SYNPROXY.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ synproxy_send_tcp(struct net *net,

skb_dst_set_noref(nskb, skb_dst(skb)); nskb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); - if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC)) + if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC)) goto free_nskb;

if (nfct) { diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c index dea138ca8925..0829f46ddfdd 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_mangle.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ ipt_mangle_out(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) iph->daddr != daddr || skb->mark != mark || iph->tos != tos) { - err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, skb, RTN_UNSPEC); + err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb, RTN_UNSPEC); if (err < 0) ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c index 52e3f9c7bc69..290a04820701 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c @@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ nf_nat_ipv4_local_fn(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,

if (ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u3.ip != ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u3.ip) { - err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, skb, RTN_UNSPEC); + err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb, RTN_UNSPEC); if (err < 0) ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err); } diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c index 5cd06ba3535d..4996db1f64a1 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *oldskb, int hook) ip4_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(nskb))); nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_put(nskb, oldskb, oth);

- if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC)) + if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb, RTN_UNSPEC)) goto free_nskb;

niph = ip_hdr(nskb); diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c index 7d82934c46f4..61003768e52b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv4.c @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_route_table_hook(void *priv, iph->daddr != daddr || skb->mark != mark || iph->tos != tos) { - err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, skb, RTN_UNSPEC); + err = ip_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb, RTN_UNSPEC); if (err < 0) ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter.c index 6d0b1f3e927b..5679fa3f696a 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter.c @@ -17,10 +17,10 @@ #include <net/xfrm.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_queue.h>

-int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb) +int ip6_route_me_harder(struct net *net, struct sock *sk_partial, struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct ipv6hdr *iph = ipv6_hdr(skb); - struct sock *sk = sk_to_full_sk(skb->sk); + struct sock *sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk_partial); unsigned int hh_len; struct dst_entry *dst; int strict = (ipv6_addr_type(&iph->daddr) & @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static int nf_ip6_reroute(struct sk_buff *skb, if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&iph->daddr, &rt_info->daddr) || !ipv6_addr_equal(&iph->saddr, &rt_info->saddr) || skb->mark != rt_info->mark) - return ip6_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, skb); + return ip6_route_me_harder(entry->state.net, entry->state.sk, skb); } return 0; } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c index b0524b18c4fb..acba3757ff60 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_mangle.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ip6t_mangle_out(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_hook_state *state) skb->mark != mark || ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit != hop_limit || flowlabel != *((u_int32_t *)ipv6_hdr(skb)))) { - err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, skb); + err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb); if (err < 0) ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c index bf25263b2dcd..2160936e5b91 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c @@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ nf_nat_ipv6_local_fn(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,

if (!nf_inet_addr_cmp(&ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.dst.u3, &ct->tuplehash[!dir].tuple.src.u3)) { - err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, skb); + err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb); if (err < 0) ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c index da3f1f8cb325..afe79cb46e63 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_chain_route_ipv6.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_route_table_hook(void *priv, skb->mark != mark || ipv6_hdr(skb)->hop_limit != hop_limit || flowlabel != *((u_int32_t *)ipv6_hdr(skb)))) { - err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, skb); + err = ip6_route_me_harder(state->net, state->sk, skb); if (err < 0) ret = NF_DROP_ERR(err); } diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c index d5e4329579e2..acaeeaf81441 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_core.c @@ -725,12 +725,12 @@ static int ip_vs_route_me_harder(struct netns_ipvs *ipvs, int af, struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);

if (dst->dev && !(dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) && - ip6_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb) != 0) + ip6_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb->sk, skb) != 0) return 1; } else #endif if (!(skb_rtable(skb)->rt_flags & RTCF_LOCAL) && - ip_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb, RTN_LOCAL) != 0) + ip_route_me_harder(ipvs->net, skb->sk, skb, RTN_LOCAL) != 0) return 1;

return 0;

From: Evgeny Novikov novikov@ispras.ru

[ Upstream commit 0d66e04875c5aae876cf3d4f4be7978fa2b00523 ]

goku_probe() goes to error label "err" and invokes goku_remove() in case of failures of pci_enable_device(), pci_resource_start() and ioremap(). goku_remove() gets a device from pci_get_drvdata(pdev) and works with it without any checks, in particular it dereferences a corresponding pointer. But goku_probe() did not set this device yet. So, one can expect various crashes. The patch moves setting the device just after allocation of memory for it.

Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).

Reported-by: Pavel Andrianov andrianov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Evgeny Novikov novikov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi balbi@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c index c3721225b61e..b706ad3034bc 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/goku_udc.c @@ -1757,6 +1757,7 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) goto err; }

+ pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev); spin_lock_init(&dev->lock); dev->pdev = pdev; dev->gadget.ops = &goku_ops; @@ -1790,7 +1791,6 @@ static int goku_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) } dev->regs = (struct goku_udc_regs __iomem *) base;

- pci_set_drvdata(pdev, dev); INFO(dev, "%s\n", driver_desc); INFO(dev, "version: " DRIVER_VERSION " %s\n", dmastr()); INFO(dev, "irq %d, pci mem %p\n", pdev->irq, base);

From: Bob Peterson rpeterso@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit a9dd945ccef07a904e412f208f8de708a3d7159e ]

Gfs2 creates an address space for its rgrps called sd_aspace, but it never called truncate_inode_pages_final on it. This confused vfs greatly which tried to reference the address space after gfs2 had freed the superblock that contained it.

This patch adds a call to truncate_inode_pages_final for sd_aspace, thus avoiding the use-after-free.

Signed-off-by: Bob Peterson rpeterso@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher agruenba@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/gfs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/gfs2/super.c b/fs/gfs2/super.c index a971862b186e..22cd68bd8c9b 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/super.c @@ -934,6 +934,7 @@ static void gfs2_put_super(struct super_block *sb) gfs2_jindex_free(sdp); /* Take apart glock structures and buffer lists */ gfs2_gl_hash_clear(sdp); + truncate_inode_pages_final(&sdp->sd_aspace); gfs2_delete_debugfs_file(sdp); /* Unmount the locking protocol */ gfs2_lm_unmount(sdp);

From: Keita Suzuki keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp

[ Upstream commit af61bc1e33d2c0ec22612b46050f5b58ac56a962 ]

When hpsa_scsi_add_host() fails, h->lastlogicals is leaked since it is missing a free() in the error handler.

Fix this by adding free() when hpsa_scsi_add_host() fails.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201027073125.14229-1-keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.... Tested-by: Don Brace don.brace@microchip.com Acked-by: Don Brace don.brace@microchip.com Signed-off-by: Keita Suzuki keitasuzuki.park@sslab.ics.keio.ac.jp Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/hpsa.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c b/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c index 53259b60e7f1..fb78be02429f 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/hpsa.c @@ -8784,7 +8784,7 @@ static int hpsa_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) /* hook into SCSI subsystem */ rc = hpsa_scsi_add_host(h); if (rc) - goto clean7; /* perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */ + goto clean8; /* lastlogicals, perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */

/* Monitor the controller for firmware lockups */ h->heartbeat_sample_interval = HEARTBEAT_SAMPLE_INTERVAL; @@ -8799,6 +8799,8 @@ static int hpsa_init_one(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) HPSA_EVENT_MONITOR_INTERVAL); return 0;

+clean8: /* lastlogicals, perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */ + kfree(h->lastlogicals); clean7: /* perf, sg, cmd, irq, shost, pci, lu, aer/h */ hpsa_free_performant_mode(h); h->access.set_intr_mask(h, HPSA_INTR_OFF);

From: Evan Quan evan.quan@amd.com

[ Upstream commit 277b080f98803cb73a83fb234f0be83a10e63958 ]

So that the succeeding resume can be performed based on a clean state.

Signed-off-by: Evan Quan evan.quan@amd.com Tested-by: Sandeep Raghuraman sandy.8925@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- .../gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c | 4 ++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h | 1 + drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h | 2 ++ .../gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c | 8 +++++++ 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c index 058898b321b8..d8e624d64ae3 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/hwmgr/smu7_hwmgr.c @@ -1531,6 +1531,10 @@ int smu7_disable_dpm_tasks(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr) PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((tmp_result == 0), "Failed to reset to default!", result = tmp_result);

+ tmp_result = smum_stop_smc(hwmgr); + PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((tmp_result == 0), + "Failed to stop smc!", result = tmp_result); + tmp_result = smu7_force_switch_to_arbf0(hwmgr); PP_ASSERT_WITH_CODE((tmp_result == 0), "Failed to force to switch arbf0!", result = tmp_result); diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h index 6ee864455a12..f59e1e737735 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/hwmgr.h @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ struct pp_smumgr_func { bool (*is_hw_avfs_present)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr); int (*update_dpm_settings)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, void *profile_setting); int (*smc_table_manager)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint8_t *table, uint16_t table_id, bool rw); /*rw: true for read, false for write */ + int (*stop_smc)(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr); };

struct pp_hwmgr_func { diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h index 82550a8a3a3f..ef4f2392e2e7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/inc/smumgr.h @@ -113,4 +113,6 @@ extern int smum_update_dpm_settings(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, void *profile_settin

extern int smum_smc_table_manager(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint8_t *table, uint16_t table_id, bool rw);

+extern int smum_stop_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr); + #endif diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c index db87cb8930d2..0d4dd607e85c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/ci_smumgr.c @@ -2934,6 +2934,29 @@ static int ci_update_smc_table(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint32_t type) return 0; }

+static void ci_reset_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr) +{ + PHM_WRITE_INDIRECT_FIELD(hwmgr->device, CGS_IND_REG__SMC, + SMC_SYSCON_RESET_CNTL, + rst_reg, 1); +} + + +static void ci_stop_smc_clock(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr) +{ + PHM_WRITE_INDIRECT_FIELD(hwmgr->device, CGS_IND_REG__SMC, + SMC_SYSCON_CLOCK_CNTL_0, + ck_disable, 1); +} + +static int ci_stop_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr) +{ + ci_reset_smc(hwmgr); + ci_stop_smc_clock(hwmgr); + + return 0; +} + const struct pp_smumgr_func ci_smu_funcs = { .smu_init = ci_smu_init, .smu_fini = ci_smu_fini, @@ -2957,4 +2980,5 @@ const struct pp_smumgr_func ci_smu_funcs = { .is_dpm_running = ci_is_dpm_running, .update_dpm_settings = ci_update_dpm_settings, .update_smc_table = ci_update_smc_table, + .stop_smc = ci_stop_smc, }; diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c index a6edd5df33b0..20ecf994d47f 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/powerplay/smumgr/smumgr.c @@ -213,3 +213,11 @@ int smum_smc_table_manager(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint8_t *table, uint16_t tabl

return -EINVAL; } + +int smum_stop_smc(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr) +{ + if (hwmgr->smumgr_funcs->stop_smc) + return hwmgr->smumgr_funcs->stop_smc(hwmgr); + + return 0; +}

From: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 14f46c1e5108696ec1e5a129e838ecedf108c7bf ]

When ieee80211_skb_resize() is called from ieee80211_build_hdr() the skb has no 802.11 header yet, in fact it consist only of the payload as the ethernet frame is removed. As such, we're using the payload data for ieee80211_is_mgmt(), which is of course completely wrong. This didn't really hurt us because these are always data frames, so we could only have added more tailroom than we needed if we determined it was a management frame and sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt was false.

However, syzbot found that of course there need not be any payload, so we're using at best uninitialized memory for the check.

Fix this to pass explicitly the kind of frame that we have instead of checking there, by replacing the "bool may_encrypt" argument with an argument that can carry the three possible states - it's not going to be encrypted, it's a management frame, or it's a data frame (and then we check sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt).

Reported-by: syzbot+32fd1a1bfe355e93f1e2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201009132538.e1fd7f802947.I799b288466ea2815f9d4c... Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg johannes.berg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/mac80211/tx.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/tx.c b/net/mac80211/tx.c index 3160ffd93a15..98d048630ad2 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/tx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/tx.c @@ -1908,19 +1908,24 @@ static bool ieee80211_tx(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,

/* device xmit handlers */

+enum ieee80211_encrypt { + ENCRYPT_NO, + ENCRYPT_MGMT, + ENCRYPT_DATA, +}; + static int ieee80211_skb_resize(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, struct sk_buff *skb, - int head_need, bool may_encrypt) + int head_need, + enum ieee80211_encrypt encrypt) { struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; bool enc_tailroom; int tail_need = 0;

- hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; - enc_tailroom = may_encrypt && - (sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt || - ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)); + enc_tailroom = encrypt == ENCRYPT_MGMT || + (encrypt == ENCRYPT_DATA && + sdata->crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt);

if (enc_tailroom) { tail_need = IEEE80211_ENCRYPT_TAILROOM; @@ -1952,23 +1957,29 @@ void ieee80211_xmit(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, { struct ieee80211_local *local = sdata->local; struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb); - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr; + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; int headroom; - bool may_encrypt; + enum ieee80211_encrypt encrypt;

- may_encrypt = !(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT); + if (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT) + encrypt = ENCRYPT_NO; + else if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control)) + encrypt = ENCRYPT_MGMT; + else + encrypt = ENCRYPT_DATA;

headroom = local->tx_headroom; - if (may_encrypt) + if (encrypt != ENCRYPT_NO) headroom += sdata->encrypt_headroom; headroom -= skb_headroom(skb); headroom = max_t(int, 0, headroom);

- if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, headroom, may_encrypt)) { + if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, headroom, encrypt)) { ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb); return; }

+ /* reload after potential resize */ hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data; info->control.vif = &sdata->vif;

@@ -2751,7 +2762,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *ieee80211_build_hdr(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, head_need += sdata->encrypt_headroom; head_need += local->tx_headroom; head_need = max_t(int, 0, head_need); - if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, head_need, true)) { + if (ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, head_need, ENCRYPT_DATA)) { ieee80211_free_txskb(&local->hw, skb); skb = NULL; return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -3414,7 +3425,7 @@ static bool ieee80211_xmit_fast(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, if (unlikely(ieee80211_skb_resize(sdata, skb, max_t(int, extra_head + hw_headroom - skb_headroom(skb), 0), - false))) { + ENCRYPT_NO))) { kfree_skb(skb); return true; }

From: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de

[ Upstream commit 5faf50e9e9fdc2117c61ff7e20da49cd6a29e0ca ]

alua_bus_detach() might be running concurrently with alua_rtpg_work(), so we might trip over h->sdev == NULL and call BUG_ON(). The correct way of handling it is to not set h->sdev to NULL in alua_bus_detach(), and call rcu_synchronize() before the final delete to ensure that all concurrent threads have left the critical section. Then we can get rid of the BUG_ON() and replace it with a simple if condition.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1600167537-12509-1-git-send-email-jitendra.khasdev... Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200924104559.26753-1-hare@suse.de Cc: Brian Bunker brian@purestorage.com Acked-by: Brian Bunker brian@purestorage.com Tested-by: Jitendra Khasdev jitendra.khasdev@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Jitendra Khasdev jitendra.khasdev@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke hare@suse.de Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c index c95c782b93a5..60c48dc5d945 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_alua.c @@ -672,8 +672,8 @@ static int alua_rtpg(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct alua_port_group *pg) rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(h, &tmp_pg->dh_list, node) { - /* h->sdev should always be valid */ - BUG_ON(!h->sdev); + if (!h->sdev) + continue; h->sdev->access_state = desc[0]; } rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -719,7 +719,8 @@ static int alua_rtpg(struct scsi_device *sdev, struct alua_port_group *pg) pg->expiry = 0; rcu_read_lock(); list_for_each_entry_rcu(h, &pg->dh_list, node) { - BUG_ON(!h->sdev); + if (!h->sdev) + continue; h->sdev->access_state = (pg->state & SCSI_ACCESS_STATE_MASK); if (pg->pref) @@ -1160,7 +1161,6 @@ static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev) spin_lock(&h->pg_lock); pg = rcu_dereference_protected(h->pg, lockdep_is_held(&h->pg_lock)); rcu_assign_pointer(h->pg, NULL); - h->sdev = NULL; spin_unlock(&h->pg_lock); if (pg) { spin_lock_irq(&pg->lock); @@ -1169,6 +1169,7 @@ static void alua_bus_detach(struct scsi_device *sdev) kref_put(&pg->kref, release_port_group); } sdev->handler_data = NULL; + synchronize_rcu(); kfree(h); }

From: Qian Cai cai@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit de5d9dae150ca1c1b5c7676711a9ca139d1a8dec ]

The call to rcu_cpu_starting() in smp_init_secondary() is not early enough in the CPU-hotplug onlining process, which results in lockdep splats as follows:

WARNING: suspicious RCU usage ----------------------------- kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3497 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

RCU used illegally from offline CPU! rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 1 no locks held by swapper/1/0.

Call Trace: show_stack+0x158/0x1f0 dump_stack+0x1f2/0x238 __lock_acquire+0x2640/0x4dd0 lock_acquire+0x3a8/0xd08 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xc0/0xf0 clockevents_register_device+0xa8/0x528 init_cpu_timer+0x33e/0x468 smp_init_secondary+0x11a/0x328 smp_start_secondary+0x82/0x88

This is avoided by moving the call to rcu_cpu_starting up near the beginning of the smp_init_secondary() function. Note that the raw_smp_processor_id() is required in order to avoid calling into lockdep before RCU has declared the CPU to be watched for readers.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/160223032121.7002.1269740091547117869.tip-bot2@... Signed-off-by: Qian Cai cai@redhat.com Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney paulmck@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens hca@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/kernel/smp.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c b/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c index 8e31dfd85de3..888f247c9261 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/smp.c @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void __init smp_detect_cpus(void) */ static void smp_start_secondary(void *cpuvoid) { - int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();

S390_lowcore.last_update_clock = get_tod_clock(); S390_lowcore.restart_stack = (unsigned long) restart_stack; @@ -844,6 +844,7 @@ static void smp_start_secondary(void *cpuvoid) set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY); set_cpu_flag(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY); cpu_init(); + rcu_cpu_starting(cpu); preempt_disable(); init_cpu_timer(); vtime_init();

From: Tommi Rantala tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com

[ Upstream commit f3ae6c6e8a3ea49076d826c64e63ea78fbf9db43 ]

Makefile already contains -D_GNU_SOURCE, so we can remove it from the *.c files.

Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala tommi.t.rantala@nokia.com Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c | 1 - tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c | 1 - tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c b/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c index fcff7047000d..8edaafc2b92f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-loadavg-001.c @@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Test that /proc/loadavg correctly reports last pid in pid namespace. */ -#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <errno.h> #include <sched.h> #include <sys/types.h> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c b/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c index 5ab5f4810e43..7b9018fad092 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-self-syscall.c @@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -#define _GNU_SOURCE #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/types.h> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c b/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c index 30e2b7849089..e7ceabed7f51 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/proc/proc-uptime-002.c @@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ */ // Test that values in /proc/uptime increment monotonically // while shifting across CPUs. -#define _GNU_SOURCE #undef NDEBUG #include <assert.h> #include <unistd.h>

From: Chunyan Zhang zhang.lyra@gmail.com

commit 5167c506d62dd9ffab73eba23c79b0a8845c9fe1 upstream.

Suspend to IDLE invokes tick_unfreeze() on resume. tick_unfreeze() on the first resuming CPU resumes timekeeping, which also has the side effect of resetting the softlockup watchdog on this CPU.

But on the secondary CPUs the watchdog is not reset in the resume / unfreeze() path, which can result in false softlockup warnings on those CPUs depending on the time spent in suspend.

Prevent this by clearing the softlock watchdog in the unfreeze path also on the secondary resuming CPUs.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Signed-off-by: Chunyan Zhang chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200110083902.27276-1-chunyan.zhang@unisoc.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/time/tick-common.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-common.c b/kernel/time/tick-common.c index a02e0f6b287c..0a3cc37e4b83 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-common.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-common.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> +#include <linux/nmi.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/profile.h> #include <linux/sched.h> @@ -520,6 +521,7 @@ void tick_unfreeze(void) trace_suspend_resume(TPS("timekeeping_freeze"), smp_processor_id(), false); } else { + touch_softlockup_watchdog(); tick_resume_local(); }

From: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com

[ Upstream commit f3c75e7a9349d1d33eb53ddc1b31640994969f73 ]

When GPIO library asks pin control to set the bias, it doesn't pass any value of it and argument is considered boolean (and this is true for ACPI GpioIo() / GpioInt() resources, by the way). Thus, individual drivers must behave well, when they got the resistance value of 1 Ohm, i.e. transforming it to sane default.

In case of Intel pin control hardware the 5 kOhm sounds plausible because on one hand it's a minimum of resistors present in all hardware generations and at the same time it's high enough to minimize leakage current (will be only 200 uA with the above choice).

Fixes: e57725eabf87 ("pinctrl: intel: Add support for hardware debouncer") Reported-by: Jamie McClymont jamie@kwiius.com Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Acked-by: Mika Westerberg mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c b/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c index 89ff2795a8b5..5e0adb00b430 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/intel/pinctrl-intel.c @@ -621,6 +621,10 @@ static int intel_config_set_pull(struct intel_pinctrl *pctrl, unsigned pin,

value |= PADCFG1_TERM_UP;

+ /* Set default strength value in case none is given */ + if (arg == 1) + arg = 5000; + switch (arg) { case 20000: value |= PADCFG1_TERM_20K << PADCFG1_TERM_SHIFT; @@ -643,6 +647,10 @@ static int intel_config_set_pull(struct intel_pinctrl *pctrl, unsigned pin, case PIN_CONFIG_BIAS_PULL_DOWN: value &= ~(PADCFG1_TERM_UP | PADCFG1_TERM_MASK);

+ /* Set default strength value in case none is given */ + if (arg == 1) + arg = 5000; + switch (arg) { case 20000: value |= PADCFG1_TERM_20K << PADCFG1_TERM_SHIFT;

From: Billy Tsai billy_tsai@aspeedtech.com

[ Upstream commit 9b92f5c51e9a41352d665f6f956bd95085a56a83 ]

Some gpio pin at aspeed soc is input only and the prefix name of these pin is "GPI" only. This patch fine-tune the condition of GPIO check from "GPIO" to "GPI" and it will fix the usage error of banks D and E in the AST2400/AST2500 and banks T and U in the AST2600.

Fixes: 4d3d0e4272d8 ("pinctrl: Add core support for Aspeed SoCs") Signed-off-by: Billy Tsai billy_tsai@aspeedtech.com Reviewed-by: Andrew Jeffery andrew@aj.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201030055450.29613-1-billy_tsai@aspeedtech.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c b/drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c index aefe3c33dffd..8dec302dc067 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/aspeed/pinctrl-aspeed.c @@ -458,13 +458,14 @@ int aspeed_pinmux_set_mux(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev, unsigned int function, static bool aspeed_expr_is_gpio(const struct aspeed_sig_expr *expr) { /* - * The signal type is GPIO if the signal name has "GPIO" as a prefix. + * The signal type is GPIO if the signal name has "GPI" as a prefix. * strncmp (rather than strcmp) is used to implement the prefix * requirement. * - * expr->signal might look like "GPIOT3" in the GPIO case. + * expr->signal might look like "GPIOB1" in the GPIO case. + * expr->signal might look like "GPIT0" in the GPI case. */ - return strncmp(expr->signal, "GPIO", 4) == 0; + return strncmp(expr->signal, "GPI", 3) == 0; }

static bool aspeed_gpio_in_exprs(const struct aspeed_sig_expr **exprs)

From: "Darrick J. Wong" darrick.wong@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit ea8439899c0b15a176664df62aff928010fad276 ]

Pass the same oldext argument (which contains the existing rmapping's unwritten state) to xfs_rmap_lookup_le_range at the start of xfs_rmap_convert_shared. At this point in the code, flags is zero, which means that we perform lookups using the wrong key.

Fixes: 3f165b334e51 ("xfs: convert unwritten status of reverse mappings for shared files") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c index 245af452840e..ab3e72e702f0 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap.c @@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ xfs_rmap_convert_shared( * record for our insertion point. This will also give us the record for * start block contiguity tests. */ - error = xfs_rmap_lookup_le_range(cur, bno, owner, offset, flags, + error = xfs_rmap_lookup_le_range(cur, bno, owner, offset, oldext, &PREV, &i); if (error) goto done;

From: "Darrick J. Wong" darrick.wong@oracle.com

[ Upstream commit 6ff646b2ceb0eec916101877f38da0b73e3a5b7f ]

Keys for extent interval records in the reverse mapping btree are supposed to be computed as follows:

(physical block, owner, fork, is_btree, is_unwritten, offset)

This provides users the ability to look up a reverse mapping from a bmbt record -- start with the physical block; then if there are multiple records for the same block, move on to the owner; then the inode fork type; and so on to the file offset.

However, the key comparison functions incorrectly remove the fork/btree/unwritten information that's encoded in the on-disk offset. This means that lookup comparisons are only done with:

(physical block, owner, offset)

This means that queries can return incorrect results. On consistent filesystems this hasn't been an issue because blocks are never shared between forks or with bmbt blocks; and are never unwritten. However, this bug means that online repair cannot always detect corruption in the key information in internal rmapbt nodes.

Found by fuzzing keys[1].attrfork = ones on xfs/371.

Fixes: 4b8ed67794fe ("xfs: add rmap btree operations") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong darrick.wong@oracle.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c index f79cf040d745..77528f413286 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c +++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_rmap_btree.c @@ -247,8 +247,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_key_diff( else if (y > x) return -1;

- x = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(kp->rm_offset)); - y = rec->rm_offset; + x = be64_to_cpu(kp->rm_offset); + y = xfs_rmap_irec_offset_pack(rec); if (x > y) return 1; else if (y > x) @@ -279,8 +279,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_diff_two_keys( else if (y > x) return -1;

- x = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(kp1->rm_offset)); - y = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(kp2->rm_offset)); + x = be64_to_cpu(kp1->rm_offset); + y = be64_to_cpu(kp2->rm_offset); if (x > y) return 1; else if (y > x) @@ -393,8 +393,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_keys_inorder( return 1; else if (a > b) return 0; - a = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(k1->rmap.rm_offset)); - b = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(k2->rmap.rm_offset)); + a = be64_to_cpu(k1->rmap.rm_offset); + b = be64_to_cpu(k2->rmap.rm_offset); if (a <= b) return 1; return 0; @@ -423,8 +423,8 @@ xfs_rmapbt_recs_inorder( return 1; else if (a > b) return 0; - a = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(r1->rmap.rm_offset)); - b = XFS_RMAP_OFF(be64_to_cpu(r2->rmap.rm_offset)); + a = be64_to_cpu(r1->rmap.rm_offset); + b = be64_to_cpu(r2->rmap.rm_offset); if (a <= b) return 1; return 0;

From: Sven Van Asbroeck thesven73@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 2b52a4b65bc8f14520fe6e996ea7fb3f7e400761 ]

In the net core, the struct net_device_ops -> ndo_set_rx_mode() callback is called with the dev->addr_list_lock spinlock held.

However, this driver's ndo_set_rx_mode callback eventually calls lan743x_dp_write(), which acquires a mutex. Mutex acquisition may sleep, and this is not allowed when holding a spinlock.

Fix by removing the dp_lock mutex entirely. Its purpose is to prevent concurrent accesses to the data port. No concurrent accesses are possible, because the dev->addr_list_lock spinlock in the core only lets through one thread at a time.

Fixes: 23f0703c125b ("lan743x: Add main source files for new lan743x driver") Signed-off-by: Sven Van Asbroeck thesven73@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109203828.5115-1-TheSven73@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c | 12 +++--------- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h | 3 --- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c index 208341541087..085fdceb3821 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.c @@ -672,14 +672,12 @@ static int lan743x_intr_open(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter) static int lan743x_dp_write(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter, u32 select, u32 addr, u32 length, u32 *buf) { - int ret = -EIO; u32 dp_sel; int i;

- mutex_lock(&adapter->dp_lock); if (lan743x_csr_wait_for_bit(adapter, DP_SEL, DP_SEL_DPRDY_, 1, 40, 100, 100)) - goto unlock; + return -EIO; dp_sel = lan743x_csr_read(adapter, DP_SEL); dp_sel &= ~DP_SEL_MASK_; dp_sel |= select; @@ -691,13 +689,10 @@ static int lan743x_dp_write(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter, lan743x_csr_write(adapter, DP_CMD, DP_CMD_WRITE_); if (lan743x_csr_wait_for_bit(adapter, DP_SEL, DP_SEL_DPRDY_, 1, 40, 100, 100)) - goto unlock; + return -EIO; } - ret = 0;

-unlock: - mutex_unlock(&adapter->dp_lock); - return ret; + return 0; }

static u32 lan743x_mac_mii_access(u16 id, u16 index, int read) @@ -2679,7 +2674,6 @@ static int lan743x_hardware_init(struct lan743x_adapter *adapter,

adapter->intr.irq = adapter->pdev->irq; lan743x_csr_write(adapter, INT_EN_CLR, 0xFFFFFFFF); - mutex_init(&adapter->dp_lock);

ret = lan743x_gpio_init(adapter); if (ret) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h index 2d6eea18973e..77273be2d1ee 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_main.h @@ -702,9 +702,6 @@ struct lan743x_adapter { struct lan743x_csr csr; struct lan743x_intr intr;

- /* lock, used to prevent concurrent access to data port */ - struct mutex dp_lock; - struct lan743x_gpio gpio; struct lan743x_ptp ptp;

From: Evan Nimmo evan.nimmo@alliedtelesis.co.nz

[ Upstream commit a5bea04fcc0b3c0aec71ee1fd58fd4ff7ee36177 ]

Commit dabf6b36b83a ("of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc") added a check to of_dma_is_coherent which returns early if OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT is enabled. This results in the of_node_put() being skipped causing a memory leak. Moved the of_node_get() below this check so we now we only get the node if OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT is not enabled.

Fixes: dabf6b36b83a ("of: Add OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT & select it on powerpc") Signed-off-by: Evan Nimmo evan.nimmo@alliedtelesis.co.nz Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110022825.30895-1-evan.nimmo@alliedtelesis.co... Signed-off-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/of/address.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/of/address.c b/drivers/of/address.c index c42aebba35ab..30806dd35735 100644 --- a/drivers/of/address.c +++ b/drivers/of/address.c @@ -975,11 +975,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(of_dma_get_range); */ bool of_dma_is_coherent(struct device_node *np) { - struct device_node *node = of_node_get(np); + struct device_node *node;

if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_OF_DMA_DEFAULT_COHERENT)) return true;

+ node = of_node_get(np); + while (node) { if (of_property_read_bool(node, "dma-coherent")) { of_node_put(node);

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

[ Upstream commit ce0f17fc93f63ee91428af10b7b2ddef38cd19e5 ]

One should use in_serving_softirq() to detect SoftIRQ context.

Fixes: 96f6d4444302 ("perf_counter: avoid recursion") Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201030151955.120572175@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- kernel/events/internal.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/internal.h b/kernel/events/internal.h index 6dc725a7e7bc..8fc0ddc38cb6 100644 --- a/kernel/events/internal.h +++ b/kernel/events/internal.h @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static inline int get_recursion_context(int *recursion) rctx = 3; else if (in_irq()) rctx = 2; - else if (in_softirq()) + else if (in_serving_softirq()) rctx = 1; else rctx = 0;

From: Joseph Qi joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com

commit 7067b2619017d51e71686ca9756b454de0e5826a upstream.

It takes xattr_sem to check inline data again but without unlock it in case not have. So unlock it before return.

Fixes: aef1c8513c1f ("ext4: let ext4_truncate handle inline data correctly") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Cc: Tao Ma boyu.mt@taobao.com Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger adilger@dilger.ca Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604370542-124630-1-git-send-email-joseph.qi@linux... Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ext4/inline.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 4572cb057951..c95246187659 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -1921,6 +1921,7 @@ int ext4_inline_data_truncate(struct inode *inode, int *has_inline)

ext4_write_lock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); if (!ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) { + ext4_write_unlock_xattr(inode, &no_expand); *has_inline = 0; ext4_journal_stop(handle); return 0;

From: Anand Jain anand.jain@oracle.com

commit cf89af146b7e62af55470cf5f3ec3c56ec144a5e upstream.

If there is a device BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID without the device replace item, then it means the filesystem is inconsistent state. This is either corruption or a crafted image. Fail the mount as this needs a closer look what is actually wrong.

As of now if BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID is present without the replace item, in __btrfs_free_extra_devids() we determine that there is an extra device, and free those extra devices but continue to mount the device. However, we were wrong in keeping tack of the rw_devices so the syzbot testcase failed:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3612 at fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1166 close_fs_devices.part.0+0x607/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1166 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 3612 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x198/0x1fd lib/dump_stack.c:118 panic+0x347/0x7c0 kernel/panic.c:231 __warn.cold+0x20/0x46 kernel/panic.c:600 report_bug+0x1bd/0x210 lib/bug.c:198 handle_bug+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:234 exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:254 asm_exc_invalid_op+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:536 RIP: 0010:close_fs_devices.part.0+0x607/0x800 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1166 RSP: 0018:ffffc900091777e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000040000 RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: ffffc9000c8b7000 RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff83097f47 RDI: 0000000000000007 RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8880988a187f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88809593a130 R13: ffff88809593a1ec R14: ffff8880988a1908 R15: ffff88809593a050 close_fs_devices fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1193 [inline] btrfs_close_devices+0x95/0x1f0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:1179 open_ctree+0x4984/0x4a2d fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3434 btrfs_fill_super fs/btrfs/super.c:1316 [inline] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x14/0x165 fs/btrfs/super.c:1672

The fix here is, when we determine that there isn't a replace item then fail the mount if there is a replace target device (devid 0).

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reported-by: syzbot+4cfe71a4da060be47502@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Anand Jain anand.jain@oracle.com Reviewed-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: David Sterba dsterba@suse.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 26 +++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c b/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c index 36c0490156ac..4d1d2657d70c 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c @@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ int btrfs_init_dev_replace(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, dev_root, &key, path, 0, 0); if (ret) { no_valid_dev_replace_entry_found: + /* + * We don't have a replace item or it's corrupted. If there is + * a replace target, fail the mount. + */ + if (btrfs_find_device(fs_info->fs_devices, + BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID, NULL, NULL, false)) { + btrfs_err(fs_info, + "found replace target device without a valid replace item"); + ret = -EUCLEAN; + goto out; + } ret = 0; dev_replace->replace_state = BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_ITEM_STATE_NEVER_STARTED; @@ -107,8 +118,19 @@ int btrfs_init_dev_replace(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info) case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_NEVER_STARTED: case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_FINISHED: case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_CANCELED: - dev_replace->srcdev = NULL; - dev_replace->tgtdev = NULL; + /* + * We don't have an active replace item but if there is a + * replace target, fail the mount. + */ + if (btrfs_find_device(fs_info->fs_devices, + BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID, NULL, NULL, false)) { + btrfs_err(fs_info, + "replace devid present without an active replace item"); + ret = -EUCLEAN; + } else { + dev_replace->srcdev = NULL; + dev_replace->tgtdev = NULL; + } break; case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_STARTED: case BTRFS_IOCTL_DEV_REPLACE_STATE_SUSPENDED: diff --git a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c index 58be80e8c61d..9c5dfeeaf9a8 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/volumes.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/volumes.c @@ -974,22 +974,13 @@ void btrfs_free_extra_devids(struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_devices, int step) continue; }

- if (device->devid == BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID) { - /* - * In the first step, keep the device which has - * the correct fsid and the devid that is used - * for the dev_replace procedure. - * In the second step, the dev_replace state is - * read from the device tree and it is known - * whether the procedure is really active or - * not, which means whether this device is - * used or whether it should be removed. - */ - if (step == 0 || test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT, - &device->dev_state)) { - continue; - } - } + /* + * We have already validated the presence of BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID, + * in btrfs_init_dev_replace() so just continue. + */ + if (device->devid == BTRFS_DEV_REPLACE_DEVID) + continue; + if (device->bdev) { blkdev_put(device->bdev, device->mode); device->bdev = NULL; @@ -998,9 +989,6 @@ void btrfs_free_extra_devids(struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_devices, int step) if (test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state)) { list_del_init(&device->dev_alloc_list); clear_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_WRITEABLE, &device->dev_state); - if (!test_bit(BTRFS_DEV_STATE_REPLACE_TGT, - &device->dev_state)) - fs_devices->rw_devices--; } list_del_init(&device->dev_list); fs_devices->num_devices--;

From: Jing Xiangfeng jingxiangfeng@huawei.com

commit 7342ca34d931a357d408aaa25fadd031e46af137 upstream.

ring_request_msix() misses to call ida_simple_remove() in an error path. Add a label 'err_ida_remove' and jump to it.

Fixes: 046bee1f9ab8 ("thunderbolt: Add MSI-X support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jing Xiangfeng jingxiangfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c b/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c index d436a1534fc2..384623c49cfe 100644 --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/nhi.c @@ -408,12 +408,23 @@ static int ring_request_msix(struct tb_ring *ring, bool no_suspend)

ring->vector = ret;

- ring->irq = pci_irq_vector(ring->nhi->pdev, ring->vector); - if (ring->irq < 0) - return ring->irq; + ret = pci_irq_vector(ring->nhi->pdev, ring->vector); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_ida_remove; + + ring->irq = ret;

irqflags = no_suspend ? IRQF_NO_SUSPEND : 0; - return request_irq(ring->irq, ring_msix, irqflags, "thunderbolt", ring); + ret = request_irq(ring->irq, ring_msix, irqflags, "thunderbolt", ring); + if (ret) + goto err_ida_remove; + + return 0; + +err_ida_remove: + ida_simple_remove(&nhi->msix_ida, ring->vector); + + return ret; }

static void ring_release_msix(struct tb_ring *ring)

From: Chris Brandt chris.brandt@renesas.com

commit 6d853c9e4104b4fc8d55dc9cd3b99712aa347174 upstream.

Renesas R-Car and RZ/G SoCs have a firmware download mode over USB. However, on reset a banner string is transmitted out which is not expected to be echoed back and will corrupt the protocol.

Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Oliver Neukum oneukum@suse.com Signed-off-by: Chris Brandt chris.brandt@renesas.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201111131209.3977903-1-chris.brandt@renesas.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c index 08751d1a765f..e0d8da4e3967 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c @@ -1738,6 +1738,15 @@ static const struct usb_device_id acm_ids[] = { { USB_DEVICE(0x0870, 0x0001), /* Metricom GS Modem */ .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */ }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x045b, 0x023c), /* Renesas USB Download mode */ + .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, /* Don't echo banner */ + }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x045b, 0x0248), /* Renesas USB Download mode */ + .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, /* Don't echo banner */ + }, + { USB_DEVICE(0x045b, 0x024D), /* Renesas USB Download mode */ + .driver_info = DISABLE_ECHO, /* Don't echo banner */ + }, { USB_DEVICE(0x0e8d, 0x0003), /* FIREFLY, MediaTek Inc; andrey.arapov@gmail.com */ .driver_info = NO_UNION_NORMAL, /* has no union descriptor */ },

From: Alexander Usyskin alexander.usyskin@intel.com

commit bcbc0b2e275f0a797de11a10eff495b4571863fc upstream.

A receive callback is queued while the client is still connected but can still be called after the client was disconnected. Upon disconnect cl->me_cl is set to NULL, hence we need to check that ME client is not-NULL in mei_cl_mtu to avoid null dereference.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexander Usyskin alexander.usyskin@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tomas Winkler tomas.winkler@intel.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201029095444.957924-2-tomas.winkler@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/misc/mei/client.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/misc/mei/client.h b/drivers/misc/mei/client.h index 64e318f589b4..0d23efcc74ff 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/mei/client.h +++ b/drivers/misc/mei/client.h @@ -138,11 +138,11 @@ static inline u8 mei_cl_me_id(const struct mei_cl *cl) * * @cl: host client * - * Return: mtu + * Return: mtu or 0 if client is not connected */ static inline size_t mei_cl_mtu(const struct mei_cl *cl) { - return cl->me_cl->props.max_msg_length; + return cl->me_cl ? cl->me_cl->props.max_msg_length : 0; }

/**

From: Wengang Wang wen.gang.wang@oracle.com

commit f5785283dd64867a711ca1fb1f5bb172f252ecdf upstream.

Though problem if found on a lower 4.1.12 kernel, I think upstream has same issue.

In one node in the cluster, there is the following callback trace:

# cat /proc/21473/stack __ocfs2_cluster_lock.isra.36+0x336/0x9e0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_inode_lock_full_nested+0x121/0x520 [ocfs2] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x152/0x820 [ocfs2] evict+0xae/0x1a0 iput+0x1c6/0x230 ocfs2_orphan_filldir+0x5d/0x100 [ocfs2] ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk+0x490/0x4f0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_dir_foreach+0x29/0x30 [ocfs2] ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x1b6/0x9a0 [ocfs2] ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x1de/0x5c0 [ocfs2] process_one_work+0x169/0x4a0 worker_thread+0x5b/0x560 kthread+0xcb/0xf0 ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90

The above stack is not reasonable, the final iput shouldn't happen in ocfs2_orphan_filldir() function. Looking at the code,

2067 /* Skip inodes which are already added to recover list, since dio may 2068 * happen concurrently with unlink/rename */ 2069 if (OCFS2_I(iter)->ip_next_orphan) { 2070 iput(iter); 2071 return 0; 2072 } 2073

The logic thinks the inode is already in recover list on seeing ip_next_orphan is non-NULL, so it skip this inode after dropping a reference which incremented in ocfs2_iget().

While, if the inode is already in recover list, it should have another reference and the iput() at line 2070 should not be the final iput (dropping the last reference). So I don't think the inode is really in the recover list (no vmcore to confirm).

Note that ocfs2_queue_orphans(), though not shown up in the call back trace, is holding cluster lock on the orphan directory when looking up for unlinked inodes. The on disk inode eviction could involve a lot of IOs which may need long time to finish. That means this node could hold the cluster lock for very long time, that can lead to the lock requests (from other nodes) to the orhpan directory hang for long time.

Looking at more on ip_next_orphan, I found it's not initialized when allocating a new ocfs2_inode_info structure.

This causes te reflink operations from some nodes hang for very long time waiting for the cluster lock on the orphan directory.

Fix: initialize ip_next_orphan as NULL.

Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang wen.gang.wang@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com Cc: Mark Fasheh mark@fasheh.com Cc: Joel Becker jlbec@evilplan.org Cc: Junxiao Bi junxiao.bi@oracle.com Cc: Changwei Ge gechangwei@live.cn Cc: Gang He ghe@suse.com Cc: Jun Piao piaojun@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201109171746.27884-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/ocfs2/super.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/super.c b/fs/ocfs2/super.c index 2658d91c1f7b..09bc2cf5f61c 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/super.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/super.c @@ -1747,6 +1747,7 @@ static void ocfs2_inode_init_once(void *data)

oi->ip_blkno = 0ULL; oi->ip_clusters = 0; + oi->ip_next_orphan = NULL;

ocfs2_resv_init_once(&oi->ip_la_data_resv);

From: Chen Zhou chenzhou10@huawei.com

commit c350f8bea271782e2733419bd2ab9bf4ec2051ef upstream.

Fix to return a negative error code from the error handling case instead of 0 in function sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(), as done elsewhere in this function.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 409dcf31538a ("selinux: Add a cache for quicker retreival of PKey SIDs") Reported-by: Hulk Robot hulkci@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou chenzhou10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Paul Moore paul@paul-moore.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- security/selinux/ibpkey.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c index 0a4b89d48297..cb05ae28ce00 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c +++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c @@ -161,8 +161,10 @@ static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid) * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache. */ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!new) + if (!new) { + ret = -ENOMEM; goto out; + }

new->psec.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix; new->psec.pkey = pkey_num;

From: Arnaud de Turckheim quarium@gmail.com

commit 23a7fdc06ebcc334fa667f0550676b035510b70b upstream.

This fixes the COS Enable Register value for enabling/disabling the corresponding IRQs bank.

Fixes: 585562046628 ("gpio: Add GPIO support for the ACCES PCIe-IDIO-24 family") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaud de Turckheim quarium@gmail.com Reviewed-by: William Breathitt Gray vilhelm.gray@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski bgolaszewski@baylibre.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c index 95b2bb2bd035..ea48c458967c 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpio-pcie-idio-24.c @@ -360,13 +360,13 @@ static void idio_24_irq_mask(struct irq_data *data) unsigned long flags; const unsigned long bit_offset = irqd_to_hwirq(data) - 24; unsigned char new_irq_mask; - const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset/8 * 8; + const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset / 8; unsigned char cos_enable_state;

raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&idio24gpio->lock, flags);

idio24gpio->irq_mask &= ~BIT(bit_offset); - new_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset; + new_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset * 8;

if (!new_irq_mask) { cos_enable_state = ioread8(&idio24gpio->reg->cos_enable); @@ -389,12 +389,12 @@ static void idio_24_irq_unmask(struct irq_data *data) unsigned long flags; unsigned char prev_irq_mask; const unsigned long bit_offset = irqd_to_hwirq(data) - 24; - const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset/8 * 8; + const unsigned long bank_offset = bit_offset / 8; unsigned char cos_enable_state;

raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&idio24gpio->lock, flags);

- prev_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset; + prev_irq_mask = idio24gpio->irq_mask >> bank_offset * 8; idio24gpio->irq_mask |= BIT(bit_offset);

if (!prev_irq_mask) {

From: Yoshihiro Shimoda yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com

commit e8973201d9b281375b5a8c66093de5679423021a upstream.

The commit 94b110aff867 ("mmc: tmio: add tmio_mmc_host_alloc/free()") added tmio_mmc_host_free(), but missed the function calling in the sh_mobile_sdhi_remove() at that time. So, fix it. Otherwise, we cannot rebind the sdhi/mmc devices when we use aliases of mmc.

Fixes: 94b110aff867 ("mmc: tmio: add tmio_mmc_host_alloc/free()") Signed-off-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda yoshihiro.shimoda.uh@renesas.com Reviewed-by: Wolfram Sang wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com Tested-by: Wolfram Sang wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com Reviewed-by: Niklas Söderlund niklas.soderlund+renesas@ragnatech.se Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1604654730-29914-1-git-send-email-yoshihiro.shimod... Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson ulf.hansson@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c b/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c index 61f0faddfd88..e8ab582551f8 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/renesas_sdhi_core.c @@ -764,6 +764,7 @@ int renesas_sdhi_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)

tmio_mmc_host_remove(host); renesas_sdhi_clk_disable(host); + tmio_mmc_host_free(host);

return 0; }

From: Thomas Zimmermann tzimmermann@suse.de

commit 06ad8d339524bf94b89859047822c31df6ace239 upstream.

The gma500 driver expects 3 pipelines in several it's IRQ functions. Accessing struct drm_device.vblank[], this fails with devices that only have 2 pipelines. An example KASAN report is shown below.

[ 62.267688] ================================================================== [ 62.268856] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx] [ 62.269450] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880012bc6d0 by task systemd-udevd/285 [ 62.269949] [ 62.270192] CPU: 0 PID: 285 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G E 5.10.0-rc1-1-default+ #572 [ 62.270807] Hardware name: /DN2800MT, BIOS MTCDT10N.86A.0164.2012.1213.1024 12/13/2012 [ 62.271366] Call Trace: [ 62.271705] dump_stack+0xae/0xe5 [ 62.272180] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x17/0xf0 [ 62.272987] ? psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx] [ 62.273474] __kasan_report.cold+0x20/0x38 [ 62.273989] ? psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx] [ 62.274460] kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 [ 62.274891] psb_irq_postinstall+0x250/0x3c0 [gma500_gfx] [ 62.275380] drm_irq_install+0x131/0x1f0 <...> [ 62.300751] Allocated by task 285: [ 62.301223] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [ 62.301731] __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xbf/0xd0 [ 62.302293] drmm_kmalloc+0x55/0x100 [ 62.302773] drm_vblank_init+0x77/0x210

Resolve the issue by only handling vblank entries up to the number of CRTCs.

I'm adding a Fixes tag for reference, although the bug has been present since the driver's initial commit.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann tzimmermann@suse.de Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Fixes: 5c49fd3aa0ab ("gma500: Add the core DRM files and headers") Cc: Alan Cox alan@linux.intel.com Cc: Dave Airlie airlied@redhat.com Cc: Patrik Jakobsson patrik.r.jakobsson@gmail.com Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org#v3.3+ Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20201105190256.3893-1-tzimmerm... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c | 34 +++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c index 78eb10902809..076b6da44f46 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/psb_irq.c @@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ int psb_irq_postinstall(struct drm_device *dev) { struct drm_psb_private *dev_priv = dev->dev_private; unsigned long irqflags; + unsigned int i;

spin_lock_irqsave(&dev_priv->irqmask_lock, irqflags);

@@ -362,20 +363,12 @@ int psb_irq_postinstall(struct drm_device *dev) PSB_WVDC32(dev_priv->vdc_irq_mask, PSB_INT_ENABLE_R); PSB_WVDC32(0xFFFFFFFF, PSB_HWSTAM);

- if (dev->vblank[0].enabled) - psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, 0, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - else - psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 0, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - - if (dev->vblank[1].enabled) - psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, 1, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - else - psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 1, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - - if (dev->vblank[2].enabled) - psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, 2, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - else - psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 2, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); + for (i = 0; i < dev->num_crtcs; ++i) { + if (dev->vblank[i].enabled) + psb_enable_pipestat(dev_priv, i, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); + else + psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, i, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); + }

if (dev_priv->ops->hotplug_enable) dev_priv->ops->hotplug_enable(dev, true); @@ -388,6 +381,7 @@ void psb_irq_uninstall(struct drm_device *dev) { struct drm_psb_private *dev_priv = dev->dev_private; unsigned long irqflags; + unsigned int i;

spin_lock_irqsave(&dev_priv->irqmask_lock, irqflags);

@@ -396,14 +390,10 @@ void psb_irq_uninstall(struct drm_device *dev)

PSB_WVDC32(0xFFFFFFFF, PSB_HWSTAM);

- if (dev->vblank[0].enabled) - psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 0, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - - if (dev->vblank[1].enabled) - psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 1, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); - - if (dev->vblank[2].enabled) - psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, 2, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); + for (i = 0; i < dev->num_crtcs; ++i) { + if (dev->vblank[i].enabled) + psb_disable_pipestat(dev_priv, i, PIPE_VBLANK_INTERRUPT_ENABLE); + }

dev_priv->vdc_irq_mask &= _PSB_IRQ_SGX_FLAG | _PSB_IRQ_MSVDX_FLAG |

From: Coiby Xu coiby.xu@gmail.com

commit 06abe8291bc31839950f7d0362d9979edc88a666 upstream.

The correct way to disable debounce filter is to clear bit 5 and 6 of the register.

Cc: stable@vger.kerne.org Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu coiby.xu@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Cc: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-gpio/df2c008b-e7b5-4fdd-42ea-4d1c62b52139@redh... Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201105231912.69527-2-coiby.xu@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij linus.walleij@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c index 46f084aa429d..d6255049e519 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-amd.c @@ -167,14 +167,14 @@ static int amd_gpio_set_debounce(struct gpio_chip *gc, unsigned offset, pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF); pin_reg |= BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF); } else { - pin_reg &= ~DB_CNTRl_MASK; + pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF); ret = -EINVAL; } } else { pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_OUT_UNIT_OFF); pin_reg &= ~BIT(DB_TMR_LARGE_OFF); pin_reg &= ~DB_TMR_OUT_MASK; - pin_reg &= ~DB_CNTRl_MASK; + pin_reg &= ~(DB_CNTRl_MASK << DB_CNTRL_OFF); } writel(pin_reg, gpio_dev->base + offset * 4); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gpio_dev->lock, flags);

From: Stefano Stabellini stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com

commit e9696d259d0fb5d239e8c28ca41089838ea76d13 upstream.

kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:swiotlb_init gets called first and tries to allocate a buffer for the swiotlb. It does so by calling

memblock_alloc_low(PAGE_ALIGN(bytes), PAGE_SIZE);

If the allocation must fail, no_iotlb_memory is set.

Later during initialization swiotlb-xen comes in (drivers/xen/swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init) and given that io_tlb_start is != 0, it thinks the memory is ready to use when actually it is not.

When the swiotlb is actually needed, swiotlb_tbl_map_single gets called and since no_iotlb_memory is set the kernel panics.

Instead, if swiotlb-xen.c:xen_swiotlb_init knew the swiotlb hadn't been initialized, it would do the initialization itself, which might still succeed.

Fix the panic by setting io_tlb_start to 0 on swiotlb initialization failure, and also by setting no_iotlb_memory to false on swiotlb initialization success.

Fixes: ac2cbab21f31 ("x86: Don't panic if can not alloc buffer for swiotlb")

Reported-by: Elliott Mitchell ehem+xen@m5p.com Tested-by: Elliott Mitchell ehem+xen@m5p.com Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk konrad.wilk@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c index 2a8c41f12d45..6f7d4e977c5c 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c @@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ int __init swiotlb_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs, int verbose) io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR; } io_tlb_index = 0; + no_iotlb_memory = false;

if (verbose) swiotlb_print_info(); @@ -270,9 +271,11 @@ swiotlb_init(int verbose) if (vstart && !swiotlb_init_with_tbl(vstart, io_tlb_nslabs, verbose)) return;

- if (io_tlb_start) + if (io_tlb_start) { memblock_free_early(io_tlb_start, PAGE_ALIGN(io_tlb_nslabs << IO_TLB_SHIFT)); + io_tlb_start = 0; + } pr_warn("Cannot allocate buffer"); no_iotlb_memory = true; } @@ -376,6 +379,7 @@ swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl(char *tlb, unsigned long nslabs) io_tlb_orig_addr[i] = INVALID_PHYS_ADDR; } io_tlb_index = 0; + no_iotlb_memory = false;

swiotlb_print_info();

From: Ursula Braun ubraun@linux.ibm.com

[ Upstream commit 4031eeafa71eaf22ae40a15606a134ae86345daf ]

syzbot reported the following KASAN finding:

BUG: KASAN: nullptr-dereference in iucv_send_ctrl+0x390/0x3f0 net/iucv/af_iucv.c:385 Read of size 2 at addr 000000000000021e by task syz-executor907/519

CPU: 0 PID: 519 Comm: syz-executor907 Not tainted 5.9.0-syzkaller-07043-gbcf9877ad213 #0 Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 701 (KVM/Linux) Call Trace: [<00000000c576af60>] unwind_start arch/s390/include/asm/unwind.h:65 [inline] [<00000000c576af60>] show_stack+0x180/0x228 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c:135 [<00000000c9dcd1f8>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] [<00000000c9dcd1f8>] dump_stack+0x268/0x2f0 lib/dump_stack.c:118 [<00000000c5fed016>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x5e/0x218 mm/kasan/report.c:383 [<00000000c5fec82a>] __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:517 [inline] [<00000000c5fec82a>] kasan_report+0x11a/0x168 mm/kasan/report.c:534 [<00000000c98b5b60>] iucv_send_ctrl+0x390/0x3f0 net/iucv/af_iucv.c:385 [<00000000c98b6262>] iucv_sock_shutdown+0x44a/0x4c0 net/iucv/af_iucv.c:1457 [<00000000c89d3a54>] __sys_shutdown+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2204 [<00000000c89d3b70>] __do_sys_shutdown net/socket.c:2212 [inline] [<00000000c89d3b70>] __s390x_sys_shutdown+0x38/0x48 net/socket.c:2210 [<00000000c9e36eac>] system_call+0xe0/0x28c arch/s390/kernel/entry.S:415

There is nothing to shutdown if a connection has never been established. Besides that iucv->hs_dev is not yet initialized if a socket is in IUCV_OPEN state and iucv->path is not yet initialized if socket is in IUCV_BOUND state. So, just skip the shutdown calls for a socket in these states.

Fixes: eac3731bd04c ("[S390]: Add AF_IUCV socket support") Fixes: 82492a355fac ("af_iucv: add shutdown for HS transport") Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik gor@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun ubraun@linux.ibm.com [jwi: correct one Fixes tag] Signed-off-by: Julian Wiedmann jwi@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/iucv/af_iucv.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c index 23a1002ed86d..ad3e515f91f0 100644 --- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c +++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c @@ -1571,7 +1571,8 @@ static int iucv_sock_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) break; }

- if (how == SEND_SHUTDOWN || how == SHUTDOWN_MASK) { + if ((how == SEND_SHUTDOWN || how == SHUTDOWN_MASK) && + sk->sk_state == IUCV_CONNECTED) { if (iucv->transport == AF_IUCV_TRANS_IUCV) { txmsg.class = 0; txmsg.tag = 0;

From: Martin Schiller ms@dev.tdt.de

[ Upstream commit 361182308766a265b6c521879b34302617a8c209 ]

This fixes a regression for blocking connects introduced by commit 4becb7ee5b3d ("net/x25: Fix x25_neigh refcnt leak when x25 disconnect").

The x25->neighbour is already set to "NULL" by x25_disconnect() now, while a blocking connect is waiting in x25_wait_for_connection_establishment(). Therefore x25->neighbour must not be accessed here again and x25->state is also already set to X25_STATE_0 by x25_disconnect().

Fixes: 4becb7ee5b3d ("net/x25: Fix x25_neigh refcnt leak when x25 disconnect") Signed-off-by: Martin Schiller ms@dev.tdt.de Reviewed-by: Xie He xie.he.0141@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201109065449.9014-1-ms@dev.tdt.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/x25/af_x25.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/x25/af_x25.c b/net/x25/af_x25.c index bd1cbbfe5924..372f4194db5a 100644 --- a/net/x25/af_x25.c +++ b/net/x25/af_x25.c @@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static int x25_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; rc = 0; out_put_neigh: - if (rc) { + if (rc && x25->neighbour) { read_lock_bh(&x25_list_lock); x25_neigh_put(x25->neighbour); x25->neighbour = NULL;

From: Martin Willi martin@strongswan.org

[ Upstream commit 9e2b7fa2df4365e99934901da4fb4af52d81e820 ]

VRF devices use an optimized direct path on output if a default qdisc is involved, calling Netfilter hooks directly. This path, however, does not consider Netfilter rules completing asynchronously, such as with NFQUEUE. The Netfilter okfn() is called for asynchronously accepted packets, but the VRF never passes that packet down the stack to send it out over the slave device. Using the slower redirect path for this seems not feasible, as we do not know beforehand if a Netfilter hook has asynchronously completing rules.

Fix the use of asynchronously completing Netfilter rules in OUTPUT and POSTROUTING by using a special completion function that additionally calls dst_output() to pass the packet down the stack. Also, slightly adjust the use of nf_reset_ct() so that is called in the asynchronous case, too.

Fixes: dcdd43c41e60 ("net: vrf: performance improvements for IPv4") Fixes: a9ec54d1b0cd ("net: vrf: performance improvements for IPv6") Signed-off-by: Martin Willi martin@strongswan.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201106073030.3974927-1-martin@strongswan.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/vrf.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/vrf.c b/drivers/net/vrf.c index 7e677182691b..e745e2c09578 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vrf.c +++ b/drivers/net/vrf.c @@ -336,8 +336,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t vrf_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) return ret; }

-static int vrf_finish_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, - struct sk_buff *skb) +static void vrf_finish_direct(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct net_device *vrf_dev = skb->dev;

@@ -356,7 +355,8 @@ static int vrf_finish_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, skb_pull(skb, ETH_HLEN); }

- return 1; + /* reset skb device */ + nf_reset(skb); }

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) @@ -435,15 +435,41 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out_redirect(struct net_device *vrf_dev, return skb; }

+static int vrf_output6_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + vrf_finish_direct(skb); + + return vrf_ip6_local_out(net, sk, skb); +} + static int vrf_output6_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { + int err = 1; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);

- return NF_HOOK_COND(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, - net, sk, skb, NULL, skb->dev, - vrf_finish_direct, - !(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED)); + if (!(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED)) + err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, net, sk, skb, + NULL, skb->dev, vrf_output6_direct_finish); + + if (likely(err == 1)) + vrf_finish_direct(skb); + + return err; +} + +static int vrf_ip6_out_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int err; + + err = vrf_output6_direct(net, sk, skb); + if (likely(err == 1)) + err = vrf_ip6_local_out(net, sk, skb); + + return err; }

static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out_direct(struct net_device *vrf_dev, @@ -456,18 +482,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out_direct(struct net_device *vrf_dev, skb->dev = vrf_dev;

err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV6, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, net, sk, - skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_output6_direct); + skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_ip6_out_direct_finish);

if (likely(err == 1)) err = vrf_output6_direct(net, sk, skb);

- /* reset skb device */ if (likely(err == 1)) - nf_reset(skb); - else - skb = NULL; + return skb;

- return skb; + return NULL; }

static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip6_out(struct net_device *vrf_dev, @@ -649,15 +672,41 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out_redirect(struct net_device *vrf_dev, return skb; }

+static int vrf_output_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + vrf_finish_direct(skb); + + return vrf_ip_local_out(net, sk, skb); +} + static int vrf_output_direct(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { + int err = 1; + skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);

- return NF_HOOK_COND(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, - net, sk, skb, NULL, skb->dev, - vrf_finish_direct, - !(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED)); + if (!(IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_REROUTED)) + err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, net, sk, skb, + NULL, skb->dev, vrf_output_direct_finish); + + if (likely(err == 1)) + vrf_finish_direct(skb); + + return err; +} + +static int vrf_ip_out_direct_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + int err; + + err = vrf_output_direct(net, sk, skb); + if (likely(err == 1)) + err = vrf_ip_local_out(net, sk, skb); + + return err; }

static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out_direct(struct net_device *vrf_dev, @@ -670,18 +719,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out_direct(struct net_device *vrf_dev, skb->dev = vrf_dev;

err = nf_hook(NFPROTO_IPV4, NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, net, sk, - skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_output_direct); + skb, NULL, vrf_dev, vrf_ip_out_direct_finish);

if (likely(err == 1)) err = vrf_output_direct(net, sk, skb);

- /* reset skb device */ if (likely(err == 1)) - nf_reset(skb); - else - skb = NULL; + return skb;

- return skb; + return NULL; }

static struct sk_buff *vrf_ip_out(struct net_device *vrf_dev,

From: George Spelvin lkml@sdf.org

commit c51f8f88d705e06bd696d7510aff22b33eb8e638 upstream.

Non-cryptographic PRNGs may have great statistical properties, but are usually trivially predictable to someone who knows the algorithm, given a small sample of their output. An LFSR like prandom_u32() is particularly simple, even if the sample is widely scattered bits.

It turns out the network stack uses prandom_u32() for some things like random port numbers which it would prefer are *not* trivially predictable. Predictability led to a practical DNS spoofing attack. Oops.

This patch replaces the LFSR with a homebrew cryptographic PRNG based on the SipHash round function, which is in turn seeded with 128 bits of strong random key. (The authors of SipHash have *not* been consulted about this abuse of their algorithm.) Speed is prioritized over security; attacks are rare, while performance is always wanted.

Replacing all callers of prandom_u32() is the quick fix. Whether to reinstate a weaker PRNG for uses which can tolerate it is an open question.

Commit f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") was an earlier attempt at a solution. This patch replaces it.

Reported-by: Amit Klein aksecurity@gmail.com Cc: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Cc: Eric Dumazet edumazet@google.com Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Jason@zx2c4.com Cc: Andy Lutomirski luto@kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Cc: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: tytso@mit.edu Cc: Florian Westphal fw@strlen.de Cc: Marc Plumb lkml.mplumb@gmail.com Fixes: f227e3ec3b5c ("random32: update the net random state on interrupt and activity") Signed-off-by: George Spelvin lkml@sdf.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20200808152628.GA27941@SDF.ORG/ [ willy: partial reversal of f227e3ec3b5c; moved SIPROUND definitions to prandom.h for later use; merged George's prandom_seed() proposal; inlined siprand_u32(); replaced the net_rand_state[] array with 4 members to fix a build issue; cosmetic cleanups to make checkpatch happy; fixed RANDOM32_SELFTEST build ] [wt: backported to 4.19 -- various context adjustments] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau w@1wt.eu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/char/random.c | 1 - include/linux/prandom.h | 36 +++- kernel/time/timer.c | 7 - lib/random32.c | 462 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 4 files changed, 317 insertions(+), 189 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index 4a9e63c81a6e..e5edf2bc2d83 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1262,7 +1262,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)

fast_mix(fast_pool); add_interrupt_bench(cycles); - this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, fast_pool->pool[cycles & 3]);

if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) { if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) && diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h index aa16e6468f91..cc1e71334e53 100644 --- a/include/linux/prandom.h +++ b/include/linux/prandom.h @@ -16,12 +16,44 @@ void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); void prandom_seed(u32 seed); void prandom_reseed_late(void);

+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 +/* + * The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in + * parallel given enough CPU resources. + */ +#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \ + v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \ + v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \ + v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \ + v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \ +) + +#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261) +#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573) + +#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32 +/* + * On 32-bit machines, we use HSipHash, a reduced-width version of SipHash. + * This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic + * applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze. + */ +#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \ + v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \ + v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \ + v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \ + v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \ +) +#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765 +#define PRND_K1 0x74656462 + +#else +#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG +#endif + struct rnd_state { __u32 s1, s2, s3, s4; };

-DECLARE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state); - u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state); void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t nbytes); void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state); diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c index 61e41ea3a96e..a6e88d9bb931 100644 --- a/kernel/time/timer.c +++ b/kernel/time/timer.c @@ -1655,13 +1655,6 @@ void update_process_times(int user_tick) scheduler_tick(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) run_posix_cpu_timers(p); - - /* The current CPU might make use of net randoms without receiving IRQs - * to renew them often enough. Let's update the net_rand_state from a - * non-constant value that's not affine to the number of calls to make - * sure it's updated when there's some activity (we don't care in idle). - */ - this_cpu_add(net_rand_state.s1, rol32(jiffies, 24) + user_tick); }

/** diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c index b6f3325e38e4..9085b1172015 100644 --- a/lib/random32.c +++ b/lib/random32.c @@ -40,16 +40,6 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h>

-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST -static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void); -#else -static inline void prandom_state_selftest(void) -{ -} -#endif - -DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct rnd_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy; - /** * prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator. * @state: pointer to state structure holding seeded state. @@ -69,25 +59,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *state) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32_state);

-/** - * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator - * - * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast - * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT - * considered safe for cryptographic use. - */ -u32 prandom_u32(void) -{ - struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state); - u32 res; - - res = prandom_u32_state(state); - put_cpu_var(net_rand_state); - - return res; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32); - /** * prandom_bytes_state - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes * @@ -119,20 +90,6 @@ void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, size_t bytes) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes_state);

-/** - * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes - * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to - * @bytes: the requested number of bytes - */ -void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes) -{ - struct rnd_state *state = &get_cpu_var(net_rand_state); - - prandom_bytes_state(state, buf, bytes); - put_cpu_var(net_rand_state); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes); - static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state) { /* Calling RNG ten times to satisfy recurrence condition */ @@ -148,96 +105,6 @@ static void prandom_warmup(struct rnd_state *state) prandom_u32_state(state); }

-static u32 __extract_hwseed(void) -{ - unsigned int val = 0; - - (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) || - arch_get_random_int(&val)); - - return val; -} - -static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed, - bool mix_with_hwseed) -{ -#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */ -#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0) - state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U); - state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U); - state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U); - state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U); -} - -/** - * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator - * @seed: seed value - * - * Add some additional seeding to the prandom pool. - */ -void prandom_seed(u32 entropy) -{ - int i; - /* - * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, well, - * expected. - */ - for_each_possible_cpu(i) { - struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i); - - state->s1 = __seed(state->s1 ^ entropy, 2U); - prandom_warmup(state); - } -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed); - -/* - * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow - * to start the prandom_u32() engine. - */ -static int __init prandom_init(void) -{ - int i; - - prandom_state_selftest(); - - for_each_possible_cpu(i) { - struct rnd_state *state = &per_cpu(net_rand_state, i); - u32 weak_seed = (i + jiffies) ^ random_get_entropy(); - - prandom_seed_early(state, weak_seed, true); - prandom_warmup(state); - } - - return 0; -} -core_initcall(prandom_init); - -static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused); - -static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer); - -static void __prandom_timer(struct timer_list *unused) -{ - u32 entropy; - unsigned long expires; - - get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); - prandom_seed(entropy); - - /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */ - expires = 40 + prandom_u32_max(40); - seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(expires * MSEC_PER_SEC); - - add_timer(&seed_timer); -} - -static void __init __prandom_start_seed_timer(void) -{ - seed_timer.expires = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(40 * MSEC_PER_SEC); - add_timer(&seed_timer); -} - void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state) { int i; @@ -257,51 +124,6 @@ void prandom_seed_full_state(struct rnd_state __percpu *pcpu_state) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed_full_state);

-/* - * Generate better values after random number generator - * is fully initialized. - */ -static void __prandom_reseed(bool late) -{ - unsigned long flags; - static bool latch = false; - static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); - - /* Asking for random bytes might result in bytes getting - * moved into the nonblocking pool and thus marking it - * as initialized. In this case we would double back into - * this function and attempt to do a late reseed. - * Ignore the pointless attempt to reseed again if we're - * already waiting for bytes when the nonblocking pool - * got initialized. - */ - - /* only allow initial seeding (late == false) once */ - if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&lock, flags)) - return; - - if (latch && !late) - goto out; - - latch = true; - prandom_seed_full_state(&net_rand_state); -out: - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&lock, flags); -} - -void prandom_reseed_late(void) -{ - __prandom_reseed(true); -} - -static int __init prandom_reseed(void) -{ - __prandom_reseed(false); - __prandom_start_seed_timer(); - return 0; -} -late_initcall(prandom_reseed); - #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST static struct prandom_test1 { u32 seed; @@ -421,7 +243,28 @@ static struct prandom_test2 { { 407983964U, 921U, 728767059U }, };

-static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void) +static u32 __extract_hwseed(void) +{ + unsigned int val = 0; + + (void)(arch_get_random_seed_int(&val) || + arch_get_random_int(&val)); + + return val; +} + +static void prandom_seed_early(struct rnd_state *state, u32 seed, + bool mix_with_hwseed) +{ +#define LCG(x) ((x) * 69069U) /* super-duper LCG */ +#define HWSEED() (mix_with_hwseed ? __extract_hwseed() : 0) + state->s1 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(seed), 2U); + state->s2 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s1), 8U); + state->s3 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s2), 16U); + state->s4 = __seed(HWSEED() ^ LCG(state->s3), 128U); +} + +static int __init prandom_state_selftest(void) { int i, j, errors = 0, runs = 0; bool error = false; @@ -461,5 +304,266 @@ static void __init prandom_state_selftest(void) pr_warn("prandom: %d/%d self tests failed\n", errors, runs); else pr_info("prandom: %d self tests passed\n", runs); + return 0; } +core_initcall(prandom_state_selftest); #endif + +/* + * The prandom_u32() implementation is now completely separate from the + * prandom_state() functions, which are retained (for now) for compatibility. + * + * Because of (ab)use in the networking code for choosing random TCP/UDP port + * numbers, which open DoS possibilities if guessable, we want something + * stronger than a standard PRNG. But the performance requirements of + * the network code do not allow robust crypto for this application. + * + * So this is a homebrew Junior Spaceman implementation, based on the + * lowest-latency trustworthy crypto primitive available, SipHash. + * (The authors of SipHash have not been consulted about this abuse of + * their work.) + * + * Standard SipHash-2-4 uses 2n+4 rounds to hash n words of input to + * one word of output. This abbreviated version uses 2 rounds per word + * of output. + */ + +struct siprand_state { + unsigned long v0; + unsigned long v1; + unsigned long v2; + unsigned long v3; +}; + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct siprand_state, net_rand_state) __latent_entropy; + +/* + * This is the core CPRNG function. As "pseudorandom", this is not used + * for truly valuable things, just intended to be a PITA to guess. + * For maximum speed, we do just two SipHash rounds per word. This is + * the same rate as 4 rounds per 64 bits that SipHash normally uses, + * so hopefully it's reasonably secure. + * + * There are two changes from the official SipHash finalization: + * - We omit some constants XORed with v2 in the SipHash spec as irrelevant; + * they are there only to make the output rounds distinct from the input + * rounds, and this application has no input rounds. + * - Rather than returning v0^v1^v2^v3, return v1+v3. + * If you look at the SipHash round, the last operation on v3 is + * "v3 ^= v0", so "v0 ^ v3" just undoes that, a waste of time. + * Likewise "v1 ^= v2". (The rotate of v2 makes a difference, but + * it still cancels out half of the bits in v2 for no benefit.) + * Second, since the last combining operation was xor, continue the + * pattern of alternating xor/add for a tiny bit of extra non-linearity. + */ +static inline u32 siprand_u32(struct siprand_state *s) +{ + unsigned long v0 = s->v0, v1 = s->v1, v2 = s->v2, v3 = s->v3; + + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + s->v0 = v0; s->v1 = v1; s->v2 = v2; s->v3 = v3; + return v1 + v3; +} + + +/** + * prandom_u32 - pseudo random number generator + * + * A 32 bit pseudo-random number is generated using a fast + * algorithm suitable for simulation. This algorithm is NOT + * considered safe for cryptographic use. + */ +u32 prandom_u32(void) +{ + struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); + u32 res = siprand_u32(state); + + put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); + return res; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_u32); + +/** + * prandom_bytes - get the requested number of pseudo-random bytes + * @buf: where to copy the pseudo-random bytes to + * @bytes: the requested number of bytes + */ +void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t bytes) +{ + struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); + u8 *ptr = buf; + + while (bytes >= sizeof(u32)) { + put_unaligned(siprand_u32(state), (u32 *)ptr); + ptr += sizeof(u32); + bytes -= sizeof(u32); + } + + if (bytes > 0) { + u32 rem = siprand_u32(state); + + do { + *ptr++ = (u8)rem; + rem >>= BITS_PER_BYTE; + } while (--bytes > 0); + } + put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_bytes); + +/** + * prandom_seed - add entropy to pseudo random number generator + * @entropy: entropy value + * + * Add some additional seed material to the prandom pool. + * The "entropy" is actually our IP address (the only caller is + * the network code), not for unpredictability, but to ensure that + * different machines are initialized differently. + */ +void prandom_seed(u32 entropy) +{ + int i; + + add_device_randomness(&entropy, sizeof(entropy)); + + for_each_possible_cpu(i) { + struct siprand_state *state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i); + unsigned long v0 = state->v0, v1 = state->v1; + unsigned long v2 = state->v2, v3 = state->v3; + + do { + v3 ^= entropy; + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + v0 ^= entropy; + } while (unlikely(!v0 || !v1 || !v2 || !v3)); + + WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(prandom_seed); + +/* + * Generate some initially weak seeding values to allow + * the prandom_u32() engine to be started. + */ +static int __init prandom_init_early(void) +{ + int i; + unsigned long v0, v1, v2, v3; + + if (!arch_get_random_long(&v0)) + v0 = jiffies; + if (!arch_get_random_long(&v1)) + v1 = random_get_entropy(); + v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0; + v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1; + + for_each_possible_cpu(i) { + struct siprand_state *state; + + v3 ^= i; + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + v0 ^= i; + + state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i); + state->v0 = v0; state->v1 = v1; + state->v2 = v2; state->v3 = v3; + } + + return 0; +} +core_initcall(prandom_init_early); + + +/* Stronger reseeding when available, and periodically thereafter. */ +static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused); + +static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, prandom_reseed); + +static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused) +{ + unsigned long expires; + int i; + + /* + * Reinitialize each CPU's PRNG with 128 bits of key. + * No locking on the CPUs, but then somewhat random results are, + * well, expected. + */ + for_each_possible_cpu(i) { + struct siprand_state *state; + unsigned long v0 = get_random_long(), v2 = v0 ^ PRND_K0; + unsigned long v1 = get_random_long(), v3 = v1 ^ PRND_K1; +#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 + int j; + + /* + * On 32-bit machines, hash in two extra words to + * approximate 128-bit key length. Not that the hash + * has that much security, but this prevents a trivial + * 64-bit brute force. + */ + for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) { + unsigned long m = get_random_long(); + + v3 ^= m; + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3); + v0 ^= m; + } +#endif + /* + * Probably impossible in practice, but there is a + * theoretical risk that a race between this reseeding + * and the target CPU writing its state back could + * create the all-zero SipHash fixed point. + * + * To ensure that never happens, ensure the state + * we write contains no zero words. + */ + state = per_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state, i); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v0, v0 ? v0 : -1ul); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v1, v1 ? v1 : -1ul); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v2, v2 ? v2 : -1ul); + WRITE_ONCE(state->v3, v3 ? v3 : -1ul); + } + + /* reseed every ~60 seconds, in [40 .. 80) interval with slack */ + expires = round_jiffies(jiffies + 40 * HZ + prandom_u32_max(40 * HZ)); + mod_timer(&seed_timer, expires); +} + +/* + * The random ready callback can be called from almost any interrupt. + * To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt + * long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event. + */ +static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused) +{ + mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies); +} + +/* + * Start periodic full reseeding as soon as strong + * random numbers are available. + */ +static int __init prandom_init_late(void) +{ + static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { + .func = prandom_timer_start + }; + int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready); + + if (ret == -EALREADY) { + prandom_timer_start(&random_ready); + ret = 0; + } + return ret; +} +late_initcall(prandom_init_late);

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com

commit d0e7b0c71fbb653de90a7163ef46912a96f0bdaf upstream.

To avoid this:

util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c: In function 'python_start_script': util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c:1595:2: error: 'visibility' attribute ignored [-Werror=attributes] 1595 | PyMODINIT_FUNC (*initfunc)(void); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~

That started breaking when building with PYTHON=python3 and these gcc versions (I haven't checked with the clang ones, maybe it breaks there as well):

# export PERF_TARBALL=http://192.168.86.5/perf/perf-5.9.0.tar.xz # dm fedora:33 fedora:rawhide 1 107.80 fedora:33 : Ok gcc (GCC) 10.2.1 20201005 (Red Hat 10.2.1-5), clang version 11.0.0 (Fedora 11.0.0-1.fc33) 2 92.47 fedora:rawhide : Ok gcc (GCC) 10.2.1 20201016 (Red Hat 10.2.1-6), clang version 11.0.0 (Fedora 11.0.0-1.fc34) #

Avoid that by ditching that 'initfunc' function pointer with its:

#define Py_EXPORTED_SYMBOL _attribute_ ((visibility ("default"))) #define PyMODINIT_FUNC Py_EXPORTED_SYMBOL PyObject*

And just call PyImport_AppendInittab() at the end of the ifdef python3 block with the functions that were being attributed to that initfunc.

Cc: Adrian Hunter adrian.hunter@intel.com Cc: Ian Rogers irogers@google.com Cc: Jiri Olsa jolsa@kernel.org Cc: Namhyung Kim namhyung@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Tapas Kundu tkundu@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c b/tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c index 9569cc06e0a7..2814251df06b 100644 --- a/tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c +++ b/tools/perf/util/scripting-engines/trace-event-python.c @@ -1493,7 +1493,6 @@ static void _free_command_line(wchar_t **command_line, int num) static int python_start_script(const char *script, int argc, const char **argv) { struct tables *tables = &tables_global; - PyMODINIT_FUNC (*initfunc)(void); #if PY_MAJOR_VERSION < 3 const char **command_line; #else @@ -1508,20 +1507,18 @@ static int python_start_script(const char *script, int argc, const char **argv) FILE *fp;

#if PY_MAJOR_VERSION < 3 - initfunc = initperf_trace_context; command_line = malloc((argc + 1) * sizeof(const char *)); command_line[0] = script; for (i = 1; i < argc + 1; i++) command_line[i] = argv[i - 1]; + PyImport_AppendInittab(name, initperf_trace_context); #else - initfunc = PyInit_perf_trace_context; command_line = malloc((argc + 1) * sizeof(wchar_t *)); command_line[0] = Py_DecodeLocale(script, NULL); for (i = 1; i < argc + 1; i++) command_line[i] = Py_DecodeLocale(argv[i - 1], NULL); + PyImport_AppendInittab(name, PyInit_perf_trace_context); #endif - - PyImport_AppendInittab(name, initfunc); Py_Initialize();

#if PY_MAJOR_VERSION < 3

From: Matteo Croce mcroce@microsoft.com

commit df5b0ab3e08a156701b537809914b339b0daa526 upstream.

Limit the CPU number to num_possible_cpus(), because setting it to a value lower than INT_MAX but higher than NR_CPUS produces the following error on reboot and shutdown:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff90ab1bb0 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1c09067 P4D 1c09067 PUD 1c0a063 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.9.0-rc8-kvm #110 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:migrate_to_reboot_cpu+0xe/0x60 Code: ea ea 00 48 89 fa 48 c7 c7 30 57 f1 81 e9 fa ef ff ff 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 53 8b 1d d5 ea ea 00 e8 14 33 fe ff 89 da <48> 0f a3 15 ea fc bd 00 48 89 d0 73 29 89 c2 c1 e8 06 65 48 8b 3c RSP: 0018:ffffc90000013e08 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88801f0a0000 RBX: 0000000077359400 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000077359400 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ffffffff81c199e0 RBP: ffffffff81c1e3c0 R08: ffff88801f41f000 R09: ffffffff81c1e348 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f32bedf8830 R14: 00000000fee1dead R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f32bedf8980(0000) GS:ffff88801f480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffff90ab1bb0 CR3: 000000001d057000 CR4: 00000000000006a0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __do_sys_reboot.cold+0x34/0x5b do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40

Fixes: 1b3a5d02ee07 ("reboot: move arch/x86 reboot= handling to generic kernel") Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce mcroce@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Cc: Fabian Frederick fabf@skynet.be Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Cc: Kees Cook keescook@chromium.org Cc: Mike Rapoport rppt@kernel.org Cc: Pavel Tatashin pasha.tatashin@soleen.com Cc: Petr Mladek pmladek@suse.com Cc: Robin Holt robinmholt@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103214025.116799-3-mcroce@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org [sudip: use reboot_mode instead of mode] Signed-off-by: Sudip Mukherjee sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/reboot.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/reboot.c b/kernel/reboot.c index db0eed5916d5..45bea54f9aee 100644 --- a/kernel/reboot.c +++ b/kernel/reboot.c @@ -546,6 +546,13 @@ static int __init reboot_setup(char *str) reboot_cpu = simple_strtoul(str+3, NULL, 0); else reboot_mode = REBOOT_SOFT; + if (reboot_cpu >= num_possible_cpus()) { + pr_err("Ignoring the CPU number in reboot= option. " + "CPU %d exceeds possible cpu number %d\n", + reboot_cpu, num_possible_cpus()); + reboot_cpu = 0; + break; + } break;

case 'g':

From: Boris Protopopov pboris@amazon.com

commit 57c176074057531b249cf522d90c22313fa74b0b upstream.

When converting trailing spaces and periods in paths, do so for every component of the path, not just the last component. If the conversion is not done for every path component, then subsequent operations in directories with trailing spaces or periods (e.g. create(), mkdir()) will fail with ENOENT. This is because on the server, the directory will have a special symbol in its name, and the client needs to provide the same.

Signed-off-by: Boris Protopopov pboris@amazon.com Acked-by: Ronnie Sahlberg lsahlber@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c index a2b2355e7f01..9986817532b1 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c +++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_unicode.c @@ -501,7 +501,13 @@ cifsConvertToUTF16(__le16 *target, const char *source, int srclen, else if (map_chars == SFM_MAP_UNI_RSVD) { bool end_of_string;

- if (i == srclen - 1) + /** + * Remap spaces and periods found at the end of every + * component of the path. The special cases of '.' and + * '..' do not need to be dealt with explicitly because + * they are addressed in namei.c:link_path_walk(). + **/ + if ((i == srclen - 1) || (source[i+1] == '\')) end_of_string = true; else end_of_string = false;