From: haibinzhang (张海斌) haibinzhang@tencent.com
stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.256 commit b51881b1da57fe9877125dfdd0aac5172958fcfd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5U71M CVE: CVE-2022-20422
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[ Upstream commit af483947d472eccb79e42059276c4deed76f99a6 ]
emulation_proc_handler() changes table->data for proc_dointvec_minmax and can generate the following Oops if called concurrently with itself:
| Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010 | Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] SMP | Call trace: | update_insn_emulation_mode+0xc0/0x148 | emulation_proc_handler+0x64/0xb8 | proc_sys_call_handler+0x9c/0xf8 | proc_sys_write+0x18/0x20 | __vfs_write+0x20/0x48 | vfs_write+0xe4/0x1d0 | ksys_write+0x70/0xf8 | __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x28 | el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x1c0 | el0_svc_handler+0x2c/0xa0 | el0_svc+0x8/0x200
To fix this issue, keep the table->data as &insn->current_mode and use container_of() to retrieve the insn pointer. Another mutex is used to protect against the current_mode update but not for retrieving insn_emulation as table->data is no longer changing.
Co-developed-by: hewenliang hewenliang4@huawei.com Signed-off-by: hewenliang hewenliang4@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Haibin Zhang haibinzhang@tencent.com Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220128090324.2727688-1-hewenliang4@huawei.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/9A004C03-250B-46C5-BF39-782D7551B00E@tencent.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: ruanjinjie ruanjinjie@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Zhang Jianhua chris.zjh@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c index 0cbf78581974..88d3454f2848 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct insn_emulation { static LIST_HEAD(insn_emulation); static int nr_insn_emulated __initdata; static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(insn_emulation_lock); +static DEFINE_MUTEX(insn_emulation_mutex);
static void register_emulation_hooks(struct insn_emulation_ops *ops) { @@ -210,10 +211,10 @@ static int emulation_proc_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, loff_t *ppos) { int ret = 0; - struct insn_emulation *insn = (struct insn_emulation *) table->data; + struct insn_emulation *insn = container_of(table->data, struct insn_emulation, current_mode); enum insn_emulation_mode prev_mode = insn->current_mode;
- table->data = &insn->current_mode; + mutex_lock(&insn_emulation_mutex); ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (ret || !write || prev_mode == insn->current_mode) @@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ static int emulation_proc_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, update_insn_emulation_mode(insn, INSN_UNDEF); } ret: - table->data = insn; + mutex_unlock(&insn_emulation_mutex); return ret; }
@@ -250,7 +251,7 @@ static void __init register_insn_emulation_sysctl(void) sysctl->maxlen = sizeof(int);
sysctl->procname = insn->ops->name; - sysctl->data = insn; + sysctl->data = &insn->current_mode; sysctl->extra1 = &insn->min; sysctl->extra2 = &insn->max; sysctl->proc_handler = emulation_proc_handler;
From: Carlos Llamas cmllamas@google.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc4 commit a0e44c64b6061dda7e00b7c458e4523e2331b739 category: bugfix bugzilla: 187805, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5U713 CVE: CVE-2022-20421
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A transaction of type BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE can fail to increment the reference for a node. In this case, the target proc normally releases the failed reference upon close as expected. However, if the target is dying in parallel the call will race with binder_deferred_release(), so the target could have released all of its references by now leaving the cleanup of the new failed reference unhandled.
The transaction then ends and the target proc gets released making the ref->proc now a dangling pointer. Later on, ref->node is closed and we attempt to take spin_lock(&ref->proc->inner_lock), which leads to the use-after-free bug reported below. Let's fix this by cleaning up the failed reference on the spot instead of relying on the target to do so.
================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150 Write of size 4 at addr ffff5ca207094238 by task kworker/1:0/590
CPU: 1 PID: 590 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8 #10 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: events binder_deferred_func Call trace: dump_backtrace.part.0+0x1d0/0x1e0 show_stack+0x18/0x70 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 print_report+0x2e4/0x61c kasan_report+0xa4/0x110 kasan_check_range+0xfc/0x1a4 __kasan_check_write+0x3c/0x50 _raw_spin_lock+0xa8/0x150 binder_deferred_func+0x5e0/0x9b0 process_one_work+0x38c/0x5f0 worker_thread+0x9c/0x694 kthread+0x188/0x190 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Acked-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) brauner@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas cmllamas@google.com Cc: stable stable@kernel.org # 4.14+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220801182511.3371447-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Ren Zhijie renzhijie2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Zhang Qiao zhangqiao22@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index 0654133efbe4..c5a39b8ae886 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -1809,6 +1809,18 @@ static int binder_inc_ref_for_node(struct binder_proc *proc, } ret = binder_inc_ref_olocked(ref, strong, target_list); *rdata = ref->data; + if (ret && ref == new_ref) { + /* + * Cleanup the failed reference here as the target + * could now be dead and have already released its + * references by now. Calling on the new reference + * with strong=0 and a tmp_refs will not decrement + * the node. The new_ref gets kfree'd below. + */ + binder_cleanup_ref_olocked(new_ref); + ref = NULL; + } + binder_proc_unlock(proc); if (new_ref && ref != new_ref) /*