From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.14-rc1 commit b6ffe7671b24689c09faa5675dd58f93758a97ae category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: CVE-2021-3655
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In one of the fallbacks that SCTP has for identifying an association for an incoming packet, it looks for AddIp chunk (from ASCONF) and take a peek. Thing is, at this stage nothing was validating that the chunk actually had enough content for that, allowing the peek to happen over uninitialized memory.
Similar check already exists in actual asconf handling in sctp_verify_asconf().
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- net/sctp/input.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/input.c b/net/sctp/input.c index a2deb36b955a6..3e621582e88b7 100644 --- a/net/sctp/input.c +++ b/net/sctp/input.c @@ -1125,6 +1125,9 @@ static struct sctp_association *__sctp_rcv_asconf_lookup( union sctp_addr_param *param; union sctp_addr paddr;
+ if (ntohs(ch->length) < sizeof(*asconf) + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) + return NULL; + /* Skip over the ADDIP header and find the Address parameter */ param = (union sctp_addr_param *)(asconf + 1);
From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.14-rc1 commit ef6c8d6ccf0c1dccdda092ebe8782777cd7803c9 category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: CVE-2021-3655
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When SCTP handles an INIT chunk, it calls for example: sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init sctp_verify_init sctp_verify_param sctp_process_init sctp_process_param handling of SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY
sctp_verify_init() wasn't doing proper size validation and neither the later handling, allowing it to work over the chunk itself, possibly being uninitialized memory.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Conflicts: net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c [yyl: asconf_enable is not added in kernel-4.19] Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index a1ca070e36b0a..0789109c2d093 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -2172,9 +2172,16 @@ static enum sctp_ierror sctp_verify_param(struct net *net, break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: - if (net->sctp.addip_enable) - break; - goto fallthrough; + if (!net->sctp.addip_enable) + goto fallthrough; + + if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) + + sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) { + sctp_process_inv_paramlength(asoc, param.p, + chunk, err_chunk); + retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT; + } + break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS: /* Tell the peer, we won't support this param. */
-
Yang Yingliang