Jakub Sitnicki (2): bpf: Allow delete from sockmap/sockhash only if update is allowed Revert "bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem"
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++++--- net/core/sock_map.c | 6 ------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
From: Jakub Sitnicki jakub@cloudflare.com
stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.33 commit 000a65bf1dc04fb2b65e2abf116f0bc0fc2ee7b1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7DCV CVE: CVE-2024-38662
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=...
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[ Upstream commit 98e948fb60d41447fd8d2d0c3b8637fc6b6dc26d ]
We have seen an influx of syzkaller reports where a BPF program attached to a tracepoint triggers a locking rule violation by performing a map_delete on a sockmap/sockhash.
We don't intend to support this artificial use scenario. Extend the existing verifier allowed-program-type check for updating sockmap/sockhash to also cover deleting from a map.
From now on only BPF programs which were previously allowed to update sockmap/sockhash can delete from these map types.
Fixes: ff9105993240 ("bpf, sockmap: Prevent lock inversion deadlock in map delete elem") Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp Reported-by: syzbot+ec941d6e24f633a59172@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki jakub@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Tested-by: syzbot+ec941d6e24f633a59172@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Acked-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ec941d6e24f633a59172 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240527-sockmap-verify-deletes-v1-1-944b372f210... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 1fcba0c46f6e..8b0eb6796e47 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -8731,7 +8731,8 @@ static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) enum bpf_attach_type eatype = env->prog->expected_attach_type; enum bpf_prog_type type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
- if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem) + if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_update_elem && + func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) return false;
/* It's not possible to get access to a locked struct sock in these @@ -8742,6 +8743,11 @@ static bool may_update_sockmap(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id) if (eatype == BPF_TRACE_ITER) return true; break; + case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS: + /* map_update allowed only via dedicated helpers with event type checks */ + if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem) + return true; + break; case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS: case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT: @@ -8837,7 +8843,6 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP: if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_map && func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_map_update && - func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_map && func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && @@ -8847,7 +8852,6 @@ static int check_map_func_compatibility(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKHASH: if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_redirect_hash && func_id != BPF_FUNC_sock_hash_update && - func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_delete_elem && func_id != BPF_FUNC_msg_redirect_hash && func_id != BPF_FUNC_sk_select_reuseport && func_id != BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem &&
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From: Jakub Sitnicki jakub@cloudflare.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.10-rc2 commit 3b9ce0491a43e9af7f108b2f1bced7cd35931660 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IA7DCV CVE: CVE-2024-38662
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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This reverts commit ff91059932401894e6c86341915615c5eb0eca48.
This check is no longer needed. BPF programs attached to tracepoints are now rejected by the verifier when they attempt to delete from a sockmap/sockhash maps.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Sitnicki jakub@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240527-sockmap-verify-deletes-v1-2-944b372f210... Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui pulehui@huawei.com --- net/core/sock_map.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/core/sock_map.c b/net/core/sock_map.c index 8598466a3805..27d733c0f65e 100644 --- a/net/core/sock_map.c +++ b/net/core/sock_map.c @@ -411,9 +411,6 @@ static int __sock_map_delete(struct bpf_stab *stab, struct sock *sk_test, struct sock *sk; int err = 0;
- if (irqs_disabled()) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* locks here are hardirq-unsafe */ - spin_lock_bh(&stab->lock); sk = *psk; if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) @@ -936,9 +933,6 @@ static long sock_hash_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *key) struct bpf_shtab_elem *elem; int ret = -ENOENT;
- if (irqs_disabled()) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* locks here are hardirq-unsafe */ - hash = sock_hash_bucket_hash(key, key_size); bucket = sock_hash_select_bucket(htab, hash);