[PATCH openEuler-5.10 01/16] ext4: avoid recheck extent for EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE

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[PATCH openEuler-5.10 01/92]...

Zheng Zengkai

15 Nov 2021 15 Nov '21

7:49 p.m.

From: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 182952 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

---------------------------

Buffer with verified means that it has been checked before. No need verify and call set_buffer_verified again.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi yi.zhang@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index 618675a41efb..a77e25ca6867 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -544,13 +544,16 @@ __read_extent_tree_block(const char *function, unsigned int line, if (err < 0) goto errout; } - if (buffer_verified(bh) && !(flags & EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE)) - return bh; - err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode, ext_block_hdr(bh), - depth, pblk, le32_to_cpu(idx->ei_block)); - if (err) - goto errout; - set_buffer_verified(bh); + if (buffer_verified(bh)) { + if (!(flags & EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE)) + return bh; + } else { + err = __ext4_ext_check(function, line, inode, ext_block_hdr(bh), + depth, pblk, le32_to_cpu(idx->ei_block)); + if (err) + goto errout; + set_buffer_verified(bh); + } /* * If this is a leaf block, cache all of its entries */

-- 2.20.1

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Zheng Zengkai

15 Nov 15 Nov

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 02/16] ext4: check magic even the extent block bh is verified

From: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 182952 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

---------------------------

Our stress testing with IO error can trigger follow OOB with a very low probability.

[59898.282466] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ext4_find_extent+0x2e4/0x480 ... [59898.287162] Call Trace: [59898.287575] dump_stack+0x8b/0xb9 [59898.288070] print_address_description+0x73/0x280 [59898.289903] ext4_find_extent+0x2e4/0x480 [59898.290553] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x125/0x1470 [59898.295481] ext4_map_blocks+0x5ee/0x940 [59898.315984] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x63c/0xdb0 [59898.320231] read_pages+0xe6/0x370 [59898.321589] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x233/0x2a0 [59898.321594] ondemand_readahead+0x157/0x450 [59898.321598] generic_file_read_iter+0xcb2/0x1550 [59898.328828] __vfs_read+0x233/0x360 [59898.328840] vfs_read+0xa5/0x190 [59898.330126] ksys_read+0xa5/0x150 [59898.331405] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x1f0 [59898.331418] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Digging deep and we found it's actually a xattr block which can happened with follow steps:

1. extent update for file1 and will remove a leaf extent block(block A) 2. we need update the idx extent block too 3. block A has been allocated as a xattr block and will set verified 3. io error happened for this idx block and will the buffer has been released late 4. extent find for file1 will read the idx block and see block A again 5. since the buffer of block A is already verified, we will use it directly, which can lead the upper OOB

Same as __ext4_xattr_check_block, we can check magic even the buffer is verified to fix the problem.

Signed-off-by: yangerkun yangerkun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi yi.zhang@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- fs/ext4/extents.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ext4/extents.c b/fs/ext4/extents.c index a77e25ca6867..74b69d83c198 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/extents.c +++ b/fs/ext4/extents.c @@ -545,6 +545,14 @@ __read_extent_tree_block(const char *function, unsigned int line, goto errout; } if (buffer_verified(bh)) { + if (unlikely(ext_block_hdr(bh)->eh_magic != EXT4_EXT_MAGIC)) { + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + ext4_error_inode(inode, function, line, 0, + "invalid magic for verified extent block %llu", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr); + goto errout; + } + if (!(flags & EXT4_EX_FORCE_CACHE)) return bh; } else {

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 03/16] scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_readcap16()

From: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17 commit 4e3ace0051e7e504b55d239daab8789dd89b863c category: bugfix bugzilla: 182951 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

-----------------------------------------------

The following warning was observed running syzkaller:

[ 3813.830724] sg_write: data in/out 65466/242 bytes for SCSI command 0x9e-- guessing data in; [ 3813.830724] program syz-executor not setting count and/or reply_len properly [ 3813.836956] ================================================================== [ 3813.839465] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.841773] Read of size 4096 at addr ffff8883cf80f540 by task syz-executor/1549 [ 3813.846612] Call Trace: [ 3813.846995] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f [ 3813.847524] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372 [ 3813.848243] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8 [ 3813.849439] check_memory_region+0x240/0x270 [ 3813.850094] memcpy+0x30/0x80 [ 3813.850553] sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.853032] sg_copy_from_buffer+0x13/0x20 [ 3813.853660] fill_from_dev_buffer+0x135/0x370 [ 3813.854329] resp_readcap16+0x1ac/0x280 [ 3813.856917] schedule_resp+0x41f/0x1630 [ 3813.858203] scsi_debug_queuecommand+0xb32/0x17e0 [ 3813.862699] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x330/0x950 [ 3813.863329] scsi_request_fn+0xd8e/0x1710 [ 3813.863946] __blk_run_queue+0x10b/0x230 [ 3813.864544] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1d8/0x400 [ 3813.865220] sg_common_write.isra.0+0xe61/0x2420 [ 3813.871637] sg_write+0x6c8/0xef0 [ 3813.878853] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x800 [ 3813.883487] vfs_write+0x17b/0x530 [ 3813.884008] ksys_write+0x103/0x270 [ 3813.886268] __x64_sys_write+0x77/0xc0 [ 3813.886841] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360 [ 3813.887415] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This issue can be reproduced with the following syzkaller log:

r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x26e1, 0x0) r1 = syz_open_procfs(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000000000)='fd/3\x00') open_by_handle_at(r1, &(0x7f00000003c0)=ANY=[@ANYRESHEX], 0x602000) r2 = syz_open_dev$sg(&(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x40782) write$binfmt_aout(r2, &(0x7f0000000340)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="00000000deff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000047f007af9e107a41ec395f1bded7be24277a1501ff6196a83366f4e6362bc0ff2b247f68a972989b094b2da4fb3607fcf611a22dd04310d28c75039d"], 0x126)

In resp_readcap16() we get "int alloc_len" value -1104926854, and then pass the huge arr_len to fill_from_dev_buffer(), but arr is only 32 bytes. This leads to OOB in sg_copy_buffer().

To solve this issue, define alloc_len as u32.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013033913.2551004-2-yebin10@huawei.com Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c index b6540b92f566..63504dc63d87 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c @@ -1855,7 +1855,7 @@ static int resp_readcap16(struct scsi_cmnd *scp, { unsigned char *cmd = scp->cmnd; unsigned char arr[SDEBUG_READCAP16_ARR_SZ]; - int alloc_len; + u32 alloc_len;

alloc_len = get_unaligned_be32(cmd + 10); /* following just in case virtual_gb changed */ @@ -1884,7 +1884,7 @@ static int resp_readcap16(struct scsi_cmnd *scp, }

return fill_from_dev_buffer(scp, arr, - min_t(int, alloc_len, SDEBUG_READCAP16_ARR_SZ)); + min_t(u32, alloc_len, SDEBUG_READCAP16_ARR_SZ)); }

#define SDEBUG_MAX_TGTPGS_ARR_SZ 1412

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 04/16] scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_report_tgtpgs()

From: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17 commit f347c26836c270199de1599c3cd466bb7747caa9 category: bugfix bugzilla: 182951 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

-----------------------------------------------

The following issue was observed running syzkaller:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831 Read of size 2132 at addr ffff8880aea95dc8 by task syz-executor.0/9815

CPU: 0 PID: 9815 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.202-00874-gfc0fe04215a9 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xe4/0x14a lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:253 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline] kasan_report+0x272/0x370 mm/kasan/report.c:410 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302 memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline] sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831 fill_from_dev_buffer+0x14f/0x340 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1021 resp_report_tgtpgs+0x5aa/0x770 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1772 schedule_resp+0x464/0x12f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4429 scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x467/0x1390 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5835 scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x3fc/0x9b0 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1896 scsi_request_fn+0x1042/0x1810 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:2034 __blk_run_queue_uncond block/blk-core.c:464 [inline] __blk_run_queue+0x1a4/0x380 block/blk-core.c:484 blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1c2/0x2d0 block/blk-exec.c:78 sg_common_write.isra.19+0xd74/0x1dc0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:847 sg_write.part.23+0x6e0/0xd00 drivers/scsi/sg.c:716 sg_write+0x64/0xa0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:622 __vfs_write+0xed/0x690 fs/read_write.c:485 kill_bdev:block_device:00000000e138492c vfs_write+0x184/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x107/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x560 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

We get 'alen' from command its type is int. If userspace passes a large length we will get a negative 'alen'.

Switch n, alen, and rlen to u32.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211013033913.2551004-3-yebin10@huawei.com Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert dgilbert@interlog.com Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen martin.petersen@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c index 63504dc63d87..3fc7c2a31c19 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c @@ -1895,8 +1895,9 @@ static int resp_report_tgtpgs(struct scsi_cmnd *scp, unsigned char *cmd = scp->cmnd; unsigned char *arr; int host_no = devip->sdbg_host->shost->host_no; - int n, ret, alen, rlen; int port_group_a, port_group_b, port_a, port_b; + u32 alen, n, rlen; + int ret;

alen = get_unaligned_be32(cmd + 6); arr = kzalloc(SDEBUG_MAX_TGTPGS_ARR_SZ, GFP_ATOMIC); @@ -1958,9 +1959,9 @@ static int resp_report_tgtpgs(struct scsi_cmnd *scp, * - The constructed command length * - The maximum array size */ - rlen = min_t(int, alen, n); + rlen = min(alen, n); ret = fill_from_dev_buffer(scp, arr, - min_t(int, rlen, SDEBUG_MAX_TGTPGS_ARR_SZ)); + min_t(u32, rlen, SDEBUG_MAX_TGTPGS_ARR_SZ)); kfree(arr); return ret; }

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 05/16] PM: hibernate: Get block device exclusively in swsusp_check()

From: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17 commit 39fbef4b0f77f9c89c8f014749ca533643a37c9f category: bugfix bugzilla: 182871 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

-----------------------------------------------

The following kernel crash can be triggered:

[ 89.266592] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 89.267427] kernel BUG at fs/buffer.c:3020! [ 89.268264] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 89.269116] CPU: 7 PID: 1750 Comm: kmmpd-loop0 Not tainted 5.10.0-862.14.0.6.x86_64-08610-gc932cda3cef4-dirty #20 [ 89.273169] RIP: 0010:submit_bh_wbc.isra.0+0x538/0x6d0 [ 89.277157] RSP: 0018:ffff888105ddfd08 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 89.278093] RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: ffff888124231498 RCX: ffffffffb2772612 [ 89.279332] RDX: 1ffff11024846293 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff888124231498 [ 89.280591] RBP: ffff8881248cc000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1024846294 [ 89.281851] R10: ffff88812423149f R11: ffffed1024846293 R12: 0000000000003800 [ 89.283095] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881161f7000 [ 89.284342] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88839b5c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 89.285711] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 89.286701] CR2: 00007f166ebc01a0 CR3: 0000000435c0e000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 89.287919] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 89.289138] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 89.290368] Call Trace: [ 89.290842] write_mmp_block+0x2ca/0x510 [ 89.292218] kmmpd+0x433/0x9a0 [ 89.294902] kthread+0x2dd/0x3e0 [ 89.296268] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 89.296906] Modules linked in:

by running the following commands:

1. mkfs.ext4 -O mmp /dev/sda -b 1024 2. mount /dev/sda /home/test 3. echo "/dev/sda" > /sys/power/resume

That happens because swsusp_check() calls set_blocksize() on the target partition which confuses the file system:

Thread1 Thread2 mount /dev/sda /home/test get s_mmp_bh --> has mapped flag start kmmpd thread echo "/dev/sda" > /sys/power/resume resume_store software_resume swsusp_check set_blocksize truncate_inode_pages_range truncate_cleanup_page block_invalidatepage discard_buffer --> clean mapped flag write_mmp_block submit_bh submit_bh_wbc BUG_ON(!buffer_mapped(bh))

To address this issue, modify swsusp_check() to open the target block device with exclusive access.

Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com [ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- kernel/power/swap.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/power/swap.c b/kernel/power/swap.c index 72e33054a2e1..c9126606fa6f 100644 --- a/kernel/power/swap.c +++ b/kernel/power/swap.c @@ -1521,9 +1521,10 @@ int swsusp_read(unsigned int *flags_p) int swsusp_check(void) { int error; + void *holder;

hib_resume_bdev = blkdev_get_by_dev(swsusp_resume_device, - FMODE_READ, NULL); + FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL, &holder); if (!IS_ERR(hib_resume_bdev)) { set_blocksize(hib_resume_bdev, PAGE_SIZE); clear_page(swsusp_header); @@ -1545,7 +1546,7 @@ int swsusp_check(void)

put: if (error) - blkdev_put(hib_resume_bdev, FMODE_READ); + blkdev_put(hib_resume_bdev, FMODE_READ | FMODE_EXCL); else pr_debug("Image signature found, resuming\n"); } else {

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 06/16] nbd: Fix use-after-free in pid_show

From: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16 commit 0c98057be9efa32de78dbc4685fc73da9d71faa1 category: bugfix bugzilla: 182875 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

-----------------------------------------------

I got issue as follows: [ 263.886511] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pid_show+0x11f/0x13f [ 263.888359] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880bf0648c0 by task cat/746 [ 263.890479] CPU: 0 PID: 746 Comm: cat Not tainted 4.19.90-dirty #140 [ 263.893162] Call Trace: [ 263.893509] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f [ 263.893999] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372 [ 263.894641] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8 [ 263.895696] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x25/0x30 [ 263.896365] pid_show+0x11f/0x13f [ 263.897422] dev_attr_show+0x48/0x90 [ 263.898361] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x24d/0x4b0 [ 263.899479] kernfs_seq_show+0x14e/0x1b0 [ 263.900029] seq_read+0x43f/0x1150 [ 263.900499] kernfs_fop_read+0xc7/0x5a0 [ 263.903764] vfs_read+0x113/0x350 [ 263.904231] ksys_read+0x103/0x270 [ 263.905230] __x64_sys_read+0x77/0xc0 [ 263.906284] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360 [ 263.906797] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reproduce this issue as follows: 1. nbd-server 8000 /tmp/disk 2. nbd-client localhost 8000 /dev/nbd1 3. cat /sys/block/nbd1/pid Then trigger use-after-free in pid_show.

Reason is after do step '2', nbd-client progress is already exit. So it's task_struct already freed. To solve this issue, revert part of 6521d39a64b3's modify and remove useless 'recv_task' member of nbd_device.

Fixes: 6521d39a64b3 ("nbd: Remove variable 'pid'") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik josef@toxicpanda.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211020073959.2679255-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe axboe@kernel.dk

conflicts: drivers/block/nbd.c

Signed-off-by: Ye Bin yebin10@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index fe635bc3e8c4..bb50af20b284 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -114,11 +114,11 @@ struct nbd_device { struct workqueue_struct *recv_workq;

struct list_head list; - struct task_struct *task_recv; struct task_struct *task_setup;

struct completion *destroy_complete; unsigned long flags; + pid_t pid; /* pid of nbd-client, if attached */ };

#define NBD_CMD_REQUEUED 1 @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static ssize_t pid_show(struct device *dev, struct gendisk *disk = dev_to_disk(dev); struct nbd_device *nbd = (struct nbd_device *)disk->private_data;

- return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", task_pid_nr(nbd->task_recv)); + return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", nbd->pid); }

static const struct device_attribute pid_attr = { @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static void nbd_size_set(struct nbd_device *nbd, loff_t blocksize, struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; config->blksize = blocksize; config->bytesize = blocksize * nr_blocks; - if (nbd->task_recv != NULL) + if (nbd->pid) nbd_size_update(nbd, false); }

@@ -1284,7 +1284,7 @@ static void nbd_config_put(struct nbd_device *nbd) if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_RT_HAS_PID_FILE, &config->runtime_flags)) device_remove_file(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), &pid_attr); - nbd->task_recv = NULL; + nbd->pid = 0; nbd_clear_sock(nbd); if (config->num_connections) { int i; @@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd) int num_connections = config->num_connections; int error = 0, i;

- if (nbd->task_recv) + if (nbd->pid) return -EBUSY; if (!config->socks) return -EINVAL; @@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd) }

blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues(&nbd->tag_set, config->num_connections); - nbd->task_recv = current; + nbd->pid = task_pid_nr(current);

nbd_parse_flags(nbd);

@@ -1612,8 +1612,8 @@ static int nbd_dbg_tasks_show(struct seq_file *s, void *unused) { struct nbd_device *nbd = s->private;

- if (nbd->task_recv) - seq_printf(s, "recv: %d\n", task_pid_nr(nbd->task_recv)); + if (nbd->pid) + seq_printf(s, "recv: %d\n", nbd->pid);

return 0; } @@ -2188,7 +2188,7 @@ static int nbd_genl_reconfigure(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) mutex_lock(&nbd->config_lock); config = nbd->config; if (!test_bit(NBD_RT_BOUND, &config->runtime_flags) || - !nbd->task_recv) { + !nbd->pid) { dev_err(nbd_to_dev(nbd), "not configured, cannot reconfigure\n"); ret = -EINVAL;

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 07/16] Fix NULL pointer dereference in handling for passthrough commands

From: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 179896 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

---------------------------

In passthrough path. If the command size for ioctl request from userspace is 0. The original process will get cmd_len from cmd->cmnd, but It has not been assigned at this time. So it will trigger a NULL pointer BUG.

------------[ cut here ]------------ BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page RIP: 0010:scsi_queue_rq+0xcb2/0x12b0 Call Trace: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x541/0xe90 __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x1fe/0x2b0 blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xbf/0x130 __blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x15b/0x230 __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue+0x18f/0x320 blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x252/0x280 blk_mq_sched_insert_request+0x228/0x260 blk_execute_rq+0x111/0x160 sg_io+0x51a/0x740 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x533/0x910 scsi_cmd_blk_ioctl+0xa1/0xb0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3f/0x2510 sr_block_ioctl+0x142/0x180 blkdev_ioctl+0x398/0x450 block_ioctl+0x6d/0x80 __se_sys_ioctl+0xd1/0x140 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x37/0x50 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

We can trigger front BUG by ioctl blow. ------------[ cut here ]------------

sg_io_hdr_t *addr;

addr = malloc(sizeof(sg_io_hdr_t)); memset(addr, 0, sizeof(sg_io_hdr_t)); addr->interface_id = 'S';

fd = open(/dev/sr0, O_RDONLY); // open a CD_ROM dev

ioctl(fd, SG_IO, addr); // all zero sg_io_hdr_t will trigger this bug

Fixes: 2ceda20f0a99a ("scsi: core: Move command size detection out of the fast path") Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c index d89db29fa829..b26c922bd65d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c @@ -1193,9 +1193,9 @@ static blk_status_t scsi_setup_scsi_cmnd(struct scsi_device *sdev, }

cmd->cmd_len = scsi_req(req)->cmd_len; + cmd->cmnd = scsi_req(req)->cmd; if (cmd->cmd_len == 0) cmd->cmd_len = scsi_command_size(cmd->cmnd); - cmd->cmnd = scsi_req(req)->cmd; cmd->transfersize = blk_rq_bytes(req); cmd->allowed = scsi_req(req)->retries; return BLK_STS_OK;

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 08/16] loop: fix loop_validate_block_size() can't make sense

From: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 176146 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL

---------------------------

We config the block size of a loop device throuth the following process:

lo_ioctl(..., unsigned long arg) | ^^^^ lo_simple_ioctl(..., unsigned long arg) | ^^^^ loop_set_block_size(..., unsigned long arg) | ^^^^ loop_validate_block_size(unsigned short bsize) | ^^^^^ blk_queue_logical_block_size(..., unsigned int size) { ''' limits->logical_block_size = size; ^^^^ int ''' }

loop_validate_block_size() will check the validity of bsize. But long to short will be truncated(eg arg=1049600 and it becomes 1024 after truncation by short. The block size must within the range of 512 ~ PAGE_SZIE, This truncation will turn illegal block szie to legal). The wrong of block size will raise other errors.

Fixes: 3448914e8cc55 ("loop: Add LOOP_CONFIGURE ioctl") Signed-off-by: Laibin Qiu qiulaibin@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- drivers/block/loop.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c index 2481c29482d7..24f4192a2ffb 100644 --- a/drivers/block/loop.c +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ static void __loop_update_dio(struct loop_device *lo, bool dio) * @bsize: size to validate */ static int -loop_validate_block_size(unsigned short bsize) +loop_validate_block_size(unsigned long bsize) { if (bsize < 512 || bsize > PAGE_SIZE || !is_power_of_2(bsize)) return -EINVAL;

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 09/16] Bluetooth: fix use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested()

From: Wang ShaoBo bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com

maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 182990 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3752

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

-------------------------------------------------

use-after-free error in lock_sock_nested is reported:

[ 179.140137][ T3731] ===================================================== [ 179.142675][ T3731] BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 [ 179.145494][ T3731] CPU: 4 PID: 3731 Comm: kworker/4:2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #54 [ 179.148432][ T3731] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 [ 179.151806][ T3731] Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout [ 179.152730][ T3731] Call Trace: [ 179.153301][ T3731] dump_stack+0x24c/0x2e0 [ 179.154063][ T3731] kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0 [ 179.154855][ T3731] __msan_warning+0x5c/0xa0 [ 179.155579][ T3731] lock_sock_nested+0x280/0x2c0 [ 179.156436][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.157257][ T3731] l2cap_sock_teardown_cb+0xb8/0x890 [ 179.158154][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 [ 179.159141][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.159994][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 [ 179.160959][ T3731] ? l2cap_sock_recv_cb+0x420/0x420 [ 179.161834][ T3731] l2cap_chan_del+0x3e1/0x1d50 [ 179.162608][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_metadata+0x116/0x180 [ 179.163435][ T3731] ? kmsan_get_shadow_origin_ptr+0x84/0xb0 [ 179.164406][ T3731] l2cap_chan_close+0xeea/0x1050 [ 179.165189][ T3731] ? kmsan_internal_unpoison_shadow+0x42/0x70 [ 179.166180][ T3731] l2cap_chan_timeout+0x1da/0x590 [ 179.167066][ T3731] ? __msan_metadata_ptr_for_load_8+0x10/0x20 [ 179.168023][ T3731] ? l2cap_chan_create+0x560/0x560 [ 179.168818][ T3731] process_one_work+0x121d/0x1ff0 [ 179.169598][ T3731] worker_thread+0x121b/0x2370 [ 179.170346][ T3731] kthread+0x4ef/0x610 [ 179.171010][ T3731] ? process_one_work+0x1ff0/0x1ff0 [ 179.171828][ T3731] ? kthread_blkcg+0x110/0x110 [ 179.172587][ T3731] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 179.173348][ T3731] [ 179.173752][ T3731] Uninit was created at: [ 179.174409][ T3731] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0xf0 [ 179.175373][ T3731] kmsan_slab_free+0x76/0xc0 [ 179.176060][ T3731] kfree+0x3a5/0x1180 [ 179.176664][ T3731] __sk_destruct+0x8af/0xb80 [ 179.177375][ T3731] __sk_free+0x812/0x8c0 [ 179.178032][ T3731] sk_free+0x97/0x130 [ 179.178686][ T3731] l2cap_sock_release+0x3d5/0x4d0 [ 179.179457][ T3731] sock_close+0x150/0x450 [ 179.180117][ T3731] __fput+0x6bd/0xf00 [ 179.180787][ T3731] ____fput+0x37/0x40 [ 179.181481][ T3731] task_work_run+0x140/0x280 [ 179.182219][ T3731] do_exit+0xe51/0x3e60 [ 179.182930][ T3731] do_group_exit+0x20e/0x450 [ 179.183656][ T3731] get_signal+0x2dfb/0x38f0 [ 179.184344][ T3731] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xaa/0xe10 [ 179.185266][ T3731] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2d2/0x560 [ 179.186136][ T3731] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x35/0x60 [ 179.186984][ T3731] do_syscall_64+0xc5/0x140 [ 179.187681][ T3731] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 179.188604][ T3731] =====================================================

In our case, there are two Thread A and B:

Context: Thread A: Context: Thread B:

l2cap_chan_timeout() __se_sys_shutdown() l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_shutdown() l2cap_chan_del() l2cap_chan_close() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()

Once l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() excuted, this sock will be marked as SOCK_ZAPPED, and can be treated as killable in l2cap_sock_kill() if sock_orphan() has excuted, at this time we close sock through sock_close() which end to call l2cap_sock_kill() like Thread C:

Context: Thread C:

sock_close() l2cap_sock_release() sock_orphan() l2cap_sock_kill() #free sock if refcnt is 1

If C completed, Once A or B reaches l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() again, use-after-free happened.

We should set chan->data to NULL if sock is destructed, for telling teardown operation is not allowed in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(), and also we should avoid killing an already killed socket in l2cap_sock_close_cb().

Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo bobo.shaobowang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz luiz.von.dentz@intel.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com Reviewed-by: weiyang wang wangweiyang2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index c99d65ef13b1..160c016a5dfb 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -1508,6 +1508,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_close_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan) { struct sock *sk = chan->data;

+ if (!sk) + return; + l2cap_sock_kill(sk); }

@@ -1516,6 +1519,9 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err) struct sock *sk = chan->data; struct sock *parent;

+ if (!sk) + return; + BT_DBG("chan %p state %s", chan, state_to_string(chan->state));

/* This callback can be called both for server (BT_LISTEN) @@ -1707,8 +1713,10 @@ static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk) { BT_DBG("sk %p", sk);

- if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan) + if (l2cap_pi(sk)->chan) { + l2cap_pi(sk)->chan->data = NULL; l2cap_chan_put(l2cap_pi(sk)->chan); + }

if (l2cap_pi(sk)->rx_busy_skb) { kfree_skb(l2cap_pi(sk)->rx_busy_skb);

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 10/16] sctp: use init_tag from inithdr for ABORT chunk

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit 4f7019c7eb33967eb87766e0e4602b5576873680 bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Currently Linux SCTP uses the verification tag of the existing SCTP asoc when failing to process and sending the packet with the ABORT chunk. This will result in the peer accepting the ABORT chunk and removing the SCTP asoc. One could exploit this to terminate a SCTP asoc.

This patch is to fix it by always using the initiate tag of the received INIT chunk for the ABORT chunk to be sent.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner marcelo.leitner@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Reviewed-by: weiyang wang wangweiyang2@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index b65bdaa84228..89a86728184d 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -6248,6 +6248,7 @@ static struct sctp_packet *sctp_ootb_pkt_new( * yet. */ switch (chunk->chunk_hdr->type) { + case SCTP_CID_INIT: case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK: { struct sctp_initack_chunk *initack;

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 11/16] sctp: fix the processing for INIT chunk

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit eae5783908042a762c24e1bd11876edb91d314b1 bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

This patch fixes the problems below:

1. In non-shutdown_ack_sent states: in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit():

chunk length check should be done before any checks that may cause to send abort, as making packet for abort will access the init_tag from init_hdr in sctp_ootb_pkt_new().

2. In shutdown_ack_sent state: in sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack():

The same checks as does in sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit() is needed for sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack().

Conflicts: net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Reviewed-by: weiyang wang wangweiyang2@huawei.com

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 89a86728184d..c51340350b33 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -149,6 +149,12 @@ static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( void *arg, struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands);

+static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands); + /* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length * is of the appropriate length. The 'required_length' argument * is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing. @@ -330,6 +336,14 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

+ /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. + * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation + * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll + * just discard the packet. + */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -344,14 +358,6 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init(struct net *net, if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

- /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation - * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll - * just discard the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back * and ABORT. Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close(). @@ -1480,19 +1486,16 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init( if (!chunk->singleton) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

+ /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification * Tag. */ if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

- /* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. - * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have - * an association established. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); /* Grab the INIT header. */ chunk->subh.init_hdr = (struct sctp_inithdr *)chunk->skb->data;

@@ -1810,9 +1813,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a( * its peer. */ if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT)) { - disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, - SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), - chunk, commands); + disposition = __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, + SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type), + chunk, commands); if (SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM == disposition) goto nomem;

@@ -2909,13 +2912,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_shut_ctsn( * that belong to this association, it should discard the INIT chunk and * retransmit the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk. */ -enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( - struct net *net, - const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, - const struct sctp_association *asoc, - const union sctp_subtype type, - void *arg, - struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +static enum sctp_disposition +__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; struct sctp_chunk *reply; @@ -2949,6 +2950,26 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack( return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM; }

+enum sctp_disposition +sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_association *asoc, + const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg, + struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands) +{ + struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg; + + if (!chunk->singleton) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0) + return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + + return __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); +} + /* * sctp_sf_do_ecn_cwr *

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 12/16] sctp: fix the processing for INIT_ACK chunk

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit 438b95a7c98f77d51cbf4db021f41b602d750a3f bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Currently INIT_ACK chunk in non-cookie_echoed state is processed in sctp_sf_discard_chunk() to send an abort with the existent asoc's vtag if the chunk length is not valid. But the vtag in the chunk's sctphdr is not verified, which may be exploited by one to cook a malicious chunk to terminal a SCTP asoc.

sctp_sf_discard_chunk() also is called in many other places to send an abort, and most of those have this problem. This patch is to fix it by sending abort with the existent asoc's vtag only if the vtag from the chunk's sctphdr is verified in sctp_sf_discard_chunk().

Note on sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort() and sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort(), the chunk length has been verified before sctp_sf_discard_chunk(), so replace it with sctp_sf_discard(). On sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack() and sctp_sf_do_asconf(), move the sctp_chunk_length_valid check ahead of sctp_sf_discard_chunk(), then replace it with sctp_sf_discard().

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index c51340350b33..aeca510b9412 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -2283,7 +2283,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2329,7 +2329,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort( */ if (SCTP_ADDR_DEL == sctp_bind_addr_state(&asoc->base.bind_addr, &chunk->dest)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

if (!sctp_err_chunk_valid(chunk)) return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); @@ -3766,6 +3766,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); }

+ /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP: Section 4.1.1 * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3774,13 +3779,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf(struct net *net, */ if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !chunk->auth)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ASCONF ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)chunk->skb->data; serial = ntohl(hdr->serial); @@ -3909,6 +3908,12 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); }

+ /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands); + /* ADD-IP, Section 4.1.2: * This chunk MUST be sent in an authenticated way by using * the mechanism defined in [I-D.ietf-tsvwg-sctp-auth]. If this chunk @@ -3917,14 +3922,7 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack(struct net *net, */ if (!asoc->peer.asconf_capable || (!net->sctp.addip_noauth && !asconf_ack->auth)) - return sctp_sf_discard_chunk(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); - - /* Make sure that the ADDIP chunk has a valid length. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(asconf_ack, - sizeof(struct sctp_addip_chunk))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);

addip_hdr = (struct sctp_addiphdr *)asconf_ack->skb->data; rcvd_serial = ntohl(addip_hdr->serial); @@ -4496,6 +4494,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_discard_chunk(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;

+ if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. * Since we don't know the chunk type, we use a general * chunkhdr structure to make a comparison.

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 13/16] sctp: fix the processing for COOKIE_ECHO chunk

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit a64b341b8695e1c744dd972b39868371b4f68f83 bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

1. In closed state: in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce():

When asoc is NULL, making packet for abort will use chunk's vtag in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(). But when asoc exists, vtag from the chunk should be verified before using peer.i.init_tag to make packet for abort in sctp_ootb_pkt_new(), and just discard it if vtag is not correct.

2. In the other states: in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook():

asoc always exists, but duplicate cookie_echo's vtag will be handled by sctp_tietags_compare() and then take actions, so before that we only verify the vtag for the abort sent for invalid chunk length.

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index aeca510b9412..8930f35450ae 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -703,6 +703,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, struct sock *sk; int error = 0;

+ if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT. */ @@ -717,7 +720,8 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce(struct net *net, * in sctp_unpack_cookie(). */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, + commands);

/* If the endpoint is not listening or if the number of associations * on the TCP-style socket exceed the max backlog, respond with an @@ -2144,9 +2148,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook( * enough for the chunk header. Cookie length verification is * done later. */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, - commands); + if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) { + if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + }

/* "Decode" the chunk. We have no optional parameters so we * are in good shape.

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 14/16] sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_violation

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit aa0f697e45286a6b5f0ceca9418acf54b9099d99 bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

sctp_sf_violation() is called when processing HEARTBEAT_ACK chunk in cookie_wait state, and some other places are also using it.

The vtag in the chunk's sctphdr should be verified, otherwise, as later in chunk length check, it may send abort with the existent asoc's vtag, which can be exploited by one to cook a malicious chunk to terminate a SCTP asoc.

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 8930f35450ae..e5dd395668ce 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -4570,6 +4570,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_violation(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;

+ if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); + /* Make sure that the chunk has a valid length. */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 15/16] sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit ef16b1734f0a176277b7bb9c71a6d977a6ef3998 bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa() is called when processing SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk in cookie_wait and cookie_echoed state.

Note that when fails to verify the vtag from SHUTDOWN-ACK chunk, SHUTDOWN COMPLETE message will still be sent back to peer, but with the vtag from SHUTDOWN-ACK chunk, as said in 5) of rfc4960#section-8.4.

While at it, also remove the unnecessary chunk length check from sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(), as it's already done in both places where it calls sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5().

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index e5dd395668ce..37574911b331 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3704,12 +3704,6 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5(

SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTCTRLCHUNKS);

- /* If the chunk length is invalid, we don't want to process - * the reset of the packet. - */ - if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) - return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands); - /* We need to discard the rest of the packet to prevent * potential bomming attacks from additional bundled chunks. * This is documented in SCTP Threats ID. @@ -3737,6 +3731,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa(struct net *net, { struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;

+ if (!sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + /* Make sure that the SHUTDOWN_ACK chunk has a valid length. */ if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_chunkhdr))) return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,

-- 2.20.1

Zheng Zengkai

7:49 p.m.

New subject: [PATCH openEuler-5.10 16/16] sctp: add vtag check in sctp_sf_ootb

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

mainline inclusion from mainline commit 9d02831e517aa36ee6bdb453a0eb47bd49923fe3 bugzilla: 182989 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4DDEL CVE: CVE-2021-3772

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

sctp_sf_ootb() is called when processing DATA chunk in closed state, and many other places are also using it.

When fails to verify the vtag from the chunk, this patch sets asoc to NULL, so that the abort will be made with the vtag from the received chunk later.

Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com --- net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c index 37574911b331..ee0b2b03657c 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c @@ -3589,6 +3589,9 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_ootb(struct net *net,

SCTP_INC_STATS(net, SCTP_MIB_OUTOFBLUES);

+ if (asoc && !sctp_vtag_verify(chunk, asoc)) + asoc = NULL; + ch = (struct sctp_chunkhdr *)chunk->chunk_hdr; do { /* Report violation if the chunk is less then minimal */

-- 2.20.1

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Zheng Zengkai