Daniel Borkmann (1): bpf, selftests: Adjust few selftest outcomes wrt unreachable code
Greg Kroah-Hartman (1): Linux 4.19.204
Lai Jiangshan (1): KVM: X86: MMU: Use the correct inherited permissions to get shadow page
Masami Hiramatsu (1): tracing: Reject string operand in the histogram expression
Miklos Szeredi (1): ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed
Pali Rohár (1): ppp: Fix generating ppp unit id when ifname is not specified
Sean Christopherson (1): KVM: SVM: Fix off-by-one indexing when nullifying last used SEV VMCB
YueHaibing (1): net: xilinx_emaclite: Do not print real IOMEM pointer
Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt | 4 +- Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 14 ++++--- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c | 5 +-- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 19 +++++++-- fs/namespace.c | 42 ++++++++++++------- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 14 +++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 2 + 9 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
From: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 17b9e2da62d7400763262b164bab3efe31ef08e7
--------------------------------
[ Upstream commit 179c6c27bf487273652efc99acd3ba512a23c137 ]
Use the raw ASID, not ASID-1, when nullifying the last used VMCB when freeing an SEV ASID. The consumer, pre_sev_run(), indexes the array by the raw ASID, thus KVM could get a false negative when checking for a different VMCB if KVM manages to reallocate the same ASID+VMCB combo for a new VM.
Note, this cannot cause a functional issue _in the current code_, as pre_sev_run() also checks which pCPU last did VMRUN for the vCPU, and last_vmentry_cpu is initialized to -1 during vCPU creation, i.e. is guaranteed to mismatch on the first VMRUN. However, prior to commit 8a14fe4f0c54 ("kvm: x86: Move last_cpu into kvm_vcpu_arch as last_vmentry_cpu"), SVM tracked pCPU on its own and zero-initialized the last_cpu variable. Thus it's theoretically possible that older versions of KVM could miss a TLB flush if the first VMRUN is on pCPU0 and the ASID and VMCB exactly match those of a prior VM.
Fixes: 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled") Cc: Tom Lendacky thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Brijesh Singh brijesh.singh@amd.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index b3aa7cbb10eee..2a499d0c78632 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@ static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu); - sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL; + sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = NULL; } }
From: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 7c165d58effc19fdf68196d4ceebf940d5da777d
--------------------------------
commit a9d10ca4986571bffc19778742d508cc8dd13e02 upstream.
Since the string type can not be the target of the addition / subtraction operation, it must be rejected. Without this fix, the string type silently converted to digits.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162742654278.290973.1523000673366456634.stgit@devn...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 100719dcef447 ("tracing: Add simple expression support to hist triggers") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu mhiramat@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c index 6d2a69652c391..bbde8d3d6c8ae 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c @@ -2790,6 +2790,12 @@ static struct hist_field *parse_unary(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data, ret = PTR_ERR(operand1); goto free; } + if (operand1->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING) { + /* String type can not be the operand of unary operator. */ + destroy_hist_field(operand1, 0); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free; + }
expr->flags |= operand1->flags & (HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP | HIST_FIELD_FL_TIMESTAMP_USECS); @@ -2890,6 +2896,10 @@ static struct hist_field *parse_expr(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data, operand1 = NULL; goto free; } + if (operand1->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free; + }
/* rest of string could be another expression e.g. b+c in a+b+c */ operand_flags = 0; @@ -2899,6 +2909,10 @@ static struct hist_field *parse_expr(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data, operand2 = NULL; goto free; } + if (operand2->flags & HIST_FIELD_FL_STRING) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto free; + }
ret = check_expr_operands(operand1, operand2); if (ret)
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit c15b387769446c37a892f958b169744dabf7ff23
--------------------------------
commit 973377ffe8148180b2651825b92ae91988141b05 upstream.
In almost all cases from test_verifier that have been changed in here, we've had an unreachable path with a load from a register which has an invalid address on purpose. This was basically to make sure that we never walk this path and to have the verifier complain if it would otherwise. Change it to match on the right error for unprivileged given we now test these paths under speculative execution.
There's one case where we match on exact # of insns_processed. Due to the extra path, this will of course mismatch on unprivileged. Thus, restrict the test->insn_processed check to privileged-only.
In one other case, we result in a 'pointer comparison prohibited' error. This is similarly due to verifying an 'invalid' branch where we end up with a value pointer on one side of the comparison.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Reviewed-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org [OP: ignore changes to tests that do not exist in 4.19] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c index b44324530948d..c7d17781dbfee 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c @@ -2792,6 +2792,8 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = { BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_7, 0), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, + .errstr_unpriv = "R7 invalid mem access 'inv'", + .result_unpriv = REJECT, .result = ACCEPT, .retval = 0, },
From: Lai Jiangshan laijs@linux.alibaba.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 4c07e70141eebd3db64297515a427deea4822957
--------------------------------
commit b1bd5cba3306691c771d558e94baa73e8b0b96b7 upstream.
When computing the access permissions of a shadow page, use the effective permissions of the walk up to that point, i.e. the logic AND of its parents' permissions. Two guest PxE entries that point at the same table gfn need to be shadowed with different shadow pages if their parents' permissions are different. KVM currently uses the effective permissions of the last non-leaf entry for all non-leaf entries. Because all non-leaf SPTEs have full ("uwx") permissions, and the effective permissions are recorded only in role.access and merged into the leaves, this can lead to incorrect reuse of a shadow page and eventually to a missing guest protection page fault.
For example, here is a shared pagetable:
pgd[] pud[] pmd[] virtual address pointers /->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr1 (u--) /->pud1(uw-)--->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr2 (uw-) pgd-| (shared pmd[] as above) ->pud2(u--)--->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr3 (u--) ->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr4 (u--)
pud1 and pud2 point to the same pmd table, so: - ptr1 and ptr3 points to the same page. - ptr2 and ptr4 points to the same page.
(pud1 and pud2 here are pud entries, while pmd1 and pmd2 here are pmd entries)
- First, the guest reads from ptr1 first and KVM prepares a shadow page table with role.access=u--, from ptr1's pud1 and ptr1's pmd1. "u--" comes from the effective permissions of pgd, pud1 and pmd1, which are stored in pt->access. "u--" is used also to get the pagetable for pud1, instead of "uw-".
- Then the guest writes to ptr2 and KVM reuses pud1 which is present. The hypervisor set up a shadow page for ptr2 with pt->access is "uw-" even though the pud1 pmd (because of the incorrect argument to kvm_mmu_get_page in the previous step) has role.access="u--".
- Then the guest reads from ptr3. The hypervisor reuses pud1's shadow pmd for pud2, because both use "u--" for their permissions. Thus, the shadow pmd already includes entries for both pmd1 and pmd2.
- At last, the guest writes to ptr4. This causes no vmexit or pagefault, because pud1's shadow page structures included an "uw-" page even though its role.access was "u--".
Any kind of shared pagetable might have the similar problem when in virtual machine without TDP enabled if the permissions are different from different ancestors.
In order to fix the problem, we change pt->access to be an array, and any access in it will not include permissions ANDed from child ptes.
The test code is: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210603050537.19605-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com/ Remember to test it with TDP disabled.
The problem had existed long before the commit 41074d07c78b ("KVM: MMU: Fix inherited permissions for emulated guest pte updates"), and it is hard to find which is the culprit. So there is no fixes tag here.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan laijs@linux.alibaba.com Message-Id: 20210603052455.21023-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: cea0f0e7ea54 ("[PATCH] KVM: MMU: Shadow page table caching") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com [OP: - apply arch/x86/kvm/mmu/* changes to arch/x86/kvm - apply documentation changes to Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt - adjusted context in arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait ovidiu.panait@windriver.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 14 +++++++++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt index e507a9e0421ed..851a8abcadce4 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt @@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information: shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3. Each quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space. role.access: - Inherited guest access permissions in the form uwx. Note execute - permission is positive, not negative. + Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx. + Note execute permission is positive, not negative. role.invalid: The page is invalid and should not be used. It is a root page that is currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h index 8220190b06050..9e15818de9737 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ struct guest_walker { gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; - unsigned pt_access; - unsigned pte_access; + unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + unsigned int pte_access; gfn_t gfn; struct x86_exception fault; }; @@ -388,13 +388,15 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, }
walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte; + + /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); } while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte));
pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte); accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0;
/* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ - walker->pt_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask); errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access); if (unlikely(errcode)) @@ -433,7 +435,8 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, }
pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n", - __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, walker->pt_access); + __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]); return 1;
error: @@ -602,7 +605,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, { struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL; struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it; - unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access; + unsigned int direct_access, access; int top_level, ret; gfn_t gfn, base_gfn;
@@ -634,6 +637,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, sp = NULL; if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) { table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2]; + access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2]; sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, it.level-1, false, access); }
From: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit ef8e4a33c0b89677cb8f158413bff2fa594696f2
--------------------------------
commit 3125f26c514826077f2a4490b75e9b1c7a644c42 upstream.
When registering new ppp interface via PPPIOCNEWUNIT ioctl then kernel has to choose interface name as this ioctl API does not support specifying it.
Kernel in this case register new interface with name "ppp<id>" where <id> is the ppp unit id, which can be obtained via PPPIOCGUNIT ioctl. This applies also in the case when registering new ppp interface via rtnl without supplying IFLA_IFNAME.
PPPIOCNEWUNIT ioctl allows to specify own ppp unit id which will kernel assign to ppp interface, in case this ppp id is not already used by other ppp interface.
In case user does not specify ppp unit id then kernel choose the first free ppp unit id. This applies also for case when creating ppp interface via rtnl method as it does not provide a way for specifying own ppp unit id.
If some network interface (does not have to be ppp) has name "ppp<id>" with this first free ppp id then PPPIOCNEWUNIT ioctl or rtnl call fails.
And registering new ppp interface is not possible anymore, until interface which holds conflicting name is renamed. Or when using rtnl method with custom interface name in IFLA_IFNAME.
As list of allocated / used ppp unit ids is not possible to retrieve from kernel to userspace, userspace has no idea what happens nor which interface is doing this conflict.
So change the algorithm how ppp unit id is generated. And choose the first number which is not neither used as ppp unit id nor in some network interface with pattern "ppp<id>".
This issue can be simply reproduced by following pppd call when there is no ppp interface registered and also no interface with name pattern "ppp<id>":
pppd ifname ppp1 +ipv6 noip noauth nolock local nodetach pty "pppd +ipv6 noip noauth nolock local nodetach notty"
Or by creating the one ppp interface (which gets assigned ppp unit id 0), renaming it to "ppp1" and then trying to create a new ppp interface (which will always fails as next free ppp unit id is 1, but network interface with name "ppp1" exists).
This patch fixes above described issue by generating new and new ppp unit id until some non-conflicting id with network interfaces is generated.
Signed-off-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c index 3e014ecffef8e..1af47aaa7ba57 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static struct channel *ppp_find_channel(struct ppp_net *pn, int unit); static int ppp_connect_channel(struct channel *pch, int unit); static int ppp_disconnect_channel(struct channel *pch); static void ppp_destroy_channel(struct channel *pch); -static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr); +static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int min); static int unit_set(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int n); static void unit_put(struct idr *p, int n); static void *unit_find(struct idr *p, int n); @@ -963,9 +963,20 @@ static int ppp_unit_register(struct ppp *ppp, int unit, bool ifname_is_set) mutex_lock(&pn->all_ppp_mutex);
if (unit < 0) { - ret = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp); + ret = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp, 0); if (ret < 0) goto err; + if (!ifname_is_set) { + while (1) { + snprintf(ppp->dev->name, IFNAMSIZ, "ppp%i", ret); + if (!__dev_get_by_name(ppp->ppp_net, ppp->dev->name)) + break; + unit_put(&pn->units_idr, ret); + ret = unit_get(&pn->units_idr, ppp, ret + 1); + if (ret < 0) + goto err; + } + } } else { /* Caller asked for a specific unit number. Fail with -EEXIST * if unavailable. For backward compatibility, return -EEXIST @@ -3252,9 +3263,9 @@ static int unit_set(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int n) }
/* get new free unit number and associate pointer with it */ -static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr) +static int unit_get(struct idr *p, void *ptr, int min) { - return idr_alloc(p, ptr, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); + return idr_alloc(p, ptr, min, 0, GFP_KERNEL); }
/* put unit number back to a pool */
From: Miklos Szeredi mszeredi@redhat.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 963d85d630dabe75a3cfde44a006fec3304d07b8
--------------------------------
commit 427215d85e8d1476da1a86b8d67aceb485eb3631 upstream.
Add the following checks from __do_loopback() to clone_private_mount() as well:
- verify that the mount is in the current namespace
- verify that there are no locked children
Reported-by: Alois Wohlschlager alois1@gmx-topmail.de Fixes: c771d683a62e ("vfs: introduce clone_private_mount()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.18 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi mszeredi@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- fs/namespace.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index c582abcdab598..bc774f3be8b86 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1852,6 +1852,20 @@ void drop_collected_mounts(struct vfsmount *mnt) namespace_unlock(); }
+static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct mount *child; + + list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { + if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry)) + continue; + + if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) + return true; + } + return false; +} + /** * clone_private_mount - create a private clone of a path * @@ -1866,14 +1880,27 @@ struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(const struct path *path) struct mount *old_mnt = real_mount(path->mnt); struct mount *new_mnt;
+ down_read(&namespace_sem); if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old_mnt)) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto invalid; + + if (!check_mnt(old_mnt)) + goto invalid; + + if (has_locked_children(old_mnt, path->dentry)) + goto invalid;
new_mnt = clone_mnt(old_mnt, path->dentry, CL_PRIVATE); + up_read(&namespace_sem); + if (IS_ERR(new_mnt)) return ERR_CAST(new_mnt);
return &new_mnt->mnt; + +invalid: + up_read(&namespace_sem); + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(clone_private_mount);
@@ -2189,19 +2216,6 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags) return err; }
-static bool has_locked_children(struct mount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry) -{ - struct mount *child; - list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) { - if (!is_subdir(child->mnt_mountpoint, dentry)) - continue; - - if (child->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_LOCKED) - return true; - } - return false; -} - /* * do loopback mount. */
From: YueHaibing yuehaibing@huawei.com
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 9322401477a6d1f9de8f18e5d6eb43a68e0b113a
--------------------------------
commit d0d62baa7f505bd4c59cd169692ff07ec49dde37 upstream.
Printing kernel pointers is discouraged because they might leak kernel memory layout. This fixes smatch warning:
drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c:1191 xemaclite_of_probe() warn: argument 4 to %08lX specifier is cast from pointer
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing yuehaibing@huawei.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek (CIP) pavel@denx.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c index c77c81eb7ab3b..edb2215f99930 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/xilinx/xilinx_emaclite.c @@ -1177,9 +1177,8 @@ static int xemaclite_of_probe(struct platform_device *ofdev) }
dev_info(dev, - "Xilinx EmacLite at 0x%08X mapped to 0x%08X, irq=%d\n", - (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start, - (unsigned int __force)lp->base_addr, ndev->irq); + "Xilinx EmacLite at 0x%08X mapped to 0x%p, irq=%d\n", + (unsigned int __force)ndev->mem_start, lp->base_addr, ndev->irq); return 0;
error:
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 59456c9cc40c8f75b5a7efa0fe1f211d9c6fcaf1
--------------------------------
Merge 8 patches from 4.19.204 stable branch (12 total) beside 4 already merged patches: 0abc8c9754c95 bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data c510c1845f7b5 bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification 9df311b2e7436 bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches 6b862aa345f04 USB:ehci:fix Kunpeng920 ehci hardware problem
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210813150520.072304554@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Shuah Khan skhan@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing lkft@linaro.org Tested-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 9cc5de875717b..f668d6cbc6e37 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 19 -SUBLEVEL = 203 +SUBLEVEL = 204 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = "People's Front"
-
Yang Yingliang