From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.11-rc1 commit 372acbbaa80940189593f9d69c7c069955f24f7a category: feature feature: Deep isolation bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N00D CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

No point in doing calculations.

tick_next_period = last_jiffies_update + tick_period

Just check whether now is before tick_next_period to figure out whether jiffies need an update.

Add a comment why the intentional data race in the quick check is safe or not so safe in a 32bit corner case and why we don't worry about it.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117132006.337366695@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index e8d351b7f9b0..82a56b8bcd60 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -57,11 +57,29 @@ static void tick_do_update_jiffies64(ktime_t now) ktime_t delta;

/* - * Do a quick check without holding jiffies_lock: - * The READ_ONCE() pairs with two updates done later in this function. + * Do a quick check without holding jiffies_lock. The READ_ONCE() + * pairs with the update done later in this function. + * + * This is also an intentional data race which is even safe on + * 32bit in theory. If there is a concurrent update then the check + * might give a random answer. It does not matter because if it + * returns then the concurrent update is already taking care, if it + * falls through then it will pointlessly contend on jiffies_lock. + * + * Though there is one nasty case on 32bit due to store tearing of + * the 64bit value. If the first 32bit store makes the quick check + * return on all other CPUs and the writing CPU context gets + * delayed to complete the second store (scheduled out on virt) + * then jiffies can become stale for up to ~2^32 nanoseconds + * without noticing. After that point all CPUs will wait for + * jiffies lock. + * + * OTOH, this is not any different than the situation with NOHZ=off + * where one CPU is responsible for updating jiffies and + * timekeeping. If that CPU goes out for lunch then all other CPUs + * will operate on stale jiffies until it decides to come back. */ - delta = ktime_sub(now, READ_ONCE(last_jiffies_update)); - if (delta < tick_period) + if (ktime_before(now, READ_ONCE(tick_next_period))) return;

/* Reevaluate with jiffies_lock held */ @@ -72,9 +90,8 @@ static void tick_do_update_jiffies64(ktime_t now) if (delta >= tick_period) {

delta = ktime_sub(delta, tick_period); - /* Pairs with the lockless read in this function. */ - WRITE_ONCE(last_jiffies_update, - ktime_add(last_jiffies_update, tick_period)); + last_jiffies_update = ktime_add(last_jiffies_update, + tick_period);

/* Slow path for long timeouts */ if (unlikely(delta >= tick_period)) { @@ -82,15 +99,18 @@ static void tick_do_update_jiffies64(ktime_t now)

ticks = ktime_divns(delta, incr);

- /* Pairs with the lockless read in this function. */ - WRITE_ONCE(last_jiffies_update, - ktime_add_ns(last_jiffies_update, - incr * ticks)); + last_jiffies_update = ktime_add_ns(last_jiffies_update, + incr * ticks); } do_timer(++ticks);

- /* Keep the tick_next_period variable up to date */ - tick_next_period = ktime_add(last_jiffies_update, tick_period); + /* + * Keep the tick_next_period variable up to date. + * WRITE_ONCE() pairs with the READ_ONCE() in the lockless + * quick check above. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(tick_next_period, + ktime_add(last_jiffies_update, tick_period)); } else { write_seqcount_end(&jiffies_seq); raw_spin_unlock(&jiffies_lock);

From: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.11-rc1 commit 7a35bf2a6a871cd0252cd371d741e7d070b53af9 category: feature feature: Deep isolation bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N00D CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Now that it's clear that there is always one tick to account, simplify the calculations some more.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner tglx@linutronix.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201117132006.565663056@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index a2a26a8feae6..2b1eb5038a1f 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static ktime_t last_jiffies_update; */ static void tick_do_update_jiffies64(ktime_t now) { - unsigned long ticks = 0; + unsigned long ticks = 1; ktime_t delta;

/* @@ -91,20 +91,21 @@ static void tick_do_update_jiffies64(ktime_t now)

write_seqcount_begin(&jiffies_seq);

- last_jiffies_update = ktime_add(last_jiffies_update, tick_period); - delta = ktime_sub(now, tick_next_period); if (unlikely(delta >= tick_period)) { /* Slow path for long idle sleep times */ s64 incr = ktime_to_ns(tick_period);

- ticks = ktime_divns(delta, incr); + ticks += ktime_divns(delta, incr);

last_jiffies_update = ktime_add_ns(last_jiffies_update, incr * ticks); + } else { + last_jiffies_update = ktime_add(last_jiffies_update, + tick_period); }

- do_timer(++ticks); + do_timer(ticks);

/* * Keep the tick_next_period variable up to date. WRITE_ONCE()

From: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.14-rc1 commit a5183862e76fdc25f36b39c2489b816a5c66e2e5 category: feature feature: Deep isolation bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N00D CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

In nohz_full mode, switching from idle to a task will unconditionally issue a tick restart. If the task is alone in the runqueue or is the highest priority, the tick will fire once then eventually stop. But that alone is still undesired noise.

Therefore, only restart the tick on idle exit when it's strictly necessary.

Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512232924.150322-3-frederic@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index 651545679c3e..eea50baf9cb0 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -906,22 +906,28 @@ static void tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, ktime_t now) tick_nohz_restart(ts, now); }

-static void tick_nohz_full_update_tick(struct tick_sched *ts) +static void __tick_nohz_full_update_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, + ktime_t now) { #ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL int cpu = smp_processor_id();

- if (!tick_nohz_full_cpu(cpu)) + if (can_stop_full_tick(cpu, ts)) + tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(ts, cpu); + else if (ts->tick_stopped) + tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, now); +#endif +} + +static void tick_nohz_full_update_tick(struct tick_sched *ts) +{ + if (!tick_nohz_full_cpu(smp_processor_id())) return;

if (!ts->tick_stopped && ts->nohz_mode == NOHZ_MODE_INACTIVE) return;

- if (can_stop_full_tick(cpu, ts)) - tick_nohz_stop_sched_tick(ts, cpu); - else if (ts->tick_stopped) - tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, ktime_get()); -#endif + __tick_nohz_full_update_tick(ts, ktime_get()); }

static bool can_stop_idle_tick(int cpu, struct tick_sched *ts) @@ -1185,18 +1191,24 @@ static void tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(struct tick_sched *ts) #endif }

-static void __tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, ktime_t now) +void tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick(void) { - tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, now); - tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(ts); + struct tick_sched *ts = this_cpu_ptr(&tick_cpu_sched); + + if (ts->tick_stopped) { + tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, ktime_get()); + tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(ts); + } }

-void tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick(void) +static void tick_nohz_idle_update_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, ktime_t now) { - struct tick_sched *ts = this_cpu_ptr(&tick_cpu_sched); + if (tick_nohz_full_cpu(smp_processor_id())) + __tick_nohz_full_update_tick(ts, now); + else + tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, now);

- if (ts->tick_stopped) - __tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick(ts, ktime_get()); + tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(ts); }

/** @@ -1228,7 +1240,7 @@ void tick_nohz_idle_exit(void) tick_nohz_stop_idle(ts, now);

if (tick_stopped) - __tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick(ts, now); + tick_nohz_idle_update_tick(ts, now);

local_irq_enable(); }

From: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.14-rc1 commit 96c9b90396f9ab6caf13b4ebf00095818ac53b7f category: feature feature: Deep isolation bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N00D CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

The idle_exittime field of tick_sched is used to record the time when the idle state was left. but currently the idle_exittime is updated in the function tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(), which is not always in idle state when nohz_full is configured:

tick_irq_exit tick_nohz_irq_exit tick_nohz_full_update_tick tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick ts->idle_exittime = now;

It's thus overwritten by mistake on nohz_full tick restart. Move the update to the appropriate idle exit path instead.

Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512232924.150322-5-frederic@kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index f9ec75c35ac5..e53a2a835f30 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -901,8 +901,6 @@ static void tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, ktime_t now) * Cancel the scheduled timer and restore the tick */ ts->tick_stopped = 0; - ts->idle_exittime = now; - tick_nohz_restart(ts, now); }

@@ -1170,10 +1168,13 @@ unsigned long tick_nohz_get_idle_calls(void) return ts->idle_calls; }

-static void tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(struct tick_sched *ts) +static void tick_nohz_account_idle_time(struct tick_sched *ts, + ktime_t now) { unsigned long ticks;

+ ts->idle_exittime = now; + if (vtime_accounting_enabled_this_cpu()) return; /* @@ -1194,8 +1195,9 @@ void tick_nohz_idle_restart_tick(void) struct tick_sched *ts = this_cpu_ptr(&tick_cpu_sched);

if (ts->tick_stopped) { - tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, ktime_get()); - tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(ts); + ktime_t now = ktime_get(); + tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, now); + tick_nohz_account_idle_time(ts, now); } }

@@ -1206,7 +1208,7 @@ static void tick_nohz_idle_update_tick(struct tick_sched *ts, ktime_t now) else tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick(ts, now);

- tick_nohz_account_idle_ticks(ts); + tick_nohz_account_idle_time(ts, now); }

/**

From: Marcelo Tosatti mtosatti@redhat.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.14-rc1 commit 1e4ca26d367ae71743e25068e5cd8750ef3f5f7d category: feature feature: Deep isolation bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N00D CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Rather than waking up all nohz_full CPUs on the system, only wake up the target CPUs of member threads of the signal.

Reduces interruptions to nohz_full CPUs.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti mtosatti@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512232924.150322-8-frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/tick.h | 8 ++++---- kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c | 4 ++-- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/tick.h b/include/linux/tick.h index 7340613c7eff..e20bb7ce3bbe 100644 --- a/include/linux/tick.h +++ b/include/linux/tick.h @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ extern void tick_nohz_dep_set_task(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit); extern void tick_nohz_dep_clear_task(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit); -extern void tick_nohz_dep_set_signal(struct signal_struct *signal, +extern void tick_nohz_dep_set_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit); extern void tick_nohz_dep_clear_signal(struct signal_struct *signal, enum tick_dep_bits bit); @@ -252,11 +252,11 @@ static inline void tick_dep_clear_task(struct task_struct *tsk, if (tick_nohz_full_enabled()) tick_nohz_dep_clear_task(tsk, bit); } -static inline void tick_dep_set_signal(struct signal_struct *signal, +static inline void tick_dep_set_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit) { if (tick_nohz_full_enabled()) - tick_nohz_dep_set_signal(signal, bit); + tick_nohz_dep_set_signal(tsk, bit); } static inline void tick_dep_clear_signal(struct signal_struct *signal, enum tick_dep_bits bit) @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static inline void tick_dep_set_task(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit) { } static inline void tick_dep_clear_task(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit) { } -static inline void tick_dep_set_signal(struct signal_struct *signal, +static inline void tick_dep_set_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, enum tick_dep_bits bit) { } static inline void tick_dep_clear_signal(struct signal_struct *signal, enum tick_dep_bits bit) { } diff --git a/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c b/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c index 5d76edd0ad9c..d6b46346be1f 100644 --- a/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c +++ b/kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static void arm_timer(struct k_itimer *timer, struct task_struct *p) if (CPUCLOCK_PERTHREAD(timer->it_clock)) tick_dep_set_task(p, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER); else - tick_dep_set_signal(p->signal, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER); + tick_dep_set_signal(p, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER); }

/* @@ -1373,7 +1373,7 @@ void set_process_cpu_timer(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int clkid, if (*newval < *nextevt) *nextevt = *newval;

- tick_dep_set_signal(tsk->signal, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER); + tick_dep_set_signal(tsk, TICK_DEP_BIT_POSIX_TIMER); }

static int do_cpu_nanosleep(const clockid_t which_clock, int flags, diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index a88741991e03..054052a58567 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -424,9 +424,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tick_nohz_dep_clear_task); * Set a per-taskgroup tick dependency. Posix CPU timers need this in order to elapse * per process timers. */ -void tick_nohz_dep_set_signal(struct signal_struct *sig, enum tick_dep_bits bit) +void tick_nohz_dep_set_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, + enum tick_dep_bits bit) { - tick_nohz_dep_set_all(&sig->tick_dep_mask, bit); + int prev; + struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; + + prev = atomic_fetch_or(BIT(bit), &sig->tick_dep_mask); + if (!prev) { + struct task_struct *t; + + lockdep_assert_held(&tsk->sighand->siglock); + __for_each_thread(sig, t) + tick_nohz_kick_task(t); + } }

void tick_nohz_dep_clear_signal(struct signal_struct *sig, enum tick_dep_bits bit)

From: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.14-rc1 commit 0fdcccfafcffac70b452b3127cc3d981f0117655 category: feature feature: Deep isolation bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N00D CVE: NA

Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...

--------------------------------

Call tick_nohz_task_switch() slightly earlier after the context switch to benefit from disabled IRQs. This way the function doesn't need to disable them once more.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar mingo@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210512232924.150322-10-frederic@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: liu chao liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chen Hui judy.chenhui@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- kernel/sched/core.c | 2 +- kernel/time/tick-sched.c | 7 +------ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c index c880f5f4e6bb..93961898567b 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/core.c +++ b/kernel/sched/core.c @@ -3652,6 +3652,7 @@ static struct rq *finish_task_switch(struct task_struct *prev) vtime_task_switch(prev); perf_event_task_sched_in(prev, current); finish_task(prev); + tick_nohz_task_switch(); finish_lock_switch(rq); finish_arch_post_lock_switch(); kcov_finish_switch(current); @@ -3689,7 +3690,6 @@ static struct rq *finish_task_switch(struct task_struct *prev) put_task_struct_rcu_user(prev); }

- tick_nohz_task_switch(); return rq; }

diff --git a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c index c5c1287f0d2a..49423dffdfc3 100644 --- a/kernel/time/tick-sched.c +++ b/kernel/time/tick-sched.c @@ -467,13 +467,10 @@ void tick_nohz_dep_clear_signal(struct signal_struct *sig, enum tick_dep_bits bi */ void __tick_nohz_task_switch(void) { - unsigned long flags; struct tick_sched *ts;

- local_irq_save(flags); - if (!tick_nohz_full_cpu(smp_processor_id())) - goto out; + return;

ts = this_cpu_ptr(&tick_cpu_sched);

@@ -482,8 +479,6 @@ void __tick_nohz_task_switch(void) atomic_read(&current->signal->tick_dep_mask)) tick_nohz_full_kick(); } -out: - local_irq_restore(flags); }

/* Get the boot-time nohz CPU list from the kernel parameters. */

From: Wang Wensheng wangwensheng4@huawei.com

ascend inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4N3XU CVE: NA

----------------------------------------------------------

Use a bootarg to precisely specify the target node to which we want to move the kernel structrue for a cdm node.

Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng wangwensheng4@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Lijun Fang fanglijun3@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Weilong Chen chenweilong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- arch/arm64/mm/numa.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c b/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c index a167b74272b2..480fcfb1b917 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/numa.c @@ -34,6 +34,85 @@ inline int arch_check_node_cdm(int nid) }

#ifdef CONFIG_ASCEND_CLEAN_CDM + +#define MAX_PARTATION_COUNT 8 +#define MAX_CDM_PER_PATRATION 8 + +/* + * Here we provide a way to precisely specify the target node to which we want + * to move the kernel structrue for a cdm node, instead of guessing the hardware + * topologies. Even the node isn't a cdm node, the movement could be reasonable. + * Suppose a node is designed to be used only by some certern processes and + * devices, the kernel structure of that node could be overwritten by a broken + * process. + * + * A possible configure in bootargs: + * cdm_move_map=0,2,3,6;1,4,5,7 + * That means to move the kernel structure for node 2,3,6 to node 0 and kernel + * structure for node 4,5,7 to node 1. + */ +static bool cdm_to_ddr_hardcode = true; +static int cdm_to_ddr_map[MAX_PARTATION_COUNT][MAX_CDM_PER_PATRATION + 1]; + +static int __init cdm_to_ddr_parse_param(char *str) +{ + int i, j; + char *p, *n; + + cdm_to_ddr_hardcode = false; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PARTATION_COUNT; i++) + for (j = 0; j < MAX_CDM_PER_PATRATION + 1; j++) + cdm_to_ddr_map[i][j] = -1; + + for (p = n = str, i = 0; strsep(&p, ";"); i++, n = p) { + char *s = n; + + for (j = 0; strsep(&n, ","); j++, s = n) { + int err; + unsigned long long nid; + + if (j >= MAX_CDM_PER_PATRATION + 1) { + pr_warn("the cdm nodes in this partation is more than supported\n"); + break; + } + + err = kstrtoull(s, 0, &nid); + if (err) { + pr_err("bootargs for cdm_move_map invalid, %d\n", + err); + return err; + } + + cdm_to_ddr_map[i][j] = (int)nid; + if (j > 0) + pr_info("node %d moved to node %d\n", + cdm_to_ddr_map[i][j], + cdm_to_ddr_map[i][0]); + } + } + + return 0; +} +early_param("cdm_move_map", cdm_to_ddr_parse_param); + +static int __init cdm_node_to_ddr_node_mapped(int nid) +{ + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PARTATION_COUNT; i++) { + if (cdm_to_ddr_map[i][0] == -1) + break; + for (j = 1; j < MAX_CDM_PER_PATRATION + 1; j++) { + if (cdm_to_ddr_map[i][j] == -1) + break; + else if (cdm_to_ddr_map[i][j] == nid) + return cdm_to_ddr_map[i][0]; + } + } + + return nid; +} + /** * cdm_node_to_ddr_node - Convert the cdm node to the ddr node of the * same partion. @@ -73,6 +152,9 @@ int __init cdm_node_to_ddr_node(int nid) */ int hbm_per_part = 2;

+ if (!cdm_to_ddr_hardcode) + return cdm_node_to_ddr_node_mapped(nid); + if (!nr_cdm || nodes_empty(numa_nodes_parsed)) return nid;

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 7fdd1c661de46e5d73583c300f8c35c41a6a7b7c.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index b7959de25a5f..00cd8095d346 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -637,16 +637,12 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { static int ima_open_for_children(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_for_children = current->nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children;

/* Allow to set children configuration only after unshare() */ if (ima_ns == current->nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children) return -EPERM;

- if (!ns_capable(ima_ns_for_children->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - - return 0; + return ima_open_simple(inode, file); }

static ssize_t ima_write_x509_for_children(struct file *file,

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 603cc292bfe4328ba42ee3545bc167fce0de38d1.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 12 ------------ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c index 9384affe8b30..2d7148ff09c1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c @@ -89,9 +89,6 @@ struct ima_digest *ima_lookup_digest(u8 *digest, enum hash_algo algo, int digest_len = hash_digest_size[algo]; unsigned int key = ima_hash_key(digest);

- if (&init_ima_ns != get_current_ns()) - return NULL; - rcu_read_lock(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(d, &ima_digests_htable.queue[key], hnext) if (d->algo == algo && d->type == type && @@ -176,9 +173,6 @@ int ima_parse_compact_list(loff_t size, void *buf, int op) size_t digest_len; int ret = 0, i;

- if (&init_ima_ns != get_current_ns()) - return -EACCES; - if (!(ima_digest_list_actions & init_policy_data.ima_policy_flag)) return -EACCES;

@@ -251,9 +245,6 @@ void ima_check_measured_appraised(struct file *file) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;

- if (&init_ima_ns != get_current_ns()) - return; - if (!ima_digest_list_actions) return;

@@ -290,9 +281,6 @@ void ima_check_measured_appraised(struct file *file)

struct ima_digest *ima_digest_allow(struct ima_digest *digest, int action) { - if (&init_ima_ns != get_current_ns()) - return NULL; - if (!(ima_digest_list_actions & action)) return NULL;

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 00cd8095d346..d9c7e1d6d543 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -60,17 +60,11 @@ static int valid_policy = 1;

static int ima_open_simple(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

if (!ns_capable(ima_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM;

- if (dentry == digests_count) { - if (&init_ima_ns != get_current_ns()) - return -EACCES; - } - return 0; }

@@ -562,12 +556,9 @@ static int ima_open_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) if (test_and_set_bit(flag, &ima_fs_flags)) return -EBUSY;

- if (dentry == digest_list_data || dentry == digest_list_data_del) { - if (&init_ima_ns != get_current_ns()) - return -EACCES; + if (dentry == digest_list_data || dentry == digest_list_data_del) if (ima_check_current_is_parser()) ima_set_parser(); - }

return 0; }

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 11047edeffe7e92b00dda3f885ac255ea2f32218.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 8b7ca11e82f7..35ec2c8f2069 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -208,13 +208,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, #endif -#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS) && \ - !defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_FIRMWARE_SIGS) && \ - !defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_KEXEC_SIGS) && \ - !defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_POLICY_SIGS) - /* Add a member to avoid a zero length array */ - {.action = UNKNOWN, .func = NONE, .flags = 0}, -#endif };

static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = {

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 9164a7e00a60c663a87a5672abbff96b50a6e56d.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 62 --------------------------------- 1 file changed, 62 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c index 29a1cbdac40d..b04f35f35f85 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c @@ -49,66 +49,6 @@ static void dec_ima_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts) return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES); }

-static int ima_ns_add_boot_aggregate(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) -{ - static const char op[] = "ns_add_boot_aggregate"; - static const char ns_aggregate_name_prefix[] = "ns_aggregate_"; - const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; - struct ima_template_entry *entry; - struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; - struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint }; - int result = -ENOMEM; - int violation = 0; - struct { - struct ima_digest_data hdr; - char digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; - } hash; - unsigned int ns_id = get_ns_id(ima_ns); - char *ns_aggregate_name; - - ns_aggregate_name = kmalloc(sizeof(ns_aggregate_name_prefix) + - sizeof(unsigned int), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ns_aggregate_name) - goto err_out; - - sprintf(ns_aggregate_name, "%s%u", ns_aggregate_name_prefix, ns_id); - - event_data.filename = ns_aggregate_name; - event_data.ns_id = ns_id; - - memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); - memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); - iint->ima_hash = &hash.hdr; - iint->ima_hash->algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; - iint->ima_hash->length = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; - - result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL); - if (result < 0) { - audit_cause = "alloc_entry"; - goto err_out; - } - - result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, - ns_aggregate_name, - CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, - NULL, - ima_ns); - if (result < 0) { - ima_free_template_entry(entry); - audit_cause = "store_entry"; - } - -err_out: - if (result < 0) - integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, - ns_aggregate_name, op, audit_cause, - result, 0); - kfree(ns_aggregate_name); - - return result; -} - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 static int ima_ns_load_x509(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { @@ -445,8 +385,6 @@ static int imans_activate(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) list_add_tail(&ima_ns->list, &ima_ns_list); up_write(&ima_ns_list_lock);

- ima_ns_add_boot_aggregate(ima_ns); - /* The x509 certificate has to be measured in the new namespace as * well as in the parent namespace, therefore it has to be loaded * after adding the namespace to the list of active namespaces. If

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 1939da7030a6b341cca58ee570e9243c63aa64a8.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/digsig.h | 11 +++---- lib/digsig.c | 11 ++++--- security/integrity/digsig.c | 40 ++++---------------------- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 20 +++++-------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 11 +++---- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/digsig.h b/include/linux/digsig.h index 9e4121253899..2ace69e41088 100644 --- a/include/linux/digsig.h +++ b/include/linux/digsig.h @@ -44,16 +44,13 @@ struct signature_hdr {

#if defined(CONFIG_SIGNATURE) || defined(CONFIG_SIGNATURE_MODULE)

-int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, struct key_tag *domain_tag, - const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, - int digestlen); +int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, + const char *digest, int digestlen);

#else

-static inline int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, - struct key_tag *domain_tag, - const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, - int digestlen) +static inline int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c index 4cf5327327c8..04b5e55ed95f 100644 --- a/lib/digsig.c +++ b/lib/digsig.c @@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key, * Normally hash of the content is used as a data for this function. * */ -int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, struct key_tag *domain_tag, - const char *sig, int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) +int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, int siglen, + const char *data, int datalen) { int err = -ENOMEM; struct signature_hdr *sh = (struct signature_hdr *)sig; @@ -217,15 +217,14 @@ int digsig_verify(struct key *keyring, struct key_tag *domain_tag, if (keyring) { /* search in specific keyring */ key_ref_t kref; - kref = keyring_search_tag(make_key_ref(keyring, 1UL), - &key_type_user, name, - domain_tag, true); + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1UL), + &key_type_user, name, true); if (IS_ERR(kref)) key = ERR_CAST(kref); else key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref); } else { - key = request_key_tag(&key_type_user, name, domain_tag, NULL); + key = request_key(&key_type_user, name, NULL); } if (IS_ERR(key)) { pr_err("key not found, id: %s\n", name); diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 4d2579a2c5ea..0f518dcfde05 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <keys/system_keyring.h> -#include <linux/ima.h>

#include "integrity.h"

@@ -33,16 +32,6 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { ".platform", };

-static unsigned long keyring_alloc_flags[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = { - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_DOMAIN_IMA, -#else - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, -#endif - KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, -}; - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY #define restrict_link_to_ima restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted #else @@ -68,22 +57,10 @@ static struct key *integrity_keyring_from_id(const unsigned int id) return keyring[id]; }

-static struct key_tag *domain_tag_from_id(const unsigned int id) -{ - if (id >= INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - - if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA) - return current->nsproxy->ima_ns->key_domain; - - return NULL; -} - int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, const char *digest, int digestlen) { struct key *keyring; - struct key_tag *domain_tag;

if (siglen < 2) return -EINVAL; @@ -92,18 +69,14 @@ int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id, const char *sig, int siglen, if (IS_ERR(keyring)) return PTR_ERR(keyring);

- domain_tag = domain_tag_from_id(id); - if (IS_ERR(domain_tag)) - return PTR_ERR(domain_tag); - switch (sig[1]) { case 1: /* v1 API expect signature without xattr type */ - return digsig_verify(keyring, domain_tag, - sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest, digestlen); + return digsig_verify(keyring, sig + 1, siglen - 1, digest, + digestlen); case 2: - return asymmetric_verify(keyring, domain_tag, sig, siglen, - digest, digestlen); + return asymmetric_verify(keyring, sig, siglen, digest, + digestlen); }

return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -129,8 +102,7 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,

keyring[id] = keyring_alloc(keyring_name[id], KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), cred, perm, - keyring_alloc_flags[id], - restriction, NULL); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, restriction, NULL); if (IS_ERR(keyring[id])) { err = PTR_ERR(keyring[id]); pr_info("Can't allocate %s keyring (%d)\n", @@ -182,7 +154,7 @@ int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data,

key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric", NULL, data, size, perm, - keyring_alloc_flags[id]); + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); if (IS_ERR(key)) { rc = PTR_ERR(key); pr_err("Problem loading X.509 certificate %d\n", rc); diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 8f4cffd73602..92dc64755e53 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -20,9 +20,7 @@ /* * Request an asymmetric key. */ -static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, - struct key_tag *domain_tag, - uint32_t keyid) +static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) { struct key *key; char name[12]; @@ -47,16 +45,14 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, /* search in specific keyring */ key_ref_t kref;

- kref = keyring_search_tag(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), - &key_type_asymmetric, name, - domain_tag, true); + kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(keyring, 1), + &key_type_asymmetric, name, true); if (IS_ERR(kref)) key = ERR_CAST(kref); else key = key_ref_to_ptr(kref); } else { - key = request_key_tag(&key_type_asymmetric, - name, domain_tag, NULL); + key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL); }

if (IS_ERR(key)) { @@ -93,9 +89,8 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, return key; }

-int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, struct key_tag *domain_tag, - const char *sig, int siglen, - const char *data, int datalen) +int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) { struct public_key_signature pks; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)sig; @@ -113,8 +108,7 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, struct key_tag *domain_tag, if (hdr->hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST) return -ENOPKG;

- key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, domain_tag, - be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid)); + key = request_asymmetric_key(keyring, be32_to_cpu(hdr->keyid)); if (IS_ERR(key)) return PTR_ERR(key);

diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 423e61627716..78078d55fd33 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -256,14 +256,11 @@ static inline int __init integrity_load_cert(const unsigned int id, #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE */

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS -int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, struct key_tag *domain_tag, - const char *sig, int siglen, - const char *data, int datalen); +int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen); #else -static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, - struct key_tag *domain_tag, - const char *sig, int siglen, - const char *data, int datalen) +static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig, + int siglen, const char *data, int datalen) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; }

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 14409624e2d8b4a38a0d597d295b0337c6363118.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/key.h | 10 ---------- security/keys/key.c | 16 ---------------- 2 files changed, 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 61250dfd9ccc..53684db44615 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -272,12 +272,6 @@ struct key { * restriction. */ struct key_restriction *restrict_link; - - /* This is set on a keyring to indicate that every key added to this - * keyring should be tagged with a given key domain tag. It is ignored - * for the non-keyring keys and can be overridden by the key-type flags. - */ - unsigned long key_alloc_domain; };

extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, @@ -297,10 +291,6 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING 0x0010 /* allocating a user or user session keyring */ #define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP 0x0020 /* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */

-/* Only one domain can be set */ -#define KEY_ALLOC_DOMAIN_IMA 0x0100 /* add IMA domain tag, based on the "current" */ -#define KEY_ALLOC_DOMAIN_MASK 0xFF00 - extern void key_revoke(struct key *key); extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key); extern void key_put(struct key *key); diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index d052b9a0b1fd..151ff39b6803 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -278,19 +278,6 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, if (!key) goto no_memory_2;

- if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_DOMAIN_MASK) { - /* set alloc domain for all keys added to this keyring */ - if (type == &key_type_keyring) - key->key_alloc_domain = (flags & KEY_ALLOC_DOMAIN_MASK); - - /* set domain tag if it's not predefined for the key type */ - if ((!type->flags) && (flags & KEY_ALLOC_DOMAIN_IMA)) - /* Set it to something meaningful after adding a key - * domain to the ima namespace. - */ - key->index_key.domain_tag = NULL; - } - key->index_key.desc_len = desclen; key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key->index_key.description) @@ -940,9 +927,6 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, perm |= KEY_POS_WRITE; }

- if (keyring->key_alloc_domain) - flags |= keyring->key_alloc_domain; - /* allocate a new key */ key = key_alloc(index_key.type, index_key.description, cred->fsuid, cred->fsgid, cred, perm, flags, NULL);

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit d3ef5f857c80b3cd26ce870544eda841410fb278.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/key.h | 17 ++++------------- security/keys/keyring.c | 15 ++++++--------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h index 53684db44615..eed3ce139a32 100644 --- a/include/linux/key.h +++ b/include/linux/key.h @@ -417,11 +417,10 @@ extern int restrict_link_reject(struct key *keyring,

extern int keyring_clear(struct key *keyring);

-extern key_ref_t keyring_search_tag(key_ref_t keyring, - struct key_type *type, - const char *description, - struct key_tag *domain_tag, - bool recurse); +extern key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, + struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + bool recurse);

extern int keyring_add_key(struct key *keyring, struct key *key); @@ -431,14 +430,6 @@ extern int keyring_restrict(key_ref_t keyring, const char *type,

extern struct key *key_lookup(key_serial_t id);

-static inline key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, - struct key_type *type, - const char *description, - bool recurse) -{ - return keyring_search_tag(keyring, type, description, NULL, recurse); -} - static inline key_serial_t key_serial(const struct key *key) { return key ? key->serial : 0; diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 12583241ff63..14abfe765b7e 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -925,25 +925,22 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_rcu(key_ref_t keyring_ref, }

/** - * keyring_search_tag - Search the supplied keyring tree for a matching key + * keyring_search - Search the supplied keyring tree for a matching key * @keyring: The root of the keyring tree to be searched. * @type: The type of keyring we want to find. * @description: The name of the keyring we want to find. - * @domain_tag: The domain_tag of the key we want to find. * @recurse: True to search the children of @keyring also * * As keyring_search_rcu() above, but using the current task's credentials and * type's default matching function and preferred search method. */ -key_ref_t keyring_search_tag(key_ref_t keyring, - struct key_type *type, - const char *description, - struct key_tag *domain_tag, - bool recurse) +key_ref_t keyring_search(key_ref_t keyring, + struct key_type *type, + const char *description, + bool recurse) { struct keyring_search_context ctx = { .index_key.type = type, - .index_key.domain_tag = domain_tag, .index_key.description = description, .index_key.desc_len = strlen(description), .cred = current_cred(), @@ -971,7 +968,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_tag(key_ref_t keyring, type->match_free(&ctx.match_data); return key; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search_tag); +EXPORT_SYMBOL(keyring_search);

static struct key_restriction *keyring_restriction_alloc( key_restrict_link_func_t check)

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 44a41d572da65f3975c5e36fe3270a7fdaabe821.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 6 ------ kernel/user_namespace.c | 11 ----------- 2 files changed, 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 6cb6a455e7aa..3eb64a50f248 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -141,7 +141,6 @@ extern bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ancestor, const struct user_namespace *child); extern bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns); struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns); -extern bool userns_set_uidmap(const struct user_namespace *ns); #else

static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns) @@ -186,11 +185,6 @@ static inline struct ns_common *ns_get_owner(struct ns_common *ns) { return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); } - -static inline bool userns_set_uidmap(const struct user_namespace *ns) -{ - return true; -} #endif

#endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */ diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index a57d52edbc31..2c15bf6680c3 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -1291,17 +1291,6 @@ bool current_in_userns(const struct user_namespace *target_ns) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_in_userns);

-bool userns_set_uidmap(const struct user_namespace *ns) -{ - bool mapping_defined; - - mutex_lock(&userns_state_mutex); - mapping_defined = ns->uid_map.nr_extents != 0; - mutex_unlock(&userns_state_mutex); - - return mapping_defined; -} - static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns) { return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit be54067bbe893e4cd860292c943854e24fdea25e.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/ima.h | 2 - security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 19 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 9 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 121 ++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 - security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 140 ++++---------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++----- 7 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 278 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 1270337c1d99..91c637c943ed 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -235,8 +235,6 @@ struct ima_namespace { struct list_head ns_measurements; atomic_long_t ml_len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */ atomic_long_t violations; - char *x509_path_for_children; - struct ima_policy_setup_data *policy_setup_for_children; } __randomize_layout;

extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index dd43dbdab7b9..fce3fc065027 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ struct ima_policy_setup_data { bool ima_use_appraise_tcb; bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb; bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable; - bool fail_unverifiable_sigs; };

/* IMA event related data */ @@ -322,10 +321,15 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);

-int ima_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); -int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); -int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); -int ima_default_appraise_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); +int ima_policy_setup(char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *policy_setup_data, + bool *fail_unverifiable_sigs); +int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(const char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data); +int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(const char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data); +int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data);

/* Appraise integrity measurements */ #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 @@ -428,11 +432,6 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void)

void ima_delete_ns_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data, bool is_root_ns); - -ssize_t ima_ns_write_x509_for_children(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, - char *x509_path); -ssize_t ima_ns_write_kcmd_for_children(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, - char *kcmd); #else static inline int __init ima_init_namespace(void) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index c30262468e4c..9d041e3deef2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -19,12 +19,9 @@

static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init;

-int ima_default_appraise_setup(char *str, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) { - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data = (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) ? - &init_policy_setup_data : ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children; - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot(); int appraisal_state = setup_data->ima_appraise; @@ -58,7 +55,7 @@ int ima_default_appraise_setup(char *str,

static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { - return ima_default_appraise_setup(str, &init_ima_ns); + return ima_default_appraise_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data); }

__setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 74a4aad02f33..bda35e2bb45c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/ctype.h> -#include <linux/string.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h>

#include "ima.h" #include "ima_digest_list.h" @@ -41,10 +39,6 @@ static struct dentry *ima_policy; static struct dentry *digests_count; static struct dentry *digest_list_data; static struct dentry *digest_list_data_del; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS -static struct dentry *x509_for_children; -static struct dentry *kcmd_for_children; -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */

bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) @@ -58,16 +52,6 @@ __setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup);

static int valid_policy = 1;

-static int ima_open_simple(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - - if (!ns_capable(ima_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - - return 0; -} - static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -89,8 +73,18 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); }

+static int ima_open_htable_value(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); + + if (!ns_capable(ima_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + return 0; +} + static const struct file_operations ima_htable_value_ops = { - .open = ima_open_simple, + .open = ima_open_htable_value, .read = ima_show_htable_value, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; @@ -623,79 +617,6 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { .llseek = generic_file_llseek, };

-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS -static int ima_open_for_children(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - - /* Allow to set children configuration only after unshare() */ - if (ima_ns == current->nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children) - return -EPERM; - - return ima_open_simple(inode, file); -} - -static ssize_t ima_write_x509_for_children(struct file *file, - const char __user *buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) -{ - ssize_t res; - char *x509_path; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = current->nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children; - - /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ - if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) - return -EINVAL; - - x509_path = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(x509_path)) - return PTR_ERR(x509_path); - - res = ima_ns_write_x509_for_children(ima_ns, x509_path); - if (res) { - kfree(x509_path); - count = res; - } - - return count; -} - -static const struct file_operations ima_x509_for_children_ops = { - .open = ima_open_for_children, - .write = ima_write_x509_for_children, -}; - -static ssize_t ima_write_kcmd_for_children(struct file *file, - const char __user *buf, - size_t count, loff_t *ppos) -{ - ssize_t res; - char *kcmd; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = current->nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children; - - /* Only allow < page size writes at the beginning of the file */ - if ((*ppos != 0) || (count >= PAGE_SIZE)) - return -EINVAL; - - kcmd = memdup_user_nul(buf, count); - if (IS_ERR(kcmd)) - return PTR_ERR(kcmd); - - res = ima_ns_write_kcmd_for_children(ima_ns, kcmd); - if (res) - count = res; - - kfree(kcmd); - - return count; -} - -static const struct file_operations ima_kcmd_for_children_ops = { - .open = ima_open_for_children, - .write = ima_write_kcmd_for_children, -}; -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ - int __init ima_fs_init(void) { ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir); @@ -759,22 +680,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(digest_list_data_del)) goto out; #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - x509_for_children = securityfs_create_file("x509_for_children", - 0202, - ima_dir, NULL, - &ima_x509_for_children_ops); - if (IS_ERR(x509_for_children)) - goto out; - - kcmd_for_children = securityfs_create_file("kcmd_for_children", - 0202, - ima_dir, NULL, - &ima_kcmd_for_children_ops); - if (IS_ERR(kcmd_for_children)) - goto out; -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ - return 0; out: securityfs_remove(digest_list_data_del); @@ -787,9 +692,5 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) securityfs_remove(ima_symlink); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); securityfs_remove(ima_policy); -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - securityfs_remove(x509_for_children); - securityfs_remove(kcmd_for_children); -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ return -1; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 7a0a640fdf9c..923373a12f5c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -31,8 +31,6 @@ struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = { .ns.inum = PROC_IMA_INIT_INO, #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS .ns.ops = &imans_operations, - .x509_path_for_children = NULL, - .policy_setup_for_children = NULL, #endif .frozen = true, .policy_data = &init_policy_data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c index 57dc9fedb8fd..ac000920d486 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c @@ -27,8 +27,6 @@ #include <linux/workqueue.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/spinlock.h> -#include <linux/string.h> -#include <linux/kernel.h>

#include "ima.h"

@@ -76,17 +74,23 @@ static struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_alloc(void) return NULL; }

-static void ima_set_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +static void ima_set_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, + char *policy_setup_str) { - struct ima_policy_setup_data setup_data = {0}; + struct ima_policy_setup_data setup_data;

- if (!ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE - setup_data.ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; + setup_data.ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; #endif - ima_init_ns_policy(ima_ns, &setup_data); - } else - ima_init_ns_policy(ima_ns, ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children); + /* Configuring IMA namespace will be implemented in the following + * patches. When it is done, parse configuration string and store result + * in setup_data. Temporarily use init_policy_setup_data. + */ + setup_data = init_policy_setup_data; + ima_ns->policy_data->ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = + init_ima_ns.policy_data->ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs; + + ima_init_ns_policy(ima_ns, &setup_data); }

static int ima_swap_user_ns(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, @@ -147,9 +151,6 @@ static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, rwlock_init(&ns->iint_tree->lock); ns->iint_tree->root = RB_ROOT;

- ns->x509_path_for_children = NULL; - ns->policy_setup_for_children = NULL; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ns_measurements); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->policy_data->ima_default_rules); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->policy_data->ima_policy_rules); @@ -217,14 +218,6 @@ static void imans_remove_hash_entries(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) } }

-static void destroy_child_config(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) -{ - kfree(ima_ns->x509_path_for_children); - ima_ns->x509_path_for_children = NULL; - kfree(ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children); - ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children = NULL; -} - static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) { bool is_init_ns = (ns == &init_ima_ns); @@ -237,7 +230,6 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) kfree(ns->iint_tree); ima_delete_ns_rules(ns->policy_data, is_init_ns); kfree(ns->policy_data); - destroy_child_config(ns); kfree(ns); }

@@ -327,31 +319,27 @@ static void imans_put(struct ns_common *ns)

static int imans_activate(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { - int res = 0; - if (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) - return res; + return 0;

if (ima_ns->frozen) - return res; + return 0;

mutex_lock(&frozen_lock); if (ima_ns->frozen) goto out;

- ima_set_ns_policy(ima_ns); + ima_set_ns_policy(ima_ns, NULL);

ima_ns->frozen = true;

down_write(&ima_ns_list_lock); list_add_tail(&ima_ns->list, &ima_ns_list); up_write(&ima_ns_list_lock); - - destroy_child_config(ima_ns); out: mutex_unlock(&frozen_lock);

- return res; + return 0; }

static int imans_install(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *new) @@ -436,97 +424,3 @@ const struct proc_ns_operations imans_for_children_operations = { .owner = imans_owner, };

-struct ima_kernel_param { - const char *name; - int (*set)(char *val, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); -}; - -/* TODO: add ima_template, ima_template_fmt, ima_hash, ... */ -static const struct ima_kernel_param ima_kernel_params[] = { - {"ima_appraise", ima_default_appraise_setup}, - {"ima_policy", ima_policy_setup}, -}; -static const size_t ima_kernel_params_size = ARRAY_SIZE(ima_kernel_params); - -ssize_t ima_ns_write_x509_for_children(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, - char *x509_path) -{ - ssize_t retval = 0; - - mutex_lock(&frozen_lock); - if (ima_ns->frozen) { - retval = -EACCES; - goto out; - } - - kfree(ima_ns->x509_path_for_children); - ima_ns->x509_path_for_children = x509_path; -out: - mutex_unlock(&frozen_lock); - - return retval; -} - -ssize_t ima_ns_write_kcmd_for_children(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, - char *kcmd) -{ - u32 i; - char *param, *val; - ssize_t ret = 0; - - mutex_lock(&frozen_lock); - if (ima_ns->frozen) { - ret = -EACCES; - goto err_unlock; - } - - if (!ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children) { - ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children = - kmalloc(sizeof(struct ima_policy_setup_data), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto err_unlock; - } - } - - memset(ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children, - 0, sizeof(struct ima_policy_setup_data)); - -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE - ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children->ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; -#endif - - kcmd = skip_spaces(kcmd); - while (*kcmd) { - kcmd = next_arg(kcmd, &param, &val); - if (!val) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err_free; - } - - for (i = 0; i < ima_kernel_params_size; i++) { - if (strcmp(param, ima_kernel_params[i].name) == 0) - break; - } - - if (i == ima_kernel_params_size) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto err_free; - } - - ima_kernel_params[i].set(val, ima_ns); - } - mutex_unlock(&frozen_lock); - - return ret; - -err_free: - kfree(ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children); - ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children = NULL; -err_unlock: - mutex_unlock(&frozen_lock); - - return ret; -} - diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 828793553a0e..0ab91cb31121 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -240,13 +240,9 @@ struct ima_policy_data init_policy_data = { .ima_rules = &init_policy_data.ima_default_rules, };

-int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(const char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) { - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data; - - setup_data = (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) ? - &init_policy_setup_data : ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children; - if (setup_data->ima_policy) return 1;

@@ -256,7 +252,7 @@ int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)

static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { - return ima_default_measure_policy_setup(str, &init_ima_ns); + return ima_default_measure_policy_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data); } __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);

@@ -265,15 +261,15 @@ static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; /** * ima_policy_setup - parse policy configuration string "ima_policy=" * @str: string to be parsed - * @ima_ns: pointer to the ima namespace which policy is being set + * @setup_data: pointer to a structure where parsed data is stored + * @fail_unverifiable_sigs: boolean flag treated separately to preserve + * __ro_after_init */ -int ima_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +int ima_policy_setup(char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data, + bool *fail_unverifiable_sigs) { char *p; - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data; - - setup_data = (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) ? - &init_policy_setup_data : ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children;

while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) { if (*p == ' ') @@ -291,7 +287,7 @@ int ima_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) setup_data->ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) - setup_data->fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; + *fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else pr_err("policy "%s" not found", p); } @@ -301,27 +297,21 @@ int ima_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns)

static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { - ima_policy_setup(str, &init_ima_ns); - ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = - init_policy_setup_data.fail_unverifiable_sigs; - return 1; + return ima_policy_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data, + &ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs); } __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);

-int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(const char *str, + struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) { - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data; - - setup_data = (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) ? - &init_policy_setup_data : ima_ns->policy_setup_for_children; - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; return 1; }

static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { - return ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(str, &init_ima_ns); + return ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data); } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 5622ee15fe4ce66427ae5e4fba87b9aa9673b5dc.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/ima.h | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 1 + 7 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index cfdd1280daff..12738e37f714 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -234,7 +234,6 @@ struct ima_namespace { struct integrity_iint_tree *iint_tree; struct list_head ns_measurements; atomic_long_t ml_len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */ - atomic_long_t violations; } __randomize_layout;

extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index fce3fc065027..59d1afb3934d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ extern spinlock_t ima_htable_lock;

struct ima_h_table { atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */ + atomic_long_t violations; struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE]; }; extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 5921922d6930..6724ee072cd9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, event_data.ns_id = get_ns_id(ima_ns);

/* can overflow, only indicator */ - atomic_long_inc(&ima_ns->violations); + atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);

result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, NULL); if (result < 0) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index bda35e2bb45c..b5d45a67a261 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

if (filp->f_path.dentry == violations) - val = &ima_ns->violations; + val = &ima_htable.violations; else if (filp->f_path.dentry == runtime_measurements_count) val = (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) ? &ima_ml_len : &ima_ns->ml_len; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST @@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) goto out;

violations = - securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH, + securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_value_ops); if (IS_ERR(violations)) goto out; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 923373a12f5c..99b9643e6763 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = { .iint_tree = &init_iint_tree, .ns_measurements = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_ima_ns.ns_measurements), .ml_len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0), - .violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0), }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c index 26c9bcd5ff74..2a4b7a23f9a7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c @@ -128,7 +128,6 @@ static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, ns->ucounts = ucounts; ns->frozen = false; atomic_long_set(&ns->ml_len, 0); - atomic_long_set(&ns->violations, 0);

rwlock_init(&ns->iint_tree->lock); ns->iint_tree->root = RB_ROOT; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index e9a88910d726..89b9c3734890 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_htable_lock); /* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */ struct ima_h_table ima_htable = { .len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0), + .violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0), .queue[0 ... IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE - 1] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT };

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit b80cb82f76da8cb7ef5da938edf7744b147a23a9.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 75 +++++++++---------------------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 18 -------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 5014eb586587..612c5e29cd85 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -30,11 +30,6 @@ #include "ima.h" #include "ima_digest_list.h"

-struct ima_file_data { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; - bool is_readcount; -}; - int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;

/* Actions (measure/appraisal) for which digest lists can be used */ @@ -136,8 +131,8 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ - if (iint && atomic_read(&iint->readcount) && - test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags)) + if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, + &iint->atomic_flags)) send_tomtou = true; } } else { @@ -245,7 +240,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, { fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; bool update; - struct ima_file_data *f_data = (struct ima_file_data *)file->f_ima; + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = (struct ima_namespace *)file->f_ima;

if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) return; @@ -260,7 +255,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE); iint->measured_pcrs = 0;

- ima_check_active_ns(f_data->ima_ns, inode); + ima_check_active_ns(ima_ns, inode);

if (update) ima_update_xattr(iint, file); @@ -281,8 +276,6 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, */ int ima_file_alloc(struct file *file) { - struct ima_file_data *f_data; - /* It is possible that ima_file_alloc() is called after * exit_task_namespaces(), when IMA does the last writer check from * __fput(). In that case it's not necessary to store the namespace @@ -290,16 +283,8 @@ int ima_file_alloc(struct file *file) if (!current->nsproxy) return 0;

- f_data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ima_file_data), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!f_data) - return -ENOMEM; - - f_data->ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - f_data->is_readcount = false; - get_ima_ns(f_data->ima_ns); - - file->f_ima = f_data; - + file->f_ima = get_current_ns(); + get_ima_ns((struct ima_namespace *)file->f_ima); return 0; }

@@ -313,36 +298,30 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - struct ima_file_data *f_data = (struct ima_file_data *)file->f_ima; + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = (struct ima_namespace *)file->f_ima;

- if (!f_data) + if (!ima_ns) return;

if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))) goto out;

- if (!f_data->ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag || - !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) goto out;

- iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(f_data->ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); + iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); if (!iint) goto out;

ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); - - if (f_data->is_readcount) - iint_readcount_dec(iint); out: - put_ima_ns(f_data->ima_ns); - kfree(f_data); + put_ima_ns(ima_ns); }

static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, - bool readcount_open) + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -363,12 +342,6 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag) return 0;

- if (ima_ns != current_ima_ns) { - iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - if (!iint) - return 0; - } - /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. @@ -389,18 +362,12 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,

inode_lock(inode);

- if (action && !iint) { + if (action) { iint = integrity_inode_rb_get(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); if (!iint) rc = -ENOMEM; }

- if ((ima_ns == current_ima_ns) && iint && readcount_open && - ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)) { - iint_readcount_inc(iint); - ((struct ima_file_data *)file->f_ima)->is_readcount = true; - } - if (!rc && violation_check) ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, &pathbuf, &pathname, filename, ima_ns); @@ -554,7 +521,7 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,

static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func, bool readcount_open) + enum ima_hooks func) { int ret; struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; @@ -569,7 +536,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, continue;

ret = process_ns_measurement(file, cred, secid, buf, size, mask, - func, ima_ns, readcount_open); + func, ima_ns); if (ret != 0) break; } @@ -596,7 +563,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, true); + 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); }

return 0; @@ -676,13 +643,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, false); + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); if (ret) return ret;

security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, false); + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); }

/** @@ -703,7 +670,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, true); + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) ima_check_measured_appraised(file); return rc; @@ -879,7 +846,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func, false); + 0, MAY_READ, func); }

const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -924,7 +891,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func, false); + MAY_READ, func); }

/** diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 78078d55fd33..05f6eabef9fe 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/hash_info.h> -#include <linux/atomic.h>

/* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 @@ -143,9 +142,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { enum integrity_status ima_creds_status:4; enum integrity_status evm_status:4; struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; - atomic_t readcount; /* Reader counter, incremented only in FILE_CHECK or - * MMAP_CHECK hooks, used for ima violation check. - */ };

enum compact_types { COMPACT_KEY, COMPACT_PARSER, COMPACT_FILE, @@ -342,17 +338,3 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source, { } #endif - -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA -static inline void iint_readcount_inc(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) -{ - atomic_inc(&iint->readcount); -} -static inline void iint_readcount_dec(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) -{ - if (WARN_ON(!atomic_read(&iint->readcount))) - return; - - atomic_dec(&iint->readcount); -} -#endif

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 782baa66083321a9f4867a6aacbea61ab86492cd.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 +---- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 13 ------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 -- 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 3d6f6e9d530c..db4d3893d32d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = { {.name = "ima-sig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig"}, {.name = "ima-buf", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|buf"}, {.name = "ima-modsig", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|sig|d-modsig|modsig"}, - {.name = "ima-ns", .fmt = "d-ng|n-ng|ns"}, {.name = "", .fmt = ""}, /* placeholder for a custom format */ };

@@ -48,8 +47,6 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, {.field_id = "evmsig", .field_init = ima_eventevmsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, - {.field_id = "ns", .field_init = ima_eventns_init, - .field_show = ima_show_template_buf}, };

/* @@ -57,7 +54,7 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { * need to be accounted for since they shouldn't be defined in the same template * description as 'd-ng' and 'n-ng' respectively. */ -#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|sig|buf|d-modisg|modsig|ns") +#define MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN sizeof("d-ng|n-ng|sig|buf|d-modisg|modsig")

static struct ima_template_desc *ima_template;

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index ca6153680cf0..90040fac150b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -514,16 +514,3 @@ int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } - -/* - * ima_eventns_init - include the ima namespace id as part of the - * template data - */ -int ima_eventns_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, - struct ima_field_data *field_data) -{ - return ima_write_template_field_data(&(event_data->ns_id), - sizeof(event_data->ns_id), - DATA_FMT_HEX, - field_data); -} diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h index b34054858f05..f4b2a2056d1d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h @@ -48,6 +48,4 @@ int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); -int ima_eventns_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, - struct ima_field_data *field_data); #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit a1f9c162b7fa1a183921a3b4286c74a3c01fc307.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/ima.h | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 7 ++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 12 +++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 +--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 3 +-- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 11 ++++------- 7 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0ab1dbf34c47..d7b2864d7d7c 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -232,7 +232,6 @@ struct ima_namespace { bool frozen; struct ima_policy_data *policy_data; struct integrity_iint_tree *iint_tree; - struct list_head ns_measurements; } __randomize_layout;

extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index f515a4405641..9086c261f0d7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ struct ima_template_entry { struct ima_queue_entry { struct hlist_node hnext; /* place in hash collision list */ struct list_head later; /* place in ima_measurements list */ - struct list_head ns_later; /* place in ima namespace list */ struct ima_template_entry *entry; }; extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */ @@ -152,8 +151,7 @@ int ima_init(void); int ima_fs_init(void); int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, const char *op, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); + const unsigned char *filename); int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash); int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len, struct ima_digest_data *hash); @@ -295,8 +293,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, - int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns); + int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest); void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 6724ee072cd9..2678faaa7a15 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -104,8 +104,7 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, - struct ima_digest *digest, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) + struct ima_digest *digest) { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; @@ -135,11 +134,10 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, }

entry->pcr = pcr; - result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename, - ima_ns); + result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); if (!result && duplicated_entry) { result = ima_add_template_entry(duplicated_entry, violation, op, - inode, filename, ima_ns); + inode, filename); if (result < 0) kfree(duplicated_entry); } @@ -179,7 +177,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, goto err_out; } result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, - CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL, ima_ns); + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: @@ -366,7 +364,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, }

result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr, - digest, ima_ns); + digest); out: if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 00c8dfea6ba8..52b675d47177 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = { .frozen = true, .policy_data = &init_policy_data, .iint_tree = &init_iint_tree, - .ns_measurements = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_ima_ns.ns_measurements), }; EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns);

@@ -105,8 +104,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)

result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, - CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL, - &init_ima_ns); + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); if (result < 0) { ima_free_template_entry(entry); audit_cause = "store_entry"; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 612c5e29cd85..9da27ab3b360 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -1078,8 +1078,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; }

- ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr, NULL, - ima_ns); + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr, NULL); if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "store_entry"; ima_free_template_entry(entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c index a6197c708f3a..04aa50473971 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c @@ -130,7 +130,6 @@ static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, rwlock_init(&ns->iint_tree->lock); ns->iint_tree->root = RB_ROOT;

- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->ns_measurements); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->policy_data->ima_default_rules); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->policy_data->ima_policy_rules); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ns->policy_data->ima_temp_rules); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 673fd95c8d33..c096ef8945c7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -91,8 +91,7 @@ static int get_binary_runtime_size(struct ima_template_entry *entry) * (Called with ima_extend_list_mutex held.) */ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, - bool update_htable, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) + bool update_htable) { struct ima_queue_entry *qe; unsigned int key; @@ -106,7 +105,6 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry,

INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later); list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements); - list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->ns_later, &ima_ns->ns_measurements);

atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len); if (update_htable) { @@ -160,8 +158,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(struct tpm_digest *digests_arg, int pcr) */ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, const char *op, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *filename, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) + const unsigned char *filename) { u8 *digest = entry->digests[ima_hash_algo_idx].digest; struct tpm_digest *digests_arg = entry->digests; @@ -179,7 +176,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, } }

- result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry, 1, ima_ns); + result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry, 1); if (result < 0) { audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; audit_info = 0; @@ -208,7 +205,7 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry) int result = 0;

mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); - result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry, 0, &init_ima_ns); + result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry, 0); mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); return result; }

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 27229fcf200a646b1a795e9c0ac655a3f1bfda42.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/ima.h | 11 - kernel/kexec_file.c | 7 - security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 12 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 95 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 13 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 6 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 7 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 240 ++++--------- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 3 - security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 345 ++++++++----------- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 10 +- security/security.c | 2 +- 14 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 507 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index d7b2864d7d7c..f5683756f2b5 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -37,8 +37,6 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); -extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode); -extern bool ima_is_root_namespace(void);

#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -130,15 +128,6 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }

static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} - -static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) -{ -} - -static inline bool ima_is_root_namespace(void) -{ - return true; -} #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */

#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c index d407f7983020..33400ff051a8 100644 --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c @@ -362,13 +362,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd, if (!capable(CAP_SYS_BOOT) || kexec_load_disabled) return -EPERM;

- /* Allow only from the initial IMA namespace, so that the user can't - * spawn a new IMA namespace with the empty policy and circumvent the - * appraisal protection. - */ - if (!ima_is_root_namespace()) - return -EPERM; - /* Make sure we have a legal set of flags */ if (flags != (flags & KEXEC_FILE_FLAGS)) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 1fae3709266f..8b59e03ec849 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -44,11 +44,15 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };

#define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0)

+/* current content of the policy */ +extern int ima_policy_flag; + /* set during initialization */ extern int ima_hash_algo; extern int ima_sha1_idx __ro_after_init; extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init; extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init; +extern int ima_appraise; extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; extern int ima_digest_list_pcr; extern bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; @@ -65,8 +69,6 @@ struct ima_policy_setup_data { int ima_appraise; bool ima_use_secure_boot; bool ima_use_appraise_tcb; - bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb; - bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable; };

/* IMA event related data */ @@ -400,9 +402,6 @@ struct ima_policy_data { int temp_ima_appraise; };

-extern struct list_head ima_ns_list; -extern struct rw_semaphore ima_ns_list_lock; - extern struct ima_policy_data init_policy_data; extern struct ima_policy_setup_data init_policy_setup_data;

@@ -416,9 +415,6 @@ static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) { return current->nsproxy->ima_ns; } - -void ima_delete_ns_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data, - bool is_root_ns); #else static inline int __init ima_init_namespace(void) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 743b9337d9e5..b4347eac9c85 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, { int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;

- flags &= ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag; + flags &= ima_policy_flag;

return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, keyring, ima_ns); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 9d041e3deef2..9213c012cbe4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -21,10 +21,18 @@ static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init;

int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) +{ + /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima + * policy, when global variables are removed. + */ + return 1; +} + +static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot(); - int appraisal_state = setup_data->ima_appraise; + int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;

if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0) appraisal_state = 0; @@ -44,7 +52,7 @@ int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option", str); } else { - setup_data->ima_appraise = appraisal_state; + ima_appraise = appraisal_state; } #endif if (strcmp(str, "enforce-evm") == 0 || @@ -53,11 +61,6 @@ int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, return 1; }

-static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) -{ - return ima_default_appraise_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data); -} - __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup);

static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; @@ -84,10 +87,7 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_digest_list=", appraise_digest_list_setup); */ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { - if (!ima_ns) - return false; - - return ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; + return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; }

/* @@ -95,18 +95,18 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) * * Return 1 to appraise or hash */ -int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { u32 secid;

- if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise) + if (!ima_appraise) return 0;

security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return ima_match_policy(inode, current_cred(), secid, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL, NULL, NULL, - ima_ns); + NULL); }

static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if ((rc == -EPERM) && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) process_buffer_measurement(NULL, digest, digestsize, "blacklisted-hash", NONE, - pcr, NULL, ima_ns); + pcr, NULL, NULL); }

return rc; @@ -381,7 +381,6 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, int rc = xattr_len, rc_evm; char _buf[sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data) + 1 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

/* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig) @@ -510,8 +509,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, op, cause, rc, 0); } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { /* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */ - if ((ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && - !try_modsig && + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && !try_modsig && (!xattr_value || xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) { if (!ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint)) @@ -576,30 +574,18 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int action; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;

- if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || - !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) + if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) + || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return;

- down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - if (!(ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE)) - continue; - - action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR, - ima_ns); - iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - if (iint) { - set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); - if (!action) - clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, - &iint->atomic_flags); - } + action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR, NULL); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (iint) { + set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + if (!action) + clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); }

/* @@ -621,30 +607,19 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns;

- if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return;

- down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - if (!(ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE)) - continue; - - iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - if (!iint) - continue; - - iint->measured_pcrs = 0; - set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); - if (digsig) - set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); - else - clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); - } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + if (digsig) + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + else + clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); }

int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c index b3330a0a1481..58aa56b0422d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c @@ -29,16 +29,6 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, unsigned long flags, bool create) { bool queued = false; - /* Measure the keys according to the current ima namespace's policy - * rules. If the new ima namespace with empty policy is created to hide - * the log, parent can join it to inspect the log until the child - * namespace exists. After its destruction, log can be accessed only - * by the processes from the initial ima namespace that see all - * measurement list entries. If this is a problem, maybe the solution - * is to track in which namespaces the key was measured and re-measure - * it when necessary. - */ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

/* Only asymmetric keys are handled by this hook. */ if (key->type != &key_type_asymmetric) @@ -70,5 +60,6 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, */ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, payload, payload_len, keyring->description, KEY_CHECK, 0, - keyring->description, ima_ns); + keyring->description, + NULL); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c index 2d7148ff09c1..dd6dbdbbc7dd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int ima_parse_compact_list(loff_t size, void *buf, int op) size_t digest_len; int ret = 0, i;

- if (!(ima_digest_list_actions & init_policy_data.ima_policy_flag)) + if (!(ima_digest_list_actions & ima_policy_flag)) return -EACCES;

while (bufp < bufendp) { @@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ void __init ima_load_digest_lists(void) .ctx.actor = load_digest_list, };

- if (!(ima_digest_list_actions & init_policy_data.ima_policy_flag)) + if (!(ima_digest_list_actions & ima_policy_flag)) return;

ret = kern_path(CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LISTS_DIR, 0, &path); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index bf1d464620f7..64f5b0997760 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -369,7 +369,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_data(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, ssize_t result; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); int i; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

/* No partial writes. */ result = -EINVAL; @@ -405,7 +404,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_data(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (data[0] == '/') { result = ima_read_sfs_file(data, dentry); } else if (dentry == ima_policy) { - if (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { pr_err("signed policy file (specified " "as an absolute pathname) required\n"); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, @@ -520,7 +519,6 @@ static int ima_release_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; enum ima_fs_flags flag = ima_get_dentry_flag(dentry); - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) return seq_release(inode, file); @@ -533,7 +531,7 @@ static int ima_release_data_upload(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return 0; }

- if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(ima_ns) < 0) { + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy(NULL) < 0) { cause = "failed"; valid_policy = 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index dea0251142fd..3b8839b97a98 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -118,16 +118,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 void __init ima_load_x509(void) { - int unset_flags = - init_ima_ns.policy_data->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE; + int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;

- init_ima_ns.policy_data->ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; + ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);

/* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */ evm_load_x509();

- init_ima_ns.policy_data->ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; + ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; } #endif

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 7986dfb3e5d6..9bbd716bff99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -30,6 +30,12 @@ #include "ima.h" #include "ima_digest_list.h"

+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE +int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; +#else +int ima_appraise; +#endif + int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;

/* Actions (measure/appraisal) for which digest lists can be used */ @@ -128,8 +134,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) { if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) { if (!iint) - iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, - inode); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags)) @@ -209,38 +214,11 @@ static int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, return ret; }

-static void ima_check_active_ns(struct ima_namespace *current_ima_ns, - struct inode *inode) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - - down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - if ((ima_ns == current_ima_ns) || - !ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag) - continue; - - iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - if (!iint) - continue; - - mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); - iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; - iint->measured_pcrs = 0; - mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); - } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); -} - static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; bool update; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = (struct ima_namespace *)file->f_ima;

if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) return; @@ -254,9 +232,6 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) { iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE); iint->measured_pcrs = 0; - - ima_check_active_ns(ima_ns, inode); - if (update) ima_update_xattr(iint, file); } @@ -306,10 +281,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))) goto out;

- if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) goto out;

- iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) goto out;

@@ -318,10 +293,10 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) put_ima_ns(ima_ns); }

-static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func, - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) +static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, + u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, + enum ima_hooks func, + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL; @@ -337,9 +312,8 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, int xattr_len = 0; bool violation_check; enum hash_algo hash_algo; - struct ima_namespace *current_ima_ns = get_current_ns();

- if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag) + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) return 0;

/* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action @@ -349,8 +323,7 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, action = ima_get_action(inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL, ima_ns); violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) && - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag & - IMA_MEASURE)); + (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE)); if (!action && !violation_check) return 0;

@@ -363,7 +336,7 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, inode_lock(inode);

if (action) { - iint = integrity_inode_rb_get(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); + iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); if (!iint) rc = -ENOMEM; } @@ -378,8 +351,6 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, goto out; if (!action) goto out; - if (ima_ns != current_ima_ns) - goto out;

mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);

@@ -510,8 +481,7 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (pathbuf) __putname(pathbuf); if (must_appraise) { - if (rc && - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) return -EACCES; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -519,32 +489,6 @@ static int process_ns_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, return 0; }

-static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, - u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask, - enum ima_hooks func) -{ - int ret; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; - struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - - if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - return 0; - - down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - - ret = process_ns_measurement(file, cred, secid, buf, size, mask, - func, ima_ns); - if (ret != 0) - break; - } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - - return ret; -} - /** * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement. * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL) @@ -563,7 +507,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK); + 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK, NULL); }

return 0; @@ -583,7 +527,6 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) */ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); struct ima_template_desc *template; struct file *file = vma->vm_file; char filename[NAME_MAX]; @@ -596,15 +539,14 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) int pcr;

/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */ - if (!(ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || - !vma->vm_file || !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || - (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) + if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file || + !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) return 0;

security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file); action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, - MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0, ima_ns); + MMAP_CHECK, &pcr, &template, 0, NULL);

/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */ if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK))) @@ -643,13 +585,13 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)

security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK); + MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK, NULL); if (ret) return ret;

security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid); return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0, - MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK); + MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK, NULL); }

/** @@ -670,7 +612,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | - MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, NULL); if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) ima_check_measured_appraised(file); return rc; @@ -679,7 +621,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);

/** * ima_file_hash - return the stored measurement if a file has been hashed and - * is in the iint cache of the current IMA namespace. + * is in the iint cache. * @file: pointer to the file * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash * @buf_size: length of the buffer @@ -697,7 +639,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); */ int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); struct inode *inode; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int hash_algo; @@ -705,11 +646,11 @@ int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) if (!file) return -EINVAL;

- if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag) + if (!ima_policy_flag) return -EOPNOTSUPP;

inode = file_inode(file); - iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return -EOPNOTSUPP;

@@ -747,30 +688,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash); */ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; int must_appraise;

- down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, - FILE_CHECK, ima_ns); - if (!must_appraise) - continue; + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK, NULL); + if (!must_appraise) + return;

- /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ - iint = integrity_inode_rb_get(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - if (!iint) - continue; + /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ + iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return;

- /* needed for writing the security xattrs */ - set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); - iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; - } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); + /* needed for writing the security xattrs */ + set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; }

/** @@ -782,30 +714,21 @@ void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) */ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int must_appraise;

- down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, - FILE_CHECK, ima_ns); - if (!must_appraise) - continue; + must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, FILE_CHECK, NULL); + if (!must_appraise) + return;

- /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ - iint = integrity_inode_rb_get(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - if (!iint) - continue; + /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */ + iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); + if (!iint) + return;

- /* needed for re-opening empty files */ - iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; - } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); + /* needed for re-opening empty files */ + iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; }

/** @@ -846,7 +769,7 @@ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, - 0, MAY_READ, func); + 0, MAY_READ, func, NULL); }

const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { @@ -876,14 +799,13 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, { enum ima_hooks func; u32 secid; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

/* permit signed certs */ if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) return 0;

if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ - if (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return -EACCES; return 0; } @@ -891,7 +813,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size, - MAY_READ, func); + MAY_READ, func, NULL); }

/** @@ -909,16 +831,9 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - - if (ima_ns != &init_ima_ns) { - pr_err("Prevent data loading in IMA namespaces other than the root\n"); - return -EACCES; - }

ima_enforce = - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == - IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;

switch (id) { case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: @@ -928,16 +843,13 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) return -EACCES; }

- if (ima_enforce && - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) { + if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } break; case LOADING_FIRMWARE: - if (ima_enforce && - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & - IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) { + if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) { pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } @@ -945,10 +857,8 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) case LOADING_MODULE: sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();

- if (ima_enforce && - (!sig_enforce && - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & - IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) { + if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce + && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } @@ -975,14 +885,9 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id load_id, char *description) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) { - if (WARN_ON(ima_ns != &init_ima_ns)) - return -EACCES; - - if ((ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && - (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } @@ -1001,7 +906,6 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed - * @ima_ns: pointer to the IMA namespace in consideration * * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ @@ -1027,7 +931,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, int action = 0; u32 secid;

- if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag) + if (!ima_policy_flag) return;

/* @@ -1040,7 +944,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, if (func) { security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, - &pcr, &template, keyring, ima_ns); + &pcr, &template, keyring, NULL); if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) return; } @@ -1103,11 +1007,6 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) { struct fd f; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - - /* Currently allowed only from the root IMA namespace */ - if (WARN_ON(ima_ns != &init_ima_ns)) - return;

if (!buf || !size) return; @@ -1118,31 +1017,10 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)

process_buffer_measurement(file_inode(f.file), buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0, NULL, - ima_ns); + NULL); fdput(f); }

-void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; - - if (!IS_IMA(inode)) - return; - - down_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(ima_ns, &ima_ns_list, list) { - if (atomic_read(&ima_ns->inactive)) - continue; - integrity_inode_rb_free(ima_ns->iint_tree, inode); - } - up_read(&ima_ns_list_lock); -} - -bool ima_is_root_namespace(void) -{ - return get_current_ns() == &init_ima_ns; -} - static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c index 04aa50473971..226a53279f71 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c @@ -181,14 +181,11 @@ int __init ima_init_namespace(void)

static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) { - bool is_init_ns = (ns == &init_ima_ns); - dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts); put_user_ns(ns->user_ns); ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); integrity_iint_tree_free(ns->iint_tree); kfree(ns->iint_tree); - ima_delete_ns_rules(ns->policy_data, is_init_ns); kfree(ns->policy_data); kfree(ns); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 0ab91cb31121..ebb4721032d4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -49,6 +49,8 @@ #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ (a) >= (sizeof_field(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))

+int ima_policy_flag; +static int temp_ima_appraise; static int build_ima_appraise __ro_after_init;

#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6 @@ -223,11 +225,16 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_appraise_rule __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_PARSER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED };

-/* Number of architecture specific rules found */ -static int arch_entries_size __ro_after_init; /* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry __ro_after_init;

+static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules); +static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules); +static struct list_head *ima_rules = &ima_default_rules; + +static int ima_policy __initdata; + struct ima_policy_setup_data init_policy_setup_data = { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE .ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE, @@ -237,25 +244,31 @@ struct ima_policy_data init_policy_data = { .ima_default_rules = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_policy_data.ima_default_rules), .ima_policy_rules = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_policy_data.ima_policy_rules), .ima_temp_rules = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_policy_data.ima_temp_rules), - .ima_rules = &init_policy_data.ima_default_rules, };

int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(const char *str, struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) { - if (setup_data->ima_policy) - return 1; - - setup_data->ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB; + /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima + * policy, when global variables are removed. + */ return 1; }

static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { - return ima_default_measure_policy_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data); + if (ima_policy) + return 1; + + ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB; + return 1; } __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);

+static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; +static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable __initdata; +static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init;

/** @@ -263,55 +276,61 @@ static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; * @str: string to be parsed * @setup_data: pointer to a structure where parsed data is stored * @fail_unverifiable_sigs: boolean flag treated separately to preserve - * __ro_after_init + * __ro_after_init */ int ima_policy_setup(char *str, struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data, bool *fail_unverifiable_sigs) +{ + + /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima + * policy, when global variables are removed. + */ + return 1; +} + +static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { char *p;

while ((p = strsep(&str, " |\n")) != NULL) { if (*p == ' ') continue; - if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !setup_data->ima_policy) - setup_data->ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; - else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !setup_data->ima_policy) - setup_data->ima_policy = EXEC_TCB; + if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) + ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; + else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) + ima_policy = EXEC_TCB; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_tcb") == 0) - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; + ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_immutable") == 0) - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable = true; + ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) - setup_data->ima_use_secure_boot = true; + ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) - *fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; + ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else pr_err("policy "%s" not found", p); }

return 1; } - -static int __init policy_setup(char *str) -{ - return ima_policy_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data, - &ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs); -} __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);

int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(const char *str, struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) { - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; + /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima + * policy, when global variables are removed. + */ return 1; }

static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { - return ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(str, &init_policy_setup_data); + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; + return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);

@@ -486,11 +505,9 @@ static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *e; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); int result;

- list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, - &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) { if (!ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) continue;

@@ -692,13 +709,12 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); - bool fail_unverifiable_sigs;

if (template_desc) *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();

rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) {

if (!(entry->action & actmask)) continue; @@ -713,10 +729,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) { action |= get_subaction(entry, func); action &= ~IMA_HASH; - fail_unverifiable_sigs = (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) ? - ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs : - ima_ns->policy_data->ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs; - if (fail_unverifiable_sigs) + if (ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs) action |= IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS; }

@@ -751,15 +764,14 @@ void ima_update_policy_flag(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry;

- list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) - ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; + ima_policy_flag |= entry->action; }

- ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise |= - (build_ima_appraise | ima_ns->policy_data->temp_ima_appraise); - if (!ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise) - ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; + ima_appraise |= (build_ima_appraise | temp_ima_appraise); + if (!ima_appraise) + ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE; }

static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) @@ -777,17 +789,16 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return 0; }

-static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, - struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, - enum policy_rule_list policy_rule, - const struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) +static void __init add_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data, + struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, + enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) { int i = 0;

for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry;

- if (setup_data->ima_policy == EXEC_TCB) { + if (ima_policy == EXEC_TCB) { if (entries == dont_measure_rules) if ((entries[i].flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && entries[i].fsmagic == TMPFS_MAGIC) @@ -799,7 +810,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, continue; }

- if (setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) { + if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) { if (entries == default_appraise_rules) { if (entries[i].action != DONT_APPRAISE) continue; @@ -809,24 +820,14 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, } }

- if (setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable) + if (ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable) if (entries == appraise_exec_rules && (entries[i].flags & IMA_FUNC) && entries[i].func == BPRM_CHECK) entries[i].flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED;

- if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) { - entry = &entries[i]; - if (ima_ns != &init_ima_ns) { - entry = kmemdup(&entries[i], sizeof(*entry), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!entry) - continue; - } - - list_add_tail(&entry->list, - &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_default_rules); - } + if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) + list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules);

if (policy_rule & IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY) { entry = kmemdup(&entries[i], sizeof(*entry), @@ -834,12 +835,11 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, if (!entry) continue;

- list_add_tail(&entry->list, - &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_rules); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules); } if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) { if (entries != build_appraise_rules) - ima_ns->policy_data->temp_ima_appraise |= + temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func); else build_ima_appraise |= @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns,

static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry);

-static int ima_init_arch_policy(void) +static int __init ima_init_arch_policy(void) { const char * const *arch_rules; const char * const *rules; @@ -899,71 +899,69 @@ static int ima_init_arch_policy(void) void ima_init_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, const struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) { - int build_appraise_entries; - - ima_ns->policy_data->ima_appraise = setup_data->ima_appraise; - - if (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns) { - /* - * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific - * measurement and appraise rules requiring file signatures for - * both the initial and custom policies, prior to other - * appraise rules. (Highest priority) - */ - arch_entries_size = ima_init_arch_policy(); - if (!arch_entries_size) - pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); + /* Set policy rules to the empty set of default rules. The rest will be + * implemented after namespacing policy. + */ + ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules = + &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_default_rules; +}

- ima_ns->policy_data->ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = - ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs; - } +/** + * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules. + * + * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the + * the new ima_policy_rules. + */ +void __init ima_init_policy(void) +{ + int build_appraise_entries, arch_entries;

/* if !ima_policy, we load NO default rules */ - if (setup_data->ima_policy) - add_rules(ima_ns, dont_measure_rules, - ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, - setup_data); + if (ima_policy) + add_rules(NULL, + dont_measure_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);

- switch (setup_data->ima_policy) { + switch (ima_policy) { case ORIGINAL_TCB: - add_rules(ima_ns, original_measurement_rules, + add_rules(NULL, original_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, - setup_data); + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; case EXEC_TCB: fallthrough; case DEFAULT_TCB: - add_rules(ima_ns, default_measurement_rules, + add_rules(NULL, default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, - setup_data); + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); default: break; }

- if (setup_data->ima_policy) - add_rules(ima_ns, &ima_parser_measure_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, - setup_data); + if (ima_policy) + add_rules(NULL, &ima_parser_measure_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);

- if (arch_entries_size) - add_rules(ima_ns, - arch_policy_entry, - arch_entries_size, - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY, - setup_data); + /* + * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement + * and appraise rules requiring file signatures for both the initial + * and custom policies, prior to other appraise rules. + * (Highest priority) + */ + arch_entries = ima_init_arch_policy(); + if (!arch_entries) + pr_info("No architecture policies found\n"); + else + add_rules(NULL, arch_policy_entry, arch_entries, + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY);

/* * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ - if (setup_data->ima_use_secure_boot || - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) - add_rules(ima_ns, secure_boot_rules, - ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, - setup_data); + if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) + add_rules(NULL, + secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);

/* * Insert the build time appraise rules requiring file signatures @@ -972,53 +970,38 @@ void ima_init_ns_policy(struct ima_namespace *ima_ns, * rules, include either one or the other set of rules, but not both. */ build_appraise_entries = ARRAY_SIZE(build_appraise_rules); - if (build_appraise_entries && (ima_ns == &init_ima_ns)) { - if (setup_data->ima_use_secure_boot) - add_rules(ima_ns, build_appraise_rules, - build_appraise_entries, - IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY, - setup_data); + if (build_appraise_entries) { + if (ima_use_secure_boot) + add_rules(NULL, + build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); else - add_rules(ima_ns, build_appraise_rules, - build_appraise_entries, - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY, - setup_data); + add_rules(NULL, + build_appraise_rules, build_appraise_entries, + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); }

- if (setup_data->ima_use_appraise_tcb || - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) - add_rules(ima_ns, default_appraise_rules, + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) + add_rules(NULL, default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, setup_data); + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);

- if (setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) - add_rules(ima_ns, appraise_exec_rules, + if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) + add_rules(NULL, appraise_exec_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(appraise_exec_rules), - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, setup_data); + IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);

- if (setup_data->ima_use_secure_boot || - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_tcb || - setup_data->ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) - add_rules(ima_ns, &ima_parser_appraise_rule, 1, - IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY, setup_data); + if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_tcb || + ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) + add_rules(NULL, &ima_parser_appraise_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY);

- ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules = - &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_default_rules; - ima_update_policy_flag(ima_ns); -} - -/** - * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules for the initial ima ns - */ -void __init ima_init_policy(void) -{ - ima_init_ns_policy(&init_ima_ns, &init_policy_setup_data); + ima_update_policy_flag(NULL); }

/* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */ int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) { - if (list_empty(&ima_ns->policy_data->ima_temp_rules)) + if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules)) return -EINVAL; return 0; } @@ -1036,18 +1019,14 @@ int ima_check_policy(const struct ima_namespace *ima_ns) */ void ima_update_policy(void) { - /* Update only the current ima namespace */ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - struct list_head *policy = &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_rules; + struct list_head *policy = &ima_policy_rules;

- list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_ns->policy_data->ima_temp_rules, - policy, synchronize_rcu); + list_splice_tail_init_rcu(&ima_temp_rules, policy, synchronize_rcu);

- if (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules != policy) { - ima_ns->policy_data->ima_policy_flag = 0; - ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules = policy; + if (ima_rules != policy) { + ima_policy_flag = 0; + ima_rules = policy;

-#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_NS /* * IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified * as strings and converted to an array of ima_entry_rules @@ -1055,9 +1034,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void) * architecture specific rules stored as an array. */ kfree(arch_policy_entry); -#endif } - ima_update_policy_flag(ima_ns); + ima_update_policy_flag(NULL);

/* Custom IMA policy has been loaded */ ima_process_queued_keys(); @@ -1121,7 +1099,6 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type) { int result; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) return -EINVAL; @@ -1138,8 +1115,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, pr_warn("rule for LSM '%s' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);

- if (ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules == - &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_default_rules) { + if (ima_rules == &ima_default_rules) { kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = NULL; result = -EINVAL; @@ -1303,7 +1279,6 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) bool uid_token; struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; int result = 0; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

ab = integrity_audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_POLICY_RULE); @@ -1665,8 +1640,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (!result && !ima_validate_rule(entry)) result = -EINVAL; else if (entry->action == APPRAISE) - ima_ns->policy_data->temp_ima_appraise |= - ima_appraise_flag(entry->func); + temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entry->func);

if (!result && entry->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) { template_desc = entry->template ? entry->template : @@ -1693,8 +1667,6 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) struct ima_rule_entry *entry; ssize_t result, len; int audit_info = 0; - /* Add rules only to the current ima namespace */ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

p = strsep(&rule, "\n"); len = strlen(p) + 1; @@ -1721,7 +1693,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) return result; }

- list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_temp_rules); + list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_temp_rules);

return len; } @@ -1733,51 +1705,15 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) * ima_delete_rules() at a time. */ void ima_delete_rules(void) -{ - /* Delete rules only from the current ima namespace */ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); - struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp; - - ima_ns->policy_data->temp_ima_appraise = 0; - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, - &ima_ns->policy_data->ima_temp_rules, list) { - list_del(&entry->list); - ima_free_rule(entry); - } -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS -/** - * ima_delete_ns_rules - delete policy rules and free the memory - * @policy_data: a pointer to the policy data of the given namespace - * @is_root_ns: indicates if the namespace being cleaned up is the root - * namespace - * - * This function should be called only for the inactive namespace, when it is - * being destroyed. - */ -void ima_delete_ns_rules(struct ima_policy_data *policy_data, - bool is_root_ns) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;

- /* no locks necessary, namespace is inactive */ - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, - &policy_data->ima_policy_rules, list) { + temp_ima_appraise = 0; + list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_temp_rules, list) { list_del(&entry->list); ima_free_rule(entry); } - - if (!is_root_ns) { - list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, - &policy_data->ima_default_rules, - list) { - list_del(&entry->list); - ima_free_rule(entry); - } - } } -#endif

#define __ima_hook_stringify(func, str) (#func),

@@ -1801,10 +1737,9 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { loff_t l = *pos; struct ima_rule_entry *entry; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns();

rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (!l--) { rcu_read_unlock(); return entry; @@ -1816,7 +1751,6 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)

void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;

rcu_read_lock(); @@ -1824,7 +1758,7 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) rcu_read_unlock(); (*pos)++;

- return (&entry->list == ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules) ? NULL : entry; + return (&entry->list == ima_rules) ? NULL : entry; }

void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v) @@ -2022,7 +1956,6 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) */ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) { - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = get_current_ns(); struct ima_rule_entry *entry; bool found = false; enum ima_hooks func; @@ -2033,7 +1966,7 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id) func = read_idmap[id] ?: FILE_CHECK;

rcu_read_lock(); - list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_ns->policy_data->ima_rules, list) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, ima_rules, list) { if (entry->action != APPRAISE) continue;

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c index 542cbe894a99..34ca54ba52b7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c @@ -110,11 +110,8 @@ bool ima_queue_key(struct key *keyring, const void *payload, if (!entry) return false;

- /* Queued keys will be processed according to the root IMA namespace - * policy, therefore allow queueing only for the root namespace. - */ mutex_lock(&ima_keys_lock); - if (!ima_process_keys && (get_current_ns() == &init_ima_ns)) { + if (!ima_process_keys) { list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_keys); queued = true; } @@ -161,15 +158,12 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void)

list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_keys, list) { if (!timer_expired) - /* Queued keys are always measured according to the - * initial namespace policy. - */ process_buffer_measurement(NULL, entry->payload, entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name, KEY_CHECK, 0, entry->keyring_name, - &init_ima_ns); + NULL); list_del(&entry->list); ima_free_key_entry(entry); } diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 33d0d1a28b42..4fb58543eeb9 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)

void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { - ima_inode_free(inode); + integrity_inode_free(inode); call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode); /* * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit eecf0d8324b4fd931349e6528f82fc115dca5928.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/integrity.h | 31 -------- security/integrity/iint.c | 126 +++++++-------------------------- security/integrity/integrity.h | 11 --- 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h index 4a38310e6e7e..2ea0f2f65ab6 100644 --- a/include/linux/integrity.h +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h @@ -8,10 +8,6 @@ #define _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H

#include <linux/fs.h> -#include <linux/rwlock_types.h> - -struct rb_root; -struct integrity_iint_tree;

enum integrity_status { INTEGRITY_PASS = 0, @@ -26,15 +22,8 @@ enum integrity_status { /* List of EVM protected security xattrs */ #ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode); -extern struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_rb_get(struct - integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree, - struct inode *inode); extern void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode); -extern void integrity_inode_rb_free(struct integrity_iint_tree *iint_tree, - struct inode *inode); extern void __init integrity_load_keys(void); -extern void integrity_iint_tree_free(struct integrity_iint_tree *iint_tree);

#else static inline struct integrity_iint_cache * @@ -43,34 +32,14 @@ static inline struct integrity_iint_cache * return NULL; }

-static inline struct integrity_iint_cache * - integrity_inode_rb_get(struct - integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree, - struct inode *inode) -{ - return NULL; -} - static inline void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { return; }

-static inline void integrity_inode_rb_free(struct integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree, - struct inode *inode) -{ -} - static inline void integrity_load_keys(void) { } - -static inline void integrity_iint_tree_free(struct integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree) -{ -} #endif /* CONFIG_INTEGRITY */

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 48716d058ed1..8953ac6412c3 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -21,29 +21,19 @@ #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include "integrity.h"

-struct integrity_iint_tree init_iint_tree = { - .lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_iint_tree.lock), - .root = RB_ROOT -}; - +static struct rb_root integrity_iint_tree = RB_ROOT; +static DEFINE_RWLOCK(integrity_iint_lock); static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;

struct dentry *integrity_dir;

/* - * __integrity_iint_rb_find - return the iint associated with an inode - * @iint_rb_root: pointer to the root of the iint tree - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * @return: pointer to the iint if found, NULL otherwise + * __integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode */ -static struct integrity_iint_cache * - __integrity_iint_rb_find(const struct rb_root - *iint_rb_root, - const struct inode - *inode) +static struct integrity_iint_cache *__integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - struct rb_node *n = iint_rb_root->rb_node; + struct rb_node *n = integrity_iint_tree.rb_node;

while (n) { iint = rb_entry(n, struct integrity_iint_cache, rb_node); @@ -62,37 +52,22 @@ static struct integrity_iint_cache * }

/* - * integrity_iint_rb_find - return the iint associated with an inode - * @iint_tree: pointer to the iint tree root node and the associated lock - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * @return: pointer to the iint if found, NULL otherwise + * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_rb_find(struct integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree, - const struct inode *inode) +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;

if (!IS_IMA(inode)) return NULL;

- read_lock(&iint_tree->lock); - iint = __integrity_iint_rb_find(&iint_tree->root, inode); - read_unlock(&iint_tree->lock); + read_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); + iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); + read_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);

return iint; }

-/* - * integrity_iint_find - return the iint associated with an inode - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * @return: pointer to the iint if found, NULL otherwise - */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode) -{ - return integrity_iint_rb_find(&init_iint_tree, inode); -} - static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { kfree(iint->ima_hash); @@ -111,36 +86,13 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) }

/** - * integrity_iint_tree_free - traverse the tree and free all nodes - * @iint_tree: pointer to the iint tree root node and the associated lock - * - * The tree cannot be in use. This function should be called only from the - * destructor when no locks are required. - */ -void integrity_iint_tree_free(struct integrity_iint_tree *iint_tree) -{ - struct rb_root *root = &iint_tree->root; - struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, *tmp; - - rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(iint, tmp, root, rb_node) { - iint_free(iint); - } - - iint_tree->root = RB_ROOT; -} - -/** - * integrity_inode_rb_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode - * @iint_tree: pointer to the iint tree root node and the associated lock + * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode * @inode: pointer to the inode - * @return: pointer to the existing iint if found, pointer to the allocated iint - * if it didn't exist, NULL in case of error + * @return: allocated iint * * Caller must lock i_mutex */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_rb_get(struct integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree, - struct inode *inode) +struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) { struct rb_node **p; struct rb_node *node, *parent = NULL; @@ -154,7 +106,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_rb_get(struct integrity_iint_tree if (!iint_cache) panic("%s: lsm=integrity required.\n", __func__);

- iint = integrity_iint_rb_find(iint_tree, inode); + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) return iint;

@@ -162,9 +114,9 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_rb_get(struct integrity_iint_tree if (!iint) return NULL;

- write_lock(&iint_tree->lock); + write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock);

- p = &iint_tree->root.rb_node; + p = &integrity_iint_tree.rb_node; while (*p) { parent = *p; test_iint = rb_entry(parent, struct integrity_iint_cache, @@ -179,63 +131,33 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_rb_get(struct integrity_iint_tree node = &iint->rb_node; inode->i_flags |= S_IMA; rb_link_node(node, parent, p); - rb_insert_color(node, &iint_tree->root); + rb_insert_color(node, &integrity_iint_tree);

- write_unlock(&iint_tree->lock); + write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock); return iint; }

/** - * integrity_inode_get - find or allocate an iint associated with an inode - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * @return: pointer to the existing iint if found, pointer to the allocated iint - * if it didn't exist, NULL in case of error - * - * Caller must lock i_mutex - */ -struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_inode_get(struct inode *inode) -{ - return integrity_inode_rb_get(&init_iint_tree, inode); -} - -/** - * integrity_inode_rb_free - called on security_inode_free - * @iint_tree: pointer to the iint tree root node and the associated lock + * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free * @inode: pointer to the inode * * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode. */ -void integrity_inode_rb_free(struct integrity_iint_tree *iint_tree, - struct inode *inode) +void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;

if (!IS_IMA(inode)) return;

- write_lock(&iint_tree->lock); - iint = __integrity_iint_rb_find(&iint_tree->root, inode); - if (!iint) { - write_unlock(&iint_tree->lock); - return; - } - rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &iint_tree->root); - write_unlock(&iint_tree->lock); + write_lock(&integrity_iint_lock); + iint = __integrity_iint_find(inode); + rb_erase(&iint->rb_node, &integrity_iint_tree); + write_unlock(&integrity_iint_lock);

iint_free(iint); }

-/** - * integrity_inode_free - called on security_inode_free - * @inode: pointer to the inode - * - * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode. - */ -void integrity_inode_free(struct inode *inode) -{ - integrity_inode_rb_free(&init_iint_tree, inode); -} - static void init_once(void *foo) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 05f6eabef9fe..77e6819e8db8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -184,20 +184,11 @@ static inline void ima_load_digest_lists(void) } #endif

-struct integrity_iint_tree { - rwlock_t lock; - struct rb_root root; -}; - /* rbtree tree calls to lookup, insert, delete * integrity data associated with an inode. */ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode);

-struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_rb_find(struct integrity_iint_tree - *iint_tree, - const struct inode *inode); - int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count);

@@ -208,8 +199,6 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,

extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;

-extern struct integrity_iint_tree init_iint_tree; - struct modsig;

#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit dcc22cddc59e3af11ddd7ab9a52dc42addc04a5e.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 10 -------- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 -------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 37 --------------------------- 3 files changed, 57 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 071e9e749420..95a877691cd0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -311,16 +311,6 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos); void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v); int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);

-int ima_policy_setup(char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *policy_setup_data, - bool *fail_unverifiable_sigs); -int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(const char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data); -int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(const char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data); -int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data); - /* Appraise integrity measurements */ #define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01 #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIX 0x02 diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index ad7715822e06..3fb378017f9d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -18,16 +18,6 @@ #include "ima_digest_list.h"

static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init; - -int ima_default_appraise_setup(const char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) -{ - /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima - * policy, when global variables are removed. - */ - return 1; -} - static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index fe5d0f311f1c..bdfe5ec0a79a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -246,15 +246,6 @@ struct ima_policy_data init_policy_data = { .ima_temp_rules = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_policy_data.ima_temp_rules), };

-int ima_default_measure_policy_setup(const char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) -{ - /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima - * policy, when global variables are removed. - */ - return 1; -} - static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) { if (ima_policy) @@ -270,25 +261,6 @@ static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable __initdata; static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; - -/** - * ima_policy_setup - parse policy configuration string "ima_policy=" - * @str: string to be parsed - * @setup_data: pointer to a structure where parsed data is stored - * @fail_unverifiable_sigs: boolean flag treated separately to preserve - * __ro_after_init - */ -int ima_policy_setup(char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data, - bool *fail_unverifiable_sigs) -{ - - /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima - * policy, when global variables are removed. - */ - return 1; -} - static int __init policy_setup(char *str) { char *p; @@ -318,15 +290,6 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) } __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);

-int ima_default_appraise_policy_setup(const char *str, - struct ima_policy_setup_data *setup_data) -{ - /* Currently unused. It will be implemented after namespacing ima - * policy, when global variables are removed. - */ - return 1; -} - static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { ima_use_appraise_tcb = true;

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit 9cf5b2e85d83daf8922d81bb43283fe216cad706.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- fs/file_table.c | 6 +---- include/linux/fs.h | 3 --- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ----- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 37 ++----------------------------- 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c index 40020a81c216..709ada3151da 100644 --- a/fs/file_table.c +++ b/fs/file_table.c @@ -109,8 +109,6 @@ static struct file *__alloc_file(int flags, const struct cred *cred) return ERR_PTR(error); }

- ima_file_alloc(f); - atomic_long_set(&f->f_count, 1); rwlock_init(&f->f_owner.lock); spin_lock_init(&f->f_lock); @@ -261,10 +259,8 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) struct inode *inode = file->f_inode; fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;

- if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))) { - ima_file_free(file); + if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))) goto out; - }

might_sleep();

diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h index a56184847086..ce2cab22d942 100644 --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -954,9 +954,6 @@ struct file { struct address_space *f_mapping; errseq_t f_wb_err; errseq_t f_sb_err; /* for syncfs */ -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA - void *f_ima; -#endif } __randomize_layout __attribute__((aligned(4))); /* lest something weird decides that 2 is OK */

diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 88734870af59..77e7f512f61b 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ struct llist_node; extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); extern void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode); -extern int ima_file_alloc(struct file *file); extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file); extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot); extern int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot); @@ -71,11 +70,6 @@ static inline void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct inode *inode) { }

-static inline int ima_file_alloc(struct file *file) -{ - return 0; -} - static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { return; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index e4b0ad29dbd8..5fd890c85413 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -238,30 +238,6 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); }

-/** - * ima_file_alloc - called on __alloc_file() - * @file: pointer to file structure being created - * - * Bind IMA namespace to the file descriptor. This is necessary, because - * __fput can be called after exit_task_namespaces() in do_exit(). - * In that case nsproxy is already NULL and ima ns has to be found - * differently in ima_file_free(). If process joins different ima ns, files - * opened in the old ns will point to that (old) ns. - */ -int ima_file_alloc(struct file *file) -{ - /* It is possible that ima_file_alloc() is called after - * exit_task_namespaces(), when IMA does the last writer check from - * __fput(). In that case it's not necessary to store the namespace - * information */ - if (!current->nsproxy) - return 0; - - file->f_ima = get_current_ns(); - get_ima_ns((struct ima_namespace *)file->f_ima); - return 0; -} - /** * ima_file_free - called on __fput() * @file: pointer to file structure being freed @@ -272,24 +248,15 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns = (struct ima_namespace *)file->f_ima; - - if (!ima_ns) - return; - - if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))) - goto out;

if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) - goto out; + return;

iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) - goto out; + return;

ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file); -out: - put_ima_ns(ima_ns); }

static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,

From: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4O25G CVE: NA

--------------------------------

This reverts commit a8352473e0aa18693cd0a911beab237cb2d396b9.

Signed-off-by: Zhang Tianxing zhangtianxing3@huawei.com Acked-by: Xie XiuQi xiexiuqi@huawei.com Acked-by: Xiu Jianfengxiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- fs/proc/namespaces.c | 4 - include/linux/ima.h | 57 -------- include/linux/nsproxy.h | 3 - include/linux/proc_ns.h | 5 +- include/linux/user_namespace.h | 1 - include/uapi/linux/sched.h | 1 - init/Kconfig | 12 -- kernel/fork.c | 24 +--- kernel/nsproxy.c | 42 +----- kernel/ucount.c | 1 - security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 - security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 13 -- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 4 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 13 -- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 232 ------------------------------ 15 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 402 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c

diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c index 117812a59e5d..8e159fc78c0a 100644 --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c @@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ static const struct proc_ns_operations *ns_entries[] = { &timens_operations, &timens_for_children_operations, #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - &imans_operations, - &imans_for_children_operations, -#endif };

static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 67af79961e4e..f7a088b2579e 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ #include <linux/kexec.h> struct linux_binprm;

-struct nsproxy; -struct task_struct; - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); extern int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask); @@ -200,58 +197,4 @@ static inline bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func) return false; } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */ - -struct ima_namespace { - struct kref kref; - struct ns_common ns; - struct ucounts *ucounts; - struct user_namespace *user_ns; -} __randomize_layout; - -extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; - -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS -struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(unsigned long flags, - struct user_namespace *user_ns, - struct ima_namespace *old_ns); - -void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref); - -int imans_on_fork(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct task_struct *tsk); - -static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) -{ - if (ns) - kref_get(&ns->kref); - return ns; -} -static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) -{ - if (ns) - kref_put(&ns->kref, free_ima_ns); -} - -#else -static inline struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(unsigned long flags, - struct user_namespace *user_ns, - struct ima_namespace *old_ns) -{ - return old_ns; -} - -static inline int imans_on_fork(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, - struct task_struct *tsk) -{ - return 0; -} - -static inline struct ima_namespace *get_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) -{ - return ns; -} - -static inline void put_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) -{ -} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ #endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */ diff --git a/include/linux/nsproxy.h b/include/linux/nsproxy.h index 56216a94009d..cdb171efc7cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/nsproxy.h +++ b/include/linux/nsproxy.h @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ struct uts_namespace; struct ipc_namespace; struct pid_namespace; struct cgroup_namespace; -struct ima_namespace; struct fs_struct;

/* @@ -39,8 +38,6 @@ struct nsproxy { struct time_namespace *time_ns; struct time_namespace *time_ns_for_children; struct cgroup_namespace *cgroup_ns; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_for_children; }; extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;

diff --git a/include/linux/proc_ns.h b/include/linux/proc_ns.h index c8c596d67629..75807ecef880 100644 --- a/include/linux/proc_ns.h +++ b/include/linux/proc_ns.h @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ struct inode; struct proc_ns_operations { const char *name; const char *real_ns_name; - uint64_t type; + int type; struct ns_common *(*get)(struct task_struct *task); void (*put)(struct ns_common *ns); int (*install)(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *ns); @@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ extern const struct proc_ns_operations mntns_operations; extern const struct proc_ns_operations cgroupns_operations; extern const struct proc_ns_operations timens_operations; extern const struct proc_ns_operations timens_for_children_operations; -extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations; -extern const struct proc_ns_operations imans_for_children_operations;

/* * We always define these enumerators @@ -48,7 +46,6 @@ enum { PROC_PID_INIT_INO = 0xEFFFFFFCU, PROC_CGROUP_INIT_INO = 0xEFFFFFFBU, PROC_TIME_INIT_INO = 0xEFFFFFFAU, - PROC_IMA_INIT_INO = 0xEFFFFFF9U, };

#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 3eb64a50f248..7616c7bf4b24 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ enum ucount_type { UCOUNT_MNT_NAMESPACES, UCOUNT_CGROUP_NAMESPACES, UCOUNT_TIME_NAMESPACES, - UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES, #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER UCOUNT_INOTIFY_INSTANCES, UCOUNT_INOTIFY_WATCHES, diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h index b30e27efee92..3bac0a8ceab2 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sched.h @@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ /* Flags for the clone3() syscall. */ #define CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND 0x100000000ULL /* Clear any signal handler and reset to SIG_DFL. */ #define CLONE_INTO_CGROUP 0x200000000ULL /* Clone into a specific cgroup given the right permissions. */ -#define CLONE_NEWIMA 0x400000000ULL /* New IMA namespace. */

/* * cloning flags intersect with CSIGNAL so can be used with unshare and clone3 diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 310082cd88fe..6d2f69cafe15 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1226,18 +1226,6 @@ config NET_NS Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances of the network stack.

-config IMA_NS - bool "IMA namespace" - depends on IMA - default n - help - This allows container engines to use ima namespaces to provide - different IMA policy rules for different containers. Also, it allows - to create what appear to be multiple instances of the IMA measurement - list and other IMA related resources. - - If unsure, say N. - endif # NAMESPACES

config SCHED_STEAL diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 6417b818b3a1..d730b57c9c22 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1924,24 +1924,11 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process( }

/* - * If the new process will be in a different time namespace or a - * different ima namespace, do not allow it to share VM or a thread - * group with the forking task. + * If the new process will be in a different time namespace + * do not allow it to share VM or a thread group with the forking task. */ if (clone_flags & (CLONE_THREAD | CLONE_VM)) { - if ((nsp->time_ns != nsp->time_ns_for_children) || - ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWIMA) || - (nsp->ima_ns != nsp->ima_ns_for_children))) - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - } - - /* - * If the new process will be in a different ima namespace - * do not allow it to share the same file descriptor table. - */ - if (clone_flags & CLONE_FILES) { - if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWIMA) || - (nsp->ima_ns != nsp->ima_ns_for_children)) + if (nsp->time_ns != nsp->time_ns_for_children) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); }

@@ -2720,8 +2707,7 @@ static bool clone3_args_valid(struct kernel_clone_args *kargs) { /* Verify that no unknown flags are passed along. */ if (kargs->flags & - ~(CLONE_LEGACY_FLAGS | - CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND | CLONE_INTO_CGROUP | CLONE_NEWIMA)) + ~(CLONE_LEGACY_FLAGS | CLONE_CLEAR_SIGHAND | CLONE_INTO_CGROUP)) return false;

/* @@ -2868,7 +2854,7 @@ static int check_unshare_flags(unsigned long unshare_flags) CLONE_VM|CLONE_FILES|CLONE_SYSVSEM| CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWNET| CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWCGROUP| - CLONE_NEWTIME|CLONE_NEWIMA)) + CLONE_NEWTIME)) return -EINVAL; /* * Not implemented, but pretend it works if there is nothing diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c index 22b24123d524..3d5a5faf91b5 100644 --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ #include <net/net_namespace.h> #include <linux/ipc_namespace.h> #include <linux/time_namespace.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> @@ -48,10 +47,6 @@ struct nsproxy init_nsproxy = { .time_ns = &init_time_ns, .time_ns_for_children = &init_time_ns, #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - .ima_ns = &init_ima_ns, - .ima_ns_for_children = &init_ima_ns, -#endif };

static inline struct nsproxy *create_nsproxy(void) @@ -126,19 +121,8 @@ static struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags, } new_nsp->time_ns = get_time_ns(tsk->nsproxy->time_ns);

- new_nsp->ima_ns_for_children = copy_ima_ns(flags, user_ns, - tsk->nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children); - if (IS_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns_for_children)) { - err = PTR_ERR(new_nsp->ima_ns_for_children); - goto out_ima; - } - new_nsp->ima_ns = get_ima_ns(tsk->nsproxy->ima_ns); - return new_nsp;

-out_ima: - put_time_ns(new_nsp->time_ns); - put_time_ns(new_nsp->time_ns_for_children); out_time: put_net(new_nsp->net_ns); out_net: @@ -173,10 +157,8 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)

if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET | - CLONE_NEWCGROUP | CLONE_NEWTIME | - CLONE_NEWIMA)))) { - if (likely((old_ns->time_ns_for_children == old_ns->time_ns) && - (old_ns->ima_ns_for_children == old_ns->ima_ns))) { + CLONE_NEWCGROUP | CLONE_NEWTIME)))) { + if (likely(old_ns->time_ns_for_children == old_ns->time_ns)) { get_nsproxy(old_ns); return 0; } @@ -204,12 +186,6 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk) return ret; }

- ret = imans_on_fork(new_ns, tsk); - if (ret) { - free_nsproxy(new_ns); - return ret; - } - tsk->nsproxy = new_ns; return 0; } @@ -228,10 +204,6 @@ void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns) put_time_ns(ns->time_ns); if (ns->time_ns_for_children) put_time_ns(ns->time_ns_for_children); - if (ns->ima_ns) - put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns); - if (ns->ima_ns_for_children) - put_ima_ns(ns->ima_ns_for_children); put_cgroup_ns(ns->cgroup_ns); put_net(ns->net_ns); kmem_cache_free(nsproxy_cachep, ns); @@ -249,7 +221,7 @@ int unshare_nsproxy_namespaces(unsigned long unshare_flags,

if (!(unshare_flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_NEWNET | CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWCGROUP | - CLONE_NEWTIME | CLONE_NEWIMA))) + CLONE_NEWTIME))) return 0;

user_ns = new_cred ? new_cred->user_ns : current_user_ns(); @@ -504,14 +476,6 @@ static int validate_nsset(struct nsset *nsset, struct pid *pid) } #endif

-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - if (flags & CLONE_NEWIMA) { - ret = validate_ns(nsset, &nsp->ima_ns->ns); - if (ret) - goto out; - } -#endif - out: if (pid_ns) put_pid_ns(pid_ns); diff --git a/kernel/ucount.c b/kernel/ucount.c index 3f4768d62b8f..11b1596e2542 100644 --- a/kernel/ucount.c +++ b/kernel/ucount.c @@ -70,7 +70,6 @@ static struct ctl_table user_table[] = { UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_mnt_namespaces"), UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_cgroup_namespaces"), UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_time_namespaces"), - UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_ima_namespaces"), #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_instances"), UCOUNT_ENTRY("max_inotify_watches"), diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 7c7272b8df65..9dda78739c85 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -15,4 +15,3 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST) += ima_digest_list.o -ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_NS) += ima_ns.o diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index edfdb1f0835d..46afb6bef45b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ #include <linux/hash.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/audit.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h>

#include "../integrity.h" @@ -363,18 +362,6 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c

#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */

-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS -static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) -{ - return current->nsproxy->ima_ns; -} -#else -static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) -{ - return &init_ima_ns; -} -#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ - #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len, struct modsig **modsig); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 90f1d9c85b31..ecdeab23f022 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, };

-static ssize_t ima_read_sfs_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) +static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) { void *data = NULL; char *datap; @@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_data(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, goto out_free;

if (data[0] == '/') { - result = ima_read_sfs_file(data, dentry); + result = ima_read_file(data, dentry); } else if (dentry == ima_policy) { if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { pr_err("signed policy file (specified " diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index b1c341e239a8..913d6b879b0b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -15,9 +15,6 @@ #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/err.h> -#include <linux/kref.h> -#include <linux/proc_ns.h> -#include <linux/user_namespace.h>

#include "ima.h"

@@ -25,16 +22,6 @@ const char boot_aggregate_name[] = "boot_aggregate"; struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip;

-struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns = { - .kref = KREF_INIT(2), - .user_ns = &init_user_ns, - .ns.inum = PROC_IMA_INIT_INO, -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - .ns.ops = &imans_operations, -#endif -}; -EXPORT_SYMBOL(init_ima_ns); - /* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend * the PCR register. * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8f5f301406a2..000000000000 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -/* - * Copyright (C) 2019-2020 Huawei Technologies Duesseldorf GmbH - * - * Author: Krzysztof Struczynski krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or - * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as - * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the - * License. - * - * File: ima_ns.c - * Functions to manage the IMA namespace. - */ - -#include <linux/export.h> -#include <linux/ima.h> -#include <linux/kref.h> -#include <linux/proc_ns.h> -#include <linux/slab.h> -#include <linux/user_namespace.h> -#include <linux/nsproxy.h> -#include <linux/sched.h> - -#include "ima.h" - -static struct ucounts *inc_ima_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns) -{ - return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES); -} - -static void dec_ima_namespaces(struct ucounts *ucounts) -{ - return dec_ucount(ucounts, UCOUNT_IMA_NAMESPACES); -} - -static struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_alloc(void) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; - - ima_ns = kzalloc(sizeof(*ima_ns), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ima_ns) - return NULL; - - return ima_ns; -} - -/** - * Clone a new ns copying an original ima namespace, setting refcount to 1 - * - * @user_ns: User namespace that current task runs in - * @old_ns: Old ima namespace to clone - * Return: ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise - */ -static struct ima_namespace *clone_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns, - struct ima_namespace *old_ns) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ns; - struct ucounts *ucounts; - int err; - - err = -ENOSPC; - ucounts = inc_ima_namespaces(user_ns); - if (!ucounts) - goto fail; - - err = -ENOMEM; - ns = ima_ns_alloc(); - if (!ns) - goto fail_dec; - - kref_init(&ns->kref); - - err = ns_alloc_inum(&ns->ns); - if (err) - goto fail_free; - - ns->ns.ops = &imans_operations; - ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); - ns->ucounts = ucounts; - - return ns; - -fail_free: - kfree(ns); -fail_dec: - dec_ima_namespaces(ucounts); -fail: - return ERR_PTR(err); -} - -/** - * Copy task's ima namespace, or clone it if flags specifies CLONE_NEWNS. - * - * @flags: Cloning flags - * @user_ns: User namespace that current task runs in - * @old_ns: Old ima namespace to clone - * - * Return: IMA namespace or ERR_PTR. - */ - -struct ima_namespace *copy_ima_ns(unsigned long flags, - struct user_namespace *user_ns, - struct ima_namespace *old_ns) -{ - if (!(flags & CLONE_NEWIMA)) - return get_ima_ns(old_ns); - - return clone_ima_ns(user_ns, old_ns); -} - -static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) -{ - dec_ima_namespaces(ns->ucounts); - put_user_ns(ns->user_ns); - ns_free_inum(&ns->ns); - kfree(ns); -} - -void free_ima_ns(struct kref *kref) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ns; - - ns = container_of(kref, struct ima_namespace, kref); - - destroy_ima_ns(ns); -} - -static inline struct ima_namespace *to_ima_ns(struct ns_common *ns) -{ - return container_of(ns, struct ima_namespace, ns); -} - -static struct ns_common *imans_get(struct task_struct *task) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL; - struct nsproxy *nsproxy; - - task_lock(task); - nsproxy = task->nsproxy; - if (nsproxy) { - ns = nsproxy->ima_ns; - get_ima_ns(ns); - } - task_unlock(task); - - return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL; -} - -static struct ns_common *imans_for_children_get(struct task_struct *task) -{ - struct ima_namespace *ns = NULL; - struct nsproxy *nsproxy; - - task_lock(task); - nsproxy = task->nsproxy; - if (nsproxy) { - ns = nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children; - get_ima_ns(ns); - } - task_unlock(task); - - return ns ? &ns->ns : NULL; -} - -static void imans_put(struct ns_common *ns) -{ - put_ima_ns(to_ima_ns(ns)); -} - -static int imans_install(struct nsset *nsset, struct ns_common *new) -{ - struct nsproxy *nsproxy = nsset->nsproxy; - struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(new); - - if (!current_is_single_threaded()) - return -EUSERS; - - if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || - !ns_capable(nsset->cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) - return -EPERM; - - get_ima_ns(ns); - put_ima_ns(nsproxy->ima_ns); - nsproxy->ima_ns = ns; - - get_ima_ns(ns); - put_ima_ns(nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children); - nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children = ns; - - return 0; -} - -int imans_on_fork(struct nsproxy *nsproxy, struct task_struct *tsk) -{ - struct ns_common *nsc = &nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children->ns; - struct ima_namespace *ns = to_ima_ns(nsc); - - /* create_new_namespaces() already incremented the ref counter */ - if (nsproxy->ima_ns == nsproxy->ima_ns_for_children) - return 0; - - get_ima_ns(ns); - put_ima_ns(nsproxy->ima_ns); - nsproxy->ima_ns = ns; - - return 0; -} - -static struct user_namespace *imans_owner(struct ns_common *ns) -{ - return to_ima_ns(ns)->user_ns; -} - -const struct proc_ns_operations imans_operations = { - .name = "ima", - .type = CLONE_NEWIMA, - .get = imans_get, - .put = imans_put, - .install = imans_install, - .owner = imans_owner, -}; - -const struct proc_ns_operations imans_for_children_operations = { - .name = "ima_for_children", - .type = CLONE_NEWIMA, - .get = imans_for_children_get, - .put = imans_put, - .install = imans_install, - .owner = imans_owner, -}; -

From: Victor Ding victording@google.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.16-rc6 commit a2c32fa736a590a7ab6e9601066a6772ae09869b category: feature feature: milan cpu bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NX57 CVE: NA

--------------------------------

Changes the static struct rapl_msr_priv to a pointer to allow using a different RAPL MSR interface, preparing for supporting AMD's RAPL MSR interface.

No functional changes.

Signed-off-by: Victor Ding victording@google.com Acked-by: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com [ rjw: Changelog edits ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: qinyu qinyu16@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiongfeng Wang wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c b/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c index 1646808d354c..a819b3b89b2f 100644 --- a/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c +++ b/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c @@ -31,7 +31,9 @@ #define MSR_VR_CURRENT_CONFIG 0x00000601

/* private data for RAPL MSR Interface */ -static struct rapl_if_priv rapl_msr_priv = { +static struct rapl_if_priv *rapl_msr_priv; + +static struct rapl_if_priv rapl_msr_priv_intel = { .reg_unit = MSR_RAPL_POWER_UNIT, .regs[RAPL_DOMAIN_PACKAGE] = { MSR_PKG_POWER_LIMIT, MSR_PKG_ENERGY_STATUS, MSR_PKG_PERF_STATUS, 0, MSR_PKG_POWER_INFO }, @@ -58,9 +60,9 @@ static int rapl_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu) { struct rapl_package *rp;

- rp = rapl_find_package_domain(cpu, &rapl_msr_priv); + rp = rapl_find_package_domain(cpu, rapl_msr_priv); if (!rp) { - rp = rapl_add_package(cpu, &rapl_msr_priv); + rp = rapl_add_package(cpu, rapl_msr_priv); if (IS_ERR(rp)) return PTR_ERR(rp); } @@ -73,7 +75,7 @@ static int rapl_cpu_down_prep(unsigned int cpu) struct rapl_package *rp; int lead_cpu;

- rp = rapl_find_package_domain(cpu, &rapl_msr_priv); + rp = rapl_find_package_domain(cpu, rapl_msr_priv); if (!rp) return 0;

@@ -136,40 +138,41 @@ static int rapl_msr_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) const struct x86_cpu_id *id = x86_match_cpu(pl4_support_ids); int ret;

- rapl_msr_priv.read_raw = rapl_msr_read_raw; - rapl_msr_priv.write_raw = rapl_msr_write_raw; + rapl_msr_priv = &rapl_msr_priv_intel; + rapl_msr_priv->read_raw = rapl_msr_read_raw; + rapl_msr_priv->write_raw = rapl_msr_write_raw;

if (id) { - rapl_msr_priv.limits[RAPL_DOMAIN_PACKAGE] = 3; - rapl_msr_priv.regs[RAPL_DOMAIN_PACKAGE][RAPL_DOMAIN_REG_PL4] = + rapl_msr_priv->limits[RAPL_DOMAIN_PACKAGE] = 3; + rapl_msr_priv->regs[RAPL_DOMAIN_PACKAGE][RAPL_DOMAIN_REG_PL4] = MSR_VR_CURRENT_CONFIG; pr_info("PL4 support detected.\n"); }

- rapl_msr_priv.control_type = powercap_register_control_type(NULL, "intel-rapl", NULL); - if (IS_ERR(rapl_msr_priv.control_type)) { + rapl_msr_priv->control_type = powercap_register_control_type(NULL, "intel-rapl", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(rapl_msr_priv->control_type)) { pr_debug("failed to register powercap control_type.\n"); - return PTR_ERR(rapl_msr_priv.control_type); + return PTR_ERR(rapl_msr_priv->control_type); }

ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "powercap/rapl:online", rapl_cpu_online, rapl_cpu_down_prep); if (ret < 0) goto out; - rapl_msr_priv.pcap_rapl_online = ret; + rapl_msr_priv->pcap_rapl_online = ret;

return 0;

out: if (ret) - powercap_unregister_control_type(rapl_msr_priv.control_type); + powercap_unregister_control_type(rapl_msr_priv->control_type); return ret; }

static int rapl_msr_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) { - cpuhp_remove_state(rapl_msr_priv.pcap_rapl_online); - powercap_unregister_control_type(rapl_msr_priv.control_type); + cpuhp_remove_state(rapl_msr_priv->pcap_rapl_online); + powercap_unregister_control_type(rapl_msr_priv->control_type); return 0; }

From: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.16-rc6 commit 8a9d881f22d7a0e06a46a326d0880fb45a06d3b5 category: feature feature: milan cpu bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NX57 CVE: NA

--------------------------------

AMD Family 19h's RAPL MSRs are identical to Family 17h's. Extend Family 17h's support to Family 19h.

Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Victor Ding victording@google.com Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: qinyu qinyu16@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiongfeng Wang wangxiongfeng2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c b/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c index 1ecd09424445..c9e57237d778 100644 --- a/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c +++ b/drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_common.c @@ -1067,6 +1067,7 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id rapl_ids[] __initconst = { X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, &rapl_defaults_hsw_server),

X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM(AMD, 0x17, &rapl_defaults_amd), + X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM(AMD, 0x19, &rapl_defaults_amd), {} }; MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, rapl_ids);

From: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.11-rc1 commit 7115ac6ef0b26017676e88a44a0b40c2d1d99299 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4MWJF CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Patch series "disable pcplists during memory offline", v3.

As per the discussions [1] [2] this is an attempt to implement David's suggestion that page isolation should disable pcplists to avoid races with page freeing in progress. This is done without extra checks in fast paths, as explained in Patch 9. The repeated draining done by [2] is then no longer needed. Previous version (RFC) is at [3].

The RFC tried to hide pcplists disabling/enabling into page isolation, but it wasn't completely possible, as memory offline does not unisolation. Michal suggested an explicit API in [4] so that's the current implementation and it seems indeed nicer.

Once we accept that page isolation users need to do explicit actions around it depending on the needed guarantees, we can also IMHO accept that the current pcplist draining can be also done by the callers, which is more effective. After all, there are only two users of page isolation. So patch 6 does effectively the same thing as Pavel proposed in [5], and patch 7 implement stronger guarantees only for memory offline. If CMA decides to opt-in to the stronger guarantee, it can be added later.

Patches 1-5 are preparatory cleanups for pcplist disabling.

Patchset was briefly tested in QEMU so that memory online/offline works, but I haven't done a stress test that would prove the race fixed by [2] is eliminated.

Note that patch 7 could be avoided if we instead adjusted page freeing in shown in [6], but I believe the current implementation of disabling pcplists is not too much complex, so I would prefer this instead of adding new checks and longer irq-disabled section into page freeing hotpaths.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200901124615.137200-1-pasha.tatashin@sole... [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200903140032.380431-1-pasha.tatashin@sole... [3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200907163628.26495-1-vbabka@suse.cz/ [4] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200909113647.GG7348@dhcp22.suse.cz/ [5] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200904151448.100489-3-pasha.tatashin@sole... [6] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/3d3b53db-aeaa-ff24-260b-36427fac9b1c@suse.c... [7] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20200922143712.12048-1-vbabka@suse.cz/ [8] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20201008114201.18824-1-vbabka@suse.cz/

This patch (of 7):

The updates to pcplists' high and batch values are handled by multiple functions that make the calculations hard to follow. Consolidate everything to pageset_set_high_and_batch() and remove pageset_set_batch() and pageset_set_high() wrappers.

The only special case using one of the removed wrappers was: build_all_zonelists_init()

setup_pageset() pageset_set_batch()

which was hardcoding batch as 0, so we can just open-code a call to pageset_update() with constant parameters instead.

No functional change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111092812.11329-1-vbabka@suse.cz Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111092812.11329-2-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador osalvador@suse.de Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Acked-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta pankaj.gupta@cloud.ionos.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org (cherry picked from commit 7115ac6ef0b26017676e88a44a0b40c2d1d99299) Signed-off-by: Guilei Xie xieguilei@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- mm/page_alloc.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 62c94ea31e17..7911cf8a4c4b 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -6112,7 +6112,7 @@ static void build_zonelists(pg_data_t *pgdat) * not check if the processor is online before following the pageset pointer. * Other parts of the kernel may not check if the zone is available. */ -static void setup_pageset(struct per_cpu_pageset *p, unsigned long batch); +static void setup_pageset(struct per_cpu_pageset *p); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct per_cpu_pageset, boot_pageset); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct per_cpu_nodestat, boot_nodestats);

@@ -6180,7 +6180,7 @@ build_all_zonelists_init(void) * (a chicken-egg dilemma). */ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) - setup_pageset(&per_cpu(boot_pageset, cpu), 0); + setup_pageset(&per_cpu(boot_pageset, cpu));

mminit_verify_zonelist(); cpuset_init_current_mems_allowed(); @@ -6590,12 +6590,6 @@ static void pageset_update(struct per_cpu_pages *pcp, unsigned long high, pcp->batch = batch; }

-/* a companion to pageset_set_high() */ -static void pageset_set_batch(struct per_cpu_pageset *p, unsigned long batch) -{ - pageset_update(&p->pcp, 6 * batch, max(1UL, 1 * batch)); -} - static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) { struct per_cpu_pages *pcp; @@ -6608,35 +6602,32 @@ static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pcp->lists[migratetype]); }

-static void setup_pageset(struct per_cpu_pageset *p, unsigned long batch) +static void setup_pageset(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) { pageset_init(p); - pageset_set_batch(p, batch); + pageset_update(&p->pcp, 0, 1); }

/* - * pageset_set_high() sets the high water mark for hot per_cpu_pagelist - * to the value high for the pageset p. + * Calculate and set new high and batch values for given per-cpu pageset of a + * zone, based on the zone's size and the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl. */ -static void pageset_set_high(struct per_cpu_pageset *p, - unsigned long high) -{ - unsigned long batch = max(1UL, high / 4); - if ((high / 4) > (PAGE_SHIFT * 8)) - batch = PAGE_SHIFT * 8; - - pageset_update(&p->pcp, high, batch); -} - static void pageset_set_high_and_batch(struct zone *zone, - struct per_cpu_pageset *pcp) + struct per_cpu_pageset *p) { - if (percpu_pagelist_fraction) - pageset_set_high(pcp, - (zone_managed_pages(zone) / - percpu_pagelist_fraction)); - else - pageset_set_batch(pcp, zone_batchsize(zone)); + unsigned long new_high, new_batch; + + if (percpu_pagelist_fraction) { + new_high = zone_managed_pages(zone) / percpu_pagelist_fraction; + new_batch = max(1UL, new_high / 4); + if ((new_high / 4) > (PAGE_SHIFT * 8)) + new_batch = PAGE_SHIFT * 8; + } else { + new_batch = zone_batchsize(zone); + new_high = 6 * new_batch; + new_batch = max(1UL, 1 * new_batch); + } + pageset_update(&p->pcp, new_high, new_batch); }

static void __meminit zone_pageset_init(struct zone *zone, int cpu)

From: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.11-rc1 commit 69a8396a2647feac197497bd992f0a91da9fd801 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4MWJF CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

We initialize boot-time pagesets with setup_pageset(), which sets high and batch values that effectively disable pcplists.

We can remove this wrapper if we just set these values for all pagesets in pageset_init(). Non-boot pagesets then subsequently update them to the proper values.

No functional change.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111092812.11329-4-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador osalvador@suse.de Acked-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta pankaj.gupta@cloud.ionos.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org (cherry picked from commit 69a8396a2647feac197497bd992f0a91da9fd801) Signed-off-by: Guilei Xie xieguilei@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- mm/page_alloc.c | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index b22cd247e571..9994fa212abc 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -6112,7 +6112,7 @@ static void build_zonelists(pg_data_t *pgdat) * not check if the processor is online before following the pageset pointer. * Other parts of the kernel may not check if the zone is available. */ -static void setup_pageset(struct per_cpu_pageset *p); +static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct per_cpu_pageset, boot_pageset); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct per_cpu_nodestat, boot_nodestats);

@@ -6180,7 +6180,7 @@ build_all_zonelists_init(void) * (a chicken-egg dilemma). */ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) - setup_pageset(&per_cpu(boot_pageset, cpu)); + pageset_init(&per_cpu(boot_pageset, cpu));

mminit_verify_zonelist(); cpuset_init_current_mems_allowed(); @@ -6600,12 +6600,15 @@ static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) pcp = &p->pcp; for (migratetype = 0; migratetype < MIGRATE_PCPTYPES; migratetype++) INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pcp->lists[migratetype]); -}

-static void setup_pageset(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) -{ - pageset_init(p); - pageset_update(&p->pcp, 0, 1); + /* + * Set batch and high values safe for a boot pageset. A true percpu + * pageset's initialization will update them subsequently. Here we don't + * need to be as careful as pageset_update() as nobody can access the + * pageset yet. + */ + pcp->high = 0; + pcp->batch = 1; }

/*

From: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.11-rc1 commit 952eaf815925f106eb6b68346b3458a68bb18ec1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4MWJF CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

All per-cpu pagesets for a zone use the same high and batch values, that are duplicated there just for performance (locality) reasons. This patch adds the same variables also to struct zone as a shared copy.

This will be useful later for making possible to disable pcplists temporarily by setting high value to 0, while remembering the values for restoring them later. But we can also immediately benefit from not updating pagesets of all possible cpus in case the newly recalculated values (after sysctl change or memory online/offline) are actually unchanged from the previous ones.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111092812.11329-6-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador osalvador@suse.de Acked-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org (cherry picked from commit 952eaf815925f106eb6b68346b3458a68bb18ec1) Signed-off-by: Guilei Xie xieguilei@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- include/linux/mmzone.h | 6 ++++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/mmzone.h b/include/linux/mmzone.h index 82fceef88448..d73b1486ffb8 100644 --- a/include/linux/mmzone.h +++ b/include/linux/mmzone.h @@ -451,6 +451,12 @@ struct zone { #endif struct pglist_data *zone_pgdat; struct per_cpu_pageset __percpu *pageset; + /* + * the high and batch values are copied to individual pagesets for + * faster access + */ + int pageset_high; + int pageset_batch;

#ifndef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM /* diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index f14560e8b34c..20cdcd2b3280 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -6113,6 +6113,9 @@ static void build_zonelists(pg_data_t *pgdat) * Other parts of the kernel may not check if the zone is available. */ static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p); +/* These effectively disable the pcplists in the boot pageset completely */ +#define BOOT_PAGESET_HIGH 0 +#define BOOT_PAGESET_BATCH 1 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct per_cpu_pageset, boot_pageset); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct per_cpu_nodestat, boot_nodestats);

@@ -6603,8 +6606,8 @@ static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) * need to be as careful as pageset_update() as nobody can access the * pageset yet. */ - pcp->high = 0; - pcp->batch = 1; + pcp->high = BOOT_PAGESET_HIGH; + pcp->batch = BOOT_PAGESET_BATCH; }

/* @@ -6628,6 +6631,13 @@ static void zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(struct zone *zone) new_batch = max(1UL, 1 * new_batch); }

+ if (zone->pageset_high == new_high && + zone->pageset_batch == new_batch) + return; + + zone->pageset_high = new_high; + zone->pageset_batch = new_batch; + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { p = per_cpu_ptr(zone->pageset, cpu); pageset_update(&p->pcp, new_high, new_batch); @@ -6688,6 +6698,8 @@ static __meminit void zone_pcp_init(struct zone *zone) * offset of a (static) per cpu variable into the per cpu area. */ zone->pageset = &boot_pageset; + zone->pageset_high = BOOT_PAGESET_HIGH; + zone->pageset_batch = BOOT_PAGESET_BATCH;

if (populated_zone(zone)) printk(KERN_DEBUG " %s zone: %lu pages, LIFO batch:%u\n",

From: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz

mainline inclusion from mainline-5.11-rc1 commit ec6e8c7e03147c65380e6c04c4cf4290e96280b6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4MWJF CVE: NA

-------------------------------------------------

Memory offlining relies on page isolation to guarantee a forward progress because pages cannot be reused while they are isolated. But the page isolation itself doesn't prevent from races while freed pages are stored on pcp lists and thus can be reused. This can be worked around by repeated draining of pcplists, as done by commit 968318261221 ("mm/memory_hotplug: drain per-cpu pages again during memory offline").

David and Michal would prefer that this race was closed in a way that callers of page isolation who need stronger guarantees don't need to repeatedly drain. David suggested disabling pcplists usage completely during page isolation, instead of repeatedly draining them.

To achieve this without adding special cases in alloc/free fastpath, we can use the same approach as boot pagesets - when pcp->high is 0, any pcplist addition will be immediately flushed.

The race can thus be closed by setting pcp->high to 0 and draining pcplists once, before calling start_isolate_page_range(). The draining will serialize after processes that already disabled interrupts and read the old value of pcp->high in free_unref_page_commit(), and processes that have not yet disabled interrupts, will observe pcp->high == 0 when they are rescheduled, and skip pcplists. This guarantees no stray pages on pcplists in zones where isolation happens.

This patch thus adds zone_pcp_disable() and zone_pcp_enable() functions that page isolation users can call before start_isolate_page_range() and after unisolating (or offlining) the isolated pages.

Also, drain_all_pages() is optimized to only execute on cpus where pcplists are not empty. The check can however race with a free to pcplist that has not yet increased the pcp->count from 0 to 1. Thus make the drain optionally skip the racy check and drain on all cpus, and use this option in zone_pcp_disable().

As we have to avoid external updates to high and batch while pcplists are disabled, we take pcp_batch_high_lock in zone_pcp_disable() and release it in zone_pcp_enable(). This also synchronizes multiple users of zone_pcp_disable()/enable().

Currently the only user of this functionality is offline_pages().

[vbabka@suse.cz: add comment, per David] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/527480ef-ed72-e1c1-52a0-1c5b0113df45@suse.cz

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111092812.11329-8-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka vbabka@suse.cz Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Suggested-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador osalvador@suse.de Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Acked-by: Michal Hocko mhocko@suse.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org (cherry picked from commit ec6e8c7e03147c65380e6c04c4cf4290e96280b6) Signed-off-by: Guilei Xie xieguilei@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- mm/internal.h | 2 ++ mm/memory_hotplug.c | 28 ++++++++--------- mm/page_alloc.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- mm/page_isolation.c | 6 ++-- 4 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index 9451ba9bbcf3..db9546707695 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ extern int user_min_free_kbytes;

extern void zone_pcp_update(struct zone *zone); extern void zone_pcp_reset(struct zone *zone); +extern void zone_pcp_disable(struct zone *zone); +extern void zone_pcp_enable(struct zone *zone);

#if defined CONFIG_COMPACTION || defined CONFIG_CMA

diff --git a/mm/memory_hotplug.c b/mm/memory_hotplug.c index fcc50f6fdb46..1549b19b36f6 100644 --- a/mm/memory_hotplug.c +++ b/mm/memory_hotplug.c @@ -1385,17 +1385,21 @@ int __ref offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages) } node = zone_to_nid(zone);

+ /* + * Disable pcplists so that page isolation cannot race with freeing + * in a way that pages from isolated pageblock are left on pcplists. + */ + zone_pcp_disable(zone); + /* set above range as isolated */ ret = start_isolate_page_range(start_pfn, end_pfn, MIGRATE_MOVABLE, MEMORY_OFFLINE | REPORT_FAILURE); if (ret) { reason = "failure to isolate range"; - goto failed_removal; + goto failed_removal_pcplists_disabled; }

- drain_all_pages(zone); - arg.start_pfn = start_pfn; arg.nr_pages = nr_pages; node_states_check_changes_offline(nr_pages, zone, &arg); @@ -1445,20 +1449,8 @@ int __ref offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages) goto failed_removal_isolated; }

- /* - * per-cpu pages are drained after start_isolate_page_range, but - * if there are still pages that are not free, make sure that we - * drain again, because when we isolated range we might have - * raced with another thread that was adding pages to pcp list. - * - * Forward progress should be still guaranteed because - * pages on the pcp list can only belong to MOVABLE_ZONE - * because has_unmovable_pages explicitly checks for - * PageBuddy on freed pages on other zones. - */ ret = test_pages_isolated(start_pfn, end_pfn, MEMORY_OFFLINE); - if (ret) - drain_all_pages(zone); + } while (ret);

/* Mark all sections offline and remove free pages from the buddy. */ @@ -1474,6 +1466,8 @@ int __ref offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages) zone->nr_isolate_pageblock -= nr_pages / pageblock_nr_pages; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zone->lock, flags);

+ zone_pcp_enable(zone); + /* removal success */ adjust_managed_page_count(pfn_to_page(start_pfn), -nr_pages); zone->present_pages -= nr_pages; @@ -1507,6 +1501,8 @@ int __ref offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long nr_pages) failed_removal_isolated: undo_isolate_page_range(start_pfn, end_pfn, MIGRATE_MOVABLE); memory_notify(MEM_CANCEL_OFFLINE, &arg); +failed_removal_pcplists_disabled: + zone_pcp_enable(zone); failed_removal: pr_debug("memory offlining [mem %#010llx-%#010llx] failed due to %s\n", (unsigned long long) start_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index da0663435f0a..43fe0c8e592e 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -3024,13 +3024,16 @@ static void drain_local_pages_wq(struct work_struct *work) }

/* - * Spill all the per-cpu pages from all CPUs back into the buddy allocator. - * - * When zone parameter is non-NULL, spill just the single zone's pages. + * The implementation of drain_all_pages(), exposing an extra parameter to + * drain on all cpus. * - * Note that this can be extremely slow as the draining happens in a workqueue. + * drain_all_pages() is optimized to only execute on cpus where pcplists are + * not empty. The check for non-emptiness can however race with a free to + * pcplist that has not yet increased the pcp->count from 0 to 1. Callers + * that need the guarantee that every CPU has drained can disable the + * optimizing racy check. */ -void drain_all_pages(struct zone *zone) +void __drain_all_pages(struct zone *zone, bool force_all_cpus) { int cpu;

@@ -3069,7 +3072,13 @@ void drain_all_pages(struct zone *zone) struct zone *z; bool has_pcps = false;

- if (zone) { + if (force_all_cpus) { + /* + * The pcp.count check is racy, some callers need a + * guarantee that no cpu is missed. + */ + has_pcps = true; + } else if (zone) { pcp = per_cpu_ptr(zone->pageset, cpu); if (pcp->pcp.count) has_pcps = true; @@ -3102,6 +3111,18 @@ void drain_all_pages(struct zone *zone) mutex_unlock(&pcpu_drain_mutex); }

+/* + * Spill all the per-cpu pages from all CPUs back into the buddy allocator. + * + * When zone parameter is non-NULL, spill just the single zone's pages. + * + * Note that this can be extremely slow as the draining happens in a workqueue. + */ +void drain_all_pages(struct zone *zone) +{ + __drain_all_pages(zone, false); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_HIBERNATION

/* @@ -6610,6 +6631,18 @@ static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) pcp->batch = BOOT_PAGESET_BATCH; }

+void __zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(struct zone *zone, unsigned long high, + unsigned long batch) +{ + struct per_cpu_pageset *p; + int cpu; + + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { + p = per_cpu_ptr(zone->pageset, cpu); + pageset_update(&p->pcp, high, batch); + } +} + /* * Calculate and set new high and batch values for all per-cpu pagesets of a * zone, based on the zone's size and the percpu_pagelist_fraction sysctl. @@ -6617,8 +6650,6 @@ static void pageset_init(struct per_cpu_pageset *p) static void zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(struct zone *zone) { unsigned long new_high, new_batch; - struct per_cpu_pageset *p; - int cpu;

if (percpu_pagelist_fraction) { new_high = zone_managed_pages(zone) / percpu_pagelist_fraction; @@ -6638,10 +6669,7 @@ static void zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(struct zone *zone) zone->pageset_high = new_high; zone->pageset_batch = new_batch;

- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { - p = per_cpu_ptr(zone->pageset, cpu); - pageset_update(&p->pcp, new_high, new_batch); - } + __zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(zone, new_high, new_batch); }

void __meminit setup_zone_pageset(struct zone *zone) @@ -8953,6 +8981,27 @@ void __meminit zone_pcp_update(struct zone *zone) mutex_unlock(&pcp_batch_high_lock); }

+/* + * Effectively disable pcplists for the zone by setting the high limit to 0 + * and draining all cpus. A concurrent page freeing on another CPU that's about + * to put the page on pcplist will either finish before the drain and the page + * will be drained, or observe the new high limit and skip the pcplist. + * + * Must be paired with a call to zone_pcp_enable(). + */ +void zone_pcp_disable(struct zone *zone) +{ + mutex_lock(&pcp_batch_high_lock); + __zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(zone, 0, 1); + __drain_all_pages(zone, true); +} + +void zone_pcp_enable(struct zone *zone) +{ + __zone_set_pageset_high_and_batch(zone, zone->pageset_high, zone->pageset_batch); + mutex_unlock(&pcp_batch_high_lock); +} + void zone_pcp_reset(struct zone *zone) { unsigned long flags; diff --git a/mm/page_isolation.c b/mm/page_isolation.c index 46005c960ffa..bddf788f45bf 100644 --- a/mm/page_isolation.c +++ b/mm/page_isolation.c @@ -174,9 +174,9 @@ __first_valid_page(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long nr_pages) * A call to drain_all_pages() after isolation can flush most of them. However * in some cases pages might still end up on pcp lists and that would allow * for their allocation even when they are in fact isolated already. Depending - * on how strong of a guarantee the caller needs, further drain_all_pages() - * might be needed (e.g. __offline_pages will need to call it after check for - * isolated range for a next retry). + * on how strong of a guarantee the caller needs, zone_pcp_disable/enable() + * might be used to flush and disable pcplist before isolation and enable after + * unisolation. * * Return: 0 on success and -EBUSY if any part of range cannot be isolated. */

From: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com

euleros inclusion category: feature feature: Memory debug feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4MTG7

-------------------------------------------------

When pagealloc debug is enabled, block mappings or contiguous hints are no longer used for linear address area. Therefore, support setting page attributes in this case is useful for debugging memory corruption problems.

Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye yeyunfeng@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang yangyingliang@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Chao Liu liuchao173@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai zhengzengkai@huawei.com --- arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c index 1b94f5b82654..0bc12dbf2843 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/pageattr.c @@ -81,8 +81,16 @@ static int change_memory_common(unsigned long addr, int numpages, area = find_vm_area((void *)addr); if (!area || end > (unsigned long)area->addr + area->size || - !(area->flags & VM_ALLOC)) + !(area->flags & VM_ALLOC)) { + /* + * When pagealloc debug is enabled, the linear address is + * mapped with NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS and NO_CONT_MAPPINGS flags. + */ + if (numpages && debug_pagealloc_enabled()) + return __change_memory_common(start, size, + set_mask, clear_mask); return -EINVAL; + }

if (!numpages) return 0;