Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered. can: bcm: Clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry().
net/can/bcm.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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From: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc7 commit 76fe372ccb81b0c89b6cd2fec26e2f38c958be85 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWDZ CVE: CVE-2024-46771
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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syzkaller reported a warning in bcm_connect() below. [0]
The repro calls connect() to vxcan1, removes vxcan1, and calls connect() with ifindex == 0.
Calling connect() for a BCM socket allocates a proc entry. Then, bcm_sk(sk)->bound is set to 1 to prevent further connect().
However, removing the bound device resets bcm_sk(sk)->bound to 0 in bcm_notify().
The 2nd connect() tries to allocate a proc entry with the same name and sets NULL to bcm_sk(sk)->bcm_proc_read, leaking the original proc entry.
Since the proc entry is available only for connect()ed sockets, let's clean up the entry when the bound netdev is unregistered.
[0]: proc_dir_entry 'can-bcm/2456' already registered WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 394 at fs/proc/generic.c:376 proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 394 Comm: syz-executor403 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc7-g852e42cc2dd4 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:proc_register+0x645/0x8f0 fs/proc/generic.c:375 Code: 00 00 00 00 00 48 85 ed 0f 85 97 02 00 00 4d 85 f6 0f 85 9f 02 00 00 48 c7 c7 9b cb cf 87 48 89 de 4c 89 fa e8 1c 6f eb fe 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 c7 c7 98 37 99 89 e8 cb 7e 22 05 bb 00 00 00 10 48 RSP: 0018:ffa0000000cd7c30 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 9e129be1950f0200 RBX: ff1100011b51582c RCX: ff1100011857cd80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffd400000000000f R09: ff1100013e78cac0 R10: ffac800000cd7980 R11: ff1100013e12b1f0 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ff1100011a99a2ec FS: 00007fbd7086f740(0000) GS:ff1100013fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200071c0 CR3: 0000000118556004 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> proc_create_net_single+0x144/0x210 fs/proc/proc_net.c:220 bcm_connect+0x472/0x840 net/can/bcm.c:1673 __sys_connect_file net/socket.c:2049 [inline] __sys_connect+0x5d2/0x690 net/socket.c:2066 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2076 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2073 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x8f/0x100 net/socket.c:2073 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7fbd708b0e5d Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 73 9f 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff8cd33f08 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fbd708b0e5d RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 0000000000000040 R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8cd34098 R13: 0000000000401280 R14: 0000000000406de8 R15: 00007fbd70ab9000 </TASK> remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'net/can-bcm', leaking at least '2456'
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: syzkaller syzkaller@googlegroups.com Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com Reviewed-by: Simon Horman horms@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240722192842.37421-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong zhangchangzhong@huawei.com --- net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index 2388c61..b2b1bd6 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1423,6 +1423,10 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg,
/* remove device reference, if this is our bound device */ if (bo->bound && bo->ifindex == dev->ifindex) { +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_FS) + if (sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) + remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir); +#endif bo->bound = 0; bo->ifindex = 0; notify_enodev = 1;
From: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com
mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc1 commit 94b0818fa63555a65f6ba107080659ea6bcca63e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IARWDZ CVE: CVE-2024-46771
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i...
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syzbot reported a warning in bcm_release(). [0]
The blamed change fixed another warning that is triggered when connect() is issued again for a socket whose connect()ed device has been unregistered.
However, if the socket is just close()d without the 2nd connect(), the remaining bo->bcm_proc_read triggers unnecessary remove_proc_entry() in bcm_release().
Let's clear bo->bcm_proc_read after remove_proc_entry() in bcm_notify().
[0] name '4986' WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5234 at fs/proc/generic.c:711 remove_proc_entry+0x2e7/0x5d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5234 Comm: syz-executor606 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc5-syzkaller-00178-g5517ae241919 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x2e7/0x5d0 fs/proc/generic.c:711 Code: ff eb 05 e8 cb 1e 5e ff 48 8b 5c 24 10 48 c7 c7 e0 f7 aa 8e e8 2a 38 8e 09 90 48 c7 c7 60 3a 1b 8c 48 89 de e8 da 42 20 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 48 8b 44 24 18 48 c7 44 24 40 0e 36 e0 45 49 c7 04 07 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000345fa20 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 2a2d0aee2eb64600 RBX: ffff888032f1f548 RCX: ffff888029431e00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000345fb08 R08: ffffffff8155b2f2 R09: 1ffff1101710519a R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed101710519b R12: ffff888011d38640 R13: 0000000000000004 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b8800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fcfb52722f0 CR3: 000000000e734000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> bcm_release+0x250/0x880 net/can/bcm.c:1578 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0xbc/0x240 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:228 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:882 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1031 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1042 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1040 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1040 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fcfb51ee969 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7fcfb51ee93f. RSP: 002b:00007ffce0109ca8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fcfb51ee969 RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: 00007fcfb526f3b0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000555500000000 R10: 0000555500000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fcfb526f3b0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcfb5271ee0 R15: 00007fcfb51bf160 </TASK>
Fixes: 76fe372ccb81 ("can: bcm: Remove proc entry when dev is unregistered.") Reported-by: syzbot+0532ac7a06fb1a03187e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0532ac7a06fb1a03187e Tested-by: syzbot+0532ac7a06fb1a03187e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima kuniyu@amazon.com Reviewed-by: Vincent Mailhol mailhol.vincent@wanadoo.fr Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240905012237.79683-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde mkl@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong zhangchangzhong@huawei.com --- net/can/bcm.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index b2b1bd6..cb849b5a 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1424,8 +1424,10 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg, /* remove device reference, if this is our bound device */ if (bo->bound && bo->ifindex == dev->ifindex) { #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_FS) - if (sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) + if (sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) { remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir); + bo->bcm_proc_read = NULL; + } #endif bo->bound = 0; bo->ifindex = 0;
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