From: Luke Nelson lukenels@cs.washington.edu
commit 4178417cc5359c329790a4a8f4a6604612338cca upstream.
This patch fixes an incorrect check in how immediate memory offsets are computed for BPF_DW on arm.
For BPF_LDX/ST/STX + BPF_DW, the 32-bit arm JIT breaks down an 8-byte access into two separate 4-byte accesses using off+0 and off+4. If off fits in imm12, the JIT emits a ldr/str instruction with the immediate and avoids the use of a temporary register. While the current check off <= 0xfff ensures that the first immediate off+0 doesn't overflow imm12, it's not sufficient for the second immediate off+4, which may cause the second access of BPF_DW to read/write the wrong address.
This patch fixes the problem by changing the check to off <= 0xfff - 4 for BPF_DW, ensuring off+4 will never overflow.
A side effect of simplifying the check is that it now allows using negative immediate offsets in ldr/str. This means that small negative offsets can also avoid the use of a temporary register.
This patch introduces no new failures in test_verifier or test_bpf.c.
Fixes: c5eae692571d6 ("ARM: net: bpf: improve 64-bit store implementation") Fixes: ec19e02b343db ("ARM: net: bpf: fix LDX instructions") Co-developed-by: Xi Wang xi.wang@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Xi Wang xi.wang@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Luke Nelson luke.r.nels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200409221752.28448-1-luke.r.nels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c index 25b3ee8..d06293a 100644 --- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c +++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c @@ -993,21 +993,35 @@ static inline void emit_a32_mul_r64(const s8 dst[], const s8 src[], arm_bpf_put_reg32(dst_hi, rd[0], ctx); }
+static bool is_ldst_imm(s16 off, const u8 size) +{ + s16 off_max = 0; + + switch (size) { + case BPF_B: + case BPF_W: + off_max = 0xfff; + break; + case BPF_H: + off_max = 0xff; + break; + case BPF_DW: + /* Need to make sure off+4 does not overflow. */ + off_max = 0xfff - 4; + break; + } + return -off_max <= off && off <= off_max; +} + /* *(size *)(dst + off) = src */ static inline void emit_str_r(const s8 dst, const s8 src[], - s32 off, struct jit_ctx *ctx, const u8 sz){ + s16 off, struct jit_ctx *ctx, const u8 sz){ const s8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1]; - s32 off_max; s8 rd;
rd = arm_bpf_get_reg32(dst, tmp[1], ctx);
- if (sz == BPF_H) - off_max = 0xff; - else - off_max = 0xfff; - - if (off < 0 || off > off_max) { + if (!is_ldst_imm(off, sz)) { emit_a32_mov_i(tmp[0], off, ctx); emit(ARM_ADD_R(tmp[0], tmp[0], rd), ctx); rd = tmp[0]; @@ -1036,18 +1050,12 @@ static inline void emit_str_r(const s8 dst, const s8 src[],
/* dst = *(size*)(src + off) */ static inline void emit_ldx_r(const s8 dst[], const s8 src, - s32 off, struct jit_ctx *ctx, const u8 sz){ + s16 off, struct jit_ctx *ctx, const u8 sz){ const s8 *tmp = bpf2a32[TMP_REG_1]; const s8 *rd = is_stacked(dst_lo) ? tmp : dst; s8 rm = src; - s32 off_max; - - if (sz == BPF_H) - off_max = 0xff; - else - off_max = 0xfff;
- if (off < 0 || off > off_max) { + if (!is_ldst_imm(off, sz)) { emit_a32_mov_i(tmp[0], off, ctx); emit(ARM_ADD_R(tmp[0], tmp[0], src), ctx); rm = tmp[0];
From: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com
commit b401efc120a399dfda1f4d2858a4de365c9b08ef upstream.
If a switch jump table's indirect branch is in a ".cold" subfunction in .text.unlikely, objtool doesn't detect it, and instead prints a false warning:
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-ioctl.o: warning: objtool: v4l_print_format.cold()+0xd6: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame drivers/hwmon/max6650.o: warning: objtool: max6650_probe.cold()+0xa5: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame drivers/media/dvb-frontends/drxk_hard.o: warning: objtool: init_drxk.cold()+0x16f: sibling call from callable instruction with modified stack frame
Fix it by comparing the function, instead of the section and offset.
Fixes: 13810435b9a7 ("objtool: Support GCC 8's cold subfunctions") Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de Reviewed-by: Miroslav Benes mbenes@suse.cz Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/157c35d42ca9b6354bbb1604fe9ad7d1153ccb21.158576102... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- tools/objtool/check.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c index ecf5fc77..9479c74 100644 --- a/tools/objtool/check.c +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c @@ -938,10 +938,7 @@ static struct rela *find_switch_table(struct objtool_file *file, * it. */ for (; - &insn->list != &file->insn_list && - insn->sec == func->sec && - insn->offset >= func->offset; - + &insn->list != &file->insn_list && insn->func && insn->func->pfunc == func; insn = insn->first_jump_src ?: list_prev_entry(insn, list)) {
if (insn != orig_insn && insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC)
From: Roman Gushchin guro@fb.com
commit d87f639258a6a5980183f11876c884931ad93da2 upstream.
Since commit a8ac900b8163 ("ext4: use non-movable memory for the superblock") buffers for ext4 superblock were allocated using the sb_bread_unmovable() helper which allocated buffer heads out of non-movable memory blocks. It was necessarily to not block page migrations and do not cause cma allocation failures.
However commit 85c8f176a611 ("ext4: preload block group descriptors") broke this by introducing pre-reading of the ext4 superblock. The problem is that __breadahead() is using __getblk() underneath, which allocates buffer heads out of movable memory.
It resulted in page migration failures I've seen on a machine with an ext4 partition and a preallocated cma area.
Fix this by introducing sb_breadahead_unmovable() and __breadahead_gfp() helpers which use non-movable memory for buffer head allocations and use them for the ext4 superblock readahead.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger adilger@dilger.ca Fixes: 85c8f176a611 ("ext4: preload block group descriptors") Signed-off-by: Roman Gushchin guro@fb.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200229001411.128010-1-guro@fb.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/buffer.c | 11 +++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/super.c | 2 +- include/linux/buffer_head.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/buffer.c b/fs/buffer.c index 5aa491d..cd8371a 100644 --- a/fs/buffer.c +++ b/fs/buffer.c @@ -1336,6 +1336,17 @@ void __breadahead(struct block_device *bdev, sector_t block, unsigned size) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__breadahead);
+void __breadahead_gfp(struct block_device *bdev, sector_t block, unsigned size, + gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct buffer_head *bh = __getblk_gfp(bdev, block, size, gfp); + if (likely(bh)) { + ll_rw_block(REQ_OP_READ, REQ_RAHEAD, 1, &bh); + brelse(bh); + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__breadahead_gfp); + /** * __bread_gfp() - reads a specified block and returns the bh * @bdev: the block_device to read from diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 0f076c6..b792dc9 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4692,7 +4692,7 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct inode *inode, if (end > table) end = table; while (b <= end) - sb_breadahead(sb, b++); + sb_breadahead_unmovable(sb, b++); }
/* diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index b92a0e2..7e3bbc1 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -4216,7 +4216,7 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) /* Pre-read the descriptors into the buffer cache */ for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) { block = descriptor_loc(sb, logical_sb_block, i); - sb_breadahead(sb, block); + sb_breadahead_unmovable(sb, block); }
for (i = 0; i < db_count; i++) { diff --git a/include/linux/buffer_head.h b/include/linux/buffer_head.h index 96225a7..9168fc3 100644 --- a/include/linux/buffer_head.h +++ b/include/linux/buffer_head.h @@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ struct buffer_head *__getblk_gfp(struct block_device *bdev, sector_t block, void __brelse(struct buffer_head *); void __bforget(struct buffer_head *); void __breadahead(struct block_device *, sector_t block, unsigned int size); +void __breadahead_gfp(struct block_device *, sector_t block, unsigned int size, + gfp_t gfp); struct buffer_head *__bread_gfp(struct block_device *, sector_t block, unsigned size, gfp_t gfp); void invalidate_bh_lrus(void); @@ -319,6 +321,12 @@ static inline void bforget(struct buffer_head *bh) __breadahead(sb->s_bdev, block, sb->s_blocksize); }
+static inline void +sb_breadahead_unmovable(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block) +{ + __breadahead_gfp(sb->s_bdev, block, sb->s_blocksize, 0); +} + static inline struct buffer_head * sb_getblk(struct super_block *sb, sector_t block) {
From: Michael Walle michael@walle.cc
commit ea104a9e4d3e9ebc26fb78dac35585b142ee288b upstream.
The restart handler is missing two things, first, the registers has to be unlocked and second there is no synchronization for the write_relaxed() calls.
This was tested on a custom board with the NXP LS1028A SoC.
Fixes: 6c5c0d48b686c ("watchdog: sp805: add restart handler") Signed-off-by: Michael Walle michael@walle.cc Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200327162450.28506-1-michael@walle.cc Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck linux@roeck-us.net Signed-off-by: Wim Van Sebroeck wim@linux-watchdog.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c index 072986d..d8876fb 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/sp805_wdt.c @@ -137,10 +137,14 @@ static unsigned int wdt_timeleft(struct watchdog_device *wdd) { struct sp805_wdt *wdt = watchdog_get_drvdata(wdd);
+ writel_relaxed(UNLOCK, wdt->base + WDTLOCK); writel_relaxed(0, wdt->base + WDTCONTROL); writel_relaxed(0, wdt->base + WDTLOAD); writel_relaxed(INT_ENABLE | RESET_ENABLE, wdt->base + WDTCONTROL);
+ /* Flush posted writes. */ + readl_relaxed(wdt->base + WDTLOCK); + return 0; }
From: Luke Nelson lukenels@cs.washington.edu
commit bb9562cf5c67813034c96afb50bd21130a504441 upstream.
The current arm BPF JIT does not correctly compile RSH or ARSH when the immediate shift amount is 0. This causes the "rsh64 by 0 imm" and "arsh64 by 0 imm" BPF selftests to hang the kernel by reaching an instruction the verifier determines to be unreachable.
The root cause is in how immediate right shifts are encoded on arm. For LSR and ASR (logical and arithmetic right shift), a bit-pattern of 00000 in the immediate encodes a shift amount of 32. When the BPF immediate is 0, the generated code shifts by 32 instead of the expected behavior (a no-op).
This patch fixes the bugs by adding an additional check if the BPF immediate is 0. After the change, the above mentioned BPF selftests pass.
Fixes: 39c13c204bb11 ("arm: eBPF JIT compiler") Co-developed-by: Xi Wang xi.wang@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Xi Wang xi.wang@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Luke Nelson luke.r.nels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200408181229.10909-1-luke.r.nels@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c index d06293a..328ced7 100644 --- a/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c +++ b/arch/arm/net/bpf_jit_32.c @@ -930,7 +930,11 @@ static inline void emit_a32_rsh_i64(const s8 dst[], rd = arm_bpf_get_reg64(dst, tmp, ctx);
/* Do LSR operation */ - if (val < 32) { + if (val == 0) { + /* An immediate value of 0 encodes a shift amount of 32 + * for LSR. To shift by 0, don't do anything. + */ + } else if (val < 32) { emit(ARM_MOV_SI(tmp2[1], rd[1], SRTYPE_LSR, val), ctx); emit(ARM_ORR_SI(rd[1], tmp2[1], rd[0], SRTYPE_ASL, 32 - val), ctx); emit(ARM_MOV_SI(rd[0], rd[0], SRTYPE_LSR, val), ctx); @@ -956,7 +960,11 @@ static inline void emit_a32_arsh_i64(const s8 dst[], rd = arm_bpf_get_reg64(dst, tmp, ctx);
/* Do ARSH operation */ - if (val < 32) { + if (val == 0) { + /* An immediate value of 0 encodes a shift amount of 32 + * for ASR. To shift by 0, don't do anything. + */ + } else if (val < 32) { emit(ARM_MOV_SI(tmp2[1], rd[1], SRTYPE_LSR, val), ctx); emit(ARM_ORR_SI(rd[1], tmp2[1], rd[0], SRTYPE_ASL, 32 - val), ctx); emit(ARM_MOV_SI(rd[0], rd[0], SRTYPE_ASR, val), ctx);
From: Martin Fuzzey martin.fuzzey@flowbird.group
commit 4141f1a40fc0789f6fd4330e171e1edf155426aa upstream.
In order to wake from suspend by ethernet magic packets the GPC must be used as intc does not have wakeup functionality.
But the FEC DT node currently uses interrupt-extended, specificying intc, thus breaking WoL.
This problem is probably fallout from the stacked domain conversion as intc used to chain to GPC.
So replace "interrupts-extended" by "interrupts" to use the default parent which is GPC.
Fixes: b923ff6af0d5 ("ARM: imx6: convert GPC to stacked domains")
Signed-off-by: Martin Fuzzey martin.fuzzey@flowbird.group Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi | 5 ++--- arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi | 1 - 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi index 00d44a6..e64ff80 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl.dtsi @@ -1013,9 +1013,8 @@ compatible = "fsl,imx6q-fec"; reg = <0x02188000 0x4000>; interrupt-names = "int0", "pps"; - interrupts-extended = - <&intc 0 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, - <&intc 0 119 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; + interrupts = <0 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, + <0 119 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; clocks = <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_ENET>, <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_ENET>, <&clks IMX6QDL_CLK_ENET_REF>; diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi index 5f51f8e..d91f92f 100644 --- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi +++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qp.dtsi @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ };
&fec { - /delete-property/interrupts-extended; interrupts = <0 118 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>, <0 119 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; };
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org
commit d9583cdf2f38d0f526d9a8c8564dd2e35e649bc7 upstream.
EINVAL should be used for malformed netlink messages. New userspace utility and old kernels might easily result in EINVAL when exercising new set features, which is misleading.
Fixes: 8aeff920dcc9 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add stateful object reference to set elements") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 5881f66..1b8a530 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -3450,7 +3450,7 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NFT_SET_INTERVAL | NFT_SET_TIMEOUT | NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_EVAL | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) - return -EINVAL; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; /* Only one of these operations is supported */ if ((flags & (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) == (NFT_SET_MAP | NFT_SET_OBJECT)) @@ -3488,7 +3488,7 @@ static int nf_tables_newset(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, objtype = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_OBJ_TYPE])); if (objtype == NFT_OBJECT_UNSPEC || objtype > NFT_OBJECT_MAX) - return -EINVAL; + return -EOPNOTSUPP; } else if (flags & NFT_SET_OBJECT) return -EINVAL; else
From: Zenghui Yu yuzenghui@huawei.com
commit edfc23f6f9fdbd7825d50ac1f380243cde19b679 upstream.
Using irq_domain_free_irqs_common() on the irqdomain free path will leave the MSI descriptor unfreed when platform devices get removed. Properly free it by MSI domain free function.
Fixes: 9650c60ebfec0 ("irqchip/mbigen: Create irq domain for each mbigen device") Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu yuzenghui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier maz@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200408114352.1604-1-yuzenghui@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c index 4ecffa1..7ea3265 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-mbigen.c @@ -231,10 +231,16 @@ static int mbigen_irq_domain_alloc(struct irq_domain *domain, return 0; }
+static void mbigen_irq_domain_free(struct irq_domain *domain, unsigned int virq, + unsigned int nr_irqs) +{ + platform_msi_domain_free(domain, virq, nr_irqs); +} + static const struct irq_domain_ops mbigen_domain_ops = { .translate = mbigen_domain_translate, .alloc = mbigen_irq_domain_alloc, - .free = irq_domain_free_irqs_common, + .free = mbigen_irq_domain_free, };
static int mbigen_of_create_domain(struct platform_device *pdev,
From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de
commit 25faa4bd37c10f19e4b848b9032a17a3d44c6f09 upstream.
At the error path of the firmware loading error, the driver tries to release the card object and set NULL to drvdata. This may be referred badly at the possible PM action, as the driver itself is still bound and the PM callbacks read the card object.
Instead, we continue the probing as if it were no option set. This is often a better choice than the forced abort, too.
Fixes: 5cb543dba986 ("ALSA: hda - Deferred probing with request_firmware_nowait()") BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207043 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200413082034.25166-2-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c | 19 +++++-------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c index a2eeb08..54a9b39 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_intel.c @@ -2076,24 +2076,15 @@ static void azx_firmware_cb(const struct firmware *fw, void *context) { struct snd_card *card = context; struct azx *chip = card->private_data; - struct pci_dev *pci = chip->pci; - - if (!fw) { - dev_err(card->dev, "Cannot load firmware, aborting\n"); - goto error; - }
- chip->fw = fw; + if (fw) + chip->fw = fw; + else + dev_err(card->dev, "Cannot load firmware, continue without patching\n"); if (!chip->disabled) { /* continue probing */ - if (azx_probe_continue(chip)) - goto error; + azx_probe_continue(chip); } - return; /* OK */ - - error: - snd_card_free(card); - pci_set_drvdata(pci, NULL); } #endif
From: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com
commit b3fb36ed694b05738d45218ea72cf7feb10ce2b1 upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 1 of 5.
of_unittest_changeset() reaches deeply into the dynamic devicetree functions. Several nodes were left with an elevated reference count and thus were not properly cleaned up. Fix the reference counts so that the memory will be freed.
Fixes: 201c910bd689 ("of: Transactional DT support.") Reported-by: Erhard F. erhard_f@mailbox.org Signed-off-by: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/of/unittest.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/of/unittest.c b/drivers/of/unittest.c index 808571f..704dafa 100644 --- a/drivers/of/unittest.c +++ b/drivers/of/unittest.c @@ -772,6 +772,10 @@ static void __init of_unittest_changeset(void) unittest(!of_changeset_revert(&chgset), "revert failed\n");
of_changeset_destroy(&chgset); + + of_node_put(n1); + of_node_put(n2); + of_node_put(n21); #endif }
From: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com
commit 216830d2413cc61be3f76bc02ffd905e47d2439e upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 2 of 5.
of_unittest_platform_populate() left an elevated reference count for grandchild nodes (which are platform devices). Fix the platform device reference counts so that the memory will be freed.
Fixes: fb2caa50fbac ("of/selftest: add testcase for nodes with same name and address") Reported-by: Erhard F. erhard_f@mailbox.org Signed-off-by: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/of/unittest.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/of/unittest.c b/drivers/of/unittest.c index 704dafa..bcb5be0 100644 --- a/drivers/of/unittest.c +++ b/drivers/of/unittest.c @@ -1059,10 +1059,13 @@ static void __init of_unittest_platform_populate(void)
of_platform_populate(np, match, NULL, &test_bus->dev); for_each_child_of_node(np, child) { - for_each_child_of_node(child, grandchild) - unittest(of_find_device_by_node(grandchild), + for_each_child_of_node(child, grandchild) { + pdev = of_find_device_by_node(grandchild); + unittest(pdev, "Could not create device for node '%pOFn'\n", grandchild); + of_dev_put(pdev); + } }
of_platform_depopulate(&test_bus->dev);
From: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com
commit 145fc138f9aae4f9e1331352e301df28e16aed35 upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 3 of 5.
of_unittest_overlay_high_level() failed to kfree the newly created property when the property named 'name' is skipped.
Fixes: 39a751a4cb7e ("of: change overlay apply input data from unflattened to FDT") Reported-by: Erhard F. erhard_f@mailbox.org Signed-off-by: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/of/unittest.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/of/unittest.c b/drivers/of/unittest.c index bcb5be0..29f17c3 100644 --- a/drivers/of/unittest.c +++ b/drivers/of/unittest.c @@ -2448,8 +2448,11 @@ static __init void of_unittest_overlay_high_level(void) goto err_unlock; } if (__of_add_property(of_symbols, new_prop)) { + kfree(new_prop->name); + kfree(new_prop->value); + kfree(new_prop); /* "name" auto-generated by unflatten */ - if (!strcmp(new_prop->name, "name")) + if (!strcmp(prop->name, "name")) continue; unittest(0, "duplicate property '%s' in overlay_base node __symbols__", prop->name);
From: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com
commit 478ff649b1c8eb2409b1a54fb75eb46f7c29f140 upstream.
kmemleak reports several memory leaks from devicetree unittest. This is the fix for problem 4 of 5.
target_path was not freed in the non-error path.
Fixes: e0a58f3e08d4 ("of: overlay: remove a dependency on device node full_name") Reported-by: Erhard F. erhard_f@mailbox.org Signed-off-by: Frank Rowand frank.rowand@sony.com Signed-off-by: Rob Herring robh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/of/overlay.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/of/overlay.c b/drivers/of/overlay.c index 514528b..a77bfea 100644 --- a/drivers/of/overlay.c +++ b/drivers/of/overlay.c @@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ static struct property *dup_and_fixup_symbol_prop(
of_property_set_flag(new_prop, OF_DYNAMIC);
+ kfree(target_path); + return new_prop;
err_free_new_prop:
From: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
commit a11589563e96bf262767294b89b25a9d44e7303b upstream.
We want to notify Hyper-V when a Linux guest VM crash occurs, so there is a record of the crash even when kdump is enabled. But crash_kexec_post_notifiers defaults to "false", so the kdump kernel runs before the notifiers and Hyper-V never gets notified. Fix this by always setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to be true for Hyper-V VMs.
Fixes: 81b18bce48af ("Drivers: HV: Send one page worth of kmsg dump over Hyper-V during panic") Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley mikelley@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406155331.2105-5-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c index 9266382..e808b7e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c @@ -250,6 +250,16 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void) cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES); }
+ /* + * Hyper-V expects to get crash register data or kmsg when + * crash enlightment is available and system crashes. Set + * crash_kexec_post_notifiers to be true to make sure that + * calling crash enlightment interface before running kdump + * kernel. + */ + if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE) + crash_kexec_post_notifiers = true; + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_X64_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS && ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_FREQUENCY_MSRS_AVAILABLE) {
From: "ndesaulniers@google.com" ndesaulniers@google.com
commit 1ad3935b39da78a403e7df7a3813f866c731bc64 upstream.
Clang warns: vector initializers are not compatible with NEON intrinsics in big endian mode [-Wnonportable-vector-initialization]
While this is usually the case, it's not an issue for this case since we're initializing the uint8x16_t (16x uint8_t's) with the same value.
Instead, use vdupq_n_u8 which both compilers lower into a single movi instruction: https://godbolt.org/z/vBrgzt
This avoids the static storage for a constant value.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/214 Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor natechancellor@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers ndesaulniers@google.com Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas catalin.marinas@arm.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- lib/raid6/neon.uc | 5 ++--- lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c | 7 ++----- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/raid6/neon.uc b/lib/raid6/neon.uc index d5242f5..b7c6803 100644 --- a/lib/raid6/neon.uc +++ b/lib/raid6/neon.uc @@ -28,7 +28,6 @@
typedef uint8x16_t unative_t;
-#define NBYTES(x) ((unative_t){x,x,x,x, x,x,x,x, x,x,x,x, x,x,x,x}) #define NSIZE sizeof(unative_t)
/* @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ void raid6_neon$#_gen_syndrome_real(int disks, unsigned long bytes, void **ptrs) int d, z, z0;
register unative_t wd$$, wq$$, wp$$, w1$$, w2$$; - const unative_t x1d = NBYTES(0x1d); + const unative_t x1d = vdupq_n_u8(0x1d);
z0 = disks - 3; /* Highest data disk */ p = dptr[z0+1]; /* XOR parity */ @@ -92,7 +91,7 @@ void raid6_neon$#_xor_syndrome_real(int disks, int start, int stop, int d, z, z0;
register unative_t wd$$, wq$$, wp$$, w1$$, w2$$; - const unative_t x1d = NBYTES(0x1d); + const unative_t x1d = vdupq_n_u8(0x1d);
z0 = stop; /* P/Q right side optimization */ p = dptr[disks-2]; /* XOR parity */ diff --git a/lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c b/lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c index 8cd20c9..7d00c31 100644 --- a/lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c +++ b/lib/raid6/recov_neon_inner.c @@ -10,11 +10,6 @@
#include <arm_neon.h>
-static const uint8x16_t x0f = { - 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, - 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, 0x0f, -}; - #ifdef CONFIG_ARM /* * AArch32 does not provide this intrinsic natively because it does not @@ -41,6 +36,7 @@ void __raid6_2data_recov_neon(int bytes, uint8_t *p, uint8_t *q, uint8_t *dp, uint8x16_t pm1 = vld1q_u8(pbmul + 16); uint8x16_t qm0 = vld1q_u8(qmul); uint8x16_t qm1 = vld1q_u8(qmul + 16); + uint8x16_t x0f = vdupq_n_u8(0x0f);
/* * while ( bytes-- ) { @@ -87,6 +83,7 @@ void __raid6_datap_recov_neon(int bytes, uint8_t *p, uint8_t *q, uint8_t *dq, { uint8x16_t qm0 = vld1q_u8(qmul); uint8x16_t qm1 = vld1q_u8(qmul + 16); + uint8x16_t x0f = vdupq_n_u8(0x0f);
/* * while (bytes--) {
From: Nathan Chancellor natechancellor@gmail.com
commit 864eb1afc60cb43e7df879b97f8ca0d719bbb735 upstream.
Clang warns when multiple pairs of parentheses are used for a single conditional statement.
drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c:851:42: warning: equality comparison with extraneous parentheses [-Wparentheses-equality] } else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* || ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~ drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c:851:42: note: remove extraneous parentheses around the comparison to silence this warning } else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* || ~ ^ ~ drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c:851:42: note: use '=' to turn this equality comparison into an assignment } else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* || ^~ = 1 warning generated.
Remove the parentheses and while we're at it, clean up the commented code, which has been here since the beginning of git history.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/118 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor natechancellor@gmail.com Cc: Thomas Winischhofer thomas@winischhofer.net Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz b.zolnierkie@samsung.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c index 27a2b72..a8fb41f 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/sis/init301.c @@ -848,9 +848,7 @@ static void SiS_OEM661Setting(struct SiS_Private *SiS_Pr, SiS_DDC2Delay(SiS_Pr, 0x4000); }
- } else if((SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) /* || - (SiS_Pr->SiS_CustomT == CUT_COMPAQ1280) || - (SiS_Pr->SiS_CustomT == CUT_CLEVO1400) */ ) { /* 315 series, LVDS; Special */ + } else if (SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_LVDS == 1) { /* 315 series, LVDS; Special */
if(SiS_Pr->SiS_IF_DEF_CH70xx == 0) { PanelID = SiS_GetReg(SiS_Pr->SiS_P3d4,0x36);
From: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 0e4e1de5b63fa423b13593337a27fd2d2b0bcf77 ]
rbd_unregister_watch() flushes notifies and therefore cannot be called under header_rwsem because a header update notify takes header_rwsem to synchronize with "rbd map". If mapping an image fails after the watch is established and a header update notify sneaks in, we deadlock when erroring out from rbd_dev_image_probe().
Move watch registration and unregistration out of the critical section. The only reason they were put there was to make header_rwsem management slightly more obvious.
Fixes: 811c66887746 ("rbd: fix rbd map vs notify races") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman dillaman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/block/rbd.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/block/rbd.c b/drivers/block/rbd.c index d3ad1b8..8e2df52 100644 --- a/drivers/block/rbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c @@ -3427,6 +3427,10 @@ static void cancel_tasks_sync(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) cancel_work_sync(&rbd_dev->unlock_work); }
+/* + * header_rwsem must not be held to avoid a deadlock with + * rbd_dev_refresh() when flushing notifies. + */ static void rbd_unregister_watch(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) { WARN_ON(waitqueue_active(&rbd_dev->lock_waitq)); @@ -5732,6 +5736,9 @@ static void rbd_dev_image_release(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) * device. If this image is the one being mapped (i.e., not a * parent), initiate a watch on its header object before using that * object to get detailed information about the rbd image. + * + * On success, returns with header_rwsem held for write if called + * with @depth == 0. */ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) { @@ -5764,6 +5771,9 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) } }
+ if (!depth) + down_write(&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); + ret = rbd_dev_header_info(rbd_dev); if (ret) goto err_out_watch; @@ -5815,6 +5825,8 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) rbd_dev_unprobe(rbd_dev); err_out_watch: if (!depth) + up_write(&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); + if (!depth) rbd_unregister_watch(rbd_dev); err_out_format: rbd_dev->image_format = 0; @@ -5872,12 +5884,9 @@ static ssize_t do_rbd_add(struct bus_type *bus, goto err_out_rbd_dev; }
- down_write(&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); rc = rbd_dev_image_probe(rbd_dev, 0); - if (rc < 0) { - up_write(&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); + if (rc < 0) goto err_out_rbd_dev; - }
/* If we are mapping a snapshot it must be marked read-only */ if (rbd_dev->spec->snap_id != CEPH_NOSNAP)
From: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 952c48b0ed18919bff7528501e9a3fff8a24f8cd ]
rbd_dev_unprobe() is supposed to undo most of rbd_dev_image_probe(), including rbd_dev_header_info(), which means that rbd_dev_header_info() isn't supposed to be called after rbd_dev_unprobe().
However, rbd_dev_image_release() calls rbd_dev_unprobe() before rbd_unregister_watch(). This is racy because a header update notify can sneak in:
"rbd unmap" thread ceph-watch-notify worker
rbd_dev_image_release() rbd_dev_unprobe() free and zero out header rbd_watch_cb() rbd_dev_refresh() rbd_dev_header_info() read in header
The same goes for "rbd map" because rbd_dev_image_probe() calls rbd_dev_unprobe() on errors. In both cases this results in a memory leak.
Fixes: fd22aef8b47c ("rbd: move rbd_unregister_watch() call into rbd_dev_image_release()") Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov idryomov@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Jason Dillaman dillaman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/block/rbd.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/block/rbd.c b/drivers/block/rbd.c index 8e2df52..1101290 100644 --- a/drivers/block/rbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/rbd.c @@ -5723,9 +5723,10 @@ static int rbd_dev_header_name(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev)
static void rbd_dev_image_release(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev) { - rbd_dev_unprobe(rbd_dev); if (rbd_dev->opts) rbd_unregister_watch(rbd_dev); + + rbd_dev_unprobe(rbd_dev); rbd_dev->image_format = 0; kfree(rbd_dev->spec->image_id); rbd_dev->spec->image_id = NULL; @@ -5776,7 +5777,7 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth)
ret = rbd_dev_header_info(rbd_dev); if (ret) - goto err_out_watch; + goto err_out_probe;
/* * If this image is the one being mapped, we have pool name and @@ -5822,12 +5823,11 @@ static int rbd_dev_image_probe(struct rbd_device *rbd_dev, int depth) return 0;
err_out_probe: - rbd_dev_unprobe(rbd_dev); -err_out_watch: if (!depth) up_write(&rbd_dev->header_rwsem); if (!depth) rbd_unregister_watch(rbd_dev); + rbd_dev_unprobe(rbd_dev); err_out_format: rbd_dev->image_format = 0; kfree(rbd_dev->spec->image_id);
From: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
[ Upstream commit 74347a99e73ae00b8385f1209aaea193c670f901 ]
When kdump is not configured, a Hyper-V VM might still respond to network traffic after a kernel panic when kernel parameter panic=0. The panic CPU goes into an infinite loop with interrupts enabled, and the VMbus driver interrupt handler still works because the VMbus connection is unloaded only in the kdump path. The network responses make the other end of the connection think the VM is still functional even though it has panic'ed, which could affect any failover actions that should be taken.
Fix this by unloading the VMbus connection during the panic process. vmbus_initiate_unload() could then be called twice (e.g., by hyperv_panic_event() and hv_crash_handler(), so reset the connection state in vmbus_initiate_unload() to ensure the unload is done only once.
Fixes: 81b18bce48af ("Drivers: HV: Send one page worth of kmsg dump over Hyper-V during panic") Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley mikelley@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406155331.2105-2-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 3 +++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 19 +++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c index 16eb9b3..3bf1f9e 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c @@ -849,6 +849,9 @@ void vmbus_initiate_unload(bool crash) { struct vmbus_channel_message_header hdr;
+ if (xchg(&vmbus_connection.conn_state, DISCONNECTED) == DISCONNECTED) + return; + /* Pre-Win2012R2 hosts don't support reconnect */ if (vmbus_proto_version < VERSION_WIN8_1) return; diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index 9aa18f3..5ff7c17 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -63,9 +63,12 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, { struct pt_regs *regs;
- regs = current_pt_regs(); + vmbus_initiate_unload(true);
- hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); + if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE) { + regs = current_pt_regs(); + hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); + } return NOTIFY_DONE; }
@@ -1228,10 +1231,16 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void) }
register_die_notifier(&hyperv_die_block); - atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, - &hyperv_panic_block); }
+ /* + * Always register the panic notifier because we need to unload + * the VMbus channel connection to prevent any VMbus + * activity after the VM panics. + */ + atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, + &hyperv_panic_block); + vmbus_request_offers();
return 0; @@ -1875,7 +1884,6 @@ static void hv_kexec_handler(void) { hv_synic_clockevents_cleanup(); vmbus_initiate_unload(false); - vmbus_connection.conn_state = DISCONNECTED; /* Make sure conn_state is set as hv_synic_cleanup checks for it */ mb(); cpuhp_remove_state(hyperv_cpuhp_online); @@ -1890,7 +1898,6 @@ static void hv_crash_handler(struct pt_regs *regs) * doing the cleanup for current CPU only. This should be sufficient * for kdump. */ - vmbus_connection.conn_state = DISCONNECTED; hv_synic_cleanup(smp_processor_id()); hyperv_cleanup(); };
From: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
[ Upstream commit 7f11a2cc10a4ae3a70e2c73361f4a9a33503539b ]
If kmsg_dump_register() fails, hv_panic_page will not be used anywhere. So free and reset it.
Fixes: 81b18bce48af ("Drivers: HV: Send one page worth of kmsg dump over Hyper-V during panic") Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley mikelley@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406155331.2105-3-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index 5ff7c17..dd6d18d 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -1222,9 +1222,13 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void) hv_panic_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); if (hv_panic_page) { ret = kmsg_dump_register(&hv_kmsg_dumper); - if (ret) + if (ret) { pr_err("Hyper-V: kmsg dump register " "error 0x%x\n", ret); + free_page( + (unsigned long)hv_panic_page); + hv_panic_page = NULL; + } } else pr_err("Hyper-V: panic message page memory " "allocation failed"); @@ -1252,7 +1256,6 @@ static int vmbus_bus_init(void) hv_remove_vmbus_irq();
bus_unregister(&hv_bus); - free_page((unsigned long)hv_panic_page); unregister_sysctl_table(hv_ctl_table_hdr); hv_ctl_table_hdr = NULL; return ret;
From: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
[ Upstream commit 73f26e526f19afb3a06b76b970a76bcac2cafd05 ]
When a guest VM panics, Hyper-V should be notified only once via the crash synthetic MSRs. Current Linux code might write these crash MSRs twice during a system panic: 1) hyperv_panic/die_event() calling hyperv_report_panic() 2) hv_kmsg_dump() calling hyperv_report_panic_msg()
Fix this by not calling hyperv_report_panic() if a kmsg dump has been successfully registered. The notification will happen later via hyperv_report_panic_msg().
Fixes: 7ed4325a44ea ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Make panic reporting to be more useful") Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley mikelley@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406155331.2105-4-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index dd6d18d..6469e1f 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
vmbus_initiate_unload(true);
- if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE) { + /* + * Hyper-V should be notified only once about a panic. If we will be + * doing hyperv_report_panic_msg() later with kmsg data, don't do + * the notification here. + */ + if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE + && !hv_panic_page) { regs = current_pt_regs(); hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); } @@ -78,7 +84,13 @@ static int hyperv_die_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, struct die_args *die = (struct die_args *)args; struct pt_regs *regs = die->regs;
- hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); + /* + * Hyper-V should be notified only once about a panic. If we will be + * doing hyperv_report_panic_msg() later with kmsg data, don't do + * the notification here. + */ + if (!hv_panic_page) + hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); return NOTIFY_DONE; }
From: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
[ Upstream commit 040026df7088c56ccbad28f7042308f67bde63df ]
When sysctl_record_panic_msg is not set, the panic will not be reported to Hyper-V via hyperv_report_panic_msg(). So the crash should be reported via hyperv_report_panic().
Fixes: 81b18bce48af ("Drivers: HV: Send one page worth of kmsg dump over Hyper-V during panic") Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley mikelley@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406155331.2105-6-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index 6469e1f..eacfe79 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -58,6 +58,18 @@ struct vmbus_dynid {
static void *hv_panic_page;
+/* + * Boolean to control whether to report panic messages over Hyper-V. + * + * It can be set via /proc/sys/kernel/hyperv/record_panic_msg + */ +static int sysctl_record_panic_msg = 1; + +static int hyperv_report_reg(void) +{ + return !sysctl_record_panic_msg || !hv_panic_page; +} + static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, void *args) { @@ -71,7 +83,7 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, * the notification here. */ if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE - && !hv_panic_page) { + && hyperv_report_reg()) { regs = current_pt_regs(); hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); } @@ -89,7 +101,7 @@ static int hyperv_die_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, * doing hyperv_report_panic_msg() later with kmsg data, don't do * the notification here. */ - if (!hv_panic_page) + if (hyperv_report_reg()) hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); return NOTIFY_DONE; } @@ -1104,13 +1116,6 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void) }
/* - * Boolean to control whether to report panic messages over Hyper-V. - * - * It can be set via /proc/sys/kernel/hyperv/record_panic_msg - */ -static int sysctl_record_panic_msg = 1; - -/* * Callback from kmsg_dump. Grab as much as possible from the end of the kmsg * buffer and call into Hyper-V to transfer the data. */
From: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com
[ Upstream commit f3a99e761efa616028b255b4de58e9b5b87c5545 ]
When oops happens with panic_on_oops unset, the oops thread is killed by die() and system continues to run. In such case, guest should not report crash register data to host since system still runs. Check panic_on_oops and return directly in hyperv_report_panic() when the function is called in the die() and panic_on_oops is unset. Fix it.
Fixes: 7ed4325a44ea ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Make panic reporting to be more useful") Signed-off-by: Tianyu Lan Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley mikelley@microsoft.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200406155331.2105-7-Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu wei.liu@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 6 +++++- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 2 +- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c index e4ba467..42fc341 100644 --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/clockchips.h> #include <linux/hyperv.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV_TSCPAGE @@ -428,11 +429,14 @@ void hyperv_cleanup(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hyperv_cleanup);
-void hyperv_report_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, long err) +void hyperv_report_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, long err, bool in_die) { static bool panic_reported; u64 guest_id;
+ if (in_die && !panic_on_oops) + return; + /* * We prefer to report panic on 'die' chain as we have proper * registers to report, but if we miss it (e.g. on BUG()) we need diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h index f377044..5b58a6c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static inline int cpumask_to_vpset(struct hv_vpset *vpset,
void __init hyperv_init(void); void hyperv_setup_mmu_ops(void); -void hyperv_report_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, long err); +void hyperv_report_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, long err, bool in_die); void hyperv_report_panic_msg(phys_addr_t pa, size_t size); bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized(void); void hyperv_cleanup(void); diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index eacfe79..fb22b72 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h"
struct vmbus_dynid { @@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ static int hyperv_panic_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE && hyperv_report_reg()) { regs = current_pt_regs(); - hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); + hyperv_report_panic(regs, val, false); } return NOTIFY_DONE; } @@ -102,7 +103,7 @@ static int hyperv_die_event(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val, * the notification here. */ if (hyperv_report_reg()) - hyperv_report_panic(regs, val); + hyperv_report_panic(regs, val, true); return NOTIFY_DONE; }
From: Claudiu Beznea claudiu.beznea@microchip.com
[ Upstream commit b0ecf1c6c6e82da4847900fad0272abfd014666d ]
clk_hw_round_rate() may call round rate function of its parents. In case of SAM9X60 two of USB parrents are PLLA and UPLL. These clocks are controlled by clk-sam9x60-pll.c driver. The round rate function for this driver is sam9x60_pll_round_rate() which call in turn sam9x60_pll_get_best_div_mul(). In case the requested rate is not in the proper range (rate < characteristics->output[0].min && rate > characteristics->output[0].max) the sam9x60_pll_round_rate() will return a negative number to its caller (called by clk_core_round_rate_nolock()). clk_hw_round_rate() will return zero in case a negative number is returned by clk_core_round_rate_nolock(). With this, the USB clock will continue its rate computation even caller of clk_hw_round_rate() returned an error. With this, the USB clock on SAM9X60 may not chose the best parent. I detected this after a suspend/resume cycle on SAM9X60.
Signed-off-by: Claudiu Beznea claudiu.beznea@microchip.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1579261009-4573-2-git-send-email-claudiu.beznea@mi... Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd sboyd@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c b/drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c index 791770a..6fac638 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c +++ b/drivers/clk/at91/clk-usb.c @@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ static int at91sam9x5_clk_usb_determine_rate(struct clk_hw *hw, tmp_parent_rate = req->rate * div; tmp_parent_rate = clk_hw_round_rate(parent, tmp_parent_rate); + if (!tmp_parent_rate) + continue; + tmp_rate = DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST(tmp_parent_rate, div); if (tmp_rate < req->rate) tmp_diff = req->rate - tmp_rate;
From: Dmitry Osipenko digetx@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit 583b53ece0b0268c542a1eafadb62e3d4b0aab8c ]
The driver fails to probe with -EPROBE_DEFER if battery's power supply (charger driver) isn't ready yet and this results in a bit noisy error message in KMSG during kernel's boot up. Let's silence the harmless error message.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko digetx@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Andrew F. Davis afd@ti.com Reviewed-by: Pali Rohár pali@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel sebastian.reichel@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c b/drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c index f022e1b..ff02a91 100644 --- a/drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c +++ b/drivers/power/supply/bq27xxx_battery.c @@ -1887,7 +1887,10 @@ int bq27xxx_battery_setup(struct bq27xxx_device_info *di)
di->bat = power_supply_register_no_ws(di->dev, psy_desc, &psy_cfg); if (IS_ERR(di->bat)) { - dev_err(di->dev, "failed to register battery\n"); + if (PTR_ERR(di->bat) == -EPROBE_DEFER) + dev_dbg(di->dev, "failed to register battery, deferring probe\n"); + else + dev_err(di->dev, "failed to register battery\n"); return PTR_ERR(di->bat); }
From: Sowjanya Komatineni skomatineni@nvidia.com
[ Upstream commit 6fe38aa8cac3a5db38154331742835a4d9740788 ]
Tegra PMC clocks clk_out_1, clk_out_2, and clk_out_3 supported parents are osc, osc_div2, osc_div4 and extern clock.
Clock driver is using incorrect parents clk_m, clk_m_div2, clk_m_div4 for PMC clocks.
This patch fixes this.
Tested-by: Dmitry Osipenko digetx@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Dmitry Osipenko digetx@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sowjanya Komatineni skomatineni@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding treding@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c b/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c index a35579a..476dab4 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c +++ b/drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra-pmc.c @@ -60,16 +60,16 @@ struct pmc_clk_init_data {
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(clk_out_lock);
-static const char *clk_out1_parents[] = { "clk_m", "clk_m_div2", - "clk_m_div4", "extern1", +static const char *clk_out1_parents[] = { "osc", "osc_div2", + "osc_div4", "extern1", };
-static const char *clk_out2_parents[] = { "clk_m", "clk_m_div2", - "clk_m_div4", "extern2", +static const char *clk_out2_parents[] = { "osc", "osc_div2", + "osc_div4", "extern2", };
-static const char *clk_out3_parents[] = { "clk_m", "clk_m_div2", - "clk_m_div4", "extern3", +static const char *clk_out3_parents[] = { "osc", "osc_div2", + "osc_div4", "extern3", };
static struct pmc_clk_init_data pmc_clks[] = {
From: Lucas Stach l.stach@pengutronix.de
[ Upstream commit e0ea2d11f8a08ba7066ff897e16c5217215d1e68 ]
Currently we wait only until the PGC inverts the isolation setting before disabling the peripheral clocks. This doesn't ensure that the reset is properly propagated through the peripheral devices in the power domain.
Wait until the PGC signals that the power up request is done and wait a bit for resets to propagate before disabling the clocks.
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach l.stach@pengutronix.de Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo shawnguo@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c b/drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c index d160fc2..56c019e 100644 --- a/drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c +++ b/drivers/soc/imx/gpc.c @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ static int imx6_pm_domain_power_off(struct generic_pm_domain *genpd) static int imx6_pm_domain_power_on(struct generic_pm_domain *genpd) { struct imx_pm_domain *pd = to_imx_pm_domain(genpd); - int i, ret, sw, sw2iso; - u32 val; + int i, ret; + u32 val, req;
if (pd->supply) { ret = regulator_enable(pd->supply); @@ -113,17 +113,18 @@ static int imx6_pm_domain_power_on(struct generic_pm_domain *genpd) regmap_update_bits(pd->regmap, pd->reg_offs + GPC_PGC_CTRL_OFFS, 0x1, 0x1);
- /* Read ISO and ISO2SW power up delays */ - regmap_read(pd->regmap, pd->reg_offs + GPC_PGC_PUPSCR_OFFS, &val); - sw = val & 0x3f; - sw2iso = (val >> 8) & 0x3f; - /* Request GPC to power up domain */ - val = BIT(pd->cntr_pdn_bit + 1); - regmap_update_bits(pd->regmap, GPC_CNTR, val, val); + req = BIT(pd->cntr_pdn_bit + 1); + regmap_update_bits(pd->regmap, GPC_CNTR, req, req);
- /* Wait ISO + ISO2SW IPG clock cycles */ - udelay(DIV_ROUND_UP(sw + sw2iso, pd->ipg_rate_mhz)); + /* Wait for the PGC to handle the request */ + ret = regmap_read_poll_timeout(pd->regmap, GPC_CNTR, val, !(val & req), + 1, 50); + if (ret) + pr_err("powerup request on domain %s timed out\n", genpd->name); + + /* Wait for reset to propagate through peripherals */ + usleep_range(5, 10);
/* Disable reset clocks for all devices in the domain */ for (i = 0; i < pd->num_clks; i++) @@ -345,6 +346,7 @@ struct imx_gpc_dt_data { .rd_table = &access_table, .wr_table = &access_table, .max_register = 0x2ac, + .fast_io = true, };
static struct generic_pm_domain *imx_gpc_onecell_domains[] = {
From: Alexandre Belloni alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com
[ Upstream commit 9cf4789e6e4673d0b2c96fa6bb0c35e81b43111a ]
The RTC IRQ is requested before the struct rtc_device is allocated, this may lead to a NULL pointer dereference in the IRQ handler.
To fix this issue, allocating the rtc_device struct before requesting the RTC IRQ using devm_rtc_allocate_device, and use rtc_register_device to register the RTC device.
Also remove the unnecessary error message as the core already prints the info.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200311223956.51352-1-alexandre.belloni@bootlin.c... Signed-off-by: Alexandre Belloni alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c index 73697e4..9d4a59a 100644 --- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c +++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-88pm860x.c @@ -341,6 +341,10 @@ static int pm860x_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) info->dev = &pdev->dev; dev_set_drvdata(&pdev->dev, info);
+ info->rtc_dev = devm_rtc_allocate_device(&pdev->dev); + if (IS_ERR(info->rtc_dev)) + return PTR_ERR(info->rtc_dev); + ret = devm_request_threaded_irq(&pdev->dev, info->irq, NULL, rtc_update_handler, IRQF_ONESHOT, "rtc", info); @@ -382,13 +386,11 @@ static int pm860x_rtc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) } }
- info->rtc_dev = devm_rtc_device_register(&pdev->dev, "88pm860x-rtc", - &pm860x_rtc_ops, THIS_MODULE); - ret = PTR_ERR(info->rtc_dev); - if (IS_ERR(info->rtc_dev)) { - dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register RTC device: %d\n", ret); + info->rtc_dev->ops = &pm860x_rtc_ops; + + ret = rtc_register_device(info->rtc_dev); + if (ret) return ret; - }
/* * enable internal XO instead of internal 3.25MHz clock since it can
From: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com
[ Upstream commit d911c57a19551c6bef116a3b55c6b089901aacb0 ]
Make sure to test the stateid for validity so that we catch instances where the server may have been reusing stateids in nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid().
Fixes: 7b410d9ce460 ("pNFS: Delay getting the layout header in CB_LAYOUTRECALL handlers") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/callback_proc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/callback_proc.c b/fs/nfs/callback_proc.c index 3159673..bcc51f1 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/callback_proc.c +++ b/fs/nfs/callback_proc.c @@ -130,6 +130,8 @@ static struct inode *nfs_layout_find_inode_by_stateid(struct nfs_client *clp,
list_for_each_entry_rcu(server, &clp->cl_superblocks, client_link) { list_for_each_entry(lo, &server->layouts, plh_layouts) { + if (!pnfs_layout_is_valid(lo)) + continue; if (stateid != NULL && !nfs4_stateid_match_other(stateid, &lo->plh_stateid)) continue;
From: Misono Tomohiro misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com
[ Upstream commit 8605cf0e852af3b2c771c18417499dc4ceed03d5 ]
When dreq is allocated by nfs_direct_req_alloc(), dreq->kref is initialized to 2. Therefore we need to call nfs_direct_req_release() twice to release the allocated dreq. Usually it is called in nfs_file_direct_{read, write}() and nfs_direct_complete().
However, current code only calls nfs_direct_req_relese() once if nfs_get_lock_context() fails in nfs_file_direct_{read, write}(). So, that case would result in memory leak.
Fix this by adding the missing call.
Signed-off-by: Misono Tomohiro misono.tomohiro@jp.fujitsu.com Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/direct.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/direct.c b/fs/nfs/direct.c index c61bd3f..e5da9d7 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/direct.c +++ b/fs/nfs/direct.c @@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ ssize_t nfs_file_direct_read(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) l_ctx = nfs_get_lock_context(dreq->ctx); if (IS_ERR(l_ctx)) { result = PTR_ERR(l_ctx); + nfs_direct_req_release(dreq); goto out_release; } dreq->l_ctx = l_ctx; @@ -1023,6 +1024,7 @@ ssize_t nfs_file_direct_write(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter) l_ctx = nfs_get_lock_context(dreq->ctx); if (IS_ERR(l_ctx)) { result = PTR_ERR(l_ctx); + nfs_direct_req_release(dreq); goto out_release; } dreq->l_ctx = l_ctx;
From: Alexander Gordeev agordeev@linux.ibm.com
[ Upstream commit 872f27103874a73783aeff2aac2b41a489f67d7c ]
/proc/cpuinfo should not print information about CPU 0 when it is offline.
Fixes: 281eaa8cb67c ("s390/cpuinfo: simplify locking and skip offline cpus early") Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev agordeev@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com [heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com: shortened commit message] Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik gor@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/kernel/processor.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c b/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c index 6fe2e18..675d4be 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/processor.c @@ -157,8 +157,9 @@ static void show_cpu_mhz(struct seq_file *m, unsigned long n) static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { unsigned long n = (unsigned long) v - 1; + unsigned long first = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
- if (!n) + if (n == first) show_cpu_summary(m, v); if (!machine_has_cpu_mhz) return 0; @@ -171,6 +172,8 @@ static inline void *c_update(loff_t *pos) { if (*pos) *pos = cpumask_next(*pos - 1, cpu_online_mask); + else + *pos = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask); return *pos < nr_cpu_ids ? (void *)*pos + 1 : NULL; }
From: Nathan Chancellor natechancellor@gmail.com
[ Upstream commit af6cf95c4d003fccd6c2ecc99a598fb854b537e7 ]
When building ppc64 defconfig, Clang errors (trimmed for brevity):
arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c:365:1: error: attribute declaration must precede definition [-Werror,-Wignored-attributes] machine_device_initcall(maple, maple_cpc925_edac_setup); ^
machine_device_initcall expands to __define_machine_initcall, which in turn has the macro machine_is used in it, which declares mach_##name with an __attribute__((weak)). define_machine actually defines mach_##name, which in this file happens before the declaration, hence the warning.
To fix this, move define_machine after machine_device_initcall so that the declaration occurs before the definition, which matches how machine_device_initcall and define_machine work throughout arch/powerpc.
While we're here, remove some spaces before tabs.
Fixes: 8f101a051ef0 ("edac: cpc925 MC platform device setup") Reported-by: Nick Desaulniers ndesaulniers@google.com Suggested-by: Ilie Halip ilie.halip@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor natechancellor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200323222729.15365-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c index b7f9375..d1fee2d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/maple/setup.c @@ -299,23 +299,6 @@ static int __init maple_probe(void) return 1; }
-define_machine(maple) { - .name = "Maple", - .probe = maple_probe, - .setup_arch = maple_setup_arch, - .init_IRQ = maple_init_IRQ, - .pci_irq_fixup = maple_pci_irq_fixup, - .pci_get_legacy_ide_irq = maple_pci_get_legacy_ide_irq, - .restart = maple_restart, - .halt = maple_halt, - .get_boot_time = maple_get_boot_time, - .set_rtc_time = maple_set_rtc_time, - .get_rtc_time = maple_get_rtc_time, - .calibrate_decr = generic_calibrate_decr, - .progress = maple_progress, - .power_save = power4_idle, -}; - #ifdef CONFIG_EDAC /* * Register a platform device for CPC925 memory controller on @@ -372,3 +355,20 @@ static int __init maple_cpc925_edac_setup(void) } machine_device_initcall(maple, maple_cpc925_edac_setup); #endif + +define_machine(maple) { + .name = "Maple", + .probe = maple_probe, + .setup_arch = maple_setup_arch, + .init_IRQ = maple_init_IRQ, + .pci_irq_fixup = maple_pci_irq_fixup, + .pci_get_legacy_ide_irq = maple_pci_get_legacy_ide_irq, + .restart = maple_restart, + .halt = maple_halt, + .get_boot_time = maple_get_boot_time, + .set_rtc_time = maple_set_rtc_time, + .get_rtc_time = maple_get_rtc_time, + .calibrate_decr = generic_calibrate_decr, + .progress = maple_progress, + .power_save = power4_idle, +};
From: Thomas Richter tmricht@linux.ibm.com
[ Upstream commit 4141b6a5e9f171325effc36a22eb92bf961e7a5c ]
When perf record -e SF_CYCLES_BASIC_DIAG runs with very high frequency, the samples arrive faster than the perf process can save them to file. Eventually, for longer running processes, this leads to the siutation where the trace buffers allocated by perf slowly fills up. At one point the auxiliary trace buffer is full and the CPU Measurement sampling facility is turned off. Furthermore a warning is printed to the kernel log buffer:
cpum_sf: The AUX buffer with 0 pages for the diagnostic-sampling mode is full
The number of allocated pages for the auxiliary trace buffer is shown as zero pages. That is wrong.
Fix this by saving the number of allocated pages before entering the work loop in the interrupt handler. When the interrupt handler processes the samples, it may detect the buffer full condition and stop sampling, reducing the buffer size to zero. Print the correct value in the error message:
cpum_sf: The AUX buffer with 256 pages for the diagnostic-sampling mode is full
Signed-off-by: Thomas Richter tmricht@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik gor@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c index 5bfb1ce..74a296c 100644 --- a/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c +++ b/arch/s390/kernel/perf_cpum_sf.c @@ -1537,6 +1537,7 @@ static void hw_collect_aux(struct cpu_hw_sf *cpuhw) perf_aux_output_end(handle, size); num_sdb = aux->sfb.num_sdb;
+ num_sdb = aux->sfb.num_sdb; while (!done) { /* Get an output handle */ aux = perf_aux_output_begin(handle, cpuhw->event);
From: Eric Sandeen sandeen@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit c96e2b8564adfb8ac14469ebc51ddc1bfecb3ae2 ]
Under some circumstances we may encounter a filesystem error on a read-only block device, and if we try to save the error info to the superblock and commit it, we'll wind up with a noisy error and backtrace, i.e.:
[ 3337.146838] EXT4-fs error (device pmem1p2): ext4_get_journal_inode:4634: comm mount: inode #0: comm mount: iget: illegal inode # ------------[ cut here ]------------ generic_make_request: Trying to write to read-only block-device pmem1p2 (partno 2) WARNING: CPU: 107 PID: 115347 at block/blk-core.c:788 generic_make_request_checks+0x6b4/0x7d0 ...
To avoid this, commit the error info in the superblock only if the block device is writable.
Reported-by: Ritesh Harjani riteshh@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen sandeen@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger adilger@dilger.ca Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4b6e774d-cc00-3469-7abb-108eb151071a@sandeen.net Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o tytso@mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext4/super.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 7e3bbc1..cc811b9 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -390,7 +390,8 @@ static void save_error_info(struct super_block *sb, const char *func, unsigned int line) { __save_error_info(sb, func, line); - ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); + if (!bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev)) + ext4_commit_super(sb, 1); }
/*
From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi krisman@collabora.com
[ Upstream commit 6e682d53fc1ef73a169e2a5300326cb23abb32ee ]
On the hypervisor side, when completing commands and the pipe is full, we retry writing only the entries that failed, by offsetting io_req_buffer, but we don't reduce the number of bytes written, which can cause a buffer overrun of io_req_buffer, and write garbage to the pipe.
Cc: Martyn Welch martyn.welch@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi krisman@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c b/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c index 83c4703..748bd09 100644 --- a/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c +++ b/arch/um/drivers/ubd_kern.c @@ -1574,7 +1574,9 @@ int io_thread(void *arg) written = 0;
do { - res = os_write_file(kernel_fd, ((char *) io_req_buffer) + written, n); + res = os_write_file(kernel_fd, + ((char *) io_req_buffer) + written, + n - written); if (res >= 0) { written += res; } else {
From: Long Li longli@microsoft.com
[ Upstream commit 3946d0d04bb360acca72db5efe9ae8440012d9dc ]
When encryption is used, smb2_transform_hdr is defined on the stack and is passed to the transport. This doesn't work with RDMA as the buffer needs to be DMA'ed.
Fix it by using kmalloc.
Signed-off-by: Long Li longli@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Steve French stfrench@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/cifs/transport.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/transport.c b/fs/cifs/transport.c index 0c4df56..7041294 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/transport.c +++ b/fs/cifs/transport.c @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ void cifs_mid_q_entry_release(struct mid_q_entry *midEntry) struct smb_rqst *rqst, int flags) { struct kvec iov; - struct smb2_transform_hdr tr_hdr; + struct smb2_transform_hdr *tr_hdr; struct smb_rqst cur_rqst[MAX_COMPOUND]; int rc;
@@ -402,28 +402,34 @@ void cifs_mid_q_entry_release(struct mid_q_entry *midEntry) if (num_rqst > MAX_COMPOUND - 1) return -ENOMEM;
- memset(&cur_rqst[0], 0, sizeof(cur_rqst)); - memset(&iov, 0, sizeof(iov)); - memset(&tr_hdr, 0, sizeof(tr_hdr)); - - iov.iov_base = &tr_hdr; - iov.iov_len = sizeof(tr_hdr); - cur_rqst[0].rq_iov = &iov; - cur_rqst[0].rq_nvec = 1; - if (!server->ops->init_transform_rq) { cifs_dbg(VFS, "Encryption requested but transform callback " "is missing\n"); return -EIO; }
+ tr_hdr = kmalloc(sizeof(*tr_hdr), GFP_NOFS); + if (!tr_hdr) + return -ENOMEM; + + memset(&cur_rqst[0], 0, sizeof(cur_rqst)); + memset(&iov, 0, sizeof(iov)); + memset(tr_hdr, 0, sizeof(*tr_hdr)); + + iov.iov_base = tr_hdr; + iov.iov_len = sizeof(*tr_hdr); + cur_rqst[0].rq_iov = &iov; + cur_rqst[0].rq_nvec = 1; + rc = server->ops->init_transform_rq(server, num_rqst + 1, &cur_rqst[0], rqst); if (rc) - return rc; + goto out;
rc = __smb_send_rqst(server, num_rqst + 1, &cur_rqst[0]); smb3_free_compound_rqst(num_rqst, &cur_rqst[1]); +out: + kfree(tr_hdr); return rc; }
From: Steven Price steven.price@arm.com
[ Upstream commit 3f3673d7d324d872d9d8ddb73b3e5e47fbf12e0d ]
If CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE is defined, but neither CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE nor CONFIG_MIGRATION, then non_swap_entry() will return 0, meaning that the condition (non_swap_entry(entry) && is_device_private_entry(entry)) in zap_pte_range() will never be true even if the entry is a device private one.
Equally any other code depending on non_swap_entry() will not function as expected.
I originally spotted this just by looking at the code, I haven't actually observed any problems.
Looking a bit more closely it appears that actually this situation (currently at least) cannot occur:
DEVICE_PRIVATE depends on ZONE_DEVICE ZONE_DEVICE depends on MEMORY_HOTREMOVE MEMORY_HOTREMOVE depends on MIGRATION
Fixes: 5042db43cc26 ("mm/ZONE_DEVICE: new type of ZONE_DEVICE for unaddressable memory") Signed-off-by: Steven Price steven.price@arm.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Jérôme Glisse jglisse@redhat.com Cc: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Cc: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Cc: John Hubbard jhubbard@nvidia.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200305130550.22693-1-steven.price@arm.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/swapops.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/swapops.h b/include/linux/swapops.h index 22af9d8..28d572b 100644 --- a/include/linux/swapops.h +++ b/include/linux/swapops.h @@ -368,7 +368,8 @@ static inline void num_poisoned_pages_inc(void) } #endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE) || defined(CONFIG_MIGRATION) +#if defined(CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE) || defined(CONFIG_MIGRATION) || \ + defined(CONFIG_DEVICE_PRIVATE) static inline int non_swap_entry(swp_entry_t entry) { return swp_type(entry) >= MAX_SWAPFILES;
From: Qian Cai cai@lca.pw
[ Upstream commit 7e2345200262e4a6056580f0231cccdaffc825f3 ]
"vm_committed_as.count" could be accessed concurrently as reported by KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __vm_enough_memory / percpu_counter_add_batch
write to 0xffffffff9451c538 of 8 bytes by task 65879 on cpu 35: percpu_counter_add_batch+0x83/0xd0 percpu_counter_add_batch at lib/percpu_counter.c:91 __vm_enough_memory+0xb9/0x260 dup_mm+0x3a4/0x8f0 copy_process+0x2458/0x3240 _do_fork+0xaa/0x9f0 __do_sys_clone+0x125/0x160 __x64_sys_clone+0x70/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
read to 0xffffffff9451c538 of 8 bytes by task 66773 on cpu 19: __vm_enough_memory+0x199/0x260 percpu_counter_read_positive at include/linux/percpu_counter.h:81 (inlined by) __vm_enough_memory at mm/util.c:839 mmap_region+0x1b2/0xa10 do_mmap+0x45c/0x700 vm_mmap_pgoff+0xc0/0x130 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x6e/0x300 __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The read is outside percpu_counter::lock critical section which results in a data race. Fix it by adding a READ_ONCE() in percpu_counter_read_positive() which could also service as the existing compiler memory barrier.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Acked-by: Marco Elver elver@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1582302724-2804-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/percpu_counter.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/percpu_counter.h b/include/linux/percpu_counter.h index 4f05249..0a4f54d 100644 --- a/include/linux/percpu_counter.h +++ b/include/linux/percpu_counter.h @@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ static inline s64 percpu_counter_read(struct percpu_counter *fbc) */ static inline s64 percpu_counter_read_positive(struct percpu_counter *fbc) { - s64 ret = fbc->count; + /* Prevent reloads of fbc->count */ + s64 ret = READ_ONCE(fbc->count);
- barrier(); /* Prevent reloads of fbc->count */ if (ret >= 0) return ret; return 0;
From: Vegard Nossum vegard.nossum@oracle.com
[ Upstream commit af9c5d2e3b355854ff0e4acfbfbfadcd5198a349 ]
compiletime_assert() uses __LINE__ to create a unique function name. This means that if you have more than one BUILD_BUG_ON() in the same source line (which can happen if they appear e.g. in a macro), then the error message from the compiler might output the wrong condition.
For this source file:
#include <linux/build_bug.h>
#define macro() \ BUILD_BUG_ON(1); \ BUILD_BUG_ON(0);
void foo() { macro(); }
gcc would output:
./include/linux/compiler.h:350:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_9' declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: 0 _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__)
However, it was not the BUILD_BUG_ON(0) that failed, so it should say 1 instead of 0. With this patch, we use __COUNTER__ instead of __LINE__, so each BUILD_BUG_ON() gets a different function name and the correct condition is printed:
./include/linux/compiler.h:350:38: error: call to `__compiletime_assert_0' declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: 1 _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __COUNTER__)
Signed-off-by: Vegard Nossum vegard.nossum@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Reviewed-by: Daniel Santos daniel.santos@pobox.com Cc: Rasmus Villemoes linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Cc: Ian Abbott abbotti@mev.co.uk Cc: Joe Perches joe@perches.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200331112637.25047-1-vegard.nossum@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds torvalds@linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- include/linux/compiler.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler.h b/include/linux/compiler.h index bb22908..75112aa 100644 --- a/include/linux/compiler.h +++ b/include/linux/compiler.h @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static inline void *offset_to_ptr(const int *off) * compiler has support to do so. */ #define compiletime_assert(condition, msg) \ - _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __LINE__) + _compiletime_assert(condition, msg, __compiletime_assert_, __COUNTER__)
#define compiletime_assert_atomic_type(t) \ compiletime_assert(__native_word(t), \
From: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com
[ Upstream commit 1493e0f944f3c319d11e067c185c904d01c17ae5 ]
We have to properly retry again by returning -EINVAL immediately in case somebody else instantiated the table concurrently. We missed to add the goto in this function only. The code now matches the other, similar shadowing functions.
We are overwriting an existing region 2 table entry. All allocated pages are added to the crst_list to be freed later, so they are not lost forever. However, when unshadowing the region 2 table, we wouldn't trigger unshadowing of the original shadowed region 3 table that we replaced. It would get unshadowed when the original region 3 table is modified. As it's not connected to the page table hierarchy anymore, it's not going to get used anymore. However, for a limited time, this page table will stick around, so it's in some sense a temporary memory leak.
Identified by manual code inspection. I don't think this classifies as stable material.
Fixes: 998f637cc4b9 ("s390/mm: avoid races on region/segment/page table shadowing") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand david@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200403153050.20569-4-david@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger borntraeger@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger borntraeger@de.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/s390/mm/gmap.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c index b56c4fd..7cde0f2 100644 --- a/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c +++ b/arch/s390/mm/gmap.c @@ -1838,6 +1838,7 @@ int gmap_shadow_r3t(struct gmap *sg, unsigned long saddr, unsigned long r3t, goto out_free; } else if (*table & _REGION_ENTRY_ORIGIN) { rc = -EAGAIN; /* Race with shadow */ + goto out_free; } crst_table_init(s_r3t, _REGION3_ENTRY_EMPTY); /* mark as invalid as long as the parent table is not protected */
From: Qian Cai cai@lca.pw
[ Upstream commit 696ac2e3bf267f5a2b2ed7d34e64131f2287d0ad ]
Similar to commit 0266d81e9bf5 ("acpi/processor: Prevent cpu hotplug deadlock") except this is for acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe():
"The problem is that the work is scheduled on the current CPU from the hotplug thread associated with that CPU.
It's not required to invoke these functions via the workqueue because the hotplug thread runs on the target CPU already.
Check whether current is a per cpu thread pinned on the target CPU and invoke the function directly to avoid the workqueue."
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ------------------------------------------------------ cpuhp/1/15 is trying to acquire lock: ffffc90003447a28 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x4c6/0x630
but task is already holding lock: ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}: cpus_read_lock+0x3e/0xc0 irq_calc_affinity_vectors+0x5f/0x91 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x10f/0x9a0 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0x13e/0x1f0 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity at drivers/pci/msi.c:1208 pqi_ctrl_init+0x72f/0x1618 [smartpqi] pqi_pci_probe.cold.63+0x882/0x892 [smartpqi] local_pci_probe+0x7a/0xc0 work_for_cpu_fn+0x2e/0x50 process_one_work+0x57e/0xb90 worker_thread+0x363/0x5b0 kthread+0x1f4/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440 kthread+0x1f4/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&wfc.work) --> cpuhp_state-up --> cpuidle_lock
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(cpuidle_lock); lock(cpuhp_state-up); lock(cpuidle_lock); lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work));
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by cpuhp/1/15: #0: ffffffffaf51ab10 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0 #1: ffffffffaf51ad40 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0 #2: ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20
Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa0/0xea print_circular_bug.cold.52+0x147/0x14c check_noncircular+0x295/0x2d0 __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440 kthread+0x1f4/0x220 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai cai@lca.pw Tested-by: Borislav Petkov bp@suse.de [ rjw: Subject ] Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c | 3 ++- drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 7 ------- include/acpi/processor.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c index 158ad14..92539a1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/acpi/cstate.c @@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ int acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe(unsigned int cpu,
/* Make sure we are running on right CPU */
- retval = work_on_cpu(cpu, acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe_cpu, cx); + retval = call_on_cpu(cpu, acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe_cpu, cx, + false); if (retval == 0) { /* Use the hint in CST */ percpu_entry->states[cx->index].eax = cx->address; diff --git a/drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c index fbc936c..62c0fe9 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c @@ -910,13 +910,6 @@ static long __acpi_processor_get_throttling(void *data) return pr->throttling.acpi_processor_get_throttling(pr); }
-static int call_on_cpu(int cpu, long (*fn)(void *), void *arg, bool direct) -{ - if (direct || (is_percpu_thread() && cpu == smp_processor_id())) - return fn(arg); - return work_on_cpu(cpu, fn, arg); -} - static int acpi_processor_get_throttling(struct acpi_processor *pr) { if (!pr) diff --git a/include/acpi/processor.h b/include/acpi/processor.h index 9235b41..26f27a8 100644 --- a/include/acpi/processor.h +++ b/include/acpi/processor.h @@ -293,6 +293,14 @@ static inline void acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_enter(struct acpi_processor_cx } #endif
+static inline int call_on_cpu(int cpu, long (*fn)(void *), void *arg, + bool direct) +{ + if (direct || (is_percpu_thread() && cpu == smp_processor_id())) + return fn(arg); + return work_on_cpu(cpu, fn, arg); +} + /* in processor_perflib.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_FREQ
From: Jack Zhang Jack.Zhang1@amd.com
[ Upstream commit 3148a6a0ef3cf93570f30a477292768f7eb5d3c3 ]
Originally, it kfrees the wrong pointer for mem_obj. It would cause memory leak under stress test.
Signed-off-by: Jack Zhang Jack.Zhang1@amd.com Acked-by: Nirmoy Das nirmoy.das@amd.com Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher alexander.deucher@amd.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c index 938d005..28022d1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c @@ -921,9 +921,9 @@ int kfd_gtt_sa_allocate(struct kfd_dev *kfd, unsigned int size, return 0;
kfd_gtt_no_free_chunk: - pr_debug("Allocation failed with mem_obj = %p\n", mem_obj); + pr_debug("Allocation failed with mem_obj = %p\n", *mem_obj); mutex_unlock(&kfd->gtt_sa_lock); - kfree(mem_obj); + kfree(*mem_obj); return -ENOMEM; }
From: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com
[ Upstream commit 862f35c94730c9270833f3ad05bd758a29f204ed ]
If we just set the mirror count to 1 without first clearing out the mirrors, we can leak queued up requests.
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/nfs/pagelist.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/pagelist.c b/fs/nfs/pagelist.c index 9cf59e2..5dae7c8 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/pagelist.c +++ b/fs/nfs/pagelist.c @@ -865,15 +865,6 @@ static void nfs_pageio_setup_mirroring(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio, pgio->pg_mirror_count = mirror_count; }
-/* - * nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring - stop using mirroring (set mirror count to 1) - */ -void nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio) -{ - pgio->pg_mirror_count = 1; - pgio->pg_mirror_idx = 0; -} - static void nfs_pageio_cleanup_mirroring(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio) { pgio->pg_mirror_count = 1; @@ -1302,6 +1293,14 @@ void nfs_pageio_cond_complete(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *desc, pgoff_t index) } }
+/* + * nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring - stop using mirroring (set mirror count to 1) + */ +void nfs_pageio_stop_mirroring(struct nfs_pageio_descriptor *pgio) +{ + nfs_pageio_complete(pgio); +} + int __init nfs_init_nfspagecache(void) { nfs_page_cachep = kmem_cache_create("nfs_page",
From: Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit 62f63eea291b50a5677ae7503ac128803174698a ]
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:f2fs_write_begin+0x823/0xb90 [f2fs] Call Trace: f2fs_quota_write+0x139/0x1d0 [f2fs] write_blk+0x36/0x80 [quota_tree] get_free_dqblk+0x42/0xa0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x235/0x4a0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x26e/0x4a0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x26e/0x4a0 [quota_tree] do_insert_tree+0x26e/0x4a0 [quota_tree] qtree_write_dquot+0x70/0x190 [quota_tree] v2_write_dquot+0x43/0x90 [quota_v2] dquot_acquire+0x77/0x100 f2fs_dquot_acquire+0x2f/0x60 [f2fs] dqget+0x310/0x450 dquot_transfer+0x7e/0x120 f2fs_setattr+0x11a/0x4a0 [f2fs] notify_change+0x349/0x480 chown_common+0x168/0x1c0 do_fchownat+0xbc/0xf0 __x64_sys_fchownat+0x20/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x220 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Passing fsdata parameter to .write_{begin,end} in f2fs_quota_write(), so that if quota file is compressed one, we can avoid above NULL pointer dereference when updating quota content.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/f2fs/super.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index da348cf..45f8f6e 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -1648,6 +1648,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type, int offset = off & (sb->s_blocksize - 1); size_t towrite = len; struct page *page; + void *fsdata = NULL; char *kaddr; int err = 0; int tocopy; @@ -1657,7 +1658,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type, towrite); retry: err = a_ops->write_begin(NULL, mapping, off, tocopy, 0, - &page, NULL); + &page, &fsdata); if (unlikely(err)) { if (err == -ENOMEM) { congestion_wait(BLK_RW_ASYNC, HZ/50); @@ -1672,7 +1673,7 @@ static ssize_t f2fs_quota_write(struct super_block *sb, int type, flush_dcache_page(page);
a_ops->write_end(NULL, mapping, off, tocopy, tocopy, - page, NULL); + page, fsdata); offset = 0; towrite -= tocopy; off += tocopy;
From: Nicolas Saenz Julienne nsaenzjulienne@suse.de
[ Upstream commit b1e7396a1d0e6af6806337fdaaa44098d6b3343c ]
Current mode validation impedes setting up some video modes which should be supported otherwise. Namely 1920x1200@60Hz.
Fix this by lowering the minimum HDMI state machine clock to pixel clock ratio allowed.
Fixes: 32e823c63e90 ("drm/vc4: Reject HDMI modes with too high of clocks.") Reported-by: Stefan Wahren stefan.wahren@i2se.com Suggested-by: Dave Stevenson dave.stevenson@raspberrypi.com Signed-off-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne nsaenzjulienne@suse.de Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard maxime@cerno.tech Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200326122001.22215-1-nsaenzj... Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c index fd5522f..86b9885 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c @@ -698,11 +698,23 @@ static void vc4_hdmi_encoder_enable(struct drm_encoder *encoder) vc4_hdmi_encoder_mode_valid(struct drm_encoder *crtc, const struct drm_display_mode *mode) { - /* HSM clock must be 108% of the pixel clock. Additionally, - * the AXI clock needs to be at least 25% of pixel clock, but - * HSM ends up being the limiting factor. + /* + * As stated in RPi's vc4 firmware "HDMI state machine (HSM) clock must + * be faster than pixel clock, infinitesimally faster, tested in + * simulation. Otherwise, exact value is unimportant for HDMI + * operation." This conflicts with bcm2835's vc4 documentation, which + * states HSM's clock has to be at least 108% of the pixel clock. + * + * Real life tests reveal that vc4's firmware statement holds up, and + * users are able to use pixel clocks closer to HSM's, namely for + * 1920x1200@60Hz. So it was decided to have leave a 1% margin between + * both clocks. Which, for RPi0-3 implies a maximum pixel clock of + * 162MHz. + * + * Additionally, the AXI clock needs to be at least 25% of + * pixel clock, but HSM ends up being the limiting factor. */ - if (mode->clock > HSM_CLOCK_FREQ / (1000 * 108 / 100)) + if (mode->clock > HSM_CLOCK_FREQ / (1000 * 101 / 100)) return MODE_CLOCK_HIGH;
return MODE_OK;
From: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org
[ Upstream commit 44a52022e7f15cbaab957df1c14f7a4f527ef7cf ]
When EXT2_ATTR_DEBUG is not defined, modify the 2 debug macros to use the no_printk() macro instead of <nothing>. This fixes gcc warnings when -Wextra is used:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c:252:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body] ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:258:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body] ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:330:42: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘if’ statement [-Wempty-body] ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:872:45: warning: suggest braces around empty body in an ‘else’ statement [-Wempty-body]
I have verified that the only object code change (with gcc 7.5.0) is the reversal of some instructions from 'cmp a,b' to 'cmp b,a'.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e18a7395-61fb-2093-18e8-ed4f8cf56248@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org Cc: Jan Kara jack@suse.com Cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr.c b/fs/ext2/xattr.c index dd8f10d..4439bfa 100644 --- a/fs/ext2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext2/xattr.c @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/buffer_head.h> #include <linux/init.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/mbcache.h> #include <linux/quotaops.h> @@ -84,8 +85,8 @@ printk("\n"); \ } while (0) #else -# define ea_idebug(f...) -# define ea_bdebug(f...) +# define ea_idebug(inode, f...) no_printk(f) +# define ea_bdebug(bh, f...) no_printk(f) #endif
static int ext2_xattr_set2(struct inode *, struct buffer_head *,
From: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz
[ Upstream commit 32302085a8d90859c40cf1a5e8313f575d06ec75 ]
Fix a debug-only build error in ext2/xattr.c:
When building without extra debugging, (and with another patch that uses no_printk() instead of <empty> for the ext2-xattr debug-print macros, this build error happens:
../fs/ext2/xattr.c: In function ‘ext2_xattr_cache_insert’: ../fs/ext2/xattr.c:869:18: error: ‘ext2_xattr_cache’ undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean ‘ext2_xattr_list’? atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count));
Fix the problem by removing cached entry count from the debug message since otherwise we'd have to export the mbcache structure just for that.
Fixes: be0726d33cb8 ("ext2: convert to mbcache2") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/ext2/xattr.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ext2/xattr.c b/fs/ext2/xattr.c index 4439bfa..bd1d68f 100644 --- a/fs/ext2/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ext2/xattr.c @@ -839,8 +839,7 @@ static void ext2_xattr_update_super_block(struct super_block *sb) error = mb_cache_entry_create(cache, GFP_NOFS, hash, bh->b_blocknr, 1); if (error) { if (error == -EBUSY) { - ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache (%d cache entries)", - atomic_read(&ext2_xattr_cache->c_entry_count)); + ea_bdebug(bh, "already in cache"); error = 0; } } else
From: Jeffery Miller jmiller@neverware.com
[ Upstream commit e42fe5b29ac07210297e75f36deefe54edbdbf80 ]
The Intel Compute Stick `STK1A32SC` can have a system vendor of "Intel(R) Client Systems". Broaden the Intel Compute Stick DMI checks so that they match "Intel Corporation" as well as "Intel(R) Client Systems".
This fixes an issue where the STK1A32SC compute sticks were still exposing a battery with the existing blacklist entry.
Signed-off-by: Jeffery Miller jmiller@neverware.com Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede hdegoede@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel sebastian.reichel@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c b/drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c index ab0b6e7..157cf5e 100644 --- a/drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c +++ b/drivers/power/supply/axp288_fuel_gauge.c @@ -718,14 +718,14 @@ static void fuel_gauge_init_irq(struct axp288_fg_info *info) { /* Intel Cherry Trail Compute Stick, Windows version */ .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "STK1AW32SC"), }, }, { /* Intel Cherry Trail Compute Stick, version without an OS */ .matches = { - DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel Corporation"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Intel"), DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "STK1A32SC"), }, },
From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com
[ Upstream commit f84afbdd3a9e5e10633695677b95422572f920dc ]
The "cmd" comes from the user and it can be up to 255. It it's more than the number of bits in long, it results out of bounds read when we check test_bit(cmd, &cmd_mask). The highest valid value for "cmd" is ND_CMD_CALL (10) so I added a compare against that.
Fixes: 62232e45f4a2 ("libnvdimm: control (ioctl) messages for nvdimm_bus and nvdimm devices") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200225162055.amtosfy7m35aivxg@kili.mountain Signed-off-by: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/nvdimm/bus.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c index 54a633e..48a070a 100644 --- a/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/bus.c @@ -984,8 +984,10 @@ static int __nd_ioctl(struct nvdimm_bus *nvdimm_bus, struct nvdimm *nvdimm, return -EFAULT; }
- if (!desc || (desc->out_num + desc->in_num == 0) || - !test_bit(cmd, &cmd_mask)) + if (!desc || + (desc->out_num + desc->in_num == 0) || + cmd > ND_CMD_CALL || + !test_bit(cmd, &cmd_mask)) return -ENOTTY;
/* fail write commands (when read-only) */
From: Adrian Huang ahuang12@lenovo.com
[ Upstream commit c20f36534666e37858a14e591114d93cc1be0d34 ]
The SPA of the GCR3 table root pointer[51:31] masks 20 bits. However, this requires 21 bits (Please see the AMD IOMMU specification). This leads to the potential failure when the bit 51 of SPA of the GCR3 table root pointer is 1'.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Huang ahuang12@lenovo.com Fixes: 52815b75682e2 ("iommu/amd: Add support for IOMMUv2 domain mode") Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel jroedel@suse.de Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h index 69f3d4c..859b064 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -352,7 +352,7 @@
#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_A(x) (((x) >> 12) & 0x00007ULL) #define DTE_GCR3_VAL_B(x) (((x) >> 15) & 0x0ffffULL) -#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_C(x) (((x) >> 31) & 0xfffffULL) +#define DTE_GCR3_VAL_C(x) (((x) >> 31) & 0x1fffffULL)
#define DTE_GCR3_INDEX_A 0 #define DTE_GCR3_INDEX_B 1
From: Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com
[ Upstream commit dc5a941223edd803f476a153abd950cc3a83c3e1 ]
There is a race condition that we may miss to wait for all node pages writeback, fix it.
- fsync() - shrink - f2fs_do_sync_file - __write_node_page - set_page_writeback(page#0) : remove DIRTY/TOWRITE flag - f2fs_fsync_node_pages : won't find page #0 as TOWRITE flag was removeD - f2fs_wait_on_node_pages_writeback : wont' wait page #0 writeback as it was not in fsync_node_list list. - f2fs_add_fsync_node_entry
Fixes: 50fa53eccf9f ("f2fs: fix to avoid broken of dnode block list") Signed-off-by: Chao Yu yuchao0@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim jaegeuk@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- fs/f2fs/node.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/node.c b/fs/f2fs/node.c index e5d4746..f0714c1 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/node.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/node.c @@ -1559,15 +1559,16 @@ static int __write_node_page(struct page *page, bool atomic, bool *submitted, if (atomic && !test_opt(sbi, NOBARRIER)) fio.op_flags |= REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_FUA;
- set_page_writeback(page); - ClearPageError(page); - + /* should add to global list before clearing PAGECACHE status */ if (f2fs_in_warm_node_list(sbi, page)) { seq = f2fs_add_fsync_node_entry(sbi, page); if (seq_id) *seq_id = seq; }
+ set_page_writeback(page); + ClearPageError(page); + fio.old_blkaddr = ni.blk_addr; f2fs_do_write_node_page(nid, &fio); set_node_addr(sbi, &ni, fio.new_blkaddr, is_fsync_dnode(page));
From: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com
commit d0802dc411f469569a537283b6f3833af47aece9 upstream.
Commit f949a12fd697 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc") tried to fix the some user controlled buffer overflows in bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set() and bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del() but the fix was using CFP_NUM_RULES, which while it is correct not to overflow the bitmaps, is not representative of what the device actually supports. Correct that by using bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size() instead.
The latter subtracts the number of rules by 1, so change the checks from greater than or equal to greater than accordingly.
Fixes: f949a12fd697 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: fix buffer overflow doing set_rxnfc") Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli f.fainelli@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c index 21db180..12156ab 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2_cfp.c @@ -742,17 +742,14 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_set(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port, fs->m_ext.data[1])) return -EINVAL;
- if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && fs->location >= CFP_NUM_RULES) + if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && + fs->location > bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size(priv)) return -EINVAL;
if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && test_bit(fs->location, priv->cfp.used)) return -EBUSY;
- if (fs->location != RX_CLS_LOC_ANY && - fs->location > bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size(priv)) - return -EINVAL; - /* This rule is a Wake-on-LAN filter and we must specifically * target the CPU port in order for it to be working. */ @@ -839,7 +836,7 @@ static int bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_del(struct bcm_sf2_priv *priv, int port, u32 next_loc = 0; int ret;
- if (loc >= CFP_NUM_RULES) + if (loc > bcm_sf2_cfp_rule_size(priv)) return -EINVAL;
/* Refuse deleting unused rules, and those that are not unique since
From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com
commit d3d19d6fc5736a798b118971935ce274f7deaa82 upstream.
The "fix" struct has a 2 byte hole after ->ywrapstep and the "fix = info->fix;" assignment doesn't necessarily clear it. It depends on the compiler. The solution is just to replace the assignment with an memcpy().
Fixes: 1f5e31d7e55a ("fbmem: don't call copy_from/to_user() with mutex held") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Cc: Andrew Morton akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: Arnd Bergmann arnd@arndb.de Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" ebiederm@xmission.com Cc: Andrea Righi righi.andrea@gmail.com Cc: Daniel Vetter daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch Cc: Sam Ravnborg sam@ravnborg.org Cc: Maarten Lankhorst maarten.lankhorst@linux.intel.com Cc: Daniel Thompson daniel.thompson@linaro.org Cc: Peter Rosin peda@axentia.se Cc: Jani Nikula jani.nikula@intel.com Cc: Gerd Hoffmann kraxel@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz b.zolnierkie@samsung.com Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200113100132.ixpaymordi24n3a... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index c48f083..8484527 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1122,7 +1122,7 @@ static long do_fb_ioctl(struct fb_info *info, unsigned int cmd, case FBIOGET_FSCREENINFO: if (!lock_fb_info(info)) return -ENODEV; - fix = info->fix; + memcpy(&fix, &info->fix, sizeof(fix)); unlock_fb_info(info);
ret = copy_to_user(argp, &fix, sizeof(fix)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
From: Maxime Roussin-Bélanger maxime.roussinbelanger@gmail.com
commit 328b50e9a0ad1fe8accdf8c19923deebab5e0c01 upstream.
The chip is configured in 24 bit mode. The values read from it must always be treated as is. This fixes the issue by replacing the previous 16 bits value by a 24 bits buffer.
This changes affects the value output by previous version of the driver, since the least significant byte was missing. The upper half of 16 bit values previously output are now the upper half of a 24 bit value.
Fixes: e01e7eaf37d8 ("iio: light: introduce si1133")
Reported-by: Simon Goyette simon.goyette@gmail.com Co-authored-by: Guillaume Champagne champagne.guillaume.c@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Maxime Roussin-Bélanger maxime.roussinbelanger@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Guillaume Champagne champagne.guillaume.c@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/iio/light/si1133.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/light/si1133.c b/drivers/iio/light/si1133.c index 015a21f..9174ab9 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/light/si1133.c +++ b/drivers/iio/light/si1133.c @@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ #define SI1133_INPUT_FRACTION_LOW 15 #define SI1133_LUX_OUTPUT_FRACTION 12 #define SI1133_LUX_BUFFER_SIZE 9 +#define SI1133_MEASURE_BUFFER_SIZE 3 + +#define SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX 23
static const int si1133_scale_available[] = { 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128}; @@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ struct si1133_lux_coeff { } };
-static int si1133_calculate_polynomial_inner(u32 input, u8 fraction, u16 mag, +static int si1133_calculate_polynomial_inner(s32 input, u8 fraction, u16 mag, s8 shift) { return ((input << fraction) / mag) << shift; }
-static int si1133_calculate_output(u32 x, u32 y, u8 x_order, u8 y_order, +static int si1133_calculate_output(s32 x, s32 y, u8 x_order, u8 y_order, u8 input_fraction, s8 sign, const struct si1133_coeff *coeffs) { @@ -276,7 +279,7 @@ static int si1133_calculate_output(u32 x, u32 y, u8 x_order, u8 y_order, * The algorithm is from: * https://siliconlabs.github.io/Gecko_SDK_Doc/efm32zg/html/si1133_8c_source.ht... */ -static int si1133_calc_polynomial(u32 x, u32 y, u8 input_fraction, u8 num_coeff, +static int si1133_calc_polynomial(s32 x, s32 y, u8 input_fraction, u8 num_coeff, const struct si1133_coeff *coeffs) { u8 x_order, y_order; @@ -614,7 +617,7 @@ static int si1133_measure(struct si1133_data *data, { int err;
- __be16 resp; + u8 buffer[SI1133_MEASURE_BUFFER_SIZE];
err = si1133_set_adcmux(data, 0, chan->channel); if (err) @@ -625,12 +628,13 @@ static int si1133_measure(struct si1133_data *data, if (err) return err;
- err = si1133_bulk_read(data, SI1133_REG_HOSTOUT(0), sizeof(resp), - (u8 *)&resp); + err = si1133_bulk_read(data, SI1133_REG_HOSTOUT(0), sizeof(buffer), + buffer); if (err) return err;
- *val = be16_to_cpu(resp); + *val = sign_extend32((buffer[0] << 16) | (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2], + SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX);
return err; } @@ -704,9 +708,9 @@ static int si1133_get_lux(struct si1133_data *data, int *val) { int err; int lux; - u32 high_vis; - u32 low_vis; - u32 ir; + s32 high_vis; + s32 low_vis; + s32 ir; u8 buffer[SI1133_LUX_BUFFER_SIZE];
/* Activate lux channels */ @@ -719,9 +723,16 @@ static int si1133_get_lux(struct si1133_data *data, int *val) if (err) return err;
- high_vis = (buffer[0] << 16) | (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2]; - low_vis = (buffer[3] << 16) | (buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5]; - ir = (buffer[6] << 16) | (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8]; + high_vis = + sign_extend32((buffer[0] << 16) | (buffer[1] << 8) | buffer[2], + SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX); + + low_vis = + sign_extend32((buffer[3] << 16) | (buffer[4] << 8) | buffer[5], + SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX); + + ir = sign_extend32((buffer[6] << 16) | (buffer[7] << 8) | buffer[8], + SI1133_SIGN_BIT_INDEX);
if (high_vis > SI1133_ADC_THRESHOLD || ir > SI1133_ADC_THRESHOLD) lux = si1133_calc_polynomial(high_vis, ir,
From: Stephen Rothwell sfr@canb.auug.org.au
commit 3670664b5da555a2a481449b3baafff113b0ac35 upstream.
ev_byte_channel_send() assumes that its third argument is a 16 byte array. Some places where it is called it may not be (or we can't easily tell if it is). Newer compilers have started producing warnings about this, so make sure we actually pass a 16 byte array.
There may be more elegant solutions to this, but the driver is quite old and hasn't been updated in many years.
The warnings (from a powerpc allyesconfig build) are:
In file included from include/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:5, from arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/byteorder.h:14, from include/asm-generic/bitops/le.h:6, from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bitops.h:250, from include/linux/bitops.h:29, from include/linux/kernel.h:12, from include/asm-generic/bug.h:19, from arch/powerpc/include/asm/bug.h:109, from include/linux/bug.h:5, from include/linux/mmdebug.h:5, from include/linux/gfp.h:5, from include/linux/slab.h:15, from drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:24: drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c: In function ‘ehv_bc_udbg_putc’: arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:20: warning: array subscript 1 is outside array bounds of ‘const char[1]’ [-Warray-bounds] 298 | r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]); include/uapi/linux/byteorder/big_endian.h:40:51: note: in definition of macro ‘__be32_to_cpu’ 40 | #define __be32_to_cpu(x) ((__force __u32)(__be32)(x)) | ^ arch/powerpc/include/asm/epapr_hcalls.h:298:7: note: in expansion of macro ‘be32_to_cpu’ 298 | r6 = be32_to_cpu(p[1]); | ^~~~~~~~~~~ drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c:166:13: note: while referencing ‘data’ 166 | static void ehv_bc_udbg_putc(char c) | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Fixes: dcd83aaff1c8 ("tty/powerpc: introduce the ePAPR embedded hypervisor byte channel driver") Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell sfr@canb.auug.org.au Tested-by: Laurentiu Tudor laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com [mpe: Trim warnings from change log] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman mpe@ellerman.id.au Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109183912.5fcb52aa@canb.auug.org.au Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c b/drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c index eea4049..ca5004a 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c +++ b/drivers/tty/ehv_bytechan.c @@ -136,6 +136,21 @@ static int find_console_handle(void) return 1; }
+static unsigned int local_ev_byte_channel_send(unsigned int handle, + unsigned int *count, + const char *p) +{ + char buffer[EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned int c = *count; + + if (c < sizeof(buffer)) { + memcpy(buffer, p, c); + memset(&buffer[c], 0, sizeof(buffer) - c); + p = buffer; + } + return ev_byte_channel_send(handle, count, p); +} + /*************************** EARLY CONSOLE DRIVER ***************************/
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC @@ -154,7 +169,7 @@ static void byte_channel_spin_send(const char data)
do { count = 1; - ret = ev_byte_channel_send(CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC_HANDLE, + ret = local_ev_byte_channel_send(CONFIG_PPC_EARLY_DEBUG_EHV_BC_HANDLE, &count, &data); } while (ret == EV_EAGAIN); } @@ -221,7 +236,7 @@ static int ehv_bc_console_byte_channel_send(unsigned int handle, const char *s, while (count) { len = min_t(unsigned int, count, EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES); do { - ret = ev_byte_channel_send(handle, &len, s); + ret = local_ev_byte_channel_send(handle, &len, s); } while (ret == EV_EAGAIN); count -= len; s += len; @@ -401,7 +416,7 @@ static void ehv_bc_tx_dequeue(struct ehv_bc_data *bc) CIRC_CNT_TO_END(bc->head, bc->tail, BUF_SIZE), EV_BYTE_CHANNEL_MAX_BYTES);
- ret = ev_byte_channel_send(bc->handle, &len, bc->buf + bc->tail); + ret = local_ev_byte_channel_send(bc->handle, &len, bc->buf + bc->tail);
/* 'len' is valid only if the return code is 0 or EV_EAGAIN */ if (!ret || (ret == EV_EAGAIN))
From: "Paul E. McKenney" paulmck@kernel.org
commit 80c503e0e68fbe271680ab48f0fe29bc034b01b7 upstream.
The __torture_print_stats() function in locktorture.c carefully initializes local variable "min" to statp[0].n_lock_acquired, but then compares it to statp[i].n_lock_fail. Given that the .n_lock_fail field should normally be zero, and given the initialization, it seems reasonable to display the maximum and minimum number acquisitions instead of miscomputing the maximum and minimum number of failures. This commit therefore switches from failures to acquisitions.
And this turns out to be not only a day-zero bug, but entirely my own fault. I hate it when that happens!
Fixes: 0af3fe1efa53 ("locktorture: Add a lock-torture kernel module") Reported-by: Will Deacon will@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney paulmck@kernel.org Acked-by: Will Deacon will@kernel.org Cc: Davidlohr Bueso dave@stgolabs.net Cc: Josh Triplett josh@joshtriplett.org Cc: Peter Zijlstra peterz@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/locking/locktorture.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/locking/locktorture.c b/kernel/locking/locktorture.c index 7d0b0ed..95395ef5 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/locktorture.c +++ b/kernel/locking/locktorture.c @@ -710,10 +710,10 @@ static void __torture_print_stats(char *page, if (statp[i].n_lock_fail) fail = true; sum += statp[i].n_lock_acquired; - if (max < statp[i].n_lock_fail) - max = statp[i].n_lock_fail; - if (min > statp[i].n_lock_fail) - min = statp[i].n_lock_fail; + if (max < statp[i].n_lock_acquired) + max = statp[i].n_lock_acquired; + if (min > statp[i].n_lock_acquired) + min = statp[i].n_lock_acquired; } page += sprintf(page, "%s: Total: %lld Max/Min: %ld/%ld %s Fail: %d %s\n",
From: Frieder Schrempf frieder.schrempf@kontron.de
commit 621a7b780bd8b7054647d53d5071961f2c9e0873 upstream.
When writing the bad block marker to the OOB area the access mode should be set to MTD_OPS_RAW as it is done for reading the marker. Currently this only works because req.mode is initialized to MTD_OPS_PLACE_OOB (0) and spinand_write_to_cache_op() checks for req.mode != MTD_OPS_AUTO_OOB.
Fix this by explicitly setting req.mode to MTD_OPS_RAW.
Fixes: 7529df465248 ("mtd: nand: Add core infrastructure to support SPI NANDs") Signed-off-by: Frieder Schrempf frieder.schrempf@kontron.de Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon boris.brezillon@collabora.com Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200218100432.32433-3-frieder.schrempf@ko... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c b/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c index ee0c74b..a2f38b3 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/nand/spi/core.c @@ -670,6 +670,7 @@ static int spinand_markbad(struct nand_device *nand, const struct nand_pos *pos) .ooboffs = 0, .ooblen = sizeof(marker), .oobbuf.out = marker, + .mode = MTD_OPS_RAW, }; int ret;
From: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com
commit 4da0ea71ea934af18db4c63396ba2af1a679ef02 upstream.
This function is only called from lpddr_probe(). We free "lpddr" both here and in the caller, so it's a double free. The best place to free "lpddr" is in lpddr_probe() so let's delete this one.
Fixes: 8dc004395d5e ("[MTD] LPDDR qinfo probing.") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter dan.carpenter@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200228092554.o57igp3nqhyvf66t@kili.mount... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c b/drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c index b13557f..947bb71 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/lpddr/lpddr_cmds.c @@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ struct mtd_info *lpddr_cmdset(struct map_info *map) shared = kmalloc_array(lpddr->numchips, sizeof(struct flchip_shared), GFP_KERNEL); if (!shared) { - kfree(lpddr); kfree(mtd); return NULL; }
From: Wen Yang wenyang@linux.alibaba.com
commit 49c64df880570034308e4a9a49c4bc95cf8cdb33 upstream.
The variable 'name' is released multiple times in the error path, which may cause double free issues. This problem is avoided by adding a goto label to release the memory uniformly. And this change also makes the code a bit more cleaner.
Fixes: 4f678a58d335 ("mtd: fix memory leaks in phram_setup") Signed-off-by: Wen Yang wenyang@linux.alibaba.com Cc: Joern Engel joern@lazybastard.org Cc: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Cc: Richard Weinberger richard@nod.at Cc: Vignesh Raghavendra vigneshr@ti.com Cc: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal miquel.raynal@bootlin.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mtd/20200318153156.25612-1-wenyang@linux.aliba... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c index 9ee04b5..5a04ff6 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/devices/phram.c @@ -240,22 +240,25 @@ static int phram_setup(const char *val)
ret = parse_num64(&start, token[1]); if (ret) { - kfree(name); parse_err("illegal start address\n"); + goto error; }
ret = parse_num64(&len, token[2]); if (ret) { - kfree(name); parse_err("illegal device length\n"); + goto error; }
ret = register_device(name, start, len); - if (!ret) - pr_info("%s device: %#llx at %#llx\n", name, len, start); - else - kfree(name); + if (ret) + goto error; + + pr_info("%s device: %#llx at %#llx\n", name, len, start); + return 0;
+error: + kfree(name); return ret; }
From: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com
commit d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 upstream.
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test:
[12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock.
That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is,
1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed.
Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.
Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Waiman Long longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/keys/big_key-type.h | 2 +- include/keys/user-type.h | 3 +- include/linux/key-type.h | 2 +- net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/key.c | 27 ++++-------- security/keys/big_key.c | 11 ++--- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 7 ++- security/keys/keyctl.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/keys/keyring.c | 6 +-- security/keys/request_key_auth.c | 7 ++- security/keys/trusted.c | 14 +----- security/keys/user_defined.c | 5 +-- 12 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/keys/big_key-type.h b/include/keys/big_key-type.h index e0970a5..a7207a9 100644 --- a/include/keys/big_key-type.h +++ b/include/keys/big_key-type.h @@ -21,6 +21,6 @@ extern void big_key_revoke(struct key *key); extern void big_key_destroy(struct key *key); extern void big_key_describe(const struct key *big_key, struct seq_file *m); -extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); +extern long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
#endif /* _KEYS_BIG_KEY_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h index 12babe9..0d8f3cd 100644 --- a/include/keys/user-type.h +++ b/include/keys/user-type.h @@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ struct user_key_payload { extern void user_revoke(struct key *key); extern void user_destroy(struct key *key); extern void user_describe(const struct key *user, struct seq_file *m); -extern long user_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); +extern long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
static inline const struct user_key_payload *user_key_payload_rcu(const struct key *key) { diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h index d3c5ae8..3341dda 100644 --- a/include/linux/key-type.h +++ b/include/linux/key-type.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct key_type { * much is copied into the buffer * - shouldn't do the copy if the buffer is NULL */ - long (*read)(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen); + long (*read)(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen);
/* handle request_key() for this type instead of invoking * /sbin/request-key (optional) diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c index 7f45348..a049420 100644 --- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c +++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + char *buffer, size_t buflen) { int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/key.c b/net/rxrpc/key.c index e7f6b88..ad9d1b2 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/key.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/key.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *); static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *); static void rxrpc_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); -static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); +static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
/* * rxrpc defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an @@ -1044,12 +1044,12 @@ struct key *rxrpc_get_null_key(const char *keyname) * - this returns the result in XDR form */ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + char *buffer, size_t buflen) { const struct rxrpc_key_token *token; const struct krb5_principal *princ; size_t size; - __be32 __user *xdr, *oldxdr; + __be32 *xdr, *oldxdr; u32 cnlen, toksize, ntoks, tok, zero; u16 toksizes[AFSTOKEN_MAX]; int loop; @@ -1126,30 +1126,25 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, if (!buffer || buflen < size) return size;
- xdr = (__be32 __user *) buffer; + xdr = (__be32 *)buffer; zero = 0; #define ENCODE(x) \ do { \ - __be32 y = htonl(x); \ - if (put_user(y, xdr++) < 0) \ - goto fault; \ + *xdr++ = htonl(x); \ } while(0) #define ENCODE_DATA(l, s) \ do { \ u32 _l = (l); \ ENCODE(l); \ - if (copy_to_user(xdr, (s), _l) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ - if (_l & 3 && \ - copy_to_user((u8 __user *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ + memcpy(xdr, (s), _l); \ + if (_l & 3) \ + memcpy((u8 *)xdr + _l, &zero, 4 - (_l & 3)); \ xdr += (_l + 3) >> 2; \ } while(0) #define ENCODE64(x) \ do { \ __be64 y = cpu_to_be64(x); \ - if (copy_to_user(xdr, &y, 8) != 0) \ - goto fault; \ + memcpy(xdr, &y, 8); \ xdr += 8 >> 2; \ } while(0) #define ENCODE_STR(s) \ @@ -1240,8 +1235,4 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key, ASSERTCMP((char __user *) xdr - buffer, ==, size); _leave(" = %zu", size); return size; - -fault: - _leave(" = -EFAULT"); - return -EFAULT; } diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 2806e70..630594a 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) * read the key data * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ -long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) +long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len]; long ret; @@ -395,9 +395,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
ret = datalen;
- /* copy decrypted data to user */ - if (copy_to_user(buffer, buf->virt, datalen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + /* copy out decrypted data */ + memcpy(buffer, buf->virt, datalen);
err_fput: fput(file); @@ -405,9 +404,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) big_key_free_buffer(buf); } else { ret = datalen; - if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], - datalen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen); }
return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index d92cbf9..571f6d4 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -895,14 +895,14 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) }
/* - * encrypted_read - format and copy the encrypted data to userspace + * encrypted_read - format and copy out the encrypted data * * The resulting datablob format is: * <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <encrypted iv> <encrypted data> * * On success, return to userspace the encrypted key datablob size. */ -static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, +static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload; @@ -950,8 +950,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, key_put(mkey); memzero_explicit(derived_key, sizeof(derived_key));
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, ascii_buf, asciiblob_len); kzfree(ascii_buf);
return asciiblob_len; diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index e00e202..4b6a084 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -743,6 +743,21 @@ long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid, }
/* + * Call the read method + */ +static long __keyctl_read_key(struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) +{ + long ret; + + down_read(&key->sem); + ret = key_validate(key); + if (ret == 0) + ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); + up_read(&key->sem); + return ret; +} + +/* * Read a key's payload. * * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the @@ -757,26 +772,27 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) struct key *key; key_ref_t key_ref; long ret; + char *key_data;
/* find the key first */ key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) { ret = -ENOKEY; - goto error; + goto out; }
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
ret = key_read_state(key); if (ret < 0) - goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */ + goto key_put_out; /* Negatively instantiated */
/* see if we can read it directly */ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); if (ret == 0) goto can_read_key; if (ret != -EACCES) - goto error2; + goto key_put_out;
/* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be @@ -784,26 +800,51 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) */ if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) { ret = -EACCES; - goto error2; + goto key_put_out; }
/* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */ can_read_key: - ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (key->type->read) { - /* Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) - * to protect against the key being updated or revoked. - */ - down_read(&key->sem); - ret = key_validate(key); - if (ret == 0) - ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen); - up_read(&key->sem); + if (!key->type->read) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + goto key_put_out; }
-error2: + if (!buffer || !buflen) { + /* Get the key length from the read method */ + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, NULL, 0); + goto key_put_out; + } + + /* + * Read the data with the semaphore held (since we might sleep) + * to protect against the key being updated or revoked. + * + * Allocating a temporary buffer to hold the keys before + * transferring them to user buffer to avoid potential + * deadlock involving page fault and mmap_sem. + */ + key_data = kmalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL); + + if (!key_data) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto key_put_out; + } + ret = __keyctl_read_key(key, key_data, buflen); + + /* + * Read methods will just return the required length without + * any copying if the provided length isn't large enough. + */ + if (ret > 0 && ret <= buflen) { + if (copy_to_user(buffer, key_data, ret)) + ret = -EFAULT; + } + kzfree(key_data); + +key_put_out: key_put(key); -error: +out: return ret; }
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 99a5514..e8f2366 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -432,7 +432,6 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) { struct keyring_read_iterator_context *ctx = data; const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - int ret;
kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}", key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen); @@ -440,10 +439,7 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen) return 1;
- ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ctx->buffer++; + *ctx->buffer++ = key->serial; ctx->count += sizeof(key->serial); return 0; } diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index 1d34b2a..13ac3b1 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *, static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *); static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *); static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *); -static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t); +static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char *, size_t);
/* * The request-key authorisation key type definition. @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, - char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) + char *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct request_key_auth *rka = get_request_key_auth(key); size_t datalen; @@ -102,8 +102,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key, if (buflen > datalen) buflen = datalen;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, rka->callout_info, buflen); }
return ret; diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 577e0104..75d50e9 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -1135,11 +1135,10 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. */ -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { const struct trusted_key_payload *p; - char *ascii_buf; char *bufp; int i;
@@ -1148,18 +1147,9 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, return -EINVAL;
if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { - ascii_buf = kmalloc_array(2, p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - - bufp = ascii_buf; + bufp = buffer; for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { - kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; - } - kzfree(ascii_buf); } return 2 * p->blob_len; } diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 9f558be..0e723b6 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) * read the key data * - the key's semaphore is read-locked */ -long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) +long user_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen) { const struct user_key_payload *upayload; long ret; @@ -185,8 +185,7 @@ long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) if (buflen > upayload->datalen) buflen = upayload->datalen;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, upayload->data, buflen) != 0) - ret = -EFAULT; + memcpy(buffer, upayload->data, buflen); }
return ret;
From: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net
[ no upstream commit ]
See the glory details in 100605035e15 ("bpf: Verifier, do_refine_retval_range may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") for why 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") is buggy. The whole series however is not suitable for stable since it adds significant amount [0] of verifier complexity in order to add 32bit subreg tracking. Something simpler is needed.
Unfortunately, reverting 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") or just cherry-picking 100605035e15 ("bpf: Verifier, do_refine_retval_range may clamp umin to 0 incorrectly") is not an option since it will break existing tracing programs badly (at least those that are using bpf_get_stack() and bpf_probe_read_str() helpers). Not fixing it in stable is also not an option since on 4.19 kernels an error will cause a soft-lockup due to hitting dead-code sanitized branch since we don't hard-wire such branches in old kernels yet. But even then for 5.x 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") would cause wrong bounds on the verifier simluation when an error is hit.
In one of the earlier iterations of mentioned patch series for upstream there was the concern that just using smax_value in do_refine_retval_range() would nuke bounds by subsequent <<32 >>32 shifts before the comparison against 0 [1] which eventually led to the 32bit subreg tracking in the first place. While I initially went for implementing the idea [1] to pattern match the two shift operations, it turned out to be more complex than actually needed, meaning, we could simply treat do_refine_retval_range() similarly to how we branch off verification for conditionals or under speculation, that is, pushing a new reg state to the stack for later verification. This means, instead of verifying the current path with the ret_reg in [S32MIN, msize_max_value] interval where later bounds would get nuked, we split this into two: i) for the success case where ret_reg can be in [0, msize_max_value], and ii) for the error case with ret_reg known to be in interval [S32MIN, -1]. Latter will preserve the bounds during these shift patterns and can match reg < 0 test. test_progs also succeed with this approach.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158507130343.15666.8018068546764556975.stgit@joh... [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158015334199.28573.4940395881683556537.stgit@joh...
Fixes: 849fa50662fb ("bpf/verifier: refine retval R0 state for bpf_get_stack helper") Reported-by: Lorenzo Fontana fontanalorenz@gmail.com Reported-by: Leonardo Di Donato leodidonato@gmail.com Reported-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann daniel@iogearbox.net Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov ast@kernel.org Acked-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Tested-by: John Fastabend john.fastabend@gmail.com Tested-by: Lorenzo Fontana fontanalorenz@gmail.com Tested-by: Leonardo Di Donato leodidonato@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index e85636f..daf0a96 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -188,8 +188,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta { bool pkt_access; int regno; int access_size; - s64 msize_smax_value; - u64 msize_umax_value; + u64 msize_max_value; };
static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock); @@ -2076,8 +2075,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, /* remember the mem_size which may be used later * to refine return values. */ - meta->msize_smax_value = reg->smax_value; - meta->msize_umax_value = reg->umax_value; + meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value;
/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check * happens using its boundaries. @@ -2448,21 +2446,44 @@ static int prepare_func_exit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *insn_idx) return 0; }
-static void do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, - int func_id, - struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) +static int do_refine_retval_range(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, + struct bpf_reg_state *regs, int ret_type, + int func_id, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { struct bpf_reg_state *ret_reg = ®s[BPF_REG_0]; + struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg = *ret_reg; + bool ret;
if (ret_type != RET_INTEGER || (func_id != BPF_FUNC_get_stack && func_id != BPF_FUNC_probe_read_str)) - return; + return 0; + + /* Error case where ret is in interval [S32MIN, -1]. */ + ret_reg->smin_value = S32_MIN; + ret_reg->smax_value = -1; + + __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); + __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); + __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); + + ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, false); + if (!ret) + return -EFAULT; + + *ret_reg = tmp_reg; + + /* Success case where ret is in range [0, msize_max_value]. */ + ret_reg->smin_value = 0; + ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_max_value; + ret_reg->umin_value = ret_reg->smin_value; + ret_reg->umax_value = ret_reg->smax_value;
- ret_reg->smax_value = meta->msize_smax_value; - ret_reg->umax_value = meta->msize_umax_value; __reg_deduce_bounds(ret_reg); __reg_bound_offset(ret_reg); + __update_reg_bounds(ret_reg); + + return 0; }
static int @@ -2617,7 +2638,9 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn return -EINVAL; }
- do_refine_retval_range(regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); + err = do_refine_retval_range(env, regs, fn->ret_type, func_id, &meta); + if (err) + return err;
err = check_map_func_compatibility(env, meta.map_ptr, func_id); if (err)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
--- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index 555dbaa..72ae7e8 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 19 -SUBLEVEL = 117 +SUBLEVEL = 118 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = "People's Front"
-
Yang Yingliang