From: Wang Wensheng wangwensheng4@huawei.com
hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I578LV CVE: NA
-------------------------------------------------
Add the missing initialization for kc.sp_flag in sp_make_share_kva_to_spg(). Or a random value would be used in sp_remap_kva_to_vma().
Fixes: da51b55eeff9 ("mm/share_pool: Support read-only memory allocation") Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng wangwensheng4@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Weilong Chen chenweilong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- mm/share_pool.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/mm/share_pool.c b/mm/share_pool.c index ec889155b0ff..893e5352bf01 100644 --- a/mm/share_pool.c +++ b/mm/share_pool.c @@ -3023,7 +3023,7 @@ static void *sp_make_share_kva_to_spg(unsigned long kva, unsigned long size, }
spa->kva = kva; - + kc.sp_flags = sp_flags; list_for_each_entry(spg_node, &spg->procs, proc_node) { mm = spg_node->master->mm; kc.state = K2U_NORMAL;
From: Vitaly Kuznetsov vkuznets@redhat.com
stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.238 commit 2f4835b5188f3b73b2b048a761ae2553e845b027 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I5EI1I CVE: CVE-2022-2153
--------------------------------
commit b1e34d325397a33d97d845e312d7cf2a8b646b44 upstream.
Setting non-zero values to SYNIC/STIMER MSRs activates certain features, this should not happen when KVM_CAP_HYPERV_SYNIC{,2} was not activated.
Note, it would've been better to forbid writing anything to SYNIC/STIMER MSRs, including zeroes, however, at least QEMU tries clearing HV_X64_MSR_STIMER0_CONFIG without SynIC. HV_X64_MSR_EOM MSR is somewhat 'special' as writing zero there triggers an action, this also should not happen when SynIC wasn't activated.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov vkuznets@redhat.com Message-Id: 20220325132140.25650-4-vkuznets@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini pbonzini@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong chenxiaosong2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jason Yan yanaijie@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng xiujianfeng@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c index 5842c5f587fe..426f612f412f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = synic_to_vcpu(synic); int ret;
- if (!synic->active && !host) + if (!synic->active && (!host || data)) return 1;
trace_kvm_hv_synic_set_msr(vcpu->vcpu_id, msr, data, host); @@ -283,6 +283,9 @@ static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic, case HV_X64_MSR_EOM: { int i;
+ if (!synic->active) + break; + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++) kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(vcpu, i); break; @@ -544,6 +547,12 @@ static int stimer_start(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer) static int stimer_set_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 config, bool host) { + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = stimer_to_vcpu(stimer); + struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = vcpu_to_synic(vcpu); + + if (!synic->active && (!host || config)) + return 1; + trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_config(stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id, stimer->index, config, host);
@@ -558,6 +567,12 @@ static int stimer_set_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 config, static int stimer_set_count(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 count, bool host) { + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = stimer_to_vcpu(stimer); + struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = vcpu_to_synic(vcpu); + + if (!synic->active && (!host || count)) + return 1; + trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_count(stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id, stimer->index, count, host);
From: Liu Shixin liushixin2@huawei.com
hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5EZK8 CVE: NA
--------------------------------
After patch ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"), swiotlb_bounce will be called in swiotlb_tbl_map_single unconditionally. This requires that the physical address must be valid, which is not always true on stable-4.19 or earlier version. On stable-4.19, swiotlb_alloc_buffer will call swiotlb_tbl_map_single with orig_addr equal to zero, which cause such a panic:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffb77a40000000 ... pc : __memcpy+0x100/0x180 lr : swiotlb_bounce+0x74/0x88 ... Call trace: __memcpy+0x100/0x180 swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x2c8/0x338 swiotlb_alloc+0xb4/0x198 __dma_alloc+0x84/0x1d8 ...
On stable-4.9 and stable-4.14, swiotlb_alloc_coherent wille call map_single with orig_addr equal to zero, which can cause same panic.
Fix this by skipping swiotlb_bounce when orig_addr is zero.
Fixes: ddbd89deb7d3 ("swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE") Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin liushixin2@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c index 694e7ccea659..8059f83bbe48 100644 --- a/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +++ b/kernel/dma/swiotlb.c @@ -590,7 +590,8 @@ phys_addr_t swiotlb_tbl_map_single(struct device *hwdev, * unconditional bounce may prevent leaking swiotlb content (i.e. * kernel memory) to user-space. */ - swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + if (orig_addr) + swiotlb_bounce(orig_addr, tlb_addr, size, DMA_TO_DEVICE); return tlb_addr; }
From: "Steven Rostedt (VMware)" rostedt@goodmis.org
stable inclusion from stable-5.10.50 commit 0531e84bc8ac750b7a15c18d478804c0d98f0a86 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I5ETW1 CVE: NA
--------------------------------
commit 9913d5745bd720c4266805c8d29952a3702e4eca upstream.
All internal use cases for tracepoint_probe_register() is set to not ever be called with the same function and data. If it is, it is considered a bug, as that means the accounting of handling tracepoints is corrupted. If the function and data for a tracepoint is already registered when tracepoint_probe_register() is called, it will call WARN_ON_ONCE() and return with EEXISTS.
The BPF system call can end up calling tracepoint_probe_register() with the same data, which now means that this can trigger the warning because of a user space process. As WARN_ON_ONCE() should not be called because user space called a system call with bad data, there needs to be a way to register a tracepoint without triggering a warning.
Enter tracepoint_probe_register_may_exist(), which can be called, but will not cause a WARN_ON() if the probe already exists. It will still error out with EEXIST, which will then be sent to the user space that performed the BPF system call.
This keeps the previous testing for issues with other users of the tracepoint code, while letting BPF call it with duplicated data and not warn about it.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210626135845.4080-1-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAK... Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=41f4318cf01762389f4d1c1c459da4f542fe515...
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: c4f6699dfcb85 ("bpf: introduce BPF_RAW_TRACEPOINT") Reported-by: syzbot syzbot+721aa903751db87aa244@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp Tested-by: syzbot+721aa903751db87aa244@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com Acked-by: Weilong Chen chenweilong@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Chen Jun chenjun102@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin chenzhongjin@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Xu Kuohai xukuohai@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu liuyongqiang13@huawei.com --- include/linux/tracepoint.h | 10 ++++++++++ kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 3 ++- kernel/tracepoint.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/tracepoint.h b/include/linux/tracepoint.h index e9de8ad0bad7..47444a35775d 100644 --- a/include/linux/tracepoint.h +++ b/include/linux/tracepoint.h @@ -42,7 +42,17 @@ extern int tracepoint_probe_register_prio(struct tracepoint *tp, void *probe, void *data, int prio); extern int +tracepoint_probe_register_prio_may_exist(struct tracepoint *tp, void *probe, void *data, + int prio); +extern int tracepoint_probe_unregister(struct tracepoint *tp, void *probe, void *data); +static inline int +tracepoint_probe_register_may_exist(struct tracepoint *tp, void *probe, + void *data) +{ + return tracepoint_probe_register_prio_may_exist(tp, probe, data, + TRACEPOINT_DEFAULT_PRIO); +} extern void for_each_kernel_tracepoint(void (*fct)(struct tracepoint *tp, void *priv), void *priv); diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c index f45e0ca388ed..a266bfc8fcf6 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c @@ -1426,7 +1426,8 @@ static int __bpf_probe_register(struct bpf_raw_event_map *btp, struct bpf_prog * if (prog->aux->max_tp_access > btp->writable_size) return -EINVAL;
- return tracepoint_probe_register(tp, (void *)btp->bpf_func, prog); + return tracepoint_probe_register_may_exist(tp, (void *)btp->bpf_func, + prog); }
int bpf_probe_register(struct bpf_raw_event_map *btp, struct bpf_prog *prog) diff --git a/kernel/tracepoint.c b/kernel/tracepoint.c index d5ce69231912..625297a9cae2 100644 --- a/kernel/tracepoint.c +++ b/kernel/tracepoint.c @@ -284,7 +284,8 @@ static void *func_remove(struct tracepoint_func **funcs, * Add the probe function to a tracepoint. */ static int tracepoint_add_func(struct tracepoint *tp, - struct tracepoint_func *func, int prio) + struct tracepoint_func *func, int prio, + bool warn) { struct tracepoint_func *old, *tp_funcs; int ret; @@ -299,7 +300,7 @@ static int tracepoint_add_func(struct tracepoint *tp, lockdep_is_held(&tracepoints_mutex)); old = func_add(&tp_funcs, func, prio); if (IS_ERR(old)) { - WARN_ON_ONCE(PTR_ERR(old) != -ENOMEM); + WARN_ON_ONCE(warn && PTR_ERR(old) != -ENOMEM); return PTR_ERR(old); }
@@ -350,6 +351,32 @@ static int tracepoint_remove_func(struct tracepoint *tp, return 0; }
+/** + * tracepoint_probe_register_prio_may_exist - Connect a probe to a tracepoint with priority + * @tp: tracepoint + * @probe: probe handler + * @data: tracepoint data + * @prio: priority of this function over other registered functions + * + * Same as tracepoint_probe_register_prio() except that it will not warn + * if the tracepoint is already registered. + */ +int tracepoint_probe_register_prio_may_exist(struct tracepoint *tp, void *probe, + void *data, int prio) +{ + struct tracepoint_func tp_func; + int ret; + + mutex_lock(&tracepoints_mutex); + tp_func.func = probe; + tp_func.data = data; + tp_func.prio = prio; + ret = tracepoint_add_func(tp, &tp_func, prio, false); + mutex_unlock(&tracepoints_mutex); + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tracepoint_probe_register_prio_may_exist); + /** * tracepoint_probe_register_prio - Connect a probe to a tracepoint with priority * @tp: tracepoint @@ -373,7 +400,7 @@ int tracepoint_probe_register_prio(struct tracepoint *tp, void *probe, tp_func.func = probe; tp_func.data = data; tp_func.prio = prio; - ret = tracepoint_add_func(tp, &tp_func, prio); + ret = tracepoint_add_func(tp, &tp_func, prio, true); mutex_unlock(&tracepoints_mutex); return ret; }
-
Yongqiang Liu