From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

commit 17a82716587e9d7c3b246a789add490b2b5dcab6 upstream.

In previous patches that added support for new iowarrior devices, the handling of the report size was not done correct.

Fix that up and update the copyright date for the driver

Reworked from an original patch written by Christoph Jung.

Fixes: bab5417f5f01 ("USB: misc: iowarrior: add support for the 100 device") Fixes: 5f6f8da2d7b5 ("USB: misc: iowarrior: add support for the 28 and 28L devices") Fixes: 461d8deb26a7 ("USB: misc: iowarrior: add support for 2 OEMed devices") Cc: stable stable@kernel.org Reported-by: Christoph Jung jung@codemercs.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200726094939.1268978-1-gregkh@linuxfoundation.or... Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c index 92875a264b14..9c1ca20d4139 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c +++ b/drivers/usb/misc/iowarrior.c @@ -2,8 +2,9 @@ /* * Native support for the I/O-Warrior USB devices * - * Copyright (c) 2003-2005 Code Mercenaries GmbH - * written by Christian Lucht lucht@codemercs.com + * Copyright (c) 2003-2005, 2020 Code Mercenaries GmbH + * written by Christian Lucht lucht@codemercs.com and + * Christoph Jung jung@codemercs.com * * based on

@@ -817,14 +818,28 @@ static int iowarrior_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,

/* we have to check the report_size often, so remember it in the endianness suitable for our machine */ dev->report_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(dev->int_in_endpoint); - if ((dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) && - ((dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56AM) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28L) || - (dev->product_id == USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW100))) - /* IOWarrior56 has wMaxPacketSize different from report size */ - dev->report_size = 7; + + /* + * Some devices need the report size to be different than the + * endpoint size. + */ + if (dev->interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceNumber == 0) { + switch (dev->product_id) { + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56: + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW56AM: + dev->report_size = 7; + break; + + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28: + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW28L: + dev->report_size = 4; + break; + + case USB_DEVICE_ID_CODEMERCS_IOW100: + dev->report_size = 13; + break; + } + }

/* create the urb and buffer for reading */ dev->int_in_urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);

From: Forest Crossman cyrozap@gmail.com

commit ec37198acca7b4c17b96247697406e47aafe0605 upstream.

I've confirmed that the ASMedia ASM1142 has the same problem as the ASM2142/ASM3142, in that it too reports that it supports 64-bit DMA addresses when in fact it does not. As with the ASM2142/ASM3142, this can cause problems on systems where the upper bits matter, and adding the XHCI_NO_64BIT_SUPPORT quirk completely fixes the issue.

Acked-by: Mathias Nyman mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Forest Crossman cyrozap@gmail.com Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200728042408.180529-3-cyrozap@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c index 296e614919da..1a6a23e57201 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c +++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_AMD_PROMONTORYA_1 0x43bc #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042_XHCI 0x1042 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI 0x1142 +#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1142_XHCI 0x1242 #define PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI 0x2142

static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd"; @@ -234,7 +235,8 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct device *dev, struct xhci_hcd *xhci) pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1042A_XHCI) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_TRUST_TX_LENGTH; if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA && - pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI) + (pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_1142_XHCI || + pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_ASMEDIA_2142_XHCI)) xhci->quirks |= XHCI_NO_64BIT_SUPPORT;

if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_ASMEDIA &&

From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de

commit 80982c7e834e5d4e325b6ce33757012ecafdf0bb upstream.

Some ioctls via OSS sequencer API may race and lead to UAF when the port create and delete are performed concurrently, as spotted by a couple of syzkaller cases. This patch is an attempt to address it by serializing the ioctls with the existing register_mutex.

Basically OSS sequencer API is an obsoleted interface and was designed without much consideration of the concurrency. There are very few applications with it, and the concurrent performance isn't asked, hence this "big hammer" approach should be good enough.

Reported-by: syzbot+1a54a94bd32716796edd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+9d2abfef257f3e2d4713@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Suggested-by: Hillf Danton hdanton@sina.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804185815.2453-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c index e1f44fc86885..ed5bca0db3e7 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss.c @@ -181,10 +181,16 @@ static long odev_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { struct seq_oss_devinfo *dp; + long rc; + dp = file->private_data; if (snd_BUG_ON(!dp)) return -ENXIO; - return snd_seq_oss_ioctl(dp, cmd, arg); + + mutex_lock(&register_mutex); + rc = snd_seq_oss_ioctl(dp, cmd, arg); + mutex_unlock(&register_mutex); + return rc; }

#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT

From: Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com

commit 51c19bf3d5cfaa66571e4b88ba2a6f6295311101 upstream.

Check upon `num_rsp` is insufficient. A malformed event packet with a large `num_rsp` number makes hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt() go out of bounds. Fix it.

This patch fixes the following syzbot bug:

https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=4bf11aa05c4ca51ce0df86e500fce486552dc8d...

Reported-by: syzbot+d8489a79b781849b9c46@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index cdb92b129906..59899dbf742d 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -4151,7 +4151,7 @@ static void hci_extended_inquiry_result_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,

BT_DBG("%s num_rsp %d", hdev->name, num_rsp);

- if (!num_rsp) + if (!num_rsp || skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) return;

if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PERIODIC_INQ))

From: Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com

commit 629b49c848ee71244203934347bd7730b0ddee8d upstream.

Check `num_rsp` before using it as for-loop counter. Add `unlock` label.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Peilin Ye yepeilin.cs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann marcel@holtmann.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c index d67ddc92f82e..2b4a7cf03041 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c @@ -3948,6 +3948,9 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct inquiry_info_with_rssi_and_pscan_mode *info; info = (void *) (skb->data + 1);

+ if (skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) + goto unlock; + for (; num_rsp; num_rsp--, info++) { u32 flags;

@@ -3969,6 +3972,9 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, } else { struct inquiry_info_with_rssi *info = (void *) (skb->data + 1);

+ if (skb->len < num_rsp * sizeof(*info) + 1) + goto unlock; + for (; num_rsp; num_rsp--, info++) { u32 flags;

@@ -3989,6 +3995,7 @@ static void hci_inquiry_result_with_rssi_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, } }

+unlock: hci_dev_unlock(hdev); }

From: Jann Horn jannh@google.com

commit 4b836a1426cb0f1ef2a6e211d7e553221594f8fc upstream.

Binder is designed such that a binder_proc never has references to itself. If this rule is violated, memory corruption can occur when a process sends a transaction to itself; see e.g. https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=09e05aba06723a94d43d.

There is a remaining edgecase through which such a transaction-to-self can still occur from the context of a task with BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR access:

- task A opens /dev/binder twice, creating binder_proc instances P1 and P2 - P1 becomes context manager - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 0 in its handle table - P1 dies (by closing the /dev/binder fd and waiting a bit) - P2 becomes context manager - P2 calls ACQUIRE on the magic handle 0, allocating index 1 in its handle table [this triggers a warning: "binder: 1974:1974 tried to acquire reference to desc 0, got 1 instead"] - task B opens /dev/binder once, creating binder_proc instance P3 - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) with (void*)1 as argument (two-way transaction) - P2 receives the handle and uses it to call P3 (two-way transaction) - P3 calls P2 (via magic handle 0) (two-way transaction) - P2 calls P2 (via handle 1) (two-way transaction)

And then, if P2 does *NOT* accept the incoming transaction work, but instead closes the binder fd, we get a crash.

Solve it by preventing the context manager from using ACQUIRE on ref 0. There shouldn't be any legitimate reason for the context manager to do that.

Additionally, print a warning if someone manages to find another way to trigger a transaction-to-self bug in the future.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver") Acked-by: Todd Kjos tkjos@google.com Signed-off-by: Jann Horn jannh@google.com Reviewed-by: Martijn Coenen maco@android.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200727120424.1627555-1-jannh@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/android/binder.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index cf4367135a00..112b5b50ad3c 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2862,6 +2862,12 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, goto err_dead_binder; } e->to_node = target_node->debug_id; + if (WARN_ON(proc == target_proc)) { + return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; + return_error_param = -EINVAL; + return_error_line = __LINE__; + goto err_invalid_target_handle; + } if (security_binder_transaction(proc->tsk, target_proc->tsk) < 0) { return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY; @@ -3366,10 +3372,17 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_node *ctx_mgr_node; mutex_lock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock); ctx_mgr_node = context->binder_context_mgr_node; - if (ctx_mgr_node) + if (ctx_mgr_node) { + if (ctx_mgr_node->proc == proc) { + binder_user_error("%d:%d context manager tried to acquire desc 0\n", + proc->pid, thread->pid); + mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock); + return -EINVAL; + } ret = binder_inc_ref_for_node( proc, ctx_mgr_node, strong, NULL, &rdata); + } mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock); } if (ret)

From: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org

commit 47a459ecc800a17109d0c496a4e21e478806ee40 upstream.

Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot blindly do devres conversions so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered.

Fixes: 8d3b6a4001ce ("leds: wm831x-status: Use devm_led_classdev_register") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6 Cc: Amitoj Kaur Chawla amitoj1606@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek pavel@ucw.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c b/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c index c5798b92e4d3..d926edcb04ee 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-wm831x-status.c @@ -273,12 +273,23 @@ static int wm831x_status_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) drvdata->cdev.blink_set = wm831x_status_blink_set; drvdata->cdev.groups = wm831x_status_groups;

- ret = devm_led_classdev_register(wm831x->dev, &drvdata->cdev); + ret = led_classdev_register(wm831x->dev, &drvdata->cdev); if (ret < 0) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "Failed to register LED: %d\n", ret); return ret; }

+ platform_set_drvdata(pdev, drvdata); + + return 0; +} + +static int wm831x_status_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct wm831x_status *drvdata = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + led_classdev_unregister(&drvdata->cdev); + return 0; }

@@ -287,6 +298,7 @@ static struct platform_driver wm831x_status_driver = { .name = "wm831x-status", }, .probe = wm831x_status_probe, + .remove = wm831x_status_remove, };

module_platform_driver(wm831x_status_driver);

From: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org

commit d584221e683bbd173738603b83a315f27d27d043 upstream.

Several MFD child drivers register their class devices directly under the parent device. This means you cannot blindly do devres conversions so that deregistration ends up being tied to the parent device, something which leads to use-after-free on driver unbind when the class device is released while still being registered.

Fixes: 50154e29e5cc ("leds: lm3533: Use devm_led_classdev_register") Cc: stable stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.6 Cc: Amitoj Kaur Chawla amitoj1606@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Pavel Machek pavel@ucw.cz Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c b/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c index 72224b599ffc..c1e562a4d6ad 100644 --- a/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c +++ b/drivers/leds/leds-lm3533.c @@ -698,7 +698,7 @@ static int lm3533_led_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)

platform_set_drvdata(pdev, led);

- ret = devm_led_classdev_register(pdev->dev.parent, &led->cdev); + ret = led_classdev_register(pdev->dev.parent, &led->cdev); if (ret) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "failed to register LED %d\n", pdev->id); return ret; @@ -708,13 +708,18 @@ static int lm3533_led_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)

ret = lm3533_led_setup(led, pdata); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_deregister;

ret = lm3533_ctrlbank_enable(&led->cb); if (ret) - return ret; + goto err_deregister;

return 0; + +err_deregister: + led_classdev_unregister(&led->cdev); + + return ret; }

static int lm3533_led_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) @@ -724,6 +729,7 @@ static int lm3533_led_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "%s\n", __func__);

lm3533_ctrlbank_disable(&led->cb); + led_classdev_unregister(&led->cdev);

return 0; }

From: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de

[ Upstream commit a39c46067c845a8a2d7144836e9468b7f072343e ]

p9_fd_open just fgets file descriptors passed in from userspace, but doesn't verify that they are valid for read or writing. This gets cought down in the VFS when actually attempting a read or write, but a new warning added in linux-next upsets syzcaller.

Fix this by just verifying the fds early on.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710085722.435850-1-hch@lst.de Reported-by: syzbot+e6f77e16ff68b2434a2c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig hch@lst.de [Dominique: amend goto as per Doug Nazar's review] Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet asmadeus@codewreck.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- net/9p/trans_fd.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/9p/trans_fd.c b/net/9p/trans_fd.c index d28c2cc9618f..b6dcb40fa8a7 100644 --- a/net/9p/trans_fd.c +++ b/net/9p/trans_fd.c @@ -831,20 +831,28 @@ static int p9_fd_open(struct p9_client *client, int rfd, int wfd) return -ENOMEM;

ts->rd = fget(rfd); + if (!ts->rd) + goto out_free_ts; + if (!(ts->rd->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) + goto out_put_rd; ts->wr = fget(wfd); - if (!ts->rd || !ts->wr) { - if (ts->rd) - fput(ts->rd); - if (ts->wr) - fput(ts->wr); - kfree(ts); - return -EIO; - } + if (!ts->wr) + goto out_put_rd; + if (!(ts->wr->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) + goto out_put_wr;

client->trans = ts; client->status = Connected;

return 0; + +out_put_wr: + fput(ts->wr); +out_put_rd: + fput(ts->rd); +out_free_ts: + kfree(ts); + return -EIO; }

static int p9_socket_open(struct p9_client *client, struct socket *csocket)

From: Ben Skeggs bskeggs@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 15fbc3b938534cc8eaac584a7b0c1183fc968b86 ]

This is tripping up the format modifier patches.

Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs bskeggs@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c index fef38ea146a2..406cb99af7f2 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fbcon.c @@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ nouveau_fbcon_create(struct drm_fb_helper *helper, struct nouveau_framebuffer *fb; struct nouveau_channel *chan; struct nouveau_bo *nvbo; - struct drm_mode_fb_cmd2 mode_cmd; + struct drm_mode_fb_cmd2 mode_cmd = {}; int ret;

mode_cmd.width = sizes->surface_width;

From: Wolfram Sang wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com

[ Upstream commit 8808981baf96e1b3dea1f08461e4d958aa0dbde1 ]

Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com Reviewed-by: Alain Volmat alain.volmat@st.com Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang wsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c index 88959c8580ce..f2e7e373ee47 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-slave.c @@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ int i2c_slave_unregister(struct i2c_client *client) { int ret;

+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(client)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!client->adapter->algo->unreg_slave) { dev_err(&client->dev, "%s: not supported by adapter\n", __func__); return -EOPNOTSUPP;

From: Qiushi Wu wu000273@umn.edu

[ Upstream commit fe3c60684377d5ad9b0569b87ed3e26e12c8173b ]

kobject_init_and_add() takes reference even when it fails. If this function returns an error, kobject_put() must be called to properly clean up the memory associated with the object. Callback function fw_cfg_sysfs_release_entry() in kobject_put() can handle the pointer "entry" properly.

Signed-off-by: Qiushi Wu wu000273@umn.edu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200613190533.15712-1-wu000273@umn.edu Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin mst@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c index 039e0f91dba8..6945c3c96637 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg.c @@ -605,8 +605,10 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f) /* register entry under "/sys/firmware/qemu_fw_cfg/by_key/" */ err = kobject_init_and_add(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_entry_ktype, fw_cfg_sel_ko, "%d", entry->select); - if (err) - goto err_register; + if (err) { + kobject_put(&entry->kobj); + return err; + }

/* add raw binary content access */ err = sysfs_create_bin_file(&entry->kobj, &fw_cfg_sysfs_attr_raw); @@ -622,7 +624,6 @@ static int fw_cfg_register_file(const struct fw_cfg_file *f)

err_add_raw: kobject_del(&entry->kobj); -err_register: kfree(entry); return err; }

From: Francesco Ruggeri fruggeri@arista.com

[ Upstream commit 024a8168b749db7a4aa40a5fbdfa04bf7e77c1c0 ]

We observed two panics involving races with igb_reset_task. The first panic is caused by this race condition:

kworker reboot -f

igb_reset_task igb_reinit_locked igb_down napi_synchronize __igb_shutdown igb_clear_interrupt_scheme igb_free_q_vectors igb_free_q_vector adapter->q_vector[v_idx] = NULL; napi_disable Panics trying to access adapter->q_vector[v_idx].napi_state

The second panic (a divide error) is caused by this race:

kworker reboot -f tx packet

igb_reset_task __igb_shutdown rtnl_lock() ... igb_clear_interrupt_scheme igb_free_q_vectors adapter->num_tx_queues = 0 ... rtnl_unlock() rtnl_lock() igb_reinit_locked igb_down igb_up netif_tx_start_all_queues dev_hard_start_xmit igb_xmit_frame igb_tx_queue_mapping Panics on r_idx % adapter->num_tx_queues

This commit applies to igb_reset_task the same changes that were applied to ixgbe in commit 2f90b8657ec9 ("ixgbe: this patch adds support for DCB to the kernel and ixgbe driver"), commit 8f4c5c9fb87a ("ixgbe: reinit_locked() should be called with rtnl_lock") and commit 88adce4ea8f9 ("ixgbe: fix possible race in reset subtask").

Signed-off-by: Francesco Ruggeri fruggeri@arista.com Tested-by: Aaron Brown aaron.f.brown@intel.com Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c index 1117373d4dd6..6d9b8e81b44d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c @@ -6226,9 +6226,18 @@ static void igb_reset_task(struct work_struct *work) struct igb_adapter *adapter; adapter = container_of(work, struct igb_adapter, reset_task);

+ rtnl_lock(); + /* If we're already down or resetting, just bail */ + if (test_bit(__IGB_DOWN, &adapter->state) || + test_bit(__IGB_RESETTING, &adapter->state)) { + rtnl_unlock(); + return; + } + igb_dump(adapter); netdev_err(adapter->netdev, "Reset adapter\n"); igb_reinit_locked(adapter); + rtnl_unlock(); }

/**

From: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon pduplessis@efficios.com

[ Upstream commit e24c6447ccb7b1a01f9bf0aec94939e6450c0b4d ]

I compiled with AddressSanitizer and I had these memory leaks while I was using the tep_parse_format function:

Direct leak of 28 byte(s) in 4 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb07db49ffe in __interceptor_realloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dffe) #1 0x7fb07a724228 in extend_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:985 #2 0x7fb07a724c21 in __read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1140 #3 0x7fb07a724f78 in read_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1206 #4 0x7fb07a725191 in __read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1291 #5 0x7fb07a7251df in read_expect_type /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1299 #6 0x7fb07a72e6c8 in process_dynamic_array_len /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:2849 #7 0x7fb07a7304b8 in process_function /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3161 #8 0x7fb07a730900 in process_arg_token /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3207 #9 0x7fb07a727c0b in process_arg /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:1786 #10 0x7fb07a731080 in event_read_print_args /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3285 #11 0x7fb07a731722 in event_read_print /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:3369 #12 0x7fb07a740054 in __tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6335 #13 0x7fb07a74047a in __parse_event /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6389 #14 0x7fb07a740536 in tep_parse_format /home/pduplessis/repo/linux/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c:6431 #15 0x7fb07a785acf in parse_event ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:251 #16 0x7fb07a785ccd in parse_systems ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:284 #17 0x7fb07a786fb3 in read_metadata ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:593 #18 0x7fb07a78760e in ftrace_fs_source_init ../../../src/fs-src/fs.c:727 #19 0x7fb07d90c19c in add_component_with_init_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1048 #20 0x7fb07d90c87b in add_source_component_with_initialize_method_data ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1127 #21 0x7fb07d90c92a in bt_graph_add_source_component ../../../../src/lib/graph/graph.c:1152 #22 0x55db11aa632e in cmd_run_ctx_create_components_from_config_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2252 #23 0x55db11aa6fda in cmd_run_ctx_create_components ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2347 #24 0x55db11aa780c in cmd_run ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2461 #25 0x55db11aa8a7d in main ../../../src/cli/babeltrace2.c:2673 #26 0x7fb07d5460b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)

The token variable in the process_dynamic_array_len function is allocated in the read_expect_type function, but is not freed before calling the read_token function.

Free the token variable before calling read_token in order to plug the leak.

Signed-off-by: Philippe Duplessis-Guindon pduplessis@efficios.com Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) rostedt@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-devel/20200730150236.5392-1-pduplessis@e... Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo acme@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin sashal@kernel.org --- tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c b/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c index 382e476629fb..c0fcc8af2a3e 100644 --- a/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c +++ b/tools/lib/traceevent/event-parse.c @@ -2766,6 +2766,7 @@ process_dynamic_array_len(struct event_format *event, struct print_arg *arg, if (read_expected(EVENT_DELIM, ")") < 0) goto out_err;

+ free_token(token); type = read_token(&token); *tok = token;

From: Frank van der Linden fllinden@amazon.com

commit 08b5d5014a27e717826999ad20e394a8811aae92 upstream.

set/removexattr on an exported filesystem should break NFS delegations. This is true in general, but also for the upcoming support for RFC 8726 (NFSv4 extended attribute support). Make sure that they do.

Additionally, they need to grow a _locked variant, since callers might call this with i_rwsem held (like the NFS server code).

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.9+ Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Al Viro viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk Signed-off-by: Frank van der Linden fllinden@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever chuck.lever@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- fs/xattr.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/xattr.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 0d6a6a4af861..470ee0af3200 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -203,10 +203,22 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return error; }

- +/** + * __vfs_setxattr_locked: set an extended attribute while holding the inode + * lock + * + * @dentry - object to perform setxattr on + * @name - xattr name to set + * @value - value to set @name to + * @size - size of @value + * @flags - flags to pass into filesystem operations + * @delegated_inode - on return, will contain an inode pointer that + * a delegation was broken on, NULL if none. + */ int -vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, - size_t size, int flags) +__vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags, + struct inode **delegated_inode) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int error; @@ -215,15 +227,40 @@ vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, if (error) return error;

- inode_lock(inode); error = security_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); if (error) goto out;

+ error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); + if (error) + goto out; + error = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, name, value, size, flags);

out: + return error; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfs_setxattr_locked); + +int +vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, + size_t size, int flags) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL; + int error; + +retry_deleg: + inode_lock(inode); + error = __vfs_setxattr_locked(dentry, name, value, size, flags, + &delegated_inode); inode_unlock(inode); + + if (delegated_inode) { + error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode); + if (!error) + goto retry_deleg; + } return error; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_setxattr); @@ -377,8 +414,18 @@ __vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__vfs_removexattr);

+/** + * __vfs_removexattr_locked: set an extended attribute while holding the inode + * lock + * + * @dentry - object to perform setxattr on + * @name - name of xattr to remove + * @delegated_inode - on return, will contain an inode pointer that + * a delegation was broken on, NULL if none. + */ int -vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +__vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, + struct inode **delegated_inode) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int error; @@ -387,11 +434,14 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) if (error) return error;

- inode_lock(inode); error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name); if (error) goto out;

+ error = try_break_deleg(inode, delegated_inode); + if (error) + goto out; + error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, name);

if (!error) { @@ -400,12 +450,32 @@ vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) }

out: + return error; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfs_removexattr_locked); + +int +vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) +{ + struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL; + int error; + +retry_deleg: + inode_lock(inode); + error = __vfs_removexattr_locked(dentry, name, &delegated_inode); inode_unlock(inode); + + if (delegated_inode) { + error = break_deleg_wait(&delegated_inode); + if (!error) + goto retry_deleg; + } + return error; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);

- /* * Extended attribute SET operations */ diff --git a/include/linux/xattr.h b/include/linux/xattr.h index 6dad031be3c2..3a71ad716da5 100644 --- a/include/linux/xattr.h +++ b/include/linux/xattr.h @@ -51,8 +51,10 @@ ssize_t vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, void *, size_t); ssize_t vfs_listxattr(struct dentry *d, char *list, size_t size); int __vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, struct inode *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); +int __vfs_setxattr_locked(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int, struct inode **); int vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *, const char *, const void *, size_t, int); int __vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *); +int __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *, const char *, struct inode **); int vfs_removexattr(struct dentry *, const char *);

ssize_t generic_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);

From: Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit 8c0de6e96c9794cb523a516c465991a70245da1c ]

IPV6_ADDRFORM causes resource leaks when converting an IPv6 socket to IPv4, particularly struct ipv6_ac_socklist. Similar to struct ipv6_mc_socklist, we should just close it on this path.

This bug can be easily reproduced with the following C program:

#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/socket.h> #include <arpa/inet.h>

int main() { int s, value; struct sockaddr_in6 addr; struct ipv6_mreq m6;

s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, 0); addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; addr.sin6_port = htons(5000); inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::ffff:192.168.122.194", &addr.sin6_addr); connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));

inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe80::AAAA", &m6.ipv6mr_multiaddr); m6.ipv6mr_interface = 5; setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_JOIN_ANYCAST, &m6, sizeof(m6));

value = AF_INET; setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &value, sizeof(value));

close(s); return 0; }

Reported-by: ch3332xr@gmail.com Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Cong Wang xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- include/net/addrconf.h | 1 + net/ipv6/anycast.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/net/addrconf.h b/include/net/addrconf.h index c8d5bb8b3616..db2a87981dd4 100644 --- a/include/net/addrconf.h +++ b/include/net/addrconf.h @@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ int ipv6_sock_ac_join(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, const struct in6_addr *addr); int ipv6_sock_ac_drop(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, const struct in6_addr *addr); +void __ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk); void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk);

int __ipv6_dev_ac_inc(struct inet6_dev *idev, const struct in6_addr *addr); diff --git a/net/ipv6/anycast.c b/net/ipv6/anycast.c index 4e0ff7031edd..55fbe330471c 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/anycast.c +++ b/net/ipv6/anycast.c @@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ int ipv6_sock_ac_drop(struct sock *sk, int ifindex, const struct in6_addr *addr) return 0; }

-void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) +void __ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) { struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); struct net_device *dev = NULL; @@ -181,10 +181,7 @@ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) struct net *net = sock_net(sk); int prev_index;

- if (!np->ipv6_ac_list) - return; - - rtnl_lock(); + ASSERT_RTNL(); pac = np->ipv6_ac_list; np->ipv6_ac_list = NULL;

@@ -201,6 +198,16 @@ void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) sock_kfree_s(sk, pac, sizeof(*pac)); pac = next; } +} + +void ipv6_sock_ac_close(struct sock *sk) +{ + struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk); + + if (!np->ipv6_ac_list) + return; + rtnl_lock(); + __ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk); rtnl_unlock(); }

diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c index 9ca4e8657534..b2e03e84a2df 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c @@ -209,6 +209,7 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,

fl6_free_socklist(sk); __ipv6_sock_mc_close(sk); + __ipv6_sock_ac_close(sk);

/* * Sock is moving from IPv6 to IPv4 (sk_prot), so

From: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com

[ Upstream commit b5141915b5aec3b29a63db869229e3741ebce258 ]

The commit cited below removed the RCU read-side critical section from rtnl_fdb_dump() which means that the ndo_fdb_dump() callback is invoked without RCU protection.

This results in the following warning [1] in the VXLAN driver, which relied on the callback being invoked from an RCU read-side critical section.

Fix this by calling rcu_read_lock() in the VXLAN driver, as already done in the bridge driver.

[1] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Not tainted ----------------------------- drivers/net/vxlan.c:1379 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 1 lock held by bridge/166: #0: ffffffff85a27850 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: netlink_dump+0xea/0x1090

stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 166 Comm: bridge Not tainted 5.8.0-rc4-custom-01521-g481007553ce6 #29 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x100/0x184 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x153/0x15d vxlan_fdb_dump+0x51e/0x6d0 rtnl_fdb_dump+0x4dc/0xad0 netlink_dump+0x540/0x1090 __netlink_dump_start+0x695/0x950 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x802/0xbd0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x17a/0x480 rtnetlink_rcv+0x22/0x30 netlink_unicast+0x5ae/0x890 netlink_sendmsg+0x98a/0xf40 __sys_sendto+0x279/0x3b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe6/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x54/0xa0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7fe14fa2ade0 Code: Bad RIP value. RSP: 002b:00007fff75bb5b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005614b1ba0020 RCX: 00007fe14fa2ade0 RDX: 000000000000011c RSI: 00007fff75bb5b90 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fff75bb5b90 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005614b1b89160 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 5e6d24358799 ("bridge: netlink dump interface at par with brctl") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel idosch@mellanox.com Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko jiri@mellanox.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/vxlan.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/vxlan.c b/drivers/net/vxlan.c index 09f0b53b2b77..69d9bb88cfd2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c @@ -975,6 +975,7 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb, for (h = 0; h < FDB_HASH_SIZE; ++h) { struct vxlan_fdb *f;

+ rcu_read_lock(); hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(f, &vxlan->fdb_head[h], hlist) { struct vxlan_rdst *rd;

@@ -987,12 +988,15 @@ static int vxlan_fdb_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb, cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq, RTM_NEWNEIGH, NLM_F_MULTI, rd); - if (err < 0) + if (err < 0) { + rcu_read_unlock(); goto out; + } skip: *idx += 1; } } + rcu_read_unlock(); } out: return err;

From: Stephen Hemminger stephen@networkplumber.org

[ Upstream commit 7c9864bbccc23e1812ac82966555d68c13ea4006 ]

If the accelerated networking SRIOV VF device has lost carrier use the synthetic network device which is available as backup path. This is a rare case since if VF link goes down, normally the VMBus device will also loose external connectivity as well. But if the communication is between two VM's on the same host the VMBus device will still work.

Reported-by: "Shah, Ashish N" ashish.n.shah@intel.com Fixes: 0c195567a8f6 ("netvsc: transparent VF management") Signed-off-by: Stephen Hemminger stephen@networkplumber.org Reviewed-by: Haiyang Zhang haiyangz@microsoft.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c index bdb55db4523b..e33cbb793b63 100644 --- a/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c @@ -543,12 +543,13 @@ static int netvsc_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *net) u32 hash; struct hv_page_buffer pb[MAX_PAGE_BUFFER_COUNT];

- /* if VF is present and up then redirect packets - * already called with rcu_read_lock_bh + /* If VF is present and up then redirect packets to it. + * Skip the VF if it is marked down or has no carrier. + * If netpoll is in uses, then VF can not be used either. */ vf_netdev = rcu_dereference_bh(net_device_ctx->vf_netdev); if (vf_netdev && netif_running(vf_netdev) && - !netpoll_tx_running(net)) + netif_carrier_ok(vf_netdev) && !netpoll_tx_running(net)) return netvsc_vf_xmit(net, vf_netdev, skb);

/* We will atmost need two pages to describe the rndis

From: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit bab9693a9a8c6dd19f670408ec1e78e12a320682 ]

A dead lock was triggered on thunderx driver:

CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- [01] lock(&(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock)->rlock); [11] lock(&(&mc->mca_lock)->rlock); [12] lock(&(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock)->rlock); [02] <Interrupt> lock(&(&mc->mca_lock)->rlock);

The path for each is:

[01] worker_thread() -> process_one_work() -> nicvf_set_rx_mode_task() [02] mld_ifc_timer_expire() [11] ipv6_add_dev() -> ipv6_dev_mc_inc() -> igmp6_group_added() -> [12] dev_mc_add() -> __dev_set_rx_mode() -> nicvf_set_rx_mode()

To fix it, it needs to disable bh on [1], so that the timer on [2] wouldn't be triggered until rx_mode_wq_lock is released. So change to use spin_lock_bh() instead of spin_lock().

Thanks to Paolo for helping with this.

v1->v2: - post to netdev.

Reported-by: Rafael P. rparrazo@redhat.com Tested-by: Dean Nelson dnelson@redhat.com Fixes: 469998c861fa ("net: thunderx: prevent concurrent data re-writing by nicvf_set_rx_mode") Signed-off-by: Xin Long lucien.xin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c index dca02b35c231..99eea9e6a8ea 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cavium/thunder/nicvf_main.c @@ -2015,11 +2015,11 @@ static void nicvf_set_rx_mode_task(struct work_struct *work_arg) /* Save message data locally to prevent them from * being overwritten by next ndo_set_rx_mode call(). */ - spin_lock(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); + spin_lock_bh(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); mode = vf_work->mode; mc = vf_work->mc; vf_work->mc = NULL; - spin_unlock(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock); + spin_unlock_bh(&nic->rx_mode_wq_lock);

__nicvf_set_rx_mode_task(mode, mc, nic); }

From: Hangbin Liu liuhangbin@gmail.com

[ Upstream commit a0dced17ad9dc08b1b25e0065b54c97a318e6e8b ]

This reverts commit 71130f29979c7c7956b040673e6b9d5643003176.

In commit 71130f29979c ("vxlan: fix tos value before xmit") we want to make sure the tos value are filtered by RT_TOS() based on RFC1349.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ | PRECEDENCE | TOS | MBZ | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

But RFC1349 has been obsoleted by RFC2474. The new DSCP field defined like

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+ | DS FIELD, DSCP | ECN FIELD | +-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

So with

IPTOS_TOS_MASK 0x1E RT_TOS(tos) ((tos)&IPTOS_TOS_MASK)

the first 3 bits DSCP info will get lost.

To take all the DSCP info in xmit, we should revert the patch and just push all tos bits to ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(), which will handling ECN field later.

Fixes: 71130f29979c ("vxlan: fix tos value before xmit") Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu liuhangbin@gmail.com Acked-by: Guillaume Nault gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/vxlan.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/vxlan.c b/drivers/net/vxlan.c index 69d9bb88cfd2..abf85f0ab72f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vxlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/vxlan.c @@ -2223,7 +2223,7 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, ndst = &rt->dst; skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(skb, ndst, VXLAN_HEADROOM);

- tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(RT_TOS(tos), old_iph, skb); + tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb); ttl = ttl ? : ip4_dst_hoplimit(&rt->dst); err = vxlan_build_skb(skb, ndst, sizeof(struct iphdr), vni, md, flags, udp_sum); @@ -2260,7 +2260,7 @@ static void vxlan_xmit_one(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,

skb_tunnel_check_pmtu(skb, ndst, VXLAN6_HEADROOM);

- tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(RT_TOS(tos), old_iph, skb); + tos = ip_tunnel_ecn_encap(tos, old_iph, skb); ttl = ttl ? : ip6_dst_hoplimit(ndst); skb_scrub_packet(skb, xnet); err = vxlan_build_skb(skb, ndst, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr),

From: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com

[ Upstream commit 65550098c1c4db528400c73acf3e46bfa78d9264 ]

There's a race between rxrpc_sendmsg setting up a call, but then failing to send anything on it due to an error, and recvmsg() seeing the call completion occur and trying to return the state to the user.

An assertion fails in rxrpc_recvmsg() because the call has already been released from the socket and is about to be released again as recvmsg deals with it. (The recvmsg_q queue on the socket holds a ref, so there's no problem with use-after-free.)

We also have to be careful not to end up reporting an error twice, in such a way that both returns indicate to userspace that the user ID supplied with the call is no longer in use - which could cause the client to malfunction if it recycles the user ID fast enough.

Fix this by the following means:

(1) When sendmsg() creates a call after the point that the call has been successfully added to the socket, don't return any errors through sendmsg(), but rather complete the call and let recvmsg() retrieve them. Make sendmsg() return 0 at this point. Further calls to sendmsg() for that call will fail with ESHUTDOWN.

Note that at this point, we haven't send any packets yet, so the server doesn't yet know about the call.

(2) If sendmsg() returns an error when it was expected to create a new call, it means that the user ID wasn't used.

(3) Mark the call disconnected before marking it completed to prevent an oops in rxrpc_release_call().

(4) recvmsg() will then retrieve the error and set MSG_EOR to indicate that the user ID is no longer known by the kernel.

An oops like the following is produced:

kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:605! ... RIP: 0010:rxrpc_recvmsg+0x256/0x5ae ... Call Trace: ? __init_waitqueue_head+0x2f/0x2f ____sys_recvmsg+0x8a/0x148 ? import_iovec+0x69/0x9c ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x5c/0x86 ___sys_recvmsg+0x72/0xaa ? __fget_files+0x22/0x57 ? __fget_light+0x46/0x51 ? fdget+0x9/0x1b do_recvmmsg+0x15e/0x232 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xa/0xb ? vtime_delta+0xf/0x25 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x2c/0x2f do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x78 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Fixes: 357f5ef64628 ("rxrpc: Call rxrpc_release_call() on error in rxrpc_new_client_call()") Reported-by: syzbot+b54969381df354936d96@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: David Howells dhowells@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Marc Dionne marc.dionne@auristor.com Signed-off-by: David S. Miller davem@davemloft.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- net/rxrpc/conn_object.c | 8 +++++--- net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c index 964c4e45de11..39f5fa3501ff 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/call_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_object.c @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, */ ret = rxrpc_connect_call(rx, call, cp, srx, gfp); if (ret < 0) - goto error; + goto error_attached_to_socket;

trace_rxrpc_call(call, rxrpc_call_connected, atomic_read(&call->usage), here, NULL); @@ -310,18 +310,29 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_new_client_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, error_dup_user_ID: write_unlock(&rx->call_lock); release_sock(&rx->sk); - ret = -EEXIST; - -error: __rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCAL_ERROR, - RX_CALL_DEAD, ret); + RX_CALL_DEAD, -EEXIST); trace_rxrpc_call(call, rxrpc_call_error, atomic_read(&call->usage), - here, ERR_PTR(ret)); + here, ERR_PTR(-EEXIST)); rxrpc_release_call(rx, call); mutex_unlock(&call->user_mutex); rxrpc_put_call(call, rxrpc_call_put); - _leave(" = %d", ret); - return ERR_PTR(ret); + _leave(" = -EEXIST"); + return ERR_PTR(-EEXIST); + + /* We got an error, but the call is attached to the socket and is in + * need of release. However, we might now race with recvmsg() when + * completing the call queues it. Return 0 from sys_sendmsg() and + * leave the error to recvmsg() to deal with. + */ +error_attached_to_socket: + trace_rxrpc_call(call, rxrpc_call_error, atomic_read(&call->usage), + here, ERR_PTR(ret)); + set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_DISCONNECTED, &call->flags); + __rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCAL_ERROR, + RX_CALL_DEAD, ret); + _leave(" = c=%08x [err]", call->debug_id); + return call; }

/* diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c index c4c4450891e0..2adb7c5c8966 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_object.c @@ -215,9 +215,11 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_call(struct rxrpc_call *call)

call->peer->cong_cwnd = call->cong_cwnd;

- spin_lock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock); - hlist_del_rcu(&call->error_link); - spin_unlock_bh(&conn->params.peer->lock); + if (!hlist_unhashed(&call->error_link)) { + spin_lock_bh(&call->peer->lock); + hlist_del_rcu(&call->error_link); + spin_unlock_bh(&call->peer->lock); + }

if (rxrpc_is_client_call(call)) return rxrpc_disconnect_client_call(call); diff --git a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c index 6e9d977f0797..e4fde33b887e 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c @@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ int rxrpc_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, goto error_unlock_call; }

- if (msg->msg_name) { + if (msg->msg_name && call->peer) { struct sockaddr_rxrpc *srx = msg->msg_name; size_t len = sizeof(call->peer->srx);

diff --git a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c index caee7632c257..edd76c41765f 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c @@ -654,6 +654,9 @@ int rxrpc_do_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len) if (IS_ERR(call)) return PTR_ERR(call); /* ... and we have the call lock. */ + ret = 0; + if (READ_ONCE(call->state) == RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE) + goto out_put_unlock; } else { switch (READ_ONCE(call->state)) { case RXRPC_CALL_UNINITIALISED:

From: Grzegorz Siwik grzegorz.siwik@intel.com

[ Upstream commit c004804dceee9ca384d97d9857ea2e2795c2651d ]

In this patch fixed wrong truncation method from u16 to u8 during validation.

It was changed by changing u8 to u32 parameter in method declaration and arguments were changed to u32.

Fixes: 5c3c48ac6bf56 ("i40e: implement virtual device interface") Signed-off-by: Grzegorz Siwik grzegorz.siwik@intel.com Tested-by: Andrew Bowers andrewx.bowers@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jesse Brandeburg jesse.brandeburg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c index 06c954c5c094..c9006469cd0c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ static inline bool i40e_vc_isvalid_queue_id(struct i40e_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id, * * check for the valid vector id **/ -static inline bool i40e_vc_isvalid_vector_id(struct i40e_vf *vf, u8 vector_id) +static inline bool i40e_vc_isvalid_vector_id(struct i40e_vf *vf, u32 vector_id) { struct i40e_pf *pf = vf->pf;

From: Martyna Szapar martyna.szapar@intel.com

[ Upstream commit 0b63644602cfcbac849f7ea49272a39e90fa95eb ]

Added freeing the old allocation of vf->qvlist_info in function i40e_config_iwarp_qvlist before overwriting it with the new allocation.

Fixes: e3219ce6a7754 ("i40e: Add support for client interface for IWARP driver") Signed-off-by: Martyna Szapar martyna.szapar@intel.com Tested-by: Andrew Bowers andrewx.bowers@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jesse Brandeburg jesse.brandeburg@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- .../ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 23 ++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c index ca555104ce45..bbbff3f7e84c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c @@ -441,6 +441,7 @@ static int i40e_config_iwarp_qvlist(struct i40e_vf *vf, u32 v_idx, i, reg_idx, reg; u32 next_q_idx, next_q_type; u32 msix_vf, size; + int ret = 0;

msix_vf = pf->hw.func_caps.num_msix_vectors_vf;

@@ -449,16 +450,19 @@ static int i40e_config_iwarp_qvlist(struct i40e_vf *vf, "Incorrect number of iwarp vectors %u. Maximum %u allowed.\n", qvlist_info->num_vectors, msix_vf); - goto err; + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_out; }

size = sizeof(struct virtchnl_iwarp_qvlist_info) + (sizeof(struct virtchnl_iwarp_qv_info) * (qvlist_info->num_vectors - 1)); + kfree(vf->qvlist_info); vf->qvlist_info = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!vf->qvlist_info) - return -ENOMEM; - + if (!vf->qvlist_info) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_out; + } vf->qvlist_info->num_vectors = qvlist_info->num_vectors;

msix_vf = pf->hw.func_caps.num_msix_vectors_vf; @@ -469,8 +473,10 @@ static int i40e_config_iwarp_qvlist(struct i40e_vf *vf, v_idx = qv_info->v_idx;

/* Validate vector id belongs to this vf */ - if (!i40e_vc_isvalid_vector_id(vf, v_idx)) - goto err; + if (!i40e_vc_isvalid_vector_id(vf, v_idx)) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_free; + }

vf->qvlist_info->qv_info[i] = *qv_info;

@@ -512,10 +518,11 @@ static int i40e_config_iwarp_qvlist(struct i40e_vf *vf, }

return 0; -err: +err_free: kfree(vf->qvlist_info); vf->qvlist_info = NULL; - return -EINVAL; +err_out: + return ret; }

/**

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org

Merge 48 patches from 4.19.139 stable branch (49 total) beside 1 already merged patches: 61219546f303 vgacon: Fix for missing check in scrollback handling

Tested-by: Shuah Khan skhan@linuxfoundation.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org --- Makefile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index daaa8ab2f550..f6012170995e 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 VERSION = 4 PATCHLEVEL = 19 -SUBLEVEL = 138 +SUBLEVEL = 139 EXTRAVERSION = NAME = "People's Front"