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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] net/sched: Fix CVE-2026-23378
by Dong Chenchen 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Fix CVE-2026-23378 Eric Dumazet (1): net/sched: act_ife: avoid possible NULL deref Jamal Hadi Salim (1): net/sched: act_ife: Fix metalist update behavior include/net/tc_act/tc_ife.h | 4 +- net/sched/act_ife.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: dvb-net: fix OOB access in ULE extension header tables
by Liu Kai 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Ariel Silver <arielsilver77(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 1a6da3dbb9985d00743073a1cc1f96e59f5abc30 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14132 CVE: CVE-2026-31405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 24d87712727a5017ad142d63940589a36cd25647 upstream. The ule_mandatory_ext_handlers[] and ule_optional_ext_handlers[] tables in handle_one_ule_extension() are declared with 255 elements (valid indices 0-254), but the index htype is derived from network-controlled data as (ule_sndu_type & 0x00FF), giving a range of 0-255. When htype equals 255, an out-of-bounds read occurs on the function pointer table, and the OOB value may be called as a function pointer. Add a bounds check on htype against the array size before either table is accessed. Out-of-range values now cause the SNDU to be discarded. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Ariel Silver <arielsilver77(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ariel Silver <arielsilver77(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c index 8bb8dd34c223..a2159b2bc176 100644 --- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c +++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvb_net.c @@ -228,6 +228,9 @@ static int handle_one_ule_extension( struct dvb_net_priv *p ) unsigned char hlen = (p->ule_sndu_type & 0x0700) >> 8; unsigned char htype = p->ule_sndu_type & 0x00FF; + if (htype >= ARRAY_SIZE(ule_mandatory_ext_handlers)) + return -1; + /* Discriminate mandatory and optional extension headers. */ if (hlen == 0) { /* Mandatory extension header */ -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched/fair: scale wake_wide() threshold by SMT width
by Zhang Qiao 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8882 -------------------------------- wake_wide() uses sd_llc_size as the spreading threshold to detect wide waker/wakee relationships and to disable wake_affine() for those cases. On SMT systems, sd_llc_size counts logical CPUs rather than physical cores. This inflates the wake_wide() threshold, allowing wake_affine() to pack more tasks into one LLC domain than the actual compute capacity of its physical cores can sustain. The resulting SMT interference may cost more than the cache-locality benefit wake_affine() intends to gain. Scale the factor by the SMT width of the current CPU so that it approximates the number of independent physical cores in the LLC domain, making wake_wide() more likely to kick in before SMT interference becomes significant. On non-SMT systems the SMT width is 1 and behaviour is unchanged. Fixes: 63b0e9edceec ("sched/fair: Beef up wake_wide()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 5 +++++ kernel/sched/features.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index ad30bb800961..4100998e18cd 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -7850,6 +7850,11 @@ static int wake_wide(struct task_struct *p) unsigned int slave = p->wakee_flips; int factor = __this_cpu_read(sd_llc_size); + /* Scale factor to physical-core count to account for SMT interference. */ + if (sched_feat(WA_SMT)) + factor = DIV_ROUND_UP(factor, + cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(smp_processor_id()))); + if (master < slave) swap(master, slave); if (slave < factor || master < slave * factor) diff --git a/kernel/sched/features.h b/kernel/sched/features.h index 24a0c853a8a0..c9ad8e72ecd0 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/features.h +++ b/kernel/sched/features.h @@ -128,3 +128,5 @@ SCHED_FEAT(SOFT_DOMAIN, false) #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SOFT_QUOTA SCHED_FEAT(SOFT_QUOTA, false) #endif + +SCHED_FEAT(WA_SMT, false) -- 2.18.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix riscv check-build warning
by Tengda Wu 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Fix riscv check-build warning. Björn Töpel (1): riscv: Replace function-like macro by static inline function Tengda Wu (1): Revert "riscv: stacktrace: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks" arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 15 ++++++++++----- arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 16 ---------------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] Xen privcmd driver: restrict to target domain at boot when not in dom0 to fix secure boot issue
by Zhang Yuwei 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Patch 1: Restrict the privcmd driver in unprivileged domU to only allow hypercalls targeting a specific domain obtained from Xenstore, preventing secure boot bypass. Patch 2: Unregister the xenstore notifier on module exit to clean up resources added by patch 1. Patch 3: Add an unrestricted boot parameter to optionally allow all hypercalls when secure boot is not active, guarded by a new lockdown reason. GuoHan Zhao (1): xen/privcmd: unregister xenstore notifier on module exit Juergen Gross (2): xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/security.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] Xen privcmd driver: restrict to target domain at boot when not in dom0 to fix secure boot issue
by Zhang Yuwei 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Patch 1: Restrict the privcmd driver in unprivileged domU to only allow hypercalls targeting a specific domain obtained from Xenstore, preventing secure boot bypass. Patch 2: Unregister the xenstore notifier on module exit to clean up resources added by patch 1. Patch 3: Add an unrestricted boot parameter to optionally allow all hypercalls when secure boot is not active, guarded by a new lockdown reason. GuoHan Zhao (1): xen/privcmd: unregister xenstore notifier on module exit Juergen Gross (2): xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- include/linux/security.h | 1 + security/security.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 33959a491e9fd557abfa5fce5ae4637d400915d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14038 CVE: CVE-2026-23404 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream. The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 83693b8d18d4..2cbe89e135fb 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -147,19 +147,43 @@ static void __list_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) } /** - * __remove_profile - remove old profile, and children - * @profile: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL) + * __remove_profile - remove profile, and children + * @profile: profile to be removed (NOT NULL) * * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared */ static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { + struct aa_profile *curr, *to_remove; + AA_BUG(!profile); AA_BUG(!profile->ns); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profile->ns->lock)); /* release any children lists first */ - __aa_profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles); + if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles)) { + curr = list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles, struct aa_profile, base.list); + + while (curr != profile) { + + while (!list_empty(&curr->base.profiles)) + curr = list_first_entry(&curr->base.profiles, + struct aa_profile, base.list); + + to_remove = curr; + if (!list_is_last(&to_remove->base.list, + &aa_deref_parent(curr)->base.profiles)) + curr = list_next_entry(to_remove, base.list); + else + curr = aa_deref_parent(curr); + + /* released by free_profile */ + aa_label_remove(&to_remove->label); + __aafs_profile_rmdir(to_remove); + __list_remove_profile(to_remove); + } + } + /* released by free_profile */ aa_label_remove(&profile->label); __aafs_profile_rmdir(profile); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 3f8699b3ee0c04b4b9bc27b82cd89a40e81e1d2e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14047 CVE: CVE-2026-23405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 2 ++ security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h index 33d665516fc1..dabb69bc87e0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include "label.h" #include "policy.h" +/* Match max depth of user namespaces */ +#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32 /* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index fd5b7afbcb48..c56ef36baef4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, AA_BUG(!name); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock)); + if (parent->level > MAX_NS_DEPTH) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC); ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 3f8699b3ee0c04b4b9bc27b82cd89a40e81e1d2e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14047 CVE: CVE-2026-23405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 2 ++ security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h index 3df6f804922d..e5704947e86e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include "label.h" #include "policy.h" +/* Match max depth of user namespaces */ +#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32 /* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index 53d24cf63893..5d342ef078e9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, AA_BUG(!name); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock)); + if (parent->level > MAX_NS_DEPTH) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC); ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 33959a491e9fd557abfa5fce5ae4637d400915d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14038 CVE: CVE-2026-23404 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream. The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index e5f501f89803..57be581980b3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -146,19 +146,43 @@ static void __list_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) } /** - * __remove_profile - remove old profile, and children - * @profile: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL) + * __remove_profile - remove profile, and children + * @profile: profile to be removed (NOT NULL) * * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared */ static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { + struct aa_profile *curr, *to_remove; + AA_BUG(!profile); AA_BUG(!profile->ns); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profile->ns->lock)); /* release any children lists first */ - __aa_profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles); + if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles)) { + curr = list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles, struct aa_profile, base.list); + + while (curr != profile) { + + while (!list_empty(&curr->base.profiles)) + curr = list_first_entry(&curr->base.profiles, + struct aa_profile, base.list); + + to_remove = curr; + if (!list_is_last(&to_remove->base.list, + &aa_deref_parent(curr)->base.profiles)) + curr = list_next_entry(to_remove, base.list); + else + curr = aa_deref_parent(curr); + + /* released by free_profile */ + aa_label_remove(&to_remove->label); + __aafs_profile_rmdir(to_remove); + __list_remove_profile(to_remove); + } + } + /* released by free_profile */ aa_label_remove(&profile->label); __aafs_profile_rmdir(profile); -- 2.34.1

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