August 2021 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

perf spe-c2c record失败的问题
by haoxin 15 Dec '21

15 Dec '21

您好，我采用最细的openEuler-1.0测试perf spe-c2c的功能，但是发现/sys/devices下没有arm_spe_0这个目录执行perf spe-c2c record时显示： event syntax error: 'arm_spe_0/ts_enable=1,pct_enable=1,pa_enable=1,load_filter=1,jitter=1,store_filter=1,min_latency=0/' \___ Cannot find PMU `arm_spe_0'. Missing kernel support? 想问下您这是为什么？需要哪里开启spe功能吗？

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 1/9] mm: add Kernel Electric-Fence infrastructure
by 1415317271＠qq.com 30 Sep '21

30 Sep '21

From: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Patch series "KFENCE: A low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector", v7. This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors. This series enables KFENCE for the x86 and arm64 architectures, and adds KFENCE hooks to the SLAB and SLUB allocators. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines. KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting a memory access error. Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval, the next allocation through the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB) returns a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool. At this point, the timer is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval. To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE. The KFENCE memory pool is of fixed size, and if the pool is exhausted no further KFENCE allocations occur. The default config is conservative with only 255 objects, resulting in a pool size of 2 MiB (with 4 KiB pages). We have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O, hackbench) and production server-workload benchmarks that a kernel with KFENCE (using sample intervals 100-500ms) is performance-neutral compared to a non-KFENCE baseline kernel. KFENCE is inspired by GWP-ASan [1], a userspace tool with similar properties. The name "KFENCE" is a homage to the Electric Fence Malloc Debugger [2]. For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst added in the series -- also viewable here: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/kasan/kfence/Documentation/dev-too… [1] http://llvm.org/docs/GwpAsan.html [2] https://linux.die.net/man/3/efence This patch (of 9): This adds the Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE) infrastructure. KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector of heap use-after-free, invalid-free, and out-of-bounds access errors. KFENCE is designed to be enabled in production kernels, and has near zero performance overhead. Compared to KASAN, KFENCE trades performance for precision. The main motivation behind KFENCE's design, is that with enough total uptime KFENCE will detect bugs in code paths not typically exercised by non-production test workloads. One way to quickly achieve a large enough total uptime is when the tool is deployed across a large fleet of machines. KFENCE objects each reside on a dedicated page, at either the left or right page boundaries. The pages to the left and right of the object page are "guard pages", whose attributes are changed to a protected state, and cause page faults on any attempted access to them. Such page faults are then intercepted by KFENCE, which handles the fault gracefully by reporting a memory access error. To detect out-of-bounds writes to memory within the object's page itself, KFENCE also uses pattern-based redzones. The following figure illustrates the page layout: ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--- | xxxxxxxxx | O : | xxxxxxxxx | : O | xxxxxxxxx | | xxxxxxxxx | B : | xxxxxxxxx | : B | xxxxxxxxx | | x GUARD x | J : RED- | x GUARD x | RED- : J | x GUARD x | | xxxxxxxxx | E : ZONE | xxxxxxxxx | ZONE : E | xxxxxxxxx | | xxxxxxxxx | C : | xxxxxxxxx | : C | xxxxxxxxx | | xxxxxxxxx | T : | xxxxxxxxx | : T | xxxxxxxxx | ---+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+--- Guarded allocations are set up based on a sample interval (can be set via kfence.sample_interval). After expiration of the sample interval, a guarded allocation from the KFENCE object pool is returned to the main allocator (SLAB or SLUB). At this point, the timer is reset, and the next allocation is set up after the expiration of the interval. To enable/disable a KFENCE allocation through the main allocator's fast-path without overhead, KFENCE relies on static branches via the static keys infrastructure. The static branch is toggled to redirect the allocation to KFENCE. To date, we have verified by running synthetic benchmarks (sysbench I/O, hackbench) that a kernel compiled with KFENCE is performance-neutral compared to the non-KFENCE baseline. For more details, see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst (added later in the series). [elver(a)google.com: fix parameter description for kfence_object_start()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106092149.GA2851373@elver.google.com [elver(a)google.com: avoid stalling work queue task without allocations] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CADYN=9J0DQhizAGB0-jz4HOBBh+05kMBXb4c0cXMS7Qi5NAJ… Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201110135320.3309507-1-elver@google.com [elver(a)google.com: fix potential deadlock due to wake_up()] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/000000000000c0645805b7f982e4@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210104130749.1768991-1-elver@google.com [elver(a)google.com: add option to use KFENCE without static keys] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210111091544.3287013-1-elver@google.com [elver(a)google.com: add missing copyright and description headers] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210118092159.145934-1-elver@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201103175841.3495947-2-elver@google.com Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sjpark(a)amazon.de> Co-developed-by: Marco Elver <elver(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa(a)zytor.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)kernel.org> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl(a)google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin(a)virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com> Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl(a)linux.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes(a)google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hillf Danton <hdanton(a)sina.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo(a)redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim(a)lge.com> Cc: Joern Engel <joern(a)purestorage.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg(a)kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yingjie Shang <1415317271(a)qq.com> Reviewed-by: Bixuan Cui <cuibixuan(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/kfence.h | 216 +++++++++++ init/main.c | 3 + lib/Kconfig.debug | 1 + lib/Kconfig.kfence | 67 ++++ mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/kfence/Makefile | 3 + mm/kfence/core.c | 840 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/kfence/kfence.h | 113 ++++++ mm/kfence/report.c | 240 ++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 1484 insertions(+) create mode 100644 include/linux/kfence.h create mode 100644 lib/Kconfig.kfence create mode 100644 mm/kfence/Makefile create mode 100644 mm/kfence/core.c create mode 100644 mm/kfence/kfence.h create mode 100644 mm/kfence/report.c diff --git a/include/linux/kfence.h b/include/linux/kfence.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..81f3911cb298 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/kfence.h @@ -0,0 +1,216 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE). Public interface for allocator and fault + * handler integration. For more info see Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. + */ + +#ifndef _LINUX_KFENCE_H +#define _LINUX_KFENCE_H + +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE + +/* + * We allocate an even number of pages, as it simplifies calculations to map + * address to metadata indices; effectively, the very first page serves as an + * extended guard page, but otherwise has no special purpose. + */ +#define KFENCE_POOL_SIZE ((CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS + 1) * 2 * PAGE_SIZE) +extern char *__kfence_pool; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS +#include <linux/static_key.h> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key); +#else +#include <linux/atomic.h> +extern atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate; +#endif + +/** + * is_kfence_address() - check if an address belongs to KFENCE pool + * @addr: address to check + * + * Return: true or false depending on whether the address is within the KFENCE + * object range. + * + * KFENCE objects live in a separate page range and are not to be intermixed + * with regular heap objects (e.g. KFENCE objects must never be added to the + * allocator freelists). Failing to do so may and will result in heap + * corruptions, therefore is_kfence_address() must be used to check whether + * an object requires specific handling. + * + * Note: This function may be used in fast-paths, and is performance critical. + * Future changes should take this into account; for instance, we want to avoid + * introducing another load and therefore need to keep KFENCE_POOL_SIZE a + * constant (until immediate patching support is added to the kernel). + */ +static __always_inline bool is_kfence_address(const void *addr) +{ + /* + * The non-NULL check is required in case the __kfence_pool pointer was + * never initialized; keep it in the slow-path after the range-check. + */ + return unlikely((unsigned long)((char *)addr - __kfence_pool) < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE && addr); +} + +/** + * kfence_alloc_pool() - allocate the KFENCE pool via memblock + */ +void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void); + +/** + * kfence_init() - perform KFENCE initialization at boot time + * + * Requires that kfence_alloc_pool() was called before. This sets up the + * allocation gate timer, and requires that workqueues are available. + */ +void __init kfence_init(void); + +/** + * kfence_shutdown_cache() - handle shutdown_cache() for KFENCE objects + * @s: cache being shut down + * + * Before shutting down a cache, one must ensure there are no remaining objects + * allocated from it. Because KFENCE objects are not referenced from the cache + * directly, we need to check them here. + * + * Note that shutdown_cache() is internal to SL*B, and kmem_cache_destroy() does + * not return if allocated objects still exist: it prints an error message and + * simply aborts destruction of a cache, leaking memory. + * + * If the only such objects are KFENCE objects, we will not leak the entire + * cache, but instead try to provide more useful debug info by making allocated + * objects "zombie allocations". Objects may then still be used or freed (which + * is handled gracefully), but usage will result in showing KFENCE error reports + * which include stack traces to the user of the object, the original allocation + * site, and caller to shutdown_cache(). + */ +void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s); + +/* + * Allocate a KFENCE object. Allocators must not call this function directly, + * use kfence_alloc() instead. + */ +void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags); + +/** + * kfence_alloc() - allocate a KFENCE object with a low probability + * @s: struct kmem_cache with object requirements + * @size: exact size of the object to allocate (can be less than @s->size + * e.g. for kmalloc caches) + * @flags: GFP flags + * + * Return: + * * NULL - must proceed with allocating as usual, + * * non-NULL - pointer to a KFENCE object. + * + * kfence_alloc() should be inserted into the heap allocation fast path, + * allowing it to transparently return KFENCE-allocated objects with a low + * probability using a static branch (the probability is controlled by the + * kfence.sample_interval boot parameter). + */ +static __always_inline void *kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS + if (static_branch_unlikely(&kfence_allocation_key)) +#else + if (unlikely(!atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate))) +#endif + return __kfence_alloc(s, size, flags); + return NULL; +} + +/** + * kfence_ksize() - get actual amount of memory allocated for a KFENCE object + * @addr: pointer to a heap object + * + * Return: + * * 0 - not a KFENCE object, must call __ksize() instead, + * * non-0 - this many bytes can be accessed without causing a memory error. + * + * kfence_ksize() returns the number of bytes requested for a KFENCE object at + * allocation time. This number may be less than the object size of the + * corresponding struct kmem_cache. + */ +size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr); + +/** + * kfence_object_start() - find the beginning of a KFENCE object + * @addr: address within a KFENCE-allocated object + * + * Return: address of the beginning of the object. + * + * SL[AU]B-allocated objects are laid out within a page one by one, so it is + * easy to calculate the beginning of an object given a pointer inside it and + * the object size. The same is not true for KFENCE, which places a single + * object at either end of the page. This helper function is used to find the + * beginning of a KFENCE-allocated object. + */ +void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr); + +/** + * __kfence_free() - release a KFENCE heap object to KFENCE pool + * @addr: object to be freed + * + * Requires: is_kfence_address(addr) + * + * Release a KFENCE object and mark it as freed. + */ +void __kfence_free(void *addr); + +/** + * kfence_free() - try to release an arbitrary heap object to KFENCE pool + * @addr: object to be freed + * + * Return: + * * false - object doesn't belong to KFENCE pool and was ignored, + * * true - object was released to KFENCE pool. + * + * Release a KFENCE object and mark it as freed. May be called on any object, + * even non-KFENCE objects, to simplify integration of the hooks into the + * allocator's free codepath. The allocator must check the return value to + * determine if it was a KFENCE object or not. + */ +static __always_inline __must_check bool kfence_free(void *addr) +{ + if (!is_kfence_address(addr)) + return false; + __kfence_free(addr); + return true; +} + +/** + * kfence_handle_page_fault() - perform page fault handling for KFENCE pages + * @addr: faulting address + * + * Return: + * * false - address outside KFENCE pool, + * * true - page fault handled by KFENCE, no additional handling required. + * + * A page fault inside KFENCE pool indicates a memory error, such as an + * out-of-bounds access, a use-after-free or an invalid memory access. In these + * cases KFENCE prints an error message and marks the offending page as + * present, so that the kernel can proceed. + */ +bool __must_check kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr); + +#else /* CONFIG_KFENCE */ + +static inline bool is_kfence_address(const void *addr) { return false; } +static inline void kfence_alloc_pool(void) { } +static inline void kfence_init(void) { } +static inline void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) { } +static inline void *kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) { return NULL; } +static inline size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) { return 0; } +static inline void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) { return NULL; } +static inline void __kfence_free(void *addr) { } +static inline bool __must_check kfence_free(void *addr) { return false; } +static inline bool __must_check kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr) { return false; } + +#endif + +#endif /* _LINUX_KFENCE_H */ diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index fc0277a9e7a3..2d027dc11b10 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/profile.h> +#include <linux/kfence.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> #include <linux/kallsyms.h> @@ -828,6 +829,7 @@ static void __init mm_init(void) */ page_ext_init_flatmem(); init_debug_pagealloc(); + kfence_alloc_pool(); report_meminit(); mem_init(); kmem_cache_init(); @@ -956,6 +958,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void) hrtimers_init(); softirq_init(); timekeeping_init(); + kfence_init(); /* * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after: diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug index 799e49a29797..29e64b4cd412 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -878,6 +878,7 @@ config DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW If in doubt, say "N". source "lib/Kconfig.kasan" +source "lib/Kconfig.kfence" endmenu # "Memory Debugging" diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kfence b/lib/Kconfig.kfence new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b88ac9d6b2e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kfence @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +config HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE + bool + +menuconfig KFENCE + bool "KFENCE: low-overhead sampling-based memory safety error detector" + depends on HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE && !KASAN && (SLAB || SLUB) + select STACKTRACE + help + KFENCE is a low-overhead sampling-based detector of heap out-of-bounds + access, use-after-free, and invalid-free errors. KFENCE is designed + to have negligible cost to permit enabling it in production + environments. + + Note that, KFENCE is not a substitute for explicit testing with tools + such as KASAN. KFENCE can detect a subset of bugs that KASAN can + detect, albeit at very different performance profiles. If you can + afford to use KASAN, continue using KASAN, for example in test + environments. If your kernel targets production use, and cannot + enable KASAN due to its cost, consider using KFENCE. + +if KFENCE + +config KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS + bool "Use static keys to set up allocations" + default y + depends on JUMP_LABEL # To ensure performance, require jump labels + help + Use static keys (static branches) to set up KFENCE allocations. Using + static keys is normally recommended, because it avoids a dynamic + branch in the allocator's fast path. However, with very low sample + intervals, or on systems that do not support jump labels, a dynamic + branch may still be an acceptable performance trade-off. + +config KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL + int "Default sample interval in milliseconds" + default 100 + help + The KFENCE sample interval determines the frequency with which heap + allocations will be guarded by KFENCE. May be overridden via boot + parameter "kfence.sample_interval". + + Set this to 0 to disable KFENCE by default, in which case only + setting "kfence.sample_interval" to a non-zero value enables KFENCE. + +config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS + int "Number of guarded objects available" + range 1 65535 + default 255 + help + The number of guarded objects available. For each KFENCE object, 2 + pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent + ones used as guard pages. + +config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS + int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT + default 0 + help + The inverse probability with which to randomly protect KFENCE object + pages, resulting in spurious use-after-frees. The main purpose of + this option is to stress test KFENCE with concurrent error reports + and allocations/frees. A value of 0 disables stress testing logic. + + Only for KFENCE testing; set to 0 if you are not a KFENCE developer. + +endif # KFENCE diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile index 2b1991759835..3d81a67d66a2 100644 --- a/mm/Makefile +++ b/mm/Makefile @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING) += page_poison.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLAB) += slab.o obj-$(CONFIG_SLUB) += slub.o obj-$(CONFIG_KASAN) += kasan/ +obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) += kfence/ obj-$(CONFIG_FAILSLAB) += failslab.o obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG) += memory_hotplug.o obj-$(CONFIG_MEMTEST) += memtest.o diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d991e9a349f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +obj-$(CONFIG_KFENCE) := core.o report.o diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d6a32c13336b --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/kfence/core.c @@ -0,0 +1,840 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * KFENCE guarded object allocator and fault handling. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kfence: " fmt + +#include <linux/atomic.h> +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/kcsan-checks.h> +#include <linux/kfence.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/lockdep.h> +#include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#include <asm/kfence.h> + +#include "kfence.h" + +/* Disables KFENCE on the first warning assuming an irrecoverable error. */ +#define KFENCE_WARN_ON(cond) \ + ({ \ + const bool __cond = WARN_ON(cond); \ + if (unlikely(__cond)) \ + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); \ + __cond; \ + }) + +/* === Data ================================================================= */ + +static bool kfence_enabled __read_mostly; + +static unsigned long kfence_sample_interval __read_mostly = CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL; + +#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX +#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX +#endif +#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kfence." + +static int param_set_sample_interval(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + unsigned long num; + int ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num); + + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + if (!num) /* Using 0 to indicate KFENCE is disabled. */ + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); + else if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled) && system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING) + return -EINVAL; /* Cannot (re-)enable KFENCE on-the-fly. */ + + *((unsigned long *)kp->arg) = num; + return 0; +} + +static int param_get_sample_interval(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return sprintf(buffer, "0\n"); + + return param_get_ulong(buffer, kp); +} + +static const struct kernel_param_ops sample_interval_param_ops = { + .set = param_set_sample_interval, + .get = param_get_sample_interval, +}; +module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_interval, 0600); + +/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */ +char *__kfence_pool __ro_after_init; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */ + +/* + * Per-object metadata, with one-to-one mapping of object metadata to + * backing pages (in __kfence_pool). + */ +static_assert(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS > 0); +struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS]; + +/* Freelist with available objects. */ +static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist); +static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS +/* The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation. */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key); +#endif + +/* Gates the allocation, ensuring only one succeeds in a given period. */ +atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate = ATOMIC_INIT(1); + +/* Statistics counters for debugfs. */ +enum kfence_counter_id { + KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED, + KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS, + KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES, + KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES, + KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS, + KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT, +}; +static atomic_long_t counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT]; +static const char *const counter_names[] = { + [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED] = "currently allocated", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS] = "total allocations", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES] = "total frees", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES] = "zombie allocations", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS] = "total bugs", +}; +static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(counter_names) == KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT); + +/* === Internals ============================================================ */ + +static bool kfence_protect(unsigned long addr) +{ + return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), true)); +} + +static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr) +{ + return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), false)); +} + +static inline struct kfence_metadata *addr_to_metadata(unsigned long addr) +{ + long index; + + /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */ + + if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr)) + return NULL; + + /* + * May be an invalid index if called with an address at the edge of + * __kfence_pool, in which case we would report an "invalid access" + * error. + */ + index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / (PAGE_SIZE * 2) - 1; + if (index < 0 || index >= CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + return NULL; + + return &kfence_metadata[index]; +} + +static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) +{ + unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2; + unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset]; + + /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */ + + /* Only call with a pointer into kfence_metadata. */ + if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta < kfence_metadata || + meta >= kfence_metadata + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)) + return 0; + + /* + * This metadata object only ever maps to 1 page; verify that the stored + * address is in the expected range. + */ + if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE) != pageaddr)) + return 0; + + return pageaddr; +} + +/* + * Update the object's metadata state, including updating the alloc/free stacks + * depending on the state transition. + */ +static noinline void metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, + enum kfence_object_state next) +{ + struct kfence_track *track = + next == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED ? &meta->free_track : &meta->alloc_track; + + lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); + + /* + * Skip over 1 (this) functions; noinline ensures we do not accidentally + * skip over the caller by never inlining. + */ + track->num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(track->stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1); + track->pid = task_pid_nr(current); + + /* + * Pairs with READ_ONCE() in + * kfence_shutdown_cache(), + * kfence_handle_page_fault(). + */ + WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next); +} + +/* Write canary byte to @addr. */ +static inline bool set_canary_byte(u8 *addr) +{ + *addr = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr); + return true; +} + +/* Check canary byte at @addr. */ +static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr) +{ + if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr))) + return true; + + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); + kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr), + KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION); + return false; +} + +/* __always_inline this to ensure we won't do an indirect call to fn. */ +static __always_inline void for_each_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool (*fn)(u8 *)) +{ + const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned long addr; + + lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); + + /* + * We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until fn() returns + * false. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the + * right of the object even if there was an error in the canary bytes to + * the left of the object. Specifically, if check_canary_byte() + * generates an error, showing both sides might give more clues as to + * what the error is about when displaying which bytes were corrupted. + */ + + /* Apply to left of object. */ + for (addr = pageaddr; addr < meta->addr; addr++) { + if (!fn((u8 *)addr)) + break; + } + + /* Apply to right of object. */ + for (addr = meta->addr + meta->size; addr < pageaddr + PAGE_SIZE; addr++) { + if (!fn((u8 *)addr)) + break; + } +} + +static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL; + unsigned long flags; + struct page *page; + void *addr; + + /* Try to obtain a free object. */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) { + meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list); + list_del_init(&meta->list); + } + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + if (!meta) + return NULL; + + if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) { + /* + * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a + * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting + * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in + * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're + * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does + * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by + * using trylock and bailing out gracefully. + */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + /* Put the object back on the freelist. */ + list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + + return NULL; + } + + meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta); + /* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */ + if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) + kfence_unprotect(meta->addr); + + /* + * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always + * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as + * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow + * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside + * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for + * such allocations. + */ + if (prandom_u32_max(2)) { + /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */ + meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size; + meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align); + } + + addr = (void *)meta->addr; + + /* Update remaining metadata. */ + metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED); + /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ + WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache); + meta->size = size; + for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte); + + /* Set required struct page fields. */ + page = virt_to_page(meta->addr); + page->slab_cache = cache; + + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + /* Memory initialization. */ + + /* + * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting + * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's + * redzone. + */ + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache))) + memzero_explicit(addr, size); + if (cache->ctor) + cache->ctor(addr); + + if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS)) + kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */ + + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]); + + return addr; +} + +static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie) +{ + struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive; + unsigned long flags; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + + if (meta->state != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED || meta->addr != (unsigned long)addr) { + /* Invalid or double-free, bail out. */ + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); + kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, meta, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + return; + } + + /* Detect racy use-after-free, or incorrect reallocation of this page by KFENCE. */ + kcsan_begin_scoped_access((void *)ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE, + KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT, + &assert_page_exclusive); + + if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS) + kfence_unprotect((unsigned long)addr); /* To check canary bytes. */ + + /* Restore page protection if there was an OOB access. */ + if (meta->unprotected_page) { + kfence_protect(meta->unprotected_page); + meta->unprotected_page = 0; + } + + /* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */ + for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte); + + /* + * Clear memory if init-on-free is set. While we protect the page, the + * data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we + * unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible. + */ + if (!zombie && unlikely(slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache))) + memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size); + + /* Mark the object as freed. */ + metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED); + + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + /* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */ + kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr); + + kcsan_end_scoped_access(&assert_page_exclusive); + if (!zombie) { + /* Add it to the tail of the freelist for reuse. */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + KFENCE_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&meta->list)); + list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + + atomic_long_dec(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]); + } else { + /* See kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]); + } +} + +static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = container_of(h, struct kfence_metadata, rcu_head); + + kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false); +} + +static bool __init kfence_init_pool(void) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; + struct page *pages; + int i; + + if (!__kfence_pool) + return false; + + if (!arch_kfence_init_pool()) + goto err; + + pages = virt_to_page(addr); + + /* + * Set up object pages: they must have PG_slab set, to avoid freeing + * these as real pages. + * + * We also want to avoid inserting kfence_free() in the kfree() + * fast-path in SLUB, and therefore need to ensure kfree() correctly + * enters __slab_free() slow-path. + */ + for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { + if (!i || (i % 2)) + continue; + + /* Verify we do not have a compound head page. */ + if (WARN_ON(compound_head(&pages[i]) != &pages[i])) + goto err; + + __SetPageSlab(&pages[i]); + } + + /* + * Protect the first 2 pages. The first page is mostly unnecessary, and + * merely serves as an extended guard page. However, adding one + * additional page in the beginning gives us an even number of pages, + * which simplifies the mapping of address to metadata index. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr))) + goto err; + + addr += PAGE_SIZE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + /* Initialize metadata. */ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list); + raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock); + meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED; + meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */ + list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); + + /* Protect the right redzone. */ + if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE))) + goto err; + + addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + } + + return true; + +err: + /* + * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change + * page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing + * page attributes for some pages fails, it is very likely that it also + * fails for the first page, and therefore expect addr==__kfence_pool in + * most failure cases. + */ + memblock_free_late(__pa(addr), KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool)); + __kfence_pool = NULL; + return false; +} + +/* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */ + +static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + int i; + + seq_printf(seq, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)); + for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT; i++) + seq_printf(seq, "%s: %ld\n", counter_names[i], atomic_long_read(&counters[i])); + + return 0; +} +DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(stats); + +/* + * debugfs seq_file operations for /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects. + * start_object() and next_object() return the object index + 1, because NULL is used + * to stop iteration. + */ +static void *start_object(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) +{ + if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); + return NULL; +} + +static void stop_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ +} + +static void *next_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + ++*pos; + if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); + return NULL; +} + +static int show_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[(long)v - 1]; + unsigned long flags; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + kfence_print_object(seq, meta); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + seq_puts(seq, "---------------------------------\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations object_seqops = { + .start = start_object, + .next = next_object, + .stop = stop_object, + .show = show_object, +}; + +static int open_objects(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return seq_open(file, &object_seqops); +} + +static const struct file_operations objects_fops = { + .open = open_objects, + .read = seq_read, + .llseek = seq_lseek, +}; + +static int __init kfence_debugfs_init(void) +{ + struct dentry *kfence_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kfence", NULL); + + debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, kfence_dir, NULL, &stats_fops); + debugfs_create_file("objects", 0400, kfence_dir, NULL, &objects_fops); + return 0; +} + +late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init); + +/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */ + +/* + * Set up delayed work, which will enable and disable the static key. We need to + * use a work queue (rather than a simple timer), since enabling and disabling a + * static key cannot be done from an interrupt. + * + * Note: Toggling a static branch currently causes IPIs, and here we'll end up + * with a total of 2 IPIs to all CPUs. If this ends up a problem in future (with + * more aggressive sampling intervals), we could get away with a variant that + * avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the + * instructions remain cached. + */ +static struct delayed_work kfence_timer; +static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work) +{ + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return; + + /* Enable static key, and await allocation to happen. */ + atomic_set(&kfence_allocation_gate, 0); +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS + static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); + /* + * Await an allocation. Timeout after 1 second, in case the kernel stops + * doing allocations, to avoid stalling this worker task for too long. + */ + { + unsigned long end_wait = jiffies + HZ; + + do { + set_current_state(TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); + if (atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate) != 0) + break; + schedule_timeout(1); + } while (time_before(jiffies, end_wait)); + __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); + } + /* Disable static key and reset timer. */ + static_branch_disable(&kfence_allocation_key); +#endif + schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, msecs_to_jiffies(kfence_sample_interval)); +} +static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); + +/* === Public interface ===================================================== */ + +void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void) +{ + if (!kfence_sample_interval) + return; + + __kfence_pool = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); + + if (!__kfence_pool) + pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n"); +} + +void __init kfence_init(void) +{ + /* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */ + if (!kfence_sample_interval) + return; + + if (!kfence_init_pool()) { + pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); + return; + } + + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); + schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0); + pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL)) + pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool, + (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE)); + else + pr_cont("\n"); +} + +void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct kfence_metadata *meta; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + bool in_use; + + meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + /* + * If we observe some inconsistent cache and state pair where we + * should have returned false here, cache destruction is racing + * with either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmem_cache_free(). Taking + * the lock will not help, as different critical section + * serialization will have the same outcome. + */ + if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || + READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) + continue; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + in_use = meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED; + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + if (in_use) { + /* + * This cache still has allocations, and we should not + * release them back into the freelist so they can still + * safely be used and retain the kernel's default + * behaviour of keeping the allocations alive (leak the + * cache); however, they effectively become "zombie + * allocations" as the KFENCE objects are the only ones + * still in use and the owning cache is being destroyed. + * + * We mark them freed, so that any subsequent use shows + * more useful error messages that will include stack + * traces of the user of the object, the original + * allocation, and caller to shutdown_cache(). + */ + kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, /*zombie=*/true); + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + /* See above. */ + if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) + continue; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + if (meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) + meta->cache = NULL; + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + } +} + +void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) +{ + /* + * allocation_gate only needs to become non-zero, so it doesn't make + * sense to continue writing to it and pay the associated contention + * cost, in case we have a large number of concurrent allocations. + */ + if (atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate) || atomic_inc_return(&kfence_allocation_gate) > 1) + return NULL; + + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return NULL; + + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) + return NULL; + + return kfence_guarded_alloc(s, size, flags); +} + +size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) +{ + const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + + /* + * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is + * either a use-after-free or invalid access. + */ + return meta ? meta->size : 0; +} + +void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) +{ + const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + + /* + * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is + * either a use-after-free or invalid access. + */ + return meta ? (void *)meta->addr : NULL; +} + +void __kfence_free(void *addr) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + + /* + * If the objects of the cache are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, defer freeing + * the object, as the object page may be recycled for other-typed + * objects once it has been freed. meta->cache may be NULL if the cache + * was destroyed. + */ + if (unlikely(meta->cache && (meta->cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))) + call_rcu(&meta->rcu_head, rcu_guarded_free); + else + kfence_guarded_free(addr, meta, false); +} + +bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr) +{ + const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE; + struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL; + enum kfence_error_type error_type; + unsigned long flags; + + if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr)) + return false; + + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) /* If disabled at runtime ... */ + return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* ... unprotect and proceed. */ + + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); + + if (page_index % 2) { + /* This is a redzone, report a buffer overflow. */ + struct kfence_metadata *meta; + int distance = 0; + + meta = addr_to_metadata(addr - PAGE_SIZE); + if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) { + to_report = meta; + /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ + distance = addr - data_race(meta->addr + meta->size); + } + + meta = addr_to_metadata(addr + PAGE_SIZE); + if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) { + /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ + if (!to_report || distance > data_race(meta->addr) - addr) + to_report = meta; + } + + if (!to_report) + goto out; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); + to_report->unprotected_page = addr; + error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB; + + /* + * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still + * report this as an OOB -- the report will simply show the + * stacktrace of the free as well. + */ + } else { + to_report = addr_to_metadata(addr); + if (!to_report) + goto out; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); + error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF; + /* + * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a + * freed object may be reallocated. We simply report this as a + * use-after-free, with the stack trace showing the place where + * the object was re-allocated. + */ + } + +out: + if (to_report) { + kfence_report_error(addr, to_report, error_type); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags); + } else { + /* This may be a UAF or OOB access, but we can't be sure. */ + kfence_report_error(addr, NULL, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID); + } + + return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* Unprotect and let access proceed. */ +} diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1014060f9707 --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Kernel Electric-Fence (KFENCE). For more info please see + * Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. + */ + +#ifndef MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H +#define MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H + +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <linux/types.h> + +#include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */ + +/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL +#define PTR_FMT "%px" +#else +#define PTR_FMT "%p" +#endif + +/* + * Get the canary byte pattern for @addr. Use a pattern that varies based on the + * lower 3 bits of the address, to detect memory corruptions with higher + * probability, where similar constants are used. + */ +#define KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr) ((u8)0xaa ^ (u8)((unsigned long)(addr) & 0x7)) + +/* Maximum stack depth for reports. */ +#define KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH 64 + +/* KFENCE object states. */ +enum kfence_object_state { + KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED, /* Object is unused. */ + KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED, /* Object is currently allocated. */ + KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, /* Object was allocated, and then freed. */ +}; + +/* Alloc/free tracking information. */ +struct kfence_track { + pid_t pid; + int num_stack_entries; + unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH]; +}; + +/* KFENCE metadata per guarded allocation. */ +struct kfence_metadata { + struct list_head list; /* Freelist node; access under kfence_freelist_lock. */ + struct rcu_head rcu_head; /* For delayed freeing. */ + + /* + * Lock protecting below data; to ensure consistency of the below data, + * since the following may execute concurrently: __kfence_alloc(), + * __kfence_free(), kfence_handle_page_fault(). However, note that we + * cannot grab the same metadata off the freelist twice, and multiple + * __kfence_alloc() cannot run concurrently on the same metadata. + */ + raw_spinlock_t lock; + + /* The current state of the object; see above. */ + enum kfence_object_state state; + + /* + * Allocated object address; cannot be calculated from size, because of + * alignment requirements. + * + * Invariant: ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE) is constant. + */ + unsigned long addr; + + /* + * The size of the original allocation. + */ + size_t size; + + /* + * The kmem_cache cache of the last allocation; NULL if never allocated + * or the cache has already been destroyed. + */ + struct kmem_cache *cache; + + /* + * In case of an invalid access, the page that was unprotected; we + * optimistically only store one address. + */ + unsigned long unprotected_page; + + /* Allocation and free stack information. */ + struct kfence_track alloc_track; + struct kfence_track free_track; +}; + +extern struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS]; + +/* KFENCE error types for report generation. */ +enum kfence_error_type { + KFENCE_ERROR_OOB, /* Detected a out-of-bounds access. */ + KFENCE_ERROR_UAF, /* Detected a use-after-free access. */ + KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION, /* Detected a memory corruption on free. */ + KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID, /* Invalid access of unknown type. */ + KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE, /* Invalid free. */ +}; + +void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, const struct kfence_metadata *meta, + enum kfence_error_type type); + +void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta); + +#endif /* MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H */ diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..64f27c8d46a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/kfence/report.c @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * KFENCE reporting. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. + */ + +#include <stdarg.h> + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/lockdep.h> +#include <linux/printk.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/stacktrace.h> +#include <linux/string.h> + +#include <asm/kfence.h> + +#include "kfence.h" + +/* Helper function to either print to a seq_file or to console. */ +__printf(2, 3) +static void seq_con_printf(struct seq_file *seq, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + + va_start(args, fmt); + if (seq) + seq_vprintf(seq, fmt, args); + else + vprintk(fmt, args); + va_end(args); +} + +/* + * Get the number of stack entries to skip to get out of MM internals. @type is + * optional, and if set to NULL, assumes an allocation or free stack. + */ +static int get_stack_skipnr(const unsigned long stack_entries[], int num_entries, + const enum kfence_error_type *type) +{ + char buf[64]; + int skipnr, fallback = 0; + bool is_access_fault = false; + + if (type) { + /* Depending on error type, find different stack entries. */ + switch (*type) { + case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF: + case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB: + case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID: + is_access_fault = true; + break; + case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION: + case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE: + break; + } + } + + for (skipnr = 0; skipnr < num_entries; skipnr++) { + int len = scnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%ps", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]); + + if (is_access_fault) { + if (!strncmp(buf, KFENCE_SKIP_ARCH_FAULT_HANDLER, len)) + goto found; + } else { + if (str_has_prefix(buf, "kfence_") || str_has_prefix(buf, "__kfence_") || + !strncmp(buf, "__slab_free", len)) { + /* + * In case of tail calls from any of the below + * to any of the above. + */ + fallback = skipnr + 1; + } + + /* Also the *_bulk() variants by only checking prefixes. */ + if (str_has_prefix(buf, "kfree") || + str_has_prefix(buf, "kmem_cache_free") || + str_has_prefix(buf, "__kmalloc") || + str_has_prefix(buf, "kmem_cache_alloc")) + goto found; + } + } + if (fallback < num_entries) + return fallback; +found: + skipnr++; + return skipnr < num_entries ? skipnr : 0; +} + +static void kfence_print_stack(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta, + bool show_alloc) +{ + const struct kfence_track *track = show_alloc ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_track; + + if (track->num_stack_entries) { + /* Skip allocation/free internals stack. */ + int i = get_stack_skipnr(track->stack_entries, track->num_stack_entries, NULL); + + /* stack_trace_seq_print() does not exist; open code our own. */ + for (; i < track->num_stack_entries; i++) + seq_con_printf(seq, " %pS\n", (void *)track->stack_entries[i]); + } else { + seq_con_printf(seq, " no %s stack\n", show_alloc ? "allocation" : "deallocation"); + } +} + +void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadata *meta) +{ + const int size = abs(meta->size); + const unsigned long start = meta->addr; + const struct kmem_cache *const cache = meta->cache; + + lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); + + if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED) { + seq_con_printf(seq, "kfence-#%zd unused\n", meta - kfence_metadata); + return; + } + + seq_con_printf(seq, + "kfence-#%zd [0x" PTR_FMT "-0x" PTR_FMT + ", size=%d, cache=%s] allocated by task %d:\n", + meta - kfence_metadata, (void *)start, (void *)(start + size - 1), size, + (cache && cache->name) ? cache->name : "<destroyed>", meta->alloc_track.pid); + kfence_print_stack(seq, meta, true); + + if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) { + seq_con_printf(seq, "\nfreed by task %d:\n", meta->free_track.pid); + kfence_print_stack(seq, meta, false); + } +} + +/* + * Show bytes at @addr that are different from the expected canary values, up to + * @max_bytes. + */ +static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show, + const struct kfence_metadata *meta) +{ + const unsigned long show_until_addr = address + bytes_to_show; + const u8 *cur, *end; + + /* Do not show contents of object nor read into following guard page. */ + end = (const u8 *)(address < meta->addr ? min(show_until_addr, meta->addr) + : min(show_until_addr, PAGE_ALIGN(address))); + + pr_cont("["); + for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) { + if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur)) + pr_cont(" ."); + else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL)) + pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur); + else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */ + pr_cont(" !"); + } + pr_cont(" ]"); +} + +void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, const struct kfence_metadata *meta, + enum kfence_error_type type) +{ + unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH] = { 0 }; + int num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1); + int skipnr = get_stack_skipnr(stack_entries, num_stack_entries, &type); + const ptrdiff_t object_index = meta ? meta - kfence_metadata : -1; + + /* Require non-NULL meta, except if KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID. */ + if (WARN_ON(type != KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID && !meta)) + return; + + if (meta) + lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); + /* + * Because we may generate reports in printk-unfriendly parts of the + * kernel, such as scheduler code, the use of printk() could deadlock. + * Until such time that all printing code here is safe in all parts of + * the kernel, accept the risk, and just get our message out (given the + * system might already behave unpredictably due to the memory error). + * As such, also disable lockdep to hide warnings, and avoid disabling + * lockdep for the rest of the kernel. + */ + lockdep_off(); + + pr_err("==================================================================\n"); + /* Print report header. */ + switch (type) { + case KFENCE_ERROR_OOB: { + const bool left_of_object = address < meta->addr; + + pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: out-of-bounds in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]); + pr_err("Out-of-bounds access at 0x" PTR_FMT " (%luB %s of kfence-#%zd):\n", + (void *)address, + left_of_object ? meta->addr - address : address - meta->addr, + left_of_object ? "left" : "right", object_index); + break; + } + case KFENCE_ERROR_UAF: + pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: use-after-free in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]); + pr_err("Use-after-free access at 0x" PTR_FMT " (in kfence-#%zd):\n", + (void *)address, object_index); + break; + case KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION: + pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: memory corruption in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]); + pr_err("Corrupted memory at 0x" PTR_FMT " ", (void *)address); + print_diff_canary(address, 16, meta); + pr_cont(" (in kfence-#%zd):\n", object_index); + break; + case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID: + pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid access in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]); + pr_err("Invalid access at 0x" PTR_FMT ":\n", (void *)address); + break; + case KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE: + pr_err("BUG: KFENCE: invalid free in %pS\n\n", (void *)stack_entries[skipnr]); + pr_err("Invalid free of 0x" PTR_FMT " (in kfence-#%zd):\n", (void *)address, + object_index); + break; + } + + /* Print stack trace and object info. */ + stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr, 0); + + if (meta) { + pr_err("\n"); + kfence_print_object(NULL, meta); + } + + /* Print report footer. */ + pr_err("\n"); + dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR); + pr_err("==================================================================\n"); + + lockdep_on(); + + if (panic_on_warn) + panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n"); + + /* We encountered a memory unsafety error, taint the kernel! */ + add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); +} -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH] 4.19: PTP_KVM support for arm/arm64
by lisiheng 14 Sep '21

14 Sep '21

From: lisiheng <lisiheng(a)bingosoft.net> PTP_KVM is used for high precision time sync between host and guests. It relies on transferring the wall clock and counter value from the host to the guest using a KVM-specific hypercall. mainline inclusion from mainline-v4.19 category: feature bugzilla:https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I3R900 CVE: NA Reference: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/_sources/virt/kvm/arm/ptp_kvm.rst.txt https://github.com/kata-containers/packaging/blob/master/kernel/patches/4.1… Signed-off-by: lisiheng <lisiheng(a)bingosoft.net> --- drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 24 ++++++ drivers/ptp/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/ptp/Makefile | 1 + drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_arm64.c | 52 ++++++++++++ drivers/ptp/{ptp_kvm.c => ptp_kvm_common.c} | 89 +++++---------------- drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++ fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 17 ---- include/asm-generic/ptp_kvm.h | 12 +++ include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 5 ++ virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.c | 14 ++++ 10 files changed, 216 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_arm64.c rename drivers/ptp/{ptp_kvm.c => ptp_kvm_common.c} (55%) create mode 100644 drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c create mode 100644 include/asm-generic/ptp_kvm.h diff --git a/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c b/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c index 6847a5fe13fd..f84bed34e9ea 100644 --- a/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c +++ b/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c @@ -1653,3 +1653,27 @@ static int __init arch_timer_acpi_init(struct acpi_table_header *table) } TIMER_ACPI_DECLARE(arch_timer, ACPI_SIG_GTDT, arch_timer_acpi_init); #endif + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK_KVM) +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_fn(long *cycle, struct timespec64 *ts, + struct clocksource **cs) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res hvc_res; + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID, + &hvc_res); + + if ((long)(hvc_res.a0) < 0) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + ts->tv_sec = hvc_res.a0; + ts->tv_nsec = hvc_res.a1; + *cycle = hvc_res.a2 << 32 | hvc_res.a3; + *cs = &clocksource_counter; + + return 0; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_fn); +#endif + diff --git a/drivers/ptp/Kconfig b/drivers/ptp/Kconfig index d137c480db46..318b3f5df1ea 100644 --- a/drivers/ptp/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/ptp/Kconfig @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ config PTP_1588_CLOCK_PCH config PTP_1588_CLOCK_KVM tristate "KVM virtual PTP clock" depends on PTP_1588_CLOCK - depends on KVM_GUEST && X86 + depends on KVM_GUEST && X86 || ARM64 default y help This driver adds support for using kvm infrastructure as a PTP diff --git a/drivers/ptp/Makefile b/drivers/ptp/Makefile index 19efa9cfa950..1bf4940a88a6 100644 --- a/drivers/ptp/Makefile +++ b/drivers/ptp/Makefile @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ # ptp-y := ptp_clock.o ptp_chardev.o ptp_sysfs.o +ptp_kvm-y := ptp_kvm_common.o ptp_kvm_$(ARCH).o obj-$(CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK) += ptp.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK_DTE) += ptp_dte.o obj-$(CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK_IXP46X) += ptp_ixp46x.o diff --git a/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_arm64.c b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_arm64.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..07ee2fc2c7b1 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_arm64.c @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Virtual PTP 1588 clock for use with KVM guests + * Copyright (C) 2019 ARM Ltd. + * All Rights Reserved + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <asm/hypervisor.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/psci.h> +#include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +#include <linux/timecounter.h> +#include <linux/sched/clock.h> +#include <asm/arch_timer.h> + + +int kvm_arch_ptp_init(void) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res hvc_res; + + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID, + &hvc_res); + if ((long)(hvc_res.a0) < 0) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + return 0; +} + +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_generic(struct timespec64 *ts, + struct arm_smccc_res *hvc_res) +{ + arm_smccc_1_1_invoke(ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID, + hvc_res); + if ((long)(hvc_res->a0) < 0) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + ts->tv_sec = hvc_res->a0; + ts->tv_nsec = hvc_res->a1; + + return 0; +} + +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock(struct timespec64 *ts) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res hvc_res; + + kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_generic(ts, &hvc_res); + + return 0; +} diff --git a/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm.c b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_common.c similarity index 55% rename from drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm.c rename to drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_common.c index c67dd11e08b1..69a7cd05d188 100644 --- a/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm.c +++ b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_common.c @@ -1,29 +1,19 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* * Virtual PTP 1588 clock for use with KVM guests * * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat Inc. * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * */ #include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <uapi/linux/kvm_para.h> #include <asm/kvm_para.h> -#include <asm/pvclock.h> -#include <asm/kvmclock.h> -#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h> +#include <asm-generic/ptp_kvm.h> #include <linux/ptp_clock_kernel.h> @@ -34,56 +24,31 @@ struct kvm_ptp_clock { DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kvm_ptp_lock); -static struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock; - -static struct kvm_clock_pairing clock_pair; -static phys_addr_t clock_pair_gpa; static int ptp_kvm_get_time_fn(ktime_t *device_time, struct system_counterval_t *system_counter, void *ctx) { - unsigned long ret; + unsigned long ret, cycle; struct timespec64 tspec; - unsigned version; - int cpu; - struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *src; + struct clocksource *cs; spin_lock(&kvm_ptp_lock); preempt_disable_notrace(); - cpu = smp_processor_id(); - src = &hv_clock[cpu].pvti; - - do { - /* - * We are using a TSC value read in the hosts - * kvm_hc_clock_pairing handling. - * So any changes to tsc_to_system_mul - * and tsc_shift or any other pvclock - * data invalidate that measurement. - */ - version = pvclock_read_begin(src); - - ret = kvm_hypercall2(KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING, - clock_pair_gpa, - KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK); - if (ret != 0) { - pr_err_ratelimited("clock pairing hypercall ret %lu\n", ret); - spin_unlock(&kvm_ptp_lock); - preempt_enable_notrace(); - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - } - - tspec.tv_sec = clock_pair.sec; - tspec.tv_nsec = clock_pair.nsec; - ret = __pvclock_read_cycles(src, clock_pair.tsc); - } while (pvclock_read_retry(src, version)); + + ret = kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_fn(&cycle, &tspec, &cs); + if (ret != 0) { + pr_err_ratelimited("clock pairing hypercall ret %lu\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&kvm_ptp_lock); + preempt_enable_notrace(); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } preempt_enable_notrace(); - system_counter->cycles = ret; - system_counter->cs = &kvm_clock; + system_counter->cycles = cycle; + system_counter->cs = cs; *device_time = timespec64_to_ktime(tspec); @@ -126,17 +91,13 @@ static int ptp_kvm_gettime(struct ptp_clock_info *ptp, struct timespec64 *ts) spin_lock(&kvm_ptp_lock); - ret = kvm_hypercall2(KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING, - clock_pair_gpa, - KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK); + ret = kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock(&tspec); if (ret != 0) { pr_err_ratelimited("clock offset hypercall ret %lu\n", ret); spin_unlock(&kvm_ptp_lock); return -EOPNOTSUPP; } - tspec.tv_sec = clock_pair.sec; - tspec.tv_nsec = clock_pair.nsec; spin_unlock(&kvm_ptp_lock); memcpy(ts, &tspec, sizeof(struct timespec64)); @@ -176,22 +137,12 @@ static void __exit ptp_kvm_exit(void) static int __init ptp_kvm_init(void) { - long ret; - - if (!kvm_para_available()) - return -ENODEV; - clock_pair_gpa = slow_virt_to_phys(&clock_pair); - hv_clock = pvclock_get_pvti_cpu0_va(); - - if (!hv_clock) - return -ENODEV; - - ret = kvm_hypercall2(KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING, clock_pair_gpa, - KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK); - if (ret == -KVM_ENOSYS || ret == -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP) - return -ENODEV; + int ret; + ret = kvm_arch_ptp_init(); + if (ret) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; kvm_ptp_clock.caps = ptp_kvm_caps; kvm_ptp_clock.ptp_clock = ptp_clock_register(&kvm_ptp_clock.caps, NULL); diff --git a/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..a52cf1c2990c --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Virtual PTP 1588 clock for use with KVM guests + * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Red Hat Inc. + */ + +#include <asm/pvclock.h> +#include <asm/kvmclock.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h> +#include <uapi/linux/kvm_para.h> +#include <linux/ptp_clock_kernel.h> + +phys_addr_t clock_pair_gpa; +struct kvm_clock_pairing clock_pair; +struct pvclock_vsyscall_time_info *hv_clock; + +int kvm_arch_ptp_init(void) +{ + int ret; + + if (!kvm_para_available()) + return -ENODEV; + + clock_pair_gpa = slow_virt_to_phys(&clock_pair); + hv_clock = pvclock_get_pvti_cpu0_va(); + if (!hv_clock) + return -ENODEV; + + ret = kvm_hypercall2(KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING, clock_pair_gpa, + KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK); + if (ret == -KVM_ENOSYS || ret == -KVM_EOPNOTSUPP) + return -ENODEV; + + return 0; +} + +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock(struct timespec64 *ts) +{ + long ret; + + ret = kvm_hypercall2(KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING, + clock_pair_gpa, + KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK); + if (ret != 0) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + ts->tv_sec = clock_pair.sec; + ts->tv_nsec = clock_pair.nsec; + + return 0; +} + +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_fn(unsigned long *cycle, struct timespec64 *tspec, + struct clocksource **cs) +{ + unsigned long ret; + unsigned int version; + int cpu; + struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info *src; + + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + src = &hv_clock[cpu].pvti; + + do { + /* + * We are using a TSC value read in the hosts + * kvm_hc_clock_pairing handling. + * So any changes to tsc_to_system_mul + * and tsc_shift or any other pvclock + * data invalidate that measurement. + */ + version = pvclock_read_begin(src); + + ret = kvm_hypercall2(KVM_HC_CLOCK_PAIRING, + clock_pair_gpa, + KVM_CLOCK_PAIRING_WALLCLOCK); + tspec->tv_sec = clock_pair.sec; + tspec->tv_nsec = clock_pair.nsec; + *cycle = __pvclock_read_cycles(src, clock_pair.tsc); + } while (pvclock_read_retry(src, version)); + + *cs = &kvm_clock; + + return 0; +} diff --git a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c index ffa6d3530f4b..4055929a043c 100644 --- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c +++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c @@ -2085,7 +2085,6 @@ int jbd2_journal_try_to_free_buffers(journal_t *journal, { struct buffer_head *head; struct buffer_head *bh; - bool has_write_io_error = false; int ret = 0; J_ASSERT(PageLocked(page)); @@ -2110,26 +2109,10 @@ int jbd2_journal_try_to_free_buffers(journal_t *journal, jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh); if (buffer_jbd(bh)) goto busy; - - /* - * If we free a metadata buffer which has been failed to - * write out, the jbd2 checkpoint procedure will not detect - * this failure and may lead to filesystem inconsistency - * after cleanup journal tail. - */ - if (buffer_write_io_error(bh)) { - pr_err("JBD2: Error while async write back metadata bh %llu.", - (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr); - has_write_io_error = true; - } } while ((bh = bh->b_this_page) != head); ret = try_to_free_buffers(page); - busy: - if (has_write_io_error) - jbd2_journal_abort(journal, -EIO); - return ret; } diff --git a/include/asm-generic/ptp_kvm.h b/include/asm-generic/ptp_kvm.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d87a08495710 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/asm-generic/ptp_kvm.h @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * linux/drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c + * + * Copyright (C) 2019 ARM Ltd. + * All Rights Reserved + */ + +int kvm_arch_ptp_init(void); +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock(struct timespec64 *ts); +int kvm_arch_ptp_get_clock_fn(unsigned long *cycle, + struct timespec64 *tspec, void *cs); diff --git a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h index 5b5f52ca6ac8..5a46bb6df894 100644 --- a/include/linux/arm-smccc.h +++ b/include/linux/arm-smccc.h @@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ 0, 1) +#define ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ + ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + 0, 2) + #define ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 \ ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, \ ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ diff --git a/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.c b/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.c index 7a6c5f18dff2..495b25b9ed13 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.c +++ b/virt/kvm/arm/hypercalls.c @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) u32 val = SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED; u32 feature; gpa_t gpa; + struct timespec64 ts; + u64 cycles, cycle_high, cycle_low; + struct system_time_snapshot systime_snapshot; switch (func_id) { case ARM_SMCCC_VERSION_FUNC_ID: @@ -63,6 +66,17 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) case ARM_SMCCC_HV_PV_SCHED_KICK_CPU: val = kvm_pvsched_kick_vcpu(vcpu); break; + + case ARM_SMCCC_VENDOR_HYP_KVM_PTP_FUNC_ID: + ktime_get_real_ts64(&ts); + ktime_get_snapshot(&systime_snapshot); + cycles = systime_snapshot.cycles - vcpu_vtimer(vcpu)->cntvoff; + cycle_high = cycles >> 32; + cycle_low = cycles << 32 >> 32; + + smccc_set_retval(vcpu, ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec, cycle_high, cycle_low); + return 1; + default: return kvm_psci_call(vcpu); } -- 2.23.0

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[PATCH kernel-4.19 0/2] virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support
by xuliqun 07 Sep '21

07 Sep '21

virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support, mainly for guest os xuliqun (2): virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support virtio_blk: fix handling single range discard request drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/uapi/linux/virtio_blk.h | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.16.2

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【Meeting Notice】openEuler kernel 技术分享第十一期 & 双周例会 Time: 2021-09-03 14:00-17:00
by Meeting Book 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/2] KVM: nSVM: always intercept VMLOAD/VMSAVE when nested (CVE-2021-3656)
by Yang Yingliang 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

From: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from linux-4.19.205 commit 119d547cbf7c055ba8100309ad71910478092f24 CVE: CVE-2021-3656 -------------------------------- [ upstream commit c7dfa4009965a9b2d7b329ee970eb8da0d32f0bc ] If L1 disables VMLOAD/VMSAVE intercepts, and doesn't enable Virtual VMLOAD/VMSAVE (currently not supported for the nested hypervisor), then VMLOAD/VMSAVE must operate on the L1 physical memory, which is only possible by making L0 intercept these instructions. Failure to do so allowed the nested guest to run VMLOAD/VMSAVE unintercepted, and thus read/write portions of the host physical memory. Fixes: 89c8a4984fc9 ("KVM: SVM: Enable Virtual VMLOAD VMSAVE feature") Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 464e271dc354d..1076dc1bd92ae 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -513,6 +513,9 @@ static void recalc_intercepts(struct vcpu_svm *svm) c->intercept_dr = h->intercept_dr | g->intercept_dr; c->intercept_exceptions = h->intercept_exceptions | g->intercept_exceptions; c->intercept = h->intercept | g->intercept; + + c->intercept |= (1ULL << INTERCEPT_VMLOAD); + c->intercept |= (1ULL << INTERCEPT_VMSAVE); } static inline struct vmcb *get_host_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) -- 2.25.1

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转发: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）
by 徐力群 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

kernel@openeuler.org邮件已经订阅成功了（华为汪少博帮忙后台处理了一下），我现在重新发一下邮件。谢谢。请帮忙审阅补丁。发件人: 徐力群发送时间: 2021年8月30日 9:13 收件人: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi(a)huawei.com>; kernel(a)openeuler.org 抄送: Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian(a)huawei.com>; 曲维杰 <quweijie(a)huayun.com> 主题: 回复: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）这个是增加了bugzilla链接地址的补丁，之前可能重复发了几次（一直以为发送失败了）。谢谢。附件包括补丁合入后的测试方法和结果。 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I47ITN 【标题描述】guest OS内删除文件，从host角度看guest的磁盘文件没有变小发件人: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi(a)huawei.com<mailto:xiexiuqi@huawei.com>> 发送时间: 2021年8月27日 22:32 收件人: 徐力群 <xuliqun(a)huayun.com<mailto:xuliqun@huayun.com>>; kernel(a)openeuler.org<mailto:kernel@openeuler.org> 抄送: Cheng Jian <cj.chengjian(a)huawei.com<mailto:cj.chengjian@huawei.com>> 主题: Re: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）你好，非常欢迎参与 openEuler kernel 开发。首先在这里提交 issue，描述下要解决什么问题。 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues 补丁的 Commit Message 中附上对应的 issue 链接，如在bugzila 行添加： bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I3DJ83 然后将适配之后的补丁发往 kernel(a)openeuler.org<mailto:kernel@openeuler.org>, 有问题可以联系我或 Cheng Jian. --- Xie XiuQi On 2021/8/27 14:18, 徐力群 wrote: 发件人: 徐力群发送时间: 2021年8月27日 14:18 收件人: kernel-owner(a)openeuler.org<mailto:kernel-owner@openeuler.org>； <kernel-owner(a)openeuler.org;><mailto:kernel-owner@openeuler.org;>; kernel(a)openeuler.org<mailto:kernel@openeuler.org> 主题: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）该补丁打上之后，guest如果删除了磁盘的文件，那么从host上看磁盘文件会变小。 virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support mainline inclusion from mainline-5.14-rc7 commit 1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c16f6b21、af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998127453 category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- from： https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c1… https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998… In commit 88c85538, "virtio-blk: add discard and write zeroes features to specification" (https://github.com/oasis-tcs/virtio-spec) the virtio block specification has been extended to add VIRTIO_BLK_T_DISCARD and VIRTIO_BLK_T_WRITE_ZEROES commands. This patch enables support for discard and write zeroes in the virtio-blk driver when the device advertises the corresponding features, VIRTIO_BLK_F_DISCARD and VIRTIO_BLK_F_WRITE_ZEROES.

2 3

Re: 转发: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）
by Xie XiuQi 31 Aug '21

31 Aug '21

On 2021/8/31 9:58, 仇大玉 wrote: > @Xie XiuQi 请问是不是遵循kernel社区的发送方式，使用git send-email的方式参与OpenEuler的kernel提交是的，发到 kernel(a)openeuler.org 即可。发送前，先订阅一下邮件列表。 > > -----Original Message----- > From: 徐力群 <xuliqun(a)huayun.com> > Sent: 2021年8月31日 9:49 > To: chengjian (D) <cj.chengjian(a)huawei.com>; kernel(a)openeuler.org; Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi(a)huawei.com> > Cc: 曲维杰 <quweijie(a)huayun.com>; 仇大玉 <qiudayu(a)huayun.com> > Subject: 回复: 转发: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内） > > 请看附件，是这个吗？ > 我是收到这个邮件之后再次转发的。 > 难道还需要等待一段时间才能彻底激活？ > > > -----邮件原件----- > 发件人: chengjian (D) <cj.chengjian(a)huawei.com> > 发送时间: 2021年8月30日 20:38 > 收件人: 徐力群 <xuliqun(a)huayun.com>; kernel(a)openeuler.org; Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi(a)huawei.com> > 抄送: 曲维杰 <quweijie(a)huayun.com>; 仇大玉 <qiudayu(a)huayun.com>; chengjian (D) <cj.chengjian(a)huawei.com> > 主题: Re: 转发: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内） > > > On 2021/8/30 11:10, 徐力群 wrote: >> kernel@openeuler.org邮件已经订阅成功了（华为汪少博帮忙后台处理了一下）， >> >> 我现在重新发一下邮件。谢谢。请帮忙审阅补丁。 >> > 您好，冒昧打扰。 > > > 我这边以及邮件列表仍然没有您那边发送的邮件(PATCH)。 > > 请问您邮件已经发送了么。 > > 如果您发送了，请确认下邮件列表是否订阅成功，以及邮件是否发送成功。（一般来说，邮件被邮件列表墙掉会有一封提醒邮件的）。 > > 谢谢 > > ---- 成坚 > > >> On 2021/8/27 14:18, 徐力群wrote: >> >> *发件人:*徐力群 >> *发送时间:*2021年8月27日14:18 >> *收件人:*kernel-owner@openeuler.org； <kernel-owner(a)openeuler.org;> >> <mailto:kernel-owner@openeuler.org;>; kernel(a)openeuler.org >> *主题:*请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内） >> >> 该补丁打上之后，guest如果删除了磁盘的文件，那么从host上看磁盘文件会变小。 >> >> virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support >> >> mainline inclusion >> >> from mainline-5.14-rc7 >> >> commit >> 1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c16f6b21、af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998127453 >> >> category: bugfix >> >> bugzilla: NA >> >> CVE: NA >> >> ------------------------------------------------- >> >> from： >> >> https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c1… >> >> https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998… >> >> In commit 88c85538, "virtio-blk: add discard and write zeroes features >> >> to specification" (https://github.com/oasis-tcs/virtio-spec) the >> virtio >> >> block specification has been extended to add VIRTIO_BLK_T_DISCARD and >> >> VIRTIO_BLK_T_WRITE_ZEROES commands. This patch enables support for >> >> discard and write zeroes in the virtio-blk driver when the device >> >> advertises the corresponding features, VIRTIO_BLK_F_DISCARD and >> >> VIRTIO_BLK_F_WRITE_ZEROES. >>

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19] tcp_comp: Fix comp_read_size return value
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

From: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I47SV5?from=project-issue CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- In comp_read_size rxm->offset should be subtracted from skb->len. And use strp_done to release resoureces when destroy sock. Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp_comp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_comp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_comp.c index f6ebe52f3f7f7..bd5274091225b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_comp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_comp.c @@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static int comp_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) if (rxm->offset > skb->len) return 0; - return skb->len; + return skb->len - rxm->offset; } void comp_setup_strp(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_comp_context *ctx) @@ -903,6 +903,7 @@ static void tcp_comp_context_free(struct rcu_head *head) tcp_comp_context_tx_free(ctx); tcp_comp_context_rx_free(ctx); + strp_done(&ctx->rx.strp); kfree(ctx); } @@ -923,6 +924,7 @@ void tcp_cleanup_compression(struct sock *sk) kfree_skb(ctx->rx.pkt); ctx->rx.pkt = NULL; } + strp_stop(&ctx->rx.strp); rcu_assign_pointer(icsk->icsk_ulp_data, NULL); call_rcu(&ctx->rcu, tcp_comp_context_free); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] virtio-blk: Add validation for block size in config space
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

From: Xie Yongji <xieyongji(a)bytedance.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.14-rc7 commit 82e89ea077b93b3c131fa175b0df3acb5b1d5cdf category: bufgix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA -------------------------------- An untrusted device might presents an invalid block size in configuration space. This tries to add validation for it in the validate callback and clear the VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE feature bit if the value is out of the supported range. And we also double check the value in virtblk_probe() in case that it's changed after the validation. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji(a)bytedance.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210809101609.148-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Conflict: drivers/block/virtio_blk.c a. commit d1e9aa9c34a7 ("virtio-blk: support per-device queue depth") is not backported, 'unsigned int queue_depth' do not exist. b. commit e982c4d0a29b ("virtio-blk: modernize sysfs attribute creation") is not backported, 'virtblk_attr_groups' do not exist. c. commit f525464a8000 ("block: add blk_alloc_disk and blk_cleanup_disk APIs") and commit 89a5f065653b ("virtio-blk: use blk_mq_alloc_disk") is not backported, 'blk_cleanup_disk' is needed to repleace with 'blk_cleanup_queue', 'out_free_vq' is needed to replace with 'out_put_disk'. Signed-off-by: Li Jinlin <lijinlin3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: louhongxiang <louhongxiang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c index 7fe0f8f75d550..4423366a99790 100644 --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c @@ -718,6 +718,28 @@ static const struct blk_mq_ops virtio_mq_ops = { static unsigned int virtblk_queue_depth; module_param_named(queue_depth, virtblk_queue_depth, uint, 0444); +static int virtblk_validate(struct virtio_device *vdev) +{ + u32 blk_size; + + if (!vdev->config->get) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n", + __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE)) + return 0; + + blk_size = virtio_cread32(vdev, + offsetof(struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size)); + + if (blk_size < SECTOR_SIZE || blk_size > PAGE_SIZE) + __virtio_clear_bit(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) { struct virtio_blk *vblk; @@ -728,12 +750,6 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) u16 min_io_size; u8 physical_block_exp, alignment_offset; - if (!vdev->config->get) { - dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n", - __func__); - return -EINVAL; - } - err = ida_simple_get(&vd_index_ida, 0, minor_to_index(1 << MINORBITS), GFP_KERNEL); if (err < 0) @@ -849,6 +865,14 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) else blk_size = queue_logical_block_size(q); + if (unlikely(blk_size < SECTOR_SIZE || blk_size > PAGE_SIZE)) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, + "block size is changed unexpectedly, now is %u\n", + blk_size); + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup_disk; + } + /* Use topology information if available */ err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_TOPOLOGY, struct virtio_blk_config, physical_block_exp, @@ -882,6 +906,8 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) device_add_disk(&vdev->dev, vblk->disk); return 0; +err_cleanup_disk: + blk_cleanup_queue(vblk->disk->queue); out_free_tags: blk_mq_free_tag_set(&vblk->tag_set); out_put_disk: @@ -991,6 +1017,7 @@ static struct virtio_driver virtio_blk = { .driver.name = KBUILD_MODNAME, .driver.owner = THIS_MODULE, .id_table = id_table, + .validate = virtblk_validate, .probe = virtblk_probe, .remove = virtblk_remove, .config_changed = virtblk_config_changed, -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19] virtio-blk: Add validation for block size in config space
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

From: Xie Yongji <xieyongji(a)bytedance.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.14-rc7 commit 82e89ea077b93b3c131fa175b0df3acb5b1d5cdf category: bufgix bugzilla: NA CVE: NA -------------------------------- An untrusted device might presents an invalid block size in configuration space. This tries to add validation for it in the validate callback and clear the VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE feature bit if the value is out of the supported range. And we also double check the value in virtblk_probe() in case that it's changed after the validation. Signed-off-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji(a)bytedance.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210809101609.148-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Conflict: drivers/block/virtio_blk.c a. commit d1e9aa9c34a7 ("virtio-blk: support per-device queue depth") is not backported, 'unsigned int queue_depth' do not exist. b. commit f525464a8000 ("block: add blk_alloc_disk and blk_cleanup_disk APIs") and commit 89a5f065653b ("virtio-blk: use blk_mq_alloc_disk") is not backported, 'blk_cleanup_disk' is needed to repleace with 'blk_cleanup_queue', 'out_free_vq' is needed to replace with 'out_put_disk'. Signed-off-by: Li Jinlin <lijinlin3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: louhongxiang <louhongxiang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/virtio_blk.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c index dac1769146d7f..c7b92a9902a5d 100644 --- a/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c +++ b/drivers/block/virtio_blk.c @@ -723,6 +723,28 @@ static const struct blk_mq_ops virtio_mq_ops = { static unsigned int virtblk_queue_depth; module_param_named(queue_depth, virtblk_queue_depth, uint, 0444); +static int virtblk_validate(struct virtio_device *vdev) +{ + u32 blk_size; + + if (!vdev->config->get) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n", + __func__); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!virtio_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE)) + return 0; + + blk_size = virtio_cread32(vdev, + offsetof(struct virtio_blk_config, blk_size)); + + if (blk_size < SECTOR_SIZE || blk_size > PAGE_SIZE) + __virtio_clear_bit(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_BLK_SIZE); + + return 0; +} + static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) { struct virtio_blk *vblk; @@ -733,12 +755,6 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) u16 min_io_size; u8 physical_block_exp, alignment_offset; - if (!vdev->config->get) { - dev_err(&vdev->dev, "%s failure: config access disabled\n", - __func__); - return -EINVAL; - } - err = ida_simple_get(&vd_index_ida, 0, minor_to_index(1 << MINORBITS), GFP_KERNEL); if (err < 0) @@ -854,6 +870,14 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) else blk_size = queue_logical_block_size(q); + if (unlikely(blk_size < SECTOR_SIZE || blk_size > PAGE_SIZE)) { + dev_err(&vdev->dev, + "block size is changed unexpectedly, now is %u\n", + blk_size); + err = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup_disk; + } + /* Use topology information if available */ err = virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_BLK_F_TOPOLOGY, struct virtio_blk_config, physical_block_exp, @@ -886,6 +910,8 @@ static int virtblk_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) device_add_disk(&vdev->dev, vblk->disk, virtblk_attr_groups); return 0; +err_cleanup_disk: + blk_cleanup_queue(vblk->disk->queue); out_free_tags: blk_mq_free_tag_set(&vblk->tag_set); out_put_disk: @@ -995,6 +1021,7 @@ static struct virtio_driver virtio_blk = { .driver.name = KBUILD_MODNAME, .driver.owner = THIS_MODULE, .id_table = id_table, + .validate = virtblk_validate, .probe = virtblk_probe, .remove = virtblk_remove, .config_changed = virtblk_config_changed, -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] blk-mq: fix divide by zero crash in tg_may_dispatch()
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 177149, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I47R8R CVE: NA ----------------------------------------------- If blk-throttle is enabled and io is issued before blk_throtl_register_queue() is done. Divide by zero crash will be triggered in tg_may_dispatch() because 'throtl_slice' is uninitialized. Thus introduce a new falg QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE. It will be set after blk_throtl_register_queue() is done, and will be checked before apply any config. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- block/blk-sysfs.c | 2 ++ block/blk-throttle.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/blkdev.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-sysfs.c b/block/blk-sysfs.c index a05b2844f01cf..9687bff0244fb 100644 --- a/block/blk-sysfs.c +++ b/block/blk-sysfs.c @@ -940,6 +940,7 @@ int blk_register_queue(struct gendisk *disk) wbt_enable_default(q); blk_throtl_register_queue(q); + blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE, q); if (q->request_fn || (q->mq_ops && q->elevator)) { ret = elv_register_queue(q); @@ -977,6 +978,7 @@ void blk_unregister_queue(struct gendisk *disk) if (!test_bit(QUEUE_FLAG_REGISTERED, &q->queue_flags)) return; + blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE, q); /* * Since sysfs_remove_dir() prevents adding new directory entries * before removal of existing entries starts, protect against diff --git a/block/blk-throttle.c b/block/blk-throttle.c index c7b4f905feb58..cfd14e95c79e1 100644 --- a/block/blk-throttle.c +++ b/block/blk-throttle.c @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blktrace_api.h> #include <linux/blk-cgroup.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> #include "blk.h" /* Max dispatch from a group in 1 round */ @@ -1434,6 +1436,31 @@ static void tg_conf_updated(struct throtl_grp *tg, bool global) } } +static inline int throtl_check_init_done(struct request_queue *q) +{ + if (test_bit(QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE, &q->queue_flags)) + return 0; + + return blk_queue_dying(q) ? -ENODEV : -EBUSY; +} + +/* + * If throtl_check_init_done() return -EBUSY, we should retry after a short + * msleep(), since that throttle init will be completed in blk_register_queue() + * soon. + */ +static inline int throtl_restart_syscall_when_busy(int errno) +{ + int ret = errno; + + if (ret == -EBUSY) { + msleep(10); + ret = restart_syscall(); + } + + return ret; +} + static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off, bool is_u64) { @@ -1447,6 +1474,10 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, if (ret) return ret; + ret = throtl_check_init_done(ctx.disk->queue); + if (ret) + goto out_finish; + ret = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(ctx.body, "%llu", &v) != 1) goto out_finish; @@ -1454,7 +1485,6 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, v = U64_MAX; tg = blkg_to_tg(ctx.blkg); - if (is_u64) *(u64 *)((void *)tg + of_cft(of)->private) = v; else @@ -1464,6 +1494,8 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, ret = 0; out_finish: blkg_conf_finish(&ctx); + ret = throtl_restart_syscall_when_busy(ret); + return ret ?: nbytes; } @@ -1613,8 +1645,11 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_limit(struct kernfs_open_file *of, if (ret) return ret; - tg = blkg_to_tg(ctx.blkg); + ret = throtl_check_init_done(ctx.disk->queue); + if (ret) + goto out_finish; + tg = blkg_to_tg(ctx.blkg); v[0] = tg->bps_conf[READ][index]; v[1] = tg->bps_conf[WRITE][index]; v[2] = tg->iops_conf[READ][index]; @@ -1710,6 +1745,8 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_limit(struct kernfs_open_file *of, ret = 0; out_finish: blkg_conf_finish(&ctx); + ret = throtl_restart_syscall_when_busy(ret); + return ret ?: nbytes; } diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h index d60280e47a2ca..50f3b1eaa021f 100644 --- a/include/linux/blkdev.h +++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h @@ -704,6 +704,7 @@ struct request_queue { #define QUEUE_FLAG_NOMERGES 5 /* disable merge attempts */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_SAME_COMP 6 /* complete on same CPU-group */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_FAIL_IO 7 /* fake timeout */ +#define QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE 8 /* io throttle can be online */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_NONROT 9 /* non-rotational device (SSD) */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_VIRT QUEUE_FLAG_NONROT /* paravirt device */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_IO_STAT 10 /* do IO stats */ -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19] blk-mq: fix divide by zero crash in tg_may_dispatch()
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 177149, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I47R8R CVE: NA ----------------------------------------------- If blk-throttle is enabled and io is issued before blk_throtl_register_queue() is done. Divide by zero crash will be triggered in tg_may_dispatch() because 'throtl_slice' is uninitialized. Thus introduce a new falg QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE. It will be set after blk_throtl_register_queue() is done, and will be checked before apply any config. Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- block/blk-sysfs.c | 2 ++ block/blk-throttle.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/linux/blkdev.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-sysfs.c b/block/blk-sysfs.c index 15ad67c3c56b8..1f958bace71fc 100644 --- a/block/blk-sysfs.c +++ b/block/blk-sysfs.c @@ -951,6 +951,7 @@ int blk_register_queue(struct gendisk *disk) blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_REGISTERED, q); wbt_enable_default(q); blk_throtl_register_queue(q); + blk_queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE, q); /* Now everything is ready and send out KOBJ_ADD uevent */ kobject_uevent(&q->kobj, KOBJ_ADD); @@ -983,6 +984,7 @@ void blk_unregister_queue(struct gendisk *disk) if (!blk_queue_registered(q)) return; + blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE, q); /* * Since sysfs_remove_dir() prevents adding new directory entries * before removal of existing entries starts, protect against diff --git a/block/blk-throttle.c b/block/blk-throttle.c index 18b8e868995f9..9426330d99dda 100644 --- a/block/blk-throttle.c +++ b/block/blk-throttle.c @@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ #include <linux/bio.h> #include <linux/blktrace_api.h> #include <linux/blk-cgroup.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> +#include <linux/delay.h> #include "blk.h" /* Max dispatch from a group in 1 round */ @@ -1436,6 +1438,31 @@ static void tg_conf_updated(struct throtl_grp *tg, bool global) } } +static inline int throtl_check_init_done(struct request_queue *q) +{ + if (test_bit(QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE, &q->queue_flags)) + return 0; + + return blk_queue_dying(q) ? -ENODEV : -EBUSY; +} + +/* + * If throtl_check_init_done() return -EBUSY, we should retry after a short + * msleep(), since that throttle init will be completed in blk_register_queue() + * soon. + */ +static inline int throtl_restart_syscall_when_busy(int errno) +{ + int ret = errno; + + if (ret == -EBUSY) { + msleep(10); + ret = restart_syscall(); + } + + return ret; +} + static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off, bool is_u64) { @@ -1449,6 +1476,10 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, if (ret) return ret; + ret = throtl_check_init_done(ctx.disk->queue); + if (ret) + goto out_finish; + ret = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(ctx.body, "%llu", &v) != 1) goto out_finish; @@ -1456,7 +1487,6 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, v = U64_MAX; tg = blkg_to_tg(ctx.blkg); - if (is_u64) *(u64 *)((void *)tg + of_cft(of)->private) = v; else @@ -1466,6 +1496,8 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_conf(struct kernfs_open_file *of, ret = 0; out_finish: blkg_conf_finish(&ctx); + ret = throtl_restart_syscall_when_busy(ret); + return ret ?: nbytes; } @@ -1615,8 +1647,11 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_limit(struct kernfs_open_file *of, if (ret) return ret; - tg = blkg_to_tg(ctx.blkg); + ret = throtl_check_init_done(ctx.disk->queue); + if (ret) + goto out_finish; + tg = blkg_to_tg(ctx.blkg); v[0] = tg->bps_conf[READ][index]; v[1] = tg->bps_conf[WRITE][index]; v[2] = tg->iops_conf[READ][index]; @@ -1712,6 +1747,8 @@ static ssize_t tg_set_limit(struct kernfs_open_file *of, ret = 0; out_finish: blkg_conf_finish(&ctx); + ret = throtl_restart_syscall_when_busy(ret); + return ret ?: nbytes; } diff --git a/include/linux/blkdev.h b/include/linux/blkdev.h index 376f5dee46fce..7ed2b137c3324 100644 --- a/include/linux/blkdev.h +++ b/include/linux/blkdev.h @@ -709,6 +709,7 @@ struct request_queue { #define QUEUE_FLAG_NOMERGES 5 /* disable merge attempts */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_SAME_COMP 6 /* complete on same CPU-group */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_FAIL_IO 7 /* fake timeout */ +#define QUEUE_FLAG_THROTL_INIT_DONE 8 /* io throttle can be online */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_NONROT 9 /* non-rotational device (SSD) */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_VIRT QUEUE_FLAG_NONROT /* paravirt device */ #define QUEUE_FLAG_IO_STAT 10 /* do IO stats */ -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH kernel-4.19 000/286] Enable Intel Icelake CPU support
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

Alexander Shishkin (28): Intel: perf/ring_buffer: Fix AUX software double buffering Intel: perf/x86/intel/pt: Remove software double buffering PMU capability intel_th: Only create useful device nodes intel_th: Rework resource passing between glue layers and core intel_th: Skip subdevices if their MMIO is missing intel_th: Add "rtit" source device intel_th: Communicate IRQ via resource intel_th: pci: Use MSI interrupt signalling intel_th: msu: Start handling IRQs intel_th: Only report useful IRQs to subdevices intel_th: msu: Replace open-coded list_{first,last,next}_entry variants intel_th: msu: Switch over to scatterlist intel_th: msu: Factor out pipeline draining intel_th: gth: Factor out trace start/stop intel_th: Add switch triggering support intel_th: msu: Correct the block wrap detection intel_th: msu: Add a sysfs attribute to trigger window switch intel_th: msu: Add current window tracking intel_th: msu: Support multipage blocks intel_th: msu: Split sgt array and pointer in multiwindow mode intel_th: msu: Start read iterator from a non-empty window intel_th: msu: Introduce buffer interface intel_th: msu-sink: An example msu buffer "sink" intel_th: gth: Fix the window switching sequence intel_th: msu: Fix an uninitialized mutex intel_th: Fix freeing IRQs intel_th: msu: Fix window switching without windows intel_th: msu: Fix the unexpected state warning Alexandru Gagniuc (1): Intel:PCI: pciehp: Wait for PDS if in-band presence is disabled Alison Schofield (1): acpi/hmat: Update acpi_hmat_type enum with ACPI_HMAT_TYPE_PROXIMITY Andi Kleen (3): Intel: perf/x86/intel: Extract memory code PEBS parser for reuse Intel: perf/x86/lbr: Avoid reading the LBRs when adaptive PEBS handles them Intel: perf tools x86: Add support for recording and printing XMM registers Andrew Murray (2): Intel: perf/core: Add function to test for event exclusion flags Intel: perf/core: Add PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE for exclusion incapable PMUs Andy Lutomirski (1): x86/traps: Stop using ist_enter/exit() in do_int3() Andy Shevchenko (4): Intel:PCI/AER: Use match_string() helper to simplify the code Intel:PCI/AER: Use for_each_set_bit() to simplify code Intel:PCI/AER: Fix kernel-doc warnings intel_th: pti: Use sysfs_match_string() helper Aneesh Kumar K.V (1): drivers/dax: Allow to include DEV_DAX_PMEM as builtin Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (3): Intel: perf record: Fix suggestion to get list of registers usable with --user-regs and --intr-regs Intel: perf parse-regs: Improve error output when faced with unknown register name tools x86 uapi asm: Sync the pt_regs.h copy with the kernel sources Bharat Kumar Gogada (1): Intel:PCI: Enable SERR# forwarding for all bridges Bjorn Helgaas (5): PCI: Add pci_speed_string() PCI: Use pci_speed_string() for all PCI/PCI-X/PCIe strings Intel:PCI/ASPM: Save LTR Capability for suspend/resume Intel:PCI/portdrv: Use conventional Device ID table formatting Intel:PCI: Use dev_printk() when possible Chen Yu (3): Intel: intel_idle: Customize IceLake server support tools/power turbostat: Support Ice Lake server intel_idle: Fix max_cstate for processor models without C-state tables Colin Ian King (2): intel_th: msu: Fix missing allocation failure check on a kstrndup intel_th: msu: Fix overflow in shift of an unsigned int Dan Carpenter (2): tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select: Fix a read overflow in isst_set_tdp_level_msr() node: fix device cleanups in error handling code Dan Williams (11): Intel: device-dax: Kill dax_region ida Intel: device-dax: Kill dax_region base Intel: device-dax: Remove multi-resource infrastructure Intel: device-dax: Start defining a dax bus model Intel: device-dax: Introduce bus + driver model Intel: device-dax: Move resource pinning+mapping into the common driver Intel: device-dax: Add support for a dax override driver Intel: device-dax: Add /sys/class/dax backwards compatibility Intel: acpi/nfit, device-dax: Identify differentiated memory with a unique numa-node Intel: device-dax: Auto-bind device after successful new_id Intel: device-dax: Add a 'target_node' attribute Dave Hansen (4): Intel: mm/resource: Move HMM pr_debug() deeper into resource code Intel: mm/memory-hotplug: Allow memory resources to be children mm/resource: Let walk_system_ram_range() search child resources Intel: device-dax: "Hotplug" persistent memory for use like normal RAM Dave Jiang (7): Intel: dmaengine: ioatdma: Add Snow Ridge ioatdma device id Intel: dmaengine: ioatdma: disable DCA enabling on IOATDMA v3.4 Intel: dmaengine: ioatdma: add descriptor pre-fetch support for v3.4 Intel: dmaengine: ioatdma: support latency tolerance report (LTR) for v3.4 Intel: ntb: intel: Add Icelake (gen4) support for Intel NTB Intel: ntb: intel: fix static declaration Intel: ntb: intel: add hw workaround for NTB BAR alignment Dinghao Liu (1): ntb: intel: Fix memleak in intel_ntb_pci_probe Dongdong Liu (1): PCI/AER: Initialize aer_fifo Erik Schmauss (1): Intel: ACPICA: ACPI 6.3: HMAT updates Frederick Lawler (1): Intel:PCI/DPC: Log messages with pci_dev, not pcie_device Guoqing Jiang (11): Intel: intel_idle: Use ACPI _CST on server systems Intel: perf/x86/intel: Add more Icelake CPUIDs Intel:PCI/AER: Use threaded IRQ for bottom half Intel:PCI/AER: Use managed resource allocations Intel:PCI/AER: Log messages with pci_dev, not pcie_device Intel:PCI: pciehp: Disable in-band presence detect when possible perf/x86/intel: Export mem events only if there's PEBS support Intel: perf/x86: Use the new pmu::update_attrs attribute group intel: perf/x86/intel: Use update attributes for skylake format Intel: perf/x86/amd: Constrain Large Increment per Cycle events Intel: perf/x86/intel: Support TopDown metrics on Ice Lake Gustavo A. R. Silva (1): intel_th: Mark expected switch fall-throughs Gustavo Pimentel (1): PCI: Decode PCIe 32 GT/s link speed Honghui Zhang (1): Intel:PCI/portdrv: Support PCIe services on subtractive decode bridges Jann Horn (2): Intel: x86/extable: Introduce _ASM_EXTABLE_UA for uaccess fixups Intel: x86/insn-eval: Add support for 64-bit kernel mode Jay Fang (1): PCI/PME: Fix kernel-doc of pcie_pme_resume() and pcie_pme_remove() Jiri Olsa (7): Intel: sysfs: Add sysfs_update_groups function Intel: perf/core: Add attr_groups_update into struct pmu Intel: perf/x86: Get rid of x86_pmu::event_attrs Intel: perf/x86: Add is_visible attribute_group callback for base events Intel: perf/x86: Use update attribute groups for caps Intel: perf/x86: Use update attribute groups for extra format Intel: perf/x86: Use update attribute groups for default attributes Jonathan Corbet (1): docs: fix numaperf.rst and add it to the doc tree Kan Liang (39): perf/x86/intel: Add Icelake support perf/x86/intel: Add Tremont core PMU support Intel: perf/x86: Support outputting XMM registers Intel: perf/x86/intel/ds: Extract code of event update in short period Intel: perf/x86/intel: Support adaptive PEBS v4 Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Intel Icelake uncore support Intel: perf parse-regs: Split parse_regs Intel: perf parse-regs: Add generic support for arch__intr/user_reg_mask() Intel: perf regs x86: Add X86 specific arch__intr_reg_mask() Intel: perf/x86: Disable extended registers for non-supported PMUs Intel: perf/x86/regs: Check reserved bits Intel: perf/x86: Clean up PEBS_XMM_REGS Intel: perf/x86: Remove pmu->pebs_no_xmm_regs Intel: perf/x86/regs: Use PERF_REG_EXTENDED_MASK Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add uncore support for Snow Ridge server Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Factor out box ref/unref functions Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Support MMIO type uncore blocks Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Clean up client IMC Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add IMC uncore support for Snow Ridge Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Factor out __snr_uncore_mmio_init_box Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add box_offsets for free-running counters Intel: perf/x86/intel/uncore: Add Ice Lake server uncore support Intel: perf/x86/intel: Factor out common code of PMI handler Intel: perf/x86/intel: Fix SLOTS PEBS event constraint Intel: perf/x86: Use event_base_rdpmc for the RDPMC userspace support Intel: perf/x86/intel: Name the global status bit in NMI handler Intel: perf/x86/intel: Introduce the fourth fixed counter Intel: perf/x86/intel: Move BTS index to 47 Intel: perf/x86/intel: Fix the name of perf METRICS Intel: perf/x86/intel: Use switch in intel_pmu_disable/enable_event Intel: perf/core: Add a new PERF_EV_CAP_SIBLING event capability Intel: perf/x86/intel: Generic support for hardware TopDown metrics Intel: perf/x86: Add a macro for RDPMC offset of fixed counters Intel: perf/x86/intel: Support per-thread RDPMC TopDown metrics Intel: perf/x86/intel: Check perf metrics feature for each CPU perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix missing marker for snr_uncore_imc_freerunning_events perf/x86/intel/uncore: Reduce the number of CBOX counters perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix the scale of the IMC free-running events perf/x86/intel/uncore: Fix M2M event umask for Ice Lake server Keith Busch (23): PCI/AER: Remove error source from AER struct aer_rpc PCI/AER: Use kfifo for tracking events instead of reimplementing it Intel: acpi: Create subtable parsing infrastructure Intel: acpi: Add HMAT to generic parsing tables Intel: acpi/hmat: Parse and report heterogeneous memory node: Link memory nodes to their compute nodes Intel: node: Add heterogenous memory access attributes Intel: node: Add memory-side caching attributes Intel: acpi/hmat: Register processor domain to its memory Intel: acpi/hmat: Register performance attributes Intel: acpi/hmat: Register memory side cache attributes Intel: doc/mm: New documentation for memory performance PCI: portdrv: Restore PCI config state on slot reset Intel:PCI/DPC: Save and restore config state PCI/ERR: Handle fatal error recovery PCI/ERR: Simplify broadcast callouts Intel:PCI/ERR: Always report current recovery status for udev PCI: Unify device inaccessible Intel:PCI: Make link active reporting detection generic Intel:PCI/AER: Remove unused aer_error_resume() Intel:PCI/AER: Use kfifo_in_spinlocked() to insert locked elements Intel:PCI/AER: Reuse existing pcie_port_find_device() interface Intel:PCI/AER: Abstract AER interrupt handling Kim Phillips (2): perf/x86/amd: Add support for Large Increment per Cycle Events perf/x86/amd: Fix sampling Large Increment per Cycle events Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (2): PCI/ERR: Combine pci_channel_io_frozen cases PCI/ERR: Update error status after reset_link() Len Brown (9): Intel: topology: Simplify cputopology.txt formatting and wording Intel: x86/topology: Add CPUID.1F multi-die/package support Intel: x86/topology: Create topology_max_die_per_package() Intel: cpu/topology: Export die_id Intel: x86/topology: Define topology_die_id() Intel: x86/topology: Define topology_logical_die_id() tools/power turbostat: reduce debug output tools/power turbostat: consolidate duplicate model numbers tools/power turbostat: Fix Haswell Core systems Leonid Ravich (1): Intel: NTB: add new parameter to peer_db_addr() db_bit and db_data Like Xu (4): perf/x86/core: Refactor hw->idx checks and cleanup Intel: perf/x86/lbr: Add interface to get LBR information Intel: perf/x86: Add constraint to create guest LBR event without hw counter Intel: perf/x86: Keep LBR records unchanged in host context for guest usage Lukas Wunner (1): PCI: Simplify disconnected marking Mel Gorman (1): intel_idle: Ignore _CST if control cannot be taken from the platform Mika Westerberg (2): Intel:PCI: Make pcie_downstream_port() available outside of access.c Intel:PCI: Get rid of dev->has_secondary_link flag Mohan Kumar (2): Intel:PCI: Replace printk(KERN_INFO) with pr_info(), etc Intel:PCI: Replace dev_printk(KERN_DEBUG) with dev_info(), etc Olof Johansson (1): Intel:PCI/DPC: Add "pcie_ports=dpc-native" to allow DPC without AER control Otto Sabart (1): doc: trace: fix reference to cpuidle documentation file Patel, Mayurkumar (1): Intel:PCI/AER: Save AER Capability for suspend/resume Pavel Tatashin (1): device-dax: fix memory and resource leak if hotplug fails Peter Zijlstra (4): perf/x86: Support constraint ranges Intel: perf/x86: Fix n_metric for cancelled txn Intel: x86/uaccess: Move copy_user_handle_tail() into asm Intel: hardirq/nmi: Allow nested nmi_enter() Qian Cai (2): acpi/hmat: fix memory leaks in hmat_init() acpi/hmat: fix an uninitialized memory_target Qiuxu Zhuo (9): Intel: EDAC, skx_common: Separate common code out from skx_edac EDAC, skx_edac: Delete duplicated code Intel: EDAC, i10nm: Add a driver for Intel 10nm server processors Intel: EDAC, skx, i10nm: Make skx_common.c a pure library Intel: EDAC, i10nm: Add Intel additional Ice-Lake support Intel: EDAC, i10nm: Check ECC enabling status per channel Intel: EDAC, skx, i10nm: Fix source ID register offset Intel: EDAC, {skx,i10nm}: Make some configurations CPU model specific Intel: EDAC/i10nm: Update driver to support different bus number config register offsets Rafael J. Wysocki (12): Intel: ACPI: processor: Export function to claim _CST control Intel: ACPI: processor: Introduce acpi_processor_evaluate_cst() Intel: ACPI: processor: Clean up acpi_processor_evaluate_cst() Intel: ACPI: processor: Export acpi_processor_evaluate_cst() Intel: intel_idle: Refactor intel_idle_cpuidle_driver_init() Intel: intel_idle: Use ACPI _CST for processor models without C-state tables Intel: Documentation: admin-guide: PM: Add cpuidle document Intel: cpuidle: Allow idle states to be disabled by default Intel: intel_idle: Allow ACPI _CST to be used for selected known processors Intel: intel_idle: Add module parameter to prevent ACPI _CST from being used Intel: ACPI: processor: Make ACPI_PROCESSOR_CSTATE depend on ACPI_PROCESSOR Intel: Documentation: admin-guide: PM: Add intel_idle document Shaokun Zhang (1): intel_th: msu: Fix unused variable warning on arm64 platform Srinivas Pandruvada (13): Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Update ioctl-number.txt for Intel Speed Select interface Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Add common API to register and handle ioctls Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Store per CPU information Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Add IOCTL to Translate Linux logical CPU to PUNIT CPU number Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Add Intel Speed Select mmio interface Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Add Intel Speed Select mailbox interface via PCI Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Add Intel Speed Select mailbox interface via MSRs Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Add Intel Speed Select PUNIT MSR interface Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Restore state on resume Intel: tools/power/x86: A tool to validate Intel Speed Select commands Intel: ICX: platform/x86: ISST: Allow additional core-power mailbox commands Intel: ICX: platform/x86: ISST: Fix wrong unregister type Intel: platform/x86: ISST: Increase timeout Stephen Rothwell (1): intel_rapl: need linux/cpuhotplug.h for enum cpuhp_state Stuart Hayes (1): PCI: pciehp: Add DMI table for in-band presence detection disabled Subbaraya Sundeep (2): Intel:PCI: Assign bus numbers present in EA capability for bridges PCI: Do not use bus number zero from EA capability Sumeet Pawnikar (1): powercap: RAPL: remove unused local MSR define Thomas Gleixner (2): genirq: Provide interrupt injection mechanism Intel:PCI/AER: Fix the broken interrupt injection Tony Luck (5): Intel: EDAC, skx_common: Add code to recognise new compound error code Intel: EDAC, skx_common: Refactor so that we initialize "dev" in result of adxl decode. Intel: EDAC, skx: Retrieve and print retry_rd_err_log registers MAINTAINERS: Update entry for EDAC-SKYLAKE MAINTAINERS: Add entry for EDAC-I10NM Vishal Verma (1): Intel: device-dax: Add a 'modalias' attribute to DAX 'bus' devices Wang Hai (1): device-dax/core: Fix memory leak when rmmod dax.ko Wei Wang (1): Intel: perf/x86: Fix variable types for LBR registers Wei Yongjun (1): intel_th: msu: Fix possible memory leak in mode_store() Yangtao Li (1): Intel: cpuidle: use BIT() for idle state flags and remove CPUIDLE_DRIVER_FLAGS_MASK Yanjiang Jin (1): Intel:PCI/AER: Queue one GHES event, not several uninitialized ones Yicong Yang (3): PCI/AER: Log which device prevents error recovery PCI: Add 32 GT/s decoding in some macros PCI: Add PCIE_LNKCAP2_SLS2SPEED() macro YueHaibing (2): Intel:PCI/ERR: Remove duplicated include from err.c intel_th: msu: Remove set but not used variable 'last' Yunying Sun (1): Intel: perf/x86/intel: Fix invalid Bit 13 for Icelake MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_x register Zhang Rui (18): Intel: powercap/intel_rapl: Simplify rapl_find_package() Intel: powercap/intel_rapl: Support multi-die/package Intel: powercap/intel_rapl: Update RAPL domain name and debug messages Intel: intel_rapl: use reg instead of msr Intel: intel_rapl: remove hardcoded register index Intel: intel_rapl: introduce intel_rapl.h Intel: intel_rapl: introduce struct rapl_if_private Intel: intel_rapl: abstract register address Intel: intel_rapl: abstract register access operations Intel: intel_rapl: cleanup some functions Intel: intel_rapl: cleanup hardcoded MSR access intel_rapl: abstract RAPL common code Intel: intel_rapl: support 64 bit register Intel: intel_rapl: support two power limits for every RAPL domain Intel: intel_rapl: Fix module autoloading issue Intel: powercap/intel_rapl: add support for IceLake desktop Intel: powercap/intel_rapl: add support for ICX Intel: powercap/intel_rapl: add support for ICX-D Zheng Zengkai (5): irqchip: phytium-2500: Fix compilation issues hulk_defconfig: Enable some Icelake support configs openeuler_defconfig: Enable some Icelake support configs hulk_defconfig: Adjust some configs for Intel icelake support openeuler_defconfig: Adjust some configs for Intel icelake support Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax | 22 + Documentation/ABI/stable/sysfs-devices-node | 87 +- .../testing/sysfs-bus-intel_th-devices-msc | 11 +- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 6 + Documentation/PCI/pci-error-recovery.txt | 35 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 + Documentation/admin-guide/mm/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/admin-guide/mm/numaperf.rst | 169 ++ Documentation/admin-guide/pm/cpuidle.rst | 3 + Documentation/admin-guide/pm/intel_idle.rst | 246 +++ .../admin-guide/pm/working-state.rst | 2 + Documentation/cpuidle/core.txt | 23 - Documentation/cpuidle/sysfs.txt | 98 - Documentation/cputopology.txt | 55 +- Documentation/ioctl/ioctl-number.txt | 1 + Documentation/trace/coresight-cpu-debug.txt | 2 +- Documentation/x86/topology.txt | 4 + MAINTAINERS | 10 +- arch/arm64/configs/hulk_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/acpi_numa.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 4 +- arch/ia64/kernel/acpi.c | 14 +- arch/x86/configs/hulk_defconfig | 18 +- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 18 +- arch/x86/events/amd/core.c | 107 +- arch/x86/events/core.c | 299 +-- arch/x86/events/intel/core.c | 929 ++++++++-- arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 501 ++++- arch/x86/events/intel/lbr.c | 84 +- arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c | 3 +- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.c | 137 +- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore.h | 40 +- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snb.c | 107 +- arch/x86/events/intel/uncore_snbep.c | 1119 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/events/perf_event.h | 160 +- arch/x86/include/asm/asm.h | 31 +- arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/intel_ds.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/perf_event.h | 181 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/ptrace.h | 13 + arch/x86/include/asm/topology.h | 16 + arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 16 +- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 3 - arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/perf_regs.h | 26 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 36 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c | 88 +- arch/x86/kernel/perf_regs.c | 28 +- arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 47 + arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 21 +- arch/x86/lib/checksum_32.S | 4 +- arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S | 138 +- arch/x86/lib/csum-copy_64.S | 8 +- arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 12 +- arch/x86/lib/insn-eval.c | 26 +- arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 10 +- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 126 +- arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 24 +- arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 8 + drivers/acpi/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/acpi/Makefile | 1 + drivers/acpi/acpi_processor.c | 182 ++ drivers/acpi/hmat/Kconfig | 11 + drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile | 1 + drivers/acpi/hmat/hmat.c | 666 +++++++ drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 8 +- drivers/acpi/numa.c | 17 +- drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c | 174 +- drivers/acpi/scan.c | 4 +- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 76 +- drivers/base/Kconfig | 8 + drivers/base/memory.c | 1 + drivers/base/node.c | 350 +++- drivers/base/topology.c | 4 + drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c | 7 +- drivers/cpuidle/sysfs.c | 10 + drivers/dax/Kconfig | 27 +- drivers/dax/Makefile | 6 +- drivers/dax/bus.c | 503 ++++++ drivers/dax/bus.h | 61 + drivers/dax/dax-private.h | 34 +- drivers/dax/dax.h | 18 - drivers/dax/device-dax.h | 25 - drivers/dax/device.c | 363 +--- drivers/dax/kmem.c | 111 ++ drivers/dax/pmem.c | 153 -- drivers/dax/pmem/Makefile | 7 + drivers/dax/pmem/compat.c | 73 + drivers/dax/pmem/core.c | 71 + drivers/dax/pmem/pmem.c | 40 + drivers/dax/super.c | 42 +- drivers/dma/ioat/dma.c | 12 + drivers/dma/ioat/dma.h | 2 +- drivers/dma/ioat/hw.h | 3 + drivers/dma/ioat/init.c | 40 +- drivers/dma/ioat/registers.h | 24 + drivers/edac/Kconfig | 12 + drivers/edac/Makefile | 7 +- drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c | 344 ++++ drivers/edac/skx_base.c | 752 ++++++++ drivers/edac/skx_common.c | 657 +++++++ drivers/edac/skx_common.h | 153 ++ drivers/edac/skx_edac.c | 1357 -------------- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/Makefile | 3 + drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/acpi.c | 10 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/core.c | 146 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/gth.c | 128 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/gth.h | 19 + drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/intel_th.h | 32 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/msu-sink.c | 116 ++ drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/msu.c | 830 +++++++-- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/msu.h | 28 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c | 32 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pti.c | 16 +- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/sth.c | 4 + drivers/idle/intel_idle.c | 388 +++- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-phytium-2500-its.c | 6 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-phytium-2500.c | 10 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v2m.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its-pci-msi.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its-platform-msi.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 6 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 10 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic.c | 4 +- drivers/mailbox/pcc.c | 2 +- drivers/ntb/hw/intel/Makefile | 2 +- drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen1.c | 72 +- drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen1.h | 6 +- drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen3.c | 44 +- drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen3.h | 8 + drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen4.c | 552 ++++++ drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen4.h | 100 + drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_intel.h | 12 + drivers/ntb/hw/mscc/ntb_hw_switchtec.c | 9 +- drivers/nvdimm/e820.c | 1 + drivers/nvdimm/nd.h | 2 +- drivers/nvdimm/of_pmem.c | 1 + drivers/nvdimm/region_devs.c | 1 + drivers/pci/access.c | 11 +- drivers/pci/bus.c | 5 +- drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp.h | 1 + drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_hpc.c | 75 +- drivers/pci/hotplug/pciehp_pci.c | 9 +- drivers/pci/pci-acpi.c | 11 +- drivers/pci/pci-stub.c | 10 +- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 27 +- drivers/pci/pci.c | 130 +- drivers/pci/pci.h | 101 +- drivers/pci/pcie/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c | 340 ++-- drivers/pci/pcie/aer_inject.c | 48 +- drivers/pci/pcie/aspm.c | 8 +- drivers/pci/pcie/dpc.c | 106 +- drivers/pci/pcie/err.c | 210 +-- drivers/pci/pcie/pme.c | 4 +- drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv.h | 6 +- drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_core.c | 12 +- drivers/pci/pcie/portdrv_pci.c | 24 +- drivers/pci/probe.c | 193 +- drivers/pci/quirks.c | 15 +- drivers/pci/setup-bus.c | 30 +- drivers/pci/slot.c | 39 +- drivers/pci/vc.c | 4 +- drivers/pci/xen-pcifront.c | 7 +- drivers/platform/x86/Kconfig | 2 + drivers/platform/x86/Makefile | 1 + .../x86/intel_speed_select_if/Kconfig | 17 + .../x86/intel_speed_select_if/Makefile | 10 + .../intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_common.c | 675 +++++++ .../intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_common.h | 69 + .../intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_mbox_msr.c | 216 +++ .../intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_mbox_pci.c | 213 +++ .../x86/intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_mmio.c | 180 ++ drivers/powercap/Kconfig | 11 +- drivers/powercap/Makefile | 4 +- .../{intel_rapl.c => intel_rapl_common.c} | 857 ++++----- drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c | 183 ++ fs/sysfs/group.c | 54 +- include/acpi/actbl1.h | 10 +- include/linux/acpi.h | 26 +- include/linux/aer.h | 4 + include/linux/cpuidle.h | 10 +- include/linux/hardirq.h | 5 +- include/linux/intel_rapl.h | 155 ++ include/linux/intel_th.h | 79 + include/linux/interrupt.h | 2 + include/linux/libnvdimm.h | 1 + include/linux/node.h | 71 + include/linux/ntb.h | 10 +- include/linux/pci.h | 5 +- include/linux/perf_event.h | 46 +- include/linux/perf_regs.h | 8 + include/linux/preempt.h | 4 +- include/linux/sysfs.h | 8 + include/linux/topology.h | 3 + include/uapi/linux/isst_if.h | 172 ++ include/uapi/linux/pci_regs.h | 12 + kernel/events/core.c | 68 +- kernel/events/ring_buffer.c | 3 +- kernel/irq/Kconfig | 5 + kernel/irq/chip.c | 2 +- kernel/irq/debugfs.c | 34 +- kernel/irq/internals.h | 2 +- kernel/irq/resend.c | 53 +- kernel/resource.c | 14 +- mm/memory_hotplug.c | 33 +- tools/Makefile | 11 +- tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/perf_regs.h | 26 +- tools/perf/Documentation/perf-record.txt | 3 +- tools/perf/arch/x86/include/perf_regs.h | 25 +- tools/perf/arch/x86/util/perf_regs.c | 44 + tools/perf/builtin-record.c | 4 +- tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.c | 33 +- tools/perf/util/parse-regs-options.h | 3 +- tools/perf/util/perf_regs.c | 10 + tools/perf/util/perf_regs.h | 3 + tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/Build | 1 + tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/Makefile | 56 + .../x86/intel-speed-select/isst-config.c | 1607 +++++++++++++++++ .../power/x86/intel-speed-select/isst-core.c | 721 ++++++++ .../x86/intel-speed-select/isst-display.c | 479 +++++ tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/isst.h | 231 +++ tools/power/x86/turbostat/turbostat.c | 80 +- tools/testing/nvdimm/Kbuild | 7 +- tools/testing/nvdimm/dax-dev.c | 16 +- 228 files changed, 17709 insertions(+), 4643 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-class-dax create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/mm/numaperf.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/pm/intel_idle.rst delete mode 100644 Documentation/cpuidle/core.txt delete mode 100644 Documentation/cpuidle/sysfs.txt create mode 100644 drivers/acpi/hmat/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/acpi/hmat/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/acpi/hmat/hmat.c create mode 100644 drivers/dax/bus.c create mode 100644 drivers/dax/bus.h delete mode 100644 drivers/dax/dax.h delete mode 100644 drivers/dax/device-dax.h create mode 100644 drivers/dax/kmem.c delete mode 100644 drivers/dax/pmem.c create mode 100644 drivers/dax/pmem/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/dax/pmem/compat.c create mode 100644 drivers/dax/pmem/core.c create mode 100644 drivers/dax/pmem/pmem.c create mode 100644 drivers/edac/i10nm_base.c create mode 100644 drivers/edac/skx_base.c create mode 100644 drivers/edac/skx_common.c create mode 100644 drivers/edac/skx_common.h delete mode 100644 drivers/edac/skx_edac.c create mode 100644 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/msu-sink.c create mode 100644 drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen4.c create mode 100644 drivers/ntb/hw/intel/ntb_hw_gen4.h create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_common.c create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_common.h create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_mbox_msr.c create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_mbox_pci.c create mode 100644 drivers/platform/x86/intel_speed_select_if/isst_if_mmio.c rename drivers/powercap/{intel_rapl.c => intel_rapl_common.c} (61%) create mode 100644 drivers/powercap/intel_rapl_msr.c create mode 100644 include/linux/intel_rapl.h create mode 100644 include/linux/intel_th.h create mode 100644 include/uapi/linux/isst_if.h create mode 100644 tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/Build create mode 100644 tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/Makefile create mode 100644 tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/isst-config.c create mode 100644 tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/isst-core.c create mode 100644 tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/isst-display.c create mode 100644 tools/power/x86/intel-speed-select/isst.h -- 2.25.1

1 286

[PATCH kernel-4.19 1/5] ext4: move inode eio simulation behind io completeion
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 174653, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I476C7 CVE: NA --------------------------- No EIO simulation is required if the buffer is uptodate, so move the simulation behind read bio completeion just like inode/block bitmap simulation does. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/20210821065450.1397451-2-yi.zhang@huawei… Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xie Miao <miaoxie(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 800e6e3de40aa..1b2ccf61354f3 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -4635,8 +4635,6 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct inode *inode, bh = sb_getblk(sb, block); if (unlikely(!bh)) return -ENOMEM; - if (ext4_simulate_fail(sb, EXT4_SIM_INODE_EIO)) - goto simulate_eio; if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) { lock_buffer(bh); @@ -4721,8 +4719,8 @@ static int __ext4_get_inode_loc(struct inode *inode, trace_ext4_load_inode(inode); ext4_read_bh_nowait(bh, REQ_META | REQ_PRIO, NULL); wait_on_buffer(bh); + ext4_simulate_fail_bh(sb, bh, EXT4_SIM_INODE_EIO); if (!buffer_uptodate(bh)) { - simulate_eio: ext4_error_inode_block(inode, block, EIO, "unable to read itable block"); brelse(bh); -- 2.25.1

1 4

[PATCH kernel-4.19 00/84] backport linux-4.19.205
by Yang Yingliang 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

Adrian Larumbe (1): dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix read-after-free bug when terminating transfers Andy Shevchenko (1): ptp_pch: Restore dependency on PCI Babu Moger (1): x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting Bixuan Cui (1): genirq/msi: Ensure deactivation on teardown Chris Lesiak (1): iio: humidity: hdc100x: Add margin to the conversion time Colin Ian King (1): iio: adc: Fix incorrect exit of for-loop DENG Qingfang (1): net: dsa: mt7530: add the missing RxUnicast MIB counter Dan Williams (1): ACPI: NFIT: Fix support for virtual SPA ranges Dave Gerlach (1): ARM: dts: am43x-epos-evm: Reduce i2c0 bus speed for tps65218 Dinghao Liu (1): net: qlcnic: add missed unlock in qlcnic_83xx_flash_read32 Dongliang Mu (4): ieee802154: hwsim: fix GPF in hwsim_set_edge_lqi ieee802154: hwsim: fix GPF in hwsim_new_edge_nl ipack: tpci200: fix many double free issues in tpci200_pci_probe ipack: tpci200: fix memory leak in the tpci200_register Eric Dumazet (2): net: igmp: fix data-race in igmp_ifc_timer_expire() net: igmp: increase size of mr_ifc_count Greg Kroah-Hartman (1): i2c: dev: zero out array used for i2c reads from userspace Harshvardhan Jha (1): scsi: megaraid_mm: Fix end of loop tests for list_for_each_entry() Ivan T. Ivanov (1): net: usb: lan78xx: don't modify phy_device state concurrently Jakub Kicinski (2): bnxt: don't lock the tx queue from napi poll bnxt: disable napi before canceling DIM Jaroslav Kysela (1): ALSA: hda - fix the 'Capture Switch' value change notifications Jeff Layton (2): locks: print a warning when mount fails due to lack of "mand" support fs: warn about impending deprecation of mandatory locks Johannes Berg (1): mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links Jouni Malinen (5): ath: Use safer key clearing with key cache entries ath9k: Clear key cache explicitly on disabling hardware ath: Export ath_hw_keysetmac() ath: Modify ath_key_delete() to not need full key entry ath9k: Postpone key cache entry deletion for TXQ frames reference it Longpeng(Mike) (1): vsock/virtio: avoid potential deadlock when vsock device remove Marcin Bachry (1): PCI: Increase D3 delay for AMD Renoir/Cezanne XHCI Marek Behún (1): cpufreq: armada-37xx: forbid cpufreq for 1.2 GHz variant Maxim Levitsky (2): KVM: nSVM: always intercept VMLOAD/VMSAVE when nested (CVE-2021-3656) KVM: nSVM: avoid picking up unsupported bits from L2 in int_ctl (CVE-2021-3653) Maximilian Heyne (1): xen/events: Fix race in set_evtchn_to_irq Nathan Chancellor (1): vmlinux.lds.h: Handle clang's module.{c,d}tor sections Neal Cardwell (1): tcp_bbr: fix u32 wrap bug in round logic if bbr_init() called after 2B packets NeilBrown (1): btrfs: prevent rename2 from exchanging a subvol with a directory from different parents Ole Bjørn Midtbø (1): Bluetooth: hidp: use correct wait queue when removing ctrl_wait Pali Rohár (1): ppp: Fix generating ifname when empty IFLA_IFNAME is specified Pavel Skripkin (1): net: 6pack: fix slab-out-of-bounds in decode_data Peter Ujfalusi (1): dmaengine: of-dma: router_xlate to return -EPROBE_DEFER if controller is not yet available Pu Lehui (1): powerpc/kprobes: Fix kprobe Oops happens in booke Randy Dunlap (2): x86/tools: Fix objdump version check again dccp: add do-while-0 stubs for dccp_pr_debug macros Richard Fitzgerald (5): ASoC: cs42l42: Correct definition of ADC Volume control ASoC: cs42l42: Don't allow SND_SOC_DAIFMT_LEFT_J ASoC: cs42l42: Fix inversion of ADC Notch Switch control ASoC: cs42l42: Remove duplicate control for WNF filter frequency ASoC: cs42l42: Fix LRCLK frame start edge Roi Dayan (1): psample: Add a fwd declaration for skbuff Saeed Mirzamohammadi (1): iommu/vt-d: Fix agaw for a supported 48 bit guest address width Saravana Kannan (2): net: mdio-mux: Don't ignore memory allocation errors net: mdio-mux: Handle -EPROBE_DEFER correctly Sasha Levin (1): Linux 4.19.205 Sergey Marinkevich (1): netfilter: nft_exthdr: fix endianness of tcp option cast Sreekanth Reddy (1): scsi: core: Avoid printing an error if target_alloc() returns -ENXIO Srinivas Kandagatla (3): slimbus: messaging: start transaction ids from 1 instead of zero slimbus: messaging: check for valid transaction id slimbus: ngd: reset dma setup during runtime pm Steven Rostedt (VMware) (1): tracing / histogram: Fix NULL pointer dereference on strcmp() on NULL event name Sudeep Holla (1): ARM: dts: nomadik: Fix up interrupt controller node names Takashi Iwai (2): ASoC: intel: atom: Fix reference to PCM buffer address ASoC: intel: atom: Fix breakage for PCM buffer address setup Takeshi Misawa (1): net: Fix memory leak in ieee802154_raw_deliver Thomas Gleixner (12): genirq: Provide IRQCHIP_AFFINITY_PRE_STARTUP x86/msi: Force affinity setup before startup x86/ioapic: Force affinity setup before startup PCI/MSI: Enable and mask MSI-X early PCI/MSI: Do not set invalid bits in MSI mask PCI/MSI: Correct misleading comments PCI/MSI: Use msi_mask_irq() in pci_msi_shutdown() PCI/MSI: Protect msi_desc::masked for multi-MSI PCI/MSI: Mask all unused MSI-X entries PCI/MSI: Enforce that MSI-X table entry is masked for update PCI/MSI: Enforce MSI[X] entry updates to be visible x86/fpu: Make init_fpstate correct with optimized XSAVE Vincent Whitchurch (1): mmc: dw_mmc: Fix hang on data CRC error Vladimir Oltean (1): net: dsa: lan9303: fix broken backpressure in .port_fdb_dump Xie Yongji (1): vhost: Fix the calculation in vhost_overflow() Yang Yingliang (1): net: bridge: fix memleak in br_add_if() Ye Bin (1): scsi: scsi_dh_rdac: Avoid crash during rdac_bus_attach() Yu Kuai (1): dmaengine: usb-dmac: Fix PM reference leak in usb_dmac_probe() .../filesystems/mandatory-locking.txt | 10 ++ Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/am43x-epos-evm.dts | 2 +- arch/arm/boot/dts/ste-nomadik-stn8815.dtsi | 4 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/kprobes.c | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/internal.h | 30 ++--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/msi.c | 13 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_rdt_monitor.c | 27 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 38 +++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 18 ++- arch/x86/tools/chkobjdump.awk | 1 + drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 3 + drivers/base/core.c | 1 + drivers/cpufreq/armada-37xx-cpufreq.c | 6 +- drivers/dma/of-dma.c | 9 +- drivers/dma/sh/usb-dmac.c | 2 +- drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 12 ++ drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c | 5 +- drivers/iio/adc/palmas_gpadc.c | 4 +- drivers/iio/humidity/hdc100x.c | 6 +- drivers/iommu/intel-iommu.c | 7 +- drivers/ipack/carriers/tpci200.c | 60 +++++---- drivers/mmc/host/dw_mmc.c | 6 +- drivers/net/dsa/lan9303-core.c | 34 ++--- drivers/net/dsa/mt7530.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 57 +++++---- .../ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_83xx_hw.c | 4 +- drivers/net/hamradio/6pack.c | 6 + drivers/net/ieee802154/mac802154_hwsim.c | 6 +- drivers/net/phy/mdio-mux.c | 36 ++++-- drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c | 2 +- drivers/net/usb/lan78xx.c | 16 ++- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath.h | 3 +- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath5k/mac80211-ops.c | 2 +- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_drv_main.c | 2 +- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hw.h | 1 + drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/main.c | 95 +++++++++++++- drivers/net/wireless/ath/key.c | 41 +++--- drivers/pci/msi.c | 120 ++++++++++++------ drivers/pci/quirks.c | 1 + drivers/ptp/Kconfig | 3 +- drivers/scsi/device_handler/scsi_dh_rdac.c | 4 +- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_mm.c | 21 ++- drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 3 +- drivers/slimbus/messaging.c | 7 +- drivers/slimbus/qcom-ngd-ctrl.c | 5 +- drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 10 +- drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 20 ++- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 10 +- fs/namespace.c | 15 ++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 1 + include/linux/device.h | 1 + include/linux/inetdevice.h | 2 +- include/linux/irq.h | 2 + include/linux/msi.h | 2 +- include/net/psample.h | 2 + kernel/irq/chip.c | 5 +- kernel/irq/msi.c | 13 +- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 2 + net/bluetooth/hidp/core.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_if.c | 2 + net/dccp/dccp.h | 6 +- net/ieee802154/socket.c | 7 +- net/ipv4/igmp.c | 21 ++- net/ipv4/tcp_bbr.c | 2 +- net/mac80211/debugfs_sta.c | 1 + net/mac80211/key.c | 1 + net/mac80211/sta_info.h | 1 + net/mac80211/tx.c | 12 +- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 8 +- net/vmw_vsock/virtio_transport.c | 7 +- sound/pci/hda/hda_generic.c | 10 +- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l42.c | 39 +++--- sound/soc/intel/atom/sst-mfld-platform-pcm.c | 3 +- 76 files changed, 642 insertions(+), 312 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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Re: 回复: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）
by chengjian (D) 30 Aug '21

30 Aug '21

On 2021/8/30 9:13, 徐力群 wrote: > > 这个是增加了bugzilla链接地址的补丁，之前可能重复发了几次（一直以为发送失败了）。谢谢。 > 您好，冒昧打扰，您订阅邮件列表了么。如果没订阅邮件列表，您的邮件可能被当作垃圾邮件墙掉。

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] mm, vmscan: guarantee drop_slab_node() termination
by Yang Yingliang 28 Aug '21

28 Aug '21

From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> mainline inclusion from linux-next commit 0b8efcb0bf057dc0203a022334d5934867a6c212 category: bugfix bugzilla: 175105 CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- drop_slab_node() is called as part of echo 2>/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches operation. It iterates over all memcgs and calls shrink_slab() which in turn iterates over all slab shrinkers. Freed objects are counted and as long as the total number of freed objects from all memcgs and shrinkers is higher than 10, drop_slab_node() loops for another full memcgs*shrinkers iteration. This arbitrary constant threshold of 10 can result in effectively an infinite loop on a system with large number of memcgs and/or parallel activity that allocates new objects. This has been reported previously by Chunxin Zang [1] and recently by our customer. The previous report [1] has resulted in commit 069c411de40a ("mm/vmscan: fix infinite loop in drop_slab_node") which added a check for signals allowing the user to terminate the command writing to drop_caches. At the time it was also considered to make the threshold grow with each iteration to guarantee termination, but such patch hasn't been formally proposed yet. This patch implements the dynamically growing threshold. At first iteration it's enough to free one object to continue, and this threshold effectively doubles with each iteration. Our customer's feedback was positive. There is always a risk that this change will result on some system in a previously terminating drop_caches operation to terminate sooner and free fewer objects. Ideally the semantics would guarantee freeing all freeable objects that existed at the moment of starting the operation, while not looping forever for newly allocated objects, but that's not feasible to track. In the less ideal solution based on thresholds, arguably the termination guarantee is more important than the exhaustiveness guarantee. If there are reports of large regression wrt being exhaustive, we can tune how fast the threshold grows. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200909152047.27905-1-zangchunxin@bytedance.c… Matthew reports [2] that if we free enough objects, we can eventually right-shift by BITS_PER_LONG, which is undefined behavior. Raise the threshold from 0 to 1 which means we will shift only up to BITS_PER_LONG-1. [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/YSTDnqKgQLvziyQI@casper.infradead.org/ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210818152239.25502-1-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Reported-by: Chunxin Zang <zangchunxin(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Chris Down <chris(a)chrisdown.name> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr(a)canb.auug.org.au> Conflicts: mm/vmscan.c Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- mm/vmscan.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/vmscan.c b/mm/vmscan.c index b5f5a366d155f..b381c891ca8fd 100644 --- a/mm/vmscan.c +++ b/mm/vmscan.c @@ -738,6 +738,7 @@ void drop_slab_node(int nid) { unsigned long freed; unsigned int counts = 0; + int shift = 0; do { struct mem_cgroup *memcg = NULL; @@ -760,7 +761,7 @@ void drop_slab_node(int nid) return; } } - } while (freed > 10); + } while ((freed >> shift++) > 1); } void drop_slab(void) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] jump_label: skip resource release if jump label is not relocated
by Yang Yingliang 28 Aug '21

28 Aug '21

From: Ye Weihua <yeweihua4(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I47NHU CVE: NA -------------------------------- Before a module is deleted, the kernel traverses the jump_label section to release resources applied by each jump entry. Common modules apply for these resources before module initialization, but livepatch modules apply during livepatch redirection. Therefore, when a livepatch module fails to be inserted, the resources to be applied by jump_label are not applied. As a result, a panic occurs when a null pointer is accessed during resource release. To solve the this problem, skip resource release if jump label is not relocated. Signed-off-by: Ye Weihua <yeweihua4(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/jump_label.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/jump_label.c b/kernel/jump_label.c index 0cf0a14969254..15c7df2065511 100644 --- a/kernel/jump_label.c +++ b/kernel/jump_label.c @@ -623,6 +623,9 @@ static void jump_label_del_module(struct module *mod) struct static_key *key = NULL; struct static_key_mod *jlm, **prev; + if (unlikely(!mod_klp_rel_completed(mod))) + return; + for (iter = iter_start; iter < iter_stop; iter++) { if (jump_entry_key(iter) == key) continue; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] ext4: make the updating inode data procedure atomic
by Yang Yingliang 28 Aug '21

28 Aug '21

From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I476C7 CVE: NA --------------------------- Now that ext4_do_update_inode() return error before filling the whole inode data if we fail to set inode blocks in ext4_inode_blocks_set(). This error should never happen in theory since sb->s_maxbytes should not have allowed this, we have already init sb->s_maxbytes according to this feature in ext4_fill_super(). So even through that could only happen due to the filesystem corruption, we'd better to return after we finish updating the inode because it may left an uninitialized buffer and we could read this buffer later in "errors=continue" mode. This patch make the updating inode data procedure atomic, call EXT4_ERROR_INODE() after we dropping i_raw_lock after something bad happened, make sure that the inode is integrated, and also drop a BUG_ON and do some small cleanups. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-ext4/20210821065450.1397451-4-yi.zhang@huawei… Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Yang Erkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xie Miao <miaoxie(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index b809d383cc5ae..a032f211b80cf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -5169,8 +5169,14 @@ static int ext4_inode_blocks_set(handle_t *handle, ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_HUGE_FILE); return 0; } + + /* + * This should never happen since sb->s_maxbytes should not have + * allowed this, sb->s_maxbytes was set according to the huge_file + * feature in ext4_fill_super(). + */ if (!ext4_has_feature_huge_file(sb)) - return -EFBIG; + return -EFSCORRUPTED; if (i_blocks <= 0xffffffffffffULL) { /* @@ -5277,16 +5283,14 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, spin_lock(&ei->i_raw_lock); - /* For fields not tracked in the in-memory inode, - * initialise them to zero for new inodes. */ + /* + * For fields not tracked in the in-memory inode, initialise them + * to zero for new inodes. + */ if (ext4_test_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEW)) memset(raw_inode, 0, EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_inode_size); err = ext4_inode_blocks_set(handle, raw_inode, ei); - if (err) { - spin_unlock(&ei->i_raw_lock); - goto out_brelse; - } raw_inode->i_mode = cpu_to_le16(inode->i_mode); i_uid = i_uid_read(inode); @@ -5295,10 +5299,11 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, if (!(test_opt(inode->i_sb, NO_UID32))) { raw_inode->i_uid_low = cpu_to_le16(low_16_bits(i_uid)); raw_inode->i_gid_low = cpu_to_le16(low_16_bits(i_gid)); -/* - * Fix up interoperability with old kernels. Otherwise, old inodes get - * re-used with the upper 16 bits of the uid/gid intact - */ + /* + * Fix up interoperability with old kernels. Otherwise, + * old inodes get re-used with the upper 16 bits of the + * uid/gid intact. + */ if (ei->i_dtime && list_empty(&ei->i_orphan)) { raw_inode->i_uid_high = 0; raw_inode->i_gid_high = 0; @@ -5367,8 +5372,9 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, } } - BUG_ON(!ext4_has_feature_project(inode->i_sb) && - i_projid != EXT4_DEF_PROJID); + if (i_projid != EXT4_DEF_PROJID && + !ext4_has_feature_project(inode->i_sb)) + err = err ?: -EFSCORRUPTED; if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE && EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw_inode, ei, i_projid)) @@ -5376,6 +5382,11 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, ext4_inode_csum_set(inode, raw_inode, ei); spin_unlock(&ei->i_raw_lock); + if (err) { + EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "corrupted inode contents"); + goto out_brelse; + } + if (inode->i_sb->s_flags & SB_LAZYTIME) ext4_update_other_inodes_time(inode->i_sb, inode->i_ino, bh->b_data); @@ -5383,13 +5394,13 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, BUFFER_TRACE(bh, "call ext4_handle_dirty_metadata"); err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, NULL, bh); if (err) - goto out_brelse; + goto out_error; ext4_clear_inode_state(inode, EXT4_STATE_NEW); if (set_large_file) { BUFFER_TRACE(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh, "get write access"); err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); if (err) - goto out_brelse; + goto out_error; lock_buffer(EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); ext4_set_feature_large_file(sb); ext4_superblock_csum_set(sb); @@ -5399,9 +5410,10 @@ static int ext4_do_update_inode(handle_t *handle, EXT4_SB(sb)->s_sbh); } ext4_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle, inode, need_datasync); +out_error: + ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err); out_brelse: brelse(bh); - ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err); return err; } -- 2.25.1

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Re: 转发: 请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内）
by Xie XiuQi 27 Aug '21

27 Aug '21

你好，非常欢迎参与 openEuler kernel 开发。首先在这里提交 issue，描述下要解决什么问题。 https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues 补丁的 Commit Message 中附上对应的 issue 链接，如在bugzila 行添加： bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I3DJ83 然后将适配之后的补丁发往 kernel(a)openeuler.org, 有问题可以联系我或 Cheng Jian. --- Xie XiuQi On 2021/8/27 14:18, 徐力群 wrote: > > > > > > *发件人:*徐力群 > *发送时间:*2021年8月27日14:18 > *收件人:*kernel-owner@openeuler.org；<kernel-owner(a)openeuler.org;>; kernel(a)openeuler.org > *主题:*请教一下，想提交一个内核的补丁，怎么操作，谢谢。（补丁内容见内） > > > > 该补丁打上之后，guest如果删除了磁盘的文件，那么从host上看磁盘文件会变小。 > > > > > > > > virtio_blk: add discard and write zeroes support > > > > mainline inclusion > > from mainline-5.14-rc7 > > commit 1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c16f6b21、af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998127453 > > category: bugfix > > bugzilla: NA > > CVE: NA > > > > ------------------------------------------------- > > from： > > https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c1… <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/1f23816b8eb8fdc39990abe166c10a18c1…> > > https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998… <https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/af822aa68fbdf0a480a17462ed70232998…> > > > > In commit 88c85538, "virtio-blk: add discard and write zeroes features > > to specification" (https://github.com/oasis-tcs/virtio-spec <https://github.com/oasis-tcs/virtio-spec>), the virtio > > block specification has been extended to add VIRTIO_BLK_T_DISCARD and > > VIRTIO_BLK_T_WRITE_ZEROES commands. This patch enables support for > > discard and write zeroes in the virtio-blk driver when the device > > advertises the corresponding features, VIRTIO_BLK_F_DISCARD and > > VIRTIO_BLK_F_WRITE_ZEROES. >

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[PATCH openEuler-21.03] proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct
by bobo~ 27 Aug '21

27 Aug '21

From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.44 commit f70102cb369cde6ab7551ca58152d00fd3478fec bugzilla: CVE: NA -------------------------------- commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream. Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener") tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread (during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files already do, though for different reasons.) Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com> Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi(a)canonical.com> Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi(a)canonical.com> Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: bobo~ <931671772(a)qq.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 720e2e524cb1..a2d472b0c2e3 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2691,6 +2691,11 @@ static int proc_pident_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); +} + static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -2721,7 +2726,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, int rv; /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */ - if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred()) + if (file->private_data != current->mm) return -EPERM; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -2771,9 +2776,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, } static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { + .open = proc_pid_attr_open, .read = proc_pid_attr_read, .write = proc_pid_attr_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, + .release = mem_release, }; #define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ -- 2.23.0

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(no subject)
by bobo~ 27 Aug '21

27 Aug '21

From f70102cb369cde6ab7551ca58152d00fd3478fec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 10:12:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH] proc: Track /proc/$pid/attr/ opener mm_struct stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.44 commit f70102cb369cde6ab7551ca58152d00fd3478fec bugzilla: CVE: NA -------------------------------- commit 591a22c14d3f45cc38bd1931c593c221df2f1881 upstream. Commit bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener") tried to make sure that there could not be a confusion between the opener of a /proc/$pid/attr/ file and the writer. It used struct cred to make sure the privileges didn't change. However, there were existing cases where a more privileged thread was passing the opened fd to a differently privileged thread (during container setup). Instead, use mm_struct to track whether the opener and writer are still the same process. (This is what several other proc files already do, though for different reasons.) Reported-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner(a)ubuntu.com> Reported-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi(a)canonical.com> Tested-by: Andrea Righi <andrea.righi(a)canonical.com> Fixes: bfb819ea20ce ("proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- fs/proc/base.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 297ea12b3cfd..511d98d09754 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2675,6 +2675,11 @@ static int proc_pident_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, } #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); +} + static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -2705,7 +2710,7 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, int rv; /* A task may only write when it was the opener. */ - if (file->f_cred != current_real_cred()) + if (file->private_data != current->mm) return -EPERM; rcu_read_lock(); @@ -2755,9 +2760,11 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, } static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = { + .open = proc_pid_attr_open, .read = proc_pid_attr_read, .write = proc_pid_attr_write, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, + .release = mem_release, }; #define LSM_DIR_OPS(LSM) \ -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-21.09 1/2] mm: fix oom killing for disabled pid
by Zheng Zengkai 26 Aug '21

26 Aug '21

From: Jing Xiangfeng <jingxiangfeng(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I46IUJ CVE: NA -------------------------------------- In oom_next_task(), if points is equal to LONG_MIN, then we choose it to kill. That is not correct. LONG_MIN means to disable killing it. So fix it. Fixes: 4da32073a8fe ("memcg: support priority for oom") Signed-off-by: Jing Xiangfeng <jingxiangfeng(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Chen Wandun <chenwandun(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> --- mm/oom_kill.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c index 41668bd37f52..fb39b0902476 100644 --- a/mm/oom_kill.c +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c @@ -311,15 +311,15 @@ static enum oom_constraint constrained_alloc(struct oom_control *oc) * choose the task with the highest number of 'points'. */ static bool oom_next_task(struct task_struct *task, struct oom_control *oc, - unsigned long points) + long points) { struct mem_cgroup *cur_memcg; struct mem_cgroup *oc_memcg; if (!static_branch_likely(&memcg_qos_stat_key)) - return !points || points < oc->chosen_points; + return (points == LONG_MIN || points < oc->chosen_points); - if (!points) + if (points == LONG_MIN) return true; if (!oc->chosen) @@ -341,9 +341,9 @@ static bool oom_next_task(struct task_struct *task, struct oom_control *oc, } #else static inline bool oom_next_task(struct task_struct *task, - struct oom_control *oc, unsigned long points) + struct oom_control *oc, long points) { - return !points || points < oc->chosen_points; + return (points == LONG_MIN || points < oc->chosen_points); } #endif -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] KVM: X86: MMU: Use the correct inherited permissions to get shadow page
by Yang Yingliang 26 Aug '21

26 Aug '21

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> stable inclusion from linux-4.19.204 commit 4c07e70141eebd3db64297515a427deea4822957 CVE: CVE-2021-38198 -------------------------------- commit b1bd5cba3306691c771d558e94baa73e8b0b96b7 upstream. When computing the access permissions of a shadow page, use the effective permissions of the walk up to that point, i.e. the logic AND of its parents' permissions. Two guest PxE entries that point at the same table gfn need to be shadowed with different shadow pages if their parents' permissions are different. KVM currently uses the effective permissions of the last non-leaf entry for all non-leaf entries. Because all non-leaf SPTEs have full ("uwx") permissions, and the effective permissions are recorded only in role.access and merged into the leaves, this can lead to incorrect reuse of a shadow page and eventually to a missing guest protection page fault. For example, here is a shared pagetable: pgd[] pud[] pmd[] virtual address pointers /->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr1 (u--) /->pud1(uw-)--->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr2 (uw-) pgd-| (shared pmd[] as above) \->pud2(u--)--->pmd1(u--)->pte1(uw-)->page1 <- ptr3 (u--) \->pmd2(uw-)->pte2(uw-)->page2 <- ptr4 (u--) pud1 and pud2 point to the same pmd table, so: - ptr1 and ptr3 points to the same page. - ptr2 and ptr4 points to the same page. (pud1 and pud2 here are pud entries, while pmd1 and pmd2 here are pmd entries) - First, the guest reads from ptr1 first and KVM prepares a shadow page table with role.access=u--, from ptr1's pud1 and ptr1's pmd1. "u--" comes from the effective permissions of pgd, pud1 and pmd1, which are stored in pt->access. "u--" is used also to get the pagetable for pud1, instead of "uw-". - Then the guest writes to ptr2 and KVM reuses pud1 which is present. The hypervisor set up a shadow page for ptr2 with pt->access is "uw-" even though the pud1 pmd (because of the incorrect argument to kvm_mmu_get_page in the previous step) has role.access="u--". - Then the guest reads from ptr3. The hypervisor reuses pud1's shadow pmd for pud2, because both use "u--" for their permissions. Thus, the shadow pmd already includes entries for both pmd1 and pmd2. - At last, the guest writes to ptr4. This causes no vmexit or pagefault, because pud1's shadow page structures included an "uw-" page even though its role.access was "u--". Any kind of shared pagetable might have the similar problem when in virtual machine without TDP enabled if the permissions are different from different ancestors. In order to fix the problem, we change pt->access to be an array, and any access in it will not include permissions ANDed from child ptes. The test code is: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20210603050537.19605-1-jiangshanlai@gmail.com/ Remember to test it with TDP disabled. The problem had existed long before the commit 41074d07c78b ("KVM: MMU: Fix inherited permissions for emulated guest pte updates"), and it is hard to find which is the culprit. So there is no fixes tag here. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> Message-Id: <20210603052455.21023-1-jiangshanlai(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: cea0f0e7ea54 ("[PATCH] KVM: MMU: Shadow page table caching") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> [OP: - apply arch/x86/kvm/mmu/* changes to arch/x86/kvm - apply documentation changes to Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt - adjusted context in arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h] Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait(a)windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h | 14 +++++++++----- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt index e507a9e0421ed..851a8abcadce4 100644 --- a/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt +++ b/Documentation/virtual/kvm/mmu.txt @@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ Shadow pages contain the following information: shadow pages) so role.quadrant takes values in the range 0..3. Each quadrant maps 1GB virtual address space. role.access: - Inherited guest access permissions in the form uwx. Note execute - permission is positive, not negative. + Inherited guest access permissions from the parent ptes in the form uwx. + Note execute permission is positive, not negative. role.invalid: The page is invalid and should not be used. It is a root page that is currently pinned (by a cpu hardware register pointing to it); once it is diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h index adf42dc8d38b0..31014a746aede 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/paging_tmpl.h @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ struct guest_walker { gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; - unsigned pt_access; - unsigned pte_access; + unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + unsigned int pte_access; gfn_t gfn; struct x86_exception fault; }; @@ -388,13 +388,15 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, } walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte; + + /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); } while (!is_last_gpte(mmu, walker->level, pte)); pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte); accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0; /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ - walker->pt_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask); errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access); if (unlikely(errcode)) @@ -432,7 +434,8 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, } pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n", - __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, walker->pt_access); + __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]); return 1; error: @@ -601,7 +604,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, { struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL; struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it; - unsigned direct_access, access = gw->pt_access; + unsigned int direct_access, access; int top_level, ret; gfn_t gfn, base_gfn; @@ -633,6 +636,7 @@ static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, sp = NULL; if (!is_shadow_present_pte(*it.sptep)) { table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2]; + access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2]; sp = kvm_mmu_get_page(vcpu, table_gfn, addr, it.level-1, false, access); } -- 2.25.1

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