January 2024 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-6.6] kabi: Reserve space for perf subsystem related structures
by Yang Jihong 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8UOCZ -------------------------------- Reserve kabi space for `struct pmu`, `struct perf_event`, `struct perf_event_context`, `struct perf_cgroup_info` and `struct perf_sample_data`. Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/perf_event.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h index e846f87e2d09..a24aa95de1fc 100644 --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct perf_guest_info_callbacks { #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/static_call.h> #include <linux/lockdep.h> +#include <linux/kabi.h> #include <asm/local.h> struct perf_callchain_entry { @@ -324,6 +325,11 @@ struct pmu { /* number of address filters this PMU can do */ unsigned int nr_addr_filters; + KABI_RESERVE(1) + KABI_RESERVE(2) + KABI_RESERVE(3) + KABI_RESERVE(4) + /* * Fully disable/enable this PMU, can be used to protect from the PMI * as well as for lazy/batch writing of the MSRs. @@ -540,6 +546,11 @@ struct pmu { * Check period value for PERF_EVENT_IOC_PERIOD ioctl. */ int (*check_period) (struct perf_event *event, u64 value); /* optional */ + + KABI_RESERVE(5) + KABI_RESERVE(6) + KABI_RESERVE(7) + KABI_RESERVE(8) }; enum perf_addr_filter_action_t { @@ -839,6 +850,13 @@ struct perf_event { * user. */ __u32 orig_type; + + KABI_RESERVE(1) + KABI_RESERVE(2) + KABI_RESERVE(3) + KABI_RESERVE(4) + KABI_RESERVE(5) + KABI_RESERVE(6) #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ }; @@ -965,6 +983,11 @@ struct perf_event_context { * that until the signal is delivered. */ local_t nr_pending; + + KABI_RESERVE(1) + KABI_RESERVE(2) + KABI_RESERVE(3) + KABI_RESERVE(4) }; /* @@ -1040,6 +1063,9 @@ struct perf_cgroup_info { u64 timestamp; u64 timeoffset; int active; + + KABI_RESERVE(1) + KABI_RESERVE(2) }; struct perf_cgroup { @@ -1192,6 +1218,11 @@ struct perf_sample_data { u64 data_page_size; u64 code_page_size; u64 aux_size; + + KABI_RESERVE(1) + KABI_RESERVE(2) + KABI_RESERVE(3) + KABI_RESERVE(4) } ____cacheline_aligned; /* default value for data source */ -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] xfs: update the last_sync_lsn with ctx start lsn
by Long Li 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8UTJ5 CVE: NA -------------------------------- While performing the io fault injection test, I caught the following data corruption report: XFS (dm-6): Internal error ltbno + ltlen > bno at line 1976 of file fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c. Caller xfs_free_ag_extent+0x40b/0x930 [xfs] CPU: 7 PID: 184267 Comm: kworker/7:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 5.10.0-136.12.0.86.h1179.eulerosv2r12.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58-20211121_093514-szxrtosci10000 04/01/2014 Workqueue: xfs-inodegc/dm-6 xfs_inodegc_worker [xfs] Call Trace: dump_stack+0x57/0x6e xfs_corruption_error+0x81/0x90 [xfs] xfs_free_ag_extent+0x43c/0x930 [xfs] xfs_free_agfl_block+0x3b/0xd0 [xfs] xfs_agfl_free_finish_item+0x14c/0x160 [xfs] xfs_defer_finish_one+0xd5/0x220 [xfs] xfs_defer_finish_noroll+0xb5/0x210 [xfs] xfs_defer_finish+0x11/0x70 [xfs] xfs_itruncate_extents_flags+0xc1/0x240 [xfs] xfs_inactive_truncate+0xab/0xe0 [xfs] xfs_inactive+0x154/0x170 [xfs] xfs_inodegc_inactivate+0x16/0x50 [xfs] xfs_inodegc_worker+0xa0/0x110 [xfs] process_one_work+0x1b5/0x350 worker_thread+0x49/0x310 kthread+0xfe/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 XFS (dm-6): Corruption detected. Unmount and run xfs_repair After analyzing the disk image, I found that the cause of the problem was that the transactions were not replayed. The problem arises in that the iclog buffer IO completion updates the l_last_sync_lsn with it's own LSN. Transactions can be large enough to span many iclogs, only commit iclog goes to update l_last_sync_lsn. Since the last_sync_lsn update and the insertion of the item into the ail list releases the l_icloglock, if the ail is is empty in the meantime, the new iclog gets the last_sync_lsn as tail lsn. If the new iclog is written to disk and a shutdown occurs, the current iclog will not be able to replay in the next mount. xlog_state_done_syncing xlog_state_do_callback spin_lock(&log->l_icloglock); xlog_state_do_iclog_callbacks xlog_state_iodone_process_iclog xlog_state_set_callback last_sync_lsn = iclog->ic_header.h_lsn spin_unlock(&log->l_icloglock); ====>AIL is empty and get tail lsn for new iclog xlog_cil_process_committed xlog_cil_committed xfs_trans_committed_bulk(ctx->start_lsn) xfs_log_item_batch_insert(commit_lsn) xlog_state_clean_iclog(log, iclog) spin_lock(&log->l_icloglock); spin_unlock(&log->l_icloglock); Fix is simple, updates the l_last_sync_lsn with it's first ctx start lsn when commit iclog buffer IO completion. Even if the above happens, the iclog will be replayed as well. Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xfs/xfs_log.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_log.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_log.c index bd167a94a6b3..96416b6ca013 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_log.c @@ -2704,19 +2704,22 @@ xlog_get_lowest_lsn( static void xlog_state_set_callback( struct xlog *log, - struct xlog_in_core *iclog, - xfs_lsn_t header_lsn) + struct xlog_in_core *iclog) { + struct xfs_cil_ctx *ctx; + trace_xlog_iclog_callback(iclog, _RET_IP_); iclog->ic_state = XLOG_STATE_CALLBACK; - ASSERT(XFS_LSN_CMP(atomic64_read(&log->l_last_sync_lsn), - header_lsn) <= 0); - - if (list_empty_careful(&iclog->ic_callbacks)) + ctx = list_first_entry_or_null(&iclog->ic_callbacks, + struct xfs_cil_ctx, iclog_entry); + if (!ctx) return; - atomic64_set(&log->l_last_sync_lsn, header_lsn); + ASSERT(XFS_LSN_CMP(atomic64_read(&log->l_last_sync_lsn), + ctx->start_lsn) <= 0); + + atomic64_set(&log->l_last_sync_lsn, ctx->start_lsn); xlog_grant_push_ail(log, 0); } @@ -2751,7 +2754,7 @@ xlog_state_iodone_process_iclog( lowest_lsn = xlog_get_lowest_lsn(log); if (lowest_lsn && XFS_LSN_CMP(lowest_lsn, header_lsn) < 0) return false; - xlog_state_set_callback(log, iclog, header_lsn); + xlog_state_set_callback(log, iclog); return false; default: /* -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/10] Backport etmem feature to OLK 6.6
by Yuchen Tang 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

v2 -> v3 - fix code style and commit messages v1 -> v2 - make independent patches to export symbols we need - make independent patches for etmem scan and swap config - fix indentation and code style problems Yuchen Tang (10): etmem: add ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig etmem: add ETMEM scan feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig mm: Export symbol __pud_trans_huge_lock mm: Export symbol walk_page_range etmem: add etmem scan feature mm: Export symbol reclaim_pages etmem: add etmem swap feature etmem: add original kernel swap enabled options etmem: add swapcache reclaim to etmem etmem: enable etmem configurations arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + fs/proc/Makefile | 3 + fs/proc/base.c | 8 + fs/proc/etmem_proc.c | 216 ++++ fs/proc/etmem_scan.c | 1383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/proc/etmem_scan.h | 149 +++ fs/proc/etmem_swap.c | 283 +++++ fs/proc/internal.h | 4 + include/linux/etmem.h | 75 ++ include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 5 + include/linux/swap.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 4 + mm/Kconfig | 33 + mm/Makefile | 1 + mm/etmem.c | 384 +++++++ mm/huge_memory.c | 1 + mm/internal.h | 1 - mm/madvise.c | 16 + mm/pagewalk.c | 1 + mm/swap_state.c | 4 + mm/vmscan.c | 16 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 8 + 24 files changed, 2605 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_proc.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.h create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_swap.c create mode 100644 include/linux/etmem.h create mode 100644 mm/etmem.c -- 2.33.0

3 12

[PATCH OLK-6.6] hfs: fix null-ptr-deref in hfs_find_init()
by Long Li 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8URA4 CVE: CVE-2018-12928 -------------------------------- It will cause a null-ptr-deref in hfs_find_init() in fuzz test. [ 107.092729] hfs: continuing without an alternate MDB [ 107.097632] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ 107.104679] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047] [ 107.109100] CPU: 0 PID: 379 Comm: hfs_inject Not tainted 5.7.0-rc7-00001-g24627f5f2973 #897 [ 107.114142] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 107.121095] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x72/0x170 [ 107.123609] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 e6 00 00 00 4c 8d 65 40 48 c7 43 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e a5 00 00 00 8b 45 40 be c0 0c [ 107.134660] RSP: 0018:ffff88810291f3f8 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 107.137897] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88810291f468 RCX: 1ffff110175cdf05 [ 107.141874] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffff88810291f468 RDI: ffff88810291f480 [ 107.145844] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1020381013 [ 107.149431] R10: ffff88810291f500 R11: ffffed1020381012 R12: 0000000000000040 [ 107.152315] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888101c0814a R15: ffff88810291f468 [ 107.155464] FS: 00000000009ea880(0000) GS:ffff88810c600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 107.159795] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 107.162987] CR2: 00005605a19dd284 CR3: 0000000103a0c006 CR4: 0000000000020ef0 [ 107.166665] Call Trace: [ 107.167969] ? find_held_lock+0x33/0x1c0 [ 107.169972] hfs_ext_read_extent+0x16b/0xb00 [ 107.172092] ? create_page_buffers+0x14e/0x1b0 [ 107.174303] ? hfs_free_extents+0x280/0x280 [ 107.176437] ? lock_downgrade+0x730/0x730 [ 107.178272] hfs_get_block+0x496/0x8a0 [ 107.179972] block_read_full_page+0x241/0x8d0 [ 107.181971] ? hfs_extend_file+0xae0/0xae0 [ 107.183814] ? end_buffer_async_read_io+0x10/0x10 [ 107.185954] ? add_to_page_cache_lru+0x13f/0x1f0 [ 107.188006] ? add_to_page_cache_locked+0x10/0x10 [ 107.190175] do_read_cache_page+0xc6a/0x1180 [ 107.192096] ? generic_file_read_iter+0x4c0/0x4c0 [ 107.194234] ? hfs_btree_open+0x408/0x1000 [ 107.196068] ? lock_downgrade+0x730/0x730 [ 107.197926] ? wake_bit_function+0x180/0x180 [ 107.199845] ? lockdep_init_map_waits+0x267/0x7c0 [ 107.201895] hfs_btree_open+0x455/0x1000 [ 107.203479] hfs_mdb_get+0x122c/0x1ae8 [ 107.205065] ? hfs_mdb_put+0x350/0x350 [ 107.206590] ? queue_work_node+0x260/0x260 [ 107.208309] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0xa1/0xd0 [ 107.210227] ? lockdep_init_map_waits+0x267/0x7c0 [ 107.212144] ? lockdep_init_map_waits+0x267/0x7c0 [ 107.213979] hfs_fill_super+0x9ba/0x1280 [ 107.215444] ? bdev_name.isra.9+0xf1/0x2b0 [ 107.217028] ? hfs_remount+0x190/0x190 [ 107.218428] ? pointer+0x5da/0x710 [ 107.219745] ? file_dentry_name+0xf0/0xf0 [ 107.221262] ? mount_bdev+0xd1/0x330 [ 107.222592] ? vsnprintf+0x7bd/0x1250 [ 107.224007] ? pointer+0x710/0x710 [ 107.225332] ? down_write+0xe5/0x160 [ 107.226698] ? hfs_remount+0x190/0x190 [ 107.228120] ? snprintf+0x91/0xc0 [ 107.229388] ? vsprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 107.230628] ? sget+0x3af/0x4a0 [ 107.231848] ? hfs_remount+0x190/0x190 [ 107.233300] mount_bdev+0x26e/0x330 [ 107.234611] ? hfs_statfs+0x540/0x540 [ 107.236015] legacy_get_tree+0x101/0x1f0 [ 107.237431] ? security_capable+0x58/0x90 [ 107.238832] vfs_get_tree+0x89/0x2d0 [ 107.240082] ? ns_capable_common+0x5c/0xd0 [ 107.241521] do_mount+0xd8a/0x1720 [ 107.242727] ? lock_downgrade+0x730/0x730 [ 107.244116] ? copy_mount_string+0x20/0x20 [ 107.245557] ? _copy_from_user+0xbe/0x100 [ 107.246967] ? memdup_user+0x47/0x70 [ 107.248212] __x64_sys_mount+0x162/0x1b0 [ 107.249537] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4f0 [ 107.250742] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3 [ 107.252369] RIP: 0033:0x44e8ea [ 107.253360] Code: 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 107.259240] RSP: 002b:00007ffd910e4c28 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [ 107.261668] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000400400 RCX: 000000000044e8ea [ 107.263920] RDX: 000000000049321e RSI: 0000000000493222 RDI: 00007ffd910e4d00 [ 107.266177] RBP: 00007ffd910e5d10 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000a [ 107.268451] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: 0000000000401c40 [ 107.270721] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000006ba018 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 107.273025] Modules linked in: [ 107.274029] Dumping ftrace buffer: [ 107.275121] (ftrace buffer empty) [ 107.276370] ---[ end trace c5e0b9d684f3570e ]--- We need check tree in hfs_find_init(). https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20180419024358.GA5215@bombadil.infrad… https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=152406881024567&w=2 References: CVE-2018-12928 Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/hfs/bfind.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/hfs/bfind.c b/fs/hfs/bfind.c index ef9498a6e88a..ae44c8fa86ec 100644 --- a/fs/hfs/bfind.c +++ b/fs/hfs/bfind.c @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd) { void *ptr; + if (!tree) + return -EINVAL; fd->tree = tree; fd->bnode = NULL; ptr = kmalloc(tree->max_key_len * 2 + 4, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v6 0/5] block: Add config to show info about opening a mounted device for write
by Li Lingfeng 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

v1->v2: 1) Replace BLK_DEV_DUMPINFO with BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED_QUIET, which is logically opposite; 2) Make BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED_QUIET dependent on BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED, and decide whether to set bd_writers by BLK_DEV_WRITE_MOUNTED_QUIET; 3) Move bdev_dump_info() into bdev_may_open(); 4) Add the cmdline interface to control whether to show info; 5) Pass the state of "writes blocked" to part0 when mounting a partition. v2->v3: Add restriction for modifying bd_writers. v3->v4: 1) Count bd_writers regardless of whether bdev_allow_write_mounted is set; 2) Expand the meaning of bdev_allow_write_mounted; 3) Add config option to detect writing to part0 while partitions mounted; 4) Add bd_mounters to record the number of times that part0 or partition is mounted; 5) Show info about opening a lower device for write while upper-layers mounted. v4->v5: Move introduction of bd_mounters to patch1. v5->v6: Delete redundant conflict judgment. Li Lingfeng (5): block: Count writers and mounters regardless of whether bdev_allow_write_mounted is set block: Expand the meaning of bdev_allow_write_mounted block: Add config option to detect writing to part0 while partitions mounted block: Add config option to show info about opening a mounted device for write block: Show info about opening a lower device for write while upper-layers mounted block/Kconfig | 19 +++++++ block/bdev.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/blk_types.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

2 6

[PATCH V4 OLK-6.6] fs/dirty_pages: dump the number of dirty pages for each inode
by Zizhi Wo 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8OHM4?from=project-issue CVE: NA ---------------------------------------- In order to analyse the IO performance when using buffer IO, it's useful to obtain the number of dirty pages for each inode in the filesystem. This feature depends on 'CONFIG_DIRTY_PAGES'. It creates 3 interfaces by using procfs. /proc/dirty/buffer_size for buffer allocation and release, /proc/dirty/page_threshold to filter result and /proc/dirty/dirty_list to get dirty pages. Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + fs/Kconfig | 13 + fs/Makefile | 1 + fs/dirty_pages.c | 355 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 371 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/dirty_pages.c diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig index a417275129a4..13ddaf47cff2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -6925,6 +6925,7 @@ CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR=y CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y CONFIG_KERNFS=y CONFIG_SYSFS=y +CONFIG_DIRTY_PAGES=y CONFIG_TMPFS=y CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR=y diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig index c09c7fe35a54..84727e7ad415 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -8121,6 +8121,7 @@ CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS=y CONFIG_PROC_CPU_RESCTRL=y CONFIG_KERNFS=y CONFIG_SYSFS=y +CONFIG_DIRTY_PAGES=y CONFIG_TMPFS=y CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR=y diff --git a/fs/Kconfig b/fs/Kconfig index 7c9d45ba9b0f..6dc83223c61b 100644 --- a/fs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/Kconfig @@ -170,6 +170,19 @@ source "fs/proc/Kconfig" source "fs/kernfs/Kconfig" source "fs/sysfs/Kconfig" +config DIRTY_PAGES + bool "Dumps the number of dirty pages of each file" + depends on PROC_FS + default y + help + This config supports the rendering of dirty page data to the user, + which may be useful to analyze the IO performance when using buffer + IO. + + It create 3 interfaces by using procfs. /proc/dirty/buffer_size for + buffer allocation and release; /proc/dirty/page_threshold to filter + result; /proc/dirty/dirty_list to get dirty pages. + config TMPFS bool "Tmpfs virtual memory file system support (former shm fs)" depends on SHMEM diff --git a/fs/Makefile b/fs/Makefile index bb6164200a39..cc4735c23c32 100644 --- a/fs/Makefile +++ b/fs/Makefile @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL) += posix_acl.o obj-$(CONFIG_NFS_COMMON) += nfs_common/ obj-$(CONFIG_COREDUMP) += coredump.o obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += drop_caches.o sysctls.o +obj-$(CONFIG_DIRTY_PAGES) += dirty_pages.o obj-$(CONFIG_FHANDLE) += fhandle.o obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_FILES) += filescontrol.o diff --git a/fs/dirty_pages.c b/fs/dirty_pages.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..712992cba9e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/fs/dirty_pages.c @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/pagemap.h> +#include <linux/pagevec.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> +#include <linux/kdev_t.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/init.h> +#include "internal.h" + +#define DIRTY_ROOT "dirty" /* proc root directory name */ +#define DIRTY_BUFFER_SIZE "buffer_size" /* proc file to control buffer */ +#define DIRTY_PAGES "dirty_list" /* proc file to obtain diry pages */ +#define DIRTY_LIMIT "page_threshold" /* proc file to filter result */ +#define MAX_BUF_NUM 102400 /* max buffer num in number of pages */ +#define TERM_STR "terminated\n" /* tail string for overflowed buffer */ +#define UNKNOW_STR "unknown" /* for unknown file name or fs type */ + +static char *buf_dirty; /* buffer to store number of dirty pages */ +static unsigned long buf_size; /* size of buffer in bytes */ +static unsigned long buf_num; /* size of buffer in number of pages */ +static unsigned long buf_limit; /* filter threshold of dirty pages */ +static unsigned long lock_word; /* for exclusive access to buffer */ + +static bool dirty_pages_lock(void) +{ + if (xchg(&lock_word, 1) == 1) + return false; + return true; +} + +static void dirty_pages_unlock(void) +{ + lock_word = 0; +} + +static unsigned long dump_dirtypages_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + XA_STATE(xas, &inode->i_mapping->i_pages, 0); + unsigned long pages = 0; + void *page; + + if (!mapping_tagged(inode->i_mapping, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY)) + return 0; + + xas_lock_irq(&xas); + xas_for_each_marked(&xas, page, (pgoff_t)-1, PAGECACHE_TAG_DIRTY) { + if (++pages % XA_CHECK_SCHED) + continue; + + xas_pause(&xas); + xas_unlock_irq(&xas); + cond_resched(); + xas_lock_irq(&xas); + } + xas_unlock_irq(&xas); + + return pages; +} + +static char *inode_filename(struct inode *inode) +{ + char *path; + static char buf[PATH_MAX]; + struct dentry *dentry; + + dentry = d_find_alias(inode); + if (!dentry) + return UNKNOW_STR; + + path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buf, PATH_MAX); + dput(dentry); + + return IS_ERR_OR_NULL(path) ? UNKNOW_STR : path; +} + +static const char *sb_fstype(struct super_block *sb) +{ + if (sb->s_type && sb->s_type->name) + return sb->s_type->name; + else + return UNKNOW_STR; +} + +static inline bool is_sb_writable(struct super_block *sb) +{ + if (sb_rdonly(sb)) + return false; + + if (sb->s_writers.frozen == SB_FREEZE_COMPLETE) + return false; + + return true; +} + +/* + * dump_dirtypages_sb - dump the dirty pages of each inode in the sb + * @sb the super block + * @m the seq_file witch is initialized in proc_dpages_open + * + * For each inode in the sb, call dump_dirtypages_pages to get the number + * of dirty pages. And use seq_printf to store the result in the buffer + * if it's not less than the threshold. The inode in unusual state will + * be skipped. + */ +static void dump_dirtypages_sb(struct super_block *sb, struct seq_file *m) +{ + struct inode *inode, *toput_inode = NULL; + unsigned long limit; + + if (!is_sb_writable(sb) || !sb->s_bdev) + return; + + limit = READ_ONCE(buf_limit); + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) { + unsigned long dirty_pages; + + spin_lock(&inode->i_lock); + if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING|I_WILL_FREE|I_NEW)) { + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + continue; + } + + __iget(inode); + spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock); + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + + dirty_pages = dump_dirtypages_inode(inode); + if (!dirty_pages || dirty_pages < limit) + goto skip; + + seq_printf(m, "FSType: %s, Dev ID: %u(%u:%u) ino %lu, dirty pages %lu, path %s\n", + sb_fstype(sb), sb->s_dev, MAJOR(sb->s_dev), + MINOR(sb->s_dev), inode->i_ino, dirty_pages, + inode_filename(inode)); + + if (seq_has_overflowed(m)) { + /* keep size > count to avoid overflow in seq_read_iter() */ + m->size += strlen(TERM_STR) + 1; + seq_puts(m, TERM_STR); + iput(inode); + iput(toput_inode); + return; + } +skip: + iput(toput_inode); + toput_inode = inode; + cond_resched(); + spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + } + spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock); + iput(toput_inode); +} + +static int proc_dpages_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + iterate_supers((void *)dump_dirtypages_sb, (void *)m); + return 0; +} + +static int proc_dpages_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + int ret; + struct seq_file *m; + + if (!dirty_pages_lock()) + return -EBUSY; + + if (buf_dirty == NULL || buf_size == 0) { + pr_warn("dirty_pages: please allocate buffer before getting dirty pages\n"); + dirty_pages_unlock(); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + ret = single_open(filp, proc_dpages_show, NULL); + if (ret) { + dirty_pages_unlock(); + return ret; + } + + m = (struct seq_file *)filp->private_data; + memset(buf_dirty, 0, buf_size); + m->size = buf_size - (strlen(TERM_STR) + 1); + m->buf = buf_dirty; + + return 0; +} + +static int proc_dpages_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + struct seq_file *m = file->private_data; + + /* we don't want to free the buf */ + m->buf = NULL; + dirty_pages_unlock(); + return single_release(inode, file); +} + +static void free_buf_dirty(void) +{ + if (!buf_dirty) + return; + + vfree(buf_dirty); + buf_dirty = NULL; + buf_size = 0; + WRITE_ONCE(buf_num, 0); +} + +static int proc_buffer_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", READ_ONCE(buf_num)); + return 0; +} + +static int proc_buffer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + int ret; + + if (((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) && !dirty_pages_lock()) + return -EBUSY; + + ret = single_open(filp, proc_buffer_show, NULL); + if (ret) + dirty_pages_unlock(); + + return ret; +} + +static ssize_t proc_buffer_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *offp) +{ + int ret; + unsigned long new_buf_num, new_buf_size; + char *new_buf_dirty; + + ret = kstrtoul_from_user(buf, count, 10, &new_buf_num); + if (ret != 0 || new_buf_num > MAX_BUF_NUM) + return -EINVAL; + + if (new_buf_num == buf_num) + return count; + + if (new_buf_num == 0) { + free_buf_dirty(); + return count; + } + + new_buf_size = PAGE_SIZE * new_buf_num; + new_buf_dirty = vzalloc(new_buf_size); + if (!new_buf_dirty) + return -ENOMEM; + + free_buf_dirty(); + buf_dirty = new_buf_dirty; + buf_size = new_buf_size; + WRITE_ONCE(buf_num, new_buf_num); + + return count; +} + +static int proc_buffer_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + dirty_pages_unlock(); + return single_release(inode, filp); +} + +static int proc_limit_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) +{ + seq_printf(m, "%lu\n", READ_ONCE(buf_limit)); + return 0; +} + +static int proc_limit_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + return single_open(filp, proc_limit_show, NULL); +} + +static ssize_t proc_limit_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *offp) +{ + int ret; + unsigned long limit; + + ret = kstrtoul_from_user(buf, count, 10, &limit); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + WRITE_ONCE(buf_limit, limit); + + return count; +} + +static const struct proc_ops proc_dpages_operations = { + .proc_open = proc_dpages_open, + .proc_read = seq_read, + .proc_release = proc_dpages_release, +}; + +static const struct proc_ops proc_buffer_operations = { + .proc_open = proc_buffer_open, + .proc_read = seq_read, + .proc_write = proc_buffer_write, + .proc_lseek = seq_lseek, + .proc_release = proc_buffer_release, +}; + +static const struct proc_ops proc_limit_operations = { + .proc_open = proc_limit_open, + .proc_read = seq_read, + .proc_write = proc_limit_write, + .proc_lseek = seq_lseek, + .proc_release = single_release, +}; + +static int __init dpages_proc_init(void) +{ + struct proc_dir_entry *dirty_dir; + + dirty_dir = proc_mkdir(DIRTY_ROOT, NULL); + if (!dirty_dir) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!proc_create(DIRTY_PAGES, 0440, dirty_dir, &proc_dpages_operations)) + goto fail_pages; + + if (!proc_create(DIRTY_BUFFER_SIZE, 0640, dirty_dir, + &proc_buffer_operations)) + goto fail_switch; + + if (!proc_create(DIRTY_LIMIT, 0640, dirty_dir, &proc_limit_operations)) + goto fail_limit; + + return 0; + +fail_limit: + remove_proc_entry(DIRTY_BUFFER_SIZE, dirty_dir); +fail_switch: + remove_proc_entry(DIRTY_PAGES, dirty_dir); +fail_pages: + remove_proc_entry(DIRTY_ROOT, NULL); + return -ENOMEM; +} + +subsys_initcall(dpages_proc_init); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Some simple extensions of the kfence feature
by Ze Zuo 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

This patchset supports the following two features: 1. The number of kfence objects is a key factor to balance kfence bug detection capabilities and performance loss, and often needs to be optimized according to actual business scenarios. The number of kfence objects can be dynamically configured kfence.num_objects cmdline, so as to reduce the release of kernel versions in actual use, thereby reducing costs. 2. The kfence feature under arm64 supports dynamic opening after system startup, which will turn all the kernel memblock memory into page-mapped mapping and increase the memory overhead, in order to save the page table memory usage, only the kfence pool supports page-mapped mapping, which can be enabled at kernel startup by setting kfence.sample _interval=-1 at kernel startup to enable the dynamic on capability, at this time it will allocate memory for kfence by default. The kfence will be allocated memory by default. Subsequent dynamic enablement and disabling will no longer consume additional memory. This feature has been tested under ARM64, x86_64 and ARM architectures, and the Kfence Kunit test results are consistent with the native ones. ChangeLog: - Add config kfence_must_early_init to perform code isolation for non-functional purposes. - Some minor changes about document, no functional changes. Ze Zuo (2): kfence: Add a module parameter to adjust kfence objects arm64: kfence: scale sample_interval to support early init for kfence. Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 8 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/kfence.h | 3 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 5 + include/linux/kfence.h | 13 +- lib/Kconfig.kfence | 28 +++++ mm/kfence/core.c | 189 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- mm/kfence/kfence.h | 4 +- mm/kfence/kfence_test.c | 2 +- 8 files changed, 222 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] pid_ns: Make pid_max per namespace
by Yi Yang 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

From: Li Zefan <lizefan(a)huawei.com> euler inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8TCPY ------------------------------------------------- The adjusted pid_max on the host also takes effect in the container. Move pid_max to pid_namespace to fix this problem. Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizefan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/pid.h | 2 ++ include/linux/pid_namespace.h | 3 ++ init/Kconfig | 6 ++++ kernel/pid.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/pid_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 2 ++ kernel/trace/pid_list.c | 4 +++ kernel/trace/trace.c | 4 +++ kernel/trace/trace.h | 2 ++ 9 files changed, 93 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/pid.h b/include/linux/pid.h index 653a527574c4..b90bc447d2a2 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid.h +++ b/include/linux/pid.h @@ -113,8 +113,10 @@ extern void transfer_pid(struct task_struct *old, struct task_struct *new, struct pid_namespace; extern struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns; +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE extern int pid_max; extern int pid_max_min, pid_max_max; +#endif /* * look up a PID in the hash table. Must be called with the tasklist_lock diff --git a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h index f9f9931e02d6..0a7c6dab0b7b 100644 --- a/include/linux/pid_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/pid_namespace.h @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ struct pid_namespace { #endif struct user_namespace *user_ns; struct ucounts *ucounts; +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + int pid_max; +#endif int reboot; /* group exit code if this pidns was rebooted */ struct ns_common ns; #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 869eea4108d0..8c07d158bb54 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -2104,3 +2104,9 @@ config ARCH_HAS_SYNC_CORE_BEFORE_USERMODE # <asm/syscall_wrapper.h>. config ARCH_HAS_SYSCALL_WRAPPER def_bool n + +config PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + bool "Make pid_max per namespace" + default y + help + Say Y here to enable make pid_max per namespace. diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c index 383abde0c208..4e9267988dd7 100644 --- a/kernel/pid.c +++ b/kernel/pid.c @@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ #include <net/sock.h> #include <uapi/linux/pidfd.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE +#include <linux/kmemleak.h> +#endif + struct pid init_struct_pid = { .count = REFCOUNT_INIT(1), .tasks = { @@ -59,12 +63,19 @@ struct pid init_struct_pid = { }, } }; +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE int pid_max = PID_MAX_DEFAULT; +#endif #define RESERVED_PIDS 300 +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE int pid_max_min = RESERVED_PIDS + 1; int pid_max_max = PID_MAX_LIMIT; +#else +static int pid_max_min = RESERVED_PIDS + 1; +static int pid_max_max = PID_MAX_LIMIT; +#endif /* * PID-map pages start out as NULL, they get allocated upon @@ -80,6 +91,9 @@ struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns = { .child_reaper = &init_task, .user_ns = &init_user_ns, .ns.inum = PROC_PID_INIT_INO, +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + .pid_max = PID_MAX_DEFAULT, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS .ns.ops = &pidns_operations, #endif @@ -194,7 +208,11 @@ struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid, tid = set_tid[ns->level - i]; retval = -EINVAL; +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE if (tid < 1 || tid >= pid_max) +#else + if (tid < 1 || tid >= task_active_pid_ns(current)->pid_max) +#endif goto out_free; /* * Also fail if a PID != 1 is requested and @@ -234,7 +252,11 @@ struct pid *alloc_pid(struct pid_namespace *ns, pid_t *set_tid, * a partially initialized PID (see below). */ nr = idr_alloc_cyclic(&tmp->idr, NULL, pid_min, +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE pid_max, GFP_ATOMIC); +#else + tmp->pid_max, GFP_ATOMIC); +#endif } spin_unlock_irq(&pidmap_lock); idr_preload_end(); @@ -646,8 +668,37 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(pidfd_open, pid_t, pid, unsigned int, flags) return fd; } +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE +static int proc_dointvec_pidmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + struct ctl_table tmp; + + tmp = *table; + tmp.data = &task_active_pid_ns(current)->pid_max; + + return proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + +static struct ctl_table pid_ctl_table[] = { + { + .procname = "pid_max", + .data = &init_pid_ns.pid_max, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_pidmax, + .extra1 = &pid_max_min, + .extra2 = &pid_max_max, + }, + {} +}; +#endif + void __init pid_idr_init(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + int pid_max = init_pid_ns.pid_max; +#endif /* Verify no one has done anything silly: */ BUILD_BUG_ON(PID_MAX_LIMIT >= PIDNS_ADDING); @@ -658,6 +709,9 @@ void __init pid_idr_init(void) PIDS_PER_CPU_MIN * num_possible_cpus()); pr_info("pid_max: default: %u minimum: %u\n", pid_max, pid_max_min); +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + init_pid_ns.pid_max = pid_max; +#endif idr_init(&init_pid_ns.idr); init_pid_ns.pid_cachep = kmem_cache_create("pid", @@ -665,6 +719,9 @@ void __init pid_idr_init(void) __alignof__(struct pid), SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC | SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + register_sysctl_init("kernel", pid_ctl_table); +#endif } static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct task_struct *task, int fd) diff --git a/kernel/pid_namespace.c b/kernel/pid_namespace.c index 619972c78774..c837b1096dcb 100644 --- a/kernel/pid_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/pid_namespace.c @@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ static struct pid_namespace *create_pid_namespace(struct user_namespace *user_ns ns->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns); ns->ucounts = ucounts; ns->pid_allocated = PIDNS_ADDING; +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + ns->pid_max = parent_pid_ns->pid_max; +#endif #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) && defined(CONFIG_MEMFD_CREATE) ns->memfd_noexec_scope = pidns_memfd_noexec_scope(parent_pid_ns); #endif @@ -295,6 +298,10 @@ static int pid_ns_ctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, next = idr_get_cursor(&pid_ns->idr) - 1; tmp.data = &next; +#ifdef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE + tmp.extra2 = &pid_ns->pid_max; +#endif + ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(&tmp, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); if (!ret && write) idr_set_cursor(&pid_ns->idr, next + 1); @@ -302,7 +309,9 @@ static int pid_ns_ctl_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE extern int pid_max; +#endif static struct ctl_table pid_ns_ctl_table[] = { { .procname = "ns_last_pid", @@ -310,7 +319,11 @@ static struct ctl_table pid_ns_ctl_table[] = { .mode = 0666, /* permissions are checked in the handler */ .proc_handler = pid_ns_ctl_handler, .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE .extra2 = &pid_max, +#else + .extra2 = &init_pid_ns.pid_max, +#endif }, { } }; diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 354a2d294f52..e84df0818517 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1809,6 +1809,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, #endif +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE { .procname = "pid_max", .data = &pid_max, @@ -1818,6 +1819,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = { .extra1 = &pid_max_min, .extra2 = &pid_max_max, }, +#endif { .procname = "panic_on_oops", .data = &panic_on_oops, diff --git a/kernel/trace/pid_list.c b/kernel/trace/pid_list.c index 95106d02b32d..8056d7441d05 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/pid_list.c +++ b/kernel/trace/pid_list.c @@ -414,7 +414,11 @@ struct trace_pid_list *trace_pid_list_alloc(void) int i; /* According to linux/thread.h, pids can be no bigger that 30 bits */ +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE WARN_ON_ONCE(pid_max > (1 << 30)); +#else + WARN_ON_ONCE(task_active_pid_ns(current)->pid_max > (1 << 30)); +#endif pid_list = kzalloc(sizeof(*pid_list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!pid_list) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.c b/kernel/trace/trace.c index b656cab67f67..5afa58302b06 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.c @@ -5423,7 +5423,11 @@ int set_tracer_flag(struct trace_array *tr, unsigned int mask, int enabled) if (mask == TRACE_ITER_RECORD_TGID) { if (!tgid_map) { +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE tgid_map_max = pid_max; +#else + tgid_map_max = init_pid_ns.pid_max; +#endif map = kvcalloc(tgid_map_max + 1, sizeof(*tgid_map), GFP_KERNEL); diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace.h b/kernel/trace/trace.h index d608f6128704..52123df262b2 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace.h +++ b/kernel/trace/trace.h @@ -695,7 +695,9 @@ extern unsigned long tracing_thresh; /* PID filtering */ +#ifndef CONFIG_PID_MAX_PER_NAMESPACE extern int pid_max; +#endif bool trace_find_filtered_pid(struct trace_pid_list *filtered_pids, pid_t search_pid); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH V4 OLK-6.6 0/8] Spark SQL scenario bpf readahead optimization synchronization to OLK-6.6
by ZhaoLong Wang 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

CONFIG: CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK=y CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK=y V2: - Using helpers function, such as i_size_read(), round_up - Fix commit log Signature - Fix the user-mode test program V3 - Do not use the round_up helper function. Use the correct calculation - err = -errno before printf V4 - Drop the "Conflict" in the commit log. Hou Tao (5): vfs: add bare tracepoints for vfs read and release fs: add helper fs_file_read_do_trace() xfs: add trace for read and release of regular file ext4: add trace for the read and release of regular file selftests/bpf: add demo for file read pattern detection Yufen Yu (1): readahead: introduce FMODE_CTL_WILLNEED to read first 2MB of file ZhaoLong Wang (2): VFS: Rolling Back the fmode macro definition and structure members selftests/bpf: Update the demo file_read_pattern to run on libbpf 1.0+ fs/ext4/file.c | 4 + fs/read_write.c | 38 +++++ fs/xfs/xfs_file.c | 3 + include/linux/fs.h | 37 +++++ include/trace/events/fs.h | 33 +++++ mm/readahead.c | 40 ++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/Makefile | 1 + .../testing/selftests/bpf/file_read_pattern.c | 76 ++++++++++ .../bpf/progs/file_read_pattern_prog.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 368 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 include/trace/events/fs.h create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/file_read_pattern.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/file_read_pattern_prog.c -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/9] Add swap control for memcg
by Jinjiang Tu 09 Jan '24

09 Jan '24

This series patches add swap control for memory cgroup. Patch[1] add page type in memory.reclaim interface to support reclaim anon pages. Patch[3] add memory.force_swapin interface to support swap back pages proactively. Patch[4-6] add memory.swapfile interface to limit available swap device for memory cgroup. Patch[7] add memory.swap.max interface to limit usage of swap for memory cgroup. Jinjiang Tu (1): memcg: make sysctl registration more extensible Liu Shixin (7): memcg: add page type to memory.reclaim interface memcg: introduce memcg swap qos feature memcg: introduce per-memcg swapin interface memcg: add restrict to swap to cgroup1 mm/swapfile: introduce per-memcg swapfile control mm: swap_slots: add per-type slot cache config: enable memcg swap qos for x86_64 and arm64 by default zhaoxiaoqiang11 (1): memcg/swap: add ability to disable memcg swap .../admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst | 4 + Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v2.rst | 10 +- arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + include/linux/memcontrol.h | 35 ++ include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/swap.h | 12 +- include/linux/swap_slots.h | 2 +- init/Kconfig | 9 + mm/madvise.c | 31 +- mm/memcontrol.c | 493 +++++++++++++++++- mm/swap_slots.c | 151 +++++- mm/swapfile.c | 97 +++- mm/vmscan.c | 9 + 14 files changed, 810 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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