June 2024 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-6.6] eeprom: at24: fix memory corruption race condition
by Wenyu Huang 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Daniel Okazaki <dtokazaki(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 2af84c46b9b8f2d6c0f88d09ee5c849ae1734676 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F4 CVE: CVE-2024-35848 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f42c97027fb75776e2e9358d16bf4a99aeb04cf2 ] If the eeprom is not accessible, an nvmem device will be registered, the read will fail, and the device will be torn down. If another driver accesses the nvmem device after the teardown, it will reference invalid memory. Move the failure point before registering the nvmem device. Signed-off-by: Daniel Okazaki <dtokazaki(a)google.com> Fixes: b20eb4c1f026 ("eeprom: at24: drop unnecessary label") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422174337.2487142-1-dtokazaki@google.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wenyu Huang <huangwenyu5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c index dbbf7db4ff2f..1dd556496f27 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c +++ b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c @@ -756,15 +756,6 @@ static int at24_probe(struct i2c_client *client) } pm_runtime_enable(dev); - at24->nvmem = devm_nvmem_register(dev, &nvmem_config); - if (IS_ERR(at24->nvmem)) { - pm_runtime_disable(dev); - if (!pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev)) - regulator_disable(at24->vcc_reg); - return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(at24->nvmem), - "failed to register nvmem\n"); - } - /* * Perform a one-byte test read to verify that the chip is functional, * unless powering on the device is to be avoided during probe (i.e. @@ -780,6 +771,15 @@ static int at24_probe(struct i2c_client *client) } } + at24->nvmem = devm_nvmem_register(dev, &nvmem_config); + if (IS_ERR(at24->nvmem)) { + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + if (!pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev)) + regulator_disable(at24->vcc_reg); + return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(at24->nvmem), + "failed to register nvmem\n"); + } + pm_runtime_idle(dev); if (writable) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] fix CVE-2024-36905
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

fix CVE-2024-36905 Eric Dumazet (1): tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets Paolo Abeni (1): net: relax socket state check at accept time. net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix CVE-2024-36905
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

fix CVE-2024-36905 Eric Dumazet (1): tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets Paolo Abeni (1): net: relax socket state check at accept time. net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2024-36905
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-36905 Eric Dumazet (1): tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets Paolo Abeni (1): net: relax socket state check at accept time. net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2023-52810
by Li Nan 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Juntong Deng (1): fs/jfs: Add check for negative db_l2nbperpage Siddh Raman Pant (1): jfs: jfs_dmap: Validate db_l2nbperpage while mounting fs/jfs/jfs_filsys.h | 2 ++ fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: qcom/emac: fix UAF in emac_remove
by Ze Zuo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.53 commit b560521eca03d0a2db6093a5a632cbdd0a0cf833 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9S29U CVE: CVE-2021-47311 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ad297cd2db8953e2202970e9504cab247b6c7cb4 upstream. adpt is netdev private data and it cannot be used after free_netdev() call. Using adpt after free_netdev() can cause UAF bug. Fix it by moving free_netdev() at the end of the function. Fixes: 54e19bc74f33 ("net: qcom/emac: do not use devm on internal phy pdev") Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c index b10f2bcf8506..938602864c24 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c @@ -754,12 +754,13 @@ static int emac_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) put_device(&adpt->phydev->mdio.dev); mdiobus_unregister(adpt->mii_bus); - free_netdev(netdev); if (adpt->phy.digital) iounmap(adpt->phy.digital); iounmap(adpt->phy.base); + free_netdev(netdev); + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI
by Shengjie Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA45I1 -------------------------------- Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI: 1. Init TSI driver when config cvm_guest. 2. Modify the token structure to reduce the number of exposed variables. 3. Add a lock for obtaining the remote attestation report. Fixes: 31071f4b2a0b ("cvm_tsi: add cvm tsi interface") Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 93 +++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..a46f2b4724 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(token_lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,11 +44,8 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; - ver = tsi_get_version(); - if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); + if (!is_cvm_world()) return -EIO; - } ret = misc_register(&ioctl_dev); if (ret) { @@ -56,6 +53,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kzalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +67,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +84,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +103,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + spin_lock(&token_lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +142,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + spin_lock(&token_lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -EFAULT; } + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return 0; } @@ -211,7 +208,7 @@ static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg) unsigned long device_cert_size; device_cert_size = MAX_DEV_CERT_SIZE; - device_cert = kmalloc(device_cert_size, GFP_KERNEL); + device_cert = kzalloc(device_cert_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!device_cert) return -ENOMEM; ret = tsi_get_device_cert(device_cert, &device_cert_size); -- 2.37.2.windows.2

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit 413c33b9f3bc36fdf719690a78824db9f88a9485 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4IQ CVE: CVE-2024-36905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 8eef91d14263..c8f65909a921 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@ void tcp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how) /* If we've already sent a FIN, or it's a closed state, skip this. */ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_SYN_SENT | - TCPF_SYN_RECV | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { + TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { /* Clear out any half completed packets. FIN if needed. */ if (tcp_close_state(sk)) tcp_send_fin(sk); @@ -2620,7 +2620,7 @@ void tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) * machine. State transitions: * * TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 - * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (forget it, it's impossible) + * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (it is difficult) * TCP_CLOSE_WAIT -> TCP_LAST_ACK * * are legal only when FIN has been sent (i.e. in window), diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index f95a18b73677..9542f42b5d0c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6514,6 +6514,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); + if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) + tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 0996c71811d5..f32351a8f031 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3474,7 +3474,9 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) return; } } else { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, sk->sk_allocation); + skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, + sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC | + __GFP_NOWARN)); if (unlikely(!skb)) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit 413c33b9f3bc36fdf719690a78824db9f88a9485 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4IQ CVE: CVE-2024-36905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index f1ab4fa04dce..758818ec3f8b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2527,7 +2527,7 @@ void tcp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how) /* If we've already sent a FIN, or it's a closed state, skip this. */ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_SYN_SENT | - TCPF_SYN_RECV | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { + TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { /* Clear out any half completed packets. FIN if needed. */ if (tcp_close_state(sk)) tcp_send_fin(sk); @@ -2638,7 +2638,7 @@ void __tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) * machine. State transitions: * * TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 - * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (forget it, it's impossible) + * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (it is difficult) * TCP_CLOSE_WAIT -> TCP_LAST_ACK * * are legal only when FIN has been sent (i.e. in window), diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 2645dd64c382..0c783f8c0b36 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6541,6 +6541,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); + if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) + tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 762f2009d61d..a1302d5cb98f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3495,7 +3495,9 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) return; } } else { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, sk->sk_allocation); + skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, + sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC | + __GFP_NOWARN)); if (unlikely(!skb)) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit f47d0d32fa94e815fdd78b8b88684873e67939f4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4IQ CVE: CVE-2024-36905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 2ff83f2897ba..0f1380c3fcf4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2714,7 +2714,7 @@ void tcp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how) /* If we've already sent a FIN, or it's a closed state, skip this. */ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_SYN_SENT | - TCPF_SYN_RECV | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { + TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { /* Clear out any half completed packets. FIN if needed. */ if (tcp_close_state(sk)) tcp_send_fin(sk); @@ -2823,7 +2823,7 @@ void __tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) * machine. State transitions: * * TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 - * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (forget it, it's impossible) + * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (it is difficult) * TCP_CLOSE_WAIT -> TCP_LAST_ACK * * are legal only when FIN has been sent (i.e. in window), diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 7529412827de..259e48b57494 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6654,6 +6654,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); + if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) + tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index f6950a42de20..cc18b8b70be0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3585,7 +3585,9 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) return; } } else { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, sk->sk_allocation); + skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, + sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC | + __GFP_NOWARN)); if (unlikely(!skb)) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1