February 2025 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] net: Fix CVE-2024-56658
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

Fix CVE-2024-56658 Dong Chenchen (1): net: Fix kabi breakage in struct net Eric Dumazet (1): net: defer final 'struct net' free in netns dismantle include/net/net_namespace.h | 1 + net/core/net_namespace.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ila: serialize calls to nf_register_net_hooks()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.233 commit d3017895e393536b234cf80a83fc463c08a28137 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBID33 CVE: CVE-2024-57900 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 260466b576bca0081a7d4acecc8e93687aa22d0e ] syzbot found a race in ila_add_mapping() [1] commit 031ae72825ce ("ila: call nf_unregister_net_hooks() sooner") attempted to fix a similar issue. Looking at the syzbot repro, we have concurrent ILA_CMD_ADD commands. Add a mutex to make sure at most one thread is calling nf_register_net_hooks(). [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rhashtable_lookup.constprop.0+0x426/0x550 include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028f40008 by task dhcpcd/5501 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5501 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602 rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] __rhashtable_lookup.constprop.0+0x426/0x550 include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline] rhashtable_lookup_fast include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 [inline] ila_lookup_wildcards net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:127 [inline] ila_xlat_addr net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:652 [inline] ila_nf_input+0x1ee/0x620 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:185 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xbb/0x200 net/netfilter/core.c:626 nf_hook.constprop.0+0x42e/0x750 include/linux/netfilter.h:269 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xa4/0x680 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5672 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x160 net/core/dev.c:5785 process_backlog+0x443/0x15f0 net/core/dev.c:6117 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb7/0x550 net/core/dev.c:6883 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6952 [inline] net_rx_action+0xa94/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7074 handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:561 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x170 kernel/softirq.c:662 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 Fixes: 7f00feaf1076 ("ila: Add generic ILA translation facility") Reported-by: syzbot+47e761d22ecf745f72b9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6772c9ae.050a0220.2f3838.04c7.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom(a)herbertland.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230162849.2795486-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c b/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c index 2e7a36a1ea0a..8483116dfa23 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c @@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops ila_nf_hook_ops[] = { }, }; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ila_mutex); + static int ila_add_mapping(struct net *net, struct ila_xlat_params *xp) { struct ila_net *ilan = net_generic(net, ila_net_id); @@ -208,16 +210,20 @@ static int ila_add_mapping(struct net *net, struct ila_xlat_params *xp) spinlock_t *lock = ila_get_lock(ilan, xp->ip.locator_match); int err = 0, order; - if (!ilan->xlat.hooks_registered) { + if (!READ_ONCE(ilan->xlat.hooks_registered)) { /* We defer registering net hooks in the namespace until the * first mapping is added. */ - err = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ila_nf_hook_ops, - ARRAY_SIZE(ila_nf_hook_ops)); + mutex_lock(&ila_mutex); + if (!ilan->xlat.hooks_registered) { + err = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ila_nf_hook_ops, + ARRAY_SIZE(ila_nf_hook_ops)); + if (!err) + WRITE_ONCE(ilan->xlat.hooks_registered, true); + } + mutex_unlock(&ila_mutex); if (err) return err; - - ilan->xlat.hooks_registered = true; } ila = kzalloc(sizeof(*ila), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched: sch_cake: add bounds checks to host bulk flow fairness counts
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc7 commit 737d4d91d35b5f7fa5bb442651472277318b0bfd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBIQOT CVE: CVE-2025-21647 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Even though we fixed a logic error in the commit cited below, syzbot still managed to trigger an underflow of the per-host bulk flow counters, leading to an out of bounds memory access. To avoid any such logic errors causing out of bounds memory accesses, this commit factors out all accesses to the per-host bulk flow counters to a series of helpers that perform bounds-checking before any increments and decrements. This also has the benefit of improving readability by moving the conditional checks for the flow mode into these helpers, instead of having them spread out throughout the code (which was the cause of the original logic error). As part of this change, the flow quantum calculation is consolidated into a helper function, which means that the dithering applied to the ost load scaling is now applied both in the DRR rotation and when a sparse flow's quantum is first initiated. The only user-visible effect of this is that the maximum packet size that can be sent while a flow stays sparse will now vary with +/- one byte in some cases. This should not make a noticeable difference in practice, and thus it's not worth complicating the code to preserve the old behaviour. Fixes: 546ea84d07e3 ("sched: sch_cake: fix bulk flow accounting logic for host fairness") Reported-by: syzbot+f63600d288bfb7057424(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107120105.70685-1-toke@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/sched/sch_cake.c [commit 7e3cf0843fe5 use get_random_{u8,u16}() in cake_dequeue, which not merged lead to conflicts] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_cake.c | 140 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_cake.c b/net/sched/sch_cake.c index 4ddb43a6644a..e0030c16143f 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_cake.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_cake.c @@ -643,6 +643,63 @@ static bool cake_ddst(int flow_mode) return (flow_mode & CAKE_FLOW_DUAL_DST) == CAKE_FLOW_DUAL_DST; } +static void cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_dsrc(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count)) + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count--; +} + +static void cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_dsrc(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count < CAKE_QUEUES)) + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count++; +} + +static void cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_ddst(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count)) + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; +} + +static void cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_ddst(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count < CAKE_QUEUES)) + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; +} + +static u16 cake_get_flow_quantum(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + u16 host_load = 1; + + if (cake_dsrc(flow_mode)) + host_load = max(host_load, + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count); + + if (cake_ddst(flow_mode)) + host_load = max(host_load, + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count); + + /* The get_random_u16() is a way to apply dithering to avoid + * accumulating roundoff errors + */ + return (q->flow_quantum * quantum_div[host_load] + + (prandom_u32() >> 16)) >> 16; +} + static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flow_mode, u16 flow_override, u16 host_override) { @@ -789,10 +846,8 @@ static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, allocate_dst = cake_ddst(flow_mode); if (q->flows[outer_hash + k].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) { - if (allocate_src) - q->hosts[q->flows[reduced_hash].srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count--; - if (allocate_dst) - q->hosts[q->flows[reduced_hash].dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; + cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[outer_hash + k], flow_mode); + cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[outer_hash + k], flow_mode); } found: /* reserve queue for future packets in same flow */ @@ -817,9 +872,10 @@ static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, q->hosts[outer_hash + k].srchost_tag = srchost_hash; found_src: srchost_idx = outer_hash + k; - if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) - q->hosts[srchost_idx].srchost_bulk_flow_count++; q->flows[reduced_hash].srchost = srchost_idx; + + if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) + cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[reduced_hash], flow_mode); } if (allocate_dst) { @@ -840,9 +896,10 @@ static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, q->hosts[outer_hash + k].dsthost_tag = dsthost_hash; found_dst: dsthost_idx = outer_hash + k; - if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) - q->hosts[dsthost_idx].dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; q->flows[reduced_hash].dsthost = dsthost_idx; + + if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) + cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[reduced_hash], flow_mode); } } @@ -1855,10 +1912,6 @@ static s32 cake_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, /* flowchain */ if (!flow->set || flow->set == CAKE_SET_DECAYING) { - struct cake_host *srchost = &b->hosts[flow->srchost]; - struct cake_host *dsthost = &b->hosts[flow->dsthost]; - u16 host_load = 1; - if (!flow->set) { list_add_tail(&flow->flowchain, &b->new_flows); } else { @@ -1868,18 +1921,8 @@ static s32 cake_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, flow->set = CAKE_SET_SPARSE; b->sparse_flow_count++; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count); - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count); - - flow->deficit = (b->flow_quantum * - quantum_div[host_load]) >> 16; + flow->deficit = cake_get_flow_quantum(b, flow, q->flow_mode); } else if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_SPARSE_WAIT) { - struct cake_host *srchost = &b->hosts[flow->srchost]; - struct cake_host *dsthost = &b->hosts[flow->dsthost]; - /* this flow was empty, accounted as a sparse flow, but actually * in the bulk rotation. */ @@ -1887,12 +1930,8 @@ static s32 cake_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, b->sparse_flow_count--; b->bulk_flow_count++; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count++; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; - + cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); } if (q->buffer_used > q->buffer_max_used) @@ -1949,13 +1988,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) { struct cake_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch); struct cake_tin_data *b = &q->tins[q->cur_tin]; - struct cake_host *srchost, *dsthost; ktime_t now = ktime_get(); struct cake_flow *flow; struct list_head *head; bool first_flow = true; struct sk_buff *skb; - u16 host_load; u64 delay; u32 len; @@ -2055,11 +2092,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) q->cur_flow = flow - b->flows; first_flow = false; - /* triple isolation (modified DRR++) */ - srchost = &b->hosts[flow->srchost]; - dsthost = &b->hosts[flow->dsthost]; - host_load = 1; - /* flow isolation (DRR++) */ if (flow->deficit <= 0) { /* Keep all flows with deficits out of the sparse and decaying @@ -2071,11 +2103,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) b->sparse_flow_count--; b->bulk_flow_count++; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count++; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; + cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); flow->set = CAKE_SET_BULK; } else { @@ -2087,19 +2116,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) } } - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count); - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count); - - WARN_ON(host_load > CAKE_QUEUES); - - /* The shifted prandom_u32() is a way to apply dithering to - * avoid accumulating roundoff errors - */ - flow->deficit += (b->flow_quantum * quantum_div[host_load] + - (prandom_u32() >> 16)) >> 16; + flow->deficit += cake_get_flow_quantum(b, flow, q->flow_mode); list_move_tail(&flow->flowchain, &b->old_flows); goto retry; @@ -2123,11 +2140,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_BULK) { b->bulk_flow_count--; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count--; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; + cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); b->decaying_flow_count++; } else if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_SPARSE || @@ -2145,12 +2159,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) else if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_BULK) { b->bulk_flow_count--; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count--; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; - + cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); } else b->decaying_flow_count--; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: conntrack: clamp maximum hashtable size to INT_MAX
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc7 commit b541ba7d1f5a5b7b3e2e22dc9e40e18a7d6dbc13 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBIQQN CVE: CVE-2025-21648 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Use INT_MAX as maximum size for the conntrack hashtable. Otherwise, it is possible to hit WARN_ON_ONCE in __kvmalloc_node_noprof() when resizing hashtable because __GFP_NOWARN is unset. See: 0708a0afe291 ("mm: Consider __GFP_NOWARN flag for oversized kvmalloc() calls") Note: hashtable resize is only possible from init_netns. Fixes: 9cc1c73ad666 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid integer overflow when resizing") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index f2634cda262c..9090d677ddfa 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -2435,12 +2435,15 @@ void *nf_ct_alloc_hashtable(unsigned int *sizep, int nulls) struct hlist_nulls_head *hash; unsigned int nr_slots, i; - if (*sizep > (UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) + if (*sizep > (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) return NULL; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head) != sizeof(struct hlist_head)); nr_slots = *sizep = roundup(*sizep, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head)); + if (nr_slots > (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) + return NULL; + hash = kvcalloc(nr_slots, sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head), GFP_KERNEL); if (hash && nulls) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: inet6: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in inet6_create()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit 35360255ca30776dee34d9fa764cffa24d0a5f65 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAPG CVE: CVE-2024-56600 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9df99c395d0f55fb444ef39f4d6f194ca437d884 ] sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk pointer to the provided sock object. If inet6_create() fails later, the sk object is released, but the sock object retains the dangling sk pointer, which may cause use-after-free later. Clear the sock sk pointer on error. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-8-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 3bd7e3a04229..bf23dbbf7536 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -259,31 +259,29 @@ static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, */ inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); err = sk->sk_prot->hash(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } if (sk->sk_prot->init) { err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } if (!kern) { err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } out: return err; out_rcu_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); goto out; +out_sk_release: + sk_common_release(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; + goto out; } static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len, -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: inet: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in inet_create()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit 2bc34d8c8898ae9fddf4612501aabb22d76c2b2c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAPL CVE: CVE-2024-56601 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9365fa510c6f82e3aa550a09d0c5c6b44dbc78ff ] sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk object to the provided sock object. If inet_create() fails later, the sk object is freed, but the sock object retains the dangling pointer, which may create use-after-free later. Clear the sk pointer in the sock object on error. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-7-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c index f8aba75192a7..c6ec22f314c4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/af_inet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/af_inet.c @@ -373,32 +373,30 @@ static int inet_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); /* Add to protocol hash chains. */ err = sk->sk_prot->hash(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } if (sk->sk_prot->init) { err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } if (!kern) { err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } out: return err; out_rcu_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); goto out; +out_sk_release: + sk_common_release(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; + goto out; } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: x_tables: fix LED ID check in led_tg_check()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit ad28612ebae1fcc1104bd432e99e99d87f6bfe09 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAO6 CVE: CVE-2024-56650 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 04317f4eb2aad312ad85c1a17ad81fe75f1f9bc7 ] Syzbot has reported the following BUG detected by KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strlen+0x58/0x70 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881022da0c8 by task repro/5879 ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 ? __pfx_dump_stack_lvl+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10 ? _printk+0xd5/0x120 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x183/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x183/0x530 print_report+0x169/0x550 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x183/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x183/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x45f/0x530 ? __phys_addr+0xba/0x170 ? strlen+0x58/0x70 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 ? strlen+0x58/0x70 strlen+0x58/0x70 kstrdup+0x20/0x80 led_tg_check+0x18b/0x3c0 xt_check_target+0x3bb/0xa40 ? __pfx_xt_check_target+0x10/0x10 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x6e4/0x830 ? nft_target_init+0x174/0xc30 nft_target_init+0x82d/0xc30 ? __pfx_nft_target_init+0x10/0x10 ? nf_tables_newrule+0x1609/0x2980 ? nf_tables_newrule+0x1609/0x2980 ? rcu_is_watching+0x15/0xb0 ? nf_tables_newrule+0x1609/0x2980 ? nf_tables_newrule+0x1609/0x2980 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x21a/0x400 nf_tables_newrule+0x1860/0x2980 ? __pfx_nf_tables_newrule+0x10/0x10 ? __nla_parse+0x40/0x60 nfnetlink_rcv+0x14e5/0x2ab0 ? __pfx_validate_chain+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_nfnetlink_rcv+0x10/0x10 ? __lock_acquire+0x1384/0x2050 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x2e/0x1b0 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x2e/0x1b0 netlink_unicast+0x7f8/0x990 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x183/0x530 ? __check_object_size+0x48e/0x900 netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? aa_sock_msg_perm+0x91/0x160 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 __sock_sendmsg+0x223/0x270 ____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 __sys_sendmsg+0x292/0x380 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x43d/0x780 ? __pfx_lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x10/0x10 ? exc_page_fault+0x590/0x8c0 ? do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x230 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f ... </TASK> Since an invalid (without '\0' byte at all) byte sequence may be passed from userspace, add an extra check to ensure that such a sequence is rejected as possible ID and so never passed to 'kstrdup()' and further. Reported-by: syzbot+6c8215822f35fdb35667(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6c8215822f35fdb35667 Fixes: 268cb38e1802 ("netfilter: x_tables: add LED trigger target") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_LED.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_LED.c b/net/netfilter/xt_LED.c index 0371c387b0d1..13a2b5820b34 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_LED.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_LED.c @@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static int led_tg_check(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) struct xt_led_info_internal *ledinternal; int err; - if (ledinfo->id[0] == '\0') + /* Bail out if empty string or not a string at all. */ + if (ledinfo->id[0] == '\0' || + !memchr(ledinfo->id, '\0', sizeof(ledinfo->id))) return -EINVAL; mutex_lock(&xt_led_mutex); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] wifi: ath9k: add range check for conn_rsp_epid in htc_connect_service()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit c941af142200d975dd3be632aeb490f4cb91dae4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBDHGJ CVE: CVE-2024-53156 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8619593634cbdf5abf43f5714df49b04e4ef09ab ] I found the following bug in my fuzzer: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c:26:51 index 255 is out of range for type 'htc_endpoint [22]' CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-dirty #14 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events request_firmware_work_func Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x180/0x1b0 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xd4/0x130 htc_issue_send.constprop.0+0x20c/0x230 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3c/0x70 ath9k_wmi_cmd+0x41d/0x610 ? mark_held_locks+0x9f/0xe0 ... Since this bug has been confirmed to be caused by insufficient verification of conn_rsp_epid, I think it would be appropriate to add a range check for conn_rsp_epid to htc_connect_service() to prevent the bug from occurring. Fixes: fb9987d0f748 ("ath9k_htc: Support for AR9271 chipset.") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)toke.dk> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <quic_kvalo(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240909103855.68006-1-aha310510@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c index 99667aba289d..00dc97ac53b9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c @@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ int htc_connect_service(struct htc_target *target, return -ETIMEDOUT; } + if (target->conn_rsp_epid < 0 || target->conn_rsp_epid >= ENDPOINT_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + *conn_rsp_epid = target->conn_rsp_epid; return 0; err: -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: ipset: add missing range check in bitmap_ip_uadt
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit 35f56c554eb1b56b77b3cf197a6b00922d49033d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB9NOX CVE: CVE-2024-53141 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- When tb[IPSET_ATTR_IP_TO] is not present but tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR] exists, the values of ip and ip_to are slightly swapped. Therefore, the range check for ip should be done later, but this part is missing and it seems that the vulnerability occurs. So we should add missing range checks and remove unnecessary range checks. Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: syzbot+58c872f7790a4d2ac951(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 72205fc68bd1 ("netfilter: ipset: bitmap:ip set type support") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec(a)blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c index e4fa00abde6a..5988b9bb9029 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_bitmap_ip.c @@ -163,11 +163,8 @@ bitmap_ip_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[], ret = ip_set_get_hostipaddr4(tb[IPSET_ATTR_IP_TO], &ip_to); if (ret) return ret; - if (ip > ip_to) { + if (ip > ip_to) swap(ip, ip_to); - if (ip < map->first_ip) - return -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE; - } } else if (tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR]) { u8 cidr = nla_get_u8(tb[IPSET_ATTR_CIDR]); @@ -178,7 +175,7 @@ bitmap_ip_uadt(struct ip_set *set, struct nlattr *tb[], ip_to = ip; } - if (ip_to > map->last_ip) + if (ip < map->first_ip || ip_to > map->last_ip) return -IPSET_ERR_BITMAP_RANGE; for (; !before(ip_to, ip); ip += map->hosts) { -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/sched: stop qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog on TC_H_ROOT
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela(a)mojatatu.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.229 commit ce691c814bc7a3c30c220ffb5b7422715458fd9b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB5KR7 CVE: CVE-2024-53057 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2e95c4384438adeaa772caa560244b1a2efef816 ] In qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog, Qdiscs with major handle ffff: are assumed to be either root or ingress. This assumption is bogus since it's valid to create egress qdiscs with major handle ffff: Budimir Markovic found that for qdiscs like DRR that maintain an active class list, it will cause a UAF with a dangling class pointer. In 066a3b5b2346, the concern was to avoid iterating over the ingress qdisc since its parent is itself. The proper fix is to stop when parent TC_H_ROOT is reached because the only way to retrieve ingress is when a hierarchy which does not contain a ffff: major handle call into qdisc_lookup with TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_ROOT). In the scenario where major ffff: is an egress qdisc in any of the tree levels, the updates will also propagate to TC_H_ROOT, which then the iteration must stop. Fixes: 066a3b5b2346 ("[NET_SCHED] sch_api: fix qdisc_tree_decrease_qlen() loop") Reported-by: Budimir Markovic <markovicbudimir(a)gmail.com> Suggested-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Tested-by: Victor Nogueira <victor(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241024165547.418570-1-jhs@mojatatu.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index efd109652f22..0b809dfb0e43 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ void qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog(struct Qdisc *sch, int n, int len) drops = max_t(int, n, 0); rcu_read_lock(); while ((parentid = sch->parent)) { - if (TC_H_MAJ(parentid) == TC_H_MAJ(TC_H_INGRESS)) + if (parentid == TC_H_ROOT) break; if (sch->flags & TCQ_F_NOPARENT) -- 2.25.1

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