July 2025 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sctp: add mutual exclusion in proc_sctp_do_udp_port()
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit 10206302af856791fbcc27a33ed3c3eb09b2793d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC1QSQ CVE: CVE-2025-22062 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- We must serialize calls to sctp_udp_sock_stop() and sctp_udp_sock_start() or risk a crash as syzbot reported: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000d: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6551 Comm: syz.1.44 Not tainted 6.14.0-syzkaller-g7f2ff7b62617 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 RIP: 0010:kernel_sock_shutdown+0x47/0x70 net/socket.c:3653 Call Trace: <TASK> udp_tunnel_sock_release+0x68/0x80 net/ipv4/udp_tunnel_core.c:181 sctp_udp_sock_stop+0x71/0x160 net/sctp/protocol.c:930 proc_sctp_do_udp_port+0x264/0x450 net/sctp/sysctl.c:553 proc_sys_call_handler+0x3d0/0x5b0 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:601 iter_file_splice_write+0x91c/0x1150 fs/splice.c:738 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:935 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x18f/0x6c0 fs/splice.c:1158 splice_direct_to_actor+0x342/0xa30 fs/splice.c:1102 do_splice_direct_actor fs/splice.c:1201 [inline] do_splice_direct+0x174/0x240 fs/splice.c:1227 do_sendfile+0xafd/0xe50 fs/read_write.c:1368 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1429 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1415 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1d8/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1415 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks") Reported-by: syzbot+fae49d997eb56fa7c74d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/67ea5c01.050a0220.1547ec.012b.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250331091532.224982-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/sctp/sysctl.c [conflicts due to not merge 78eb4ea25cd5 ("sysctl: treewide: constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlers")] Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/sysctl.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c index fd73be940f46..77a76634014a 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c +++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c @@ -529,6 +529,8 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write, return ret; } +static DEFINE_MUTEX(sctp_sysctl_mutex); + static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -553,6 +555,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write, if (new_value > max || new_value < min) return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex); net->sctp.udp_port = new_value; sctp_udp_sock_stop(net); if (new_value) { @@ -565,6 +568,7 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(struct ctl_table *ctl, int write, lock_sock(sk); sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port); release_sock(sk); + mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex); } return ret; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] rtnetlink: Allocate vfinfo size for VF GUIDs when supported
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Mark Zhang <markzhang(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.87 commit 15f150771e0ec97f8ab1657e7d2568e593c7fa04 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC1QR5 CVE: CVE-2025-22075 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 23f00807619d15063d676218f36c5dfeda1eb420 ] Commit 30aad41721e0 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") added support for getting VF port and node GUIDs in netlink ifinfo messages, but their size was not taken into consideration in the function that allocates the netlink message, causing the following warning when a netlink message is filled with many VF port and node GUIDs: # echo 64 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:08\:00.0/sriov_numvfs # ip link show dev ib0 RTNETLINK answers: Message too long Cannot send link get request: Message too long Kernel warning: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1930 at net/core/rtnetlink.c:4151 rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Modules linked in: xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter overlay mlx5_ib macsec mlx5_core tls rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm iw_cm ib_ipoib fuse ib_cm ib_core CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1930 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 Code: cb 82 e8 3d af 0a 00 4d 85 ff 0f 84 08 ff ff ff 4c 89 ff 41 be ea ff ff ff e8 66 63 5b ff 49 c7 07 80 4f cb 82 e9 36 fc ff ff <0f> 0b e9 16 fe ff ff e8 de a0 56 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888113557348 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 00000000ffffffa6 RBX: ffff88817e87aa34 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff88817e87afb8 RBP: 0000000000000009 R08: ffffffff821f44aa R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8881260f79a8 R11: ffff88817e87af00 R12: ffff88817e87aa00 R13: ffffffff8563d300 R14: 00000000ffffffa6 R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f63a5dbf280(0000) GS:ffff88881ee00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f63a5ba4493 CR3: 00000001700fe002 CR4: 0000000000772eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa5/0x230 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? report_bug+0x22d/0x240 ? handle_bug+0x53/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 ? skb_trim+0x6a/0x80 ? rtnl_getlink+0x586/0x5a0 ? __pfx_rtnl_getlink+0x10/0x10 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1e5/0x860 ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1d/0x70 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x860 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 netlink_rcv_skb+0xe0/0x210 ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? __pfx___netlink_lookup+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xfd/0x290 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x95/0x290 netlink_unicast+0x31f/0x480 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? lock_acquire+0xd5/0x410 netlink_sendmsg+0x369/0x660 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? import_ubuf+0xb9/0xf0 ? __import_iovec+0x254/0x2b0 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ____sys_sendmsg+0x559/0x5a0 ? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ? do_read_fault+0x213/0x4a0 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe4/0x150 ? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? do_fault+0x2cc/0x6f0 ? handle_pte_fault+0x2e3/0x3d0 ? __pfx_handle_pte_fault+0x10/0x10 ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0 ? __down_read_trylock+0x150/0x270 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x404/0x8e0 ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 __sys_sendmsg+0xd5/0x150 ? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 ? __up_read+0x192/0x480 ? lock_release+0x62/0x200 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x65/0x90 ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f63a5b13367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007fff8c726bc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000067b687c2 RCX: 00007f63a5b13367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff8c726c30 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007fff8c726cb8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000034 R10: 00007fff8c726c7c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff8c726cd0 R15: 00007fff8c726cd0 </TASK> irq event stamp: 0 hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff813f9e58>] copy_process+0xd08/0x2830 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Thus, when calculating ifinfo message size, take VF GUIDs sizes into account when supported. Fixes: 30aad41721e0 ("net/core: Add support for getting VF GUIDs") Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd(a)queasysnail.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250325090226.749730-1-mbloch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/rtnetlink.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/rtnetlink.c b/net/core/rtnetlink.c index 4acde7067519..26c520d1af6e 100644 --- a/net/core/rtnetlink.c +++ b/net/core/rtnetlink.c @@ -1011,6 +1011,9 @@ static inline int rtnl_vfinfo_size(const struct net_device *dev, /* IFLA_VF_STATS_TX_DROPPED */ nla_total_size_64bit(sizeof(__u64))); } + if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_get_vf_guid) + size += num_vfs * 2 * + nla_total_size(sizeof(struct ifla_vf_guid)); return size; } else return 0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: Remove RTNL dance for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF.
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit ed3ba9b6e280e14cc3148c1b226ba453f02fa76c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC1QRY CVE: CVE-2025-22111 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- SIOCBRDELIF is passed to dev_ioctl() first and later forwarded to br_ioctl_call(), which causes unnecessary RTNL dance and the splat below [0] under RTNL pressure. Let's say Thread A is trying to detach a device from a bridge and Thread B is trying to remove the bridge. In dev_ioctl(), Thread A bumps the bridge device's refcnt by netdev_hold() and releases RTNL because the following br_ioctl_call() also re-acquires RTNL. In the race window, Thread B could acquire RTNL and try to remove the bridge device. Then, rtnl_unlock() by Thread B will release RTNL and wait for netdev_put() by Thread A. Thread A, however, must hold RTNL after the unlock in dev_ifsioc(), which may take long under RTNL pressure, resulting in the splat by Thread B. Thread A (SIOCBRDELIF) Thread B (SIOCBRDELBR) ---------------------- ---------------------- sock_ioctl sock_ioctl `- sock_do_ioctl `- br_ioctl_call `- dev_ioctl `- br_ioctl_stub |- rtnl_lock | |- dev_ifsioc ' ' |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...) |- netdev_hold(dev, ...) . / |- rtnl_unlock ------. | | |- br_ioctl_call `---> |- rtnl_lock Race | | `- br_ioctl_stub |- br_del_bridge Window | | | |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...) | | | May take long | `- br_dev_delete(dev, ...) | | | under RTNL pressure | `- unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, ...) | | | | `- rtnl_unlock \ | |- rtnl_lock <-' `- netdev_run_todo | |- ... `- netdev_run_todo | `- rtnl_unlock |- __rtnl_unlock | |- netdev_wait_allrefs_any |- netdev_put(dev, ...) <----------------' Wait refcnt decrement and log splat below To avoid blocking SIOCBRDELBR unnecessarily, let's not call dev_ioctl() for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF. In the dev_ioctl() path, we do the following: 1. Copy struct ifreq by get_user_ifreq in sock_do_ioctl() 2. Check CAP_NET_ADMIN in dev_ioctl() 3. Call dev_load() in dev_ioctl() 4. Fetch the master dev from ifr.ifr_name in dev_ifsioc() 3. can be done by request_module() in br_ioctl_call(), so we move 1., 2., and 4. to br_ioctl_stub(). Note that 2. is also checked later in add_del_if(), but it's better performed before RTNL. SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF have been processed in dev_ioctl() since the pre-git era, and there seems to be no specific reason to process them there. [0]: unregister_netdevice: waiting for wpan3 to become free. Usage count = 2 ref_tracker: wpan3@ffff8880662d8608 has 1/1 users at __netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4282 [inline] netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4311 [inline] dev_ifsioc+0xc6a/0x1160 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:624 dev_ioctl+0x255/0x10c0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:826 sock_do_ioctl+0x1ca/0x260 net/socket.c:1213 sock_ioctl+0x23a/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1318 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a4/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:892 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcb/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 893b19587534 ("net: bridge: fix ioctl locking") Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Reported-by: yan kang <kangyan91(a)outlook.com> Reported-by: yue sun <samsun1006219(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/SY8P300MB0421225D54EB92762AE8F0F2A1D32@SY8P3… Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf(a)fomichev.me> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor(a)blackwall.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250316192851.19781-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: net/core/dev_ioctl.c [conflicts due to not merge be94cfdb993f ("dev: Hold rtnl_net_lock() for dev_ifsioc()")] Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/if_bridge.h | 6 ++---- net/bridge/br_ioctl.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- net/bridge/br_private.h | 3 +-- net/core/dev_ioctl.c | 16 ---------------- net/socket.c | 19 +++++++++---------- 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/if_bridge.h b/include/linux/if_bridge.h index 3ff96ae31bf6..c5fe3b2a53e8 100644 --- a/include/linux/if_bridge.h +++ b/include/linux/if_bridge.h @@ -65,11 +65,9 @@ struct br_ip_list { #define BR_DEFAULT_AGEING_TIME (300 * HZ) struct net_bridge; -void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, - unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr, +void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg)); -int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd, - struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg); +int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BRIDGE_IGMP_SNOOPING) int br_multicast_list_adjacent(struct net_device *dev, diff --git a/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c b/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c index f213ed108361..6bc0a11f2ed3 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_ioctl.c @@ -394,10 +394,26 @@ static int old_deviceless(struct net *net, void __user *data) return -EOPNOTSUPP; } -int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd, - struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg) +int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg) { int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + struct ifreq ifr; + + if (cmd == SIOCBRADDIF || cmd == SIOCBRDELIF) { + void __user *data; + char *colon; + + if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + + if (get_user_ifreq(&ifr, &data, uarg)) + return -EFAULT; + + ifr.ifr_name[IFNAMSIZ - 1] = 0; + colon = strchr(ifr.ifr_name, ':'); + if (colon) + *colon = 0; + } rtnl_lock(); @@ -430,7 +446,21 @@ int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd, break; case SIOCBRADDIF: case SIOCBRDELIF: - ret = add_del_if(br, ifr->ifr_ifindex, cmd == SIOCBRADDIF); + { + struct net_device *dev; + + dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr.ifr_name); + if (!dev || !netif_device_present(dev)) { + ret = -ENODEV; + break; + } + if (!netif_is_bridge_master(dev)) { + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; + break; + } + + ret = add_del_if(netdev_priv(dev), ifr.ifr_ifindex, cmd == SIOCBRADDIF); + } break; } diff --git a/net/bridge/br_private.h b/net/bridge/br_private.h index 72d80fd943a8..bbb07ede9dad 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_private.h +++ b/net/bridge/br_private.h @@ -944,8 +944,7 @@ br_port_get_check_rtnl(const struct net_device *dev) /* br_ioctl.c */ int br_dev_siocdevprivate(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *rq, void __user *data, int cmd); -int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd, - struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg); +int br_ioctl_stub(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg); /* br_multicast.c */ #ifdef CONFIG_BRIDGE_IGMP_SNOOPING diff --git a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c index b46aedc36939..541d42bf1e40 100644 --- a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c +++ b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c @@ -517,7 +517,6 @@ static int dev_ifsioc(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *data, int err; struct net_device *dev = __dev_get_by_name(net, ifr->ifr_name); const struct net_device_ops *ops; - netdevice_tracker dev_tracker; if (!dev) return -ENODEV; @@ -580,19 +579,6 @@ static int dev_ifsioc(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *data, case SIOCWANDEV: return dev_siocwandev(dev, &ifr->ifr_settings); - case SIOCBRADDIF: - case SIOCBRDELIF: - if (!netif_device_present(dev)) - return -ENODEV; - if (!netif_is_bridge_master(dev)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - netdev_hold(dev, &dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); - rtnl_unlock(); - err = br_ioctl_call(net, netdev_priv(dev), cmd, ifr, NULL); - netdev_put(dev, &dev_tracker); - rtnl_lock(); - return err; - case SIOCDEVPRIVATE ... SIOCDEVPRIVATE + 15: return dev_siocdevprivate(dev, ifr, data, cmd); @@ -773,8 +759,6 @@ int dev_ioctl(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr, case SIOCBONDRELEASE: case SIOCBONDSETHWADDR: case SIOCBONDCHANGEACTIVE: - case SIOCBRADDIF: - case SIOCBRDELIF: case SIOCSHWTSTAMP: if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c index c7e48890531d..01088da25a09 100644 --- a/net/socket.c +++ b/net/socket.c @@ -1172,12 +1172,10 @@ static ssize_t sock_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from) */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(br_ioctl_mutex); -static int (*br_ioctl_hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, - unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr, +static int (*br_ioctl_hook)(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg); -void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, - unsigned int cmd, struct ifreq *ifr, +void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg)) { mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex); @@ -1186,8 +1184,7 @@ void brioctl_set(int (*hook)(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(brioctl_set); -int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd, - struct ifreq *ifr, void __user *uarg) +int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, unsigned int cmd, void __user *uarg) { int err = -ENOPKG; @@ -1196,7 +1193,7 @@ int br_ioctl_call(struct net *net, struct net_bridge *br, unsigned int cmd, mutex_lock(&br_ioctl_mutex); if (br_ioctl_hook) - err = br_ioctl_hook(net, br, cmd, ifr, uarg); + err = br_ioctl_hook(net, cmd, uarg); mutex_unlock(&br_ioctl_mutex); return err; @@ -1296,7 +1293,9 @@ static long sock_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned cmd, unsigned long arg) case SIOCSIFBR: case SIOCBRADDBR: case SIOCBRDELBR: - err = br_ioctl_call(net, NULL, cmd, NULL, argp); + case SIOCBRADDIF: + case SIOCBRDELIF: + err = br_ioctl_call(net, cmd, argp); break; case SIOCGIFVLAN: case SIOCSIFVLAN: @@ -3458,6 +3457,8 @@ static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, case SIOCGPGRP: case SIOCBRADDBR: case SIOCBRDELBR: + case SIOCBRADDIF: + case SIOCBRDELIF: case SIOCGIFVLAN: case SIOCSIFVLAN: case SIOCGSKNS: @@ -3497,8 +3498,6 @@ static int compat_sock_ioctl_trans(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, case SIOCGIFPFLAGS: case SIOCGIFTXQLEN: case SIOCSIFTXQLEN: - case SIOCBRADDIF: - case SIOCBRDELIF: case SIOCGIFNAME: case SIOCSIFNAME: case SIOCGMIIPHY: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: fix NULL pointer dereference in l3mdev_l3_rcv
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit 0032c99e83b9ce6d5995d65900aa4b6ffb501cce category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC1QTB CVE: CVE-2025-22103 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When delete l3s ipvlan: ip link del link eth0 ipvlan1 type ipvlan mode l3s This may cause a null pointer dereference: Call trace: ip_rcv_finish+0x48/0xd0 ip_rcv+0x5c/0x100 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x64/0xb0 __netif_receive_skb+0x20/0x80 process_backlog+0xb4/0x204 napi_poll+0xe8/0x294 net_rx_action+0xd8/0x22c __do_softirq+0x12c/0x354 This is because l3mdev_l3_rcv() visit dev->l3mdev_ops after ipvlan_l3s_unregister() assign the dev->l3mdev_ops to NULL. The process like this: (CPU1) | (CPU2) l3mdev_l3_rcv() | check dev->priv_flags: | master = skb->dev; | | | ipvlan_l3s_unregister() | set dev->priv_flags | dev->l3mdev_ops = NULL; | visit master->l3mdev_ops | To avoid this by do not set dev->l3mdev_ops when unregister l3s ipvlan. Suggested-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Fixes: c675e06a98a4 ("ipvlan: decouple l3s mode dependencies from other modes") Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250321090353.1170545-1-wangliang74@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_l3s.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_l3s.c b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_l3s.c index d5b05e803219..ca35a50bb640 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_l3s.c +++ b/drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_l3s.c @@ -224,5 +224,4 @@ void ipvlan_l3s_unregister(struct ipvl_port *port) dev->priv_flags &= ~IFF_L3MDEV_RX_HANDLER; ipvlan_unregister_nf_hook(read_pnet(&port->pnet)); - dev->l3mdev_ops = NULL; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] atm: Fix NULL pointer dereference
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Minjoong Kim <pwn9uin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.86 commit 9da6b6340dbcf0f60ae3ec6a7d6438337c32518a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC1KBC CVE: CVE-2025-22018 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bf2986fcf82a449441f9ee4335df19be19e83970 upstream. When MPOA_cache_impos_rcvd() receives the msg, it can trigger Null Pointer Dereference Vulnerability if both entry and holding_time are NULL. Because there is only for the situation where entry is NULL and holding_time exists, it can be passed when both entry and holding_time are NULL. If these are NULL, the entry will be passd to eg_cache_put() as parameter and it is referenced by entry->use code in it. kasan log: [ 3.316691] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006:I [ 3.317568] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] [ 3.318188] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 79 Comm: ex Not tainted 6.14.0-rc2 #102 [ 3.318601] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 3.319298] RIP: 0010:eg_cache_remove_entry+0xa5/0x470 [ 3.319677] Code: c1 f7 6e fd 48 c7 c7 00 7e 38 b2 e8 95 64 54 fd 48 c7 c7 40 7e 38 b2 48 89 ee e80 [ 3.321220] RSP: 0018:ffff88800583f8a8 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 3.321596] RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: ffff888005989000 RCX: ffffffffaecc2d8e [ 3.322112] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000030 [ 3.322643] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff6558b88 [ 3.323181] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 203a207972746e65 R12: 1ffff11000b07f15 [ 3.323707] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888005989000 R15: ffff888005989068 [ 3.324185] FS: 000000001b6313c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3.325042] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3.325545] CR2: 00000000004b4b40 CR3: 000000000248e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 3.326430] Call Trace: [ 3.326725] <TASK> [ 3.326927] ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0 [ 3.327330] ? exc_general_protection+0x161/0x2a0 [ 3.327662] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 [ 3.328214] ? vprintk_emit+0x15e/0x420 [ 3.328543] ? eg_cache_remove_entry+0xa5/0x470 [ 3.328910] ? eg_cache_remove_entry+0x9a/0x470 [ 3.329294] ? __pfx_eg_cache_remove_entry+0x10/0x10 [ 3.329664] ? console_unlock+0x107/0x1d0 [ 3.329946] ? __pfx_console_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 3.330283] ? do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 [ 3.330584] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x47/0x7f [ 3.331090] ? __pfx_prb_read_valid+0x10/0x10 [ 3.331395] ? down_trylock+0x52/0x80 [ 3.331703] ? vprintk_emit+0x15e/0x420 [ 3.331986] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10 [ 3.332279] ? down_trylock+0x52/0x80 [ 3.332527] ? _printk+0xbf/0x100 [ 3.332762] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10 [ 3.333007] ? _raw_write_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 [ 3.333284] ? __pfx__raw_write_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 3.333614] msg_from_mpoad+0x1185/0x2750 [ 3.333893] ? __build_skb_around+0x27b/0x3a0 [ 3.334183] ? __pfx_msg_from_mpoad+0x10/0x10 [ 3.334501] ? __alloc_skb+0x1c0/0x310 [ 3.334809] ? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 3.335283] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe0/0xe0 [ 3.335632] ? finish_wait+0x8d/0x1e0 [ 3.335975] vcc_sendmsg+0x684/0xba0 [ 3.336250] ? __pfx_vcc_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 3.336587] ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 [ 3.337056] ? fdget+0x176/0x3e0 [ 3.337348] __sys_sendto+0x4a2/0x510 [ 3.337663] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 3.337969] ? ioctl_has_perm.constprop.0.isra.0+0x284/0x400 [ 3.338364] ? sock_ioctl+0x1bb/0x5a0 [ 3.338653] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x825/0xd20 [ 3.339017] ? __pfx_sock_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [ 3.339316] ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 3.339727] ? selinux_file_ioctl+0xa4/0x260 [ 3.340166] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 [ 3.340526] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x123/0x140 [ 3.340898] do_syscall_64+0xa6/0x1a0 [ 3.341170] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 3.341533] RIP: 0033:0x44a380 [ 3.341757] Code: 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c00 [ 3.343078] RSP: 002b:00007ffc1d404098 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 3.343631] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc1d404458 RCX: 000000000044a380 [ 3.344306] RDX: 000000000000019c RSI: 00007ffc1d4040b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 3.344833] RBP: 00007ffc1d404260 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 3.345381] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 3.346015] R13: 00007ffc1d404448 R14: 00000000004c17d0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 3.346503] </TASK> [ 3.346679] Modules linked in: [ 3.346956] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 3.347315] RIP: 0010:eg_cache_remove_entry+0xa5/0x470 [ 3.347737] Code: c1 f7 6e fd 48 c7 c7 00 7e 38 b2 e8 95 64 54 fd 48 c7 c7 40 7e 38 b2 48 89 ee e80 [ 3.349157] RSP: 0018:ffff88800583f8a8 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 3.349517] RAX: 0000000000000006 RBX: ffff888005989000 RCX: ffffffffaecc2d8e [ 3.350103] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000030 [ 3.350610] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff6558b88 [ 3.351246] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 203a207972746e65 R12: 1ffff11000b07f15 [ 3.351785] R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888005989000 R15: ffff888005989068 [ 3.352404] FS: 000000001b6313c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d380000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 3.353099] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 3.353544] CR2: 00000000004b4b40 CR3: 000000000248e000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 3.354072] note: ex[79] exited with irqs disabled [ 3.354458] note: ex[79] exited with preempt_count 1 Signed-off-by: Minjoong Kim <pwn9uin(a)gmail.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250322105200.14981-1-pwn9uin@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/atm/mpc.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/atm/mpc.c b/net/atm/mpc.c index 033871e718a3..583c27131b7d 100644 --- a/net/atm/mpc.c +++ b/net/atm/mpc.c @@ -1314,6 +1314,8 @@ static void MPOA_cache_impos_rcvd(struct k_message *msg, holding_time = msg->content.eg_info.holding_time; dprintk("(%s) entry = %p, holding_time = %u\n", mpc->dev->name, entry, holding_time); + if (entry == NULL && !holding_time) + return; if (entry == NULL && holding_time) { entry = mpc->eg_ops->add_entry(msg, mpc); mpc->eg_ops->put(entry); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: dsa: free routing table on probe failure
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.88 commit fb12b460ec46c9efad98de6d9ba349691db51dc7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC5BMY CVE: CVE-2025-37786 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8bf108d7161ffc6880ad13a0cc109de3cf631727 ] If complete = true in dsa_tree_setup(), it means that we are the last switch of the tree which is successfully probing, and we should be setting up all switches from our probe path. After "complete" becomes true, dsa_tree_setup_cpu_ports() or any subsequent function may fail. If that happens, the entire tree setup is in limbo: the first N-1 switches have successfully finished probing (doing nothing but having allocated persistent memory in the tree's dst->ports, and maybe dst->rtable), and switch N failed to probe, ending the tree setup process before anything is tangible from the user's PoV. If switch N fails to probe, its memory (ports) will be freed and removed from dst->ports. However, the dst->rtable elements pointing to its ports, as created by dsa_link_touch(), will remain there, and will lead to use-after-free if dereferenced. If dsa_tree_setup_switches() returns -EPROBE_DEFER, which is entirely possible because that is where ds->ops->setup() is, we get a kasan report like this: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mv88e6xxx_setup_upstream_port+0x240/0x568 Read of size 8 at addr ffff000004f56020 by task kworker/u8:3/42 Call trace: __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x20/0x30 mv88e6xxx_setup_upstream_port+0x240/0x568 mv88e6xxx_setup+0xebc/0x1eb0 dsa_register_switch+0x1af4/0x2ae0 mv88e6xxx_register_switch+0x1b8/0x2a8 mv88e6xxx_probe+0xc4c/0xf60 mdio_probe+0x78/0xb8 really_probe+0x2b8/0x5a8 __driver_probe_device+0x164/0x298 driver_probe_device+0x78/0x258 __device_attach_driver+0x274/0x350 Allocated by task 42: __kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x298/0x490 dsa_switch_touch_ports+0x174/0x3d8 dsa_register_switch+0x800/0x2ae0 mv88e6xxx_register_switch+0x1b8/0x2a8 mv88e6xxx_probe+0xc4c/0xf60 mdio_probe+0x78/0xb8 really_probe+0x2b8/0x5a8 __driver_probe_device+0x164/0x298 driver_probe_device+0x78/0x258 __device_attach_driver+0x274/0x350 Freed by task 42: __kasan_slab_free+0x48/0x68 kfree+0x138/0x418 dsa_register_switch+0x2694/0x2ae0 mv88e6xxx_register_switch+0x1b8/0x2a8 mv88e6xxx_probe+0xc4c/0xf60 mdio_probe+0x78/0xb8 really_probe+0x2b8/0x5a8 __driver_probe_device+0x164/0x298 driver_probe_device+0x78/0x258 __device_attach_driver+0x274/0x350 The simplest way to fix the bug is to delete the routing table in its entirety. dsa_tree_setup_routing_table() has no problem in regenerating it even if we deleted links between ports other than those of switch N, because dsa_link_touch() first checks whether the port pair already exists in dst->rtable, allocating if not. The deletion of the routing table in its entirety already exists in dsa_tree_teardown(), so refactor that into a function that can also be called from the tree setup error path. In my analysis of the commit to blame, it is the one which added dsa_link elements to dst->rtable. Prior to that, each switch had its own ds->rtable which is freed when the switch fails to probe. But the tree is potentially persistent memory. Fixes: c5f51765a1f6 ("net: dsa: list DSA links in the fabric") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250414213001.2957964-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/dsa/dsa.c | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa.c b/net/dsa/dsa.c index 21f8a4ff939a..951425c944c4 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa.c @@ -867,6 +867,16 @@ static void dsa_tree_teardown_lags(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) kfree(dst->lags); } +static void dsa_tree_teardown_routing_table(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) +{ + struct dsa_link *dl, *next; + + list_for_each_entry_safe(dl, next, &dst->rtable, list) { + list_del(&dl->list); + kfree(dl); + } +} + static int dsa_tree_setup(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) { bool complete; @@ -884,7 +894,7 @@ static int dsa_tree_setup(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) err = dsa_tree_setup_cpu_ports(dst); if (err) - return err; + goto teardown_rtable; err = dsa_tree_setup_switches(dst); if (err) @@ -916,14 +926,14 @@ static int dsa_tree_setup(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) dsa_tree_teardown_switches(dst); teardown_cpu_ports: dsa_tree_teardown_cpu_ports(dst); +teardown_rtable: + dsa_tree_teardown_routing_table(dst); return err; } static void dsa_tree_teardown(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) { - struct dsa_link *dl, *next; - if (!dst->setup) return; @@ -937,10 +947,7 @@ static void dsa_tree_teardown(struct dsa_switch_tree *dst) dsa_tree_teardown_cpu_ports(dst); - list_for_each_entry_safe(dl, next, &dst->rtable, list) { - list_del(&dl->list); - kfree(dl); - } + dsa_tree_teardown_routing_table(dst); pr_info("DSA: tree %d torn down\n", dst->index); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sctp: detect and prevent references to a freed transport in sendmsg
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.88 commit c6fefcb71d246baaf3bacdad1af7ff50ebcfe652 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC5BIR CVE: CVE-2025-23142 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f1a69a940de58b16e8249dff26f74c8cc59b32be upstream. sctp_sendmsg() re-uses associations and transports when possible by doing a lookup based on the socket endpoint and the message destination address, and then sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() sets the selected transport in all the message chunks to be sent. There's a possible race condition if another thread triggers the removal of that selected transport, for instance, by explicitly unbinding an address with setsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_REM), after the chunks have been set up and before the message is sent. This can happen if the send buffer is full, during the period when the sender thread temporarily releases the socket lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). This causes the access to the transport data in sctp_outq_select_transport(), when the association outqueue is flushed, to result in a use-after-free read. This change avoids this scenario by having sctp_transport_free() signal the freeing of the transport, tagging it as "dead". In order to do this, the patch restores the "dead" bit in struct sctp_transport, which was removed in commit 47faa1e4c50e ("sctp: remove the dead field of sctp_transport"). Then, in the scenario where the sender thread has released the socket lock in sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(), the bit is checked again after re-acquiring the socket lock to detect the deletion. This is done while holding a reference to the transport to prevent it from being freed in the process. If the transport was deleted while the socket lock was relinquished, sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() will return -EAGAIN to let userspace retry the send. The bug was found by a private syzbot instance (see the error report [1] and the C reproducer that triggers it [2]). Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-fr… [1] Link: https://people.igalia.com/rcn/kernel_logs/20250402__KASAN_slab-use-after-fr… [2] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: df132eff4638 ("sctp: clear the transport of some out_chunk_list chunks in sctp_assoc_rm_peer") Suggested-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ricardo Cañuelo Navarro <rcn(a)igalia.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404-kasan_slab-use-after-free_read_in_sctp_ou… Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/sctp/structs.h | 3 ++- net/sctp/socket.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- net/sctp/transport.c | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/sctp/structs.h b/include/net/sctp/structs.h index 5a24d6d8522a..d943bb454b17 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/structs.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/structs.h @@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ struct sctp_transport { /* Reference counting. */ refcount_t refcnt; + __u32 dead:1, /* RTO-Pending : A flag used to track if one of the DATA * chunks sent to this address is currently being * used to compute a RTT. If this flag is 0, @@ -787,7 +788,7 @@ struct sctp_transport { * calculation completes (i.e. the DATA chunk * is SACK'd) clear this flag. */ - __u32 rto_pending:1, + rto_pending:1, /* * hb_sent : a flag that signals that we have a pending diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 108a0745c0c3..b84c5e0a76f5 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -71,8 +71,9 @@ /* Forward declarations for internal helper functions. */ static bool sctp_writeable(const struct sock *sk); static void sctp_wfree(struct sk_buff *skb); -static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, - size_t msg_len); +static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sctp_transport *transport, + long *timeo_p, size_t msg_len); static int sctp_wait_for_packet(struct sock *sk, int *err, long *timeo_p); static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *, long *timeo_p); static int sctp_wait_for_accept(struct sock *sk, long timeo); @@ -1827,7 +1828,7 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, if (sctp_wspace(asoc) <= 0 || !sk_wmem_schedule(sk, msg_len)) { timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT); - err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, &timeo, msg_len); + err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, transport, &timeo, msg_len); if (err) goto err; if (unlikely(sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt)) { @@ -9208,8 +9209,9 @@ void sctp_sock_rfree(struct sk_buff *skb) /* Helper function to wait for space in the sndbuf. */ -static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, - size_t msg_len) +static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sctp_transport *transport, + long *timeo_p, size_t msg_len) { struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; long current_timeo = *timeo_p; @@ -9219,7 +9221,9 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p, timeo:%ld, msg_len:%zu\n", __func__, asoc, *timeo_p, msg_len); - /* Increment the association's refcnt. */ + /* Increment the transport and association's refcnt. */ + if (transport) + sctp_transport_hold(transport); sctp_association_hold(asoc); /* Wait on the association specific sndbuf space. */ @@ -9228,7 +9232,7 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (asoc->base.dead) goto do_dead; - if (!*timeo_p) + if ((!*timeo_p) || (transport && transport->dead)) goto do_nonblock; if (sk->sk_err || asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_SHUTDOWN_PENDING) goto do_error; @@ -9253,7 +9257,9 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p, out: finish_wait(&asoc->wait, &wait); - /* Release the association's refcnt. */ + /* Release the transport and association's refcnt. */ + if (transport) + sctp_transport_put(transport); sctp_association_put(asoc); return err; diff --git a/net/sctp/transport.c b/net/sctp/transport.c index 2abe45af98e7..31eca29b6cfb 100644 --- a/net/sctp/transport.c +++ b/net/sctp/transport.c @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ struct sctp_transport *sctp_transport_new(struct net *net, */ void sctp_transport_free(struct sctp_transport *transport) { + transport->dead = 1; + /* Try to delete the heartbeat timer. */ if (del_timer(&transport->hb_timer)) sctp_transport_put(transport); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net_sched: hfsc: Fix a UAF vulnerability in class handling
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.89 commit 3aa852e3605000d5c47035c3fc3a986d14ccfa9f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC5D95 CVE: CVE-2025-37797 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3df275ef0a6ae181e8428a6589ef5d5231e58b5c ] This patch fixes a Use-After-Free vulnerability in the HFSC qdisc class handling. The issue occurs due to a time-of-check/time-of-use condition in hfsc_change_class() when working with certain child qdiscs like netem or codel. The vulnerability works as follows: 1. hfsc_change_class() checks if a class has packets (q.qlen != 0) 2. It then calls qdisc_peek_len(), which for certain qdiscs (e.g., codel, netem) might drop packets and empty the queue 3. The code continues assuming the queue is still non-empty, adding the class to vttree 4. This breaks HFSC scheduler assumptions that only non-empty classes are in vttree 5. Later, when the class is destroyed, this can lead to a Use-After-Free The fix adds a second queue length check after qdisc_peek_len() to verify the queue wasn't emptied. Fixes: 21f4d5cc25ec ("net_sched/hfsc: fix curve activation in hfsc_change_class()") Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai(a)starlabs.sg> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250417184732.943057-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_hfsc.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c b/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c index 880c5f16b29c..90801b6fe2b0 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c @@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ hfsc_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, if (cl != NULL) { int old_flags; + int len = 0; if (parentid) { if (cl->cl_parent && @@ -988,9 +989,13 @@ hfsc_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, if (usc != NULL) hfsc_change_usc(cl, usc, cur_time); + if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen != 0) + len = qdisc_peek_len(cl->qdisc); + /* Check queue length again since some qdisc implementations + * (e.g., netem/codel) might empty the queue during the peek + * operation. + */ if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen != 0) { - int len = qdisc_peek_len(cl->qdisc); - if (cl->cl_flags & HFSC_RSC) { if (old_flags & HFSC_RSC) update_ed(cl, len); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net_sched: hfsc: Fix a potential UAF in hfsc_dequeue() too
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.89 commit 76c4c22c2437d3d3880efc0f62eca06ef078d290 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC6BXK CVE: CVE-2025-37823 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6ccbda44e2cc3d26fd22af54c650d6d5d801addf ] Similarly to the previous patch, we need to safe guard hfsc_dequeue() too. But for this one, we don't have a reliable reproducer. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Gerrard Tai <gerrard.tai(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250417184732.943057-3-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_hfsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c b/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c index 880c5f16b29c..6b02ff873ffb 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c @@ -1633,10 +1633,16 @@ hfsc_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen != 0) { /* update ed */ next_len = qdisc_peek_len(cl->qdisc); - if (realtime) - update_ed(cl, next_len); - else - update_d(cl, next_len); + /* Check queue length again since some qdisc implementations + * (e.g., netem/codel) might empty the queue during the peek + * operation. + */ + if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen != 0) { + if (realtime) + update_ed(cl, next_len); + else + update_d(cl, next_len); + } } else { /* the class becomes passive */ eltree_remove(cl); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: fix -ENOENT when deleting VLANs and MST is unsupported
by Wang Liang 18 Jul '25

18 Jul '25

From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.88 commit afae9087301471970254a9180e5a26d3d8e8af09 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IC6M33 CVE: CVE-2025-37865 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ea08dfc35f83cfc73493c52f63ae4f2e29edfe8d ] Russell King reports that on the ZII dev rev B, deleting a bridge VLAN from a user port fails with -ENOENT: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/Z_lQXNP0s5-IiJzd@shell.armlinux.org.uk/ This comes from mv88e6xxx_port_vlan_leave() -> mv88e6xxx_mst_put(), which tries to find an MST entry in &chip->msts associated with the SID, but fails and returns -ENOENT as such. But we know that this chip does not support MST at all, so that is not surprising. The question is why does the guard in mv88e6xxx_mst_put() not exit early: if (!sid) return 0; And the answer seems to be simple: the sid comes from vlan.sid which supposedly was previously populated by mv88e6xxx_vtu_get(). But some chip->info->ops->vtu_getnext() implementations do not populate vlan.sid, for example see mv88e6185_g1_vtu_getnext(). In that case, later in mv88e6xxx_port_vlan_leave() we are using a garbage sid which is just residual stack memory. Testing for sid == 0 covers all cases of a non-bridge VLAN or a bridge VLAN mapped to the default MSTI. For some chips, SID 0 is valid and installed by mv88e6xxx_stu_setup(). A chip which does not support the STU would implicitly only support mapping all VLANs to the default MSTI, so although SID 0 is not valid, it would be sufficient, if we were to zero-initialize the vlan structure, to fix the bug, due to the coincidence that a test for vlan.sid == 0 already exists and leads to the same (correct) behavior. Another option which would be sufficient would be to add a test for mv88e6xxx_has_stu() inside mv88e6xxx_mst_put(), symmetric to the one which already exists in mv88e6xxx_mst_get(). But that placement means the caller will have to dereference vlan.sid, which means it will access uninitialized memory, which is not nice even if it ignores it later. So we end up making both modifications, in order to not rely just on the sid == 0 coincidence, but also to avoid having uninitialized structure fields which might get temporarily accessed. Fixes: acaf4d2e36b3 ("net: dsa: mv88e6xxx: MST Offloading") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250414212913.2955253-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Liang <wangliang74(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c index a39b33353ca6..3c7b84f8ac35 100644 --- a/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c +++ b/drivers/net/dsa/mv88e6xxx/chip.c @@ -1742,6 +1742,8 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_vtu_get(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u16 vid, if (!chip->info->ops->vtu_getnext) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + memset(entry, 0, sizeof(*entry)); + entry->vid = vid ? vid - 1 : mv88e6xxx_max_vid(chip); entry->valid = false; @@ -1877,7 +1879,16 @@ static int mv88e6xxx_mst_put(struct mv88e6xxx_chip *chip, u8 sid) struct mv88e6xxx_mst *mst, *tmp; int err; - if (!sid) + /* If the SID is zero, it is for a VLAN mapped to the default MSTI, + * and mv88e6xxx_stu_setup() made sure it is always present, and thus, + * should not be removed here. + * + * If the chip lacks STU support, numerically the "sid" variable will + * happen to also be zero, but we don't want to rely on that fact, so + * we explicitly test that first. In that case, there is also nothing + * to do here. + */ + if (!mv88e6xxx_has_stu(chip) || !sid) return 0; list_for_each_entry_safe(mst, tmp, &chip->msts, node) { -- 2.34.1

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