April 2026 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-6.6] apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 3f8699b3ee0c04b4b9bc27b82cd89a40e81e1d2e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14047 CVE: CVE-2026-23405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 2 ++ security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h index 33d665516fc1..dabb69bc87e0 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include "label.h" #include "policy.h" +/* Match max depth of user namespaces */ +#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32 /* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index fd5b7afbcb48..c56ef36baef4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, AA_BUG(!name); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock)); + if (parent->level > MAX_NS_DEPTH) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC); ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 3f8699b3ee0c04b4b9bc27b82cd89a40e81e1d2e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14047 CVE: CVE-2026-23405 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream. Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource. Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 2 ++ security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h index 3df6f804922d..e5704947e86e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h @@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ #include "label.h" #include "policy.h" +/* Match max depth of user namespaces */ +#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32 /* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index 53d24cf63893..5d342ef078e9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, AA_BUG(!name); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&parent->lock)); + if (parent->level > MAX_NS_DEPTH) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOSPC); ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach
by Cui GaoSheng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer(a)canonical.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 33959a491e9fd557abfa5fce5ae4637d400915d3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14038 CVE: CVE-2026-23404 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream. The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes. Reproducer: $ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a; pf="$pf//x"; done $ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion. Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index e5f501f89803..57be581980b3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -146,19 +146,43 @@ static void __list_remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) } /** - * __remove_profile - remove old profile, and children - * @profile: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL) + * __remove_profile - remove profile, and children + * @profile: profile to be removed (NOT NULL) * * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared */ static void __remove_profile(struct aa_profile *profile) { + struct aa_profile *curr, *to_remove; + AA_BUG(!profile); AA_BUG(!profile->ns); AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profile->ns->lock)); /* release any children lists first */ - __aa_profile_list_release(&profile->base.profiles); + if (!list_empty(&profile->base.profiles)) { + curr = list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles, struct aa_profile, base.list); + + while (curr != profile) { + + while (!list_empty(&curr->base.profiles)) + curr = list_first_entry(&curr->base.profiles, + struct aa_profile, base.list); + + to_remove = curr; + if (!list_is_last(&to_remove->base.list, + &aa_deref_parent(curr)->base.profiles)) + curr = list_next_entry(to_remove, base.list); + else + curr = aa_deref_parent(curr); + + /* released by free_profile */ + aa_label_remove(&to_remove->label); + __aafs_profile_rmdir(to_remove); + __list_remove_profile(to_remove); + } + } + /* released by free_profile */ aa_label_remove(&profile->label); __aafs_profile_rmdir(profile); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v6 0/2] kvm: arm64: Transition from CPU Type to MIDR Register for Virtualization Feature Detection
by liqiqi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Currently, there are two methods for determining whether a chip supports specific virtualization features: 1. Reading the chip's CPU type from BIOS 2. Reading the value of the MIDR register The issue with the first method is that each time a new chip is introduced, the new CPU type must be defined, which leads to poor code portability and maintainability. Therefore, the second method has been adopted to replace the first. This approach eliminates the dependency on CPU type by using the MIDR register. liqiqi (2): kvm: arm64: Add MIDR definitions and use MIDR to determine whether features are supported kvm: arm64: Remove cpu_type definition and it's related interfaces arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.c | 110 +++-------------------- arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.h | 12 --- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.c | 2 +- tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 +- 10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nf_tables: nft_dynset: fix possible stateful expression memleak in error path
by Dong Chenchen 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc3 commit 0548a13b5a145b16e4da0628b5936baf35f51b43 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14034 CVE: CVE-2026-23399 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- If cloning the second stateful expression in the element via GFP_ATOMIC fails, then the first stateful expression remains in place without being released. unreferenced object (percpu) 0x607b97e9cab8 (size 16): comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294931867 hex dump (first 16 bytes on cpu 3): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 backtrace (crc 0): pcpu_alloc_noprof+0x453/0xd80 nft_counter_clone+0x9c/0x190 [nf_tables] nft_expr_clone+0x8f/0x1b0 [nf_tables] nft_dynset_new+0x2cb/0x5f0 [nf_tables] nft_rhash_update+0x236/0x11c0 [nf_tables] nft_dynset_eval+0x11f/0x670 [nf_tables] nft_do_chain+0x253/0x1700 [nf_tables] nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x18d/0x270 [nf_tables] nf_hook_slow+0xaa/0x1e0 ip_local_deliver+0x209/0x330 Fixes: 563125a73ac3 ("netfilter: nftables: generalize set extension to support for several expressions") Reported-by: Gurpreet Shergill <giki.shergill(a)proton.me> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Conflicts: include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c [commit 9dad402b89e8 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c | 10 +++++++++- 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h index e1c4d903f39b..0f890ff1769b 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h @@ -859,6 +859,8 @@ void *nft_set_elem_init(const struct nft_set *set, u64 timeout, u64 expiration, gfp_t gfp); int nft_set_elem_expr_clone(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, struct nft_set *set, struct nft_expr *expr_array[]); +void nft_set_elem_expr_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr); void nft_set_elem_destroy(const struct nft_set *set, void *elem, bool destroy_expr); void nf_tables_set_elem_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index 98d3156179ee..9d5f7bafa4d6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -6471,8 +6471,8 @@ static void __nft_set_elem_expr_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, } } -static void nft_set_elem_expr_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, - struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr) +void nft_set_elem_expr_destroy(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, + struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr) { struct nft_expr *expr; u32 size; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c b/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c index a81bd69b059b..8ea45d61ed88 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_dynset.c @@ -30,18 +30,26 @@ static int nft_dynset_expr_setup(const struct nft_dynset *priv, const struct nft_set_ext *ext) { struct nft_set_elem_expr *elem_expr = nft_set_ext_expr(ext); + struct nft_ctx ctx = { + .net = read_pnet(&priv->set->net), + .family = priv->set->table->family, + }; struct nft_expr *expr; int i; for (i = 0; i < priv->num_exprs; i++) { expr = nft_setelem_expr_at(elem_expr, elem_expr->size); if (nft_expr_clone(expr, priv->expr_array[i], GFP_ATOMIC) < 0) - return -1; + goto err_out; elem_expr->size += priv->expr_array[i]->ops->size; } return 0; +err_out: + nft_set_elem_expr_destroy(&ctx, elem_expr); + + return -1; } static void *nft_dynset_new(struct nft_set *set, const struct nft_expr *expr, -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] xdp: Fix CVE-2026-23343
by Dong Chenchen 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Fix CVE-2026-23343 Larysa Zaremba (2): xdp: use modulo operation to calculate XDP frag tailroom xdp: produce a warning when calculated tailroom is negative net/core/filter.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 1/3] xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU
by Zhang Yuwei 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit 453b8fb68f3641fea970db88b7d9a153ed2a37e8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14027 CVE: CVE-2026-31788 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The Xen privcmd driver allows to issue arbitrary hypercalls from user space processes. This is normally no problem, as access is usually limited to root and the hypervisor will deny any hypercalls affecting other domains. In case the guest is booted using secure boot, however, the privcmd driver would be enabling a root user process to modify e.g. kernel memory contents, thus breaking the secure boot feature. The only known case where an unprivileged domU is really needing to use the privcmd driver is the case when it is acting as the device model for another guest. In this case all hypercalls issued via the privcmd driver will target that other guest. Fortunately the privcmd driver can already be locked down to allow only hypercalls targeting a specific domain, but this mode can be activated from user land only today. The target domain can be obtained from Xenstore, so when not running in dom0 restrict the privcmd driver to that target domain from the beginning, resolving the potential problem of breaking secure boot. This is XSA-482 Reported-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie(a)vates.tech> Fixes: 1c5de1939c20 ("xen: add privcmd driver") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Conflicts: drivers/xen/privcmd.c [commit bf4afc53b77ae not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> it push" to publish your local commits) --- drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c index 28537a1a0e0b..cb50038c0c9c 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "xen:" KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/kstrtox.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -24,7 +25,8 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> - +#include <linux/notifier.h> +#include <linux/wait.h> #include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h> @@ -37,7 +39,7 @@ #include <xen/page.h> #include <xen/xen-ops.h> #include <xen/balloon.h> - +#include <xen/xenbus.h> #include "privcmd.h" MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); @@ -59,6 +61,11 @@ struct privcmd_data { domid_t domid; }; +/* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */ +static domid_t target_domain = DOMID_INVALID; +static bool restrict_wait; +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(restrict_wait_wq); + static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped( struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, @@ -878,13 +885,16 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, static int privcmd_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file) { - struct privcmd_data *data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + struct privcmd_data *data; + if (wait_event_interruptible(restrict_wait_wq, !restrict_wait) < 0) + return -EINTR; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - /* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */ - data->domid = DOMID_INVALID; + data->domid = target_domain; file->private_data = data; return 0; @@ -977,6 +987,45 @@ static struct miscdevice privcmd_dev = { .fops = &xen_privcmd_fops, }; +static int init_restrict(struct notifier_block *notifier, + unsigned long event, + void *data) +{ + char *target; + unsigned int domid; + + /* Default to an guaranteed unused domain-id. */ + target_domain = DOMID_IDLE; + + target = xenbus_read(XBT_NIL, "target", "", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(target) || kstrtouint(target, 10, &domid)) { + pr_err("No target domain found, blocking all hypercalls\n"); + goto out; + } + + target_domain = domid; + + out: + if (!IS_ERR(target)) + kfree(target); + + restrict_wait = false; + wake_up_all(&restrict_wait_wq); + + return NOTIFY_DONE; +} + +static struct notifier_block xenstore_notifier = { + .notifier_call = init_restrict, +}; + +static void __init restrict_driver(void) +{ + restrict_wait = true; + + register_xenstore_notifier(&xenstore_notifier); +} + static int __init privcmd_init(void) { int err; @@ -984,6 +1033,9 @@ static int __init privcmd_init(void) if (!xen_domain()) return -ENODEV; + if (!xen_initial_domain()) + restrict_driver(); + err = misc_register(&privcmd_dev); if (err != 0) { pr_err("Could not register Xen privcmd device\n"); -- 2.22.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 1/3] xen/privcmd: restrict usage in unprivileged domU
by Zhang Yuwei 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit 453b8fb68f3641fea970db88b7d9a153ed2a37e8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14027 CVE: CVE-2026-31788 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The Xen privcmd driver allows to issue arbitrary hypercalls from user space processes. This is normally no problem, as access is usually limited to root and the hypervisor will deny any hypercalls affecting other domains. In case the guest is booted using secure boot, however, the privcmd driver would be enabling a root user process to modify e.g. kernel memory contents, thus breaking the secure boot feature. The only known case where an unprivileged domU is really needing to use the privcmd driver is the case when it is acting as the device model for another guest. In this case all hypercalls issued via the privcmd driver will target that other guest. Fortunately the privcmd driver can already be locked down to allow only hypercalls targeting a specific domain, but this mode can be activated from user land only today. The target domain can be obtained from Xenstore, so when not running in dom0 restrict the privcmd driver to that target domain from the beginning, resolving the potential problem of breaking secure boot. This is XSA-482 Reported-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie(a)vates.tech> Fixes: 1c5de1939c20 ("xen: add privcmd driver") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Conflicts: drivers/xen/privcmd.c [commit bf4afc53b77ae not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/xen/privcmd.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c index 61aaded483e1..3c97710fc094 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/privcmd.c +++ b/drivers/xen/privcmd.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include <linux/eventfd.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/kstrtox.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> #include <linux/poll.h> @@ -30,7 +31,8 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> - +#include <linux/notifier.h> +#include <linux/wait.h> #include <asm/xen/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/xen/hypercall.h> @@ -43,7 +45,7 @@ #include <xen/page.h> #include <xen/xen-ops.h> #include <xen/balloon.h> - +#include <xen/xenbus.h> #include "privcmd.h" MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); @@ -65,6 +67,11 @@ struct privcmd_data { domid_t domid; }; +/* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */ +static domid_t target_domain = DOMID_INVALID; +static bool restrict_wait; +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(restrict_wait_wq); + static int privcmd_vma_range_is_mapped( struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr, @@ -1156,13 +1163,16 @@ static long privcmd_ioctl(struct file *file, static int privcmd_open(struct inode *ino, struct file *file) { - struct privcmd_data *data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); + struct privcmd_data *data; + if (wait_event_interruptible(restrict_wait_wq, !restrict_wait) < 0) + return -EINTR; + + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - /* DOMID_INVALID implies no restriction */ - data->domid = DOMID_INVALID; + data->domid = target_domain; file->private_data = data; return 0; @@ -1255,6 +1265,45 @@ static struct miscdevice privcmd_dev = { .fops = &xen_privcmd_fops, }; +static int init_restrict(struct notifier_block *notifier, + unsigned long event, + void *data) +{ + char *target; + unsigned int domid; + + /* Default to an guaranteed unused domain-id. */ + target_domain = DOMID_IDLE; + + target = xenbus_read(XBT_NIL, "target", "", NULL); + if (IS_ERR(target) || kstrtouint(target, 10, &domid)) { + pr_err("No target domain found, blocking all hypercalls\n"); + goto out; + } + + target_domain = domid; + + out: + if (!IS_ERR(target)) + kfree(target); + + restrict_wait = false; + wake_up_all(&restrict_wait_wq); + + return NOTIFY_DONE; +} + +static struct notifier_block xenstore_notifier = { + .notifier_call = init_restrict, +}; + +static void __init restrict_driver(void) +{ + restrict_wait = true; + + register_xenstore_notifier(&xenstore_notifier); +} + static int __init privcmd_init(void) { int err; @@ -1262,6 +1311,9 @@ static int __init privcmd_init(void) if (!xen_domain()) return -ENODEV; + if (!xen_initial_domain()) + restrict_driver(); + err = misc_register(&privcmd_dev); if (err != 0) { pr_err("Could not register Xen privcmd device\n"); -- 2.22.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched/fair: scale wake_wide() threshold by SMT width
by Zhang Qiao 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8882 -------------------------------- wake_wide() uses sd_llc_size as the spreading threshold to detect wide waker/wakee relationships and to disable wake_affine() for those cases. On SMT systems, sd_llc_size counts logical CPUs rather than physical cores. This inflates the wake_wide() threshold, allowing wake_affine() to pack more tasks into one LLC domain than the actual compute capacity of its physical cores can sustain. The resulting SMT interference may cost more than the cache-locality benefit wake_affine() intends to gain. Scale the factor by the SMT width of the current CPU so that it approximates the number of independent physical cores in the LLC domain, making wake_wide() more likely to kick in before SMT interference becomes significant. On non-SMT systems the SMT width is 1 and behaviour is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 5 +++++ kernel/sched/features.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index ad30bb800961..4100998e18cd 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -7850,6 +7850,11 @@ static int wake_wide(struct task_struct *p) unsigned int slave = p->wakee_flips; int factor = __this_cpu_read(sd_llc_size); + /* Scale factor to physical-core count to account for SMT interference. */ + if (sched_feat(WA_SMT)) + factor = DIV_ROUND_UP(factor, + cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(smp_processor_id()))); + if (master < slave) swap(master, slave); if (slave < factor || master < slave * factor) diff --git a/kernel/sched/features.h b/kernel/sched/features.h index 24a0c853a8a0..c9ad8e72ecd0 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/features.h +++ b/kernel/sched/features.h @@ -128,3 +128,5 @@ SCHED_FEAT(SOFT_DOMAIN, false) #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SOFT_QUOTA SCHED_FEAT(SOFT_QUOTA, false) #endif + +SCHED_FEAT(WA_SMT, false) -- 2.18.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] sched/fair: scale wake_wide() threshold by SMT width
by Zhang Qiao 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

hulk inclusion category: perfermance bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8882 -------------------------------- wake_wide() uses sd_llc_size as the spreading threshold to detect wide waker/wakee relationships and to disable wake_affine() for those cases. On SMT systems, sd_llc_size counts logical CPUs rather than physical cores. This inflates the wake_wide() threshold, allowing wake_affine() to pack more tasks into one LLC domain than the actual compute capacity of its physical cores can sustain. The resulting SMT interference may cost more than the cache-locality benefit wake_affine() intends to gain. Scale the factor by the SMT width of the current CPU so that it approximates the number of independent physical cores in the LLC domain, making wake_wide() more likely to kick in before SMT interference becomes significant. On non-SMT systems the SMT width is 1 and behaviour is unchanged. Signed-off-by: Zhang Qiao <zhangqiao22(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 5 +++++ kernel/sched/features.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index ad30bb800961..4100998e18cd 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -7850,6 +7850,11 @@ static int wake_wide(struct task_struct *p) unsigned int slave = p->wakee_flips; int factor = __this_cpu_read(sd_llc_size); + /* Scale factor to physical-core count to account for SMT interference. */ + if (sched_feat(WA_SMT)) + factor = DIV_ROUND_UP(factor, + cpumask_weight(cpu_smt_mask(smp_processor_id()))); + if (master < slave) swap(master, slave); if (slave < factor || master < slave * factor) diff --git a/kernel/sched/features.h b/kernel/sched/features.h index 24a0c853a8a0..c9ad8e72ecd0 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/features.h +++ b/kernel/sched/features.h @@ -128,3 +128,5 @@ SCHED_FEAT(SOFT_DOMAIN, false) #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SOFT_QUOTA SCHED_FEAT(SOFT_QUOTA, false) #endif + +SCHED_FEAT(WA_SMT, false) -- 2.18.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix riscv check-build warning
by Tengda Wu 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Fix rsicv check-build warning. Björn Töpel (1): riscv: Replace function-like macro by static inline function Tengda Wu (1): Revert "riscv: stacktrace: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks" arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 15 ++++++++++----- arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 16 ---------------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ice: Fix memory leak in ice_set_ringparam()
by Pan Taixi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc3 commit fe868b499d16f55bbeea89992edb98043c9de416 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14020/ CVE: CVE-2026-23389 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In ice_set_ringparam, tx_rings and xdp_rings are allocated before rx_rings. If the allocation of rx_rings fails, the code jumps to the done label leaking both tx_rings and xdp_rings. Furthermore, if the setup of an individual Rx ring fails during the loop, the code jumps to the free_tx label which releases tx_rings but leaks xdp_rings. Fix this by introducing a free_xdp label and updating the error paths to ensure both xdp_rings and tx_rings are properly freed if rx_rings allocation or setup fails. Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool and code review. Fixes: fcea6f3da546 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Fixes: efc2214b6047 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel(a)molgen.mpg.de> Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha(a)intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c [Context conflicts due to different memory allocation function used] Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c index dd58b2372dc0..bab857a6dc18 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c @@ -2839,7 +2839,7 @@ ice_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_ringparam *ring, rx_rings = kcalloc(vsi->num_rxq, sizeof(*rx_rings), GFP_KERNEL); if (!rx_rings) { err = -ENOMEM; - goto done; + goto free_xdp; } ice_for_each_rxq(vsi, i) { @@ -2869,7 +2869,7 @@ ice_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_ringparam *ring, } kfree(rx_rings); err = -ENOMEM; - goto free_tx; + goto free_xdp; } } @@ -2920,6 +2920,13 @@ ice_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_ringparam *ring, } goto done; +free_xdp: + if (xdp_rings) { + ice_for_each_xdp_txq(vsi, i) + ice_free_tx_ring(&xdp_rings[i]); + kfree(xdp_rings); + } + free_tx: /* error cleanup if the Rx allocations failed after getting Tx */ if (tx_rings) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ice: Fix memory leak in ice_set_ringparam()
by Pan Taixi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc3 commit fe868b499d16f55bbeea89992edb98043c9de416 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14020/ CVE: CVE-2026-23389 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In ice_set_ringparam, tx_rings and xdp_rings are allocated before rx_rings. If the allocation of rx_rings fails, the code jumps to the done label leaking both tx_rings and xdp_rings. Furthermore, if the setup of an individual Rx ring fails during the loop, the code jumps to the free_tx label which releases tx_rings but leaks xdp_rings. Fix this by introducing a free_xdp label and updating the error paths to ensure both xdp_rings and tx_rings are properly freed if rx_rings allocation or setup fails. Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool and code review. Fixes: fcea6f3da546 ("ice: Add stats and ethtool support") Fixes: efc2214b6047 ("ice: Add support for XDP") Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin(a)seu.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel(a)molgen.mpg.de> Reviewed-by: Aleksandr Loktionov <aleksandr.loktionov(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Rinitha S <sx.rinitha(a)intel.com> (A Contingent worker at Intel) Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c [ Context conflicts due to different memory allocation function used. Also, ice_for_each_xdp_txq is introduced in unmmerged commit 2faf63b650bb ("ice: make use of ice_for_each_* macros"), use normal for loops here instead. ] Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c index 9659668279dc..585ae5e92558 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c @@ -2865,7 +2865,7 @@ ice_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_ringparam *ring, rx_rings = kcalloc(vsi->num_rxq, sizeof(*rx_rings), GFP_KERNEL); if (!rx_rings) { err = -ENOMEM; - goto done; + goto free_xdp; } ice_for_each_rxq(vsi, i) { @@ -2894,7 +2894,7 @@ ice_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_ringparam *ring, } kfree(rx_rings); err = -ENOMEM; - goto free_tx; + goto free_xdp; } } @@ -2945,6 +2945,13 @@ ice_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev, struct ethtool_ringparam *ring, } goto done; +free_xdp: + if (xdp_rings) { + for (i = 0; i < vsi->num_xdp_txq; i++) + ice_free_tx_ring(&xdp_rings[i]); + kfree(xdp_rings); + } + free_tx: /* error cleanup if the Rx allocations failed after getting Tx */ if (tx_rings) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()
by Pan Taixi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Sai Ritvik Tanksalkar <stanksal(a)purdue.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.128 commit cff0ef043e16feb5a02307c8f9d0117a96c5587c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8792 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 5669645c052f235726a85f443769b6fc02f66762 ] persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records). Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL, but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to: 1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls 2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size The KASAN splat would look similar to: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x... Read of size N at addr ... by task ... The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit: 0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes. 1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash, allocates old_log with size X 2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0) 3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues) 4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X) 5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called 6. System continues running (not a panic oops) 7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds 8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1) 9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old() 10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes 11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap Requirements: - a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size (almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size) - pstore_update_ms >= 0 (disabled by default) - Non-fatal oops (system survives) Free and reallocate the buffer when the new size differs from the previously allocated size. This ensures old_log always has sufficient space for the data being copied. Fixes: 201e4aca5aa1 ("pstore/ram: Should update old dmesg buffer before reading") Signed-off-by: Sai Ritvik Tanksalkar <stanksal(a)purdue.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201132240.2948732-1-stanksal@purdue.edu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/pstore/ram_core.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c index f1848cdd6d34..c9eaacdec37e 100644 --- a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c +++ b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c @@ -298,6 +298,17 @@ void persistent_ram_save_old(struct persistent_ram_zone *prz) if (!size) return; + /* + * If the existing buffer is differently sized, free it so a new + * one is allocated. This can happen when persistent_ram_save_old() + * is called early in boot and later for a timer-triggered + * survivable crash when the crash dumps don't match in size + * (which would be extremely unlikely given kmsg buffers usually + * exceed prz buffer sizes). + */ + if (prz->old_log && prz->old_log_size != size) + persistent_ram_free_old(prz); + if (!prz->old_log) { persistent_ram_ecc_old(prz); prz->old_log = kvzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] pstore/ram: fix buffer overflow in persistent_ram_save_old()
by Pan Taixi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Sai Ritvik Tanksalkar <stanksal(a)purdue.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.252 commit 58bda5a1d1ee98254383ef34f76b2c35140513ea category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14048/ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 5669645c052f235726a85f443769b6fc02f66762 ] persistent_ram_save_old() can be called multiple times for the same persistent_ram_zone (e.g., via ramoops_pstore_read -> ramoops_get_next_prz for PSTORE_TYPE_DMESG records). Currently, the function only allocates prz->old_log when it is NULL, but it unconditionally updates prz->old_log_size to the current buffer size and then performs memcpy_fromio() using this new size. If the buffer size has grown since the first allocation (which can happen across different kernel boot cycles), this leads to: 1. A heap buffer overflow (OOB write) in the memcpy_fromio() calls 2. A subsequent OOB read when ramoops_pstore_read() accesses the buffer using the incorrect (larger) old_log_size The KASAN splat would look similar to: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ramoops_pstore_read+0x... Read of size N at addr ... by task ... The conditions are likely extremely hard to hit: 0. Crash with a ramoops write of less-than-record-max-size bytes. 1. Reboot: ramoops registers, pstore_get_records(0) reads old crash, allocates old_log with size X 2. Crash handler registered, timer started (if pstore_update_ms >= 0) 3. Oops happens (non-fatal, system continues) 4. pstore_dump() writes oops via ramoops_pstore_write() size Y (>X) 5. pstore_new_entry = 1, pstore_timer_kick() called 6. System continues running (not a panic oops) 7. Timer fires after pstore_update_ms milliseconds 8. pstore_timefunc() → schedule_work() → pstore_dowork() → pstore_get_records(1) 9. ramoops_get_next_prz() → persistent_ram_save_old() 10. buffer_size() returns Y, but old_log is X bytes 11. Y > X: memcpy_fromio() overflows heap Requirements: - a prior crash record exists that did not fill the record size (almost impossible since the crash handler writes as much as it can possibly fit into the record, capped by max record size and the kmsg buffer almost always exceeds the max record size) - pstore_update_ms >= 0 (disabled by default) - Non-fatal oops (system survives) Free and reallocate the buffer when the new size differs from the previously allocated size. This ensures old_log always has sufficient space for the data being copied. Fixes: 201e4aca5aa1 ("pstore/ram: Should update old dmesg buffer before reading") Signed-off-by: Sai Ritvik Tanksalkar <stanksal(a)purdue.edu> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260201132240.2948732-1-stanksal@purdue.edu Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809(a)h-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/pstore/ram_core.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c index 5ac9b1f155a8..97ec9041b9b9 100644 --- a/fs/pstore/ram_core.c +++ b/fs/pstore/ram_core.c @@ -298,6 +298,17 @@ void persistent_ram_save_old(struct persistent_ram_zone *prz) if (!size) return; + /* + * If the existing buffer is differently sized, free it so a new + * one is allocated. This can happen when persistent_ram_save_old() + * is called early in boot and later for a timer-triggered + * survivable crash when the crash dumps don't match in size + * (which would be extremely unlikely given kmsg buffers usually + * exceed prz buffer sizes). + */ + if (prz->old_log && prz->old_log_size != size) + persistent_ram_free_old(prz); + if (!prz->old_log) { persistent_ram_ecc_old(prz); prz->old_log = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks
by Pan Taixi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.130 commit 9c05cd8f42325a53474093f372f6c08a56ae18d1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14049/ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d55c571e4333fac71826e8db3b9753fadfbead6a ] This script #!/usr/bin/bash echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space echo 'void main(void) {}' > TEST.c # -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test "hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop. The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0 get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used by the stack vma. arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit > TASK_SIZE. vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address > TASK_SIZE and then get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr > TASK_SIZE - len)" check. handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently restarts the probed insn. Endless loop. I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case because ->orig_ax = -1. But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true. Fixes: 1b028f784e8c ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()") Reported-by: Paulo Andrade <pandrade(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aV5uldEvV7pb4RA8@redhat.com/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aWO7Fdxn39piQnxu@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/uprobes.h | 1 + kernel/events/uprobes.c | 10 +++++++--- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c index 6402fb3089d2..aac2a2c5c6c5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c @@ -1102,3 +1102,27 @@ bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check ctx, else return regs->sp <= ret->stack; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION +unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void) +{ + struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); + unsigned long vaddr; + + /* + * HACK: we are not in a syscall, but x86 get_unmapped_area() paths + * ignore TIF_ADDR32 and rely on in_32bit_syscall() to calculate + * vm_unmapped_area_info.high_limit. + * + * The #ifdef above doesn't cover the CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y case, + * but in this case in_32bit_syscall() -> in_x32_syscall() always + * (falsely) returns true because ->orig_ax == -1. + */ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32)) + ti->status |= TS_COMPAT; + vaddr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0); + ti->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; + + return vaddr; +} +#endif diff --git a/include/linux/uprobes.h b/include/linux/uprobes.h index b0c15a04adcc..7c63f47a497d 100644 --- a/include/linux/uprobes.h +++ b/include/linux/uprobes.h @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check c extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs); extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr, void *src, unsigned long len); +extern unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void); #else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */ struct uprobes_state { }; diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c index 9d2d68d171e9..8f73ab934c38 100644 --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c @@ -1478,6 +1478,12 @@ void uprobe_munmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned lon set_bit(MMF_RECALC_UPROBES, &vma->vm_mm->flags); } +unsigned long __weak arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void) +{ + /* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */ + return get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0); +} + /* Slot allocation for XOL */ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) { @@ -1493,9 +1499,7 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) } if (!area->vaddr) { - /* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */ - area->vaddr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, - PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0); + area->vaddr = arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(area->vaddr)) { ret = area->vaddr; goto fail; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks
by Pan Taixi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit d55c571e4333fac71826e8db3b9753fadfbead6a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14049/ Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This script #!/usr/bin/bash echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space echo 'void main(void) {}' > TEST.c # -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test "hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop. The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0 get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used by the stack vma. arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit > TASK_SIZE. vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address > TASK_SIZE and then get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr > TASK_SIZE - len)" check. handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently restarts the probed insn. Endless loop. I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case because ->orig_ax = -1. But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true. Fixes: 1b028f784e8c ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()") Reported-by: Paulo Andrade <pandrade(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aV5uldEvV7pb4RA8@redhat.com/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aWO7Fdxn39piQnxu@redhat.com Conflicts: arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c include/linux/uprobes.h kernel/events/uprobes.c [Context conflicts only] Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/uprobes.h | 1 + kernel/events/uprobes.c | 10 +++++++--- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c index 9f948b2d26f6..099ca674e3de 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/uprobes.c @@ -1095,3 +1095,27 @@ bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check ctx, else return regs->sp <= ret->stack; } + +#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION +unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void) +{ + struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); + unsigned long vaddr; + + /* + * HACK: we are not in a syscall, but x86 get_unmapped_area() paths + * ignore TIF_ADDR32 and rely on in_32bit_syscall() to calculate + * vm_unmapped_area_info.high_limit. + * + * The #ifdef above doesn't cover the CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y case, + * but in this case in_32bit_syscall() -> in_x32_syscall() always + * (falsely) returns true because ->orig_ax == -1. + */ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_ADDR32)) + ti->status |= TS_COMPAT; + vaddr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0); + ti->status &= ~TS_COMPAT; + + return vaddr; +} +#endif diff --git a/include/linux/uprobes.h b/include/linux/uprobes.h index 2c693d6eb9cb..568c211b617e 100644 --- a/include/linux/uprobes.h +++ b/include/linux/uprobes.h @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ extern bool arch_uretprobe_is_alive(struct return_instance *ret, enum rp_check c extern bool arch_uprobe_ignore(struct arch_uprobe *aup, struct pt_regs *regs); extern void arch_uprobe_copy_ixol(struct page *page, unsigned long vaddr, void *src, unsigned long len); +extern unsigned long arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void); #else /* !CONFIG_UPROBES */ struct uprobes_state { }; diff --git a/kernel/events/uprobes.c b/kernel/events/uprobes.c index e51dbb0e8a56..fe518be0615f 100644 --- a/kernel/events/uprobes.c +++ b/kernel/events/uprobes.c @@ -1443,6 +1443,12 @@ void uprobe_munmap(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start, unsigned lon set_bit(MMF_RECALC_UPROBES, &vma->vm_mm->flags); } +unsigned long __weak arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(void) +{ + /* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */ + return get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0); +} + /* Slot allocation for XOL */ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) { @@ -1458,9 +1464,7 @@ static int xol_add_vma(struct mm_struct *mm, struct xol_area *area) } if (!area->vaddr) { - /* Try to map as high as possible, this is only a hint. */ - area->vaddr = get_unmapped_area(NULL, TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE, - PAGE_SIZE, 0, 0); + area->vaddr = arch_uprobe_get_xol_area(); if (IS_ERR_VALUE(area->vaddr)) { ret = area->vaddr; goto fail; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix riscv compiling error
by Tengda Wu 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Fix riscv compiling error. Björn Töpel (1): riscv: Replace function-like macro by static inline function Tengda Wu (1): Revert "riscv: stacktrace: Disable KASAN checks for non-current tasks" arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 15 ++++++++++----- arch/riscv/kernel/stacktrace.c | 19 ++----------------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: yt6801: fix link info for yt6801
by Frank_Sae 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

yt6801 inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/7229 -------------------------------------------------------------------- fix the link info is not update on os installation. Fixes: b9f5c0893d16 ("net: yt6801: add link info for yt6801") Signed-off-by: Frank_Sae <Frank.Sae(a)motor-comm.com> --- .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c index 01eed3ace..3fcb6f853 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c @@ -27,6 +27,18 @@ const struct net_device_ops *fxgmac_get_netdev_ops(void); static void fxgmac_napi_enable(struct fxgmac_pdata *priv); +const struct ethtool_ops *fxgmac_get_ethtool_ops(void); + +static const struct ethtool_ops fxgmac_ethtool_ops = { + .get_link = ethtool_op_get_link, + .get_link_ksettings = phy_ethtool_get_link_ksettings, + .set_link_ksettings = phy_ethtool_set_link_ksettings +}; + +const struct ethtool_ops *fxgmac_get_ethtool_ops(void) +{ + return &fxgmac_ethtool_ops; +} #define PHY_WR_CONFIG(reg_offset) (0x8000205 + ((reg_offset) * 0x10000)) static int fxgmac_phy_write_reg(struct fxgmac_pdata *priv, u32 reg_id, u32 data) @@ -1898,7 +1910,9 @@ static int fxgmac_init(struct fxgmac_pdata *priv, bool save_private_reg) ndev->max_mtu = FXGMAC_JUMBO_PACKET_MTU + (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN); + ndev->netdev_ops = fxgmac_get_netdev_ops();/* Set device operations */ + ndev->ethtool_ops = fxgmac_get_ethtool_ops();/* Set device operations */ /* Set device features */ if (priv->hw_feat.tso) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] riscv: Replace function-like macro by static inline function
by Tengda Wu 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Björn Töpel <bjorn(a)rivosinc.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.133 commit 0b1ac9743f3d9cfced2ac3cb9f274c0675bd4189 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 121f34341d396b666d8a90b24768b40e08ca0d61 upstream. The flush_icache_range() function is implemented as a "function-like macro with unused parameters", which can result in "unused variables" warnings. Replace the macro with a static inline function, as advised by Documentation/process/coding-style.rst. Fixes: 08f051eda33b ("RISC-V: Flush I$ when making a dirty page executable") Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn(a)rivosinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250419111402.1660267-1-bjorn@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer(a)rivosinc.com> Signed-off-by: Ron Economos <re(a)w6rz.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h index 3f65acd0ef75..2b7f5da96c50 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cacheflush.h @@ -34,11 +34,6 @@ static inline void flush_dcache_page(struct page *page) flush_dcache_folio(page_folio(page)); } -/* - * RISC-V doesn't have an instruction to flush parts of the instruction cache, - * so instead we just flush the whole thing. - */ -#define flush_icache_range(start, end) flush_icache_all() #define flush_icache_user_page(vma, pg, addr, len) \ flush_icache_mm(vma->vm_mm, 0) @@ -59,6 +54,16 @@ void flush_icache_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, bool local); #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ +/* + * RISC-V doesn't have an instruction to flush parts of the instruction cache, + * so instead we just flush the whole thing. + */ +#define flush_icache_range flush_icache_range +static inline void flush_icache_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) +{ + flush_icache_all(); +} + extern unsigned int riscv_cbom_block_size; extern unsigned int riscv_cboz_block_size; void riscv_init_cbo_blocksizes(void); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v5 0/2] kvm: arm64: Transition from CPU Type to MIDR Register for Virtualization Feature Detection
by liqiqi 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

Currently, there are two methods for determining whether a chip supports specific virtualization features: 1. Reading the chip's CPU type from BIOS 2. Reading the value of the MIDR register The issue with the first method is that each time a new chip is introduced, the new CPU type must be defined, which leads to poor code portability and maintainability. Therefore, the second method has been adopted to replace the first. This approach eliminates the dependency on CPU type by using the MIDR register. liqiqi (2): kvm: arm64: Add MIDR definitions and use MIDR to determine whether features are supported kvm: arm64: Remove cpu_type definition and it's related interfaces arch/arm64/include/asm/cache.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 8 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 - arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.c | 110 +++-------------------- arch/arm64/kvm/hisilicon/hisi_virt.h | 12 --- drivers/perf/hisilicon/hisi_uncore_pmu.c | 2 +- tools/arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 +- 10 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management
by Yi Yang 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc4 commit 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13879 CVE: CVE-2026-23268 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface. This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation. The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces. Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check. Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files") Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa(a)qualys.com> Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil(a)debian.org> Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia(a)canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can(a)canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen(a)canonical.com> Conflicts: security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c security/apparmor/include/policy.h security/apparmor/policy.c [Commit 90c436a64a6e ("apparmor: pass cred through to audit info.") was not merged. The aa_may_manage_policy function is different.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 19 +++++++++------ security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/policy.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 06eac2266565..0900fd07def7 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -409,7 +409,8 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_write_to_buffer(const char __user *userbuf, } static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, - loff_t *pos, struct aa_ns *ns) + loff_t *pos, struct aa_ns *ns, + const struct cred *ocred) { struct aa_loaddata *data; struct aa_label *label; @@ -420,7 +421,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, const char __user *buf, size_t size, /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, mask); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, ocred, mask); if (error) goto end_section; @@ -441,7 +442,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_load(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos) { struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_ns(f->f_inode->i_private); - int error = policy_update(AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY, buf, size, pos, ns); + int error = policy_update(AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY, buf, size, pos, ns, + f->f_cred); aa_put_ns(ns); @@ -459,7 +461,7 @@ static ssize_t profile_replace(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, { struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_ns(f->f_inode->i_private); int error = policy_update(AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY | AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY, - buf, size, pos, ns); + buf, size, pos, ns, f->f_cred); aa_put_ns(ns); return error; @@ -483,7 +485,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct file *f, const char __user *buf, /* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, ns, f->f_cred, + AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY); if (error) goto out; @@ -1787,7 +1790,8 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) int error; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, NULL, + AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); end_current_label_crit_section(label); if (error) return error; @@ -1836,7 +1840,8 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) int error; label = begin_current_label_crit_section(); - error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); + error = aa_may_manage_policy(label, NULL, NULL, + AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY); end_current_label_crit_section(label); if (error) return error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h index b5aa4231af68..f6682a31df23 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h @@ -304,6 +304,6 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile) bool policy_view_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); bool policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns); int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, - u32 mask); + const struct cred *ocred, u32 mask); #endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index fcf22577f606..e5f501f89803 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -671,14 +671,42 @@ bool policy_admin_capable(struct aa_ns *ns) return policy_view_capable(ns) && capable && !aa_g_lock_policy; } +static bool is_subset_of_obj_privilege(const struct cred *cred, + struct aa_label *label, + const struct cred *ocred) +{ + if (cred == ocred) + return true; + + if (!aa_label_is_subset(label, cred_label(ocred))) + return false; + /* don't allow crossing userns for now */ + if (cred->user_ns != ocred->user_ns) + return false; + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_inheritable, ocred->cap_inheritable)) + return false; + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_permitted, ocred->cap_permitted)) + return false; + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_effective, ocred->cap_effective)) + return false; + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_bset, ocred->cap_bset)) + return false; + if (!cap_issubset(cred->cap_ambient, ocred->cap_ambient)) + return false; + return true; +} + /** * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy * @label: label to check if it can manage policy - * @op: the policy manipulation operation being done + * @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns) + * @ocred: object cred if request is coming from an open object + * @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done * * Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error */ -int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask) +int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, + const struct cred *ocred, u32 mask) { const char *op; @@ -694,6 +722,11 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns, u32 mask) return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "policy_locked", -EACCES); + if (ocred && !is_subset_of_obj_privilege(current_cred(), label, ocred)) + return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, + "not privileged for target profile", + -EACCES); + if (!policy_admin_capable(ns)) return audit_policy(label, op, NULL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: Compare MACs in constant time
by Li Lingfeng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc2 commit c5794709bc9105935dbedef8b9cf9c06f2b559fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13917 CVE: CVE-2026-23364 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- To prevent timing attacks, MAC comparisons need to be constant-time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq(). Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflicts: fs/smb/server/Kconfig fs/smb/server/auth.c fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c [Commit 38c8a9a52082 ("smb: move client and server files to common directory fs/smb") move client and server files to common directory fs/smb; commit 7033b937e21b ("crypto: lib - create utils module and move __crypto_memneq into it") change the config of memneq.c.] Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/Kconfig | 1 + fs/ksmbd/auth.c | 4 +++- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/Kconfig b/fs/ksmbd/Kconfig index e1fe17747ed6..832c6a0dd327 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/Kconfig +++ b/fs/ksmbd/Kconfig @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ config SMB_SERVER select CRYPTO_ECB select CRYPTO_LIB_DES select CRYPTO_SHA256 + select LIB_MEMNEQ select CRYPTO_CMAC select CRYPTO_SHA512 select CRYPTO_AEAD2 diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/auth.c b/fs/ksmbd/auth.c index c5916064b85e..fb4a6f9e4e98 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/auth.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/auth.c @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/aead.h> +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> @@ -280,7 +281,8 @@ int ksmbd_auth_ntlmv2(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct ksmbd_session *sess, goto out; } - if (memcmp(ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp, CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE) != 0) + if (crypto_memneq(ntlmv2->ntlmv2_hash, ntlmv2_rsp, + CIFS_HMAC_MD5_HASH_SIZE)) rc = -EINVAL; out: if (ctx) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 1588867b4e71..d75de3035327 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2018 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. */ +#include <crypto/algapi.h> #include <linux/inetdevice.h> #include <net/addrconf.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> @@ -8344,7 +8345,7 @@ int smb2_check_sign_req(struct ksmbd_work *work) signature)) return 0; - if (memcmp(signature, signature_req, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) { + if (crypto_memneq(signature, signature_req, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) { pr_err("bad smb2 signature\n"); return 0; } @@ -8456,7 +8457,7 @@ int smb3_check_sign_req(struct ksmbd_work *work) if (ksmbd_sign_smb3_pdu(conn, signing_key, iov, 1, signature)) return 0; - if (memcmp(signature, signature_req, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) { + if (crypto_memneq(signature, signature_req, SMB2_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) { pr_err("bad smb2 signature\n"); return 0; } -- 2.52.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] *** fix CVE-2026-23208 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

*** fix CVE-2026-23208 *** Edward Adam Davis (1): ALSA: usb-audio: Prevent excessive number of frames Takashi Iwai (1): ALSA: usb-audio: Use the right limit for PCM OOB check sound/usb/pcm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: yt6801: fix link info for yt6801
by Frank_Sae 07 Apr '26

07 Apr '26

yt6801 inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/7229 -------------------------------------------------------------------- fix the link info is not update on os installation. Fixes: b9f5c0893d16 ("net: yt6801: add link info for yt6801") Signed-off-by: Frank_Sae <Frank.Sae(a)motor-comm.com> --- .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 91 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c index 01eed3ace..83b5ab258 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_main.c @@ -27,6 +27,95 @@ const struct net_device_ops *fxgmac_get_netdev_ops(void); static void fxgmac_napi_enable(struct fxgmac_pdata *priv); +const struct ethtool_ops *fxgmac_get_ethtool_ops(void); + +#define MII_SPEC_STATUS 0x11 /* PHY specific status */ +#define FXGMAC_EPHY_LINK_STATUS BIT(10) +#define PHY_MII_SPEC_DUPLEX BIT(13) + +static int fxgmac_get_link_ksettings(struct net_device *netdev, + struct ethtool_link_ksettings *cmd) +{ + struct fxgmac_pdata *pdata = netdev_priv(netdev); + struct phy_device *phydev = netdev->phydev; + u32 duplex, regval, link_status; + u32 adv = 0xFFFFFFFF; + + ethtool_link_ksettings_zero_link_mode(cmd, supported); + ethtool_link_ksettings_zero_link_mode(cmd, advertising); + + /* set the supported link speeds */ + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, 1000baseT_Full); + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, 100baseT_Full); + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, 100baseT_Half); + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, 10baseT_Full); + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, 10baseT_Half); + + /* Indicate pause support */ + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, Pause); + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, Asym_Pause); + + adv = phy_read(phydev, MII_ADVERTISE); + + if (field_get(ADVERTISE_PAUSE_CAP, adv)) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, Pause); + + if (field_get(ADVERTISE_PAUSE_ASYM, adv)) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, Asym_Pause); + + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, MII); + cmd->base.port = PORT_MII; + + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, supported, Autoneg); + regval = phy_read(phydev, MII_BMCR); + + regval = field_get(BMCR_ANENABLE, regval); + if (regval) { + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, Autoneg); + + adv = phy_read(phydev, MII_ADVERTISE); + + if (adv & ADVERTISE_10HALF) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, 10baseT_Half); + if (adv & ADVERTISE_10FULL) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, 10baseT_Full); + if (adv & ADVERTISE_100HALF) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, 100baseT_Half); + if (adv & ADVERTISE_100FULL) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, 100baseT_Full); + + adv = phy_read(phydev, MII_CTRL1000); + + if (adv & ADVERTISE_1000FULL) + ethtool_link_ksettings_add_link_mode(cmd, advertising, 1000baseT_Full); + } + + cmd->base.autoneg = 1; + + regval = phy_read(phydev, MII_SPEC_STATUS); + + link_status = field_get(FXGMAC_EPHY_LINK_STATUS, regval); + if (link_status) { + duplex = field_get(PHY_MII_SPEC_DUPLEX, regval); + cmd->base.duplex = duplex; + cmd->base.speed = pdata->mac_speed; + } else { + cmd->base.duplex = DUPLEX_UNKNOWN; + cmd->base.speed = SPEED_UNKNOWN; + } + + return 0; +} + +static const struct ethtool_ops fxgmac_ethtool_ops = { + .get_link = ethtool_op_get_link, + .get_link_ksettings = fxgmac_get_link_ksettings, +}; + +const struct ethtool_ops *fxgmac_get_ethtool_ops(void) +{ + return &fxgmac_ethtool_ops; +} #define PHY_WR_CONFIG(reg_offset) (0x8000205 + ((reg_offset) * 0x10000)) static int fxgmac_phy_write_reg(struct fxgmac_pdata *priv, u32 reg_id, u32 data) @@ -1898,7 +1987,9 @@ static int fxgmac_init(struct fxgmac_pdata *priv, bool save_private_reg) ndev->max_mtu = FXGMAC_JUMBO_PACKET_MTU + (ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN + ETH_FCS_LEN); + ndev->netdev_ops = fxgmac_get_netdev_ops();/* Set device operations */ + ndev->ethtool_ops = fxgmac_get_ethtool_ops();/* Set device operations */ /* Set device features */ if (priv->hw_feat.tso) { -- 2.34.1

2 1