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[PATCH OLK-6.6] APEI/GHES: ARM processor Error: don't go past allocated memory
by Liu Mingrui 30 May '26

30 May '26

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc1 commit 87880af2d24e62a84ed19943dbdd524f097172f2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14747 CVE: CVE-2026-43201 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- If the BIOS generates a very small ARM Processor Error, or an incomplete one, the current logic will fail to deferrence err->section_length and ctx_info->size Add checks to avoid that. With such changes, such GHESv2 records won't cause OOPSes like this: [ 1.492129] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP [ 1.495449] Modules linked in: [ 1.495820] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-00017-gabadcc3553dd-dirty #18 PREEMPT [ 1.496125] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 02/02/2022 [ 1.496433] Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred [ 1.496967] pstate: 814000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 1.497199] pc : log_arm_hw_error+0x5c/0x200 [ 1.497380] lr : ghes_handle_arm_hw_error+0x94/0x220 0xffff8000811c5324 is in log_arm_hw_error (../drivers/ras/ras.c:75). 70 err_info = (struct cper_arm_err_info *)(err + 1); 71 ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)(err_info + err->err_info_num); 72 ctx_err = (u8 *)ctx_info; 73 74 for (n = 0; n < err->context_info_num; n++) { 75 sz = sizeof(struct cper_arm_ctx_info) + ctx_info->size; 76 ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)((long)ctx_info + sz); 77 ctx_len += sz; 78 } 79 and similar ones while trying to access section_length on an error dump with too small size. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hanjun Guo <guohanjun(a)huawei.com> [ rjw: Subject tweaks ] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/7fd9f38413be05ee2d7cfdb0dc31ea2274cf1a54.176787195… Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Conflicts: drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c drivers/ras/ras.c [conflicts due to not merged 96b010536ee0 ("efi/cper: align ARM CPER type with UEFI 2.9A/2.10 specs")] Signed-off-by: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- drivers/ras/ras.c | 6 +++++- 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c index 48b94dff8029..2091aa4b3a00 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/apei/ghes.c @@ -607,27 +607,51 @@ static bool ghes_handle_arm_hw_error(struct acpi_hest_generic_data *gdata, { struct cper_sec_proc_arm *err = acpi_hest_get_payload(gdata); int flags = sync ? MF_ACTION_REQUIRED : 0; + int length = gdata->error_data_length; bool queued = false; int sec_sev, i; bool critical; char *p; sec_sev = ghes_severity(gdata->error_severity); ++ if (length >= sizeof(*err)) { #ifdef CONFIG_RAS_ARM_EVENT_INFO - log_arm_hw_error(err, sec_sev); + log_arm_hw_error(err, sec_sev); #else - log_arm_hw_error(err); + log_arm_hw_error(err); #endif + } else { + pr_warn(FW_BUG "arm error length: %d\n", length); + pr_warn(FW_BUG "length is too small\n"); + pr_warn(FW_BUG "firmware-generated error record is incorrect\n"); + return false; + } + if (sev != GHES_SEV_RECOVERABLE || sec_sev != GHES_SEV_RECOVERABLE) return false; p = (char *)(err + 1); critical = ghes_armp_vendor_critical_error(err, sync); + length -= sizeof(err); + for (i = 0; i < err->err_info_num; i++) { - struct cper_arm_err_info *err_info = (struct cper_arm_err_info *)p; - bool is_cache = (err_info->type == CPER_ARM_CACHE_ERROR); - bool has_pa = (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_PHYSICAL_ADDR); const char *error_type = "unknown error"; + struct cper_arm_err_info *err_info; + bool is_cache, has_pa; + + /* Ensure we have enough data for the error info header */ + if (length < sizeof(*err_info)) + break; + + err_info = (struct cper_arm_err_info *)p; + + /* Validate the claimed length before using it */ + length -= err_info->length; + if (length < 0) + break; + + is_cache = err_info->type & CPER_ARM_CACHE_ERROR; + has_pa = (err_info->validation_bits & CPER_ARM_INFO_VALID_PHYSICAL_ADDR); /* * The field (err_info->error_info & BIT(26)) is fixed to set to diff --git a/drivers/ras/ras.c b/drivers/ras/ras.c index 547e058e2d56..ecfaff12816c 100644 --- a/drivers/ras/ras.c +++ b/drivers/ras/ras.c @@ -77,7 +77,11 @@ void log_arm_hw_error(struct cper_sec_proc_arm *err) ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)(err_info + err->err_info_num); ctx_err = (u8 *)ctx_info; for (n = 0; n < err->context_info_num; n++) { - sz = sizeof(struct cper_arm_ctx_info) + ctx_info->size; + sz = sizeof(struct cper_arm_ctx_info); + + if (sz + (long)ctx_info - (long)err >= err->section_length) + sz += ctx_info->size; + ctx_info = (struct cper_arm_ctx_info *)((long)ctx_info + sz); ctx_len += sz; } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed
by Tengda Wu 30 May '26

30 May '26

From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit 83ce43a21bb7df8dd52228afdd918d2d058eefde category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15294 CVE: CVE-2026-46052 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 803447f93d75ab6e40c85e6d12b5630d281d70d6 ] Ceph can call d_add(dentry, NULL) on a negative dentry that is already present in the primary dcache hash. In the current VFS that is not safe. d_add() goes through __d_add() to __d_rehash(), which unconditionally reinserts dentry->d_hash into the hlist_bl bucket. If the dentry is already hashed, reinserting the same node can corrupt the bucket, including creating a self-loop. Once that happens, __d_lookup() can spin forever in the hlist_bl walk, typically looping only on the d_name.hash mismatch check and eventually triggering RCU stall reports like this one: rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 87-....: (2100 ticks this GP) idle=3a4c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=25003319/25003319 fqs=829 rcu: (t=2101 jiffies g=79058445 q=698988 ncpus=192) CPU: 87 UID: 2952868916 PID: 3933303 Comm: php-cgi8.3 Not tainted 6.18.17-i1-amd #950 NONE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.6 09/22/2023 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x46/0xb0 Code: c1 e8 07 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 00 49 89 fc 49 89 f5 48 89 c3 48 83 e3 fe 48 83 f8 01 77 0f eb 2d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 1b 48 85 db <74> 20 39 6b 18 75 f3 48 8d 7b 78 e8 ba 85 d0 00 4c 39 63 10 74 1f RSP: 0018:ff745a70c8253898 EFLAGS: 00000282 RAX: ff26e470054cb208 RBX: ff26e470054cb208 RCX: 000000006e958966 RDX: ff26e48267340000 RSI: ff745a70c82539b0 RDI: ff26e458f74655c0 RBP: 000000006e958966 R08: 0000000000000180 R09: 9cd08d909b919a89 R10: ff26e458f74655c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff26e458f74655c0 R13: ff745a70c82539b0 R14: d0d0d0d0d0d0d0d0 R15: 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f FS: 00007f5770896980(0000) GS:ff26e482c5d88000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5764de50c0 CR3: 000000a72abb5001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> lookup_fast+0x9f/0x100 walk_component+0x1f/0x150 link_path_walk+0x20e/0x3d0 path_lookupat+0x68/0x180 filename_lookup+0xdc/0x1e0 vfs_statx+0x6c/0x140 vfs_fstatat+0x67/0xa0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x24/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e This is reachable with reused cached negative dentries. A Ceph lookup or atomic_open can be handed a negative dentry that is already hashed, and fs/ceph/dir.c then hits one of two paths that incorrectly assume "negative" also means "unhashed": - ceph_finish_lookup(): MDS reply is -ENOENT with no trace -> d_add(dentry, NULL) - ceph_lookup(): local ENOENT fast path for a complete directory with shared caps -> d_add(dentry, NULL) Both paths can therefore re-add an already-hashed negative dentry. Ceph already uses the correct pattern elsewhere: ceph_fill_trace() only calls d_add(dn, NULL) for a negative null-dentry reply when d_unhashed(dn) is true. Fix both fs/ceph/dir.c sites the same way: only call d_add() for a negative dentry when it is actually unhashed. If the negative dentry is already hashed, leave it in place and reuse it as-is. This preserves the existing behavior for unhashed dentries while avoiding d_hash list corruption for reused hashed negatives. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2817b000b02c ("ceph: directory operations") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> [ kept existing dout() debug call instead of upstream's doutc() form when adding the d_unhashed() guard around d_add() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index beedb07ee4af..949c2a450cfb 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -745,7 +745,8 @@ struct dentry *ceph_finish_lookup(struct ceph_mds_request *req, d_drop(dentry); err = -ENOENT; } else { - d_add(dentry, NULL); + if (d_unhashed(dentry)) + d_add(dentry, NULL); } } } @@ -813,7 +814,8 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, __ceph_touch_fmode(ci, mdsc, CEPH_FILE_MODE_RD); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); dout(" dir %p complete, -ENOENT\n", dir); - d_add(dentry, NULL); + if (d_unhashed(dentry)) + d_add(dentry, NULL); di->lease_shared_gen = atomic_read(&ci->i_shared_gen); return NULL; } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed
by Tengda Wu 30 May '26

30 May '26

From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 803447f93d75ab6e40c85e6d12b5630d281d70d6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15294 CVE: CVE-2026-46052 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ceph can call d_add(dentry, NULL) on a negative dentry that is already present in the primary dcache hash. In the current VFS that is not safe. d_add() goes through __d_add() to __d_rehash(), which unconditionally reinserts dentry->d_hash into the hlist_bl bucket. If the dentry is already hashed, reinserting the same node can corrupt the bucket, including creating a self-loop. Once that happens, __d_lookup() can spin forever in the hlist_bl walk, typically looping only on the d_name.hash mismatch check and eventually triggering RCU stall reports like this one: rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 87-....: (2100 ticks this GP) idle=3a4c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=25003319/25003319 fqs=829 rcu: (t=2101 jiffies g=79058445 q=698988 ncpus=192) CPU: 87 UID: 2952868916 PID: 3933303 Comm: php-cgi8.3 Not tainted 6.18.17-i1-amd #950 NONE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.6 09/22/2023 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x46/0xb0 Code: c1 e8 07 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 00 49 89 fc 49 89 f5 48 89 c3 48 83 e3 fe 48 83 f8 01 77 0f eb 2d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 1b 48 85 db <74> 20 39 6b 18 75 f3 48 8d 7b 78 e8 ba 85 d0 00 4c 39 63 10 74 1f RSP: 0018:ff745a70c8253898 EFLAGS: 00000282 RAX: ff26e470054cb208 RBX: ff26e470054cb208 RCX: 000000006e958966 RDX: ff26e48267340000 RSI: ff745a70c82539b0 RDI: ff26e458f74655c0 RBP: 000000006e958966 R08: 0000000000000180 R09: 9cd08d909b919a89 R10: ff26e458f74655c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff26e458f74655c0 R13: ff745a70c82539b0 R14: d0d0d0d0d0d0d0d0 R15: 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f FS: 00007f5770896980(0000) GS:ff26e482c5d88000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5764de50c0 CR3: 000000a72abb5001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> lookup_fast+0x9f/0x100 walk_component+0x1f/0x150 link_path_walk+0x20e/0x3d0 path_lookupat+0x68/0x180 filename_lookup+0xdc/0x1e0 vfs_statx+0x6c/0x140 vfs_fstatat+0x67/0xa0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x24/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e This is reachable with reused cached negative dentries. A Ceph lookup or atomic_open can be handed a negative dentry that is already hashed, and fs/ceph/dir.c then hits one of two paths that incorrectly assume "negative" also means "unhashed": - ceph_finish_lookup(): MDS reply is -ENOENT with no trace -> d_add(dentry, NULL) - ceph_lookup(): local ENOENT fast path for a complete directory with shared caps -> d_add(dentry, NULL) Both paths can therefore re-add an already-hashed negative dentry. Ceph already uses the correct pattern elsewhere: ceph_fill_trace() only calls d_add(dn, NULL) for a negative null-dentry reply when d_unhashed(dn) is true. Fix both fs/ceph/dir.c sites the same way: only call d_add() for a negative dentry when it is actually unhashed. If the negative dentry is already hashed, leave it in place and reuse it as-is. This preserves the existing behavior for unhashed dentries while avoiding d_hash list corruption for reused hashed negatives. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2817b000b02c ("ceph: directory operations") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Conflicts: fs/ceph/dir.c [Context conflict] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 1fddb9cd3e88..504693f6b72d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -719,7 +719,8 @@ struct dentry *ceph_finish_lookup(struct ceph_mds_request *req, d_drop(dentry); err = -ENOENT; } else { - d_add(dentry, NULL); + if (d_unhashed(dentry)) + d_add(dentry, NULL); } } } @@ -775,7 +776,8 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, __ceph_touch_fmode(ci, mdsc, CEPH_FILE_MODE_RD); spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); dout(" dir %p complete, -ENOENT\n", dir); - d_add(dentry, NULL); + if (d_unhashed(dentry)) + d_add(dentry, NULL); di->lease_shared_gen = atomic_read(&ci->i_shared_gen); return NULL; } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ceph: only d_add() negative dentries when they are unhashed
by Tengda Wu 30 May '26

30 May '26

From: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit 803447f93d75ab6e40c85e6d12b5630d281d70d6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15294 CVE: CVE-2026-46052 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ceph can call d_add(dentry, NULL) on a negative dentry that is already present in the primary dcache hash. In the current VFS that is not safe. d_add() goes through __d_add() to __d_rehash(), which unconditionally reinserts dentry->d_hash into the hlist_bl bucket. If the dentry is already hashed, reinserting the same node can corrupt the bucket, including creating a self-loop. Once that happens, __d_lookup() can spin forever in the hlist_bl walk, typically looping only on the d_name.hash mismatch check and eventually triggering RCU stall reports like this one: rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU rcu: 87-....: (2100 ticks this GP) idle=3a4c/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=25003319/25003319 fqs=829 rcu: (t=2101 jiffies g=79058445 q=698988 ncpus=192) CPU: 87 UID: 2952868916 PID: 3933303 Comm: php-cgi8.3 Not tainted 6.18.17-i1-amd #950 NONE Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7615/0G9DHV, BIOS 1.6.6 09/22/2023 RIP: 0010:__d_lookup+0x46/0xb0 Code: c1 e8 07 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 00 49 89 fc 49 89 f5 48 89 c3 48 83 e3 fe 48 83 f8 01 77 0f eb 2d 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 1b 48 85 db <74> 20 39 6b 18 75 f3 48 8d 7b 78 e8 ba 85 d0 00 4c 39 63 10 74 1f RSP: 0018:ff745a70c8253898 EFLAGS: 00000282 RAX: ff26e470054cb208 RBX: ff26e470054cb208 RCX: 000000006e958966 RDX: ff26e48267340000 RSI: ff745a70c82539b0 RDI: ff26e458f74655c0 RBP: 000000006e958966 R08: 0000000000000180 R09: 9cd08d909b919a89 R10: ff26e458f74655c0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff26e458f74655c0 R13: ff745a70c82539b0 R14: d0d0d0d0d0d0d0d0 R15: 2f2f2f2f2f2f2f2f FS: 00007f5770896980(0000) GS:ff26e482c5d88000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5764de50c0 CR3: 000000a72abb5001 CR4: 0000000000771ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> lookup_fast+0x9f/0x100 walk_component+0x1f/0x150 link_path_walk+0x20e/0x3d0 path_lookupat+0x68/0x180 filename_lookup+0xdc/0x1e0 vfs_statx+0x6c/0x140 vfs_fstatat+0x67/0xa0 __do_sys_newfstatat+0x24/0x60 do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x230 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e This is reachable with reused cached negative dentries. A Ceph lookup or atomic_open can be handed a negative dentry that is already hashed, and fs/ceph/dir.c then hits one of two paths that incorrectly assume "negative" also means "unhashed": - ceph_finish_lookup(): MDS reply is -ENOENT with no trace -> d_add(dentry, NULL) - ceph_lookup(): local ENOENT fast path for a complete directory with shared caps -> d_add(dentry, NULL) Both paths can therefore re-add an already-hashed negative dentry. Ceph already uses the correct pattern elsewhere: ceph_fill_trace() only calls d_add(dn, NULL) for a negative null-dentry reply when d_unhashed(dn) is true. Fix both fs/ceph/dir.c sites the same way: only call d_add() for a negative dentry when it is actually unhashed. If the negative dentry is already hashed, leave it in place and reuse it as-is. This preserves the existing behavior for unhashed dentries while avoiding d_hash list corruption for reused hashed negatives. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2817b000b02c ("ceph: directory operations") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <max.kellermann(a)ionos.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Conflicts: fs/ceph/dir.c [Context conflict] Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/dir.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/dir.c b/fs/ceph/dir.c index 7f3f64ba464f..0a12e668133c 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/dir.c +++ b/fs/ceph/dir.c @@ -703,7 +703,8 @@ struct dentry *ceph_finish_lookup(struct ceph_mds_request *req, d_drop(dentry); err = -ENOENT; } else { - d_add(dentry, NULL); + if (d_unhashed(dentry)) + d_add(dentry, NULL); } } } @@ -758,7 +759,8 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, (__ceph_caps_issued_mask(ci, CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED, 1))) { spin_unlock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); dout(" dir %p complete, -ENOENT\n", dir); - d_add(dentry, NULL); + if (d_unhashed(dentry)) + d_add(dentry, NULL); di->lease_shared_gen = atomic_read(&ci->i_shared_gen); return NULL; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/6] CVE-2026-43421
by Xinyu Zheng 30 May '26

30 May '26

Krishna Kurapati (2): usb: gadget: ncm: Add support to update wMaxSegmentSize via configfs usb: gadget: ncm: Fix endianness of wMaxSegmentSize variable in ecm_desc Kuen-Han Tsai (2): usb: gadget: f_ncm: Fix net_device lifecycle with device_move usb: gadget: u_ether: Fix NULL pointer deref in eth_get_drvinfo Thomas Gleixner (1): cleanup: Provide retain_and_null_ptr() Udipto Goswami (1): usb: gadget: ncm: Fix indentations in documentation of NCM section Documentation/usb/gadget-testing.rst | 20 ++--- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_ncm.c | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.c | 28 ++++++- drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ether.h | 26 +++++++ drivers/usb/gadget/function/u_ncm.h | 4 +- include/linux/cleanup.h | 19 +++++ 6 files changed, 173 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 7

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-45984
by Hongbo Li 30 May '26

30 May '26

Fix CVE-2026-45984. Andreas Gruenbacher (1): gfs2: Add metapath_dibh helper Deepanshu Kartikey (1): gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path fs/gfs2/bmap.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq()
by Chen Jinghuang 30 May '26

30 May '26

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.140 commit c5dc30da990045105c9762248d23076223e7878a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/15428 CVE: CVE-2026-46178 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c54c7e4cb679c0aaa1cb489b9c3f2cd98e63a44c upstream. Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 225c7b1feef1 ("IB/mlx4: Add a driver Mellanox ConnectX InfiniBand adapters") Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/0-v1-e911b76a94d1%2B65d95-rdma_udata_rep_jgg… Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/11-v1-41f3135e5565+9d2-rdma_ai_fixes1_jgg@nvidia… Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/srq.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/srq.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/srq.c index c4cf91235eee..68e8b04c5388 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/srq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/srq.c @@ -193,13 +193,15 @@ int mlx4_ib_create_srq(struct ib_srq *ib_srq, if (udata) if (ib_copy_to_udata(udata, &srq->msrq.srqn, sizeof (__u32))) { err = -EFAULT; - goto err_wrid; + goto err_srq; } init_attr->attr.max_wr = srq->msrq.max - 1; return 0; +err_srq: + mlx4_srq_free(dev->dev, &srq->msrq); err_wrid: if (udata) mlx4_ib_db_unmap_user(ucontext, &srq->db); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] Fix CVE-2026-45984
by Hongbo Li 30 May '26

30 May '26

Fix CVE-2026-45984. Deepanshu Kartikey (1): gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path fs/gfs2/bmap.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/7] Fix CVE-2026-45984
by Hongbo Li 30 May '26

30 May '26

Fix CVE-2026-45984. Andreas Gruenbacher (6): gfs2: Add new gfs2_iomap_get helper gfs2: Turn gfs2_extent_map into gfs2_{get,alloc}_extent gfs2: Replace gfs2_lblk_to_dblk with gfs2_get_extent gfs2: Add wrapper for iomap_file_buffered_write gfs2: Move the inode glock locking to gfs2_file_buffered_write gfs2: Add metapath_dibh helper Deepanshu Kartikey (1): gfs2: Fix use-after-free in iomap inline data write path fs/gfs2/bmap.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- fs/gfs2/bmap.h | 13 ++- fs/gfs2/dir.c | 13 ++- fs/gfs2/file.c | 59 +++++++++--- fs/gfs2/log.c | 6 +- fs/gfs2/quota.c | 4 +- fs/gfs2/recovery.c | 4 +- 7 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 164 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openeuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: ctnetlink: ensure safe access to master conntrack
by superdcc97＠163.com 30 May '26

30 May '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc6 commit bffcaad9afdfe45d7fc777397d3b83c1e3ebffe5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14619 CVE: CVE-2026-43116 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Holding reference on the expectation is not sufficient, the master conntrack object can just go away, making exp->master invalid. To access exp->master safely: - Grab the nf_conntrack_expect_lock, this gets serialized with clean_from_lists() which also holds this lock when the master conntrack goes away. - Hold reference on master conntrack via nf_conntrack_find_get(). Not so easy since the master tuple to look up for the master conntrack is not available in the existing problematic paths. This patch goes for extending the nf_conntrack_expect_lock section to address this issue for simplicity, in the cases that are described below this is just slightly extending the lock section. The add expectation command already holds a reference to the master conntrack from ctnetlink_create_expect(). However, the delete expectation command needs to grab the spinlock before looking up for the expectation. Expand the existing spinlock section to address this to cover the expectation lookup. Note that, the nf_ct_expect_iterate_net() calls already grabs the spinlock while iterating over the expectation table, which is correct. The get expectation command needs to grab the spinlock to ensure master conntrack does not go away. This also expands the existing spinlock section to cover the expectation lookup too. I needed to move the netlink skb allocation out of the spinlock to keep it GFP_KERNEL. For the expectation events, the IPEXP_DESTROY event is already delivered under the spinlock, just move the delivery of IPEXP_NEW under the spinlock too because the master conntrack event cache is reached through exp->master. While at it, add lockdep notations to help identify what codepaths need to grab the spinlock. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h | 5 ++++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c | 2 ++ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 10 +++++++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 30 +++++++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h index 4e3fff9f929b..7e12d5b27249 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h @@ -81,4 +81,9 @@ void nf_conntrack_lock(spinlock_t *lock); extern spinlock_t nf_conntrack_expect_lock; +static inline void lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(void) +{ + lockdep_assert_held(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); +} + #endif /* _NF_CONNTRACK_CORE_H */ diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c index c11822a7d2bf..c8b4c0c15767 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_ecache.c @@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ void nf_ct_expect_event_report(enum ip_conntrack_expect_events event, struct nf_exp_event_notifier *notify; struct nf_conntrack_ecache *e; + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + rcu_read_lock(); notify = rcu_dereference(net->ct.nf_expect_event_cb); if (!notify) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index 27b84231db10..a8dcb4e44d5f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ void nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, struct nf_conn_help *master_help = nfct_help(exp->master); struct net *net = nf_ct_exp_net(exp); + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); WARN_ON(!master_help); WARN_ON(timer_pending(&exp->timeout)); @@ -105,6 +106,8 @@ nf_ct_exp_equal(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, bool nf_ct_remove_expect(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp) { + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { nf_ct_unlink_expect(exp); nf_ct_expect_put(exp); @@ -162,6 +165,8 @@ nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, struct nf_conntrack_expect *i, *exp = NULL; unsigned int h; + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + if (!net->ct.expect_count) return NULL; @@ -414,6 +419,8 @@ static inline int __nf_ct_expect_check(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect) unsigned int h; int ret = 0; + lockdep_nfct_expect_lock_held(); + if (!master_help) { ret = -ESHUTDOWN; goto out; @@ -467,8 +474,9 @@ int nf_ct_expect_related_report(struct nf_conntrack_expect *expect, nf_ct_expect_insert(expect); - spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); nf_ct_expect_event_report(IPEXP_NEW, expect, portid, report); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + return 0; out: spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c index 331839218a1c..203a5d059b20 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c @@ -3056,31 +3056,37 @@ static int ctnetlink_get_expect(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (err < 0) return err; + err = -ENOMEM; + skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!skb2) + return -ENOMEM; + + spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); exp = nf_ct_expect_find_get(net, &zone, &tuple); - if (!exp) + if (!exp) { + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + kfree_skb(skb2); return -ENOENT; + } if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) { __be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]); if (id != nf_expect_get_id(exp)) { nf_ct_expect_put(exp); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + kfree_skb(skb2); return -ENOENT; } } - err = -ENOMEM; - skb2 = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (skb2 == NULL) { - nf_ct_expect_put(exp); - goto out; - } - rcu_read_lock(); err = ctnetlink_exp_fill_info(skb2, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlh->nlmsg_seq, IPCTNL_MSG_EXP_NEW, exp); rcu_read_unlock(); nf_ct_expect_put(exp); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + if (err <= 0) goto free; @@ -3135,22 +3141,26 @@ static int ctnetlink_del_expect(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, if (err < 0) return err; + spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); + /* bump usage count to 2 */ exp = nf_ct_expect_find_get(net, &zone, &tuple); - if (!exp) + if (!exp) { + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); return -ENOENT; + } if (cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]) { __be32 id = nla_get_be32(cda[CTA_EXPECT_ID]); if (id != nf_expect_get_id(exp)) { nf_ct_expect_put(exp); + spin_unlock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); return -ENOENT; } } /* after list removal, usage count == 1 */ - spin_lock_bh(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(exp, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, nlmsg_report(nlh)); -- 2.43.0

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