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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds read/write access
by Zhang Changzhong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Jakub Raczynski <j.raczynski(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.94 commit bab6bca0834cbb5be2a7cfe59ec6ad016ec72608 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9645 CVE: CVE-2025-38111 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0e629694126ca388916f059453a1c36adde219c4 ] When using publicly available tools like 'mdio-tools' to read/write data from/to network interface and its PHY via mdiobus, there is no verification of parameters passed to the ioctl and it accepts any mdio address. Currently there is support for 32 addresses in kernel via PHY_MAX_ADDR define, but it is possible to pass higher value than that via ioctl. While read/write operation should generally fail in this case, mdiobus provides stats array, where wrong address may allow out-of-bounds read/write. Fix that by adding address verification before read/write operation. While this excludes this access from any statistics, it improves security of read/write operation. Fixes: 080bb352fad00 ("net: phy: Maintain MDIO device and bus statistics") Signed-off-by: Jakub Raczynski <j.raczynski(a)samsung.com> Reported-by: Wenjing Shan <wenjing.shan(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c index 6f8177a..e02706b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c @@ -850,6 +850,9 @@ int __mdiobus_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, u32 regnum) lockdep_assert_held_once(&bus->mdio_lock); + if (addr >= PHY_MAX_ADDR) + return -ENXIO; + if (bus->read) retval = bus->read(bus, addr, regnum); else @@ -879,6 +882,9 @@ int __mdiobus_write(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, u32 regnum, u16 val) lockdep_assert_held_once(&bus->mdio_lock); + if (addr >= PHY_MAX_ADDR) + return -ENXIO; + if (bus->write) err = bus->write(bus, addr, regnum, val); else -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2025-38111
by Zhang Changzhong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

Andrew Lunn (1): net: mdio: C22 is now optional, EOPNOTSUPP if not provided Jakub Raczynski (1): net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds read/write access drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds clause 45 read/write access
by Zhang Changzhong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Jakub Raczynski <j.raczynski(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.94 commit abb0605ca00979a49572a6516f6db22c3dc57223 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9663 CVE: CVE-2025-38110 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 260388f79e94fb3026c419a208ece8358bb7b555 ] When using publicly available tools like 'mdio-tools' to read/write data from/to network interface and its PHY via C45 (clause 45) mdiobus, there is no verification of parameters passed to the ioctl and it accepts any mdio address. Currently there is support for 32 addresses in kernel via PHY_MAX_ADDR define, but it is possible to pass higher value than that via ioctl. While read/write operation should generally fail in this case, mdiobus provides stats array, where wrong address may allow out-of-bounds read/write. Fix that by adding address verification before C45 read/write operation. While this excludes this access from any statistics, it improves security of read/write operation. Fixes: 4e4aafcddbbf ("net: mdio: Add dedicated C45 API to MDIO bus drivers") Signed-off-by: Jakub Raczynski <j.raczynski(a)samsung.com> Reported-by: Wenjing Shan <wenjing.shan(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c index 25dcaa4..6f8177a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c @@ -940,6 +940,9 @@ int __mdiobus_c45_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, int devad, u32 regnum) lockdep_assert_held_once(&bus->mdio_lock); + if (addr >= PHY_MAX_ADDR) + return -ENXIO; + if (bus->read_c45) retval = bus->read_c45(bus, addr, devad, regnum); else @@ -971,6 +974,9 @@ int __mdiobus_c45_write(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, int devad, u32 regnum, lockdep_assert_held_once(&bus->mdio_lock); + if (addr >= PHY_MAX_ADDR) + return -ENXIO; + if (bus->write_c45) err = bus->write_c45(bus, addr, devad, regnum, val); else -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: phy: clear phydev->devlink when the link is deleted
by Zhang Changzhong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Wei Fang <wei.fang(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.94 commit 363fdf2777423ad346d781f09548cca14877f729 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9635 CVE: CVE-2025-38149 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0795b05a59b1371b18ffbf09d385296b12e9f5d5 ] There is a potential crash issue when disabling and re-enabling the network port. When disabling the network port, phy_detach() calls device_link_del() to remove the device link, but it does not clear phydev->devlink, so phydev->devlink is not a NULL pointer. Then the network port is re-enabled, but if phy_attach_direct() fails before calling device_link_add(), the code jumps to the "error" label and calls phy_detach(). Since phydev->devlink retains the old value from the previous attach/detach cycle, device_link_del() uses the old value, which accesses a NULL pointer and causes a crash. The simplified crash log is as follows. [ 24.702421] Call trace: [ 24.704856] device_link_put_kref+0x20/0x120 [ 24.709124] device_link_del+0x30/0x48 [ 24.712864] phy_detach+0x24/0x168 [ 24.716261] phy_attach_direct+0x168/0x3a4 [ 24.720352] phylink_fwnode_phy_connect+0xc8/0x14c [ 24.725140] phylink_of_phy_connect+0x1c/0x34 Therefore, phydev->devlink needs to be cleared when the device link is deleted. Fixes: bc66fa87d4fd ("net: phy: Add link between phy dev and mac dev") Signed-off-by: Wei Fang <wei.fang(a)nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew(a)lunn.ch> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250523083759.3741168-1-wei.fang@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c index ee43f4d..14da8fdb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c @@ -1833,8 +1833,10 @@ void phy_detach(struct phy_device *phydev) struct module *ndev_owner = NULL; struct mii_bus *bus; - if (phydev->devlink) + if (phydev->devlink) { device_link_del(phydev->devlink); + phydev->devlink = NULL; + } if (phydev->sysfs_links) { if (dev) -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: prevent overflow in lookup table allocation
by Zhang Changzhong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 4c5c6aa9967dbe55bd017bb509885928d0f31206 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9687 CVE: CVE-2025-38162 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When calculating the lookup table size, ensure the following multiplication does not overflow: - desc->field_len[] maximum value is U8_MAX multiplied by NFT_PIPAPO_GROUPS_PER_BYTE(f) that can be 2, worst case. - NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(f->bb) is 2^8, worst case. - sizeof(unsigned long), from sizeof(*f->lt), lt in struct nft_pipapo_field. Then, use check_mul_overflow() to multiply by bucket size and then use check_add_overflow() to the alignment for avx2 (if needed). Finally, add lt_size_check_overflow() helper and use it to consolidate this. While at it, replace leftover allocation using the GFP_KERNEL to GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT for consistency, in pipapo_resize(). Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c [commit 9f439bd6ef4f, aac14d516c2b, 69e687cea79f not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c index ebd0f70..90ade86 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c @@ -610,6 +610,30 @@ static void *nft_pipapo_get(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, nft_genmask_cur(net), get_jiffies_64()); } + +/** + * lt_calculate_size() - Get storage size for lookup table with overflow check + * @groups: Amount of bit groups + * @bb: Number of bits grouped together in lookup table buckets + * @bsize: Size of each bucket in lookup table, in longs + * + * Return: allocation size including alignment overhead, negative on overflow + */ +static ssize_t lt_calculate_size(unsigned int groups, unsigned int bb, + unsigned int bsize) +{ + ssize_t ret = groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(bb) * sizeof(long); + + if (check_mul_overflow(ret, bsize, &ret)) + return -1; + if (check_add_overflow(ret, NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN_HEADROOM, &ret)) + return -1; + if (ret > INT_MAX) + return -1; + + return ret; +} + /** * pipapo_resize() - Resize lookup or mapping table, or both * @f: Field containing lookup and mapping tables @@ -628,6 +652,7 @@ static int pipapo_resize(struct nft_pipapo_field *f, int old_rules, int rules) union nft_pipapo_map_bucket *new_mt, *old_mt = f->mt; size_t new_bucket_size, copy; int group, bucket; + ssize_t lt_size; new_bucket_size = DIV_ROUND_UP(rules, BITS_PER_LONG); #ifdef NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN @@ -643,10 +668,11 @@ static int pipapo_resize(struct nft_pipapo_field *f, int old_rules, int rules) else copy = new_bucket_size; - new_lt = kvzalloc(f->groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(f->bb) * - new_bucket_size * sizeof(*new_lt) + - NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN_HEADROOM, - GFP_KERNEL); + lt_size = lt_calculate_size(f->groups, f->bb, new_bucket_size); + if (lt_size < 0) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_lt = kvzalloc(lt_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_lt) return -ENOMEM; @@ -845,7 +871,7 @@ static void pipapo_lt_bits_adjust(struct nft_pipapo_field *f) { unsigned long *new_lt; int groups, bb; - size_t lt_size; + ssize_t lt_size; lt_size = f->groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(f->bb) * f->bsize * sizeof(*f->lt); @@ -855,15 +881,17 @@ static void pipapo_lt_bits_adjust(struct nft_pipapo_field *f) groups = f->groups * 2; bb = NFT_PIPAPO_GROUP_BITS_LARGE_SET; - lt_size = groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(bb) * f->bsize * - sizeof(*f->lt); + lt_size = lt_calculate_size(groups, bb, f->bsize); + if (lt_size < 0) + return; } else if (f->bb == NFT_PIPAPO_GROUP_BITS_LARGE_SET && lt_size < NFT_PIPAPO_LT_SIZE_LOW) { groups = f->groups / 2; bb = NFT_PIPAPO_GROUP_BITS_SMALL_SET; - lt_size = groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(bb) * f->bsize * - sizeof(*f->lt); + lt_size = lt_calculate_size(groups, bb, f->bsize); + if (lt_size < 0) + return; /* Don't increase group width if the resulting lookup table size * would exceed the upper size threshold for a "small" set. @@ -874,7 +902,7 @@ static void pipapo_lt_bits_adjust(struct nft_pipapo_field *f) return; } - new_lt = kvzalloc(lt_size + NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN_HEADROOM, GFP_KERNEL); + new_lt = kvzalloc(lt_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_lt) return; @@ -1347,13 +1375,15 @@ static struct nft_pipapo_match *pipapo_clone(struct nft_pipapo_match *old) for (i = 0; i < old->field_count; i++) { unsigned long *new_lt; + ssize_t lt_size; memcpy(dst, src, offsetof(struct nft_pipapo_field, lt)); - new_lt = kvzalloc(src->groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(src->bb) * - src->bsize * sizeof(*dst->lt) + - NFT_PIPAPO_ALIGN_HEADROOM, - GFP_KERNEL); + lt_size = lt_calculate_size(src->groups, src->bb, src->bsize); + if (lt_size < 0) + goto out_lt; + + new_lt = kvzalloc(lt_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_lt) goto out_lt; -- 2.9.5

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/8] CVE-2024-21823
by Wang Zhaolong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

Arjan van de Ven (2): VFIO: Add the SPR_DSA and SPR_IAX devices to the denylist dmaengine: idxd: add a new security check to deal with a hardware erratum Dave Jiang (2): dmaengine: idxd: add per DSA wq workqueue for processing cr faults dmaengine: idxd: Fix ->poll() return value Fenghua Yu (1): dmaengine: idxd: add idxd_copy_cr() to copy user completion record during page fault handling Harshit Mogalapalli (1): dmaengine: idxd: Fix passing freed memory in idxd_cdev_open() Nikhil Rao (1): dmaengine: idxd: add a write() method for applications to submit work Vinicius Costa Gomes (1): dmaengine: idxd: Fix allowing write() from different address spaces drivers/dma/idxd/cdev.c | 205 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/dma/idxd/idxd.h | 10 ++ drivers/dma/idxd/init.c | 6 + drivers/dma/idxd/registers.h | 3 - drivers/dma/idxd/sysfs.c | 28 ++++- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 2 + include/linux/pci_ids.h | 2 + 7 files changed, 245 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] smb3: fix for slab out of bounds on mount to ksmbd
by Wang Zhaolong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc2 commit 7d34ec36abb84fdfb6632a0f2cbda90379ae21fc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9094 CVE: CVE-2025-38728 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- With KASAN enabled, it is possible to get a slab out of bounds during mount to ksmbd due to missing check in parse_server_interfaces() (see below): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881433dba98 by task mount/9827 CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 9827 Comm: mount Tainted: G OE 6.16.0-rc2-kasan #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/0MWYPT, BIOS 2.13.1 06/14/2019 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x9f/0xf0 print_report+0xd1/0x670 __virt_addr_valid+0x22c/0x430 ? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x2a/0x1f0 ? parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] kasan_report+0xd6/0x110 parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0x13/0x20 parse_server_interfaces+0x14ee/0x1880 [cifs] ? __pfx_parse_server_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x51/0x60 SMB3_request_interfaces+0x1ad/0x3f0 [cifs] ? __pfx_SMB3_request_interfaces+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? SMB2_tcon+0x23c/0x15d0 [cifs] smb3_qfs_tcon+0x173/0x2b0 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200 ? cifs_get_tcon+0x105d/0x2120 [cifs] ? __pfx_smb3_qfs_tcon+0x10/0x10 [cifs] cifs_mount_get_tcon+0x369/0xb90 [cifs] ? dfs_cache_find+0xe7/0x150 [cifs] dfs_mount_share+0x985/0x2970 [cifs] ? check_path.constprop.0+0x28/0x50 ? save_trace+0x54/0x370 ? __pfx_dfs_mount_share+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? __lock_acquire+0xb82/0x2ba0 ? __kasan_check_write+0x18/0x20 cifs_mount+0xbc/0x9e0 [cifs] ? __pfx_cifs_mount+0x10/0x10 [cifs] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x5d/0x200 ? cifs_setup_cifs_sb+0x29d/0x810 [cifs] cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x263/0x1990 [cifs] Reported-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflicts: fs/cifs/smb2ops.c fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c [Conflict with mainline commit aa45dadd34e4 ("cifs: change iface_list from array to sorted linked list").] Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong(a)huaweicloud.com> --- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c index 2bc268401d91..e3f96a99a4d5 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -479,10 +479,17 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *buf, next = le32_to_cpu(p->Next); if (!next) { bytes_left -= sizeof(*p); break; } + /* Validate that Next doesn't point beyond the buffer */ + if (next > bytes_left) { + cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: invalid Next pointer %zu > %zd\n", + __func__, next, bytes_left); + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } p = (struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *)((u8 *)p+next); bytes_left -= next; } if (!nb_iface) { @@ -490,14 +497,15 @@ parse_server_interfaces(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp *buf, rc = -EINVAL; goto out; } /* Azure rounds the buffer size up 8, to a 16 byte boundary */ - if ((bytes_left > 8) || p->Next) + if ((bytes_left > 8) || + (bytes_left >= offsetof(struct network_interface_info_ioctl_rsp, Next) + + sizeof(p->Next) && p->Next)) cifs_dbg(VFS, "%s: incomplete interface info\n", __func__); - /* * Second pass: extract info to internal structure */ *iface_list = kcalloc(nb_iface, sizeof(**iface_list), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.34.3

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent
by Wang Zhaolong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.238 commit a24c2f05ac3c5b0aaa539d9d913826d2643dfd0e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9768 CVE: CVE-2025-38051 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a7a8fe56e932a36f43e031b398aef92341bf5ea0 upstream. There is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may access the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the following KASAN warning. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70 print_report+0xce/0x640 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs] cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs] iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8 RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000 </TASK> Allocated by task 408: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0 mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0 cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs] allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs] kthread+0x394/0x720 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 342979: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50 kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500 cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs] cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs] iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520 __x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000 which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588 The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== POC is available in the link [1]. The problem triggering process is as follows: Process 1 Process 2 ----------------------------------------------------------------- cifs_readdir /* file->private_data == NULL */ initiate_cifs_search cifsFile = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cifsFileInfo), GFP_KERNEL); smb2_query_dir_first ->query_dir_first() SMB2_query_directory SMB2_query_directory_init cifs_send_recv smb2_parse_query_directory srch_inf->ntwrk_buf_start = (char *)rsp; srch_inf->srch_entries_start = (char *)rsp + ... srch_inf->last_entry = (char *)rsp + ... srch_inf->smallBuf = true; find_cifs_entry /* if (cfile->srch_inf.ntwrk_buf_start) */ cifs_small_buf_release(cfile->srch_inf // free cifs_readdir ->iterate_shared() /* file->private_data != NULL */ find_cifs_entry /* in while (...) loop */ smb2_query_dir_next ->query_dir_next() SMB2_query_directory SMB2_query_directory_init cifs_send_recv compound_send_recv smb_send_rqst __smb_send_rqst rc = -ERESTARTSYS; /* if (fatal_signal_pending()) */ goto out; return rc /* if (cfile->srch_inf.last_entry) */ cifs_save_resume_key() cifs_fill_dirent // UAF /* if (rc) */ return -ENOENT; Fix this by ensuring the return code is checked before using pointers from the srch_inf. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=220131 [1] Fixes: a364bc0b37f1 ("[CIFS] fix saving of resume key before CIFSFindNext") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc(a)manguebit.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Mingrui <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong(a)huaweicloud.com> --- fs/cifs/readdir.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/cifs/readdir.c b/fs/cifs/readdir.c index 799be3a5d25e..a7a9391214c1 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/cifs/readdir.c @@ -776,15 +776,15 @@ find_cifs_entry(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, loff_t pos, (rc == 0) && !cfile->srch_inf.endOfSearch) { cifs_dbg(FYI, "calling findnext2\n"); rc = server->ops->query_dir_next(xid, tcon, &cfile->fid, search_flags, &cfile->srch_inf); + if (rc) + return -ENOENT; /* FindFirst/Next set last_entry to NULL on malformed reply */ if (cfile->srch_inf.last_entry) cifs_save_resume_key(cfile->srch_inf.last_entry, cfile); - if (rc) - return -ENOENT; } if (index_to_find < cfile->srch_inf.index_of_last_entry) { /* we found the buffer that contains the entry */ /* scan and find it */ int i; -- 2.34.3

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] NFS: Automounted filesystems should inherit ro,noexec,nodev,sync flags
by Wang Zhaolong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit 8675c69816e4276b979ff475ee5fac4688f80125 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13299 CVE: CVE-2025-68764 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a filesystem is being automounted, it needs to preserve the user-set superblock mount options, such as the "ro" flag. Reported-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240604112636.236517-3-lilingfeng@huaweicloud.… Fixes: f2aedb713c28 ("NFS: Add fs_context support.") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Zhaolong <wangzhaolong(a)huaweicloud.com> --- fs/nfs/namespace.c | 6 ++++++ fs/nfs/super.c | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/namespace.c b/fs/nfs/namespace.c index e7494cdd957e..40d7163bca87 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/nfs/namespace.c @@ -147,10 +147,11 @@ struct vfsmount *nfs_d_automount(struct path *path) struct nfs_fs_context *ctx; struct fs_context *fc; struct vfsmount *mnt = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SB(path->dentry->d_sb); struct nfs_client *client = server->nfs_client; + unsigned long s_flags = path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags; int timeout = READ_ONCE(nfs_mountpoint_expiry_timeout); int ret; if (IS_ROOT(path->dentry)) return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE); @@ -172,10 +173,15 @@ struct vfsmount *nfs_d_automount(struct path *path) if (fc->net_ns != client->cl_net) { put_net(fc->net_ns); fc->net_ns = get_net(client->cl_net); } + /* Inherit the flags covered by NFS_SB_MASK */ + fc->sb_flags_mask |= NFS_SB_MASK; + fc->sb_flags &= ~NFS_SB_MASK; + fc->sb_flags |= s_flags & NFS_SB_MASK; + /* for submounts we want the same server; referrals will reassign */ memcpy(&ctx->nfs_server._address, &client->cl_addr, client->cl_addrlen); ctx->nfs_server.addrlen = client->cl_addrlen; ctx->nfs_server.port = server->port; diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c index 1c2969cb907e..9fa3d17981bd 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/super.c +++ b/fs/nfs/super.c @@ -1318,14 +1318,10 @@ int nfs_get_tree_common(struct fs_context *fc) /* -o noac implies -o sync */ if (server->flags & NFS_MOUNT_NOAC) fc->sb_flags |= SB_SYNCHRONOUS; - if (ctx->clone_data.sb) - if (ctx->clone_data.sb->s_flags & SB_SYNCHRONOUS) - fc->sb_flags |= SB_SYNCHRONOUS; - /* Get a superblock - note that we may end up sharing one that already exists */ fc->s_fs_info = server; s = sget_fc(fc, compare_super, nfs_set_super); fc->s_fs_info = NULL; if (IS_ERR(s)) { -- 2.34.3

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] VMCI: fix race between vmci_host_setup_notify and vmci_ctx_unset_notify
by Chen Ridong 12 Jan '26

12 Jan '26

From: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.240 commit 6e3af836805ed1d7a699f76ec798626198917aa4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9640 CVE: CVE-2025-38102 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1bd6406fb5f36c2bb1e96e27d4c3e9f4d09edde4 ] During our test, it is found that a warning can be trigger in try_grab_folio as follow: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1678 at mm/gup.c:147 try_grab_folio+0x106/0x130 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1678 Comm: syz.3.31 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc5 #163 PREEMPT(undef) RIP: 0010:try_grab_folio+0x106/0x130 Call Trace: <TASK> follow_huge_pmd+0x240/0x8e0 follow_pmd_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x40b/0x5c0 follow_pud_mask.constprop.0.isra.0+0x14a/0x170 follow_page_mask+0x1c2/0x1f0 __get_user_pages+0x176/0x950 __gup_longterm_locked+0x15b/0x1060 ? gup_fast+0x120/0x1f0 gup_fast_fallback+0x17e/0x230 get_user_pages_fast+0x5f/0x80 vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl+0x21c/0xf80 RIP: 0033:0x54d2cd ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Digging into the source, context->notify_page may init by get_user_pages_fast and can be seen in vmci_ctx_unset_notify which will try to put_page. However get_user_pages_fast is not finished here and lead to following try_grab_folio warning. The race condition is shown as follow: cpu0 cpu1 vmci_host_do_set_notify vmci_host_setup_notify get_user_pages_fast(uva, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &context->notify_page); lockless_pages_from_mm gup_pgd_range gup_huge_pmd // update &context->notify_page vmci_host_do_set_notify vmci_ctx_unset_notify notify_page = context->notify_page; if (notify_page) put_page(notify_page); // page is freed __gup_longterm_locked __get_user_pages follow_trans_huge_pmd try_grab_folio // warn here To slove this, use local variable page to make notify_page can be seen after finish get_user_pages_fast. Fixes: a1d88436d53a ("VMCI: Fix two UVA mapping bugs") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/e91da589-ad57-3969-d979-879bbd10dddd@huawei.com/ Signed-off-by: Wupeng Ma <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250510033040.901582-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c | 11 +++++------ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c index cc6da9e5a542..e7965ee6bdba 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c +++ b/drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c @@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ static int drv_cp_harray_to_user(void __user *user_buf_uva, static int vmci_host_setup_notify(struct vmci_ctx *context, unsigned long uva) { + struct page *page; int retval; if (context->notify_page) { @@ -243,13 +244,11 @@ static int vmci_host_setup_notify(struct vmci_ctx *context, /* * Lock physical page backing a given user VA. */ - retval = get_user_pages_fast(uva, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &context->notify_page); - if (retval != 1) { - context->notify_page = NULL; + retval = get_user_pages_fast(uva, 1, FOLL_WRITE, &page); + if (retval != 1) return VMCI_ERROR_GENERIC; - } - if (context->notify_page == NULL) - return VMCI_ERROR_UNAVAILABLE; + + context->notify_page = page; /* * Map the locked page and set up notify pointer. -- 2.34.1

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