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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2026-90129
by Jiacheng Yu 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

CVE-2026-90129 Denis V. Lunev (3): virtio: add virtio_device_shutdown() helper virtio_balloon: factor out virtballoon_quiesce() virtio_balloon: quiesce balloon work before device shutdown drivers/virtio/virtio.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------- drivers/virtio/virtio_balloon.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/virtio.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] firmware_loader: do not queue completed sysfs fallback requests
by Jiacheng Yu 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

From: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha(a)oss.qualcomm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 5a250bff75a446374c05622973b18b4ab662b504 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19245 CVE: CVE-2026-90284 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b48373c901951fad1a26bd7c33ad91172b3945b5 upstream. fw_load_sysfs_fallback() calls device_add() before adding the fw_priv to pending_fw_head. device_add() publishes the fallback loading interface, so a userspace helper which discovers the device by scanning sysfs can write 0 to the loading attribute and complete the request before it is queued as pending. In that interleaving firmware_loading_store() calls fw_state_done() while pending_list still points to itself, so it cannot remove an entry from pending_fw_head. The subsequent unconditional list_add() then queues an already-completed fw_priv. Once the request is released, pending_fw_head can retain a pointer to freed memory and the next fallback request can fault while validating the list. Only in-flight fallback requests need suspend or reboot abort handling. If the request is already DONE after device_add(), return success from the fallback path without sending another uevent, waiting again, or queueing it as pending. This preserves the invariant that pending_fw_head contains only active fallback requests. Fixes: 75d95e2e39b2 ("firmware_loader: fix use-after-free in firmware_fallback_sysfs") Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <mukesh.ojha(a)oss.qualcomm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260716081601.1674470-1-mukesh.ojha@oss.qualcomm.… Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c index bf68e3947814..b66a529fd041 100644 --- a/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c +++ b/drivers/base/firmware_loader/fallback.c @@ -91,6 +91,16 @@ static int fw_load_sysfs_fallback(struct fw_sysfs *fw_sysfs, long timeout) retval = -EINTR; goto out; } + + /* + * device_add() exposes the loading interface before pending_list is + * linked into pending_fw_head, so fw_state_done() may run first. + */ + if (fw_state_is_done(fw_priv)) { + mutex_unlock(&fw_lock); + goto out; + } + list_add(&fw_priv->pending_list, &pending_fw_head); mutex_unlock(&fw_lock); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] iommu/vt-d: Force requesting ACS when tboot is enabled
by Jiacheng Yu 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

From: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 607432b2618b61df81134be0ef2562b8300c1216 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18838 CVE: CVE-2026-89448 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Currently the conditions of requesting ACS in detect_intel_iommu() don't include tboot, leading to a possible misconfiguration with ACS disabled (e.g. due to user opts) while iommu is later forced on by tboot_force_iommu(). Fix it by checking tboot in detect_intel_iommu(). Fixes: 5d990b627537 ("PCI: add pci_request_acs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h include/linux/intel-iommu.h [1. Context conflicts in drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c. 2. The upstream patch stores the Intel IOMMU header at drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h; this tree keeps it at include/linux/intel-iommu.h. Move the extern int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce declaration and the intel_iommu_tboot_noforce (0) fallback there and drop the drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h change.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 2 +- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c index fde7eb3d8103..80b997c5c0d3 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c @@ -919,6 +919,18 @@ dmar_validate_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_header *entry, void *arg) return 0; } +static bool dmar_required(void) +{ + /* tboot supersedes any user/platform opt */ + if (!intel_iommu_tboot_noforce && tboot_enabled()) + return true; + + if (!no_iommu && (!dmar_disabled || dmar_platform_optin())) + return true; + + return false; +} + int __init detect_intel_iommu(void) { int ret; @@ -932,8 +944,7 @@ int __init detect_intel_iommu(void) if (!ret) ret = dmar_walk_dmar_table((struct acpi_table_dmar *)dmar_tbl, &validate_drhd_cb); - if (!ret && !no_iommu && !iommu_detected && - (!dmar_disabled || dmar_platform_optin())) { + if (!ret && !iommu_detected && dmar_required()) { iommu_detected = 1; /* Make sure ACS will be enabled */ pci_request_acs(); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c index 245fef1026c3..c8889eccf3bf 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int rwbf_quirk; * (used when kernel is launched w/ TXT) */ static int force_on = 0; -static int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; +int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; static int no_platform_optin; #define ROOT_ENTRY_NR (VTD_PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct root_entry)) diff --git a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h index a05221cb9e11..454094815d88 100644 --- a/include/linux/intel-iommu.h +++ b/include/linux/intel-iommu.h @@ -811,6 +811,7 @@ extern int iommu_calculate_max_sagaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu); extern int dmar_disabled; extern int intel_iommu_enabled; extern int intel_iommu_gfx_mapped; +extern int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; #else static inline int iommu_calculate_agaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu) { @@ -822,6 +823,7 @@ static inline int iommu_calculate_max_sagaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu) } #define dmar_disabled (1) #define intel_iommu_enabled (0) +#define intel_iommu_tboot_noforce (0) #endif #endif -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/vt-d: Force requesting ACS when tboot is enabled
by Jiacheng Yu 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

From: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 579eb867d3da63f3b5e32f235925e1daa7ec70d0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18838 CVE: CVE-2026-89448 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 607432b2618b61df81134be0ef2562b8300c1216 upstream. Currently the conditions of requesting ACS in detect_intel_iommu() don't include tboot, leading to a possible misconfiguration with ACS disabled (e.g. due to user opts) while iommu is later forced on by tboot_force_iommu(). Fix it by checking tboot in detect_intel_iommu(). Fixes: 5d990b627537 ("PCI: add pci_request_acs") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 2 +- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c index 3a99de229370..5e3a36f24791 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c @@ -972,6 +972,18 @@ dmar_validate_one_drhd(struct acpi_dmar_header *entry, void *arg) return 0; } +static bool dmar_required(void) +{ + /* tboot supersedes any user/platform opt */ + if (!intel_iommu_tboot_noforce && tboot_enabled()) + return true; + + if (!no_iommu && (!dmar_disabled || dmar_platform_optin())) + return true; + + return false; +} + void __init detect_intel_iommu(void) { int ret; @@ -985,8 +997,7 @@ void __init detect_intel_iommu(void) if (!ret) ret = dmar_walk_dmar_table((struct acpi_table_dmar *)dmar_tbl, &validate_drhd_cb); - if (!ret && !no_iommu && !iommu_detected && - (!dmar_disabled || dmar_platform_optin())) { + if (!ret && !iommu_detected && dmar_required()) { iommu_detected = 1; /* Make sure ACS will be enabled */ pci_request_acs(); diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c index f982327f3dfd..1f6394d780ee 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static int rwbf_quirk; * (used when kernel is launched w/ TXT) */ static int force_on = 0; -static int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; +int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; static int no_platform_optin; #define ROOT_ENTRY_NR (VTD_PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct root_entry)) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h index 791326fa95ba..afd473a8983d 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.h @@ -1172,6 +1172,7 @@ static inline bool ecmd_has_pmu_essential(struct intel_iommu *iommu) extern int dmar_disabled; extern int intel_iommu_enabled; +extern int intel_iommu_tboot_noforce; #else static inline int iommu_calculate_agaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu) { @@ -1184,6 +1185,7 @@ static inline int iommu_calculate_max_sagaw(struct intel_iommu *iommu) #define dmar_disabled (1) #define intel_iommu_enabled (0) #define intel_iommu_sm (0) +#define intel_iommu_tboot_noforce (0) #endif static inline const char *decode_prq_descriptor(char *str, size_t size, -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
by Jiacheng Yu 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice(a)isovalent.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 339f47ae04dcc6b5a730dd6bc70dddc8937c3260 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19380 CVE: CVE-2026-90063 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c27c449d455aafd9018a3cbab150f1c42c87923f ] The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by gso_size. Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly tested at tools/testing/selftests/net/tun.c:649. Fixes: 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user") Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice(a)isovalent.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822120117.1163423-2-alice.kernel@fastmail.im Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 02a9f4dc594d0..d2cab10569644 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> #include <linux/udp.h> +#include <net/tcp.h> #include <uapi/linux/tcp.h> #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h> @@ -178,6 +179,9 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb->csum_offset != offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)) return -EINVAL; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE * GSO_MAX_SEGS < GSO_MAX_SIZE); + gso_size = max(gso_size, TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE); break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs
by Jiacheng Yu 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

From: Alice Mikityanska <alice(a)isovalent.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 339f47ae04dcc6b5a730dd6bc70dddc8937c3260 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19380 CVE: CVE-2026-90063 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c27c449d455aafd9018a3cbab150f1c42c87923f ] The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by gso_size. Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly tested at tools/testing/selftests/net/tun.c:649. Fixes: 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user") Signed-off-by: Alice Mikityanska <alice(a)isovalent.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260822120117.1163423-2-alice.kernel@fastmail.im Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/virtio_net.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/virtio_net.h b/include/linux/virtio_net.h index 02a9f4dc594d0..d2cab10569644 100644 --- a/include/linux/virtio_net.h +++ b/include/linux/virtio_net.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> #include <linux/udp.h> +#include <net/tcp.h> #include <uapi/linux/tcp.h> #include <uapi/linux/virtio_net.h> @@ -178,6 +179,9 @@ static inline int virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL && skb->csum_offset != offsetof(struct tcphdr, check)) return -EINVAL; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE * GSO_MAX_SEGS < GSO_MAX_SIZE); + gso_size = max(gso_size, TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE); break; } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH 0/3] arm64: Fix NMI/DAIF handling in hibernate, suspend and kprobes
by Qinxin Xia 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

arm64: Fix NMI/DAIF handling in hibernate, suspend and kprobes Ada Couprie Diaz (1): arm64: hibernate: mask DAIF before restoring hibernated kernel Vladimir Murzin (2): arm64: suspend: Always initialise PSTATE.ALLINT arm64: kprobes: Disable NMIs arch/arm64/include/asm/daifflags.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/hibernate.c | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/probes/kprobes.c | 12 +++++++----- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
by Zhang Qilong 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.266 commit 1ed45c8d96498725eb54f740172f9068d8673906 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18381 CVE: CVE-2026-80561 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 437b6551cfcc235eea1d735a874f9d421f555e17 upstream. decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim changelog ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c [Just context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index 68ca68df66d1..46932f8db596 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -250,31 +250,38 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker) ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_id_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name)); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, + sizeof(locker->id.name), bad); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) return PTR_ERR(s); locker->id.cookie = s; ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_info_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */ + /* skip expiration */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad); + ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->info.addr, sizeof(locker->info.addr)); ceph_decode_addr(&locker->info.addr); - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* skip description */ + + /* skip description */ + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__, ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie, ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr.in_addr)); return 0; + +bad: + return -EINVAL; } static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, struct ceph_locker **lockers, u32 *num_lockers) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] xfrm: fix stale skb->prev UAF in validate_xmit_xfrm() for async crypto GSO segments
by superdcc97＠163.com 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> CVE: CVE-2026-68426 Reference: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17032 This series fixes CVE-2026-68426, a use-after-free in validate_xmit_xfrm(): when async crypto steals GSO segments (->xmit() returns -EINPROGRESS), the returned segment list head keeps skb->prev pointing at a stolen (crypto-owned) segment. validate_xmit_skb_list() later does tail = skb->prev and tail->next = skb, writing through the stale pointer. Patch 1 is a prerequisite backport of upstream d1d17a359ce6 ("esp: remove the skb from the chain when it's enqueued in cryptd_wq", v5.6). It introduces the pskb tracking of the last retained segment and properly unlinks stolen segments from the chain. Without it the CVE fix commit cannot be applied faithfully: its skb->prev repoint logic builds directly on the pskb variable and the unlinking behaviour introduced there. Patch 2 is the mainline fix for CVE-2026-68426, 3f4c3919baf0944ad96580467c302bc6c7758b00 (v7.2-rc4): repoint skb->prev at the last retained segment before returning, so validate_xmit_skb_list() never chains onto a segment now owned by the crypto engine. Both patches are adapted to the 4.19-based openEuler-1.0-LTS code base, which still uses the original do-while loop form of validate_xmit_xfrm() (the upstream skb_list_walk_safe refactor c3b18e0d9254 is a pure refactor and is not backported). The target's "return skb" semantics are kept (upstream's ERR_PTR(-EINPROGRESS) return comes from the unrelated later commit 6860b467f569 and is not needed for this fix). Note: this series is based on f702ec806ef8 and supersedes the incomplete single-commit adaptation 0026e6ba24b0 ("xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment"), which tracked pskb without the prerequisite chain-unlink fix. Petr Wozniak (1): xfrm: fix stale skb->prev after async crypto steals a GSO segment Xin Long (1): esp: remove the skb from the chain when it's enqueued in cryptd_wq net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[openEuler-1.0-LTS] libceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
by Zhang Qilong 08 Oct '26

08 Oct '26

From: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.266 commit 1ed45c8d96498725eb54f740172f9068d8673906 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18381 CVE: CVE-2026-80561 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 437b6551cfcc235eea1d735a874f9d421f555e17 upstream. decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger slab-out-of-bounds reads: 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past the validated buffer boundary. 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a bogus boundary. 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping the decode window entirely. Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants: ceph_decode_copy -> ceph_decode_copy_safe *p += sizeof(...) -> ceph_decode_skip_n ceph_decode_32(p) -> ceph_decode_32_safe *p += len -> ceph_decode_skip_n A new label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition) without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. [ idryomov: use ceph_decode_skip_string() to skip description, trim changelog ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info") Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c [Just context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Zhang Qilong <zhangqilong3(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 15 +++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c index 68ca68df66d1..46932f8db596 100644 --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c @@ -250,31 +250,38 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker) ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_id_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name)); + ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, + sizeof(locker->id.name), bad); s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO); if (IS_ERR(s)) return PTR_ERR(s); locker->id.cookie = s; ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "locker_info_t", &struct_v, &len); if (ret) return ret; - *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */ + /* skip expiration */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad); + ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->info.addr, sizeof(locker->info.addr)); ceph_decode_addr(&locker->info.addr); - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* skip description */ + + /* skip description */ + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__, ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie, ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr.in_addr)); return 0; + +bad: + return -EINVAL; } static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag, struct ceph_locker **lockers, u32 *num_lockers) { -- 2.43.0

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