- Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs()
by Pu Lehui 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 848b80ca6b410f350d08b8ac19a00ef88223f2ea category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18970 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 68d541754d6cd3bb98d1fd8314f57e5eb533557d upstream. __build_xattrs() decodes the MDS-supplied xattr blob one attribute at a time. For each attribute it reads a 32-bit name length, advances past the name bytes, reads a 32-bit value length, records the value pointer, and advances past the value bytes. The two length fields are read with ceph_decode_32_safe(), but the value bytes themselves are advanced over with a bare "p += len" and no ceph_decode_need() check that "len" bytes remain in the blob. For every attribute except the last, the next iteration's ceph_decode_32_safe() on the following name length implicitly verifies that the previous value did not run past the blob end. The final attribute has no successor, so its decoded value length is never checked against the blob bounds. A malicious or compromised metadata server can set the last attribute's value length larger than the bytes actually present in the blob. The blob is a dedicated kvmalloc() allocation sized to the wire length (ceph_buffer_new() in ceph_fill_inode()). __set_xattr() records the oversized length in xattr->val_len verbatim, and a later getxattr(2) runs memcpy(value, xattr->val, xattr->val_len) into a user-supplied buffer, copying bytes past the end of the allocation back to user space. Impact: a malicious metadata server discloses adjacent kernel heap bytes to a local user via getxattr(2) on a CephFS file. Add the missing ceph_decode_need() so an out-of-bounds value length on the final attribute fails the decode and returns -EIO instead of being stored. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 355da1eb7a1f ("ceph: inode operations") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c index d1fd81b1b541..80f39d46f12d 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c @@ -715,6 +715,7 @@ static int __build_xattrs(struct inode *inode) name = p; p += len; ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad); + ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad); val = p; p += len; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: bound xattr value length in __build_xattrs()
by Pu Lehui 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 61f085cb8976c9cebc90e1a8933e4cc1ad8b0fce category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18970 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 68d541754d6cd3bb98d1fd8314f57e5eb533557d upstream. __build_xattrs() decodes the MDS-supplied xattr blob one attribute at a time. For each attribute it reads a 32-bit name length, advances past the name bytes, reads a 32-bit value length, records the value pointer, and advances past the value bytes. The two length fields are read with ceph_decode_32_safe(), but the value bytes themselves are advanced over with a bare "p += len" and no ceph_decode_need() check that "len" bytes remain in the blob. For every attribute except the last, the next iteration's ceph_decode_32_safe() on the following name length implicitly verifies that the previous value did not run past the blob end. The final attribute has no successor, so its decoded value length is never checked against the blob bounds. A malicious or compromised metadata server can set the last attribute's value length larger than the bytes actually present in the blob. The blob is a dedicated kvmalloc() allocation sized to the wire length (ceph_buffer_new() in ceph_fill_inode()). __set_xattr() records the oversized length in xattr->val_len verbatim, and a later getxattr(2) runs memcpy(value, xattr->val, xattr->val_len) into a user-supplied buffer, copying bytes past the end of the allocation back to user space. Impact: a malicious metadata server discloses adjacent kernel heap bytes to a local user via getxattr(2) on a CephFS file. Add the missing ceph_decode_need() so an out-of-bounds value length on the final attribute fails the decode and returns -EIO instead of being stored. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 355da1eb7a1f ("ceph: inode operations") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c index 3920aa4e40a8..4abed75b01ba 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c @@ -844,6 +844,7 @@ static int __build_xattrs(struct inode *inode) name = p; p += len; ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad); + ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad); val = p; p += len; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
by Pu Lehui 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19003 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory. A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker. Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel. Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function. Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d463a43d69f4 ("ceph: CEPH_FEATURE_MDSENC support") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Conflicts: fs/ceph/mdsmap.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c index 44e53abeb32a..5583f5e171af 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> @@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end) int err = -EINVAL; u8 mdsmap_v, mdsmap_cv; u16 mdsmap_ev; + size_t export_targets_len; m = kzalloc(sizeof(*m), GFP_NOFS); if (!m) @@ -192,8 +194,11 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end) *p += namelen; if (info_v >= 2) { ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, num_export_targets, bad); + export_targets_len = size_mul(num_export_targets, + sizeof(u32)); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, export_targets_len, bad); pexport_targets = *p; - *p += num_export_targets * sizeof(u32); + *p += export_targets_len; } else { num_export_targets = 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
by Pu Lehui 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19003 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory. A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker. Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel. Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function. Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d463a43d69f4 ("ceph: CEPH_FEATURE_MDSENC support") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Conflicts: fs/ceph/mdsmap.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c index 47f2903bacb9..05c25f1de6ad 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> @@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end) int err; u8 mdsmap_v; u16 mdsmap_ev; + size_t export_targets_len; m = kzalloc(sizeof(*m), GFP_NOFS); if (!m) @@ -219,8 +221,11 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(void **p, void *end) *p += namelen; if (info_v >= 2) { ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, num_export_targets, bad); + export_targets_len = size_mul(num_export_targets, + sizeof(u32)); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, export_targets_len, bad); pexport_targets = *p; - *p += num_export_targets * sizeof(u32); + *p += export_targets_len; } else { num_export_targets = 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: bound num_export_targets array for mds info v2/v3
by Pu Lehui 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit eb3e1a1cb1634c76d59c5a9cb1a026fc69d40911 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19003 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a3eb169ee297aa99670ba927c659990bd1e453f3 upstream. ceph_mdsmap_decode() in fs/ceph/mdsmap.c reads num_export_targets from each per-mds info record and advances the decode cursor by num_export_targets * sizeof(u32) without first checking that many bytes remain. The only upper-bound check that catches a runaway cursor (*p > info_end) is gated on info_v >= 4, because info_end is left NULL for info_v 2 and 3. When the monitor sends an MDS map whose per-mds info version is 2 or 3 with an oversized num_export_targets, the cursor moves past the message front buffer and the later export-targets loop calls the unchecked ceph_decode_32() on out-of-bounds memory. A kernel client processes CEPH_MSG_MDS_MAP from its monitor session (net/ceph/mon_client.c dispatches it; fs/ceph/super.c routes it to ceph_mdsc_handle_mdsmap(), which sets end to the front buffer bound and calls ceph_mdsmap_decode()). A malicious or compromised monitor, or an on-path attacker on an unsigned/unencrypted messenger session, can therefore drive an out-of-bounds read in the client kernel; on x86_64 with KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in ceph_mdsmap_decode(). The decoded values land in the internal info->export_targets[] array, so the consequence is a kernel out-of-bounds read, not an information leak to the attacker. Impact: a malicious or compromised Ceph monitor sending an MDS map with a per-mds info version of 2 or 3 and an oversized num_export_targets field triggers an out-of-bounds read in the CephFS client kernel. Add a ceph_decode_need() for the export-targets array before advancing the cursor, so the bound is enforced for every info_v >= 2, not only info_v >= 4. This mirrors the count-then-need idiom already used for m_data_pg_pools later in the same function. Compute the export-targets byte count with size_mul() and reuse that checked length when advancing the cursor, so the attacker-controlled num_export_targets multiplication fails closed on overflow rather than relying on the later kcalloc() guard. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d463a43d69f4 ("ceph: CEPH_FEATURE_MDSENC support") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c index c046b567ac30..939790d2620f 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> @@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, void **p, u8 mdsmap_v; u16 mdsmap_ev; u32 target; + size_t export_targets_len; m = kzalloc(sizeof(*m), GFP_NOFS); if (!m) @@ -222,8 +224,11 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, void **p, *p += namelen; if (info_v >= 2) { ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, num_export_targets, bad); + export_targets_len = size_mul(num_export_targets, + sizeof(u32)); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, export_targets_len, bad); pexport_targets = *p; - *p += num_export_targets * sizeof(u32); + *p += export_targets_len; } else { num_export_targets = 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: reject export_targets ranks >= CEPH_MAX_MDS in mdsmap decode
by Pu Lehui 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit c4addccd05bacbef2144b4db14853d0308a218ac category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18981 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit aedc9053d909508a5f56c3f49f885fc030df4730 upstream. MDSMap export_targets entries are monitor controlled. check_new_map() uses each entry as a bit number in a fixed stack bitmap, so a rank outside the protocol namespace can make set_bit() write past the end of the array. Reject ranks outside CEPH_MAX_MDS while decoding the map. Do not validate against possible_max_rank here because maps may legitimately reference ranks beyond a temporarily reduced max_mds. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d517b3983dd3 ("ceph: reconnect to the export targets on new mdsmaps") Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/mdsmap.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c index 15243241bc2b..c046b567ac30 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c +++ b/fs/ceph/mdsmap.c @@ -264,6 +264,10 @@ struct ceph_mdsmap *ceph_mdsmap_decode(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, void **p, goto nomem; for (j = 0; j < num_export_targets; j++) { target = ceph_decode_32(&pexport_targets); + if (target >= CEPH_MAX_MDS) { + err = -EIO; + goto corrupt; + } info->export_targets[j] = target; } } else { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock
by Chen Yuxi 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li(a)clyso.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 7af4c4f01305b0935adf6d4301b1ec407025485d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19017 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- list_for_each_entry() iterates ci->i_cap_flush_list but drops i_ceph_lock to send cap messages. During the unlock window, handle_cap_flush_ack() can acquire i_ceph_lock, detach cf entries with tid <= flush_tid from the list, release i_ceph_lock, and free them via ceph_free_cap_flush() outside any lock. When the original thread reacquires i_ceph_lock and the for-loop macro advances via cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list), it dereferences cf->i_list.next on freed memory. The race timeline: __kick_flushing_caps() handle_cap_flush_ack() ----------------------- ----------------------- holds i_ceph_lock <--- iterates to cf (tid=10) prepares FLUSH message drops i_ceph_lock <--- __send_cap() ── FLUSH(tid=10) MDS sends FLUSH_ACK(tid=10) ---> acquires i_ceph_lock cf->tid(10) <= flush_tid(10), detaches cf from i_cap_flush_list drops i_ceph_lock ceph_free_cap_flush(cf) <- frees it! acquires i_ceph_lock <--- for-loop advances: cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list) -- UAF on freed cf->i_list.next The cf was just sent by __kick_flushing_caps itself via __send_cap(). The MDS may respond with FLUSH_ACK quickly enough that handle_cap_flush_ack() frees cf before __kick_flushing_caps can finish the iteration. Fix by converting to a manual while loop: save the next pointer under i_ceph_lock before dropping it, then use the saved pointer after reacquiring, so the potentially-freed cf is never accessed again. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li(a)clyso.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Conflicts: fs/ceph/caps.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Chen Yuxi <chenyuxi19(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 9bebdafd5ec9..d709edea84ae 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -2513,9 +2513,14 @@ static void __kick_flushing_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, } } - list_for_each_entry(cf, &ci->i_cap_flush_list, i_list) { - if (cf->tid < first_tid) + cf = list_first_entry(&ci->i_cap_flush_list, struct ceph_cap_flush, i_list); + while (&cf->i_list != &ci->i_cap_flush_list) { + struct ceph_cap_flush *next; + + if (cf->tid < first_tid) { + cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list); continue; + } cap = ci->i_auth_cap; if (!(cap && cap->session == session)) { @@ -2525,6 +2530,7 @@ static void __kick_flushing_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, } first_tid = cf->tid + 1; + next = list_next_entry(cf, i_list); if (!cf->is_capsnap) { struct cap_msg_args arg; @@ -2565,6 +2571,7 @@ static void __kick_flushing_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, } spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + cf = next; } } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ceph: fix UAF in __kick_flushing_caps() on cf entry freed during unlock
by Chen Yuxi 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

From: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li(a)clyso.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 7af4c4f01305b0935adf6d4301b1ec407025485d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19017 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- list_for_each_entry() iterates ci->i_cap_flush_list but drops i_ceph_lock to send cap messages. During the unlock window, handle_cap_flush_ack() can acquire i_ceph_lock, detach cf entries with tid <= flush_tid from the list, release i_ceph_lock, and free them via ceph_free_cap_flush() outside any lock. When the original thread reacquires i_ceph_lock and the for-loop macro advances via cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list), it dereferences cf->i_list.next on freed memory. The race timeline: __kick_flushing_caps() handle_cap_flush_ack() ----------------------- ----------------------- holds i_ceph_lock <--- iterates to cf (tid=10) prepares FLUSH message drops i_ceph_lock <--- __send_cap() ── FLUSH(tid=10) MDS sends FLUSH_ACK(tid=10) ---> acquires i_ceph_lock cf->tid(10) <= flush_tid(10), detaches cf from i_cap_flush_list drops i_ceph_lock ceph_free_cap_flush(cf) <- frees it! acquires i_ceph_lock <--- for-loop advances: cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list) -- UAF on freed cf->i_list.next The cf was just sent by __kick_flushing_caps itself via __send_cap(). The MDS may respond with FLUSH_ACK quickly enough that handle_cap_flush_ack() frees cf before __kick_flushing_caps can finish the iteration. Fix by converting to a manual while loop: save the next pointer under i_ceph_lock before dropping it, then use the saved pointer after reacquiring, so the potentially-freed cf is never accessed again. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Xiubo Li <xiubo.li(a)clyso.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava(a)dubeyko.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Conflicts: fs/ceph/caps.c [ctx conflict] Signed-off-by: Chen Yuxi <chenyuxi19(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/caps.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/caps.c b/fs/ceph/caps.c index 0ff68e63f5a6..c80a17f82f81 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/caps.c +++ b/fs/ceph/caps.c @@ -2534,9 +2534,14 @@ static void __kick_flushing_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, } } - list_for_each_entry(cf, &ci->i_cap_flush_list, i_list) { - if (cf->tid < first_tid) + cf = list_first_entry(&ci->i_cap_flush_list, struct ceph_cap_flush, i_list); + while (&cf->i_list != &ci->i_cap_flush_list) { + struct ceph_cap_flush *next; + + if (cf->tid < first_tid) { + cf = list_next_entry(cf, i_list); continue; + } cap = ci->i_auth_cap; if (!(cap && cap->session == session)) { @@ -2546,6 +2551,7 @@ static void __kick_flushing_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, } first_tid = cf->tid + 1; + next = list_next_entry(cf, i_list); if (!cf->is_capsnap) { struct cap_msg_args arg; @@ -2586,6 +2592,7 @@ static void __kick_flushing_caps(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc, } spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock); + cf = next; } } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-89636
by Yifan Qiao 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

Fredric Cover (2): smb: client: harden DFS cache against invalid target hints smb: client: clear ce->tgthint in free_tgts() fs/smb/client/dfs_cache.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2026-89636
by Yifan Qiao 17 Sep '26

17 Sep '26

Fredric Cover (2): smb: client: harden DFS cache against invalid target hints smb: client: clear ce->tgthint in free_tgts() fs/cifs/dfs_cache.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3