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[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] RDMA/erdma: Hold CQ references when processing EQ events
by Tang Hui 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

From: Cheng Xu <chengyou(a)linux.alibaba.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit c0a83f29a24c7e7f8516630848ef6db4c174deed category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19472 CVE: CVE-2026-90309 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 98df2aee1459ee1c62c70cbe9b370d2a532aea36 ] EQ handlers look up CQs from dev->cq_xa and invoke CQ completion or error callbacks outside the xarray lock. erdma_destroy_cq() can erase the CQ from the xarray and free its queue buffer and doorbell record while a previously scheduled EQ handler is still using the CQ. Add a CQ refcount and take a reference under the xarray lock with refcount_inc_not_zero(). Remove the CQ from the xarray before dropping the destroy-path reference, then wait for in-flight EQ users before releasing CQ resources. Fixes: 155055771704 ("RDMA/erdma: Add verbs implementation") Signed-off-by: Cheng Xu <chengyou(a)linux.alibaba.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730124357.12976-1-chengyou@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Co-authored-by: BackportAgent(a)deepseek-v4.1-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tang Hui <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_eq.c | 6 ++++-- drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c | 12 +++++++++-- drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_eq.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_eq.c index ea47cb21fdb8c..d59e2de4e4e10 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_eq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_eq.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ void erdma_aeq_event_handler(struct erdma_dev *dev) if (FIELD_GET(ERDMA_AEQE_HDR_TYPE_MASK, le32_to_cpu(aeqe->hdr)) == ERDMA_AE_TYPE_CQ_ERR) { cqn = le32_to_cpu(aeqe->event_data0); - cq = find_cq_by_cqn(dev, cqn); + cq = erdma_cq_get_by_cqn(dev, cqn); if (!cq) continue; @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ void erdma_aeq_event_handler(struct erdma_dev *dev) if (cq->ibcq.event_handler) cq->ibcq.event_handler(&event, cq->ibcq.cq_context); + erdma_cq_put(cq); } else { qpn = le32_to_cpu(aeqe->event_data0); qp = find_qp_by_qpn(dev, qpn); @@ -142,7 +143,7 @@ void erdma_ceq_completion_handler(struct erdma_eq_cb *ceq_cb) poll_cnt++; cqn = FIELD_GET(ERDMA_CEQE_HDR_CQN_MASK, READ_ONCE(*ceqe)); - cq = find_cq_by_cqn(dev, cqn); + cq = erdma_cq_get_by_cqn(dev, cqn); if (!cq) continue; @@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ void erdma_ceq_completion_handler(struct erdma_eq_cb *ceq_cb) if (cq->ibcq.comp_handler) cq->ibcq.comp_handler(&cq->ibcq, cq->ibcq.cq_context); + erdma_cq_put(cq); } notify_eq(&ceq_cb->eq); diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c index e990690d8b3cd..0c66d2bed569b 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c @@ -1228,6 +1228,7 @@ int erdma_destroy_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, struct ib_udata *udata) struct erdma_dev *dev = to_edev(ibcq->device); struct erdma_ucontext *ctx = rdma_udata_to_drv_context( udata, struct erdma_ucontext, ibucontext); + unsigned long flags; int err; struct erdma_cmdq_destroy_cq_req req; @@ -1239,6 +1240,13 @@ int erdma_destroy_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, struct ib_udata *udata) if (err) return err; + xa_lock_irqsave(&dev->cq_xa, flags); + __xa_erase(&dev->cq_xa, cq->cqn); + xa_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->cq_xa, flags); + + erdma_cq_put(cq); + wait_for_completion(&cq->free); + if (rdma_is_kernel_res(&cq->ibcq.res)) { dma_free_coherent(&dev->pdev->dev, WARPPED_BUFSIZE(cq->depth << CQE_SHIFT), @@ -1248,8 +1256,6 @@ int erdma_destroy_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, struct ib_udata *udata) put_mtt_entries(dev, &cq->user_cq.qbuf_mem); } - xa_erase(&dev->cq_xa, cq->cqn); - return 0; } @@ -1658,6 +1664,8 @@ int erdma_create_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, const struct ib_cq_init_attr *attr, cq->ibcq.cqe = depth; cq->depth = depth; cq->assoc_eqn = attr->comp_vector + 1; + refcount_set(&cq->refcount, 1); + init_completion(&cq->free); ret = xa_alloc_cyclic(&dev->cq_xa, &cq->cqn, cq, XA_LIMIT(1, dev->attrs.max_cq - 1), diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.h b/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.h index eb9c0f92fb6f0..10b9b8a5f6a8b 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.h +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.h @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ #ifndef __ERDMA_VERBS_H__ #define __ERDMA_VERBS_H__ +#include <linux/completion.h> +#include <linux/refcount.h> + #include "erdma.h" /* RDMA Capability. */ @@ -261,6 +264,8 @@ struct erdma_cq { u32 depth; u32 assoc_eqn; + refcount_t refcount; + struct completion free; union { struct erdma_kcq_info kern_cq; @@ -275,9 +280,25 @@ static inline struct erdma_qp *find_qp_by_qpn(struct erdma_dev *dev, int id) return (struct erdma_qp *)xa_load(&dev->qp_xa, id); } -static inline struct erdma_cq *find_cq_by_cqn(struct erdma_dev *dev, int id) +static inline struct erdma_cq *erdma_cq_get_by_cqn(struct erdma_dev *dev, + int id) +{ + struct erdma_cq *cq; + unsigned long flags; + + xa_lock_irqsave(&dev->cq_xa, flags); + cq = xa_load(&dev->cq_xa, id); + if (cq && !refcount_inc_not_zero(&cq->refcount)) + cq = NULL; + xa_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->cq_xa, flags); + + return cq; +} + +static inline void erdma_cq_put(struct erdma_cq *cq) { - return (struct erdma_cq *)xa_load(&dev->cq_xa, id); + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cq->refcount)) + complete(&cq->free); } void erdma_qp_get(struct erdma_qp *qp); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-90042 OLK-6.6
by Pan Taixi 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

Backport "ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers" to fix CVE-2026-90042. This patch depends on "ceph: pass fscrypt tname buffers directly". Pan Taixi (2): ceph: pass fscrypt tname buffers directly ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers fs/ceph/crypto.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 12 +++++++---- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-90042 OLK-6.6
by Pan Taixi 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

Backport "ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers" to fix CVE-2026-90042. This patch depends on "ceph: pass fscrypt tname buffers directly". Pan Taixi (2): ceph: pass fscrypt tname buffers directly ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers fs/ceph/crypto.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 12 +++++++---- 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 V1 0/5] Fix CVE-2026-90329
by Yao Yiqi 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

5 commits in total. 1 for CVE fix, 2 as stable dependencies, 2 as fix for those dependencies from upstream kernel. Dan Carpenter (1): HID: fix an error code in hid_check_device_match() Dmitry Torokhov (2): HID: split apart hid_device_probe to make logic more apparent HID: ensure timely release of driver-allocated resources Vitaly Kuznetsov (1): HID: hyperv: streamline driver probe to avoid devres issues Yousef Alhouseen (1): HID: synchronize input before cleaning up a failed probe drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 120 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c | 58 +++++++++++++------ include/linux/hid.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2026-90247
by Pu Lehui 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

Ihor Solodrai (1): bpf: Factor out stack_map build ID helpers Sanghyun Park (1): bpf: Fix mmap_lock leak in irq_work path kernel/bpf/mmap_unlock_work.h | 51 ++++++++++++---------- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- kernel/bpf/task_iter.c | 14 +++++-- 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
by Pan Taixi 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

From: Nilesh Javali <njavali(a)marvell.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.157 commit 84bde5ce4038d9ad811e5c994305bbfcbd7a9f79 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19080 CVE: CVE-2026-89865 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b47d4a1547d9ef21b2e9d1a739fe2204d4be05dc upstream. The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp(). qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value: if (len == 1) opt |= BIT_0; if (opt & BIT_0) len = *sfp; *sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash. Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap contents. Fixes: 697a4bc69159 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Provide method for updating I2C attached VPD.") Fixes: 9ebb5d9c69f1 ("[SCSI] qla2xxx: Add I2C BSG interface.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Sashiko <sashiko-dev(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Nilesh Javali <njavali(a)marvell.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730155838.2119230-32-njavali@marvell.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen (Oracle) <mkp(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c [Context conflicts due to aa51b8115a6a ("scsi: qla2xxx: Zero-init bsg stack buffers to avoid info leak")] Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c index b372bcb9ba04..55e98f39ed16 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_bsg.c @@ -1563,11 +1563,11 @@ qla2x00_update_fru_versions(struct bsg_job *bsg_job) uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE] = {}; struct qla_image_version_list *list = (void *)bsg; struct qla_image_version *image; uint32_t count; dma_addr_t sfp_dma; - void *sfp = dma_pool_alloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); + void *sfp = dma_pool_zalloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); if (!sfp) { bsg_reply->reply_data.vendor_reply.vendor_rsp[0] = EXT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto done; @@ -1614,11 +1614,11 @@ qla2x00_read_fru_status(struct bsg_job *bsg_job) struct qla_hw_data *ha = vha->hw; int rval = 0; uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE] = {}; struct qla_status_reg *sr = (void *)bsg; dma_addr_t sfp_dma; - uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_alloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); + uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_zalloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); if (!sfp) { bsg_reply->reply_data.vendor_reply.vendor_rsp[0] = EXT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto done; @@ -1665,11 +1665,11 @@ qla2x00_write_fru_status(struct bsg_job *bsg_job) struct qla_hw_data *ha = vha->hw; int rval = 0; uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE] = {}; struct qla_status_reg *sr = (void *)bsg; dma_addr_t sfp_dma; - uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_alloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); + uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_zalloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); if (!sfp) { bsg_reply->reply_data.vendor_reply.vendor_rsp[0] = EXT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto done; @@ -1712,11 +1712,11 @@ qla2x00_write_i2c(struct bsg_job *bsg_job) struct qla_hw_data *ha = vha->hw; int rval = 0; uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE] = {}; struct qla_i2c_access *i2c = (void *)bsg; dma_addr_t sfp_dma; - uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_alloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); + uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_zalloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); if (!sfp) { bsg_reply->reply_data.vendor_reply.vendor_rsp[0] = EXT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto done; @@ -1758,11 +1758,11 @@ qla2x00_read_i2c(struct bsg_job *bsg_job) struct qla_hw_data *ha = vha->hw; int rval = 0; uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE] = {}; struct qla_i2c_access *i2c = (void *)bsg; dma_addr_t sfp_dma; - uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_alloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); + uint8_t *sfp = dma_pool_zalloc(ha->s_dma_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &sfp_dma); if (!sfp) { bsg_reply->reply_data.vendor_reply.vendor_rsp[0] = EXT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; goto done; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] sctp: validate cookie AUTH state before use
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Sep '26

24 Sep '26

From: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2 commit 3dbb44d88b1e94dd31fe43588af7437b34b44d56 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18398 CVE: CVE-2026-74752 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- When cookie authentication is disabled, COOKIE_ECHO restores fixed-size AUTH fields directly from peer-controlled cookie bytes. A forged RANDOM length, HMAC list, or CHUNKS list can then reach association consumers with lengths or identifiers that were never validated against the local backing arrays. A forged RANDOM length can cause out-of-bounds reads during key-vector construction. A forged HMAC identifier also caused a 32-byte write past a zero-length AUTH chunk, providing a primitive for a local privilege escalation chain. Validate the cookie's RANDOM, HMACS, and CHUNKS parameters at the cookie trust boundary before copying them into the association. Reject invalid types, malformed lengths, unsupported HMAC identifiers, HMAC lists without SHA1, and forbidden chunk ids. Fixes: bbd0d59809f9 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk") Fixes: 1f485649f529 ("[SCTP]: Implement SCTP-AUTH internals") Signed-off-by: Jérémy Jean <Jeremy.Jean(a)oss.cyber.gouv.fr> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804200042.2412009-1-Jeremy.Jean@oss.cyber.gou… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: include/net/sctp/auth.h net/sctp/auth.c [Backport of upstream 3dbb44d88b1e adding sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params() to validate the cookie's RANDOM/HMACS/CHUNKS parameters before they are restored into an association. Two helpers used by the new function are provided by later mainline refactors absent on this tree and are replaced with in-tree equivalents: - sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->cookie_auth_enable (from 2f3dd6ec901f2, which replaces sp->hmac with a bool) becomes sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac, whose non-NULL value keeps the same "cookie HMAC auth enabled" meaning already used by sctp_pack_cookie()/sctp_unpack_cookie(); - sctp_hmac_supported(hmac_id) (from bf40785fa437c) becomes the equivalent "hmac_id >= SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS || !sctp_hmac_list[hmac_id].hmac_name" check matching auth.c style. In auth.h the new declaration and the struct sctp_cookie forward declaration are added while the downstream crypto_shash, init_hmacs, destroy_hmacs declarations and the non-const sctp_auth_get_hmac()/ sctp_auth_asoc_get_hmac() signatures (predating the const qualifiers of the upstream refactors) are preserved. The full validation logic is retained and is semantically equivalent to upstream.] Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/sctp/auth.h | 3 ++ net/sctp/auth.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 3 ++ 3 files changed, 82 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/net/sctp/auth.h b/include/net/sctp/auth.h index 687e7f80037d..3c375bf0050b 100644 --- a/include/net/sctp/auth.h +++ b/include/net/sctp/auth.h @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ struct sctp_association; struct sctp_authkey; struct sctp_hmacalgo; struct crypto_shash; +struct sctp_cookie; /* * Define a generic struct that will hold all the info @@ -92,6 +93,8 @@ struct sctp_shared_key *sctp_auth_get_shkey( int sctp_auth_asoc_copy_shkeys(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sctp_association *asoc, gfp_t gfp); +bool sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_cookie *cookie); int sctp_auth_init_hmacs(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, gfp_t gfp); void sctp_auth_destroy_hmacs(struct crypto_shash *auth_hmacs[]); struct sctp_hmac *sctp_auth_get_hmac(__u16 hmac_id); diff --git a/net/sctp/auth.c b/net/sctp/auth.c index 9cf61a18098a..a5e9eee937e0 100644 --- a/net/sctp/auth.c +++ b/net/sctp/auth.c @@ -391,6 +391,82 @@ int sctp_auth_asoc_copy_shkeys(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, return -ENOMEM; } +static bool sctp_auth_chunk_id_forbidden(__u8 chunk_id) +{ + switch (chunk_id) { + case SCTP_CID_INIT: + case SCTP_CID_INIT_ACK: + case SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: + case SCTP_CID_AUTH: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +/* Verify AUTH parameters copied from a state cookie before they are restored + * into an association. When cookie authentication is disabled these fields + * are peer-controlled, so they must satisfy the same constraints as locally + * generated AUTH parameters. + */ +bool sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep, + const struct sctp_cookie *cookie) +{ + const struct sctp_paramhdr *random; + const struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *hmacs; + const struct sctp_chunks_param *chunks; + u16 hmacs_len, chunks_len; + u16 n_hmacs, n_chunks, i; + bool has_sha1 = false; + + if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac || !ep->auth_enable) + return true; + + random = (const struct sctp_paramhdr *)cookie->auth_random; + if (random->type != SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM || + ntohs(random->length) != sizeof(*random) + SCTP_AUTH_RANDOM_LENGTH) + return false; + + hmacs = (const struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)cookie->auth_hmacs; + hmacs_len = ntohs(hmacs->param_hdr.length); + if (hmacs->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO || + hmacs_len < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) + + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]) || + hmacs_len > sizeof(cookie->auth_hmacs) || + (hmacs_len - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) % + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0])) + return false; + + n_hmacs = (hmacs_len - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) / + sizeof(hmacs->hmac_ids[0]); + for (i = 0; i < n_hmacs; i++) { + u16 hmac_id = ntohs(hmacs->hmac_ids[i]); + + if (hmac_id >= SCTP_AUTH_NUM_HMACS || + !sctp_hmac_list[hmac_id].hmac_name) + return false; + if (hmac_id == SCTP_AUTH_HMAC_ID_SHA1) + has_sha1 = true; + } + if (!has_sha1) + return false; + + chunks = (const struct sctp_chunks_param *)cookie->auth_chunks; + chunks_len = ntohs(chunks->param_hdr.length); + if (chunks->param_hdr.type != SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS || + chunks_len < sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr) || + chunks_len > sizeof(cookie->auth_chunks)) + return false; + + n_chunks = chunks_len - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr); + for (i = 0; i < n_chunks; i++) { + if (sctp_auth_chunk_id_forbidden(chunks->chunks[i])) + return false; + } + + return true; +} + /* Public interface to create the association shared key. * See code above for the algorithm. diff --git a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c index caa41c90e537..0ed35b2a62f4 100644 --- a/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c +++ b/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c @@ -1849,6 +1849,9 @@ struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie( /* Set up our peer's port number. */ retval->peer.port = ntohs(chunk->sctp_hdr->source); + if (!sctp_auth_verify_cookie_params(ep, bear_cookie)) + goto malformed; + /* Populate the association from the cookie. */ memcpy(&retval->c, bear_cookie, sizeof(*bear_cookie)); -- 2.43.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] bpf backport
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

Daniel Borkmann (1): bpf: Reject a store through a fault prone pointer Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi (2): bpf: Mark sched_process_wait argument as nullable bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 10 ++++++++++ kernel/bpf/btf.c | 7 +++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] bpf mainline about tp
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi (2): bpf: Mark sched_process_wait argument as nullable bpf: Mark signal tracepoint siginfo arguments as scalar kernel/bpf/btf.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] lockd: pin next file across nlm_inspect_file lock-drop
by Pu Lehui 23 Sep '26

23 Sep '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 526c49cff3f72c3ec74752016380c7567040581b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18850 CVE: CVE-2026-89485 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- nlm_traverse_files() pins the current file with f_count++ across a mutex_unlock for nlm_inspect_file(), but nothing pins the saved next pointer. A concurrent nlm_release_file() can kfree the next file during the unlock window, and the iterator dereferences freed memory on the next loop step. Pin both current and next before the lock-drop. Advance by swapping the pinned cursors at the end of each iteration so next is always held alive across the unlock. Always call nlm_file_release() after dropping the iteration pin, regardless of whether the file matched the predicate. Use nlm_file_inuse(), which does a live walk of the inode lock list, rather than the cached f_locks field, so skipped files that never ran nlm_inspect_file() are evaluated correctly. Because every file in a hash bucket is now pinned and released, files skipped by the is_failover_file predicate that have no locks, blocks, shares, or external references are deleted during traversal. The old code never evaluated skipped files for cleanup. The new behavior is intentional: such files are stale and should not persist in the table. Fixes: 01df9c5e918a ("LOCKD: Fix a deadlock in nlm_traverse_files()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260524115527.1734251-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: fs/lockd/svcsubs.c [Downstream tree has no standalone nlm_close_files() helper; the teardown was inlined inside nlm_traverse_files(). Add nlm_file_release() (as upstream does) and rewrite the traversal loop to the new pinned-cursor form.] Co-authored-by: BackportAgent@deepseek-v4-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- fs/lockd/svcsubs.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c index 028fc152da22..23fd515b2185 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c +++ b/fs/lockd/svcsubs.c @@ -246,6 +246,11 @@ nlm_file_inuse(struct nlm_file *file) return 0; } +static void nlm_file_release(struct nlm_file *file) +{ + if (!nlm_file_inuse(file)) + nlm_delete_file(file); +} /* * Loop over all files in the file table. */ @@ -253,32 +258,41 @@ static int nlm_traverse_files(void *data, nlm_host_match_fn_t match, int (*is_failover_file)(void *data, struct nlm_file *file)) { - struct hlist_node *next; - struct nlm_file *file; + struct nlm_file *file, *next; int i, ret = 0; mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); for (i = 0; i < FILE_NRHASH; i++) { - hlist_for_each_entry_safe(file, next, &nlm_files[i], f_list) { - if (is_failover_file && !is_failover_file(data, file)) - continue; + file = hlist_entry_safe(nlm_files[i].first, + struct nlm_file, f_list); + if (file) file->f_count++; - mutex_unlock(&nlm_file_mutex); - - /* Traverse locks, blocks and shares of this file - * and update file->f_locks count */ - if (nlm_inspect_file(data, file, match)) - ret = 1; + while (file) { + /* + * Pin the next neighbour before we drop the mutex + * for nlm_inspect_file(); a concurrent + * nlm_release_file() under the same mutex would + * otherwise be free to unlink and kfree it during + * the unlock window, leaving us to dereference a + * freed slab when we walked to next afterwards. + */ + next = hlist_entry_safe(file->f_list.next, + struct nlm_file, f_list); + if (next) + next->f_count++; + + if (!is_failover_file || is_failover_file(data, file)) { + mutex_unlock(&nlm_file_mutex); + + if (nlm_inspect_file(data, file, match)) + ret = 1; + + mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); + } - mutex_lock(&nlm_file_mutex); file->f_count--; - /* No more references to this file. Let go of it. */ - if (list_empty(&file->f_blocks) && !file->f_locks - && !file->f_shares && !file->f_count) { - hlist_del(&file->f_list); - nlmsvc_ops->fclose(file->f_file); - kfree(file); - } + nlm_file_release(file); + file = next; } } mutex_unlock(&nlm_file_mutex); -- 2.34.1

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