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[PATCH OLK-6.6] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (FD links)
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 138c692d2b2d63d26f2eb957d0e4fcc5d61f9ff2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16670 CVE: CVE-2026-64375 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6255da28d4bb5349fe18e84cb043ccd394eba75d ] proc_pid_get_link() and proc_pid_readlink() currently look up the task from the pid once, then do the ptrace access check on that task, then look up the task from the pid a second time to do the actual access. That's racy in several ways. To fix it, pass the task to the ->proc_get_link() handler, and instead of proc_fd_access_allowed(), introduce a new helper call_proc_get_link() that looks up and locks the task, does the access check, and calls ->proc_get_link(). Fixes: 778c1144771f ("[PATCH] proc: Use sane permission checks on the /proc/<pid>/fd/ symlinks") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-2-5c3d20e0ac33@go… Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/proc/base.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/proc/base.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- fs/proc/fd.c | 27 +++++----- fs/proc/internal.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 698db152926e..aed3022beb42 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -222,33 +222,24 @@ static int get_task_root(struct task_struct *task, struct path *root) return result; } -static int proc_cwd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_cwd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); int result = -ENOENT; - if (task) { - task_lock(task); - if (task->fs) { - get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path); - result = 0; - } - task_unlock(task); - put_task_struct(task); + task_lock(task); + if (task->fs) { + get_fs_pwd(task->fs, path); + result = 0; } + task_unlock(task); return result; } -static int proc_root_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_root_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - int result = -ENOENT; - - if (task) { - result = get_task_root(task, path); - put_task_struct(task); - } - return result; + return get_task_root(task, path); } /* @@ -708,23 +699,6 @@ static int proc_pid_syscall(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, /* Here the fs part begins */ /************************************************************************/ -/* permission checks */ -static bool proc_fd_access_allowed(struct inode *inode) -{ - struct task_struct *task; - bool allowed = false; - /* Allow access to a task's file descriptors if it is us or we - * may use ptrace attach to the process and find out that - * information. - */ - task = get_proc_task(inode); - if (task) { - allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); - put_task_struct(task); - } - return allowed; -} - int proc_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { @@ -1782,16 +1756,12 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_pid_set_comm_operations = { .release = single_release, }; -static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path) +static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task; struct file *exe_file; - task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - if (!task) - return -ENOENT; exe_file = get_task_exe_file(task); - put_task_struct(task); if (exe_file) { *exe_path = exe_file->f_path; path_get(&exe_file->f_path); @@ -1801,26 +1771,42 @@ static int proc_exe_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *exe_path) return -ENOENT; } +static int call_proc_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct path *path_out) +{ + struct task_struct *task; + int ret; + + task = get_proc_task(inode); + if (!task) + return -ENOENT; + ret = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (ret) + goto out_put_task; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { + ret = -EACCES; + goto out; + } + ret = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, path_out, task); + +out: + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); +out_put_task: + put_task_struct(task); + return ret; +} + static const char *proc_pid_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { struct path path; - int error = -EACCES; + int error; if (!dentry) return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); - - /* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */ - if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode)) - goto out; - - error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path); - if (error) - goto out; - - error = nd_jump_link(&path); -out: + error = call_proc_get_link(dentry, inode, &path); + if (!error) + error = nd_jump_link(&path); return ERR_PTR(error); } @@ -1854,17 +1840,11 @@ static int proc_pid_readlink(struct dentry * dentry, char __user * buffer, int b struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct path path; - /* Are we allowed to snoop on the tasks file descriptors? */ - if (!proc_fd_access_allowed(inode)) - goto out; - - error = PROC_I(inode)->op.proc_get_link(dentry, &path); - if (error) - goto out; - - error = do_proc_readlink(&path, buffer, buflen); - path_put(&path); -out: + error = call_proc_get_link(dentry, inode, &path); + if (!error) { + error = do_proc_readlink(&path, buffer, buflen); + path_put(&path); + } return error; } @@ -2252,21 +2232,16 @@ static const struct dentry_operations tid_map_files_dentry_operations = { .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry, }; -static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int map_files_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { unsigned long vm_start, vm_end; struct vm_area_struct *vma; - struct task_struct *task; struct mm_struct *mm; int rc; rc = -ENOENT; - task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - if (!task) - goto out; - mm = get_task_mm(task); - put_task_struct(task); if (!mm) goto out; diff --git a/fs/proc/fd.c b/fs/proc/fd.c index 4297287f6ca0..ab9157d2621d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/fd.c +++ b/fs/proc/fd.c @@ -172,24 +172,19 @@ static const struct dentry_operations tid_fd_dentry_operations = { .d_delete = pid_delete_dentry, }; -static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path) +static int proc_fd_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct path *path, + struct task_struct *task) { - struct task_struct *task; int ret = -ENOENT; - - task = get_proc_task(d_inode(dentry)); - if (task) { - unsigned int fd = proc_fd(d_inode(dentry)); - struct file *fd_file; - - fd_file = fget_task(task, fd); - if (fd_file) { - *path = fd_file->f_path; - path_get(&fd_file->f_path); - ret = 0; - fput(fd_file); - } - put_task_struct(task); + unsigned int fd = proc_fd(d_inode(dentry)); + struct file *fd_file; + + fd_file = fget_task(task, fd); + if (fd_file) { + *path = fd_file->f_path; + path_get(&fd_file->f_path); + ret = 0; + fput(fd_file); } return ret; diff --git a/fs/proc/internal.h b/fs/proc/internal.h index 464d729ab0c8..10b3da6d4544 100644 --- a/fs/proc/internal.h +++ b/fs/proc/internal.h @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *proc_dir_entry_cache; void pde_free(struct proc_dir_entry *pde); union proc_op { - int (*proc_get_link)(struct dentry *, struct path *); + int (*proc_get_link)(struct dentry *, struct path *, struct task_struct *); int (*proc_show)(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] i2c: core: fix adapter registration race
by Zhang Yuwei 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit ba14d7cf2fe7284610a29854bdff22b2537d3ce6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16120 CVE: CVE-2026-64279 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Adapters can be looked up by their id using i2c_get_adapter() which takes a reference to the embedded struct device. Remove the adapter from the IDR before tearing it down during deregistration (and on registration failure) to make sure its resources are not accessed after having been freed (e.g. the device name). Fixes: 35fc37f81881 ("i2c: Limit core locking to the necessary sections") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 2.6.31 Cc: Jean Delvare <khali(a)linux-fr.org> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas(a)sang-engineering.com> Conflicts: drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c [contxt conflict] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c index 366bd86285d6..abf40f523ac3 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c @@ -1284,6 +1284,9 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) res = device_register(&adap->dev); if (res) { pr_err("adapter '%s': can't register device (%d)\n", adap->name, res); + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); goto out_list; } @@ -1323,6 +1326,9 @@ static int i2c_register_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) return 0; out_reg: + mutex_lock(&core_lock); + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); + mutex_unlock(&core_lock); init_completion(&adap->dev_released); device_unregister(&adap->dev); wait_for_completion(&adap->dev_released); @@ -1479,6 +1485,8 @@ void i2c_del_adapter(struct i2c_adapter *adap) /* First make sure that this adapter was ever added */ mutex_lock(&core_lock); found = idr_find(&i2c_adapter_idr, adap->nr); + if (found == adap) + idr_replace(&i2c_adapter_idr, NULL, adap->nr); mutex_unlock(&core_lock); if (found != adap) { pr_debug("attempting to delete unregistered adapter [%s]\n", adap->name); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] i2c: stub: Reject I2C block transfers with invalid length
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.260 commit 7e9072dbd5f2f17934751873450d2c22080ead80 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16516 CVE: CVE-2026-64191 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 6036b5067a8199ba7a2dc7b377d4b9dd276d5f9e upstream. The I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case in stub_xfer() uses data->block[0] as the transfer length. The existing check only clamps it to avoid overrunning the chip->words[256] register array, but does not validate it against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX (32), which is the limit of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer (34 bytes total). The driver is a development/test tool (CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m, not built by default) that must be loaded with a chip_addr= parameter. A local user with access to /dev/i2c-* can issue an I2C_SMBUS ioctl with I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA and data->block[0] > 32, causing stub_xfer() to read or write past the end of the union i2c_smbus_data.block buffer: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223) Read of size 1 at addr ffff88800abcfd92 by task exploit/81 Call Trace: <TASK> stub_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c:223) __i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:593) i2c_smbus_xfer (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-smbus.c:536) i2cdev_ioctl_smbus (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:391) i2cdev_ioctl (drivers/i2c/i2c-dev.c:478) __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:583) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130) </TASK> The bug exists because i2c-stub implements .smbus_xfer directly, bypassing the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). The I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function correctly validates against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX, but the I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA case does not. Fix by rejecting transfers with data->block[0] == 0 or data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX with -EINVAL, consistent with both the I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_DATA case in the same function and the I2C_SMBUS_I2C_BLOCK_DATA validation in i2c_smbus_xfer_emulated(). Fixes: 4710317891e4 ("i2c-stub: Implement I2C block support") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jean Delvare <jdelvare(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas(a)sang-engineering.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c index f31ec0861979..fbfc7d4fb3d7 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-stub.c @@ -223,6 +223,11 @@ static s32 stub_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr, unsigned short flags, * We ignore banks here, because banked chips don't use I2C * block transfers */ + if (data->block[0] == 0 || + data->block[0] > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) { + ret = -EINVAL; + break; + } if (data->block[0] > 256 - command) /* Avoid overrun */ data->block[0] = 256 - command; len = data->block[0]; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vfio: prevent infinite loop in vfio_mig_get_next_state() on blocked arc
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 8e872c07e40d51a66dee7b280a23a460a2e1e3fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16763 CVE: CVE-2026-64474 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a26b499b757cfc8bbff1088bb1b844639e250893 upstream. vfio_mig_get_next_state() walks vfio_from_fsm_table[] one step at a time, looping to skip optional states the device does not support until *next_fsm is supported. A blocked transition is encoded as VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR, which the trailing return reports as -EINVAL. The skip loop does not account for the ERROR sentinel. state_flags_table[ERROR] is ~0U and vfio_from_fsm_table[ERROR][*] is ERROR, so once *next_fsm becomes ERROR the loop condition stays true and *next_fsm never changes. The blocked arcs STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY and STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY_P2P map to ERROR yet pass the support check on a precopy-capable device, causing the loop to spin forever while holding the driver state mutex. This can result in a soft lockup, and a panic with softlockup_panic set. Terminate the skip loop on the ERROR sentinel so a blocked transition falls through to the existing return and reports -EINVAL. Fixes: 4db52602a607 ("vfio: Extend the device migration protocol with PRE_COPY") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/SYBPR01MB7881290BBDE79B61AE6A017FAF122@SYBPR01MB7… Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex(a)shazbot.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c index e9c71005bff5..1f557c268947 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c @@ -801,7 +801,8 @@ int vfio_mig_get_next_state(struct vfio_device *device, * logical state, as per the above comment. */ *next_fsm = vfio_from_fsm_table[cur_fsm][new_fsm]; - while ((state_flags_table[*next_fsm] & device->migration_flags) != + while (*next_fsm != VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR && + (state_flags_table[*next_fsm] & device->migration_flags) != state_flags_table[*next_fsm]) *next_fsm = vfio_from_fsm_table[*next_fsm][new_fsm]; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vfio/pci: Latch disable_idle_d3 per device
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 654710ef3135c4546b20a903bc23a51b0c44d6c8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16765 CVE: CVE-2026-64476 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4575e9aac5336d1365138c0284773bf8da4b1fa3 upstream. When disable_idle_d3 was introduced in vfio-pci, it directly manipulated the device power state with pci_set_power_state(). There were no refcounts to maintain or balanced operations, we could unconditionally bring the device to D0 and conditionally move it to D3hot. Therefore the module parameter was made writable. Later, in commit c61302aa48f7 ("vfio/pci: Move module parameters to vfio_pci.c"), as part of the vfio-pci-core split, the writable aspect of the module parameter was nullified. The parameter value could still be changed through sysfs, but the vfio-pci driver latched the values into vfio-pci-core globals at module init. Loading the vfio-pci module, or unloading and reloading, with non-default or different values could change the globals relative to existing devices bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. Runtime PM was introduced in commit 7ab5e10eda02 ("vfio/pci: Move the unused device into low power state with runtime PM"), which marks the point where power states became refcounted. PM get and put operations need to be balanced, but the same module operations noted above can change the global variables relative to those devices already bound to vfio-pci variant drivers. This introduces a window where PM operations can now become unbalanced. To resolve this with a narrow footprint for stable backports, the disable_idle_d3 flag is latched into the vfio_pci_core_device at the time of initialization, such that the device always operates with a consistent value. NB. vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset() now unconditionally raises the runtime PM usage count around bus reset to account for disable_idle_d3 becoming a per-device rather than global flag. When this flag is set, the additional get/put pair is harmless and allows continued use of the shared vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get() helper. Fixes: 7ab5e10eda02 ("vfio/pci: Move the unused device into low power state with runtime PM") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260615191241.688297-2-alex.williamson@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex(a)shazbot.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c | 19 ++++++++++--------- include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c index b7ef86f3f0d0..1d26a18aa274 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_core.c @@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) u16 cmd; u8 msix_pos; - if (!disable_idle_d3) { + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) { ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(&pdev->dev); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_enable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) out_disable_device: pci_disable_device(pdev); out_power: - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); return ret; } @@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ void vfio_pci_core_disable(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(vdev->vdev.dev_set); /* Put the pm-runtime usage counter acquired during enable */ - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(&pdev->dev); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfio_pci_core_disable); @@ -2216,6 +2216,8 @@ int vfio_pci_core_init_dev(struct vfio_device *core_vdev) init_rwsem(&vdev->memory_lock); xa_init(&vdev->ctx); + vdev->disable_idle_d3 = disable_idle_d3; + return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfio_pci_core_init_dev); @@ -2308,7 +2310,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) dev->driver->pm = &vfio_pci_core_pm_ops; pm_runtime_allow(dev); - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_put(dev); ret = vfio_register_group_dev(&vdev->vdev); @@ -2317,7 +2319,7 @@ int vfio_pci_core_register_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) return 0; out_power: - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev); pm_runtime_forbid(dev); @@ -2336,7 +2338,7 @@ void vfio_pci_core_unregister_device(struct vfio_pci_core_device *vdev) vfio_pci_vf_uninit(vdev); vfio_pci_vga_uninit(vdev); - if (!disable_idle_d3) + if (!vdev->disable_idle_d3) pm_runtime_get_noresume(&vdev->pdev->dev); pm_runtime_forbid(&vdev->pdev->dev); @@ -2670,7 +2672,7 @@ static void vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(struct vfio_device_set *dev_set) * state. Increment the usage count for all the devices in the dev_set * before reset and decrement the same after reset. */ - if (!disable_idle_d3 && vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get(dev_set)) + if (vfio_pci_dev_set_pm_runtime_get(dev_set)) return; if (!pci_reset_bus(pdev)) @@ -2680,8 +2682,7 @@ static void vfio_pci_dev_set_try_reset(struct vfio_device_set *dev_set) if (reset_done) cur->needs_reset = false; - if (!disable_idle_d3) - pm_runtime_put(&cur->pdev->dev); + pm_runtime_put(&cur->pdev->dev); } } diff --git a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h index 562e8754869d..4037d5d4a10a 100644 --- a/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h +++ b/include/linux/vfio_pci_core.h @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct vfio_pci_core_device { bool needs_pm_restore:1; bool pm_intx_masked:1; bool pm_runtime_engaged:1; + bool disable_idle_d3:1; struct pci_saved_state *pci_saved_state; struct pci_saved_state *pm_save; int ioeventfds_nr; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommufd: Break the loop on failure in iommufd_fault_fops_read()
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.18.39 commit 5539da127d03c1f6c2e2a49fdfbe331a0ccbdea8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16588 CVE: CVE-2026-64290 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 172fc8b19825a0f5884c38f2289188284e2d45ee upstream. On a copy_to_user() failure inside the inner list_for_each_entry, only the inner loop breaks; the outer while re-fetches the just-restored fault group and retries the failing copy_to_user() forever, spinning the reader at 100% CPU with fault->mutex held. Check rc after the inner loop and break the outer while as well. Fixes: 07838f7fd529 ("iommufd: Add iommufd fault object") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/336a9b6e44fe66a24199d3be777c405c85c98622.1780343… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Pranjal Shrivastava <praan(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c index f8c8bbf8e457..854756d5abc0 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/iommufd/fault.c @@ -292,6 +292,8 @@ static ssize_t iommufd_fault_fops_read(struct file *filep, char __user *buf, } done += fault_size; } + if (rc) + break; list_del(&group_extend->node); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vfio: prevent infinite loop in vfio_mig_get_next_state() on blocked arc
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit f1db80a67da928a92ba460ede1be52d8941f46be category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16761 CVE: CVE-2026-64472 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a26b499b757cfc8bbff1088bb1b844639e250893 upstream. vfio_mig_get_next_state() walks vfio_from_fsm_table[] one step at a time, looping to skip optional states the device does not support until *next_fsm is supported. A blocked transition is encoded as VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR, which the trailing return reports as -EINVAL. The skip loop does not account for the ERROR sentinel. state_flags_table[ERROR] is ~0U and vfio_from_fsm_table[ERROR][*] is ERROR, so once *next_fsm becomes ERROR the loop condition stays true and *next_fsm never changes. The blocked arcs STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY and STOP_COPY -> PRE_COPY_P2P map to ERROR yet pass the support check on a precopy-capable device, causing the loop to spin forever while holding the driver state mutex. This can result in a soft lockup, and a panic with softlockup_panic set. Terminate the skip loop on the ERROR sentinel so a blocked transition falls through to the existing return and reports -EINVAL. Fixes: 4db52602a607 ("vfio: Extend the device migration protocol with PRE_COPY") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang <danisjiang(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Junrui Luo <moonafterrain(a)outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/SYBPR01MB7881290BBDE79B61AE6A017FAF122@SYBPR01MB7… Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex(a)shazbot.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c index e9c71005bff5..1f557c268947 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_main.c @@ -801,7 +801,8 @@ int vfio_mig_get_next_state(struct vfio_device *device, * logical state, as per the above comment. */ *next_fsm = vfio_from_fsm_table[cur_fsm][new_fsm]; - while ((state_flags_table[*next_fsm] & device->migration_flags) != + while (*next_fsm != VFIO_DEVICE_STATE_ERROR && + (state_flags_table[*next_fsm] & device->migration_flags) != state_flags_table[*next_fsm]) *next_fsm = vfio_from_fsm_table[*next_fsm][new_fsm]; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill
by Pu Lehui 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit a0c584fc18056709c8e047a82a6045d6c209f4ce category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9180 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When querying info for an offloaded BPF map or program, bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns() and bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns() obtain the network namespace with get_net(dev_net(offmap->netdev)). However, the associated netdev's netns may be racing with teardown during netns destruction. If the netns refcount has already reached 0, get_net() performs a refcount_t increment on 0, triggering: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Although rtnl_lock and bpf_devs_lock ensure the netdev pointer remains valid, they cannot prevent the netns refcount from reaching zero. Fix this by using maybe_get_net() instead of get_net(). maybe_get_net() uses refcount_inc_not_zero() and returns NULL if the refcount is already zero, which causes ns_get_path_cb() to fail and the caller to return -ENOENT -- the correct behavior when the netns is being destroyed. Fixes: 675fc275a3a2d ("bpf: offload: report device information for offloaded programs") Fixes: 52775b33bb507 ("bpf: offload: report device information about offloaded maps") Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91(a)hust.edu.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f0aa3678-79c9-47ae-9e8c-02a3d1df160a@hust.edu.c… Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260409023733.168050-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/offload.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/offload.c b/kernel/bpf/offload.c index bd09290e3648..bfd2ce673369 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/offload.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/offload.c @@ -277,9 +277,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_prog_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data) if (aux->offload) { args->info->ifindex = aux->offload->netdev->ifindex; - net = dev_net(aux->offload->netdev); - get_net(net); - ns = &net->ns; + net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(aux->offload->netdev)); + ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL; } else { args->info->ifindex = 0; ns = NULL; @@ -504,9 +503,8 @@ static struct ns_common *bpf_map_offload_info_fill_ns(void *private_data) if (args->offmap->netdev) { args->info->ifindex = args->offmap->netdev->ifindex; - net = dev_net(args->offmap->netdev); - get_net(net); - ns = &net->ns; + net = maybe_get_net(dev_net(args->offmap->netdev)); + ns = net ? &net->ns : NULL; } else { args->info->ifindex = 0; ns = NULL; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

From: Cássio Gabriel <cassiogabrielcontato(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.97 commit 8947215c0136c9d905e4a46d824824f8b48a2e5b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16770 CVE: CVE-2026-64481 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b65020d5398f499c09498c9786dba6d67ae57664 ] cs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the cs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue fw_load_work. Those controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove only cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is skipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart disabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been initialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued work runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver state that is no longer valid. Track the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control callback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel fw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel the work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown. Fixes: 47ceabd99a28 ("ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Support Firmware switching and reloading") Fixes: 4c870513fbb0 ("ALSA: hda: cs35l41: Add read-only ALSA control for forced mute") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Cássio Gabriel <cassiogabrielcontato(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Binding <sbinding(a)opensource.cirrus.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260511-alsa-hda-cs35l41-fw-work-teardown-v1-1-11… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.c sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.h [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.h | 5 +++ 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.c b/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.c index 4b7c355d97d2..63fec4c5ffbd 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.c +++ b/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.c @@ -1072,6 +1072,43 @@ static int cs35l41_fw_type_ctl_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol, struct snd_ct return snd_ctl_enum_info(uinfo, 1, ARRAY_SIZE(hda_cs_dsp_fw_ids), hda_cs_dsp_fw_ids); } +static void cs35l41_remove_controls(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41) +{ + if (!cs35l41->codec) + return; + + snd_ctl_remove(cs35l41->codec->card, cs35l41->mute_override_ctl); + cs35l41->mute_override_ctl = NULL; + + snd_ctl_remove(cs35l41->codec->card, cs35l41->fw_load_ctl); + cs35l41->fw_load_ctl = NULL; + + snd_ctl_remove(cs35l41->codec->card, cs35l41->fw_type_ctl); + cs35l41->fw_type_ctl = NULL; +} + +static int cs35l41_add_control(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41, + struct snd_kcontrol_new *ctl, + struct snd_kcontrol **kctl) +{ + int ret; + + *kctl = snd_ctl_new1(ctl, cs35l41); + if (!*kctl) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, *kctl); + if (ret) { + dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", ctl->name, ret); + *kctl = NULL; + return ret; + } + + dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", ctl->name); + + return 0; +} + static int cs35l41_create_controls(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41) { char fw_type_ctl_name[SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN]; @@ -1097,23 +1134,19 @@ static int cs35l41_create_controls(struct cs35l41_hda *cs35l41) scnprintf(fw_load_ctl_name, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ID_NAME_MAXLEN, "%s DSP1 Firmware Load", cs35l41->amp_name); - ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, snd_ctl_new1(&fw_type_ctl, cs35l41)); - if (ret) { - dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", fw_type_ctl.name, ret); - return ret; - } - - dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", fw_type_ctl.name); - - ret = snd_ctl_add(cs35l41->codec->card, snd_ctl_new1(&fw_load_ctl, cs35l41)); - if (ret) { - dev_err(cs35l41->dev, "Failed to add KControl %s = %d\n", fw_load_ctl.name, ret); - return ret; - } + ret = cs35l41_add_control(cs35l41, &fw_type_ctl, &cs35l41->fw_type_ctl); + if (ret) + goto err; - dev_dbg(cs35l41->dev, "Added Control %s\n", fw_load_ctl.name); + ret = cs35l41_add_control(cs35l41, &fw_load_ctl, &cs35l41->fw_load_ctl); + if (ret) + goto err; return 0; + +err: + cs35l41_remove_controls(cs35l41); + return ret; } static int cs35l41_hda_bind(struct device *dev, struct device *master, void *master_data) @@ -1189,6 +1222,10 @@ static void cs35l41_hda_unbind(struct device *dev, struct device *master, void * sleep_flags = lock_system_sleep(); device_link_remove(&cs35l41->codec->core.dev, cs35l41->dev); unlock_system_sleep(sleep_flags); + + cs35l41_remove_controls(cs35l41); + cancel_work_sync(&cs35l41->fw_load_work); + cs35l41->codec = NULL; } } @@ -1707,6 +1744,7 @@ void cs35l41_hda_remove(struct device *dev) cs35l41_remove_dsp(cs35l41); component_del(cs35l41->dev, &cs35l41_hda_comp_ops); + cancel_work_sync(&cs35l41->fw_load_work); pm_runtime_put_noidle(cs35l41->dev); diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.h b/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.h index b93bf762976e..e8992b2bc0e2 100644 --- a/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.h +++ b/sound/pci/hda/cs35l41_hda.h @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ enum cs35l41_hda_gpio_function { CS35l41_SYNC, }; +struct snd_kcontrol; + struct cs35l41_hda { struct device *dev; struct regmap *regmap; @@ -62,6 +64,9 @@ struct cs35l41_hda { int speaker_id; struct mutex fw_mutex; struct work_struct fw_load_work; + struct snd_kcontrol *fw_type_ctl; + struct snd_kcontrol *fw_load_ctl; + struct snd_kcontrol *mute_override_ctl; struct regmap_irq_chip_data *irq_data; bool firmware_running; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/5] bpf mainline
by Pu Lehui 03 Aug '26

03 Aug '26

David Windsor (1): bpf: Reject sleepable BPF_LSM_CGROUP programs at load time Jiri Olsa (1): bpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data Kaitao Cheng (1): bpf: Clear rb node linkage when freeing bpf_rb_root Xu Kuohai (2): bpf: Fix setting retval to -EPERM for cgroup hooks not returning errno bpf: Add validation for bpf_set_retval argument include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 6 ++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 20 ++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 11 +++++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 +++++++ 6 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6