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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 00/19] linux-4.19.y inclusion
by Yongqiang Liu 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

*** BLURB HERE *** Armin Wolf (1): ACPI: battery: Fix missing NUL-termination with large strings Baokun Li (1): ext4: fail ext4_iget if special inode unallocated Breno Leitao (1): x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on init Daniil Tatianin (1): ACPICA: nsrepair: handle cases without a return value correctly Dave Hansen (1): uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user() Herbert Xu (2): crypto: seqiv - Handle EBUSY correctly crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Use akcipher_request_complete Jann Horn (1): timers: Prevent union confusion from unexpected restart_syscall() Jason A. Donenfeld (1): random: always mix cycle counter in add_latent_entropy() Johan Hovold (3): irqdomain: Fix association race irqdomain: Fix disassociation race irqdomain: Drop bogus fwspec-mapping error handling Nikita Zhandarovich (1): x86/mm: Fix use of uninitialized buffer in sme_enable() Thomas Gleixner (1): alarmtimer: Prevent starvation by small intervals and SIG_IGN Vishal Verma (1): ACPI: NFIT: fix a potential deadlock during NFIT teardown Yang Jihong (2): x86/kprobes: Fix __recover_optprobed_insn check optimizing logic x86/kprobes: Fix arch_check_optimized_kprobe check within optimized_kprobe range Zhen Lei (1): genirq: Fix the return type of kstat_cpu_irqs_sum() Zhihao Cheng (1): ext4: zero i_disksize when initializing the bootloader inode arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 ++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c | 3 ++- crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 34 +++++++++++++----------------- crypto/seqiv.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/acpica/nsrepair.c | 12 ++++++----- drivers/acpi/battery.c | 2 +- drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 +++++++--------- fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 1 + include/linux/kernel_stat.h | 2 +- include/linux/kprobes.h | 2 ++ include/linux/nospec.h | 4 ++++ include/linux/random.h | 6 +++--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 -- kernel/irq/irqdomain.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++---------- kernel/kprobes.c | 6 +++--- kernel/time/alarmtimer.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- kernel/time/hrtimer.c | 2 ++ kernel/time/posix-stubs.c | 2 ++ kernel/time/posix-timers.c | 2 ++ lib/usercopy.c | 7 ++++++ 23 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 19

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 01/19] alarmtimer: Prevent starvation by small intervals and SIG_IGN
by Yongqiang Liu 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.274 commit d6a300076d11a6e27b4d4f7fd986ec66ee97a3e1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6TIG1 CVE: NA -------------------------------- commit d125d1349abeb46945dc5e98f7824bf688266f13 upstream. syzbot reported a RCU stall which is caused by setting up an alarmtimer with a very small interval and ignoring the signal. The reproducer arms the alarm timer with a relative expiry of 8ns and an interval of 9ns. Not a problem per se, but that's an issue when the signal is ignored because then the timer is immediately rearmed because there is no way to delay that rearming to the signal delivery path. See posix_timer_fn() and commit 58229a189942 ("posix-timers: Prevent softirq starvation by small intervals and SIG_IGN") for details. The reproducer does not set SIG_IGN explicitely, but it sets up the timers signal with SIGCONT. That has the same effect as explicitely setting SIG_IGN for a signal as SIGCONT is ignored if there is no handler set and the task is not ptraced. The log clearly shows that: [pid 5102] --- SIGCONT {si_signo=SIGCONT, si_code=SI_TIMER, si_timerid=0, si_overrun=316014, si_int=0, si_ptr=NULL} --- It works because the tasks are traced and therefore the signal is queued so the tracer can see it, which delays the restart of the timer to the signal delivery path. But then the tracer is killed: [pid 5087] kill(-5102, SIGKILL <unfinished ...> ... ./strace-static-x86_64: Process 5107 detached and after it's gone the stall can be observed: syzkaller login: [ 79.439102][ C0] hrtimer: interrupt took 68471 ns [ 184.460538][ C1] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: ... [ 184.658237][ C1] rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: [ 184.664574][ C1] Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0: [ 184.669821][ C0] NMI backtrace for cpu 0 [ 184.669831][ C0] CPU: 0 PID: 5108 Comm: syz-executor192 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc6-next-20230203-syzkaller #0 ... [ 184.670036][ C0] Call Trace: [ 184.670041][ C0] <IRQ> [ 184.670045][ C0] alarmtimer_fired+0x327/0x670 posix_timer_fn() prevents that by checking whether the interval for timers which have the signal ignored is smaller than a jiffie and artifically delay it by shifting the next expiry out by a jiffie. That's accurate vs. the overrun accounting, but slightly inaccurate vs. timer_gettimer(2). The comment in that function says what needs to be done and there was a fix available for the regular userspace induced SIG_IGN mechanism, but that did not work due to the implicit ignore for SIGCONT and similar signals. This needs to be worked on, but for now the only available workaround is to do exactly what posix_timer_fn() does: Increase the interval of self-rearming timers, which have their signal ignored, to at least a jiffie. Interestingly this has been fixed before via commit ff86bf0c65f1 ("alarmtimer: Rate limit periodic intervals") already, but that fix got lost in a later rework. Reported-by: syzbot+b9564ba6e8e00694511b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f2c45807d399 ("alarmtimer: Switch over to generic set/get/rearm routine") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: John Stultz <jstultz(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87k00q1no2.ffs@tglx Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/time/alarmtimer.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c index 6a2ba39889bd..56af8a97cf2d 100644 --- a/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c +++ b/kernel/time/alarmtimer.c @@ -476,11 +476,35 @@ u64 alarm_forward(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t now, ktime_t interval) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alarm_forward); -u64 alarm_forward_now(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t interval) +static u64 __alarm_forward_now(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t interval, bool throttle) { struct alarm_base *base = &alarm_bases[alarm->type]; + ktime_t now = base->gettime(); + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS) && throttle) { + /* + * Same issue as with posix_timer_fn(). Timers which are + * periodic but the signal is ignored can starve the system + * with a very small interval. The real fix which was + * promised in the context of posix_timer_fn() never + * materialized, but someone should really work on it. + * + * To prevent DOS fake @now to be 1 jiffie out which keeps + * the overrun accounting correct but creates an + * inconsistency vs. timer_gettime(2). + */ + ktime_t kj = NSEC_PER_SEC / HZ; + + if (interval < kj) + now = ktime_add(now, kj); + } + + return alarm_forward(alarm, now, interval); +} - return alarm_forward(alarm, base->gettime(), interval); +u64 alarm_forward_now(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t interval) +{ + return __alarm_forward_now(alarm, interval, false); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alarm_forward_now); @@ -554,9 +578,10 @@ static enum alarmtimer_restart alarm_handle_timer(struct alarm *alarm, if (posix_timer_event(ptr, si_private) && ptr->it_interval) { /* * Handle ignored signals and rearm the timer. This will go - * away once we handle ignored signals proper. + * away once we handle ignored signals proper. Ensure that + * small intervals cannot starve the system. */ - ptr->it_overrun += alarm_forward_now(alarm, ptr->it_interval); + ptr->it_overrun += __alarm_forward_now(alarm, ptr->it_interval, true); ++ptr->it_requeue_pending; ptr->it_active = 1; result = ALARMTIMER_RESTART; -- 2.25.1

1 18

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/7] Revert "cgroup: Add missing cpus_read_lock() to cgroup_attach_task_all()"
by Yongqiang Liu 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

From: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6TI3Y CVE: NA -------------------------------- This reverts commit c2d8355618485dd9108ee9077799a227771af307. Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h | 2 -- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 4 ++-- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h index edb45e2f7f54..2e65e4c4d6e7 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h @@ -226,8 +226,6 @@ int cgroup_migrate(struct task_struct *leader, bool threadgroup, int cgroup_attach_task(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, struct task_struct *leader, bool threadgroup); -void cgroup_attach_lock(void); -void cgroup_attach_unlock(void); struct task_struct *cgroup_procs_write_start(char *buf, bool threadgroup) __acquires(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); void cgroup_procs_write_finish(struct task_struct *task) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c index 8bd36f2143eb..c4cc6c1ddacd 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ int cgroup_attach_task_all(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *tsk) int retval = 0; mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); - cgroup_attach_lock(); + percpu_down_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); for_each_root(root) { struct cgroup *from_cgrp; @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int cgroup_attach_task_all(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *tsk) if (retval) break; } - cgroup_attach_unlock(); + percpu_up_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); return retval; diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index 4a4d8a3f06ab..6487df9a6be0 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -2236,7 +2236,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(task_cgroup_path); * write-locking cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem. This allows ->attach() to assume that * CPU hotplug is disabled on entry. */ -void cgroup_attach_lock(void) +static void cgroup_attach_lock(void) { cpus_read_lock(); percpu_down_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); @@ -2246,7 +2246,7 @@ void cgroup_attach_lock(void) * cgroup_attach_unlock - Undo cgroup_attach_lock() * @lock_threadgroup: whether to up_write cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem */ -void cgroup_attach_unlock(void) +static void cgroup_attach_unlock(void) { percpu_up_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); cpus_read_unlock(); -- 2.25.1

1 6

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] net/smc: align the connect behaviour with TCP
by Litao Jiao 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19.rc1 commit 3aba103006bcc4a7472b7c9506b3bc065ffb7992 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6TK1U CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Connect with O_NONBLOCK will not be completed immediately and returns -EINPROGRESS. It is possible to use selector/poll for completion by selecting the socket for writing. After select indicates writability, a second connect function call will return 0 to indicate connected successfully as TCP does, but smc returns -EISCONN. Use socket state for smc to indicate connect state, which can help smc aligning the connect behaviour with TCP. Signed-off-by: Guangguan Wang <guangguan.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Acked-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Litao Jiao <jiaolitao(a)sangfor.com.cn> --- net/smc/af_smc.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/smc/af_smc.c b/net/smc/af_smc.c index 5d7710dd9514..8f73da1ee7b4 100644 --- a/net/smc/af_smc.c +++ b/net/smc/af_smc.c @@ -1097,9 +1097,29 @@ static int smc_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, goto out_err; lock_sock(sk); + switch (sock->state) { + default: + rc = -EINVAL; + goto out; + case SS_CONNECTED: + rc = sk->sk_state == SMC_ACTIVE ? -EISCONN : -EINVAL; + goto out; + case SS_CONNECTING: + if (sk->sk_state == SMC_ACTIVE) + goto connected; + break; + case SS_UNCONNECTED: + sock->state = SS_CONNECTING; + break; + } + switch (sk->sk_state) { default: goto out; + case SMC_CLOSED: + rc = sock_error(sk) ? : -ECONNABORTED; + sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED; + goto out; case SMC_ACTIVE: rc = -EISCONN; goto out; @@ -1118,21 +1138,26 @@ static int smc_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, if (rc && rc != -EINPROGRESS) goto out; - if (smc->use_fallback) + if (smc->use_fallback) { + sock->state = rc ? SS_CONNECTING : SS_CONNECTED; goto out; + } sock_hold(&smc->sk); /* sock put in passive closing */ + if (flags & O_NONBLOCK) { if (queue_work(smc_hs_wq, &smc->connect_work)) smc->connect_nonblock = 1; rc = -EINPROGRESS; + goto out; } else { rc = __smc_connect(smc); if (rc < 0) goto out; - else - rc = 0; /* success cases including fallback */ } +connected: + rc = 0; + sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; out: release_sock(sk); out_err: @@ -1234,6 +1259,7 @@ struct sock *smc_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, } if (new_sock) { sock_graft(new_sk, new_sock); + new_sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; if (isk->use_fallback) { smc_sk(new_sk)->clcsock->file = new_sock->file; isk->clcsock->file->private_data = isk->clcsock; @@ -1865,7 +1891,7 @@ static int smc_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) rc = -EINVAL; if ((sk->sk_state != SMC_INIT && sk->sk_state != SMC_LISTEN) || - smc->connect_nonblock) + smc->connect_nonblock || sock->state != SS_UNCONNECTED) goto out; rc = 0; @@ -2135,6 +2161,17 @@ static int smc_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) lock_sock(sk); + if (sock->state == SS_CONNECTING) { + if (sk->sk_state == SMC_ACTIVE) + sock->state = SS_CONNECTED; + else if (sk->sk_state == SMC_PEERCLOSEWAIT1 || + sk->sk_state == SMC_PEERCLOSEWAIT2 || + sk->sk_state == SMC_APPCLOSEWAIT1 || + sk->sk_state == SMC_APPCLOSEWAIT2 || + sk->sk_state == SMC_APPFINCLOSEWAIT) + sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING; + } + rc = -ENOTCONN; if ((sk->sk_state != SMC_ACTIVE) && (sk->sk_state != SMC_PEERCLOSEWAIT1) && @@ -2148,6 +2185,7 @@ static int smc_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) sk->sk_shutdown = smc->clcsock->sk->sk_shutdown; if (sk->sk_shutdown == SHUTDOWN_MASK) { sk->sk_state = SMC_CLOSED; + sk->sk_socket->state = SS_UNCONNECTED; sock_put(sk); } goto out; @@ -2173,6 +2211,10 @@ static int smc_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) /* map sock_shutdown_cmd constants to sk_shutdown value range */ sk->sk_shutdown |= how + 1; + if (sk->sk_state == SMC_CLOSED) + sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED; + else + sock->state = SS_DISCONNECTING; out: release_sock(sk); return rc ? rc : rc1; @@ -2464,6 +2506,7 @@ static int smc_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, rc = -ENOBUFS; sock->ops = &smc_sock_ops; + sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED; sk = smc_sock_alloc(net, sock, protocol); if (!sk) goto out; -- 2.18.0.windows.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 01/13] mm: mem_reliable: Initialize reliable_nr_page when mm_init()
by Yongqiang Liu 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6RKHX CVE: NA -------------------------------- After the fork operation, it is erroneous for the child process to have a reliable page size twice that of its parent process. Upon examining the mm_struct structure, it was discovered that reliable_nr_page should be initialized to 0, similar to how RSS is initialized during mm_init(). This particular problem that arises during forking is merely one such example. To resolve this issue, it is recommended to set reliable_nr_page to 0 during the mm_init() operation. Fixes: 094eaabb3fe8 ("proc: Count reliable memory usage of reliable tasks") Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/mem_reliable.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/mem_reliable.h b/include/linux/mem_reliable.h index 6d57c36fb676..aa3fe77c8a72 100644 --- a/include/linux/mem_reliable.h +++ b/include/linux/mem_reliable.h @@ -123,6 +123,13 @@ static inline bool mem_reliable_shmem_limit_check(void) shmem_reliable_nr_page; } +static inline void reliable_clear_page_counter(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + if (!mem_reliable_is_enabled()) + return; + + atomic_long_set(&mm->reliable_nr_page, 0); +} #else #define reliable_enabled 0 #define reliable_allow_fb_enabled() false @@ -171,6 +178,7 @@ static inline void reliable_lru_add_batch(int zid, enum lru_list lru, int val) {} static inline bool mem_reliable_counter_initialized(void) { return false; } +static inline void reliable_clear_page_counter(struct mm_struct *mm) {} #endif #endif diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index b5453a26655e..c256525d4ce5 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1007,6 +1007,7 @@ static struct mm_struct *mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *p, atomic_long_set(&mm->locked_vm, 0); mm->pinned_vm = 0; memset(&mm->rss_stat, 0, sizeof(mm->rss_stat)); + reliable_clear_page_counter(mm); spin_lock_init(&mm->page_table_lock); spin_lock_init(&mm->arg_lock); mm_init_cpumask(mm); -- 2.25.1

1 12

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/5] loop: Add parm check in loop_control_ioctl
by Yongqiang Liu 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

From: Zhong Jinghua <zhongjinghua(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 188586, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6TFPJ CVE: NA ---------------------------------------- We found that in loop_control_ioctl, the kernel panic can be easily caused: 1. syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[1], 0x4c80, 0x80000200000ul); Create a loop device 0x80000200000ul. In fact, in the code, it is used as the first_minor number, and the first_minor number is 0. So the created loop device number is 7:0. 2. syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[2], 0x4c80, 0ul); Create a loop device 0x0ul. Since the 7:0 device has been created in 1, add_disk will fail because the major and first_minor numbers are consistent. 3. syscall(__NR_ioctl, r[5], 0x4c81, 0ul); Delete the device that failed to create, the kernel panics. Panic like below: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in device_del+0xb3/0x840 drivers/base/core.c:3107 Call Trace: kill_device drivers/base/core.c:3079 [inline] device_del+0xb3/0x840 drivers/base/core.c:3107 del_gendisk+0x463/0x5f0 block/genhd.c:971 loop_remove drivers/block/loop.c:2190 [inline] loop_control_ioctl drivers/block/loop.c:2289 [inline] The stack like below: Create loop device: loop_control_ioctl loop_add add_disk device_add_disk bdi_register bdi_register_va device_create device_create_groups_vargs device_add kfree(dev->p); dev->p = NULL; Remove loop device: loop_control_ioctl loop_remove del_gendisk device_del kill_device if (dev->p->dead) // p is null Fix it by adding a check for parm. Fixes: 770fe30a46a1 ("loop: add management interface for on-demand device allocation") Signed-off-by: Zhong Jinghua <zhongjinghua(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/loop.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/loop.c b/drivers/block/loop.c index 108a4ff27bcd..826633aa328c 100644 --- a/drivers/block/loop.c +++ b/drivers/block/loop.c @@ -1972,6 +1972,17 @@ static int loop_add(struct loop_device **l, int i) struct gendisk *disk; int err; + /* + * i << part_shift is actually used as the first_minor. + * So here should avoid i << part_shift overflow. + * And, MKDEV() expect that the max bits of + * first_minor is 20. + */ + if (i > 0 && i > MINORMASK >> part_shift) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + err = -ENOMEM; lo = kzalloc(sizeof(*lo), GFP_KERNEL); if (!lo) @@ -1985,7 +1996,8 @@ static int loop_add(struct loop_device **l, int i) if (err == -ENOSPC) err = -EEXIST; } else { - err = idr_alloc(&loop_index_idr, lo, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); + err = idr_alloc(&loop_index_idr, lo, 0, + (MINORMASK >> part_shift) + 1, GFP_KERNEL); } if (err < 0) goto out_free_dev; -- 2.25.1

1 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] block/wbt: enable wbt after switching cfq to other schedulers
by Zhang Changzhong 07 Apr '23

07 Apr '23

From: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6LH5K CVE: NA -------------------------------- Commit 80061216078b ("block/wbt: fix negative inflight counter when remove scsi device") move wbt_enable_default() from elv_unregister_queue() to bfq_exit_queue(). As the result of it, wbt can't be enabled when we switch cfq to other schedulers. Fixes: 80061216078b ("block/wbt: fix negative inflight counter when remove scsi device") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- block/cfq-iosched.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/block/cfq-iosched.c b/block/cfq-iosched.c index 88bae55..130854a 100644 --- a/block/cfq-iosched.c +++ b/block/cfq-iosched.c @@ -4563,6 +4563,7 @@ static void cfq_exit_queue(struct elevator_queue *e) kfree(cfqd->root_group); #endif kfree(cfqd); + wbt_enable_default(q); } static int cfq_init_queue(struct request_queue *q, struct elevator_type *e) -- 2.9.5

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] Fix double fget() in vhost_net_set_backend()
by Yongqiang Liu 06 Apr '23

06 Apr '23

From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.245 commit 6ca70982c646cc32e458150ee7f2530a24369b8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6T1EY CVE: CVE-2023-1838 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit fb4554c2232e44d595920f4d5c66cf8f7d13f9bc upstream. Descriptor table is a shared resource; two fget() on the same descriptor may return different struct file references. get_tap_ptr_ring() is called after we'd found (and pinned) the socket we'll be using and it tries to find the private tun/tap data structures associated with it. Redoing the lookup by the same file descriptor we'd used to get the socket is racy - we need to same struct file. Thanks to Jason for spotting a braino in the original variant of patch - I'd missed the use of fd == -1 for disabling backend, and in that case we can end up with sock == NULL and sock != oldsock. Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vhost/net.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c index 1d99f5c443ee..4b9151474a24 100644 --- a/drivers/vhost/net.c +++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c @@ -1211,13 +1211,9 @@ static struct socket *get_raw_socket(int fd) return ERR_PTR(r); } -static struct ptr_ring *get_tap_ptr_ring(int fd) +static struct ptr_ring *get_tap_ptr_ring(struct file *file) { struct ptr_ring *ring; - struct file *file = fget(fd); - - if (!file) - return NULL; ring = tun_get_tx_ring(file); if (!IS_ERR(ring)) goto out; @@ -1226,7 +1222,6 @@ static struct ptr_ring *get_tap_ptr_ring(int fd) goto out; ring = NULL; out: - fput(file); return ring; } @@ -1313,8 +1308,12 @@ static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd) r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq); if (r) goto err_used; - if (index == VHOST_NET_VQ_RX) - nvq->rx_ring = get_tap_ptr_ring(fd); + if (index == VHOST_NET_VQ_RX) { + if (sock) + nvq->rx_ring = get_tap_ptr_ring(sock->file); + else + nvq->rx_ring = NULL; + } oldubufs = nvq->ubufs; nvq->ubufs = ubufs; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] btrfs: fix race between quota disable and quota assign ioctls
by Yongqiang Liu 06 Apr '23

06 Apr '23

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc8 commit 2f1a6be12ab6c8470d5776e68644726c94257c54 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6PQCT CVE: CVE-2023-1611 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The quota assign ioctl can currently run in parallel with a quota disable ioctl call. The assign ioctl uses the quota root, while the disable ioctl frees that root, and therefore we can have a use-after-free triggered in the assign ioctl, leading to a trace like the following when KASAN is enabled: [672.723][T736] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.723][T736] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888022ec0208 by task btrfs_search_sl/27736 [672.724][T736] [672.725][T736] CPU: 1 PID: 27736 Comm: btrfs_search_sl Not tainted 6.3.0-rc3 #37 [672.723][T736] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [672.727][T736] Call Trace: [672.728][T736] <TASK> [672.728][T736] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 [672.725][T736] print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 [672.720][T736] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x61/0x2e0 [672.727][T736] ? __phys_addr+0xc9/0x150 [672.725][T736] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.722][T736] kasan_report+0xc0/0xf0 [672.729][T736] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.724][T736] btrfs_search_slot+0x2962/0x2db0 [672.723][T736] ? fs_reclaim_acquire+0xba/0x160 [672.722][T736] ? split_leaf+0x13d0/0x13d0 [672.726][T736] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xb0 [672.723][T736] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x338/0x3c0 [672.722][T736] update_qgroup_status_item+0xf7/0x320 [672.724][T736] ? add_qgroup_rb+0x3d0/0x3d0 [672.739][T736] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x12d/0x2b0 [672.730][T736] ? spin_bug+0x1d0/0x1d0 [672.737][T736] btrfs_run_qgroups+0x5de/0x840 [672.730][T736] ? btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0xa70/0xa70 [672.738][T736] ? __del_qgroup_relation+0x4ba/0xe00 [672.738][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x3d58/0x5d80 [672.735][T736] ? tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x16a/0x550 [672.737][T736] ? tomoyo_execute_permission+0x4a0/0x4a0 [672.731][T736] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50 [672.737][T736] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x54/0x90 [672.734][T736] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x132/0x1660 [672.730][T736] ? vfs_fileattr_set+0xc40/0xc40 [672.730][T736] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2e/0x50 [672.732][T736] ? sigprocmask+0xf2/0x340 [672.737][T736] ? __fget_files+0x26a/0x480 [672.732][T736] ? bpf_lsm_file_ioctl+0x9/0x10 [672.738][T736] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x50/0x50 [672.736][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210 [672.736][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.731][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.739][T736] RIP: 0033:0x4556ad [672.742][T736] </TASK> [672.743][T736] [672.748][T736] Allocated by task 27677: [672.743][T736] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 [672.741][T736] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [672.741][T736] __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xb0 [672.749][T736] btrfs_alloc_root+0x48/0x90 [672.746][T736] btrfs_create_tree+0x146/0xa20 [672.744][T736] btrfs_quota_enable+0x461/0x1d20 [672.743][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x4a1c/0x5d80 [672.747][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210 [672.749][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.744][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.756][T736] [672.757][T736] Freed by task 27677: [672.759][T736] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 [672.759][T736] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [672.756][T736] kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 [672.751][T736] ____kasan_slab_free+0x162/0x1c0 [672.758][T736] slab_free_freelist_hook+0x89/0x1c0 [672.752][T736] __kmem_cache_free+0xaf/0x2e0 [672.752][T736] btrfs_put_root+0x1ff/0x2b0 [672.759][T736] btrfs_quota_disable+0x80a/0xbc0 [672.752][T736] btrfs_ioctl+0x3e5f/0x5d80 [672.756][T736] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x198/0x210 [672.753][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.765][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.769][T736] [672.768][T736] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888022ec0000 [672.768][T736] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 [672.769][T736] The buggy address is located 520 bytes inside of [672.769][T736] freed 4096-byte region [ffff888022ec0000, ffff888022ec1000) [672.760][T736] [672.764][T736] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [672.761][T736] page:ffffea00008bb000 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x22ec0 [672.766][T736] head:ffffea00008bb000 order:3 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [672.779][T736] flags: 0xfff00000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) [672.770][T736] raw: 00fff00000010200 ffff888012842140 ffffea000054ba00 dead000000000002 [672.770][T736] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000040004 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [672.771][T736] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [672.778][T736] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [672.777][T736] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd2040(__GFP_IO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC), pid 88 [672.779][T736] get_page_from_freelist+0x119c/0x2d50 [672.779][T736] __alloc_pages+0x1cb/0x4a0 [672.776][T736] alloc_pages+0x1aa/0x270 [672.773][T736] allocate_slab+0x260/0x390 [672.771][T736] ___slab_alloc+0xa9a/0x13e0 [672.778][T736] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x56/0xb0 [672.771][T736] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x136/0x320 [672.789][T736] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x1a0 [672.783][T736] tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0xc3/0x600 [672.781][T736] tomoyo_path_perm+0x22f/0x420 [672.782][T736] tomoyo_path_unlink+0x92/0xd0 [672.780][T736] security_path_unlink+0xdb/0x150 [672.788][T736] do_unlinkat+0x377/0x680 [672.788][T736] __x64_sys_unlink+0xca/0x110 [672.789][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.783][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.784][T736] page last free stack trace: [672.787][T736] free_pcp_prepare+0x4e5/0x920 [672.787][T736] free_unref_page+0x1d/0x4e0 [672.784][T736] __unfreeze_partials+0x17c/0x1a0 [672.797][T736] qlist_free_all+0x6a/0x180 [672.796][T736] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x189/0x1d0 [672.797][T736] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x64/0x90 [672.793][T736] kmem_cache_alloc+0x17c/0x3c0 [672.799][T736] getname_flags.part.0+0x50/0x4e0 [672.799][T736] getname_flags+0x9e/0xe0 [672.792][T736] vfs_fstatat+0x77/0xb0 [672.791][T736] __do_sys_newlstat+0x84/0x100 [672.798][T736] do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 [672.796][T736] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [672.790][T736] [672.791][T736] Memory state around the buggy address: [672.799][T736] ffff888022ec0100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.805][T736] ffff888022ec0180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.802][T736] >ffff888022ec0200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.809][T736] ^ [672.809][T736] ffff888022ec0280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [672.809][T736] ffff888022ec0300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb Fix this by having the qgroup assign ioctl take the qgroup ioctl mutex before calling btrfs_run_qgroups(), which is what all qgroup ioctls should call. Reported-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAFcO6XN3VD8ogmHwqRk4kbiwtpUSNySu2VAxN8… CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.10+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/qgroup.c Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/ioctl.c | 2 ++ fs/btrfs/qgroup.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c index a5ae02bf3652..00424d3f3464 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.c @@ -5240,7 +5240,9 @@ static long btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_assign(struct file *file, void __user *arg) } /* update qgroup status and info */ + mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock); err = btrfs_run_qgroups(trans); + mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock); if (err < 0) btrfs_handle_fs_error(fs_info, err, "failed to update qgroup status and info"); diff --git a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c index 7916f711daf5..8e58c58f73a3 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/qgroup.c @@ -2196,7 +2196,8 @@ int btrfs_qgroup_account_extents(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) } /* - * called from commit_transaction. Writes all changed qgroups to disk. + * Writes all changed qgroups to disk. + * Called by the transaction commit path and the qgroup assign ioctl. */ int btrfs_run_qgroups(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) { @@ -2204,6 +2205,14 @@ int btrfs_run_qgroups(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans) struct btrfs_root *quota_root = fs_info->quota_root; int ret = 0; + /* + * In case we are called from the qgroup assign ioctl, assert that we + * are holding the qgroup_ioctl_lock, otherwise we can race with a quota + * disable operation (ioctl) and access a freed quota root. + */ + if (trans->transaction->state != TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING) + lockdep_assert_held(&fs_info->qgroup_ioctl_lock); + if (!quota_root) return ret; -- 2.25.1

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Kernel sig 4.7 14:00-15:30 例会议题情况//答复: openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by liaotao (C) 06 Apr '23

06 Apr '23

当前例会议题：议题一：进展update --- 张伽琳 & 郑增凯议题二：openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2需求评审 ---张伽琳欢迎大家继续申报~ -----原始约会----- 发件人: openEuler conference <public(a)openeuler.org> 发送时间: 2023年4月7日 9:30 收件人: dev@openeuler.org,kernel-discuss@openeuler.org,kernel@openeuler.org 主题: openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会时间: 2023年4月7日星期五 14:00-15:30(UTC+08:00) 北京，重庆，香港特别行政区，乌鲁木齐。地点: 您好！ Kernel SIG 邀请您参加 2023-04-07 14:00 召开的Zoom会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议内容： 1.进展update 2.议题征集中欢迎大家积极申报议题（新增议题可以直接回复邮件，或录入会议看板）会议链接：https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88353599877?pwd=aFZtMjJwUHl1UmNTZFV4eUJQM2xVdz09 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 温馨提醒：建议接入会议后修改参会人的姓名，也可以使用您在gitee.com的ID 更多资讯尽在：https://openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! openEuler Kernel SIG invites you to attend the Zoom conference(auto recording) will be held at 2023-04-07 14:00, The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会, Summary: 1.进展update 2.议题征集中欢迎大家积极申报议题（新增议题可以直接回复邮件，或录入会议看板） You can join the meeting at https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88353599877?pwd=aFZtMjJwUHl1UmNTZFV4eUJQM2xVdz09. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings. Note: You are advised to change the participant name after joining the conference or use your ID at gitee.com. More information: https://openeuler.org/en/

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