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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/9] CVE-2024-50102
by Qi Xi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

*** BLURB HERE *** David Gow (1): x86/uaccess: Zero the 8-byte get_range case on failure on 32-bit David Laight (1): x86: fix off-by-one in access_ok() Linus Torvalds (5): runtime constants: deal with old decrepit linkers runtime constants: add x86 architecture support x86: fix whitespace in runtime-const assembler output x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue Stephen Brennan (1): dcache: keep dentry_hashtable or d_hash_shift even when not used Thomas Gleixner (1): x86/uaccess: Add missing __force to casts in __access_ok() and valid_user_address() arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 49 ++++++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 80 ++++++++++------------------ fs/dcache.c | 9 +++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 7 +++ 7 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h -- 2.33.0

2 10

[PATCH OLK-6.6] [Backport] btrfs: fix use-after-free in btrfs_encoded_read_endio()
by Yongjian Sun 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc3 commit 05b36b04d74a517d6675bf2f90829ff1ac7e28dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAOP CVE: CVE-2024-56582 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Shinichiro reported the following use-after free that sometimes is happening in our CI system when running fstests' btrfs/284 on a TCMU runner device: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x708/0x780 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888106a83f18 by task kworker/u80:6/219 CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 219 Comm: kworker/u80:6 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-kts+ #15 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPi-TF, BIOS 3.3 02/21/2020 Workqueue: btrfs-endio btrfs_end_bio_work [btrfs] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xa0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 print_report+0x174/0x505 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x224/0x410 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 kasan_report+0xda/0x1b0 ? lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __wake_up+0x44/0x60 lock_release+0x708/0x780 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 ? lock_is_held_type+0x9a/0x110 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x1f/0x60 __wake_up+0x44/0x60 btrfs_encoded_read_endio+0x14b/0x190 [btrfs] btrfs_check_read_bio+0x8d9/0x1360 [btrfs] ? lock_release+0x1b0/0x780 ? trace_lock_acquire+0x12f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_btrfs_check_read_bio+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 ? lock_acquire+0x31/0xc0 ? process_one_work+0x7e3/0x1460 process_one_work+0x85c/0x1460 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? assign_work+0x16c/0x240 worker_thread+0x5e6/0xfc0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c3/0x3a0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x16c/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 3661: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x143/0x490 btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages+0x531/0x6d0 [btrfs] send_extent_data+0xf0f/0x24a0 [btrfs] process_extent+0x48a/0x1830 [btrfs] changed_cb+0x178b/0x2ea0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_send+0x3bf9/0x5c20 [btrfs] _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x117/0x330 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x184a/0x60a0 [btrfs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12e/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888106a83f00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-rnd-07-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff888106a83f00, ffff888106a83f60) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888106a83800 pfn:0x106a83 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000000 ffff888100053680 ffffea0004917200 0000000000000004 raw: ffff888106a83800 0000000080200019 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888106a83e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a83e80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >ffff888106a83f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ ffff888106a83f80: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ffff888106a84000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ================================================================== Further analyzing the trace and the crash dump's vmcore file shows that the wake_up() call in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is calling wake_up() on the wait_queue that is in the private data passed to the end_io handler. Commit 4ff47df40447 ("btrfs: move priv off stack in btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages()") moved 'struct btrfs_encoded_read_private' off the stack. Before that commit one can see a corruption of the private data when analyzing the vmcore after a crash: *(struct btrfs_encoded_read_private *)0xffff88815626eec8 = { .wait = (wait_queue_head_t){ .lock = (spinlock_t){ .rlock = (struct raw_spinlock){ .raw_lock = (arch_spinlock_t){ .val = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-2005885696, }, .locked = (u8)0, .pending = (u8)157, .locked_pending = (u16)40192, .tail = (u16)34928, }, .magic = (unsigned int)536325682, .owner_cpu = (unsigned int)29, .owner = (void *)__SCT__tp_func_btrfs_transaction_commit+0x0 = 0x0, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .__padding = (u8 [24]){ 0, 157, 112, 136, 50, 174, 247, 31, 29 }, .dep_map = (struct lockdep_map){ .key = (struct lock_class_key *)0xffff8881575a3b6c, .class_cache = (struct lock_class *[2]){ 0xffff8882a71985c0, 0xffffea00066f5d40 }, .name = (const char *)0xffff88815626f100 = "", .wait_type_outer = (u8)37, .wait_type_inner = (u8)178, .lock_type = (u8)154, }, }, .head = (struct list_head){ .next = (struct list_head *)0x112cca, .prev = (struct list_head *)0x47, }, }, .pending = (atomic_t){ .counter = (int)-1491499288, }, .status = (blk_status_t)130, } Here we can see several indicators of in-memory data corruption, e.g. the large negative atomic values of ->pending or ->wait->lock->rlock->raw_lock->val, as well as the bogus spinlock magic 0x1ff7ae32 (decimal 536325682 above) instead of 0xdead4ead or the bogus pointer values for ->wait->head. To fix this, change atomic_dec_return() to atomic_dec_and_test() to fix the corruption, as atomic_dec_return() is defined as two instructions on x86_64, whereas atomic_dec_and_test() is defined as a single atomic operation. This can lead to a situation where counter value is already decremented but the if statement in btrfs_encoded_read_endio() is not completely processed, i.e. the 0 test has not completed. If another thread continues executing btrfs_encoded_read_regular_fill_pages() the atomic_dec_return() there can see an already updated ->pending counter and continues by freeing the private data. Continuing in the endio handler the test for 0 succeeds and the wait_queue is woken up, resulting in a use-after-free. Reported-by: Shinichiro Kawasaki <shinichiro.kawasaki(a)wdc.com> Suggested-by: Damien Le Moal <Damien.LeMoal(a)wdc.com> Fixes: 1881fba89bd5 ("btrfs: add BTRFS_IOC_ENCODED_READ ioctl") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn(a)wdc.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sun Yongjian <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/inode.c b/fs/btrfs/inode.c index fae45b8d485e..fb262145f193 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/inode.c @@ -9974,7 +9974,7 @@ static void btrfs_encoded_read_endio(struct btrfs_bio *bbio) */ WRITE_ONCE(priv->status, bbio->bio.bi_status); } - if (!atomic_dec_return(&priv->pending)) + if (atomic_dec_and_test(&priv->pending)) wake_up(&priv->wait); bio_put(&bbio->bio); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: fix recursive lock when verdict program return SK_PASS
by Liu Jian 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre(a)163.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit da2bc8a0c8f3ac66fdf980fc59936f851a083561 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEDOY CVE: CVE-2024-56694 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8ca2a1eeadf09862190b2810697702d803ceef2d ] When the stream_verdict program returns SK_PASS, it places the received skb into its own receive queue, but a recursive lock eventually occurs, leading to an operating system deadlock. This issue has been present since v6.9. ''' sk_psock_strp_data_ready write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) strp_data_ready strp_read_sock read_sock -> tcp_read_sock strp_recv cb.rcv_msg -> sk_psock_strp_read # now stream_verdict return SK_PASS without peer sock assign __SK_PASS = sk_psock_map_verd(SK_PASS, NULL) sk_psock_verdict_apply sk_psock_skb_ingress_self sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue sk_psock_data_ready read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock) <= dead lock ''' This topic has been discussed before, but it has not been fixed. Previous discussion: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6684a5864ec86_403d20898@john.notmuch Fixes: 6648e613226e ("bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue") Reported-by: Vincent Whitchurch <vincent.whitchurch(a)datadoghq.com> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <mrpre(a)163.com> Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241118030910.36230-2-mrpre@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skmsg.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 04a98327f81a4..5e77b9344d667 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -1125,9 +1125,9 @@ static void sk_psock_strp_data_ready(struct sock *sk) if (tls_sw_has_ctx_rx(sk)) { psock->saved_data_ready(sk); } else { - write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); strp_data_ready(&psock->strp); - write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } } rcu_read_unlock(); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: hsr: avoid potential out-of-bound access in fill_frame_info()
by Liu Jian 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit aa632691c722a123e47ccd05a3afdd5f87a36061 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEANV CVE: CVE-2024-56648 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b9653d19e556c6afd035602927a93d100a0d7644 ] syzbot is able to feed a packet with 14 bytes, pretending it is a vlan one. Since fill_frame_info() is relying on skb->mac_len already, extend the check to cover this case. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724 fill_frame_info net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:709 [inline] hsr_forward_skb+0x9ee/0x3b10 net/hsr/hsr_forward.c:724 hsr_dev_xmit+0x2f0/0x350 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:235 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5002 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5011 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3590 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3606 __dev_queue_xmit+0x366a/0x57d0 net/core/dev.c:4434 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3168 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3146 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x91ae/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726 __sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200 x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4091 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4134 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4186 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587 __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1323 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xd00 net/core/skbuff.c:6612 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2881 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2995 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3089 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x74c6/0xa6f0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3178 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:726 __sys_sendto+0x594/0x750 net/socket.c:2197 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2204 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2200 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2200 x64_sys_call+0x346a/0x3c30 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:45 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Fixes: 48b491a5cc74 ("net: hsr: fix mac_len checks") Reported-by: syzbot+671e2853f9851d039551(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6745dc7f.050a0220.21d33d.0018.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: WingMan Kwok <w-kwok2(a)ti.com> Cc: Murali Karicheri <m-karicheri2(a)ti.com> Cc: MD Danish Anwar <danishanwar(a)ti.com> Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Cc: George McCollister <george.mccollister(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241126144344.4177332-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/hsr/hsr_forward.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c b/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c index 0c115d8ded03c..a58c0be64272b 100644 --- a/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c +++ b/net/hsr/hsr_forward.c @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ static int fill_frame_info(struct hsr_frame_info *frame, frame->is_vlan = true; if (frame->is_vlan) { + if (skb->mac_len < offsetofend(struct hsr_vlan_ethhdr, vlanhdr)) + return -EINVAL; vlan_hdr = (struct hsr_vlan_ethhdr *)ethhdr; proto = vlan_hdr->vlanhdr.h_vlan_encapsulated_proto; /* FIXME: */ -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/16] net:yt6801: Add Motorcomm yt6801 PCIe driver
by Frank Sae 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

This series includes adding Motorcomm YT6801 Gigabit ethernet driver and adding yt6801 ethernet driver entry in MAINTAINERS file. YT6801 integrates a YT8531S phy. Frank Sae (16): motorcomm:yt6801: Add support for a pci table in this module motorcomm:yt6801: Implement pci_driver shutdown motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_drv_probe function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the .ndo_open function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_start function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the poll functions motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_init function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the fxgmac_read_mac_addr function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement some hw_ops function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement .ndo_start_xmit function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement some net_device_ops function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement .ndo_tx_timeout and .ndo_change_mtu functions motorcomm:yt6801: Implement some ethtool_ops function motorcomm:yt6801: Implement the WOL function of ethtool_ops motorcomm:yt6801: Implement pci_driver suspend and resume motorcomm:yt6801: Update the Makefile, Kconfig and maintainer for yt6801 MAINTAINERS | 8 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 4 +- arch/powerpc/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 +- arch/riscv/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 4 +- arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 4 +- drivers/net/ethernet/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/Makefile | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Kconfig | 27 + drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Makefile | 6 + .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/Makefile | 9 + .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801.h | 617 +++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.c | 635 ++++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.h | 39 + .../motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_ethtool.c | 838 ++++ .../net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_hw.c | 3383 +++++++++++++++++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.c | 2907 ++++++++++++++ .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.h | 32 + .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_pci.c | 191 + .../ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_type.h | 1398 +++++++ 19 files changed, 10102 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Kconfig create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/Makefile create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801.h create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_desc.h create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_ethtool.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_hw.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_net.h create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_pci.c create mode 100644 drivers/net/ethernet/motorcomm/yt6801/yt6801_type.h -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2024-53237
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

CVE-2024-53237 Andy Shevchenko (1): driver core: Introduce device_find_any_child() helper Dmitry Antipov (1): Bluetooth: fix use-after-free in device_for_each_child() drivers/base/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/device.h | 2 ++ net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c | 15 ++++----------- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2024-53237
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

CVE-2024-53237 Aaron Lu (1): x86/sgx: Fix deadlock in SGX NUMA node search Weili Qian (1): crypto: hisilicon/qm - inject error before stopping queue -- 2.22.0

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2024-53237
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

CVE-2024-53237 Aaron Lu (1): x86/sgx: Fix deadlock in SGX NUMA node search Weili Qian (1): crypto: hisilicon/qm - inject error before stopping queue -- 2.22.0

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2024-56724
by Liao Chen 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

fix CVE-2024-56724 Andy Shevchenko (2): [Backport] mfd: intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc: Use IRQ domain for USB Type-C device [Backport] mfd: intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc: Use IRQ domain for TMU device drivers/mfd/intel_soc_pmic_bxtwc.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/platform/x86/intel_bxtwc_tmu.c | 22 ++----- drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/wcove.c | 4 -- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: fix use-after-free in device_for_each_child()
by Guo Mengqi 08 Jan '25

08 Jan '25

From: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit de5a44f351ca7efd9add9851b218f5353e2224b7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEADX CVE: CVE-2024-53237 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 27aabf27fd014ae037cc179c61b0bee7cff55b3d ] Syzbot has reported the following KASAN splat: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801f605308 by task kbnepd bnep0/4980 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4980 Comm: kbnepd bnep0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc4-00161-gae90f6a6170d #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 ? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 print_report+0x13a/0x4cb ? __virt_addr_valid+0x5e/0x590 ? __phys_addr+0xc6/0x150 ? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ? device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_dev_memalloc_noio+0x10/0x10 device_for_each_child+0x18f/0x1a0 ? __pfx_device_for_each_child+0x10/0x10 pm_runtime_set_memalloc_noio+0xf2/0x180 netdev_unregister_kobject+0x1ed/0x270 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x123c/0x1d80 ? __mutex_trylock_common+0xde/0x250 ? __pfx_unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x10/0x10 ? trace_contention_end+0xe6/0x140 ? __mutex_lock+0x4e7/0x8f0 ? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10 ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0 ? unregister_netdev+0x12/0x30 unregister_netdevice_queue+0x30d/0x3f0 ? __pfx_unregister_netdevice_queue+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 unregister_netdev+0x1c/0x30 bnep_session+0x1fb3/0x2ab0 ? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_woken_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? __kthread_parkme+0x132/0x200 ? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10 ? kthread+0x13a/0x370 ? __pfx_bnep_session+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2b7/0x370 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 4974: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1d1/0x440 hci_alloc_dev_priv+0x1d/0x2820 __vhci_create_device+0xef/0x7d0 vhci_write+0x2c7/0x480 vfs_write+0x6a0/0xfc0 ksys_write+0x12f/0x260 do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 4979: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x4f/0x70 kfree+0x141/0x490 hci_release_dev+0x4d9/0x600 bt_host_release+0x6a/0xb0 device_release+0xa4/0x240 kobject_put+0x1ec/0x5a0 put_device+0x1f/0x30 vhci_release+0x81/0xf0 __fput+0x3f6/0xb30 task_work_run+0x151/0x250 do_exit+0xa79/0x2c30 do_group_exit+0xd5/0x2a0 get_signal+0x1fcd/0x2210 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x93/0x780 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x140/0x290 do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x250 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f In 'hci_conn_del_sysfs()', 'device_unregister()' may be called when an underlying (kobject) reference counter is greater than 1. This means that reparenting (happened when the device is actually freed) is delayed and, during that delay, parent controller device (hciX) may be deleted. Since the latter may create a dangling pointer to freed parent, avoid that scenario by reparenting to NULL explicitly. Reported-by: syzbot+6cf5652d3df49fae2e3f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+6cf5652d3df49fae2e3f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6cf5652d3df49fae2e3f Fixes: a85fb91e3d72 ("Bluetooth: Fix double free in hci_conn_cleanup") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov <dmantipov(a)yandex.ru> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c | 15 ++++----------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c index 367e32fe30eb..4b54dbbf0729 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sysfs.c @@ -21,16 +21,6 @@ static const struct device_type bt_link = { .release = bt_link_release, }; -/* - * The rfcomm tty device will possibly retain even when conn - * is down, and sysfs doesn't support move zombie device, - * so we should move the device before conn device is destroyed. - */ -static int __match_tty(struct device *dev, void *data) -{ - return !strncmp(dev_name(dev), "rfcomm", 6); -} - void hci_conn_init_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn) { struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev; @@ -73,10 +63,13 @@ void hci_conn_del_sysfs(struct hci_conn *conn) return; } + /* If there are devices using the connection as parent reset it to NULL + * before unregistering the device. + */ while (1) { struct device *dev; - dev = device_find_child(&conn->dev, NULL, __match_tty); + dev = device_find_any_child(&conn->dev); if (!dev) break; device_move(dev, NULL, DPM_ORDER_DEV_LAST); -- 2.22.0

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