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[PATCH v4 OLK-5.10 00/15] Fix CVE-2026-46054
by Cai Xinchen 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

v3->v4: Add GET_FILE_WRAP in alloc_empty_file and alloc_empty_file_noaccount in error path use kmem_cache_free. There is no need to set vma->vm_file to user_file because in __mmap_region handle error path, it will be set NULL. v2->v3: Fix lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks in ovl_mmap when security_mmap_backing_file failed, fput realfile but not set vma->vm_file to original user_file. v1->v2: Add commit 9fe595fad54d ("selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs") ovl_open_realfile reletion code feature patch ("ovl: pass layer mnt to ovl_open_realfile: ovl_open_realfile reletion.") init_file code refactoring patch ("fs: move kmem_cache_zalloc() into alloc_empty_file*() helpers") backing_file structure and backing_file_open function reletion features: patch ("fs: use backing_file container for internal files with "fake" f_path") patch ("fs: move cleanup from init_file() into its callers") bpf_fd_pass const warning fix patch ("lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file()") code refactoring: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path patch ("fs: get mnt_writers count for an open backing file's real path") patch ("fs: create helper file_user_path() for user displayed mapped file path") patch ("fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path") patch ("ovl: Fix nested backing file paths") patch ("perf/core: Fix MMAP event path names with backing files") backing_file const warning fix patch ("fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers") SELinux overlay backing_file mmap/mprotect check prepare for lsm function: patch ("fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file") patch ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") CVE-2026-46054 fix: Add SELinux lsm hooks for backing_file mmap/mprotect patch ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") bugfix commit 9fe595fad54d ("selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs") to fix mount check PROCESS__EXEC to the mounter Adrian Hunter (1): perf/core: Fix MMAP event path names with backing files Amir Goldstein (9): [Backport] ovl: pass layer mnt to ovl_open_realfile() fs: move kmem_cache_zalloc() into alloc_empty_file*() helpers fs: use backing_file container for internal files with "fake" f_path fs: move cleanup from init_file() into its callers fs: get mnt_writers count for an open backing file's real path fs: create helper file_user_path() for user displayed mapped file path fs: store real path instead of fake path in backing file f_path fs: constify file ptr in backing_file accessor helpers fs: prepare for adding LSM blob to backing_file André Almeida (1): ovl: Fix nested backing file paths Khadija Kamran (1): lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file() Ondrej Mosnacek (1): selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs Paul Moore (2): lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks arch/arc/kernel/troubleshoot.c | 6 +- fs/file_table.c | 139 +++++++++++++--- fs/internal.h | 18 ++- fs/open.c | 76 ++++++--- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 34 ++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/super.c | 16 +- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 14 ++ fs/proc/base.c | 2 +- fs/proc/nommu.c | 2 +- fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 4 +- fs/proc/task_nommu.c | 2 +- include/linux/fs.h | 44 ++++- include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 7 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + include/linux/security.h | 26 ++- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- kernel/trace/trace_output.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 112 ++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 256 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 11 ++ 22 files changed, 637 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-) -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs
by Cai Xinchen 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc4 commit 9fe595fad54d4ac6a402edb3f60bec859d52cea6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9692 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable memory mapping in general. The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the mounter credentials would be incorrect. Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and determine it based on the boolean and the file struct. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2d9f365022cb..b3d93234a4c3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3794,9 +3794,9 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; -static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, - const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, - bool shared, bool bf_user_file) +static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool mounter_check, + bool bf_user_file) { struct inode *inode = NULL; bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC; @@ -3809,10 +3809,10 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, inode = file_inode(file); } - if (default_noexec && prot_exec && + if (!mounter_check && default_noexec && prot_exec && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) { int rc; - u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); + u32 sid = current_sid(); /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private @@ -3825,6 +3825,8 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, } if (file) { + const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ? + file->f_cred : current_cred(); /* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */ u32 av = FILE__READ; if (shared && prot_write) @@ -3838,11 +3840,11 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, return 0; } -static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, - const struct file *file, - unsigned long prot, bool shared) +static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, + unsigned long prot, bool shared, + bool mounter_check) { - return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false); + return __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check, false); } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) @@ -3858,12 +3860,14 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) return rc; } -static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, - unsigned long prot, bool shared) +static int selinux_mmap_file_common(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool mounter_check) { if (file) { int rc; struct common_audit_data ad; + const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ? + file->f_cred : current_cred(); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; @@ -3872,15 +3876,16 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, return rc; } - return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared); + return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check); } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot, - (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); + return selinux_mmap_file_common(file, prot, + (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED, + false); } /** @@ -3912,8 +3917,9 @@ static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) prot |= PROT_EXEC; - return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file, - prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED); + return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file, prot, + vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED, + true); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -3974,11 +3980,11 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } } - rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file); + rc = __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, false, backing_file); if (rc) return rc; if (backing_file) { - rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared); + rc = file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, true); if (rc) return rc; } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/6] bpf back main
by Pu Lehui 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huaweicloud.com> David Windsor (1): bpf: Reject sleepable BPF_LSM_CGROUP programs at load time Jiri Olsa (1): bpf: Guard __get_user acesss with access_ok for uprobe_multi data Kaitao Cheng (1): bpf: Clear rb node linkage when freeing bpf_rb_root Mykyta Yatsenko (1): bpf: Fix NMI/tracepoint re-entry deadlock on lru locks Xu Kuohai (2): bpf: Fix setting retval to -EPERM for cgroup hooks not returning errno bpf: Add validation for bpf_set_retval argument include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 6 ++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.h | 25 ++++++++++++---- kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 20 +++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 11 +++++-- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 11 +++++++ 7 files changed, 158 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 7

[PATCH] selinux: fix incorrect execmem checks on overlayfs
by Cai Xinchen 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc4 commit 9fe595fad54d4ac6a402edb3f60bec859d52cea6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9692 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The commit fixing the overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks failed to skip the execmem check in __file_map_prot_check() for the case where the "mounter check" is being performed. This check should be performed only against the credentials of the task that is calling mmap()/mprotect(), since it doesn't pertain to the file itself, but rather just gates the ability of the calling task to get an executable memory mapping in general. The purpose of the "mounter check" is to guard against using an overlayfs mount to gain file access that would otherwise be denied to the mounter. For execmem this is not relevant, as there is no further file access granted based on it (notice that the file's context is not used as the target in the check), so checking it also against the mounter credentials would be incorrect. Fix this by passing a boolean to [__]file_map_prot_check() and selinux_mmap_file_common() that indicates if we are doing the "mounter check" and skiping the execmem check in that case. Since this boolean also indicates if we use current_cred() or the mounter cred as the subject, also remove the "cred" argument from these functions and determine it based on the boolean and the file struct. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 2d9f365022cb..b3d93234a4c3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3794,9 +3794,9 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, static int default_noexec __ro_after_init; -static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, - const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, - bool shared, bool bf_user_file) +static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool mounter_check, + bool bf_user_file) { struct inode *inode = NULL; bool prot_exec = prot & PROT_EXEC; @@ -3809,10 +3809,10 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, inode = file_inode(file); } - if (default_noexec && prot_exec && + if (!mounter_check && default_noexec && prot_exec && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(inode) || (!shared && prot_write))) { int rc; - u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); + u32 sid = current_sid(); /* * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a private @@ -3825,6 +3825,8 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, } if (file) { + const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ? + file->f_cred : current_cred(); /* "read" always possible, "write" only if shared */ u32 av = FILE__READ; if (shared && prot_write) @@ -3838,11 +3840,11 @@ static int __file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, return 0; } -static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct cred *cred, - const struct file *file, - unsigned long prot, bool shared) +static inline int file_map_prot_check(const struct file *file, + unsigned long prot, bool shared, + bool mounter_check) { - return __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, false); + return __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check, false); } static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) @@ -3858,12 +3860,14 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) return rc; } -static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, - unsigned long prot, bool shared) +static int selinux_mmap_file_common(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, + bool shared, bool mounter_check) { if (file) { int rc; struct common_audit_data ad; + const struct cred *cred = mounter_check ? + file->f_cred : current_cred(); ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE; ad.u.file = file; @@ -3872,15 +3876,16 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file_common(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, return rc; } - return file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared); + return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, mounter_check); } static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot __always_unused, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) { - return selinux_mmap_file_common(current_cred(), file, prot, - (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); + return selinux_mmap_file_common(file, prot, + (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED, + false); } /** @@ -3912,8 +3917,9 @@ static int selinux_mmap_backing_file(struct vm_area_struct *vma, if (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC) prot |= PROT_EXEC; - return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file->f_cred, backing_file, - prot, vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED); + return selinux_mmap_file_common(backing_file, prot, + vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED, + true); } static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, @@ -3974,11 +3980,11 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, } } - rc = __file_map_prot_check(cred, file, prot, shared, backing_file); + rc = __file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, false, backing_file); if (rc) return rc; if (backing_file) { - rc = file_map_prot_check(file->f_cred, file, prot, shared); + rc = file_map_prot_check(file, prot, shared, true); if (rc) return rc; } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2026-64352
by Tengda Wu 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

Fix CVE-2026-64352. Andrii Nakryiko (1): bpf: Consistently use bpf_rcu_lock_held() everywhere Vlad Poenaru (1): bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs include/linux/bpf.h | 3 +++ include/linux/bpf_local_storage.h | 3 --- kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 21 +++++++-------------- kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 12 ++++-------- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 10 ++++------ 5 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] cgroup/rstat: avoid disabling irqs for O(num_cpu)
by Cai Xinchen 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit 0efc297a3c4974dbd609ee36fc6345720b6ca735 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9685 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- cgroup_rstat_flush_locked() grabs the irq safe cgroup_rstat_lock while iterating all possible cpus. It only drops the lock if there is scheduler or spin lock contention. If neither, then interrupts can be disabled for a long time. On large machines this can disable interrupts for a long enough time to drop network packets. On 400+ CPU machines I've seen interrupt disabled for over 40 msec. Prevent rstat from disabling interrupts while processing all possible cpus. Instead drop and reacquire cgroup_rstat_lock for each cpu. This approach was previously discussed in https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZBz%2FV5a7%2F6PZeM7S@slm.duckdns.org/, though this was in the context of an non-irq rstat spin lock. Benchmark this change with: 1) a single stat_reader process with 400 threads, each reading a test memcg's memory.stat repeatedly for 10 seconds. 2) 400 memory hog processes running in the test memcg and repeatedly charging memory until oom killed. Then they repeat charging and oom killing. v6.14-rc6 with CONFIG_IRQSOFF_TRACER with stat_reader and hogs, finds interrupts are disabled by rstat for 45341 usec: # => started at: _raw_spin_lock_irq # => ended at: cgroup_rstat_flush # # # _------=> CPU# # / _-----=> irqs-off/BH-disabled # | / _----=> need-resched # || / _---=> hardirq/softirq # ||| / _--=> preempt-depth # |||| / _-=> migrate-disable # ||||| / delay # cmd pid |||||| time | caller # \ / |||||| \ | / stat_rea-96532 52d.... 0us*: _raw_spin_lock_irq stat_rea-96532 52d.... 45342us : cgroup_rstat_flush stat_rea-96532 52d.... 45342us : tracer_hardirqs_on <-cgroup_rstat_flush stat_rea-96532 52d.... 45343us : <stack trace> => memcg1_stat_format => memory_stat_format => memory_stat_show => seq_read_iter => vfs_read => ksys_read => do_syscall_64 => entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe With this patch the CONFIG_IRQSOFF_TRACER doesn't find rstat to be the longest holder. The longest irqs-off holder has irqs disabled for 4142 usec, a huge reduction from previous 45341 usec rstat finding. Running stat_reader memory.stat reader for 10 seconds: - without memory hogs: 9.84M accesses => 12.7M accesses - with memory hogs: 9.46M accesses => 11.1M accesses The throughput of memory.stat access improves. The mode of memory.stat access latency after grouping by of 2 buckets: - without memory hogs: 64 usec => 16 usec - with memory hogs: 64 usec => 8 usec The memory.stat latency improves. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen(a)google.com> Tested-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen(a)google.com> Acked-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny(a)suse.com> Reviewed-by: Yosry Ahmed <yosry.ahmed(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/cgroup/rstat.c [Use spin_(un)lock_irq instead of __cgroup_rstat_(un)lock in 6.6] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/cgroup/rstat.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c b/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c index b589868cc85c..ea5a21dc9df3 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/rstat.c @@ -205,12 +205,10 @@ static void cgroup_rstat_flush_locked(struct cgroup *cgrp) raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(cpu_lock, flags); /* play nice and yield if necessary */ - if (need_resched() || spin_needbreak(&cgroup_rstat_lock)) { - spin_unlock_irq(&cgroup_rstat_lock); - if (!cond_resched()) - cpu_relax(); - spin_lock_irq(&cgroup_rstat_lock); - } + spin_unlock_irq(&cgroup_rstat_lock); + if (!cond_resched()) + cpu_relax(); + spin_lock_irq(&cgroup_rstat_lock); } } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] udf: validate free block extents against the partition length
by Lai Zewei 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit fb49099206c5c57af28a157249fa7bcb5518f99e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16620 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap array. A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the image have a higher prerequisite. No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by a kernel panic. Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted callers cannot walk past the flexible array. Fixes: 56e69e59751d ("udf: prevent integer overflow in udf_bitmap_free_blocks()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260515142327.1120767-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.c… Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Lai Zewei <laizewei3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/udf/balloc.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/udf/balloc.c b/fs/udf/balloc.c index f5de2030e769..e3bf8122b7dc 100644 --- a/fs/udf/balloc.c +++ b/fs/udf/balloc.c @@ -82,8 +82,9 @@ static int __load_block_bitmap(struct super_block *sb, int nr_groups = bitmap->s_nr_groups; if (block_group >= nr_groups) { - udf_debug("block_group (%u) > nr_groups (%d)\n", + udf_debug("block_group (%u) >= nr_groups (%d)\n", block_group, nr_groups); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; } if (bitmap->s_block_bitmap[block_group]) { @@ -679,7 +680,7 @@ void udf_free_blocks(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, if (check_add_overflow(bloc->logicalBlockNum, offset, &blk) || check_add_overflow(blk, count, &blk) || - bloc->logicalBlockNum + count > map->s_partition_len) { + blk > map->s_partition_len) { udf_debug("Invalid request to free blocks: (%d, %u), off %u, " "len %u, partition len %u\n", partition, bloc->logicalBlockNum, offset, count, -- 2.52.0

2 7

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iov_iter: Fix potential underflow in iov_iter_extract_xarray_pages()
by Chen Jinghuang 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc2 commit 55f4bb9373ca4a521f3b0119366db92715a39b81 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9684 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- In iov_iter_extract_xarray_pages(), if no pages are extracted because there's a hole (or something otherwise unextractable) in the xarray, then the calculation of maxsize at the end can go wrong if the starting offset is not zero. Fix this by returning 0 in such a case and freeing the page array if allocated here rather than being passed in. Note that in the near future, ITER_XARRAY should be removed. Fixes: 7d58fe731028 ("iov_iter: Add a function to extract a page list from an iterator") Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260608145432.681865-1-dhowells%40redhat.com Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260616100821.2062304-1-dhowells%40redhat.c… Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625140640.3116900-6-dhowells@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> cc: Paulo Alcantara <pc(a)manguebit.org> cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)infradead.org> cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> cc: Mike Marshall <hubcap(a)omnibond.com> cc: netfs(a)lists.linux.dev cc: linux-fsdevel(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: lib/iov_iter.c [a little context conflict] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- lib/iov_iter.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/lib/iov_iter.c b/lib/iov_iter.c index 0b8fc9831225..a4cc8d68b409 100644 --- a/lib/iov_iter.c +++ b/lib/iov_iter.c @@ -1625,6 +1625,7 @@ static ssize_t iov_iter_extract_xarray_pages(struct iov_iter *i, struct page *page, **p; unsigned int nr = 0, offset; loff_t pos = i->xarray_start + i->iov_offset; + bool will_alloc = !*pages; pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT; XA_STATE(xas, i->xarray, index); @@ -1653,6 +1654,14 @@ static ssize_t iov_iter_extract_xarray_pages(struct iov_iter *i, } rcu_read_unlock(); + if (!nr) { + if (will_alloc) { + kvfree(*pages); + *pages = NULL; + } + return 0; + } + maxsize = min_t(size_t, nr * PAGE_SIZE - offset, maxsize); iov_iter_advance(i, maxsize); return maxsize; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs
by Tengda Wu 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: Vlad Poenaru <vlad.wing(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit ec662a8b2cde01e76b37ccd4b992d0342299e69c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16648 CVE: CVE-2026-64352 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2f884d371fafea137afea504d49ee4a7c8d7985b ] trie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with only rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c) resolves to "c || rcu_read_lock_held()", this passes for XDP/NAPI and classic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter via __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace(). trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a different form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which asserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from sleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem helpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In the writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie->lock (an rqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side lock to keep nodes alive there. A sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore triggers lockdep on debug kernels: ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 7.1.0-... Tainted: G E ----------------------------- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage! 1 lock held by net_tests/540: #0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0}, at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl lockdep_rcu_suspicious trie_lookup_elem bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect bpf_trampoline_... security_socket_connect __sys_connect do_syscall_64 This is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize against the trie's reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per distinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM that touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common. For the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation from rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all three contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already follow this convention. For trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as rcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same file -- since trie->lock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no lockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to '1' rather than lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock); the protection is real but not machine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare rcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which holds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left untouched. Fixes: 694cea395fde ("bpf: Allow RCU-protected lookups to happen from bh context") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vlad Poenaru <vlad.wing(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil(a)etsalapatis.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260609135558.193287-2-vlad.wing@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c index c4f1d465ae35..7c7cacf9fa59 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void *trie_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key) /* Start walking the trie from the root node ... */ - for (node = rcu_dereference_check(trie->root, rcu_read_lock_bh_held()); + for (node = rcu_dereference_check(trie->root, bpf_rcu_lock_held()); node;) { unsigned int next_bit; size_t matchlen; @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ static void *trie_lookup_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key) */ next_bit = extract_bit(key->data, node->prefixlen); node = rcu_dereference_check(node->child[next_bit], - rcu_read_lock_bh_held()); + bpf_rcu_lock_held()); } if (!found) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] perf/core: Detach event groups during remove_on_exec
by Luo Gengkun 30 Jul '26

30 Jul '26

From: Taeyang Lee <0wn(a)theori.io> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.145 commit 4cdb1b3ab96eb1b7eb70bc5c82fede334bd60df2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16858 CVE: CVE-2026-64556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 037a3c43edfb597665dd34457cd22b14692f2ba3 ] perf_event_remove_on_exec() removes events by calling perf_event_exit_event(). For top-level events, this removes the event from the context with DETACH_EXIT only. This can leave inconsistent group state when a removed event is a group leader and the group contains siblings without remove_on_exec. If the group was active, the surviving siblings can remain active and attached to the removed leader's sibling list, but are no longer represented by a valid group leader on the PMU context active lists. A later close of the removed leader uses DETACH_GROUP and can promote the still-active siblings from this stale group state. The next schedule-in can then add an already-linked active_list entry again, corrupting the PMU context active list. With DEBUG_LIST enabled, this is caught as a list_add double-add in merge_sched_in(). Fix this by detaching group relationships when remove_on_exec removes an event. This preserves the existing task-exit and revoke behavior, while ensuring surviving siblings are ungrouped before the removed event leaves the context. Fixes: 2e498d0a74e5 ("perf: Add support for event removal on exec") Signed-off-by: Taeyang Lee <0wn(a)theori.io> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz(a)infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/ai65GgZcC0LAlWLG@Taeyangs-MacBook-Pro.local Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/events/core.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index dbfe7f054d4b..6916dc78b0e7 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -4451,7 +4451,8 @@ static void perf_event_enable_on_exec(struct perf_event_context *ctx) static void perf_remove_from_owner(struct perf_event *event); static void perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, - struct perf_event_context *ctx); + struct perf_event_context *ctx, + unsigned long detach_flags); /* * Removes all events from the current task that have been marked @@ -4478,7 +4479,7 @@ static void perf_event_remove_on_exec(struct perf_event_context *ctx) modified = true; - perf_event_exit_event(event, ctx); + perf_event_exit_event(event, ctx, DETACH_GROUP); } raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->lock, flags); @@ -13224,10 +13225,11 @@ static void sync_child_event(struct perf_event *child_event) } static void -perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx) +perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, + struct perf_event_context *ctx, + unsigned long detach_flags) { struct perf_event *parent_event = event->parent; - unsigned long detach_flags = 0; if (parent_event) { /* @@ -13242,7 +13244,7 @@ perf_event_exit_event(struct perf_event *event, struct perf_event_context *ctx) * Do destroy all inherited groups, we don't care about those * and being thorough is better. */ - detach_flags = DETACH_GROUP | DETACH_CHILD; + detach_flags |= DETACH_GROUP | DETACH_CHILD; mutex_lock(&parent_event->child_mutex); } @@ -13321,7 +13323,7 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child) perf_event_task(child, child_ctx, 0); list_for_each_entry_safe(child_event, next, &child_ctx->event_list, event_entry) - perf_event_exit_event(child_event, child_ctx); + perf_event_exit_event(child_event, child_ctx, 0); mutex_unlock(&child_ctx->mutex); -- 2.34.1

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