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Subject: [PATCHOLK-6.6] ASoC: dapm: fix bounds checker error in
by Wang Jinchao 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: Aleksei Vetrov <vvvvvv(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.11.7 commit c549cb66e8de0ba1936fc97a59f0156741d3492a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB5KRC CVE: CVE-2024-53045 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2ef9439f7a19fd3d43b288d38b1c6e55b668a4fe ] The widgets array in the snd_soc_dapm_widget_list has a __counted_by attribute attached to it, which points to the num_widgets variable. This attribute is used in bounds checking, and if it is not set before the array is filled, then the bounds sanitizer will issue a warning or a kernel panic if CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP is set. This patch sets the size of the widgets list calculated with list_for_each as the initial value for num_widgets as it is used for allocating memory for the array. It is updated with the actual number of added elements after the array is filled. Signed-off-by: Aleksei Vetrov <vvvvvv(a)google.com> Fixes: 80e698e2df5b ("ASoC: soc-dapm: Annotate struct snd_soc_dapm_widget_list with __counted_by") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241028-soc-dapm-bounds-checker-fix-v1-1-262b0394… Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by:WangJinchao<wangjinchao(a)xfusion.com> --- sound/soc/soc-dapm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c b/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c index e39df5d10b07..1647b24ca34d 100644 --- a/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c +++ b/sound/soc/soc-dapm.c @@ -1147,6 +1147,8 @@ static int dapm_widget_list_create(struct snd_soc_dapm_widget_list **list, if (*list == NULL) return -ENOMEM; + (*list)->num_widgets = size; + list_for_each_entry(w, widgets, work_list) (*list)->widgets[i++] = w; -- 2.47.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix out-of-bounds write in trie_get_next_key()
by Xiaomeng Zhang 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.229 commit 590976f921723d53ac199c01d5b7b73a94875e68 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IB379Y CVE: CVE-2024-50262 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 13400ac8fb80c57c2bfb12ebd35ee121ce9b4d21 ] trie_get_next_key() allocates a node stack with size trie->max_prefixlen, while it writes (trie->max_prefixlen + 1) nodes to the stack when it has full paths from the root to leaves. For example, consider a trie with max_prefixlen is 8, and the nodes with key 0x00/0, 0x00/1, 0x00/2, ... 0x00/8 inserted. Subsequent calls to trie_get_next_key with _key with .prefixlen = 8 make 9 nodes be written on the node stack with size 8. Fixes: b471f2f1de8b ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command for LPM_TRIE map") Signed-off-by: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Zxx384ZfdlFYnz6J@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Zhang <zhangxiaomeng13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c index 3c2d8722d45b..8370b391f1d6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static int trie_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key, void *_next_key) if (!key || key->prefixlen > trie->max_prefixlen) goto find_leftmost; - node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen, + node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen + 1, sizeof(struct lpm_trie_node *), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!node_stack) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix out-of-bounds write in trie_get_next_key()
by Xiaomeng Zhang 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.229 commit 590976f921723d53ac199c01d5b7b73a94875e68 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IB379Y CVE: CVE-2024-50262 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 13400ac8fb80c57c2bfb12ebd35ee121ce9b4d21 ] trie_get_next_key() allocates a node stack with size trie->max_prefixlen, while it writes (trie->max_prefixlen + 1) nodes to the stack when it has full paths from the root to leaves. For example, consider a trie with max_prefixlen is 8, and the nodes with key 0x00/0, 0x00/1, 0x00/2, ... 0x00/8 inserted. Subsequent calls to trie_get_next_key with _key with .prefixlen = 8 make 9 nodes be written on the node stack with size 8. Fixes: b471f2f1de8b ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command for LPM_TRIE map") Signed-off-by: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Zxx384ZfdlFYnz6J@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Zhang <zhangxiaomeng13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c index 3c2d8722d45b..8370b391f1d6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static int trie_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key, void *_next_key) if (!key || key->prefixlen > trie->max_prefixlen) goto find_leftmost; - node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen, + node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen + 1, sizeof(struct lpm_trie_node *), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!node_stack) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/16] blk-mq/scsi: tracking device queue depth via sbitmap
by Zheng Qixing 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

Linux mainline-5.13 uses sbitmap to track the queue depth of SCSI devices. This patch set backports the mainline patches to OLK-5.10 and fixes some KABI issues. Tests on scsi_debug show that this method can improve IO performance by more than 30%. Kashyap Desai (1): scsi: megaraid_sas: Replace sdev_busy with local counter Ming Lei (12): scsi: sbitmap: Remove sbitmap_clear_bit_unlock scsi: sbitmap: Maintain allocation round_robin in sbitmap scsi: sbitmap: Add helpers for updating allocation hint scsi: sbitmap: Move allocation hint into sbitmap scsi: sbitmap: Export sbitmap_weight scsi: sbitmap: Add sbitmap_calculate_shift() helper scsi: blk-mq: Add callbacks for storing & retrieving budget token scsi: blk-mq: Return budget token from .get_budget callback scsi: core: Put hot fields of scsi_host_template in one cacheline scsi: core: Add scsi_device_busy() wrapper scsi: core: Make sure sdev->queue_depth is <= max(shost->can_queue, 1024) scsi: core: Replace sdev->device_busy with sbitmap Pavel Begunkov (1): sbitmap: optimise sbitmap_deferred_clear() Zheng Qixing (2): sbitmap: fix kabi broken by adding struct sbitmap_extend sbitmap: fix kabi broken in struct scsi_device block/blk-mq-sched.c | 17 +- block/blk-mq.c | 38 ++- block/blk-mq.h | 25 +- block/kyber-iosched.c | 3 +- drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas.h | 2 + drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c | 47 +++- drivers/scsi/mpt3sas/mpt3sas_scsih.c | 2 +- drivers/scsi/scsi.c | 13 ++ drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c | 71 ++++-- drivers/scsi/scsi_priv.h | 3 + drivers/scsi/scsi_scan.c | 45 +++- drivers/scsi/scsi_sysfs.c | 4 +- drivers/scsi/sg.c | 2 +- drivers/vhost/scsi.c | 4 +- include/linux/blk-mq.h | 13 +- include/linux/sbitmap.h | 91 ++++++-- include/scsi/scsi_cmnd.h | 2 + include/scsi/scsi_device.h | 13 +- include/scsi/scsi_host.h | 72 +++--- lib/sbitmap.c | 243 +++++++++++--------- 21 files changed, 486 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 17

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm, slub: avoid zeroing kmalloc redzone
by Liu Shixin 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc1 commit 59090e479ac78ae18facd4c58eb332562a23020e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYRAH CVE: CVE-2024-49885 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since commit 946fa0dbf2d8 ("mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra allocated kmalloc space than requested"), setting orig_size treats the wasted space (object_size - orig_size) as a redzone. However with init_on_free=1 we clear the full object->size, including the redzone. Additionally we clear the object metadata, including the stored orig_size, making it zero, which makes check_object() treat the whole object as a redzone. These issues lead to the following BUG report with "slub_debug=FUZ init_on_free=1": [ 0.000000] ============================================================================= [ 0.000000] BUG kmalloc-8 (Not tainted): kmalloc Redzone overwritten [ 0.000000] ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f @offset=2136. First byte 0x0 instead of 0xcc [ 0.000000] FIX kmalloc-8: Restoring kmalloc Redzone 0xffff000010032858-0xffff00001003285f=0xcc [ 0.000000] Slab 0xfffffdffc0400c80 objects=36 used=23 fp=0xffff000010032a18 flags=0x3fffe0000000200(workingset|node=0|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [ 0.000000] Object 0xffff000010032858 @offset=2136 fp=0xffff0000100328c8 [ 0.000000] [ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032850: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 0.000000] Object ffff000010032858: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 0.000000] Redzone ffff000010032860: cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc ........ [ 0.000000] Padding ffff0000100328b4: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-next-20240814-00004-g61844c55c3f4 #144 [ 0.000000] Hardware name: NXP i.MX95 19X19 board (DT) [ 0.000000] Call trace: [ 0.000000] dump_backtrace+0x90/0xe8 [ 0.000000] show_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 0.000000] dump_stack_lvl+0x74/0x8c [ 0.000000] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 0.000000] print_trailer+0x150/0x218 [ 0.000000] check_object+0xe4/0x454 [ 0.000000] free_to_partial_list+0x2f8/0x5ec To address the issue, use orig_size to clear the used area. And restore the value of orig_size after clear the remaining area. When CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not defined, (get_orig_size()' directly returns s->object_size. So when using memset to init the area, the size can simply be orig_size, as orig_size returns object_size when CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG not enabled. And orig_size can never be bigger than object_size. Fixes: 946fa0dbf2d8 ("mm/slub: extend redzone check to extra allocated kmalloc space than requested") Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang(a)intel.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Conflicts: mm/slub.c [ Context conflict due to miss commit 4d2bcefa965b, 2d5524635b00 and 8f828aa48812. ] Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- mm/slub.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c index bcbfd720b574..a5ff41567a8f 100644 --- a/mm/slub.c +++ b/mm/slub.c @@ -467,6 +467,26 @@ static inline void set_freepointer(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, void *fp) *(freeptr_t *)freeptr_addr = freelist_ptr_encode(s, fp, freeptr_addr); } +/* + * See comment in calculate_sizes(). + */ +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s) +{ + return s->offset >= s->inuse; +} + +/* + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if + * not overlapping with object. + */ +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s) +{ + if (freeptr_outside_object(s)) + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *); + else + return s->inuse; +} + /* Loop over all objects in a slab */ #define for_each_object(__p, __s, __addr, __objects) \ for (__p = fixup_red_left(__s, __addr); \ @@ -642,6 +662,50 @@ static inline bool slab_update_freelist(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, return false; } +/* + * kmalloc caches has fixed sizes (mostly power of 2), and kmalloc() API + * family will round up the real request size to these fixed ones, so + * there could be an extra area than what is requested. Save the original + * request size in the meta data area, for better debug and sanity check. + */ +static inline void set_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, + void *object, unsigned int orig_size) +{ + void *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); + + if (!slub_debug_orig_size(s)) + return; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC + /* + * KASAN could save its free meta data in object's data area at + * offset 0, if the size is larger than 'orig_size', it will + * overlap the data redzone in [orig_size+1, object_size], and + * the check should be skipped. + */ + if (kasan_metadata_size(s, true) > orig_size) + orig_size = s->object_size; +#endif + + p += get_info_end(s); + p += sizeof(struct track) * 2; + + *(unsigned int *)p = orig_size; +} + +static inline unsigned int get_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) +{ + void *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); + + if (!slub_debug_orig_size(s)) + return s->object_size; + + p += get_info_end(s); + p += sizeof(struct track) * 2; + + return *(unsigned int *)p; +} + #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG static unsigned long object_map[BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_OBJS_PER_PAGE)]; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(object_map_lock); @@ -755,26 +819,6 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr, metadata_access_disable(); } -/* - * See comment in calculate_sizes(). - */ -static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s) -{ - return s->offset >= s->inuse; -} - -/* - * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if - * not overlapping with object. - */ -static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s) -{ - if (freeptr_outside_object(s)) - return s->inuse + sizeof(void *); - else - return s->inuse; -} - static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, enum track_item alloc) { @@ -875,50 +919,6 @@ static void print_slab_info(const struct slab *slab) folio_flags(folio, 0)); } -/* - * kmalloc caches has fixed sizes (mostly power of 2), and kmalloc() API - * family will round up the real request size to these fixed ones, so - * there could be an extra area than what is requested. Save the original - * request size in the meta data area, for better debug and sanity check. - */ -static inline void set_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, - void *object, unsigned int orig_size) -{ - void *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); - - if (!slub_debug_orig_size(s)) - return; - -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC - /* - * KASAN could save its free meta data in object's data area at - * offset 0, if the size is larger than 'orig_size', it will - * overlap the data redzone in [orig_size+1, object_size], and - * the check should be skipped. - */ - if (kasan_metadata_size(s, true) > orig_size) - orig_size = s->object_size; -#endif - - p += get_info_end(s); - p += sizeof(struct track) * 2; - - *(unsigned int *)p = orig_size; -} - -static inline unsigned int get_orig_size(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object) -{ - void *p = kasan_reset_tag(object); - - if (!slub_debug_orig_size(s)) - return s->object_size; - - p += get_info_end(s); - p += sizeof(struct track) * 2; - - return *(unsigned int *)p; -} - void skip_orig_size_check(struct kmem_cache *s, const void *object) { set_orig_size(s, (void *)object, s->object_size); @@ -1764,7 +1764,6 @@ static inline void inc_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node, int objects) {} static inline void dec_slabs_node(struct kmem_cache *s, int node, int objects) {} - #ifndef CONFIG_SLUB_TINY static bool freelist_corrupted(struct kmem_cache *s, struct slab *slab, void **freelist, void *nextfree) @@ -1804,12 +1803,19 @@ static __always_inline bool slab_free_hook(struct kmem_cache *s, */ if (init) { int rsize; + unsigned int orig_size; + orig_size = get_orig_size(s, x); if (!kasan_has_integrated_init()) - memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, s->object_size); + memset(kasan_reset_tag(x), 0, orig_size); rsize = (s->flags & SLAB_RED_ZONE) ? s->red_left_pad : 0; memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(x) + s->inuse, 0, s->size - s->inuse - rsize); + /* + * Restore orig_size, otherwize kmalloc redzone overwritten + * would be reported + */ + set_orig_size(s, x, orig_size); } /* KASAN might put x into memory quarantine, delaying its reuse. */ return kasan_slab_free(s, x, init); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/4] CVE-2024-47745
by Liu Shixin 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

CVE-2024-47745 Kirill A. Shutemov (1): mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between Liam Howlett (1): mm/mmap.c: don't unlock VMAs in remap_file_pages() Liam R. Howlett (1): remap_file_pages: Use vma_lookup() instead of find_vma() Shu Han (1): mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() mm/mmap.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH] bpf: Fix out-of-bounds write in trie_get_next_key()
by Xiaomeng Zhang 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.229 commit 590976f921723d53ac199c01d5b7b73a94875e68 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IB4U3C CVE: CVE-2024-50262 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 13400ac8fb80c57c2bfb12ebd35ee121ce9b4d21 ] trie_get_next_key() allocates a node stack with size trie->max_prefixlen, while it writes (trie->max_prefixlen + 1) nodes to the stack when it has full paths from the root to leaves. For example, consider a trie with max_prefixlen is 8, and the nodes with key 0x00/0, 0x00/1, 0x00/2, ... 0x00/8 inserted. Subsequent calls to trie_get_next_key with _key with .prefixlen = 8 make 9 nodes be written on the node stack with size 8. Fixes: b471f2f1de8b ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command for LPM_TRIE map") Signed-off-by: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Zxx384ZfdlFYnz6J@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiaomeng Zhang <zhangxiaomeng13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c index 3c2d8722d45b..8370b391f1d6 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c @@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static int trie_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key, void *_next_key) if (!key || key->prefixlen > trie->max_prefixlen) goto find_leftmost; - node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen, + node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen + 1, sizeof(struct lpm_trie_node *), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!node_stack) -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] CVE-2024-47745
by Liu Shixin 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

CVE-2024-47745 Kirill A. Shutemov (1): mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between Liam Howlett (1): mm/mmap.c: don't unlock VMAs in remap_file_pages() Liam R. Howlett (1): remap_file_pages: Use vma_lookup() instead of find_vma() Shu Han (1): mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() mm/mmap.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm: split critical region in remap_file_pages() and invoke LSMs in between
by Liu Shixin 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc6 commit 58a039e679fe72bd0efa8b2abe669a7914bb4429 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAYQSE CVE: CVE-2024-47745 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and mprotect(). However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock lock, while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit 8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem"). This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system call was called. Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock, retrieves the VMA and the file descriptor associated, and calculates the 'prot' and 'flags' variables; the second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA flags and the VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the first critical region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls do_mmap(). In between, after releasing the read lock and before taking the write lock, call security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241018161415.3845146-1-roberto.sassu@huaweiclou… Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Reported-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/66f7b10e.050a0220.46d20.0036.… Tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett(a)Oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Tested-by: syzbot+1cd571a672400ef3a930(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin(a)gmail.com> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg(a)oracle.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris(a)namei.org> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge(a)hallyn.com> Cc: Shu Han <ebpqwerty472123(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: mm/mmap.c [ Some offset inconsistency in git-am. No functional difference. ] Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- mm/mmap.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index c898103c6d72..dfa3d2bfe289 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -3040,6 +3040,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, unsigned long populate = 0; unsigned long ret = -EINVAL; struct file *file; + vm_flags_t vm_flags; pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n", current->comm, current->pid); @@ -3056,12 +3057,60 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff) return ret; - if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) + if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) + return -EINTR; + + /* + * Look up VMA under read lock first so we can perform the security + * without holding locks (which can be problematic). We reacquire a + * write lock later and check nothing changed underneath us. + */ + vma = vma_lookup(mm, start); + + if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) { + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + return -EINVAL; + } + + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0; + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0; + prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0; + + flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK; + flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE; + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) + flags |= MAP_LOCKED; + + /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */ + vm_flags = vma->vm_flags; + file = get_file(vma->vm_file); + + mmap_read_unlock(mm); + + /* Call outside mmap_lock to be consistent with other callers. */ + ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags); + if (ret) { + fput(file); + return ret; + } + + ret = -EINVAL; + + /* OK security check passed, take write lock + let it rip. */ + if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) { + fput(file); return -EINTR; + } vma = vma_lookup(mm, start); - if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) + if (!vma) + goto out; + + /* Make sure things didn't change under us. */ + if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags) + goto out; + if (vma->vm_file != file) goto out; if (start + size > vma->vm_end) { @@ -3089,25 +3138,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, goto out; } - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0; - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0; - prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0; - - flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK; - flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE; - if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED) - flags |= MAP_LOCKED; - - file = get_file(vma->vm_file); - ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags); - if (ret) - goto out_fput; ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size, prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL); -out_fput: - fput(file); out: mmap_write_unlock(mm); + fput(file); if (populate) mm_populate(ret, populate); if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret)) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Fix out-of-bounds write in trie_get_next_key()
by Xiaomeng Zhang 21 Nov '24

21 Nov '24

From: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.60 commit 90a6e0e1e151ef7a9282e78f54c3091de2dcc99c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB379Y Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 13400ac8fb80c57c2bfb12ebd35ee121ce9b4d21 ] trie_get_next_key() allocates a node stack with size trie->max_prefixlen, while it writes (trie->max_prefixlen + 1) nodes to the stack when it has full paths from the root to leaves. For example, consider a trie with max_prefixlen is 8, and the nodes with key 0x00/0, 0x00/1, 0x00/2, ... 0x00/8 inserted. Subsequent calls to trie_get_next_key with _key with .prefixlen = 8 make 9 nodes be written on the node stack with size 8. Fixes: b471f2f1de8b ("bpf: implement MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY command for LPM_TRIE map") Signed-off-by: Byeonguk Jeong <jungbu2855(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)kernel.org> Tested-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Zxx384ZfdlFYnz6J@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wen Zhiwei <wenzhiwei(a)kylinos.cn> --- kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c index d0febf07051e..daf8ffcfcdac 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c @@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static int trie_get_next_key(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key, void *_next_key) if (!key || key->prefixlen > trie->max_prefixlen) goto find_leftmost; - node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen, + node_stack = kmalloc_array(trie->max_prefixlen + 1, sizeof(struct lpm_trie_node *), GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN); if (!node_stack) -- 2.34.1

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