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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] spi: spi-mt65xx: Fix NULL pointer access in interrupt handler
by Wenyu Huang 08 May '24

08 May '24

From: Fei Shao <fshao(a)chromium.org> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.313 commit 2342b05ec5342a519e00524a507f7a6ea6791a38 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9L9O8 CVE: CVE-2024-27028 -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a20ad45008a7c82f1184dc6dee280096009ece55 ] The TX buffer in spi_transfer can be a NULL pointer, so the interrupt handler may end up writing to the invalid memory and cause crashes. Add a check to trans->tx_buf before using it. Fixes: 1ce24864bff4 ("spi: mediatek: Only do dma for 4-byte aligned buffers") Signed-off-by: Fei Shao <fshao(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno(a)collabora.com> Link: https://msgid.link/r/20240321070942.1587146-2-fshao@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wenyu Huang <huangwenyu5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/spi/spi-mt65xx.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/spi/spi-mt65xx.c b/drivers/spi/spi-mt65xx.c index 0c2867deb36f..1a1c54bf2ae1 100644 --- a/drivers/spi/spi-mt65xx.c +++ b/drivers/spi/spi-mt65xx.c @@ -522,17 +522,19 @@ static irqreturn_t mtk_spi_interrupt(int irq, void *dev_id) mdata->xfer_len = min(MTK_SPI_MAX_FIFO_SIZE, len); mtk_spi_setup_packet(master); - cnt = mdata->xfer_len / 4; - iowrite32_rep(mdata->base + SPI_TX_DATA_REG, - trans->tx_buf + mdata->num_xfered, cnt); - - remainder = mdata->xfer_len % 4; - if (remainder > 0) { - reg_val = 0; - memcpy(&reg_val, - trans->tx_buf + (cnt * 4) + mdata->num_xfered, - remainder); - writel(reg_val, mdata->base + SPI_TX_DATA_REG); + if (trans->tx_buf) { + cnt = mdata->xfer_len / 4; + iowrite32_rep(mdata->base + SPI_TX_DATA_REG, + trans->tx_buf + mdata->num_xfered, cnt); + + remainder = mdata->xfer_len % 4; + if (remainder > 0) { + reg_val = 0; + memcpy(&reg_val, + trans->tx_buf + (cnt * 4) + mdata->num_xfered, + remainder); + writel(reg_val, mdata->base + SPI_TX_DATA_REG); + } } mtk_spi_enable_transfer(master); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] firmware: arm_scmi: Harden accesses to the reset domains
by g30012805 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc7 commit e9076ffbcaed5da6c182b144ef9f6e24554af268 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189860 CVE: CVE-2022-48655 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Accessing reset domains descriptors by the index upon the SCMI drivers requests through the SCMI reset operations interface can potentially lead to out-of-bound violations if the SCMI driver misbehave. Add an internal consistency check before any such domains descriptors accesses. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817172731.1185305-5-cristian.marussi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Conflicts: drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c [This is a conflict caused by commit 7e0293442238("firmware: arm_scmi: Port reset protocol to new protocols interface") which is not merged.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c index a981a22cfe89..b8388a3b9c06 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c @@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ static int scmi_domain_reset(const struct scmi_handle *handle, u32 domain, struct scmi_xfer *t; struct scmi_msg_reset_domain_reset *dom; struct scmi_reset_info *pi = handle->reset_priv; - struct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; + struct reset_dom_info *rdom; + if (domain >= pi->num_domains) + return -EINVAL; + + rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; if (rdom->async_reset) flags |= ASYNCHRONOUS_RESET; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] firmware: arm_scmi: Harden accesses to the reset domains
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc7 commit e9076ffbcaed5da6c182b144ef9f6e24554af268 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189860 CVE: CVE-2022-48655 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Accessing reset domains descriptors by the index upon the SCMI drivers requests through the SCMI reset operations interface can potentially lead to out-of-bound violations if the SCMI driver misbehave. Add an internal consistency check before any such domains descriptors accesses. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817172731.1185305-5-cristian.marussi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Conflicts: drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c [This is a conflict caused by commit 7e0293442238("firmware: arm_scmi: Port reset protocol to new protocols interface") which is not merged.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c index a981a22cfe89..b8388a3b9c06 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c @@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ static int scmi_domain_reset(const struct scmi_handle *handle, u32 domain, struct scmi_xfer *t; struct scmi_msg_reset_domain_reset *dom; struct scmi_reset_info *pi = handle->reset_priv; - struct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; + struct reset_dom_info *rdom; + if (domain >= pi->num_domains) + return -EINVAL; + + rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; if (rdom->async_reset) flags |= ASYNCHRONOUS_RESET; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] firmware: arm_scmi: Harden accesses to the reset domains
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc7 commit e9076ffbcaed5da6c182b144ef9f6e24554af268 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189860 CVE: CVE-2022-48655 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Accessing reset domains descriptors by the index upon the SCMI drivers requests through the SCMI reset operations interface can potentially lead to out-of-bound violations if the SCMI driver misbehave. Add an internal consistency check before any such domains descriptors accesses. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817172731.1185305-5-cristian.marussi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Conflicts: drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c [This is a conflict caused by commit 7e0293442238("firmware: arm_scmi: Port reset protocol to new protocols interface") which is not merged.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c index a981a22cfe89..b8388a3b9c06 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c @@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ static int scmi_domain_reset(const struct scmi_handle *handle, u32 domain, struct scmi_xfer *t; struct scmi_msg_reset_domain_reset *dom; struct scmi_reset_info *pi = handle->reset_priv; - struct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; + struct reset_dom_info *rdom; + if (domain >= pi->num_domains) + return -EINVAL; + + rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; if (rdom->async_reset) flags |= ASYNCHRONOUS_RESET; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] firmware: arm_scmi: Harden accesses to the reset domains
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc7 commit e9076ffbcaed5da6c182b144ef9f6e24554af268 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189860 CVE: CVE-2022-48655 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Accessing reset domains descriptors by the index upon the SCMI drivers requests through the SCMI reset operations interface can potentially lead to out-of-bound violations if the SCMI driver misbehave. Add an internal consistency check before any such domains descriptors accesses. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220817172731.1185305-5-cristian.marussi@arm.com Signed-off-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Conflicts: drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c [This is a conflict caused by commit 7e0293442238("firmware: arm_scmi: Port reset protocol to new protocols interface") which is not merged.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c index a981a22cfe89..b8388a3b9c06 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/reset.c @@ -149,8 +149,12 @@ static int scmi_domain_reset(const struct scmi_handle *handle, u32 domain, struct scmi_xfer *t; struct scmi_msg_reset_domain_reset *dom; struct scmi_reset_info *pi = handle->reset_priv; - struct reset_dom_info *rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; + struct reset_dom_info *rdom; + if (domain >= pi->num_domains) + return -EINVAL; + + rdom = pi->dom_info + domain; if (rdom->async_reset) flags |= ASYNCHRONOUS_RESET; -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check on 32-bit arches
by g30012805 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit 15641007df0f0d35fa28742b25c2a7db9dcd6895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HKCB CVE: CVE-2024-26883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7a4b21250bf79eef26543d35bd390448646c536b ] The stackmap code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value, which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. The commit in the fixes tag actually attempted to fix this, but the fix did not account for the UB, so the fix only works on CPUs where an overflow does result in a neat truncation to zero, which is not guaranteed. Checking the value before rounding does not have this problem. Fixes: 6183f4d3a0a2 ("bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-4-toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 5d1704f64ade..000c21924212 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -115,11 +115,14 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) } else if (value_size / 8 > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* hash table size must be power of 2 */ - n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); - if (!n_buckets) + /* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow + * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first + */ + if (attr->max_entries > 1UL << 31) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); + cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost + attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size)); -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check on 32-bit arches
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit 15641007df0f0d35fa28742b25c2a7db9dcd6895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HKCB CVE: CVE-2024-26883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7a4b21250bf79eef26543d35bd390448646c536b ] The stackmap code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value, which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. The commit in the fixes tag actually attempted to fix this, but the fix did not account for the UB, so the fix only works on CPUs where an overflow does result in a neat truncation to zero, which is not guaranteed. Checking the value before rounding does not have this problem. Fixes: 6183f4d3a0a2 ("bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-4-toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 5d1704f64ade..000c21924212 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -115,11 +115,14 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) } else if (value_size / 8 > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* hash table size must be power of 2 */ - n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); - if (!n_buckets) + /* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow + * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first + */ + if (attr->max_entries > 1UL << 31) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); + cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost + attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size)); -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check on 32-bit arches
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit 15641007df0f0d35fa28742b25c2a7db9dcd6895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HKCB CVE: CVE-2024-26883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7a4b21250bf79eef26543d35bd390448646c536b ] The stackmap code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value, which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. The commit in the fixes tag actually attempted to fix this, but the fix did not account for the UB, so the fix only works on CPUs where an overflow does result in a neat truncation to zero, which is not guaranteed. Checking the value before rounding does not have this problem. Fixes: 6183f4d3a0a2 ("bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-4-toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 5d1704f64ade..000c21924212 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -115,11 +115,14 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) } else if (value_size / 8 > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* hash table size must be power of 2 */ - n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); - if (!n_buckets) + /* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow + * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first + */ + if (attr->max_entries > 1UL << 31) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); + cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost + attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size)); -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] bpf: Fix stackmap overflow check on 32-bit arches
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit 15641007df0f0d35fa28742b25c2a7db9dcd6895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HKCB CVE: CVE-2024-26883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7a4b21250bf79eef26543d35bd390448646c536b ] The stackmap code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value, which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. The commit in the fixes tag actually attempted to fix this, but the fix did not account for the UB, so the fix only works on CPUs where an overflow does result in a neat truncation to zero, which is not guaranteed. Checking the value before rounding does not have this problem. Fixes: 6183f4d3a0a2 ("bpf: Check for integer overflow when using roundup_pow_of_two()") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-4-toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/stackmap.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c index 5d1704f64ade..000c21924212 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/stackmap.c @@ -115,11 +115,14 @@ static struct bpf_map *stack_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) } else if (value_size / 8 > sysctl_perf_event_max_stack) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - /* hash table size must be power of 2 */ - n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); - if (!n_buckets) + /* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow + * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first + */ + if (attr->max_entries > 1UL << 31) return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); + n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(attr->max_entries); + cost = n_buckets * sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket *) + sizeof(*smap); err = bpf_map_charge_init(&mem, cost + attr->max_entries * (sizeof(struct stack_map_bucket) + (u64)value_size)); -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] bpf: Fix hashtab overflow check on 32-bit arches
by Guo Mengqi 07 May '24

07 May '24

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.214 commit 64f00b4df0597590b199b62a37a165473bf658a6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK6X CVE: CVE-2024-26884 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6787d916c2cf9850c97a0a3f73e08c43e7d973b1 ] The hashtab code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value, which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. So apply the same fix to hashtab, by moving the overflow check to before the roundup. Fixes: daaf427c6ab3 ("bpf: fix arraymap NULL deref and missing overflow and zero size checks") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-3-toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c index ec8497314272..72bc5f575254 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c @@ -443,7 +443,13 @@ static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) num_possible_cpus()); } - /* hash table size must be power of 2 */ + /* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow + * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first + */ + err = -E2BIG; + if (htab->map.max_entries > 1UL << 31) + goto free_htab; + htab->n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(htab->map.max_entries); htab->elem_size = sizeof(struct htab_elem) + @@ -453,10 +459,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) else htab->elem_size += round_up(htab->map.value_size, 8); - err = -E2BIG; - /* prevent zero size kmalloc and check for u32 overflow */ - if (htab->n_buckets == 0 || - htab->n_buckets > U32_MAX / sizeof(struct bucket)) + /* check for u32 overflow */ + if (htab->n_buckets > U32_MAX / sizeof(struct bucket)) goto free_htab; cost = (u64) htab->n_buckets * sizeof(struct bucket) + -- 2.17.1

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