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[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Mark raw_tp arguments with PTR_MAYBE_NULL
by Pu Lehui 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit cb4158ce8ec8a5bb528cc1693356a5eb8058094d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEDPP CVE: CVE-2024-56702 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Arguments to a raw tracepoint are tagged as trusted, which carries the semantics that the pointer will be non-NULL. However, in certain cases, a raw tracepoint argument may end up being NULL. More context about this issue is available in [0]. Thus, there is a discrepancy between the reality, that raw_tp arguments can actually be NULL, and the verifier's knowledge, that they are never NULL, causing explicit NULL checks to be deleted, and accesses to such pointers potentially crashing the kernel. To fix this, mark raw_tp arguments as PTR_MAYBE_NULL, and then special case the dereference and pointer arithmetic to permit it, and allow passing them into helpers/kfuncs; these exceptions are made for raw_tp programs only. Ensure that we don't do this when ref_obj_id > 0, as in that case this is an acquired object and doesn't need such adjustment. The reason we do mask_raw_tp_trusted_reg logic is because other will recheck in places whether the register is a trusted_reg, and then consider our register as untrusted when detecting the presence of the PTR_MAYBE_NULL flag. To allow safe dereference, we enable PROBE_MEM marking when we see loads into trusted pointers with PTR_MAYBE_NULL. While trusted raw_tp arguments can also be passed into helpers or kfuncs where such broken assumption may cause issues, a future patch set will tackle their case separately, as PTR_TO_BTF_ID (without PTR_TRUSTED) can already be passed into helpers and causes similar problems. Thus, they are left alone for now. It is possible that these checks also permit passing non-raw_tp args that are trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID with null marking. In such a case, allowing dereference when pointer is NULL expands allowed behavior, so won't regress existing programs, and the case of passing these into helpers is the same as above and will be dealt with later. Also update the failure case in tp_btf_nullable selftest to capture the new behavior, as the verifier will no longer cause an error when directly dereference a raw tracepoint argument marked as __nullable. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/ZrCZS6nisraEqehw@jlelli-thinkpadt14gen4.remote.… Reviewed-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 3f00c5239344 ("bpf: Allow trusted pointers to be passed to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS kfuncs") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241104171959.2938862-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: kernel/bpf/verifier.c tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_tp_btf_nullable.c [The conflicts were due to not merge commit e2b3c4ff5d18 and 2060f07f861a2] Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++ kernel/bpf/btf.c | 4 +++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h index 73ef8dda7ada..7e7a2507a3e5 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf.h @@ -3322,4 +3322,10 @@ static inline gfp_t bpf_memcg_flags(gfp_t flags) return flags; } +static inline bool bpf_prog_is_raw_tp(const struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING && + prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP; +} + #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */ diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c index 7a82194ad51d..a54a7fdf99cd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c @@ -6076,6 +6076,10 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type, if (prog_args_trusted(prog)) info->reg_type |= PTR_TRUSTED; + /* Raw tracepoint arguments always get marked as maybe NULL */ + if (bpf_prog_is_raw_tp(prog)) + info->reg_type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; + if (tgt_prog) { enum bpf_prog_type tgt_type; diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8fa7b37152c0..fe0c8bf97663 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -495,6 +495,25 @@ static struct btf_record *reg_btf_record(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg) return rec; } +static bool mask_raw_tp_reg_cond(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { + return reg->type == (PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL) && + bpf_prog_is_raw_tp(env->prog) && !reg->ref_obj_id; +} + +static bool mask_raw_tp_reg(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) +{ + if (!mask_raw_tp_reg_cond(env, reg)) + return false; + reg->type &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL; + return true; +} + +static void unmask_raw_tp_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *reg, bool result) +{ + if (result) + reg->type |= PTR_MAYBE_NULL; +} + static bool subprog_is_global(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) { struct bpf_func_info_aux *aux = env->prog->aux->func_info_aux; @@ -6458,6 +6477,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *field_name = NULL; enum bpf_type_flag flag = 0; u32 btf_id = 0; + bool mask; int ret; if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) { @@ -6529,7 +6549,21 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, if (ret < 0) return ret; - + /* For raw_tp progs, we allow dereference of PTR_MAYBE_NULL + * trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID, these are the ones that are possibly + * arguments to the raw_tp. Since internal checks in for trusted + * reg in check_ptr_to_btf_access would consider PTR_MAYBE_NULL + * modifier as problematic, mask it out temporarily for the + * check. Don't apply this to pointers with ref_obj_id > 0, as + * those won't be raw_tp args. + * + * We may end up applying this relaxation to other trusted + * PTR_TO_BTF_ID with maybe null flag, since we cannot + * distinguish PTR_MAYBE_NULL tagged for arguments vs normal + * tagging, but that should expand allowed behavior, and not + * cause regression for existing behavior. + */ + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg); if (ret != PTR_TO_BTF_ID) { /* just mark; */ @@ -6590,8 +6624,13 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, clear_trusted_flags(&flag); } - if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) + if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) { mark_btf_ld_reg(env, regs, value_regno, ret, reg->btf, btf_id, flag); + /* We've assigned a new type to regno, so don't undo masking. */ + if (regno == value_regno) + mask = false; + } + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); return 0; } @@ -6963,7 +7002,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); } else if (base_type(reg->type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && - !type_may_be_null(reg->type)) { + (mask_raw_tp_reg_cond(env, reg) || !type_may_be_null(reg->type))) { err = check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, regno, off, size, t, value_regno); } else if (reg->type == CONST_PTR_TO_MAP) { @@ -8515,6 +8554,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, enum bpf_reg_type type = reg->type; u32 *arg_btf_id = NULL; int err = 0; + bool mask; if (arg_type == ARG_DONTCARE) return 0; @@ -8555,11 +8595,11 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg); err = check_reg_type(env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); - if (err) - return err; - err = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); + err = err ?: check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); if (err) return err; @@ -11366,6 +11406,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ enum bpf_arg_type arg_type = ARG_DONTCARE; u32 regno = i + 1, ref_id, type_size; bool is_ret_buf_sz = false; + bool mask = false; int kf_arg_type; t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[i].type, NULL); @@ -11424,11 +11465,14 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ return -EINVAL; } + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg); if ((is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) || is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) && (register_is_null(reg) || type_may_be_null(reg->type))) { verbose(env, "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg%d\n", i); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); return -EACCES; } + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); if (reg->ref_obj_id) { if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && meta->ref_obj_id) { @@ -11455,17 +11499,24 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ if (!is_kfunc_trusted_args(meta) && !is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) break; + /* Allow passing maybe NULL raw_tp arguments to + * kfuncs for compatibility. Don't apply this to + * arguments with ref_obj_id > 0. + */ + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg); if (!is_trusted_reg(reg)) { if (!is_kfunc_rcu(meta)) { verbose(env, "R%d must be referenced or trusted\n", regno); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); return -EINVAL; } if (!is_rcu_reg(reg)) { verbose(env, "R%d must be a rcu pointer\n", regno); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); return -EINVAL; } } - + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); fallthrough; case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX: /* Trusted arguments have the same offset checks as release arguments */ @@ -11490,7 +11541,9 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ if (is_kfunc_release(meta) && reg->ref_obj_id) arg_type |= OBJ_RELEASE; + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg); ret = check_func_arg_reg_off(env, reg, regno, arg_type); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -11651,6 +11704,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ return ret; break; case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID: + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, reg); /* Only base_type is checked, further checks are done here */ if ((base_type(reg->type) != PTR_TO_BTF_ID || (bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(reg->type) && !is_rcu_reg(reg))) && @@ -11659,9 +11713,11 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ verbose(env, "expected %s or socket\n", reg_type_str(env, base_type(reg->type) | (type_flag(reg->type) & BPF_REG_TRUSTED_MODIFIERS))); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); return -EINVAL; } ret = process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(env, reg, ref_t, ref_tname, ref_id, meta, i); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(reg, mask); if (ret < 0) return ret; break; @@ -12548,7 +12604,7 @@ static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, */ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, - const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, + struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg, const struct bpf_reg_state *off_reg) { struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; @@ -12562,6 +12618,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_sanitize_info info = {}; u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code); u32 dst = insn->dst_reg; + bool mask; int ret; dst_reg = &regs[dst]; @@ -12588,11 +12645,14 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, return -EACCES; } + mask = mask_raw_tp_reg(env, ptr_reg); if (ptr_reg->type & PTR_MAYBE_NULL) { verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited, null-check it first\n", dst, reg_type_str(env, ptr_reg->type)); + unmask_raw_tp_reg(ptr_reg, mask); return -EACCES; } + unmask_raw_tp_reg(ptr_reg, mask); switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: @@ -18455,6 +18515,7 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) * for this case. */ case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC | PTR_UNTRUSTED: + case PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL: if (type == BPF_READ) { if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEM) insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_PROBE_MEM | -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] etmem: fix use-after-free of mm in the scan release process
by chenrenhui 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

etmem: fix use-after-free of mm in the scan release process chenrenhui (1): etmem: fix use-after-free of mm in the scan release process fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ALSA: pcm: Add sanity NULL check for the default mmap fault handler
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit bc200027ee92fba84f1826494735ed675f3aa911 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEADU CVE: CVE-2024-53180 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit d2913a07d9037fe7aed4b7e680684163eaed6bc4 upstream. A driver might allow the mmap access before initializing its runtime->dma_area properly. Add a proper NULL check before passing to virt_to_page() for avoiding a panic. Reported-by: syzbot+4bf62a7b1d0f4fdb7ae2(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241120141104.7060-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- sound/core/pcm_native.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/pcm_native.c b/sound/core/pcm_native.c index cc21c483c4a5..e40de64ec85c 100644 --- a/sound/core/pcm_native.c +++ b/sound/core/pcm_native.c @@ -3794,9 +3794,11 @@ static vm_fault_t snd_pcm_mmap_data_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; if (substream->ops->page) page = substream->ops->page(substream, offset); - else if (!snd_pcm_get_dma_buf(substream)) + else if (!snd_pcm_get_dma_buf(substream)) { + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!runtime->dma_area)) + return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; page = virt_to_page(runtime->dma_area + offset); - else + } else page = snd_sgbuf_get_page(snd_pcm_get_dma_buf(substream), offset); if (!page) return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS; -- 2.20.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/rxe: Fix the qp flush warnings in req
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit 31978d5c5aef034d96fc53b4a9cb3c6e11dbb94d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAFD CVE: CVE-2024-53229 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ea4c990fa9e19ffef0648e40c566b94ba5ab31be ] When the qp is in error state, the status of WQEs in the queue should be set to error. Or else the following will appear. [ 920.617269] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 21 at drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_comp.c:756 rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.617744] Modules linked in: rnbd_client(O) rtrs_client(O) rtrs_core(O) rdma_ucm rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm crc32_generic rdma_rxe ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ib_uverbs ib_core loop brd null_blk ipv6 [ 920.618516] CPU: 1 PID: 21 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Tainted: G O 6.1.113-storage+ #65 [ 920.618986] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 920.619396] RIP: 0010:rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.619658] Code: 0f b6 84 24 3a 02 00 00 41 89 84 24 44 04 00 00 e9 2a f7 ff ff 39 ca bb 03 00 00 00 b8 0e 00 00 00 48 0f 45 d8 e9 15 f7 ff ff <0f> 0b e9 cb f8 ff ff 41 bf f5 ff ff ff e9 08 f8 ff ff 49 8d bc 24 [ 920.620482] RSP: 0018:ffff97b7c00bbc38 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 920.620817] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000c RCX: 0000000000000008 [ 920.621183] RDX: ffff960dc396ebc0 RSI: 0000000000005400 RDI: ffff960dc4e2fbac [ 920.621548] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffac406450 [ 920.621884] R10: ffffffffac4060c0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff960dc4e2f800 [ 920.622254] R13: ffff960dc4e2f928 R14: ffff97b7c029c580 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 920.622609] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff960ef7d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 920.622979] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 920.623245] CR2: 00007fa056965e90 CR3: 00000001107f1000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 920.623680] Call Trace: [ 920.623815] <TASK> [ 920.623933] ? __warn+0x79/0xc0 [ 920.624116] ? rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.624356] ? report_bug+0xfb/0x150 [ 920.624594] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x60 [ 920.624796] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70 [ 920.624976] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20 [ 920.625203] ? rxe_completer+0x989/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.625474] ? rxe_completer+0x329/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.625749] rxe_do_task+0x80/0x110 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.626037] rxe_requester+0x625/0xde0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.626310] ? rxe_cq_post+0xe2/0x180 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.626583] ? do_complete+0x18d/0x220 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.626812] ? rxe_completer+0x1a3/0xcc0 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.627050] rxe_do_task+0x80/0x110 [rdma_rxe] [ 920.627285] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xa4/0x120 [ 920.627522] handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x250 [ 920.627728] ? sort_range+0x20/0x20 [ 920.627942] run_ksoftirqd+0x1f/0x30 [ 920.628158] smpboot_thread_fn+0xc7/0x1b0 [ 920.628334] kthread+0xd6/0x100 [ 920.628504] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 920.628709] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 920.628892] </TASK> Fixes: ae720bdb703b ("RDMA/rxe: Generate error completion for error requester QP state") Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241025152036.121417-1-yanjun.zhu@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c index 7a36080d2bae..7ff152ffe15b 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_req.c @@ -693,10 +693,12 @@ int rxe_requester(struct rxe_qp *qp) if (unlikely(qp_state(qp) == IB_QPS_ERR)) { wqe = __req_next_wqe(qp); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&qp->state_lock, flags); - if (wqe) + if (wqe) { + wqe->status = IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR; goto err; - else + } else { goto exit; + } } if (unlikely(qp_state(qp) == IB_QPS_RESET)) { -- 2.20.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] PCI: Fix use-after-free of slot->bus on hot remove
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit da6e6ff1f6c57f16e07af955e0e997fc90dd1e75 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAF8 CVE: CVE-2024-53194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c7acef99642b763ba585f4a43af999fcdbcc3dc4 upstream. Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bfd4c0e976c1776cd08e76603903b338cf25729.17285792… Reported-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de4b45ff2b32dd91a805ec02ec8ec73ef411bf6.camel@se… Tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/slot.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/slot.c b/drivers/pci/slot.c index ed2077e7470ae..a42e2cf774fd8 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/slot.c +++ b/drivers/pci/slot.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj) up_read(&pci_bus_sem); list_del(&slot->list); + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); } @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, goto err; } - slot->bus = parent; + slot->bus = pci_bus_get(parent); slot->number = slot_nr; slot->kobj.kset = pci_slots_kset; @@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, slot_name = make_slot_name(name); if (!slot_name) { err = -ENOMEM; + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); goto err; } -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] PCI: Fix use-after-free of slot->bus on hot remove
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit da6e6ff1f6c57f16e07af955e0e997fc90dd1e75 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAF8 CVE: CVE-2024-53194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c7acef99642b763ba585f4a43af999fcdbcc3dc4 upstream. Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bfd4c0e976c1776cd08e76603903b338cf25729.17285792… Reported-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de4b45ff2b32dd91a805ec02ec8ec73ef411bf6.camel@se… Tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/slot.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/slot.c b/drivers/pci/slot.c index ed2077e7470ae..a42e2cf774fd8 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/slot.c +++ b/drivers/pci/slot.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj) up_read(&pci_bus_sem); list_del(&slot->list); + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); } @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, goto err; } - slot->bus = parent; + slot->bus = pci_bus_get(parent); slot->number = slot_nr; slot->kobj.kset = pci_slots_kset; @@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, slot_name = make_slot_name(name); if (!slot_name) { err = -ENOMEM; + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); goto err; } -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] PCI: Fix use-after-free of slot->bus on hot remove
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.325 commit 50473dd3b2a08601a078f852ea05572de9b1f86c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAF8 CVE: CVE-2024-53194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c7acef99642b763ba585f4a43af999fcdbcc3dc4 upstream. Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bfd4c0e976c1776cd08e76603903b338cf25729.17285792… Reported-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de4b45ff2b32dd91a805ec02ec8ec73ef411bf6.camel@se… Tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/slot.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/slot.c b/drivers/pci/slot.c index 19de071ca698..ddc0e962285f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/slot.c +++ b/drivers/pci/slot.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj) up_read(&pci_bus_sem); list_del(&slot->list); + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); } @@ -260,7 +261,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, goto err; } - slot->bus = parent; + slot->bus = pci_bus_get(parent); slot->number = slot_nr; slot->kobj.kset = pci_slots_kset; @@ -268,6 +269,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, slot_name = make_slot_name(name); if (!slot_name) { err = -ENOMEM; + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); goto err; } -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] PCI: Fix use-after-free of slot->bus on hot remove
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit e5d5c04aac71bf1476dc44b56f2206a4c2facca8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAF8 CVE: CVE-2024-53194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c7acef99642b763ba585f4a43af999fcdbcc3dc4 upstream. Dennis reports a boot crash on recent Lenovo laptops with a USB4 dock. Since commit 0fc70886569c ("thunderbolt: Reset USB4 v2 host router") and commit 59a54c5f3dbd ("thunderbolt: Reset topology created by the boot firmware"), USB4 v2 and v1 Host Routers are reset on probe of the thunderbolt driver. The reset clears the Presence Detect State and Data Link Layer Link Active bits at the USB4 Host Router's Root Port and thus causes hot removal of the dock. The crash occurs when pciehp is unbound from one of the dock's Downstream Ports: pciehp creates a pci_slot on bind and destroys it on unbind. The pci_slot contains a pointer to the pci_bus below the Downstream Port, but a reference on that pci_bus is never acquired. The pci_bus is destroyed before the pci_slot, so a use-after-free ensues when pci_slot_release() accesses slot->bus. In principle this should not happen because pci_stop_bus_device() unbinds pciehp (and therefore destroys the pci_slot) before the pci_bus is destroyed by pci_remove_bus_device(). However the stacktrace provided by Dennis shows that pciehp is unbound from pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). To understand the significance of this, one needs to know that the PCI core uses a two step process to remove a portion of the hierarchy: It first unbinds all drivers in the sub-hierarchy in pci_stop_bus_device() and then actually removes the devices in pci_remove_bus_device(). There is no precaution to prevent driver binding in-between pci_stop_bus_device() and pci_remove_bus_device(). In Dennis' case, it seems removal of the hierarchy by pciehp races with driver binding by pci_bus_add_devices(). pciehp is bound to the Downstream Port after pci_stop_bus_device() has run, so it is unbound by pci_remove_bus_device() instead of pci_stop_bus_device(). Because the pci_bus has already been destroyed at that point, accesses to it result in a use-after-free. One might conclude that driver binding needs to be prevented after pci_stop_bus_device() has run. However it seems risky that pci_slot points to pci_bus without holding a reference. Solely relying on correct ordering of driver unbind versus pci_bus destruction is certainly not defensive programming. If pci_slot has a need to access data in pci_bus, it ought to acquire a reference. Amend pci_create_slot() accordingly. Dennis reports that the crash is not reproducible with this change. Abridged stacktrace: pcieport 0000:00:07.0: PME: Signaling with IRQ 156 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot #12 AttnBtn- PwrCtrl- MRL- AttnInd- PwrInd- HotPlug+ Surprise+ Interlock- NoCompl+ IbPresDis- LLActRep+ pci_bus 0000:20: dev 00, created physical slot 12 pcieport 0000:00:07.0: pciehp: Slot(12): Card not present ... pcieport 0000:21:02.0: pciehp: pcie_disable_notification: SLOTCTRL d8 write cmd 0 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 134 Comm: irq/156-pciehp Not tainted 6.11.0-devel+ #1 RIP: 0010:dev_driver_string+0x12/0x40 pci_destroy_slot pciehp_remove pcie_port_remove_service device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del device_unregister remove_iter device_for_each_child pcie_portdrv_remove pci_device_remove device_release_driver_internal bus_remove_device device_del pci_remove_bus_device (recursive invocation) pci_remove_bus_device pciehp_unconfigure_device pciehp_disable_slot pciehp_handle_presence_or_link_change pciehp_ist Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4bfd4c0e976c1776cd08e76603903b338cf25729.17285792… Reported-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6de4b45ff2b32dd91a805ec02ec8ec73ef411bf6.camel@se… Tested-by: Dennis Wassenberg <Dennis.Wassenberg(a)secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas(a)wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/slot.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/slot.c b/drivers/pci/slot.c index 0f87cade10f7..ed645c7a4e4b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/slot.c +++ b/drivers/pci/slot.c @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void pci_slot_release(struct kobject *kobj) up_read(&pci_bus_sem); list_del(&slot->list); + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); } @@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, goto err; } - slot->bus = parent; + slot->bus = pci_bus_get(parent); slot->number = slot_nr; slot->kobj.kset = pci_slots_kset; @@ -269,6 +270,7 @@ struct pci_slot *pci_create_slot(struct pci_bus *parent, int slot_nr, slot_name = make_slot_name(name); if (!slot_name) { err = -ENOMEM; + pci_bus_put(slot->bus); kfree(slot); goto err; } -- 2.20.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] wifi: ath12k: fix warning when unbinding
by Xiongfeng Wang 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.64 commit 223b546c6222d42147eff034433002ca5e2e7e09 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAF7 CVE: CVE-2024-53191 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ca68ce0d9f4bcd032fd1334441175ae399642a06 upstream. If there is an error during some initialization related to firmware, the buffers dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status are released. However this is released again when the device is unbinded (ath12k_pci), and we get: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2098 at mm/slub.c:4689 free_large_kmalloc+0x4d/0x80 Call Trace: free_large_kmalloc ath12k_dp_free ath12k_core_deinit ath12k_pci_remove ... The issue is always reproducible from a VM because the MSI addressing initialization is failing. In order to fix the issue, just set the buffers to NULL after releasing in order to avoid the double free. cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: d889913205cf ("wifi: ath12k: driver for Qualcomm Wi-Fi 7 devices") Signed-off-by: Jose Ignacio Tornos Martinez <jtornosm(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241017181004.199589-3-jtornosm@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Johnson <quic_jjohnson(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp.c index 907655c45a4b..8f85d6504e5f 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/dp.c @@ -1249,8 +1249,10 @@ void ath12k_dp_free(struct ath12k_base *ab) ath12k_dp_rx_reo_cmd_list_cleanup(ab); - for (i = 0; i < ab->hw_params->max_tx_ring; i++) + for (i = 0; i < ab->hw_params->max_tx_ring; i++) { kfree(dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status); + dp->tx_ring[i].tx_status = NULL; + } ath12k_dp_rx_free(ab); /* Deinit any SOC level resource */ -- 2.20.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] vfio/pci: Properly hide first-in-list PCIe extended capability
by Liu Shixin 03 Jan '25

03 Jan '25

From: Avihai Horon <avihaih(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.325 commit 4464e5aa3aa4574063640f1082f7d7e323af8eb4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAFO CVE: CVE-2024-53214 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit fe4bf8d0b6716a423b16495d55b35d3fe515905d ] There are cases where a PCIe extended capability should be hidden from the user. For example, an unknown capability (i.e., capability with ID greater than PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX) or a capability that is intentionally chosen to be hidden from the user. Hiding a capability is done by virtualizing and modifying the 'Next Capability Offset' field of the previous capability so it points to the capability after the one that should be hidden. The special case where the first capability in the list should be hidden is handled differently because there is no previous capability that can be modified. In this case, the capability ID and version are zeroed while leaving the next pointer intact. This hides the capability and leaves an anchor for the rest of the capability list. However, today, hiding the first capability in the list is not done properly if the capability is unknown, as struct vfio_pci_core_device->pci_config_map is set to the capability ID during initialization but the capability ID is not properly checked later when used in vfio_config_do_rw(). This leads to the following warning [1] and to an out-of-bounds access to ecap_perms array. Fix it by checking cap_id in vfio_config_do_rw(), and if it is greater than PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX, use an alternative struct perm_bits for direct read only access instead of the ecap_perms array. Note that this is safe since the above is the only case where cap_id can exceed PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX (except for the special capabilities, which are already checked before). [1] WARNING: CPU: 118 PID: 5329 at drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c:1900 vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] CPU: 118 UID: 0 PID: 5329 Comm: simx-qemu-syste Not tainted 6.12.0+ #1 (snip) Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x69/0x80 ? __warn+0x8d/0x140 ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] ? report_bug+0x18f/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x63/0xa0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x395/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] ? vfio_pci_config_rw+0x244/0x430 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_pci_rw+0x101/0x1b0 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_pci_core_read+0x1d/0x30 [vfio_pci_core] vfio_device_fops_read+0x27/0x40 [vfio] vfs_read+0xbd/0x340 ? vfio_device_fops_unl_ioctl+0xbb/0x740 [vfio] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xa4/0x4b0 __x64_sys_pread64+0x96/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x1c3d/0x20d0 do_syscall_64+0x4d/0x120 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Fixes: 89e1f7d4c66d ("vfio: Add PCI device driver") Signed-off-by: Avihai Horon <avihaih(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Yi Liu <yi.l.liu(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241124142739.21698-1-avihaih@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c index 86e917f1cc21..0f20e2d977d4 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci_config.c @@ -315,6 +315,10 @@ static int vfio_virt_config_read(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, int pos, return count; } +static struct perm_bits direct_ro_perms = { + .readfn = vfio_direct_config_read, +}; + /* Default capability regions to read-only, no-virtualization */ static struct perm_bits cap_perms[PCI_CAP_ID_MAX + 1] = { [0 ... PCI_CAP_ID_MAX] = { .readfn = vfio_direct_config_read } @@ -1837,9 +1841,17 @@ static ssize_t vfio_config_do_rw(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev, char __user *buf, cap_start = *ppos; } else { if (*ppos >= PCI_CFG_SPACE_SIZE) { - WARN_ON(cap_id > PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX); + /* + * We can get a cap_id that exceeds PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX + * if we're hiding an unknown capability at the start + * of the extended capability list. Use default, ro + * access, which will virtualize the id and next values. + */ + if (cap_id > PCI_EXT_CAP_ID_MAX) + perm = &direct_ro_perms; + else + perm = &ecap_perms[cap_id]; - perm = &ecap_perms[cap_id]; cap_start = vfio_find_cap_start(vdev, *ppos); } else { WARN_ON(cap_id > PCI_CAP_ID_MAX); -- 2.34.1

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