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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] btrfs: lock the inode in shared mode before starting fiemap
by Baokun Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc8 commit 519b7e13b5ae8dd38da1e52275705343be6bb508 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4LZ CVE: CVE-2023-52737 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Currently fiemap does not take the inode's lock (VFS lock), it only locks a file range in the inode's io tree. This however can lead to a deadlock if we have a concurrent fsync on the file and fiemap code triggers a fault when accessing the user space buffer with fiemap_fill_next_extent(). The deadlock happens on the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore, which is taken both by fsync and btrfs_page_mkwrite(). This deadlock was recently reported by syzbot and triggers a trace like the following: task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:20264 pid:5668 ppid:5119 flags:0x00004004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline] __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606 schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682 wait_on_state fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:707 [inline] wait_extent_bit+0x577/0x6f0 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:751 lock_extent+0x1c2/0x280 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1742 find_lock_delalloc_range+0x4e6/0x9c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:488 writepage_delalloc+0x1ef/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1863 __extent_writepage+0x736/0x14e0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2174 extent_write_cache_pages+0x983/0x1220 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3091 extent_writepages+0x219/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3211 do_writepages+0x3c3/0x680 mm/page-writeback.c:2581 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x11e/0x170 mm/filemap.c:388 __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:421 [inline] filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x175/0x200 mm/filemap.c:439 btrfs_fdatawrite_range fs/btrfs/file.c:3850 [inline] start_ordered_ops fs/btrfs/file.c:1737 [inline] btrfs_sync_file+0x4ff/0x1190 fs/btrfs/file.c:1839 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2885 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0xcd3/0x1280 fs/btrfs/file.c:1684 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9 RSP: 002b:00007f7d404fa2f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87a0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9 RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69 R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87a8 </TASK> INFO: task syz-executor361:5697 blocked for more than 145 seconds. Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00376-g7c6984405241 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:21216 pid:5697 ppid:5119 flags:0x00004004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline] __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606 schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682 rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x5f9/0x930 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1095 __down_read_common+0x54/0x2a0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1260 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x417/0xc80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8526 do_page_mkwrite+0x19e/0x5e0 mm/memory.c:2947 wp_page_shared+0x15e/0x380 mm/memory.c:3295 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4949 [inline] __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:5073 [inline] handle_mm_fault+0x1b79/0x26b0 mm/memory.c:5219 do_user_addr_fault+0x69b/0xcb0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1428 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1519 [inline] exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1575 asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570 RIP: 0010:copy_user_short_string+0xd/0x40 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:233 Code: 74 0a 89 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc9000570f330 EFLAGS: 00050202 RAX: ffffffff843e6601 RBX: 00007fffffffefc8 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000570f3e0 RDI: 0000000020000120 RBP: ffffc9000570f490 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffff52000ae1e83 R10: fffff52000ae1e83 R11: 1ffff92000ae1e7c R12: 0000000000000038 R13: ffffc9000570f3e0 R14: 0000000020000120 R15: ffffc9000570f3e0 copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:37 [inline] raw_copy_to_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:58 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xe9/0x130 lib/usercopy.c:34 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:169 [inline] fiemap_fill_next_extent+0x22e/0x410 fs/ioctl.c:144 emit_fiemap_extent+0x22d/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3458 fiemap_process_hole+0xa00/0xad0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3716 extent_fiemap+0xe27/0x2100 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3922 btrfs_fiemap+0x172/0x1e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8209 ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:219 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x185b/0x2980 fs/ioctl.c:810 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:868 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x83/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9 RSP: 002b:00007f7d390d92f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87b0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9 RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 00007f7d390d9700 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f7d390d9700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69 R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87b8 </TASK> What happens is the following: 1) Task A is doing an fsync, enters btrfs_sync_file() and flushes delalloc before locking the inode and the i_mmap_lock semaphore, that is, before calling btrfs_inode_lock(); 2) After task A flushes delalloc and before it calls btrfs_inode_lock(), another task dirties a page; 3) Task B starts a fiemap without FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC, so the page dirtied at step 2 remains dirty and unflushed. Then when it enters extent_fiemap() and it locks a file range that includes the range of the page dirtied in step 2; 4) Task A calls btrfs_inode_lock() and locks the inode (VFS lock) and the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in write mode. Then it tries to flush delalloc by calling start_ordered_ops(), which will block, at find_lock_delalloc_range(), when trying to lock the range of the page dirtied at step 2, since this range was locked by the fiemap task (at step 3); 5) Task B generates a page fault when accessing the user space fiemap buffer with a call to fiemap_fill_next_extent(). The fault handler needs to call btrfs_page_mkwrite() for some other page of our inode, and there we deadlock when trying to lock the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in read mode, since the fsync task locked it in write mode (step 4) and the fsync task can not progress because it's waiting to lock a file range that is currently locked by us (the fiemap task, step 3). Fix this by taking the inode's lock (VFS lock) in shared mode when entering fiemap. This effectively serializes fiemap with fsync (except the most expensive part of fsync, the log sync), preventing this deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+cc35f55c41e34c30dcb5(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000032dc7305f2a66f46@google.com/ CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c [a14b78ad06ab ("btrfs: introduce btrfs_inode_lock()/unlock()") and 570eb97bace8 ("btrfs: unify the lock/unlock extent variants") are not merged] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index 5fc65a780f83..16172c3b125d 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -4757,6 +4757,7 @@ int extent_fiemap(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, last_for_get_extent = isize; } + inode_lock_shared(&inode->vfs_inode); lock_extent_bits(&inode->io_tree, start, start + len - 1, &cached_state); @@ -4872,6 +4873,7 @@ int extent_fiemap(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, out: unlock_extent_cached(&inode->io_tree, start, start + len - 1, &cached_state); + inode_unlock_shared(&inode->vfs_inode); out_free_ulist: btrfs_free_path(path); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] btrfs: lock the inode in shared mode before starting fiemap
by Baokun Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc8 commit 519b7e13b5ae8dd38da1e52275705343be6bb508 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4LZ CVE: CVE-2023-52737 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Currently fiemap does not take the inode's lock (VFS lock), it only locks a file range in the inode's io tree. This however can lead to a deadlock if we have a concurrent fsync on the file and fiemap code triggers a fault when accessing the user space buffer with fiemap_fill_next_extent(). The deadlock happens on the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore, which is taken both by fsync and btrfs_page_mkwrite(). This deadlock was recently reported by syzbot and triggers a trace like the following: task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:20264 pid:5668 ppid:5119 flags:0x00004004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline] __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606 schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682 wait_on_state fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:707 [inline] wait_extent_bit+0x577/0x6f0 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:751 lock_extent+0x1c2/0x280 fs/btrfs/extent-io-tree.c:1742 find_lock_delalloc_range+0x4e6/0x9c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:488 writepage_delalloc+0x1ef/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1863 __extent_writepage+0x736/0x14e0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2174 extent_write_cache_pages+0x983/0x1220 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3091 extent_writepages+0x219/0x540 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3211 do_writepages+0x3c3/0x680 mm/page-writeback.c:2581 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x11e/0x170 mm/filemap.c:388 __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:421 [inline] filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x175/0x200 mm/filemap.c:439 btrfs_fdatawrite_range fs/btrfs/file.c:3850 [inline] start_ordered_ops fs/btrfs/file.c:1737 [inline] btrfs_sync_file+0x4ff/0x1190 fs/btrfs/file.c:1839 generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2885 [inline] btrfs_do_write_iter+0xcd3/0x1280 fs/btrfs/file.c:1684 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2189 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline] vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584 ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9 RSP: 002b:00007f7d404fa2f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87a0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9 RDX: 0000000000000090 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69 R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87a8 </TASK> INFO: task syz-executor361:5697 blocked for more than 145 seconds. Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00376-g7c6984405241 #0 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:syz-executor361 state:D stack:21216 pid:5697 ppid:5119 flags:0x00004004 Call Trace: <TASK> context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5293 [inline] __schedule+0x995/0xe20 kernel/sched/core.c:6606 schedule+0xcb/0x190 kernel/sched/core.c:6682 rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x5f9/0x930 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1095 __down_read_common+0x54/0x2a0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1260 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x417/0xc80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8526 do_page_mkwrite+0x19e/0x5e0 mm/memory.c:2947 wp_page_shared+0x15e/0x380 mm/memory.c:3295 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:4949 [inline] __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:5073 [inline] handle_mm_fault+0x1b79/0x26b0 mm/memory.c:5219 do_user_addr_fault+0x69b/0xcb0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1428 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1519 [inline] exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1575 asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:570 RIP: 0010:copy_user_short_string+0xd/0x40 arch/x86/lib/copy_user_64.S:233 Code: 74 0a 89 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc9000570f330 EFLAGS: 00050202 RAX: ffffffff843e6601 RBX: 00007fffffffefc8 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9000570f3e0 RDI: 0000000020000120 RBP: ffffc9000570f490 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffff52000ae1e83 R10: fffff52000ae1e83 R11: 1ffff92000ae1e7c R12: 0000000000000038 R13: ffffc9000570f3e0 R14: 0000000020000120 R15: ffffc9000570f3e0 copy_user_generic arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:37 [inline] raw_copy_to_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:58 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xe9/0x130 lib/usercopy.c:34 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:169 [inline] fiemap_fill_next_extent+0x22e/0x410 fs/ioctl.c:144 emit_fiemap_extent+0x22d/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3458 fiemap_process_hole+0xa00/0xad0 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3716 extent_fiemap+0xe27/0x2100 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:3922 btrfs_fiemap+0x172/0x1e0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8209 ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:219 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x185b/0x2980 fs/ioctl.c:810 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:868 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x83/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f7d4054e9b9 RSP: 002b:00007f7d390d92f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d405d87b0 RCX: 00007f7d4054e9b9 RDX: 0000000020000100 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f7d405a51d0 R08: 00007f7d390d9700 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f7d390d9700 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 61635f65646f6e69 R13: 65646f7475616f6e R14: 7261637369646f6e R15: 00007f7d405d87b8 </TASK> What happens is the following: 1) Task A is doing an fsync, enters btrfs_sync_file() and flushes delalloc before locking the inode and the i_mmap_lock semaphore, that is, before calling btrfs_inode_lock(); 2) After task A flushes delalloc and before it calls btrfs_inode_lock(), another task dirties a page; 3) Task B starts a fiemap without FIEMAP_FLAG_SYNC, so the page dirtied at step 2 remains dirty and unflushed. Then when it enters extent_fiemap() and it locks a file range that includes the range of the page dirtied in step 2; 4) Task A calls btrfs_inode_lock() and locks the inode (VFS lock) and the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in write mode. Then it tries to flush delalloc by calling start_ordered_ops(), which will block, at find_lock_delalloc_range(), when trying to lock the range of the page dirtied at step 2, since this range was locked by the fiemap task (at step 3); 5) Task B generates a page fault when accessing the user space fiemap buffer with a call to fiemap_fill_next_extent(). The fault handler needs to call btrfs_page_mkwrite() for some other page of our inode, and there we deadlock when trying to lock the inode's i_mmap_lock semaphore in read mode, since the fsync task locked it in write mode (step 4) and the fsync task can not progress because it's waiting to lock a file range that is currently locked by us (the fiemap task, step 3). Fix this by taking the inode's lock (VFS lock) in shared mode when entering fiemap. This effectively serializes fiemap with fsync (except the most expensive part of fsync, the log sync), preventing this deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+cc35f55c41e34c30dcb5(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/00000000000032dc7305f2a66f46@google.com/ CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 6.1+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef(a)toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Conflicts: fs/btrfs/extent_io.c [a14b78ad06ab ("btrfs: introduce btrfs_inode_lock()/unlock()") and 570eb97bace8 ("btrfs: unify the lock/unlock extent variants") are not merged] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/btrfs/extent_io.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c index 685a375bb6af..7119b81cf76d 100644 --- a/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c +++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_io.c @@ -4758,6 +4758,7 @@ int extent_fiemap(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, last_for_get_extent = isize; } + inode_lock_shared(&inode->vfs_inode); lock_extent_bits(&inode->io_tree, start, start + len - 1, &cached_state); @@ -4873,6 +4874,7 @@ int extent_fiemap(struct btrfs_inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, out: unlock_extent_cached(&inode->io_tree, start, start + len - 1, &cached_state); + inode_unlock_shared(&inode->vfs_inode); out_free_ulist: btrfs_free_path(path); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] bna: ensure the copied buf is NUL terminated
by Zhang Zekun 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc7 commit 8c34096c7fdf272fd4c0c37fe411cd2e3ed0ee9f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U1KE CVE: CVE-2024-36934 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ----------------------------------------------------------- Currently, we allocate a nbytes-sized kernel buffer and copy nbytes from userspace to that buffer. Later, we use sscanf on this buffer but we don't ensure that the string is terminated inside the buffer, this can lead to OOB read when using sscanf. Fix this issue by using memdup_user_nul instead of memdup_user. Fixes: 7afc5dbde091 ("bna: Add debugfs interface.") Signed-off-by: Bui Quang Minh <minhquangbui99(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424-fix-oob-read-v2-2-f1f1b53a10f4@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Zekun <zhangzekun11(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad_debugfs.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad_debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad_debugfs.c index 933799be0471..d549fdb6bbe2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/brocade/bna/bnad_debugfs.c @@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ bnad_debugfs_write_regrd(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, void *kern_buf; /* Copy the user space buf */ - kern_buf = memdup_user(buf, nbytes); + kern_buf = memdup_user_nul(buf, nbytes); if (IS_ERR(kern_buf)) return PTR_ERR(kern_buf); @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ bnad_debugfs_write_regwr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, void *kern_buf; /* Copy the user space buf */ - kern_buf = memdup_user(buf, nbytes); + kern_buf = memdup_user_nul(buf, nbytes); if (IS_ERR(kern_buf)) return PTR_ERR(kern_buf); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI
by Shengjie Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA45I1 -------------------------------- Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI: 1. Init TSI driver when config cvm_guest. 2. Modify the token structure to reduce the number of exposed variables. 3. Add a lock for obtaining the remote attestation report. Fixes: 31071f4b2a0b ("cvm_tsi: add cvm tsi interface") Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 93 +++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..a020dc12a5 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(token_lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,11 +44,8 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; - ver = tsi_get_version(); - if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); + if (!is_cvm_world()) return -EIO; - } ret = misc_register(&ioctl_dev); if (ret) { @@ -56,6 +53,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kzalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +67,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +84,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +103,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + mutex_lock(&token_lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +142,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + mutex_lock(&token_lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return -EFAULT; } + mutex_unlock(&token_lock); return 0; } @@ -211,7 +208,7 @@ static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg) unsigned long device_cert_size; device_cert_size = MAX_DEV_CERT_SIZE; - device_cert = kmalloc(device_cert_size, GFP_KERNEL); + device_cert = kzalloc(device_cert_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!device_cert) return -ENOMEM; ret = tsi_get_device_cert(device_cert, &device_cert_size); -- 2.37.2.windows.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] eeprom: at24: fix memory corruption race condition
by Wenyu Huang 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Daniel Okazaki <dtokazaki(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 2af84c46b9b8f2d6c0f88d09ee5c849ae1734676 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F4 CVE: CVE-2024-35848 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f42c97027fb75776e2e9358d16bf4a99aeb04cf2 ] If the eeprom is not accessible, an nvmem device will be registered, the read will fail, and the device will be torn down. If another driver accesses the nvmem device after the teardown, it will reference invalid memory. Move the failure point before registering the nvmem device. Signed-off-by: Daniel Okazaki <dtokazaki(a)google.com> Fixes: b20eb4c1f026 ("eeprom: at24: drop unnecessary label") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240422174337.2487142-1-dtokazaki@google.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wenyu Huang <huangwenyu5(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c index dbbf7db4ff2f..1dd556496f27 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c +++ b/drivers/misc/eeprom/at24.c @@ -756,15 +756,6 @@ static int at24_probe(struct i2c_client *client) } pm_runtime_enable(dev); - at24->nvmem = devm_nvmem_register(dev, &nvmem_config); - if (IS_ERR(at24->nvmem)) { - pm_runtime_disable(dev); - if (!pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev)) - regulator_disable(at24->vcc_reg); - return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(at24->nvmem), - "failed to register nvmem\n"); - } - /* * Perform a one-byte test read to verify that the chip is functional, * unless powering on the device is to be avoided during probe (i.e. @@ -780,6 +771,15 @@ static int at24_probe(struct i2c_client *client) } } + at24->nvmem = devm_nvmem_register(dev, &nvmem_config); + if (IS_ERR(at24->nvmem)) { + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + if (!pm_runtime_status_suspended(dev)) + regulator_disable(at24->vcc_reg); + return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(at24->nvmem), + "failed to register nvmem\n"); + } + pm_runtime_idle(dev); if (writable) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] fix CVE-2024-36905
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

fix CVE-2024-36905 Eric Dumazet (1): tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets Paolo Abeni (1): net: relax socket state check at accept time. net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix CVE-2024-36905
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

fix CVE-2024-36905 Eric Dumazet (1): tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets Paolo Abeni (1): net: relax socket state check at accept time. net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2024-36905
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-36905 Eric Dumazet (1): tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets Paolo Abeni (1): net: relax socket state check at accept time. net/ipv4/af_inet.c | 4 +++- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 4 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2023-52810
by Li Nan 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Juntong Deng (1): fs/jfs: Add check for negative db_l2nbperpage Siddh Raman Pant (1): jfs: jfs_dmap: Validate db_l2nbperpage while mounting fs/jfs/jfs_filsys.h | 2 ++ fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: qcom/emac: fix UAF in emac_remove
by Ze Zuo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.53 commit b560521eca03d0a2db6093a5a632cbdd0a0cf833 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9S29U CVE: CVE-2021-47311 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ad297cd2db8953e2202970e9504cab247b6c7cb4 upstream. adpt is netdev private data and it cannot be used after free_netdev() call. Using adpt after free_netdev() can cause UAF bug. Fix it by moving free_netdev() at the end of the function. Fixes: 54e19bc74f33 ("net: qcom/emac: do not use devm on internal phy pdev") Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c index b10f2bcf8506..938602864c24 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/emac/emac.c @@ -754,12 +754,13 @@ static int emac_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) put_device(&adpt->phydev->mdio.dev); mdiobus_unregister(adpt->mii_bus); - free_netdev(netdev); if (adpt->phy.digital) iounmap(adpt->phy.digital); iounmap(adpt->phy.base); + free_netdev(netdev); + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI
by Shengjie Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA45I1 -------------------------------- Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI: 1. Init TSI driver when config cvm_guest. 2. Modify the token structure to reduce the number of exposed variables. 3. Add a lock for obtaining the remote attestation report. Fixes: 31071f4b2a0b ("cvm_tsi: add cvm tsi interface") Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 93 +++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..a46f2b4724 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(token_lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,11 +44,8 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; - ver = tsi_get_version(); - if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { - pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); + if (!is_cvm_world()) return -EIO; - } ret = misc_register(&ioctl_dev); if (ret) { @@ -56,6 +53,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kzalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +67,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +84,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +103,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + spin_lock(&token_lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +142,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + spin_lock(&token_lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return -EFAULT; } + spin_unlock(&token_lock); return 0; } @@ -211,7 +208,7 @@ static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg) unsigned long device_cert_size; device_cert_size = MAX_DEV_CERT_SIZE; - device_cert = kmalloc(device_cert_size, GFP_KERNEL); + device_cert = kzalloc(device_cert_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!device_cert) return -ENOMEM; ret = tsi_get_device_cert(device_cert, &device_cert_size); -- 2.37.2.windows.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit 413c33b9f3bc36fdf719690a78824db9f88a9485 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4IQ CVE: CVE-2024-36905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 8eef91d14263..c8f65909a921 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2508,7 +2508,7 @@ void tcp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how) /* If we've already sent a FIN, or it's a closed state, skip this. */ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_SYN_SENT | - TCPF_SYN_RECV | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { + TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { /* Clear out any half completed packets. FIN if needed. */ if (tcp_close_state(sk)) tcp_send_fin(sk); @@ -2620,7 +2620,7 @@ void tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) * machine. State transitions: * * TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 - * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (forget it, it's impossible) + * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (it is difficult) * TCP_CLOSE_WAIT -> TCP_LAST_ACK * * are legal only when FIN has been sent (i.e. in window), diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index f95a18b73677..9542f42b5d0c 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6514,6 +6514,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); + if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) + tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 0996c71811d5..f32351a8f031 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3474,7 +3474,9 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) return; } } else { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, sk->sk_allocation); + skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, + sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC | + __GFP_NOWARN)); if (unlikely(!skb)) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit 413c33b9f3bc36fdf719690a78824db9f88a9485 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4IQ CVE: CVE-2024-36905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index f1ab4fa04dce..758818ec3f8b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2527,7 +2527,7 @@ void tcp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how) /* If we've already sent a FIN, or it's a closed state, skip this. */ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_SYN_SENT | - TCPF_SYN_RECV | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { + TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { /* Clear out any half completed packets. FIN if needed. */ if (tcp_close_state(sk)) tcp_send_fin(sk); @@ -2638,7 +2638,7 @@ void __tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) * machine. State transitions: * * TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 - * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (forget it, it's impossible) + * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (it is difficult) * TCP_CLOSE_WAIT -> TCP_LAST_ACK * * are legal only when FIN has been sent (i.e. in window), diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 2645dd64c382..0c783f8c0b36 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6541,6 +6541,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); + if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) + tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index 762f2009d61d..a1302d5cb98f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3495,7 +3495,9 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) return; } } else { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, sk->sk_allocation); + skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, + sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC | + __GFP_NOWARN)); if (unlikely(!skb)) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tcp: defer shutdown(SEND_SHUTDOWN) for TCP_SYN_RECV sockets
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit f47d0d32fa94e815fdd78b8b88684873e67939f4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4IQ CVE: CVE-2024-36905 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 94062790aedb505bdda209b10bea47b294d6394f ] TCP_SYN_RECV state is really special, it is only used by cross-syn connections, mostly used by fuzzers. In the following crash [1], syzbot managed to trigger a divide by zero in tcp_rcv_space_adjust() A socket makes the following state transitions, without ever calling tcp_init_transfer(), meaning tcp_init_buffer_space() is also not called. TCP_CLOSE connect() TCP_SYN_SENT TCP_SYN_RECV shutdown() -> tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN) TCP_FIN_WAIT1 To fix this issue, change tcp_shutdown() to not perform a TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 transition, which makes no sense anyway. When tcp_rcv_state_process() later changes socket state from TCP_SYN_RECV to TCP_ESTABLISH, then look at sk->sk_shutdown to finally enter TCP_FIN_WAIT1 state, and send a FIN packet from a sane socket state. This means tcp_send_fin() can now be called from BH context, and must use GFP_ATOMIC allocations. [1] divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 5084 Comm: syz-executor358 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00022-g98369dccd2f8 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 RIP: 0010:tcp_rcv_space_adjust+0x2df/0x890 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:767 Code: e3 04 4c 01 eb 48 8b 44 24 38 0f b6 04 10 84 c0 49 89 d5 0f 85 a5 03 00 00 41 8b 8e c8 09 00 00 89 e8 29 c8 48 0f af c3 31 d2 <48> f7 f1 48 8d 1c 43 49 8d 96 76 08 00 00 48 89 d0 48 c1 e8 03 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc900031ef3f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0c677a10441f8f42 RBX: 000000004fb95e7e RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000027d4b11f R08: ffffffff89e535a4 R09: 1ffffffff25e6ab7 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8135e920 R12: ffff88802a9f8d30 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff88802a9f8d00 R15: 1ffff1100553f2da FS: 00005555775c0380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f1155bf2304 CR3: 000000002b9f2000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> tcp_recvmsg_locked+0x106d/0x25a0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2513 tcp_recvmsg+0x25d/0x920 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2578 inet6_recvmsg+0x16a/0x730 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:680 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1046 [inline] sock_recvmsg+0x109/0x280 net/socket.c:1068 ____sys_recvmsg+0x1db/0x470 net/socket.c:2803 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7faeb6363db9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 c1 17 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffcc1997168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007faeb6363db9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000bc0 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000122 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller(a)googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240501125448.896529-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 2 ++ net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c index 2ff83f2897ba..0f1380c3fcf4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c @@ -2714,7 +2714,7 @@ void tcp_shutdown(struct sock *sk, int how) /* If we've already sent a FIN, or it's a closed state, skip this. */ if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_ESTABLISHED | TCPF_SYN_SENT | - TCPF_SYN_RECV | TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { + TCPF_CLOSE_WAIT)) { /* Clear out any half completed packets. FIN if needed. */ if (tcp_close_state(sk)) tcp_send_fin(sk); @@ -2823,7 +2823,7 @@ void __tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) * machine. State transitions: * * TCP_ESTABLISHED -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 - * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (forget it, it's impossible) + * TCP_SYN_RECV -> TCP_FIN_WAIT1 (it is difficult) * TCP_CLOSE_WAIT -> TCP_LAST_ACK * * are legal only when FIN has been sent (i.e. in window), diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index 7529412827de..259e48b57494 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -6654,6 +6654,8 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(sk); tcp_fast_path_on(tp); + if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) + tcp_shutdown(sk, SEND_SHUTDOWN); break; case TCP_FIN_WAIT1: { diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c index f6950a42de20..cc18b8b70be0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c @@ -3585,7 +3585,9 @@ void tcp_send_fin(struct sock *sk) return; } } else { - skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, sk->sk_allocation); + skb = alloc_skb_fclone(MAX_TCP_HEADER, + sk_gfp_mask(sk, GFP_ATOMIC | + __GFP_NOWARN)); if (unlikely(!skb)) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] mmc: mmc_spi: fix error handling in mmc_spi_probe()
by Li Nan 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.169 commit 0b3edcb24bd81b3b2e3dac89f4733bfd47d283be category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4N9 CVE: CVE-2023-52708 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ---------------------------------------------------- commit cf4c9d2ac1e42c7d18b921bec39486896645b714 upstream. If mmc_add_host() fails, it doesn't need to call mmc_remove_host(), or it will cause null-ptr-deref, because of deleting a not added device in mmc_remove_host(). To fix this, goto label 'fail_glue_init', if mmc_add_host() fails, and change the label 'fail_add_host' to 'fail_gpiod_request'. Fixes: 15a0580ced08 ("mmc_spi host driver") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Cc:stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230131013835.3564011-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c b/drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c index 02f4fd26e76a..1d814919eb6b 100644 --- a/drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/mmc_spi.c @@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ static int mmc_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi) status = mmc_add_host(mmc); if (status != 0) - goto fail_add_host; + goto fail_glue_init; /* * Index 0 is card detect @@ -1458,7 +1458,7 @@ static int mmc_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi) */ status = mmc_gpiod_request_cd(mmc, NULL, 0, false, 1000); if (status == -EPROBE_DEFER) - goto fail_add_host; + goto fail_gpiod_request; if (!status) { /* * The platform has a CD GPIO signal that may support @@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ static int mmc_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi) /* Index 1 is write protect/read only */ status = mmc_gpiod_request_ro(mmc, NULL, 1, 0); if (status == -EPROBE_DEFER) - goto fail_add_host; + goto fail_gpiod_request; if (!status) has_ro = true; @@ -1487,7 +1487,7 @@ static int mmc_spi_probe(struct spi_device *spi) ? ", cd polling" : ""); return 0; -fail_add_host: +fail_gpiod_request: mmc_remove_host(mmc); fail_glue_init: mmc_spi_dma_free(host); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix CVE-2024-36949
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-36949 Mukul Joshi (1): drm/amdkfd: Rework kfd_locked handling Zhigang Luo (1): amd/amdkfd: sync all devices to wait all processes being evicted drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c | 7 ------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_priv.h | 2 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_process.c | 8 +++++++- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: do not free live element
by Wei Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc5 commit 3cfc9ec039af60dbd8965ae085b2c2ccdcfbe1cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9JFG2 CVE: CVE-2024-26924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?i… -------------------------------- Pablo reports a crash with large batches of elements with a back-to-back add/remove pattern. Quoting Pablo: add_elem("00000000") timeout 100 ms ... add_elem("0000000X") timeout 100 ms del_elem("0000000X") <---------------- delete one that was just added ... add_elem("00005000") timeout 100 ms 1) nft_pipapo_remove() removes element 0000000X Then, KASAN shows a splat. Looking at the remove function there is a chance that we will drop a rule that maps to a non-deactivated element. Removal happens in two steps, first we do a lookup for key k and return the to-be-removed element and mark it as inactive in the next generation. Then, in a second step, the element gets removed from the set/map. The _remove function does not work correctly if we have more than one element that share the same key. This can happen if we insert an element into a set when the set already holds an element with same key, but the element mapping to the existing key has timed out or is not active in the next generation. In such case its possible that removal will unmap the wrong element. If this happens, we will leak the non-deactivated element, it becomes unreachable. The element that got deactivated (and will be freed later) will remain reachable in the set data structure, this can result in a crash when such an element is retrieved during lookup (stale pointer). Add a check that the fully matching key does in fact map to the element that we have marked as inactive in the deactivation step. If not, we need to continue searching. Add a bug/warn trap at the end of the function as well, the remove function must not ever be called with an invisible/unreachable/non-existent element. v2: avoid uneeded temporary variable (Stefano) Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges") Reported-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c [lw: fix context conflict due to lack of commit f8bf7706151a ("netfilter: nf_tables: integrate pipapo into commit protocol")] Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c index 9ca18f4c4eaf..ef6fb41fd31f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c @@ -1932,6 +1932,8 @@ static void nft_pipapo_remove(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, rules_fx = rules_f0; nft_pipapo_for_each_field(f, i, m) { + bool last = i == m->field_count - 1; + if (!pipapo_match_field(f, start, rules_fx, match_start, match_end)) break; @@ -1944,17 +1946,19 @@ static void nft_pipapo_remove(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, match_start += NFT_PIPAPO_GROUPS_PADDED_SIZE(f); match_end += NFT_PIPAPO_GROUPS_PADDED_SIZE(f); - } - if (i == m->field_count) { - priv->dirty = true; - pipapo_drop(m, rulemap); - pipapo_commit(set); - return; + if (last && f->mt[rulemap[i].to].e == e) { + priv->dirty = true; + pipapo_drop(m, rulemap); + pipapo_commit(set); + return; + } } first_rule += rules_f0; } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); /* elem_priv not found * } /** -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] Fix CVE-2024-36949
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-36949 Mukul Joshi (1): drm/amdkfd: Rework kfd_locked handling Zhigang Luo (1): amd/amdkfd: sync all devices to wait all processes being evicted drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_chardev.c | 7 ------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_priv.h | 2 ++ drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_process.c | 8 +++++++- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] powerpc/powernv: Add a null pointer check in opal_powercap_init()
by Zhang Zekun 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Kunwu Chan <chentao(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit a67a04ad05acb56640798625e73fa54d6d41cce1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9HG CVE: CVE-2023-52696 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e123015c0ba859cf48aa7f89c5016cc6e98e018d ] kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Fixes: b9ef7b4b867f ("powerpc: Convert to using %pOFn instead of device_node.name") Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231126095739.1501990-1-chentao@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: sanglipeng1 <sanglipeng1(a)jd.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Zekun <zhangzekun11(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-powercap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-powercap.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-powercap.c index c16d44f6f1d1..ce9ec3962cef 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-powercap.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-powercap.c @@ -196,6 +196,12 @@ void __init opal_powercap_init(void) j = 0; pcaps[i].pg.name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%pOFn", node); + if (!pcaps[i].pg.name) { + kfree(pcaps[i].pattrs); + kfree(pcaps[i].pg.attrs); + goto out_pcaps_pattrs; + } + if (has_min) { powercap_add_attr(min, "powercap-min", &pcaps[i].pattrs[j]); -- 2.17.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm: enhance security for cvm host feature
by Ju Fu 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TM0T -------------------------------- enhance security for cvm host feature Signed-off-by: Ju Fu <fuju1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 4 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h | 34 ++------------------ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h index 540563623..1271df56c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h @@ -571,7 +571,9 @@ static inline enum cvm_state kvm_cvm_state(struct kvm *kvm) { struct cvm *cvm = kvm->arch.cvm; - return cvm && READ_ONCE(cvm->state); + if (!cvm) + return 0; + return READ_ONCE(cvm->state); } #endif #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h index 536594017..b89680f31 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h @@ -18,22 +18,6 @@ #define TMM_TTT_LEVEL_2 2 #define TMM_TTT_LEVEL_3 3 -#ifdef CONFIG_CVM_HOST_FVP_PLAT -#define CVM_MEM_BASE ULL(0x8800000000) /* choose FVP platform to run cVM */ -#define VQ_NUM 3 -#else -#define CVM_MEM_BASE ULL(0x800000000) /* choose qemu platform to run cVM */ -#define VQ_NUM 3 -#endif - -#define MEM_SEG_NUMS 2 - -/* define in QEMU hw/arm/virt.c */ -#define VIRT_PCIE_MMIO 0x10000000 /* 256MB */ -#define VIRT_PCIE_MMIO_SIZE 0x1000000 /* 16MB */ -#define VIRT_HIGH_PCIE_ECAM 0x8000000000 /* 512GB */ -#define VIRT_HIGH_PCIE_ECAM_SIZE 0x12000000 /* 288MB */ - /* TMI error codes. */ #define TMI_SUCCESS 0 #define TMI_ERROR_INPUT 1 @@ -214,6 +198,8 @@ struct tmi_tec_run { #define TMI_NO_MEASURE_CONTENT U(0) #define TMI_MEASURE_CONTENT U(1) +#define CVM_IPA_MAX_VAL (1UL << 48) + /* * SMC_TMM_INIT_COMPLETE is the only function in the TMI that originates from * the CVM world and is handled by the SPMD. The remaining functions are @@ -264,7 +250,7 @@ struct tmi_tec_run { #define TMI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(_version) ((_version) >> 16) #define TMI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(_version) ((_version) & 0xFFFF) -#define TMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR U(0x0) +#define TMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR U(0x1) /* KVM_CAP_ARM_TMM on VM fd */ #define KVM_CAP_ARM_TMM_CONFIG_CVM_HOST 0 @@ -330,20 +316,6 @@ struct kvm_cap_arm_tmm_populate_region_args { __u32 reserved[3]; }; -enum tmi_tmm_mem_type { - TMM_MEM_TYPE_RD, - TMM_MEM_TYPE_TEC, - TMM_MEM_TYPE_TTT, - TMM_MEM_TYPE_CVM_PA, -}; - -enum tmi_tmm_map_size { - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_4K, - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_2M, - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_1G, - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_MAX, -}; - static inline bool tmm_is_addr_ttt_level_aligned(uint64_t addr, int level) { uint64_t mask = (1 << (12 + 9 * (3 - level))) - 1; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h index 88fa0873c..8cc7a35c9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include <uapi/linux/kvm.h> enum cvm_state { - CVM_STATE_NONE, + CVM_STATE_NONE = 1, CVM_STATE_NEW, CVM_STATE_ACTIVE, CVM_STATE_DYING diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c index 70521fec8..73b8daede 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c @@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ int kvm_arm_create_cvm(struct kvm *kvm) memcpy(cvm->params->rpv, &cvm->cvm_vmid, sizeof(cvm->cvm_vmid)); cvm->rd = tmi_cvm_create(__pa(cvm->params), numa_set); if (!cvm->rd) { - kvm_err("KVM creates cVM: %d\n", cvm->cvm_vmid); + kvm_err("KVM creates cVM failed: %d\n", cvm->cvm_vmid); ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; } WRITE_ONCE(cvm->state, CVM_STATE_NEW); @@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ int kvm_cvm_populate_par_region(struct kvm *kvm, u64 numa_set, */ ipa = ALIGN_DOWN(ipa, map_size); - if (is_data_create_region(ipa_base, args)) { + if (is_data_create_region(ipa, args)) { pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(memslot, gpa_to_gfn(ipa)); if (is_error_pfn(pfn)) { ret = -EFAULT; @@ -602,6 +603,7 @@ static int kvm_populate_ram_region(struct kvm *kvm, u64 map_size, static int kvm_populate_ipa_cvm_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_cap_arm_tmm_populate_region_args *args) { + struct cvm *cvm = (struct cvm *)kvm->arch.cvm; u64 l2_granule = cvm_granule_size(TMM_TTT_LEVEL_2); phys_addr_t ipa_base1, ipa_end2; @@ -612,7 +614,10 @@ static int kvm_populate_ipa_cvm_range(struct kvm *kvm, !IS_ALIGNED(args->populate_ipa_base2, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(args->populate_ipa_size2, PAGE_SIZE)) return -EINVAL; - if (args->populate_ipa_base2 < args->populate_ipa_base1 + args->populate_ipa_size1) + + if (args->populate_ipa_base1 < cvm->loader_start || + args->populate_ipa_base2 < args->populate_ipa_base1 + args->populate_ipa_size1 || + cvm->dtb_end < args->populate_ipa_base2 + args->populate_ipa_size2) return -EINVAL; if (args->flags & ~TMI_MEASURE_CONTENT) @@ -755,6 +760,26 @@ int kvm_init_tmm(void) return 0; } +static bool is_numa_ipa_range_valid(struct kvm_numa_info *numa_info) +{ + unsigned long i; + struct kvm_numa_node *numa_node, *prev_numa_node; + + prev_numa_node = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < numa_info->numa_cnt; i++) { + numa_node = &numa_info->numa_nodes[i]; + if (numa_node->ipa_start + numa_node->ipa_size < numa_node->ipa_start) + return false; + if (prev_numa_node && + numa_node->ipa_start < prev_numa_node->ipa_start + prev_numa_node->ipa_size) + return false; + prev_numa_node = numa_node; + } + if (numa_node->ipa_start + numa_node->ipa_size > CVM_IPA_MAX_VAL) + return false; + return true; +} + int kvm_load_user_data(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long arg) { struct kvm_user_data user_data; @@ -766,26 +791,34 @@ int kvm_load_user_data(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&user_data, argp, sizeof(user_data))) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; numa_info = &user_data.numa_info; if (numa_info->numa_cnt > MAX_NUMA_NODE) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; if (numa_info->numa_cnt > 0) { unsigned long i, total_size = 0; struct kvm_numa_node *numa_node = &numa_info->numa_nodes[0]; unsigned long ipa_end = numa_node->ipa_start + numa_node->ipa_size; + if (!is_numa_ipa_range_valid(numa_info)) + return -EINVAL; if (user_data.loader_start < numa_node->ipa_start || user_data.dtb_end > ipa_end) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < numa_info->numa_cnt; i++) total_size += numa_info->numa_nodes[i].ipa_size; if (total_size != user_data.ram_size) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; } + if (user_data.image_end <= user_data.loader_start || + user_data.initrd_start < user_data.image_end || + user_data.dtb_end < user_data.initrd_start || + user_data.ram_size < user_data.dtb_end - user_data.loader_start) + return -EINVAL; + cvm->loader_start = user_data.loader_start; cvm->image_end = user_data.image_end; cvm->initrd_start = user_data.initrd_start; @@ -871,6 +904,7 @@ int kvm_init_cvm_vm(struct kvm *kvm) return -ENOMEM; cvm->params = params; + WRITE_ONCE(cvm->state, CVM_STATE_NONE); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c index 2c2f23f35..153930d01 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c @@ -2905,7 +2905,7 @@ static void its_free_tables(struct its_node *its) for (i = 0; i < GITS_BASER_NR_REGS; i++) { if (its->tables[i].base) { #ifdef CONFIG_CVM_GUEST - if (!is_cvm_world()) + if (is_cvm_world()) its_free_shared_pages(its->tables[i].base, its->tables[i].order); else -- 2.25.1.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/4] Fix CVE-2024-35915
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-35915 Ryosuke Yasuoka (3): nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_rx_work nfc: nci: Fix handling of zero-length payload packets in nci_rx_work() Tetsuo Handa (1): nfc: nci: Fix kcov check in nci_rx_work() net/nfc/nci/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/4] Fix CVE-2024-35915
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-35915 Ryosuke Yasuoka (3): nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_rx_work nfc: nci: Fix handling of zero-length payload packets in nci_rx_work() Tetsuo Handa (1): nfc: nci: Fix kcov check in nci_rx_work() net/nfc/nci/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/4] Fix CVE-2024-35915
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2024-35915 Ryosuke Yasuoka (3): nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_rx_work nfc: nci: Fix handling of zero-length payload packets in nci_rx_work() Tetsuo Handa (1): nfc: nci: Fix kcov check in nci_rx_work() net/nfc/nci/core.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] nfp: Fix memory leak in nfp_cpp_area_cache_add()
by Li Huafei 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021(a)163.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.221 commit eb51f639ef3fd5498b7def290ed8681b6aadd9a7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9S258 CVE: CVE-2021-47516 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c56c96303e9289cc34716b1179597b6f470833de upstream. In line 800 (#1), nfp_cpp_area_alloc() allocates and initializes a CPP area structure. But in line 807 (#2), when the cache is allocated failed, this CPP area structure is not freed, which will result in memory leak. We can fix it by freeing the CPP area when the cache is allocated failed (#2). 792 int nfp_cpp_area_cache_add(struct nfp_cpp *cpp, size_t size) 793 { 794 struct nfp_cpp_area_cache *cache; 795 struct nfp_cpp_area *area; 800 area = nfp_cpp_area_alloc(cpp, NFP_CPP_ID(7, NFP_CPP_ACTION_RW, 0), 801 0, size); // #1: allocates and initializes 802 if (!area) 803 return -ENOMEM; 805 cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_KERNEL); 806 if (!cache) 807 return -ENOMEM; // #2: missing free 817 return 0; 818 } Fixes: 4cb584e0ee7d ("nfp: add CPP access core") Signed-off-by: Jianglei Nie <niejianglei2021(a)163.com> Acked-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman(a)corigine.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211209061511.122535-1-niejianglei2021@163.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c index 6f5d69293a252..f7b354e796cb6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/netronome/nfp/nfpcore/nfp_cppcore.c @@ -803,8 +803,10 @@ int nfp_cpp_area_cache_add(struct nfp_cpp *cpp, size_t size) return -ENOMEM; cache = kzalloc(sizeof(*cache), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!cache) + if (!cache) { + nfp_cpp_area_free(area); return -ENOMEM; + } cache->id = 0; cache->addr = 0; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] comedi: vmk80xx: fix bulk-buffer overflow
by Liu Shixin 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.217 commit 063f576c43d589a4c153554b681d32b3f8317c7b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9RD4V CVE: CVE-2021-47474 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 78cdfd62bd54af615fba9e3ca1ba35de39d3871d upstream. The driver is using endpoint-sized buffers but must not assume that the tx and rx buffers are of equal size or a malicious device could overflow the slab-allocated receive buffer when doing bulk transfers. Fixes: 985cafccbf9b ("Staging: Comedi: vmk80xx: Add k8061 support") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 2.6.31 Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti(a)mev.co.uk> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211025114532.4599-5-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c | 16 +++++++--------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c index 2bbfaf54220e..ff52299c1fb0 100644 --- a/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c +++ b/drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c @@ -159,22 +159,20 @@ static void vmk80xx_do_bulk_msg(struct comedi_device *dev) __u8 rx_addr; unsigned int tx_pipe; unsigned int rx_pipe; - size_t size; + size_t tx_size; + size_t rx_size; tx_addr = devpriv->ep_tx->bEndpointAddress; rx_addr = devpriv->ep_rx->bEndpointAddress; tx_pipe = usb_sndbulkpipe(usb, tx_addr); rx_pipe = usb_rcvbulkpipe(usb, rx_addr); - - /* - * The max packet size attributes of the K8061 - * input/output endpoints are identical - */ - size = usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx); + tx_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx); + rx_size = usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx); usb_bulk_msg(usb, tx_pipe, devpriv->usb_tx_buf, - size, NULL, devpriv->ep_tx->bInterval); - usb_bulk_msg(usb, rx_pipe, devpriv->usb_rx_buf, size, NULL, HZ * 10); + tx_size, NULL, devpriv->ep_tx->bInterval); + + usb_bulk_msg(usb, rx_pipe, devpriv->usb_rx_buf, rx_size, NULL, HZ * 10); } static int vmk80xx_read_packet(struct comedi_device *dev) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/amd/display: Atom Integrated System Info v2_2 for DCN35
by Yi Yang 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Gabe Teeger <gabe.teeger(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 7e3030774431eb093165a31baff040d35446fb8b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TNHC CVE: CVE-2024-36897 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9a35d205f466501dcfe5625ca313d944d0ac2d60 ] New request from KMD/VBIOS in order to support new UMA carveout model. This fixes a null dereference from accessing Ctx->dc_bios->integrated_info while it was NULL. DAL parses through the BIOS and extracts the necessary integrated_info but was missing a case for the new BIOS version 2.3. Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas(a)amd.com> Acked-by: Aurabindo Pillai <aurabindo.pillai(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Gabe Teeger <gabe.teeger(a)amd.com> Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <daniel.wheeler(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c index 4c3c4c8de1cf..93720cf069d7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/bios/bios_parser2.c @@ -2961,6 +2961,7 @@ static enum bp_result construct_integrated_info( result = get_integrated_info_v2_1(bp, info); break; case 2: + case 3: result = get_integrated_info_v2_2(bp, info); break; default: -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] iomap: Don't finish dio under irq when there exists pages
by Zhihao Cheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

hulk inclusion category: perf bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA4DAW CVE: NA -------------------------------- Fixes: 6fac6d0e975afe1dec ("ext4: Optimize endio process for DIO overwrites") Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao(a)huaweicloud.com> --- fs/iomap/direct-io.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/iomap/direct-io.c b/fs/iomap/direct-io.c index 892a4f8109e5..f6b3311fcc3e 100644 --- a/fs/iomap/direct-io.c +++ b/fs/iomap/direct-io.c @@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ static void iomap_dio_bio_end_io(struct bio *bio) goto release_bio; } + if ((dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP) && dio->size && + (dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_WRITE) && + file_inode(iocb->ki_filp)->i_mapping->nrpages) + dio->flags &= ~IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP; + /* * Flagged with IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP, we can complete it inline */ -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: ti: fix UAF in tlan_remove_one
by Liu Shixin 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.199 commit a0a817b2d308fac090a05cbbe80988e073ac5193 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9S1ZJ CVE: CVE-2021-47310 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 0336f8ffece62f882ab3012820965a786a983f70 upstream. priv is netdev private data and it cannot be used after free_netdev() call. Using priv after free_netdev() can cause UAF bug. Fix it by moving free_netdev() at the end of the function. Fixes: 1e0a8b13d355 ("tlan: cancel work at remove path") Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/tlan.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/tlan.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/tlan.c index 93d142867c2a..c6595b4ff55a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/tlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/ti/tlan.c @@ -312,9 +312,8 @@ static void tlan_remove_one(struct pci_dev *pdev) pci_release_regions(pdev); #endif - free_netdev(dev); - cancel_work_sync(&priv->tlan_tqueue); + free_netdev(dev); } static void tlan_start(struct net_device *dev) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] iomap: Don't finish dio under irq when there exists pages
by Zhihao Cheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

hulk inclusion category: perf bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA4DAW CVE: NA -------------------------------- Fixes: 48774b90b5677bdb4 ("ext4: Optimize endio process for DIO overwrites") Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao(a)huaweicloud.com> --- fs/iomap/direct-io.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/iomap/direct-io.c b/fs/iomap/direct-io.c index 892a4f8109e5..f6b3311fcc3e 100644 --- a/fs/iomap/direct-io.c +++ b/fs/iomap/direct-io.c @@ -177,6 +177,11 @@ static void iomap_dio_bio_end_io(struct bio *bio) goto release_bio; } + if ((dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP) && dio->size && + (dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_WRITE) && + file_inode(iocb->ki_filp)->i_mapping->nrpages) + dio->flags &= ~IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP; + /* * Flagged with IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP, we can complete it inline */ -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] powerpc/powernv: Add a null pointer check in opal_event_init()
by Guo Mengqi 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Kunwu Chan <chentao(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit e6ad05e3ae9c84c5a71d7bb2d44dc845ae7990cf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9IH Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8649829a1dd25199bbf557b2621cedb4bf9b3050 ] kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Fixes: 2717a33d6074 ("powerpc/opal-irqchip: Use interrupt names if present") Signed-off-by: Kunwu Chan <chentao(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe(a)ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20231127030755.1546750-1-chentao@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-irqchip.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-irqchip.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-irqchip.c index c164419e254d..dcec0f760c8f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-irqchip.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/opal-irqchip.c @@ -278,6 +278,8 @@ int __init opal_event_init(void) else name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "opal"); + if (!name) + continue; /* Install interrupt handler */ rc = request_irq(r->start, opal_interrupt, r->flags & IRQD_TRIGGER_MASK, name, NULL); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ACPI: video: check for error while searching for backlight device parent
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Nikita Kiryushin <kiryushin(a)ancud.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit c4e1a0ef0b4782854c9b77a333ca912b392bed2f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9CJ CVE: CVE-2023-52693 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ccd45faf4973746c4f30ea41eec864e5cf191099 ] If acpi_get_parent() called in acpi_video_dev_register_backlight() fails, for example, because acpi_ut_acquire_mutex() fails inside acpi_get_parent), this can lead to incorrect (uninitialized) acpi_parent handle being passed to acpi_get_pci_dev() for detecting the parent pci device. Check acpi_get_parent() result and set parent device only in case of success. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 9661e92c10a9 ("acpi: tie ACPI backlight devices to PCI devices if possible") Signed-off-by: Nikita Kiryushin <kiryushin(a)ancud.ru> Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/acpi/acpi_video.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpi_video.c b/drivers/acpi/acpi_video.c index cf6c9ffe04a2..9d384656323a 100644 --- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_video.c +++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_video.c @@ -1788,12 +1788,12 @@ static void acpi_video_dev_register_backlight(struct acpi_video_device *device) return; count++; - acpi_get_parent(device->dev->handle, &acpi_parent); - - pdev = acpi_get_pci_dev(acpi_parent); - if (pdev) { - parent = &pdev->dev; - pci_dev_put(pdev); + if (ACPI_SUCCESS(acpi_get_parent(device->dev->handle, &acpi_parent))) { + pdev = acpi_get_pci_dev(acpi_parent); + if (pdev) { + parent = &pdev->dev; + pci_dev_put(pdev); + } } memset(&props, 0, sizeof(struct backlight_properties)); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: do not free live element
by Guo Mengqi 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc5 commit 3cfc9ec039af60dbd8965ae085b2c2ccdcfbe1cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9JFG2 CVE: CVE-2024-26924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?i… -------------------------------- Pablo reports a crash with large batches of elements with a back-to-back add/remove pattern. Quoting Pablo: add_elem("00000000") timeout 100 ms ... add_elem("0000000X") timeout 100 ms del_elem("0000000X") <---------------- delete one that was just added ... add_elem("00005000") timeout 100 ms 1) nft_pipapo_remove() removes element 0000000X Then, KASAN shows a splat. Looking at the remove function there is a chance that we will drop a rule that maps to a non-deactivated element. Removal happens in two steps, first we do a lookup for key k and return the to-be-removed element and mark it as inactive in the next generation. Then, in a second step, the element gets removed from the set/map. The _remove function does not work correctly if we have more than one element that share the same key. This can happen if we insert an element into a set when the set already holds an element with same key, but the element mapping to the existing key has timed out or is not active in the next generation. In such case its possible that removal will unmap the wrong element. If this happens, we will leak the non-deactivated element, it becomes unreachable. The element that got deactivated (and will be freed later) will remain reachable in the set data structure, this can result in a crash when such an element is retrieved during lookup (stale pointer). Add a check that the fully matching key does in fact map to the element that we have marked as inactive in the deactivation step. If not, we need to continue searching. Add a bug/warn trap at the end of the function as well, the remove function must not ever be called with an invisible/unreachable/non-existent element. v2: avoid uneeded temporary variable (Stefano) Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges") Reported-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c index 9c311b6f37af..8c43335d59f6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c @@ -1980,6 +1980,8 @@ static void nft_pipapo_remove(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, rules_fx = rules_f0; nft_pipapo_for_each_field(f, i, m) { + bool last = i == m->field_count - 1; + if (!pipapo_match_field(f, start, rules_fx, match_start, match_end)) break; @@ -1992,16 +1994,18 @@ static void nft_pipapo_remove(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, match_start += NFT_PIPAPO_GROUPS_PADDED_SIZE(f); match_end += NFT_PIPAPO_GROUPS_PADDED_SIZE(f); - } - if (i == m->field_count) { - priv->dirty = true; - pipapo_drop(m, rulemap); - return; + if (last && f->mt[rulemap[i].to].e == e) { + priv->dirty = true; + pipapo_drop(m, rulemap); + return; + } } first_rule += rules_f0; } + + WARN_ON_ONCE(1); /* elem_priv not found */ } /** -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] aio: fix mremap after fork null-deref
by Guo Mengqi 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Seth Jenkins <sethjenkins(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.169 commit c261f798f7baa8080cf0214081d43d5f86bb073f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9K29F Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 81e9d6f8647650a7bead74c5f926e29970e834d1 upstream. Commit e4a0d3e720e7 ("aio: Make it possible to remap aio ring") introduced a null-deref if mremap is called on an old aio mapping after fork as mm->ioctx_table will be set to NULL. [jmoyer(a)redhat.com: fix 80 column issue] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/x49sffq4nvg.fsf@segfault.boston.devel.redhat.com Fixes: e4a0d3e720e7 ("aio: Make it possible to remap aio ring") Signed-off-by: Seth Jenkins <sethjenkins(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer(a)redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl(a)kvack.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul(a)parallels.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- fs/aio.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c index 0063e4bc0aad..00641a1ad0b3 100644 --- a/fs/aio.c +++ b/fs/aio.c @@ -335,6 +335,9 @@ static int aio_ring_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) spin_lock(&mm->ioctx_lock); rcu_read_lock(); table = rcu_dereference(mm->ioctx_table); + if (!table) + goto out_unlock; + for (i = 0; i < table->nr; i++) { struct kioctx *ctx; @@ -348,6 +351,7 @@ static int aio_ring_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *vma) } } +out_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); spin_unlock(&mm->ioctx_lock); return res; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2022-48652
by Guo Mengqi 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

CVE-2022-48652 Anatolii Gerasymenko (1): ice: ethtool: Prohibit improper channel config for DCB Ding Hui (1): ice: Fix crash by keep old cfg when update TCs more than queues drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 10 ++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_lib.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2022-48652
by Guo Mengqi 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

CVE-2022-48652 Anatolii Gerasymenko (1): ice: ethtool: Prohibit improper channel config for DCB Ding Hui (1): ice: Fix crash by keep old cfg when update TCs more than queues drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_ethtool.c | 10 ++++++ drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_lib.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] usb: typec: ucsi: Limit read size on v1.2
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit(a)chromium.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.27 commit 266f403ec47573046dee4bcebda82777ce702c40 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QGLG CVE: CVE-2024-35924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b3db266fb031fba88c423d4bb8983a73a3db6527 ] Between UCSI 1.2 and UCSI 2.0, the size of the MESSAGE_IN region was increased from 16 to 256. In order to avoid overflowing reads for older systems, add a mechanism to use the read UCSI version to truncate read sizes on UCSI v1.2. Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit(a)chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209143723.v5.1.Iacf5570a66b82b73ef03daa6557e… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c [Some contexts around ucsi_register different. No functional impact.] Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c index 4cd5c291cdf3..be3104dd56a2 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c @@ -36,6 +36,19 @@ */ #define UCSI_SWAP_TIMEOUT_MS 5000 +static int ucsi_read_message_in(struct ucsi *ucsi, void *buf, + size_t buf_size) +{ + /* + * Below UCSI 2.0, MESSAGE_IN was limited to 16 bytes. Truncate the + * reads here. + */ + if (ucsi->version <= UCSI_VERSION_1_2) + buf_size = clamp(buf_size, (size_t)0, (size_t)16); + + return ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, buf, buf_size); +} + static int ucsi_acknowledge_command(struct ucsi *ucsi) { u64 ctrl; @@ -72,7 +85,7 @@ static int ucsi_read_error(struct ucsi *ucsi) if (ret < 0) return ret; - ret = ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, &error, sizeof(error)); + ret = ucsi_read_message_in(ucsi, &error, sizeof(error)); if (ret) return ret; @@ -165,7 +178,7 @@ int ucsi_send_command(struct ucsi *ucsi, u64 command, length = ret; if (data) { - ret = ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, data, size); + ret = ucsi_read_message_in(ucsi, data, size); if (ret) goto out; } @@ -1303,6 +1316,15 @@ int ucsi_register(struct ucsi *ucsi) if (!ucsi->version) return -ENODEV; + /* + * Version format is JJ.M.N (JJ = Major version, M = Minor version, + * N = sub-minor version). + */ + dev_dbg(ucsi->dev, "Registered UCSI interface with version %x.%x.%x", + UCSI_BCD_GET_MAJOR(ucsi->version), + UCSI_BCD_GET_MINOR(ucsi->version), + UCSI_BCD_GET_SUBMINOR(ucsi->version)); + queue_work(system_long_wq, &ucsi->work); return 0; diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h index fce23ad16c6d..32f25dc88258 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h @@ -21,6 +21,17 @@ struct ucsi_altmode; #define UCSI_CONTROL 8 #define UCSI_MESSAGE_IN 16 #define UCSI_MESSAGE_OUT 32 +#define UCSIv2_MESSAGE_OUT 272 + +/* UCSI versions */ +#define UCSI_VERSION_1_2 0x0120 +#define UCSI_VERSION_2_0 0x0200 +#define UCSI_VERSION_2_1 0x0210 +#define UCSI_VERSION_3_0 0x0300 + +#define UCSI_BCD_GET_MAJOR(_v_) (((_v_) >> 8) & 0xFF) +#define UCSI_BCD_GET_MINOR(_v_) (((_v_) >> 4) & 0x0F) +#define UCSI_BCD_GET_SUBMINOR(_v_) ((_v_) & 0x0F) /* Command Status and Connector Change Indication (CCI) bits */ #define UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(_c_) (((_c_) & GENMASK(7, 1)) >> 1) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] usb: typec: ucsi: Limit read size on v1.2
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit(a)chromium.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.27 commit 266f403ec47573046dee4bcebda82777ce702c40 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QGLG CVE: CVE-2024-35924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b3db266fb031fba88c423d4bb8983a73a3db6527 ] Between UCSI 1.2 and UCSI 2.0, the size of the MESSAGE_IN region was increased from 16 to 256. In order to avoid overflowing reads for older systems, add a mechanism to use the read UCSI version to truncate read sizes on UCSI v1.2. Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong(a)linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Prashant Malani <pmalani(a)chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <abhishekpandit(a)chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209143723.v5.1.Iacf5570a66b82b73ef03daa6557e… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c [Some contexts around ucsi_register different. No functional impact.] Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c index 4cd5c291cdf3..be3104dd56a2 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c @@ -36,6 +36,19 @@ */ #define UCSI_SWAP_TIMEOUT_MS 5000 +static int ucsi_read_message_in(struct ucsi *ucsi, void *buf, + size_t buf_size) +{ + /* + * Below UCSI 2.0, MESSAGE_IN was limited to 16 bytes. Truncate the + * reads here. + */ + if (ucsi->version <= UCSI_VERSION_1_2) + buf_size = clamp(buf_size, (size_t)0, (size_t)16); + + return ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, buf, buf_size); +} + static int ucsi_acknowledge_command(struct ucsi *ucsi) { u64 ctrl; @@ -72,7 +85,7 @@ static int ucsi_read_error(struct ucsi *ucsi) if (ret < 0) return ret; - ret = ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, &error, sizeof(error)); + ret = ucsi_read_message_in(ucsi, &error, sizeof(error)); if (ret) return ret; @@ -165,7 +178,7 @@ int ucsi_send_command(struct ucsi *ucsi, u64 command, length = ret; if (data) { - ret = ucsi->ops->read(ucsi, UCSI_MESSAGE_IN, data, size); + ret = ucsi_read_message_in(ucsi, data, size); if (ret) goto out; } @@ -1303,6 +1316,15 @@ int ucsi_register(struct ucsi *ucsi) if (!ucsi->version) return -ENODEV; + /* + * Version format is JJ.M.N (JJ = Major version, M = Minor version, + * N = sub-minor version). + */ + dev_dbg(ucsi->dev, "Registered UCSI interface with version %x.%x.%x", + UCSI_BCD_GET_MAJOR(ucsi->version), + UCSI_BCD_GET_MINOR(ucsi->version), + UCSI_BCD_GET_SUBMINOR(ucsi->version)); + queue_work(system_long_wq, &ucsi->work); return 0; diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h index fce23ad16c6d..32f25dc88258 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.h @@ -21,6 +21,17 @@ struct ucsi_altmode; #define UCSI_CONTROL 8 #define UCSI_MESSAGE_IN 16 #define UCSI_MESSAGE_OUT 32 +#define UCSIv2_MESSAGE_OUT 272 + +/* UCSI versions */ +#define UCSI_VERSION_1_2 0x0120 +#define UCSI_VERSION_2_0 0x0200 +#define UCSI_VERSION_2_1 0x0210 +#define UCSI_VERSION_3_0 0x0300 + +#define UCSI_BCD_GET_MAJOR(_v_) (((_v_) >> 8) & 0xFF) +#define UCSI_BCD_GET_MINOR(_v_) (((_v_) >> 4) & 0x0F) +#define UCSI_BCD_GET_SUBMINOR(_v_) ((_v_) & 0x0F) /* Command Status and Connector Change Indication (CCI) bits */ #define UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR(_c_) (((_c_) & GENMASK(7, 1)) >> 1) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] iomap: Don't finish dio under irq when there exists pages
by Zhihao Cheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: perf bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA4DAW CVE: NA -------------------------------- Fixes: 48774b90b5677bdb4 ("ext4: Optimize endio process for DIO overwrites") Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao(a)huaweicloud.com> --- fs/iomap/direct-io.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/iomap/direct-io.c b/fs/iomap/direct-io.c index 892a4f8109e5..540f300c5685 100644 --- a/fs/iomap/direct-io.c +++ b/fs/iomap/direct-io.c @@ -180,7 +180,9 @@ static void iomap_dio_bio_end_io(struct bio *bio) /* * Flagged with IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP, we can complete it inline */ - if (dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP) { + if ((dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_INLINE_COMP) && + !(dio->size && (dio->flags & IOMAP_DIO_WRITE) && + file_inode(iocb->ki_filp)->i_mapping->nrpages)) { iomap_dio_complete_work(&dio->aio.work); goto release_bio; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] clk: sunxi-ng: h6: Reparent CPUX during PLL CPUX rate change
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 0b82eb134d2942ecc669e2ab2be3f0a58d79428a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TOGH CVE: CVE-2023-52882 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7e91ed763dc07437777bd012af7a2bd4493731ff ] While PLL CPUX clock rate change when CPU is running from it works in vast majority of cases, now and then it causes instability. This leads to system crashes and other undefined behaviour. After a lot of testing (30+ hours) while also doing a lot of frequency switches, we can't observe any instability issues anymore when doing reparenting to stable clock like 24 MHz oscillator. Fixes: 524353ea480b ("clk: sunxi-ng: add support for the Allwinner H6 CCU") Reported-by: Chad Wagner <wagnerch42(a)gmail.com> Link: https://forum.libreelec.tv/thread/27295-orange-pi-3-lts-freezes/ Tested-by: Chad Wagner <wagnerch42(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens(a)csie.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231013181712.2128037-1-jernej.skrabec@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c index 42568c616181..892df807275c 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c +++ b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c @@ -1181,11 +1181,18 @@ static const u32 usb2_clk_regs[] = { SUN50I_H6_USB3_CLK_REG, }; +static struct ccu_mux_nb sun50i_h6_cpu_nb = { + .common = &cpux_clk.common, + .cm = &cpux_clk.mux, + .delay_us = 1, + .bypass_index = 0, /* index of 24 MHz oscillator */ +}; + static int sun50i_h6_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { void __iomem *reg; + int i, ret; u32 val; - int i; reg = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); if (IS_ERR(reg)) @@ -1252,7 +1259,15 @@ static int sun50i_h6_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) val |= BIT(24); writel(val, reg + SUN50I_H6_HDMI_CEC_CLK_REG); - return devm_sunxi_ccu_probe(&pdev->dev, reg, &sun50i_h6_ccu_desc); + ret = devm_sunxi_ccu_probe(&pdev->dev, reg, &sun50i_h6_ccu_desc); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Reparent CPU during PLL CPUX rate changes */ + ccu_mux_notifier_register(pll_cpux_clk.common.hw.clk, + &sun50i_h6_cpu_nb); + + return 0; } static const struct of_device_id sun50i_h6_ccu_ids[] = { -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] firewire: ohci: mask bus reset interrupts between ISR and bottom half
by Ze Zuo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Adam Goldman <adamg(a)pobox.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit fa273f312334246c909475c5868e6daab889cc8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UOCQ CVE: CVE-2024-36950 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 752e3c53de0fa3b7d817a83050b6699b8e9c6ec9 ] In the FireWire OHCI interrupt handler, if a bus reset interrupt has occurred, mask bus reset interrupts until bus_reset_work has serviced and cleared the interrupt. Normally, we always leave bus reset interrupts masked. We infer the bus reset from the self-ID interrupt that happens shortly thereafter. A scenario where we unmask bus reset interrupts was introduced in 2008 in a007bb857e0b26f5d8b73c2ff90782d9c0972620: If OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS (8) is set in the debug parameter bitmask, we will unmask bus reset interrupts so we can log them. irq_handler logs the bus reset interrupt. However, we can't clear the bus reset event flag in irq_handler, because we won't service the event until later. irq_handler exits with the event flag still set. If the corresponding interrupt is still unmasked, the first bus reset will usually freeze the system due to irq_handler being called again each time it exits. This freeze can be reproduced by loading firewire_ohci with "modprobe firewire_ohci debug=-1" (to enable all debugging output). Apparently there are also some cases where bus_reset_work will get called soon enough to clear the event, and operation will continue normally. This freeze was first reported a few months after a007bb85 was committed, but until now it was never fixed. The debug level could safely be set to -1 through sysfs after the module was loaded, but this would be ineffectual in logging bus reset interrupts since they were only unmasked during initialization. irq_handler will now leave the event flag set but mask bus reset interrupts, so irq_handler won't be called again and there will be no freeze. If OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS is enabled, bus_reset_work will unmask the interrupt after servicing the event, so future interrupts will be caught as desired. As a side effect to this change, OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS can now be enabled through sysfs in addition to during initial module loading. However, when enabled through sysfs, logging of bus reset interrupts will be effective only starting with the second bus reset, after bus_reset_work has executed. Signed-off-by: Adam Goldman <adamg(a)pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi(a)sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firewire/ohci.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c index 45d19cc0aeac..9b2471d12783 100644 --- a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c +++ b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c @@ -2049,6 +2049,8 @@ static void bus_reset_work(struct work_struct *work) ohci->generation = generation; reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntEventClear, OHCI1394_busReset); + if (param_debug & OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS) + reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntMaskSet, OHCI1394_busReset); if (ohci->quirks & QUIRK_RESET_PACKET) ohci->request_generation = generation; @@ -2115,12 +2117,14 @@ static irqreturn_t irq_handler(int irq, void *data) return IRQ_NONE; /* - * busReset and postedWriteErr must not be cleared yet + * busReset and postedWriteErr events must not be cleared yet * (OHCI 1.1 clauses 7.2.3.2 and 13.2.8.1) */ reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntEventClear, event & ~(OHCI1394_busReset | OHCI1394_postedWriteErr)); log_irqs(ohci, event); + if (event & OHCI1394_busReset) + reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntMaskClear, OHCI1394_busReset); if (event & OHCI1394_selfIDComplete) queue_work(selfid_workqueue, &ohci->bus_reset_work); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] clk: sunxi-ng: h6: Reparent CPUX during PLL CPUX rate change
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit bfc78b4628497eb6df09a6b5bba9dd31616ee175 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TOGH CVE: CVE-2023-52882 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7e91ed763dc07437777bd012af7a2bd4493731ff ] While PLL CPUX clock rate change when CPU is running from it works in vast majority of cases, now and then it causes instability. This leads to system crashes and other undefined behaviour. After a lot of testing (30+ hours) while also doing a lot of frequency switches, we can't observe any instability issues anymore when doing reparenting to stable clock like 24 MHz oscillator. Fixes: 524353ea480b ("clk: sunxi-ng: add support for the Allwinner H6 CCU") Reported-by: Chad Wagner <wagnerch42(a)gmail.com> Link: https://forum.libreelec.tv/thread/27295-orange-pi-3-lts-freezes/ Tested-by: Chad Wagner <wagnerch42(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens(a)csie.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231013181712.2128037-1-jernej.skrabec@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c index bff446b78290..2d4fc55718eb 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c +++ b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c @@ -1181,12 +1181,19 @@ static const u32 usb2_clk_regs[] = { SUN50I_H6_USB3_CLK_REG, }; +static struct ccu_mux_nb sun50i_h6_cpu_nb = { + .common = &cpux_clk.common, + .cm = &cpux_clk.mux, + .delay_us = 1, + .bypass_index = 0, /* index of 24 MHz oscillator */ +}; + static int sun50i_h6_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct resource *res; void __iomem *reg; + int i, ret; u32 val; - int i; res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); reg = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res); @@ -1240,7 +1247,15 @@ static int sun50i_h6_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) val |= BIT(24); writel(val, reg + SUN50I_H6_HDMI_CEC_CLK_REG); - return sunxi_ccu_probe(pdev->dev.of_node, reg, &sun50i_h6_ccu_desc); + ret = sunxi_ccu_probe(pdev->dev.of_node, reg, &sun50i_h6_ccu_desc); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Reparent CPU during PLL CPUX rate changes */ + ccu_mux_notifier_register(pll_cpux_clk.common.hw.clk, + &sun50i_h6_cpu_nb); + + return 0; } static const struct of_device_id sun50i_h6_ccu_ids[] = { -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] clk: sunxi-ng: h6: Reparent CPUX during PLL CPUX rate change
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit bfc78b4628497eb6df09a6b5bba9dd31616ee175 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TOGH CVE: CVE-2023-52882 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 7e91ed763dc07437777bd012af7a2bd4493731ff ] While PLL CPUX clock rate change when CPU is running from it works in vast majority of cases, now and then it causes instability. This leads to system crashes and other undefined behaviour. After a lot of testing (30+ hours) while also doing a lot of frequency switches, we can't observe any instability issues anymore when doing reparenting to stable clock like 24 MHz oscillator. Fixes: 524353ea480b ("clk: sunxi-ng: add support for the Allwinner H6 CCU") Reported-by: Chad Wagner <wagnerch42(a)gmail.com> Link: https://forum.libreelec.tv/thread/27295-orange-pi-3-lts-freezes/ Tested-by: Chad Wagner <wagnerch42(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Chen-Yu Tsai <wens(a)csie.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231013181712.2128037-1-jernej.skrabec@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jernej Skrabec <jernej.skrabec(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c index bff446b78290..2d4fc55718eb 100644 --- a/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c +++ b/drivers/clk/sunxi-ng/ccu-sun50i-h6.c @@ -1181,12 +1181,19 @@ static const u32 usb2_clk_regs[] = { SUN50I_H6_USB3_CLK_REG, }; +static struct ccu_mux_nb sun50i_h6_cpu_nb = { + .common = &cpux_clk.common, + .cm = &cpux_clk.mux, + .delay_us = 1, + .bypass_index = 0, /* index of 24 MHz oscillator */ +}; + static int sun50i_h6_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { struct resource *res; void __iomem *reg; + int i, ret; u32 val; - int i; res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); reg = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, res); @@ -1240,7 +1247,15 @@ static int sun50i_h6_ccu_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) val |= BIT(24); writel(val, reg + SUN50I_H6_HDMI_CEC_CLK_REG); - return sunxi_ccu_probe(pdev->dev.of_node, reg, &sun50i_h6_ccu_desc); + ret = sunxi_ccu_probe(pdev->dev.of_node, reg, &sun50i_h6_ccu_desc); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Reparent CPU during PLL CPUX rate changes */ + ccu_mux_notifier_register(pll_cpux_clk.common.hw.clk, + &sun50i_h6_cpu_nb); + + return 0; } static const struct of_device_id sun50i_h6_ccu_ids[] = { -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] firewire: ohci: mask bus reset interrupts between ISR and bottom half
by Ze Zuo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Adam Goldman <adamg(a)pobox.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit fa273f312334246c909475c5868e6daab889cc8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UOCQ CVE: CVE-2024-36950 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 752e3c53de0fa3b7d817a83050b6699b8e9c6ec9 ] In the FireWire OHCI interrupt handler, if a bus reset interrupt has occurred, mask bus reset interrupts until bus_reset_work has serviced and cleared the interrupt. Normally, we always leave bus reset interrupts masked. We infer the bus reset from the self-ID interrupt that happens shortly thereafter. A scenario where we unmask bus reset interrupts was introduced in 2008 in a007bb857e0b26f5d8b73c2ff90782d9c0972620: If OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS (8) is set in the debug parameter bitmask, we will unmask bus reset interrupts so we can log them. irq_handler logs the bus reset interrupt. However, we can't clear the bus reset event flag in irq_handler, because we won't service the event until later. irq_handler exits with the event flag still set. If the corresponding interrupt is still unmasked, the first bus reset will usually freeze the system due to irq_handler being called again each time it exits. This freeze can be reproduced by loading firewire_ohci with "modprobe firewire_ohci debug=-1" (to enable all debugging output). Apparently there are also some cases where bus_reset_work will get called soon enough to clear the event, and operation will continue normally. This freeze was first reported a few months after a007bb85 was committed, but until now it was never fixed. The debug level could safely be set to -1 through sysfs after the module was loaded, but this would be ineffectual in logging bus reset interrupts since they were only unmasked during initialization. irq_handler will now leave the event flag set but mask bus reset interrupts, so irq_handler won't be called again and there will be no freeze. If OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS is enabled, bus_reset_work will unmask the interrupt after servicing the event, so future interrupts will be caught as desired. As a side effect to this change, OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS can now be enabled through sysfs in addition to during initial module loading. However, when enabled through sysfs, logging of bus reset interrupts will be effective only starting with the second bus reset, after bus_reset_work has executed. Signed-off-by: Adam Goldman <adamg(a)pobox.com> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi(a)sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firewire/ohci.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c index 45c048751f3b..11f53e5a4060 100644 --- a/drivers/firewire/ohci.c +++ b/drivers/firewire/ohci.c @@ -2018,6 +2018,8 @@ static void bus_reset_work(struct work_struct *work) ohci->generation = generation; reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntEventClear, OHCI1394_busReset); + if (param_debug & OHCI_PARAM_DEBUG_BUSRESETS) + reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntMaskSet, OHCI1394_busReset); if (ohci->quirks & QUIRK_RESET_PACKET) ohci->request_generation = generation; @@ -2084,12 +2086,14 @@ static irqreturn_t irq_handler(int irq, void *data) return IRQ_NONE; /* - * busReset and postedWriteErr must not be cleared yet + * busReset and postedWriteErr events must not be cleared yet * (OHCI 1.1 clauses 7.2.3.2 and 13.2.8.1) */ reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntEventClear, event & ~(OHCI1394_busReset | OHCI1394_postedWriteErr)); log_irqs(ohci, event); + if (event & OHCI1394_busReset) + reg_write(ohci, OHCI1394_IntMaskClear, OHCI1394_busReset); if (event & OHCI1394_selfIDComplete) queue_work(selfid_workqueue, &ohci->bus_reset_work); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix xfs fsmap errors.
by Zizhi Wo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix FS_IOC_GETFSMAP ioctl error in xfs. Darrick J. Wong (2): xfs: fix interval filtering in multi-step fsmap queries xfs: fix an agbno overflow in __xfs_getfsmap_datadev fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] wifi: nl80211: don't free NULL coalescing rule
by Zhang Zekun 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc6 commit 801ea33ae82d6a9d954074fbcf8ea9d18f1543a7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U96L CVE: CVE-2024-36941 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------- If the parsing fails, we can dereference a NULL pointer here. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: be29b99a9b51 ("cfg80211/nl80211: Add packet coalesce support") Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit(a)intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240418105220.b328f80406e7.Id75d961050deb05b3e4e354e024… Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Zekun <zhangzekun11(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/nl80211.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c index de9580f13914..5acb25f6d5a8 100644 --- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c +++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c @@ -11475,6 +11475,8 @@ static int nl80211_set_coalesce(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) error: for (i = 0; i < new_coalesce.n_rules; i++) { tmp_rule = &new_coalesce.rules[i]; + if (!tmp_rule) + continue; for (j = 0; j < tmp_rule->n_patterns; j++) kfree(tmp_rule->patterns[j].mask); kfree(tmp_rule->patterns); -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/5] Fix CVE-2023-52732
by Zizhi Wo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Fix CVE-2023-52732. Jeff Layton (4): ceph: drop private list from remove_session_caps_cb ceph: fix auth cap handling logic in remove_session_caps_cb ceph: refactor remove_session_caps_cb ceph: shut down access to inode when async create fails Xiubo Li (1): ceph: blocklist the kclient when receiving corrupted snap trace fs/ceph/addr.c | 30 ++++++-- fs/ceph/caps.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/export.c | 12 ++- fs/ceph/file.c | 13 +++- fs/ceph/inode.c | 33 +++++++- fs/ceph/locks.c | 7 ++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 144 ++++++++--------------------------- fs/ceph/snap.c | 36 ++++++++- fs/ceph/super.h | 12 +++ include/linux/ceph/libceph.h | 1 + 10 files changed, 296 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 6

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fs/9p: translate O_TRUNC into OTRUNC
by Ye Bin 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Joakim Sindholt <opensource(a)zhasha.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit dbf68fd7e392541d65a200906026f3a3353f84fe category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UNVB CVE: CVE-2024-36964 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 87de39e70503e04ddb58965520b15eb9efa7eef3 ] This one hits both 9P2000 and .u as it appears v9fs has never translated the O_TRUNC flag. Signed-off-by: Joakim Sindholt <opensource(a)zhasha.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> --- fs/9p/vfs_inode.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c index ea695c4a7a3f..0e44c6765b51 100644 --- a/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c +++ b/fs/9p/vfs_inode.c @@ -178,6 +178,9 @@ int v9fs_uflags2omode(int uflags, int extended) break; } + if (uflags & O_TRUNC) + ret |= P9_OTRUNC; + if (extended) { if (uflags & O_EXCL) ret |= P9_OEXCL; -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] ext4: avoid deadlock in fs reclaim with page writeback
by Baokun Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit 00d873c17e29cc32d90ca852b82685f1673acaa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9SYGK CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ext4 has a filesystem wide lock protecting ext4_writepages() calls to avoid races with switching of journalled data flag or inode format. This lock can however cause a deadlock like: CPU0 CPU1 ext4_writepages() percpu_down_read(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); ext4_change_inode_journal_flag() percpu_down_write(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); - blocks, all readers block from now on ext4_do_writepages() ext4_init_io_end() kmem_cache_zalloc(io_end_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) fs_reclaim frees dentry... dentry_unlink_inode() iput() - last ref => iput_final() - inode dirty => write_inode_now()... ext4_writepages() tries to acquire sbi->s_writepages_rwsem and blocks forever Make sure we cannot recurse into filesystem reclaim from writeback code to avoid the deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+6898da502aef574c5f8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000004c66b405fa108e27@google.com Fixes: c8585c6fcaf2 ("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230504124723.20205-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/ext4.h fs/ext4/super.c fs/ext4/inode.c fs/ext4/migrate.c [Because we have merged in 41d10c74ff04 ("ext4: fix race between writepages and remount") and we don't have ext4_do_writepages() yet and i_mmap_sem hasn't switched to invalidate_lock yet.] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- V1->V2: Correct fs/ext4/migrate.c fs/ext4/ext4.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- fs/ext4/migrate.c | 11 ++++++----- fs/ext4/super.c | 11 ++++++----- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 6df919b154b4..1794f5ce1b46 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/compat.h> #endif @@ -1571,6 +1572,30 @@ static inline struct ext4_inode_info *EXT4_I(struct inode *inode) return container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode); } +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_read(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_read(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_write(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_write(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) { return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO || diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 35033bb43149..7110fda36c14 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -2744,13 +2744,14 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct blk_plug plug; bool give_up_on_write = false; unsigned long retry_warn_ddl = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #define RETRY_WARN_TIMEOUT (30 * HZ) if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); /* @@ -2981,7 +2982,7 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, out_writepages: trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -2992,17 +2993,18 @@ static int ext4_dax_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, long nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(mapping->host->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); ret = dax_writeback_mapping_range(mapping, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, wbc); trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -6245,7 +6247,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) journal_t *journal; handle_t *handle; int err; - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; /* * We have to be very careful here: changing a data block's @@ -6285,7 +6287,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) } } - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal); /* @@ -6302,7 +6304,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal); if (err < 0) { jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode); return err; } @@ -6311,7 +6313,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) ext4_set_aops(inode); jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); if (val) up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem); diff --git a/fs/ext4/migrate.c b/fs/ext4/migrate.c index ed9e7816efbb..443a09087dac 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/migrate.c +++ b/fs/ext4/migrate.c @@ -407,7 +407,6 @@ static int free_ext_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) { - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); handle_t *handle; int retval = 0, i; __le32 *i_data; @@ -417,6 +416,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unsigned long max_entries; __u32 goal, tmp_csum_seed; uid_t owner[2]; + int alloc_ctx; /* * If the filesystem does not support extents, or the inode @@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) */ return retval; - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); /* * Worst case we can touch the allocation bitmaps and a block @@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unlock_new_inode(tmp_inode); iput(tmp_inode); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return retval; } @@ -603,6 +603,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_fsblk_t blk; handle_t *handle; int ret; + int alloc_ctx; if (!ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb) || (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) @@ -619,7 +620,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) ext4_alloc_da_blocks(inode); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MIGRATE, 1); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { @@ -661,6 +662,6 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_journal_stop(handle); up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 1cfec3ac7c9e..8761fe5037a6 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5559,6 +5559,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) ext4_group_t g; unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO; int err = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA int i, j; char *to_free[EXT4_MAXQUOTAS]; @@ -5611,13 +5612,13 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) * s_writepages_rwsem to avoid race between writepages ops and * remount. */ - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); if (!parse_options(data, sb, NULL, &journal_ioprio, 1)) { err = -EINVAL; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); goto restore_opts; } - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if ((old_opts.s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) ^ test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) { @@ -5850,7 +5851,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) sb_any_quota_suspended(sb)) dquot_resume(sb, -1); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); sb->s_flags = old_sb_flags; sbi->s_mount_opt = old_opts.s_mount_opt; sbi->s_mount_opt2 = old_opts.s_mount_opt2; @@ -5859,7 +5860,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) sbi->s_commit_interval = old_opts.s_commit_interval; sbi->s_min_batch_time = old_opts.s_min_batch_time; sbi->s_max_batch_time = old_opts.s_max_batch_time; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if (!test_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY) && sbi->system_blks) ext4_release_system_zone(sb); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: lpfc: Release hbalock before calling lpfc_worker_wake_up()
by Ye Bin 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit e8bf2c05e8ad68e90f9d5889a9e4ef3f6fe00683 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U211 CVE: CVE-2024-36924 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ded20192dff31c91cef2a04f7e20e60e9bb887d3 ] lpfc_worker_wake_up() calls the lpfc_work_done() routine, which takes the hbalock. Thus, lpfc_worker_wake_up() should not be called while holding the hbalock to avoid potential deadlock. Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305200503.57317-7-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c | 5 ++--- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c | 14 +++++++------- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c index 18b8325fd419..44d3ada9fbbc 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_els.c @@ -4432,23 +4432,23 @@ lpfc_els_retry_delay(struct timer_list *t) unsigned long flags; struct lpfc_work_evt *evtp = &ndlp->els_retry_evt; + /* Hold a node reference for outstanding queued work */ + if (!lpfc_nlp_get(ndlp)) + return; + spin_lock_irqsave(&phba->hbalock, flags); if (!list_empty(&evtp->evt_listp)) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, flags); + lpfc_nlp_put(ndlp); return; } - /* We need to hold the node by incrementing the reference - * count until the queued work is done - */ - evtp->evt_arg1 = lpfc_nlp_get(ndlp); - if (evtp->evt_arg1) { - evtp->evt = LPFC_EVT_ELS_RETRY; - list_add_tail(&evtp->evt_listp, &phba->work_list); - lpfc_worker_wake_up(phba); - } + evtp->evt_arg1 = ndlp; + evtp->evt = LPFC_EVT_ELS_RETRY; + list_add_tail(&evtp->evt_listp, &phba->work_list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, flags); - return; + + lpfc_worker_wake_up(phba); } /** diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c index 5154eeaee0ec..93703ab6ce03 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_hbadisc.c @@ -257,7 +257,9 @@ lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_callbk(struct fc_rport *rport) if (evtp->evt_arg1) { evtp->evt = LPFC_EVT_DEV_LOSS; list_add_tail(&evtp->evt_listp, &phba->work_list); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); lpfc_worker_wake_up(phba); + return; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); } else { @@ -275,10 +277,7 @@ lpfc_dev_loss_tmo_callbk(struct fc_rport *rport) lpfc_disc_state_machine(vport, ndlp, NULL, NLP_EVT_DEVICE_RM); } - } - - return; } /** diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c index 4dfadf254a72..9dab33686a93 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_sli.c @@ -1217,9 +1217,9 @@ lpfc_set_rrq_active(struct lpfc_hba *phba, struct lpfc_nodelist *ndlp, empty = list_empty(&phba->active_rrq_list); list_add_tail(&rrq->list, &phba->active_rrq_list); phba->hba_flag |= HBA_RRQ_ACTIVE; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); if (empty) lpfc_worker_wake_up(phba); - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); return 0; out: spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); @@ -11369,18 +11369,18 @@ lpfc_sli_post_recovery_event(struct lpfc_hba *phba, unsigned long iflags; struct lpfc_work_evt *evtp = &ndlp->recovery_evt; + /* Hold a node reference for outstanding queued work */ + if (!lpfc_nlp_get(ndlp)) + return; + spin_lock_irqsave(&phba->hbalock, iflags); if (!list_empty(&evtp->evt_listp)) { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); + lpfc_nlp_put(ndlp); return; } - /* Incrementing the reference count until the queued work is done. */ - evtp->evt_arg1 = lpfc_nlp_get(ndlp); - if (!evtp->evt_arg1) { - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); - return; - } + evtp->evt_arg1 = ndlp; evtp->evt = LPFC_EVT_RECOVER_PORT; list_add_tail(&evtp->evt_listp, &phba->work_list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&phba->hbalock, iflags); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: avoid deadlock in fs reclaim with page writeback
by Baokun Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit 00d873c17e29cc32d90ca852b82685f1673acaa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9SYGK CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ext4 has a filesystem wide lock protecting ext4_writepages() calls to avoid races with switching of journalled data flag or inode format. This lock can however cause a deadlock like: CPU0 CPU1 ext4_writepages() percpu_down_read(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); ext4_change_inode_journal_flag() percpu_down_write(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); - blocks, all readers block from now on ext4_do_writepages() ext4_init_io_end() kmem_cache_zalloc(io_end_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) fs_reclaim frees dentry... dentry_unlink_inode() iput() - last ref => iput_final() - inode dirty => write_inode_now()... ext4_writepages() tries to acquire sbi->s_writepages_rwsem and blocks forever Make sure we cannot recurse into filesystem reclaim from writeback code to avoid the deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+6898da502aef574c5f8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000004c66b405fa108e27@google.com Fixes: c8585c6fcaf2 ("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230504124723.20205-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/ext4.h fs/ext4/super.c fs/ext4/inode.c fs/ext4/migrate.c [Because we have merged in 41d10c74ff04 ("ext4: fix race between writepages and remount") and we don't have ext4_do_writepages() yet and i_mmap_sem hasn't switched to invalidate_lock yet.] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- fs/ext4/super.c | 11 ++++++----- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 6df919b154b4..1794f5ce1b46 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/falloc.h> #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/compat.h> #endif @@ -1571,6 +1572,30 @@ static inline struct ext4_inode_info *EXT4_I(struct inode *inode) return container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode); } +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_read(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_read(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_write(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_write(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) { return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO || diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 35033bb43149..7110fda36c14 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -2744,13 +2744,14 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct blk_plug plug; bool give_up_on_write = false; unsigned long retry_warn_ddl = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #define RETRY_WARN_TIMEOUT (30 * HZ) if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); /* @@ -2981,7 +2982,7 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, out_writepages: trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -2992,17 +2993,18 @@ static int ext4_dax_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, long nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(mapping->host->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); ret = dax_writeback_mapping_range(mapping, inode->i_sb->s_bdev, wbc); trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -6245,7 +6247,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) journal_t *journal; handle_t *handle; int err; - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; /* * We have to be very careful here: changing a data block's @@ -6285,7 +6287,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) } } - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal); /* @@ -6302,7 +6304,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal); if (err < 0) { jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); ext4_inode_resume_unlocked_dio(inode); return err; } @@ -6311,7 +6313,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) ext4_set_aops(inode); jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); if (val) up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem); diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 1cfec3ac7c9e..8761fe5037a6 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5559,6 +5559,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) ext4_group_t g; unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO; int err = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA int i, j; char *to_free[EXT4_MAXQUOTAS]; @@ -5611,13 +5612,13 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) * s_writepages_rwsem to avoid race between writepages ops and * remount. */ - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); if (!parse_options(data, sb, NULL, &journal_ioprio, 1)) { err = -EINVAL; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); goto restore_opts; } - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if ((old_opts.s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) ^ test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) { @@ -5850,7 +5851,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) sb_any_quota_suspended(sb)) dquot_resume(sb, -1); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); sb->s_flags = old_sb_flags; sbi->s_mount_opt = old_opts.s_mount_opt; sbi->s_mount_opt2 = old_opts.s_mount_opt2; @@ -5859,7 +5860,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) sbi->s_commit_interval = old_opts.s_commit_interval; sbi->s_min_batch_time = old_opts.s_min_batch_time; sbi->s_max_batch_time = old_opts.s_max_batch_time; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if (!test_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY) && sbi->system_blks) ext4_release_system_zone(sb); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] kabi: reserve kabi for struct device
by Peng Zhang 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: cleanup bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8OWRC -------------------------------- Just testing if the kabi check is working. Please ignore this patch. Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/device.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h index 17427fc8e035..0128883e652d 100644 --- a/include/linux/device.h +++ b/include/linux/device.h @@ -814,6 +814,7 @@ struct device { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) + KABI_RESERVE(9) }; /** -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH] kabi: reserve kabi for struct device
by Peng Zhang 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: cleanup bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I8OWRC -------------------------------- Just testing if the kabi check is working. Please ignore this patch. Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/device.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h index 17427fc8e035..0128883e652d 100644 --- a/include/linux/device.h +++ b/include/linux/device.h @@ -814,6 +814,7 @@ struct device { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) + KABI_RESERVE(9) }; /** -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ext4: avoid deadlock in fs reclaim with page writeback
by Baokun Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit 00d873c17e29cc32d90ca852b82685f1673acaa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9SYGK Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ext4 has a filesystem wide lock protecting ext4_writepages() calls to avoid races with switching of journalled data flag or inode format. This lock can however cause a deadlock like: CPU0 CPU1 ext4_writepages() percpu_down_read(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); ext4_change_inode_journal_flag() percpu_down_write(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); - blocks, all readers block from now on ext4_do_writepages() ext4_init_io_end() kmem_cache_zalloc(io_end_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) fs_reclaim frees dentry... dentry_unlink_inode() iput() - last ref => iput_final() - inode dirty => write_inode_now()... ext4_writepages() tries to acquire sbi->s_writepages_rwsem and blocks forever Make sure we cannot recurse into filesystem reclaim from writeback code to avoid the deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+6898da502aef574c5f8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000004c66b405fa108e27@google.com Fixes: c8585c6fcaf2 ("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230504124723.20205-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/ext4.h fs/ext4/super.c fs/ext4/inode.c [Because we have merged in 583b2fb551d0 ("ext4: fix race between writepages and remount") and we don't have ext4_do_writepages() yet and i_mmap_sem hasn't switched to invalidate_lock yet.] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- fs/ext4/migrate.c | 11 ++++++----- fs/ext4/super.c | 11 ++++++----- 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index 5d5ae6f44510..3cf1fe773f4f 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <linux/falloc.h> #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h> #include <linux/fiemap.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/compat.h> #endif @@ -1689,6 +1690,30 @@ static inline struct ext4_inode_info *EXT4_I(struct inode *inode) return container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode); } +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_read(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_read(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_write(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_write(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) { return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO || diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index f26d9b88d48d..9c438215cf56 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -2705,13 +2705,14 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct blk_plug plug; bool give_up_on_write = false; unsigned long retry_warn_ddl = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #define RETRY_WARN_TIMEOUT (30 * HZ) if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); /* @@ -2932,7 +2933,7 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, out_writepages: trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -2943,17 +2944,18 @@ static int ext4_dax_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, long nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(mapping->host->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); ret = dax_writeback_mapping_range(mapping, sbi->s_daxdev, wbc); trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -6065,7 +6067,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) journal_t *journal; handle_t *handle; int err; - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; /* * We have to be very careful here: changing a data block's @@ -6103,7 +6105,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) } } - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal); /* @@ -6120,7 +6122,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal); if (err < 0) { jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return err; } ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA); @@ -6128,7 +6130,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) ext4_set_aops(inode); jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); if (val) up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem); diff --git a/fs/ext4/migrate.c b/fs/ext4/migrate.c index 04320715d61f..274f7ab37fff 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/migrate.c +++ b/fs/ext4/migrate.c @@ -409,7 +409,6 @@ static int free_ext_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) { - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); handle_t *handle; int retval = 0, i; __le32 *i_data; @@ -419,6 +418,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unsigned long max_entries; __u32 goal, tmp_csum_seed; uid_t owner[2]; + int alloc_ctx; /* * If the filesystem does not support extents, or the inode @@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) */ return retval; - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); /* * Worst case we can touch the allocation bitmaps and a block @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unlock_new_inode(tmp_inode); iput(tmp_inode); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return retval; } @@ -605,6 +605,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_fsblk_t blk; handle_t *handle; int ret, ret2 = 0; + int alloc_ctx; if (!ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb) || (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) @@ -621,7 +622,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) ext4_alloc_da_blocks(inode); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MIGRATE, 1); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { @@ -665,6 +666,6 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_journal_stop(handle); up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index ac032f517a60..2bdb16df5c23 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5939,6 +5939,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) ext4_group_t g; unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO; int err = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA int i, j; char *to_free[EXT4_MAXQUOTAS]; @@ -5991,13 +5992,13 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) * here s_writepages_rwsem to avoid race between writepages ops and * remount. */ - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); if (!parse_options(data, sb, NULL, &journal_ioprio, 1)) { err = -EINVAL; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); goto restore_opts; } - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if ((old_opts.s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) ^ test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) { @@ -6215,7 +6216,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) return 0; restore_opts: - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); sb->s_flags = old_sb_flags; sbi->s_mount_opt = old_opts.s_mount_opt; sbi->s_mount_opt2 = old_opts.s_mount_opt2; @@ -6224,7 +6225,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) sbi->s_commit_interval = old_opts.s_commit_interval; sbi->s_min_batch_time = old_opts.s_min_batch_time; sbi->s_max_batch_time = old_opts.s_max_batch_time; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if (!test_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY) && sbi->s_system_blks) ext4_release_system_zone(sb); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: avoid deadlock in fs reclaim with page writeback
by Baokun Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit 00d873c17e29cc32d90ca852b82685f1673acaa5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9SYGK Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Ext4 has a filesystem wide lock protecting ext4_writepages() calls to avoid races with switching of journalled data flag or inode format. This lock can however cause a deadlock like: CPU0 CPU1 ext4_writepages() percpu_down_read(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); ext4_change_inode_journal_flag() percpu_down_write(sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); - blocks, all readers block from now on ext4_do_writepages() ext4_init_io_end() kmem_cache_zalloc(io_end_cachep, GFP_KERNEL) fs_reclaim frees dentry... dentry_unlink_inode() iput() - last ref => iput_final() - inode dirty => write_inode_now()... ext4_writepages() tries to acquire sbi->s_writepages_rwsem and blocks forever Make sure we cannot recurse into filesystem reclaim from writeback code to avoid the deadlock. Reported-by: syzbot+6898da502aef574c5f8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000004c66b405fa108e27@google.com Fixes: c8585c6fcaf2 ("ext4: fix races between changing inode journal mode and ext4_writepages") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230504124723.20205-1-jack@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Conflicts: fs/ext4/ext4.h fs/ext4/super.c fs/ext4/inode.c [Because we have merged in b66c23ec7fcf ("ext4: fix race between writepages and remount") and we don't have ext4_do_writepages() yet and i_mmap_sem hasn't switched to invalidate_lock yet.] Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/ext4.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- fs/ext4/migrate.c | 11 ++++++----- fs/ext4/super.c | 12 +++++++----- 4 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/ext4.h b/fs/ext4/ext4.h index b701f7ac7f66..a9530484147d 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h +++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include <linux/falloc.h> #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h> #include <linux/fiemap.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> #ifdef __KERNEL__ #include <linux/compat.h> #endif @@ -1701,6 +1702,30 @@ static inline struct ext4_inode_info *EXT4_I(struct inode *inode) return container_of(inode, struct ext4_inode_info, vfs_inode); } +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_read(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_read(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_read(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + +static inline int ext4_writepages_down_write(struct super_block *sb) +{ + percpu_down_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); + return memalloc_nofs_save(); +} + +static inline void ext4_writepages_up_write(struct super_block *sb, int ctx) +{ + memalloc_nofs_restore(ctx); + percpu_up_write(&EXT4_SB(sb)->s_writepages_rwsem); +} + static inline int ext4_valid_inum(struct super_block *sb, unsigned long ino) { return ino == EXT4_ROOT_INO || diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 412af3c5fde4..0f8d23aa2838 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -2709,13 +2709,14 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, struct blk_plug plug; bool give_up_on_write = false; unsigned long retry_warn_ddl = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #define RETRY_WARN_TIMEOUT (30 * HZ) if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); /* @@ -2936,7 +2937,7 @@ static int ext4_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, out_writepages: trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -2947,17 +2948,18 @@ static int ext4_dax_writepages(struct address_space *mapping, long nr_to_write = wbc->nr_to_write; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(mapping->host->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; if (unlikely(ext4_forced_shutdown(EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)))) return -EIO; - percpu_down_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_read(inode->i_sb); trace_ext4_writepages(inode, wbc); ret = dax_writeback_mapping_range(mapping, sbi->s_daxdev, wbc); trace_ext4_writepages_result(inode, wbc, ret, nr_to_write - wbc->nr_to_write); - percpu_up_read(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_read(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } @@ -6107,7 +6109,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) journal_t *journal; handle_t *handle; int err; - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); + int alloc_ctx; /* * We have to be very careful here: changing a data block's @@ -6145,7 +6147,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) } } - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); jbd2_journal_lock_updates(journal); /* @@ -6162,7 +6164,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) err = jbd2_journal_flush(journal); if (err < 0) { jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return err; } ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_JOURNAL_DATA); @@ -6170,7 +6172,7 @@ int ext4_change_inode_journal_flag(struct inode *inode, int val) ext4_set_aops(inode); jbd2_journal_unlock_updates(journal); - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); if (val) up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_mmap_sem); diff --git a/fs/ext4/migrate.c b/fs/ext4/migrate.c index b0ea646454ac..50e449ec62bf 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/migrate.c +++ b/fs/ext4/migrate.c @@ -409,7 +409,6 @@ static int free_ext_block(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode) int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) { - struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb); handle_t *handle; int retval = 0, i; __le32 *i_data; @@ -419,6 +418,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unsigned long max_entries; __u32 goal, tmp_csum_seed; uid_t owner[2]; + int alloc_ctx; /* * If the filesystem does not support extents, or the inode @@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) */ return retval; - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); /* * Worst case we can touch the allocation bitmaps and a block @@ -587,7 +587,7 @@ int ext4_ext_migrate(struct inode *inode) unlock_new_inode(tmp_inode); iput(tmp_inode); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return retval; } @@ -606,6 +606,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_fsblk_t blk; handle_t *handle; int ret, ret2 = 0; + int alloc_ctx; if (!ext4_has_feature_extents(inode->i_sb) || (!ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) @@ -622,7 +623,7 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) if (test_opt(inode->i_sb, DELALLOC)) ext4_alloc_da_blocks(inode); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(inode->i_sb); handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, EXT4_HT_MIGRATE, 1); if (IS_ERR(handle)) { @@ -666,6 +667,6 @@ int ext4_ind_migrate(struct inode *inode) ext4_journal_stop(handle); up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem); out_unlock: - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(inode->i_sb, alloc_ctx); return ret; } diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 90f886184fc6..bfa592bfd298 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -5961,6 +5961,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) ext4_group_t g; unsigned int journal_ioprio = DEFAULT_JOURNAL_IOPRIO; int err = 0; + int alloc_ctx; #ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA int enable_quota = 0; int i, j; @@ -6014,13 +6015,13 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) * here s_writepages_rwsem to avoid race between writepages ops and * remount. */ - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); if (!parse_options(data, sb, NULL, &journal_ioprio, 1)) { err = -EINVAL; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); goto restore_opts; } - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if ((old_opts.s_mount_opt & EXT4_MOUNT_JOURNAL_CHECKSUM) ^ test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)) { @@ -6247,7 +6248,8 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) if ((sb->s_flags & SB_RDONLY) && !(old_sb_flags & SB_RDONLY) && sb_any_quota_suspended(sb)) dquot_resume(sb, -1); - percpu_down_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + + alloc_ctx = ext4_writepages_down_write(sb); sb->s_flags = old_sb_flags; sbi->s_mount_opt = old_opts.s_mount_opt; sbi->s_mount_opt2 = old_opts.s_mount_opt2; @@ -6256,7 +6258,7 @@ static int ext4_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data) sbi->s_commit_interval = old_opts.s_commit_interval; sbi->s_min_batch_time = old_opts.s_min_batch_time; sbi->s_max_batch_time = old_opts.s_max_batch_time; - percpu_up_write(&sbi->s_writepages_rwsem); + ext4_writepages_up_write(sb, alloc_ctx); if (!test_opt(sb, BLOCK_VALIDITY) && sbi->s_system_blks) ext4_release_system_zone(sb); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] phonet: fix rtm_phonet_notify() skb allocation
by Wang Wensheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9 commit d8cac8568618dcb8a51af3db1103e8d4cc4aeea7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U4L2 CVE: CVE-2024-36946 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- fill_route() stores three components in the skb: - struct rtmsg - RTA_DST (u8) - RTA_OIF (u32) Therefore, rtm_phonet_notify() should use NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtmsg)) + nla_total_size(1) + nla_total_size(4) Fixes: f062f41d0657 ("Phonet: routing table Netlink interface") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <courmisch(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502161700.1804476-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- net/phonet/pn_netlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c index 59aebe296890..dd4c7e9a634f 100644 --- a/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c +++ b/net/phonet/pn_netlink.c @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ void rtm_phonet_notify(int event, struct net_device *dev, u8 dst) struct sk_buff *skb; int err = -ENOBUFS; - skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ifaddrmsg)) + + skb = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtmsg)) + nla_total_size(1) + nla_total_size(4), GFP_KERNEL); if (skb == NULL) goto errout; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] i40e: Fix NULL pointer dereference in i40e_dbg_dump_desc
by Li Huafei 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Norbert Zulinski <norbertx.zulinski(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.85 commit e5b7fb2198abc50058f1a29c395b004f76ab1c83 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9S22G CVE: CVE-2021-47501 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 23ec111bf3549aae37140330c31a16abfc172421 upstream. When trying to dump VFs VSI RX/TX descriptors using debugfs there was a crash due to NULL pointer dereference in i40e_dbg_dump_desc. Added a check to i40e_dbg_dump_desc that checks if VSI type is correct for dumping RX/TX descriptors. Fixes: 02e9c290814c ("i40e: debugfs interface") Signed-off-by: Sylwester Dziedziuch <sylwesterx.dziedziuch(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Norbert Zulinski <norbertx.zulinski(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Palczewski <mateusz.palczewski(a)intel.com> Tested-by: Gurucharan G <gurucharanx.g(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_debugfs.c [ Conflicts caused by not merging 44ea803e2fa7 ("i40e: introduce new dump desc XDP command"). ] Signed-off-by: Li Huafei <lihuafei1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_debugfs.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_debugfs.c index 56b911a5dd8be..3e6c6585012f9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_debugfs.c @@ -506,6 +506,14 @@ static void i40e_dbg_dump_desc(int cnt, int vsi_seid, int ring_id, int desc_n, dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, "vsi %d not found\n", vsi_seid); return; } + if (vsi->type != I40E_VSI_MAIN && + vsi->type != I40E_VSI_FDIR && + vsi->type != I40E_VSI_VMDQ2) { + dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, + "vsi %d type %d descriptor rings not available\n", + vsi_seid, vsi->type); + return; + } if (ring_id >= vsi->num_queue_pairs || ring_id < 0) { dev_info(&pf->pdev->dev, "ring %d not found\n", ring_id); return; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] hugetlbfs: fix hugetlbfs_statfs() locking
by Yifan Qiao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 4b25f030ae69ba710eff587cabb4c57cb7e7a8a1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9SY02 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After commit db71ef79b59b ("hugetlb: make free_huge_page irq safe"), the subpool lock should be locked with spin_lock_irq() and all call sites was modified as such, except for the ones in hugetlbfs_statfs(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220429202207.3045-1-almasrymina@google.com Fixes: db71ef79b59b ("hugetlb: make free_huge_page irq safe") Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c index 8274f096e89f..73a008dfe322 100644 --- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c @@ -1122,12 +1122,12 @@ static int hugetlbfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) if (sbinfo->spool) { long free_pages; - spin_lock(&sbinfo->spool->lock); + spin_lock_irq(&sbinfo->spool->lock); buf->f_blocks = sbinfo->spool->max_hpages; free_pages = sbinfo->spool->max_hpages - sbinfo->spool->used_hpages; buf->f_bavail = buf->f_bfree = free_pages; - spin_unlock(&sbinfo->spool->lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&sbinfo->spool->lock); buf->f_files = sbinfo->max_inodes; buf->f_ffree = sbinfo->free_inodes; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] hugetlbfs: fix hugetlbfs_statfs() locking
by Yifan Qiao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 4b25f030ae69ba710eff587cabb4c57cb7e7a8a1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9SY02 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- After commit db71ef79b59b ("hugetlb: make free_huge_page irq safe"), the subpool lock should be locked with spin_lock_irq() and all call sites was modified as such, except for the ones in hugetlbfs_statfs(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220429202207.3045-1-almasrymina@google.com Fixes: db71ef79b59b ("hugetlb: make free_huge_page irq safe") Signed-off-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c index 508c20ef9061..1203178914cc 100644 --- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c @@ -1133,12 +1133,12 @@ static int hugetlbfs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) if (sbinfo->spool) { long free_pages; - spin_lock(&sbinfo->spool->lock); + spin_lock_irq(&sbinfo->spool->lock); buf->f_blocks = sbinfo->spool->max_hpages; free_pages = sbinfo->spool->max_hpages - sbinfo->spool->used_hpages; buf->f_bavail = buf->f_bfree = free_pages; - spin_unlock(&sbinfo->spool->lock); + spin_unlock_irq(&sbinfo->spool->lock); buf->f_files = sbinfo->max_inodes; buf->f_ffree = sbinfo->free_inodes; } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] gpiolib: cdev: fix uninitialised kfifo
by Luo Gengkun 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Kent Gibson <warthog618(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9 commit ee0166b637a5e376118e9659e5b4148080f1d27e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U7YV CVE: CVE-2024-36898 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- If a line is requested with debounce, and that results in debouncing in software, and the line is subsequently reconfigured to enable edge detection then the allocation of the kfifo to contain edge events is overlooked. This results in events being written to and read from an uninitialised kfifo. Read events are returned to userspace. Initialise the kfifo in the case where the software debounce is already active. Fixes: 65cff7046406 ("gpiolib: cdev: support setting debounce") Signed-off-by: Kent Gibson <warthog618(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240510065342.36191-1-warthog618@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c [fix context conflict] Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c index 84125e55de10..29b671c92621 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c @@ -1121,6 +1121,8 @@ static int edge_detector_update(struct line *line, struct gpio_v2_line_config *lc, unsigned int line_idx, u64 edflags) { + u64 eflags; + int ret; u64 active_edflags = READ_ONCE(line->edflags); unsigned int debounce_period_us = gpio_v2_line_config_debounce_period(lc, line_idx); @@ -1132,6 +1134,18 @@ static int edge_detector_update(struct line *line, /* sw debounced and still will be...*/ if (debounce_period_us && READ_ONCE(line->sw_debounced)) { WRITE_ONCE(line->desc->debounce_period_us, debounce_period_us); + /* + * ensure event fifo is initialised if edge detection + * is now enabled. + */ + eflags = edflags & GPIO_V2_LINE_EDGE_FLAGS; + if (eflags && !kfifo_initialized(&line->req->events)) { + ret = kfifo_alloc(&line->req->events, + line->req->event_buffer_size, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret) + return ret; + } return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xfs: fix interval filtering in multi-step fsmap queries
by Zizhi Wo 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc1 commit 63ef7a35912dd743cabd65d5bb95891625c0dd46 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA470G Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- I noticed a bug in ranged GETFSMAP queries: EXT: DEV BLOCK-RANGE OWNER FILE-OFFSET AG AG-OFFSET TOTAL 0: 8:80 [0..7]: static fs metadata 0 (0..7) 8 <snip> 9: 8:80 [192..223]: 137 0..31 0 (192..223) 32 That's not right -- we asked what block maps block 208, and we should've received a mapping for inode 137 offset 16. Instead, we get nothing. The root cause of this problem is a mis-interaction between the fsmap code and how btree ranged queries work. xfs_btree_query_range returns any btree record that overlaps with the query interval, even if the record starts before or ends after the interval. Similarly, GETFSMAP is supposed to return a recordset containing all records that overlap the range queried. However, it's possible that the recordset is larger than the buffer that the caller provided to convey mappings to userspace. In /that/ case, userspace is supposed to copy the last record returned to fmh_keys[0] and call GETFSMAP again. In this case, we do not want to return mappings that we have already supplied to the caller. The call to xfs_btree_query_range is the same, but now we ignore any records that start before fmh_keys[0]. Unfortunately, we didn't implement the filtering predicate correctly. The predicate should only be called when we're calling back for more records. Accomplish this by setting info->low.rm_blockcount to a nonzero value and ensuring that it is cleared as necessary. As a result, we no longer want to adjust dkeys[0] in the main setup function because that's confusing. This patch doesn't touch the logdev/rtbitmap backends because they have bigger problems that will be addressed by subsequent patches. Found via xfs/556 with parent pointers enabled. Fixes: e89c041338ed ("xfs: implement the GETFSMAP ioctl") Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c [Because there are many conflicting patches that need to be adapted, the in-place context adaptation is performed directly.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c index 595450a99ae2..deaed94011ad 100644 --- a/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c +++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_fsmap.c @@ -161,7 +161,14 @@ struct xfs_getfsmap_info { u64 missing_owner; /* owner of holes */ u32 dev; /* device id */ xfs_agnumber_t agno; /* AG number, if applicable */ - struct xfs_rmap_irec low; /* low rmap key */ + /* + * Low rmap key for the query. If low.rm_blockcount is nonzero, this + * is the second (or later) call to retrieve the recordset in pieces. + * xfs_getfsmap_rec_before_start will compare all records retrieved + * by the rmapbt query to filter out any records that start before + * the last record. + */ + struct xfs_rmap_irec low; struct xfs_rmap_irec high; /* high rmap key */ bool last; /* last extent? */ }; @@ -237,6 +244,17 @@ xfs_getfsmap_format( xfs_fsmap_from_internal(rec, xfm); } +static inline bool +xfs_getfsmap_rec_before_start( + struct xfs_getfsmap_info *info, + const struct xfs_rmap_irec *rec, + xfs_daddr_t rec_daddr) +{ + if (info->low.rm_blockcount) + return xfs_rmap_compare(rec, &info->low) < 0; + return false; +} + /* * Format a reverse mapping for getfsmap, having translated rm_startblock * into the appropriate daddr units. @@ -260,7 +278,7 @@ xfs_getfsmap_helper( * Filter out records that start before our startpoint, if the * caller requested that. */ - if (xfs_rmap_compare(rec, &info->low) < 0) { + if (xfs_getfsmap_rec_before_start(info, rec, rec_daddr)) { rec_daddr += XFS_FSB_TO_BB(mp, rec->rm_blockcount); if (info->next_daddr < rec_daddr) info->next_daddr = rec_daddr; @@ -604,9 +622,27 @@ __xfs_getfsmap_datadev( error = xfs_fsmap_owner_to_rmap(&info->low, &keys[0]); if (error) return error; - info->low.rm_blockcount = 0; + info->low.rm_blockcount = XFS_BB_TO_FSBT(mp, keys[0].fmr_length); xfs_getfsmap_set_irec_flags(&info->low, &keys[0]); + /* Adjust the low key if we are continuing from where we left off. */ + if (info->low.rm_blockcount == 0) { + /* empty */ + } else if (XFS_RMAP_NON_INODE_OWNER(info->low.rm_owner) || + (info->low.rm_flags & (XFS_RMAP_ATTR_FORK | + XFS_RMAP_BMBT_BLOCK | + XFS_RMAP_UNWRITTEN))) { + info->low.rm_startblock += info->low.rm_blockcount; + info->low.rm_owner = 0; + info->low.rm_offset = 0; + + start_fsb += info->low.rm_blockcount; + if (XFS_FSB_TO_DADDR(mp, start_fsb) >= eofs) + return 0; + } else { + info->low.rm_offset += info->low.rm_blockcount; + } + info->high.rm_startblock = -1U; info->high.rm_owner = ULLONG_MAX; info->high.rm_offset = ULLONG_MAX; @@ -657,12 +693,8 @@ __xfs_getfsmap_datadev( * Set the AG low key to the start of the AG prior to * moving on to the next AG. */ - if (info->agno == start_ag) { - info->low.rm_startblock = 0; - info->low.rm_owner = 0; - info->low.rm_offset = 0; - info->low.rm_flags = 0; - } + if (info->agno == start_ag) + memset(&info->low, 0, sizeof(info->low)); } /* Report any gap at the end of the AG */ @@ -886,21 +918,17 @@ xfs_getfsmap( * blocks could be mapped to several other files/offsets. * According to rmapbt record ordering, the minimal next * possible record for the block range is the next starting - * offset in the same inode. Therefore, bump the file offset to - * continue the search appropriately. For all other low key - * mapping types (attr blocks, metadata), bump the physical - * offset as there can be no other mapping for the same physical - * block range. + * offset in the same inode. Therefore, each fsmap backend bumps + * the file offset to continue the search appropriately. For + * all other low key mapping types (attr blocks, metadata), each + * fsmap backend bumps the physical offset as there can be no + * other mapping for the same physical block range. */ dkeys[0] = head->fmh_keys[0]; if (dkeys[0].fmr_flags & (FMR_OF_SPECIAL_OWNER | FMR_OF_EXTENT_MAP)) { - dkeys[0].fmr_physical += dkeys[0].fmr_length; - dkeys[0].fmr_owner = 0; if (dkeys[0].fmr_offset) return -EINVAL; - } else - dkeys[0].fmr_offset += dkeys[0].fmr_length; - dkeys[0].fmr_length = 0; + } memset(&dkeys[1], 0xFF, sizeof(struct xfs_fsmap)); if (!xfs_getfsmap_check_keys(dkeys, &head->fmh_keys[1])) @@ -948,6 +976,7 @@ xfs_getfsmap( info.dev = handlers[i].dev; info.last = false; info.agno = NULLAGNUMBER; + info.low.rm_blockcount = 0; error = handlers[i].fn(tp, dkeys, &info); if (error) break; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] blk-iocost: do not WARN if iocg was already offlined
by Li Nan 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc5 commit 01bc4fda9ea0a6b52f12326486f07a4910666cf6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UABH CVE: CVE-2024-36908 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In iocg_pay_debt(), warn is triggered if 'active_list' is empty, which is intended to confirm iocg is active when it has debt. However, warn can be triggered during a blkcg or disk removal, if iocg_waitq_timer_fn() is run at that time: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2344971 at block/blk-iocost.c:1402 iocg_pay_debt+0x14c/0x190 Call trace: iocg_pay_debt+0x14c/0x190 iocg_kick_waitq+0x438/0x4c0 iocg_waitq_timer_fn+0xd8/0x130 __run_hrtimer+0x144/0x45c __hrtimer_run_queues+0x16c/0x244 hrtimer_interrupt+0x2cc/0x7b0 The warn in this situation is meaningless. Since this iocg is being removed, the state of the 'active_list' is irrelevant, and 'waitq_timer' is canceled after removing 'active_list' in ioc_pd_free(), which ensures iocg is freed after iocg_waitq_timer_fn() returns. Therefore, add the check if iocg was already offlined to avoid warn when removing a blkcg or disk. Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240419093257.3004211-1-linan666@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- block/blk-iocost.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-iocost.c b/block/blk-iocost.c index 6a3e8a21c0fc..3ac79f0c098f 100644 --- a/block/blk-iocost.c +++ b/block/blk-iocost.c @@ -1439,8 +1439,11 @@ static void iocg_pay_debt(struct ioc_gq *iocg, u64 abs_vpay, lockdep_assert_held(&iocg->ioc->lock); lockdep_assert_held(&iocg->waitq.lock); - /* make sure that nobody messed with @iocg */ - WARN_ON_ONCE(list_empty(&iocg->active_list)); + /* + * make sure that nobody messed with @iocg. Check iocg->pd.online + * to avoid warn when removing blkcg or disk. + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(list_empty(&iocg->active_list) && iocg->pd.online); WARN_ON_ONCE(iocg->inuse > 1); iocg->abs_vdebt -= min(abs_vpay, iocg->abs_vdebt); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] gpiolib: cdev: Fix use after free in lineinfo_changed_notify
by Wupeng Ma 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 95ca7c90eaf5ea8a8460536535101e3e81160e2a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UG5Z CVE: CVE-2024-36899 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 02f6b0e1ec7e0e7d059dddc893645816552039da ] The use-after-free issue occurs as follows: when the GPIO chip device file is being closed by invoking gpio_chrdev_release(), watched_lines is freed by bitmap_free(), but the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain failed due to waiting write rwsem. Additionally, one of the GPIO chip's lines is also in the release process and holds the notifier chain's read rwsem. Consequently, a race condition leads to the use-after-free of watched_lines. Here is the typical stack when issue happened: [free] gpio_chrdev_release() --> bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines) <-- freed --> blocking_notifier_chain_unregister() --> down_write(&nh->rwsem) <-- waiting rwsem --> __down_write_common() --> rwsem_down_write_slowpath() --> schedule_preempt_disabled() --> schedule() [use] st54spi_gpio_dev_release() --> gpio_free() --> gpiod_free() --> gpiod_free_commit() --> gpiod_line_state_notify() --> blocking_notifier_call_chain() --> down_read(&nh->rwsem); <-- held rwsem --> notifier_call_chain() --> lineinfo_changed_notify() --> test_bit(xxxx, cdev->watched_lines) <-- use after free The side effect of the use-after-free issue is that a GPIO line event is being generated for userspace where it shouldn't. However, since the chrdev is being closed, userspace won't have the chance to read that event anyway. To fix the issue, call the bitmap_free() function after the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain. Fixes: 51c1064e82e7 ("gpiolib: add new ioctl() for monitoring changes in line info") Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240505141156.2944912-1-quic_zhonhan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c [Ma Wupeng: context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c index 0f98a07efcd6..62666174a2c9 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c @@ -2328,9 +2328,9 @@ static int gpio_chrdev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct gpio_chardev_data *cdev = file->private_data; struct gpio_device *gdev = cdev->gdev; - bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&gdev->notifier, &cdev->lineinfo_changed_nb); + bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); put_device(&gdev->dev); kfree(cdev); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI
by Shengjie Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA45I1 -------------------------------- Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI: 1. Init TSI driver when config cvm_guest. 2. Modify the token structure to reduce the number of exposed variables. 3. Add a lock for obtaining the remote attestation report. Fixes: 31071f4b2a0b ("cvm_tsi: add cvm tsi interface") Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 89 ++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..252fe5352a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; + if (!is_cvm_world()) + return -EIO; + ver = tsi_get_version(); if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); @@ -56,6 +59,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +73,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +109,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + spin_lock(&lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + spin_unlock(&lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +148,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + spin_lock(&lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EFAULT; } + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; } -- 2.37.2.windows.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.26 commit a946ebee45b09294c8b0b0e77410b763c4d2817a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QG8F CVE: CVE-2024-35915 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d24b03535e5eb82e025219c2f632b485409c898f ] syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1][2]: nci_rx_work() parses and processes received packet. When the payload length is zero, each message type handler reads uninitialized payload and KMSAN detects this issue. The receipt of a packet with a zero-size payload is considered unexpected, and therefore, such packets should be silently discarded. This patch resolved this issue by checking payload size before calling each message type handler codes. Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ea9413ea6749baf5574(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea9413ea6749baf5574 [1] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2 [2] Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jeremy(a)jcline.org> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- net/nfc/nci/core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/core.c b/net/nfc/nci/core.c index 7148bc0af030..f393aae80598 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/core.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/core.c @@ -1507,6 +1507,11 @@ static void nci_rx_work(struct work_struct *work) nfc_send_to_raw_sock(ndev->nfc_dev, skb, RAW_PAYLOAD_NCI, NFC_DIRECTION_RX); + if (!nci_plen(skb->data)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + break; + } + /* Process frame */ switch (nci_mt(skb->data)) { case NCI_MT_RSP_PKT: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free of encap entry in neigh update handler
by Zhang Changzhong 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Vlad Buslov <vladbu(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc7 commit fb1a3132ee1ac968316e45d21a48703a6db0b6c3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4FV CVE: CVE-2021-47247 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn't updated to accommodate rtnl lock removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free: [23827.464923] ================================================================== [23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635 [23827.472251] [23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5 [23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core] [23827.476731] Call Trace: [23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_generic+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.495296] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x41e/0x5e0 [mlx5_core] [23827.496338] ? mlx5e_rep_neigh_entry_release+0xb80/0xb80 [mlx5_core] [23827.497486] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [23827.498250] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [23827.498889] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.499638] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [23827.500537] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2c0/0x2c0 [23827.501359] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [23827.502116] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.502831] ? process_one_work+0x14e0/0x14e0 [23827.503627] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.504254] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [23827.505065] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x90/0x90 [23827.505912] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.506621] [23827.506987] Allocated by task 28248: [23827.507694] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.508476] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [23827.509197] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xde1/0x1d40 [mlx5_core] [23827.510194] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x397/0xc40 [mlx5_core] [23827.511218] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x519/0xb30 [mlx5_core] [23827.512234] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x191c/0x4870 [mlx5_core] [23827.513298] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1d5/0x420 [23827.514023] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x382/0x6a0 [cls_flower] [23827.514975] fl_change+0x2ceb/0x4a51 [cls_flower] [23827.515821] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070 [23827.516548] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.517300] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.518021] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.518742] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.519467] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.520131] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.520851] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.521552] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.522238] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.522907] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.523797] [23827.524163] Freed by task 25948: [23827.524780] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.525488] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [23827.526187] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [23827.526968] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130 [23827.527709] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xcf/0x1d0 [23827.528528] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x33a/0x6e0 [23827.529317] kfree_rcu_work+0x55f/0xb70 [23827.530024] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.530770] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.531480] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.532114] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.532785] [23827.533147] Last potentially related work creation: [23827.534007] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.534710] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0 [23827.535492] kvfree_call_rcu+0x31/0x7b0 [23827.536206] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x577/0xef0 [mlx5_core] [23827.537305] mlx5e_flow_put+0x49/0x80 [mlx5_core] [23827.538290] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x6d1/0xe60 [mlx5_core] [23827.539300] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0x18e/0x2f0 [23827.540144] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1d2/0x310 [cls_flower] [23827.541148] __fl_delete+0x4dc/0x660 [cls_flower] [23827.541985] fl_delete+0x97/0x160 [cls_flower] [23827.542782] tc_del_tfilter+0x7ab/0x13d0 [23827.543503] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.544257] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.544981] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.545700] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.546424] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.547084] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.547850] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.548606] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.549303] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.549969] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.550853] [23827.551217] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d1322200 [23827.551217] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [23827.553341] The buggy address is located 140 bytes inside of [23827.553341] 256-byte region [ffff8881d1322200, ffff8881d1322300) [23827.555747] The buggy address belongs to the page: [23827.556847] page:00000000898762aa refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d1320 [23827.558651] head:00000000898762aa order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [23827.559961] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [23827.561243] raw: 002ffff800010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 [23827.562653] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [23827.564112] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [23827.565439] [23827.565932] Memory state around the buggy address: [23827.566917] ffff8881d1322180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.568485] ffff8881d1322200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.569818] >ffff8881d1322280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.571143] ^ [23827.571879] ffff8881d1322300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.573283] ffff8881d1322380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.574654] ================================================================== Most of the necessary logic is already correctly implemented by mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() helper that is used in neigh stats update handler. Make the handler generic by renaming it to mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() and use callback to test whether flow is matching instead of hardcoded check for 'valid' flag value. Implement mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID flag. Implement new mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() helper by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap completion result to be non-error and use it in mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() to safely iterate over nhe->encap_list. Remove encap completion logic from mlx5e_rep_update_flows() since the encap entries passed to this function are already guaranteed to be properly initialized by similar code in mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(). Fixes: 2a1f1768fa17 ("net/mlx5e: Refactor neigh update for concurrent execution") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_tun_encap.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h [Adjust context because patchset 08cbabb77e90 ("Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2021-02-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/saeed/linux") not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c | 15 ++++------ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c | 6 +--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c index 58e2703..bbc182e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c @@ -129,9 +129,8 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(struct work_struct *work) work); struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe = update_work->nhe; struct neighbour *n = update_work->n; - struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e; + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e = NULL; unsigned char ha[ETH_ALEN]; - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; bool neigh_connected; u8 nud_state, dead; @@ -152,14 +151,12 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(struct work_struct *work) trace_mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(nhe, ha, neigh_connected); - list_for_each_entry(e, &nhe->encap_list, encap_list) { - if (!mlx5e_encap_take(e)) - continue; + /* mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() releases previous encap before returning + * the next one. + */ + while ((e = mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(nhe, e)) != NULL) + mlx5e_rep_update_flows(netdev_priv(e->out_dev), e, neigh_connected, ha); - priv = netdev_priv(e->out_dev); - mlx5e_rep_update_flows(priv, e, neigh_connected, ha); - mlx5e_encap_put(priv, e); - } rtnl_unlock(); mlx5e_release_neigh_update_work(update_work); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c index 2fdea05..552c07e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c @@ -91,13 +91,9 @@ void mlx5e_rep_update_flows(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, ASSERT_RTNL(); - /* wait for encap to be fully initialized */ - wait_for_completion(&e->res_ready); - mutex_lock(&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock); encap_connected = !!(e->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID); - if (e->compl_result < 0 || (encap_connected == neigh_connected && - ether_addr_equal(e->h_dest, ha))) + if (encap_connected == neigh_connected && ether_addr_equal(e->h_dest, ha)) goto unlock; mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows(e, &flow_list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c index 1ad1692..f5a3078 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c @@ -1647,9 +1647,12 @@ void mlx5e_put_encap_flow_list(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct list_head *flow_l mlx5e_flow_put(priv, flow); } +typedef bool (match_cb)(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *); + static struct mlx5e_encap_entry * -mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, - struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e, + match_cb match) { struct mlx5e_encap_entry *next = NULL; @@ -1684,7 +1687,7 @@ mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, /* wait for encap to be fully initialized */ wait_for_completion(&next->res_ready); /* continue searching if encap entry is not in valid state after completion */ - if (!(next->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID)) { + if (!match(next)) { e = next; goto retry; } @@ -1692,6 +1695,30 @@ mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, return next; } +static bool mlx5e_encap_valid(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return e->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID; +} + +static struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(nhe, e, mlx5e_encap_valid); +} + +static bool mlx5e_encap_initialized(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return e->compl_result >= 0; +} + +struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(nhe, e, mlx5e_encap_initialized); +} + void mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe) { struct mlx5e_neigh *m_neigh = &nhe->m_neigh; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h index 4a2ce24..e7e5f0c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h @@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ void mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e, struct list_head *f void mlx5e_put_encap_flow_list(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct list_head *flow_list); struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry; +struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e); void mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe); void mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work(struct work_struct *work); -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] gpiolib: cdev: Fix use after free in lineinfo_changed_notify
by Wupeng Ma 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 95ca7c90eaf5ea8a8460536535101e3e81160e2a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UG5Z CVE: CVE-2024-36899 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 02f6b0e1ec7e0e7d059dddc893645816552039da ] The use-after-free issue occurs as follows: when the GPIO chip device file is being closed by invoking gpio_chrdev_release(), watched_lines is freed by bitmap_free(), but the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain failed due to waiting write rwsem. Additionally, one of the GPIO chip's lines is also in the release process and holds the notifier chain's read rwsem. Consequently, a race condition leads to the use-after-free of watched_lines. Here is the typical stack when issue happened: [free] gpio_chrdev_release() --> bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines) <-- freed --> blocking_notifier_chain_unregister() --> down_write(&nh->rwsem) <-- waiting rwsem --> __down_write_common() --> rwsem_down_write_slowpath() --> schedule_preempt_disabled() --> schedule() [use] st54spi_gpio_dev_release() --> gpio_free() --> gpiod_free() --> gpiod_free_commit() --> gpiod_line_state_notify() --> blocking_notifier_call_chain() --> down_read(&nh->rwsem); <-- held rwsem --> notifier_call_chain() --> lineinfo_changed_notify() --> test_bit(xxxx, cdev->watched_lines) <-- use after free The side effect of the use-after-free issue is that a GPIO line event is being generated for userspace where it shouldn't. However, since the chrdev is being closed, userspace won't have the chance to read that event anyway. To fix the issue, call the bitmap_free() function after the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain. Fixes: 51c1064e82e7 ("gpiolib: add new ioctl() for monitoring changes in line info") Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240505141156.2944912-1-quic_zhonhan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c [Ma Wupeng: context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c index 40d0196d8bdc..b273cb988aec 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c @@ -2345,9 +2345,9 @@ static int gpio_chrdev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct gpio_chardev_data *cdev = file->private_data; struct gpio_device *gdev = cdev->gdev; - bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&gdev->notifier, &cdev->lineinfo_changed_nb); + bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); put_device(&gdev->dev); kfree(cdev); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.26 commit a946ebee45b09294c8b0b0e77410b763c4d2817a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QG8F CVE: CVE-2024-35915 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d24b03535e5eb82e025219c2f632b485409c898f ] syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1][2]: nci_rx_work() parses and processes received packet. When the payload length is zero, each message type handler reads uninitialized payload and KMSAN detects this issue. The receipt of a packet with a zero-size payload is considered unexpected, and therefore, such packets should be silently discarded. This patch resolved this issue by checking payload size before calling each message type handler codes. Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ea9413ea6749baf5574(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea9413ea6749baf5574 [1] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2 [2] Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jeremy(a)jcline.org> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- net/nfc/nci/core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/core.c b/net/nfc/nci/core.c index 9e524884d4ac..8bfc87a6a4f6 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/core.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/core.c @@ -1498,6 +1498,11 @@ static void nci_rx_work(struct work_struct *work) nfc_send_to_raw_sock(ndev->nfc_dev, skb, RAW_PAYLOAD_NCI, NFC_DIRECTION_RX); + if (!nci_plen(skb->data)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + break; + } + /* Process frame */ switch (nci_mt(skb->data)) { case NCI_MT_RSP_PKT: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] Refactor hbmdev a bit
by Zhang Zekun 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

Refactoring some mechanism in hbmdev: 1. Memory node on the hbmdev need to be offlined before poweroff the device. 2. Use AML code to trigger the hbmdev poweroff process Zhang Zekun (3): soc: hisilicon: hisi_hbmdev: Notify the device in the ACPI soc: hisilicon: Don't poweroff if memblocks don't offlined arm64: config: Open the hbmdev related config arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 5 ++-- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 1 - drivers/soc/hisilicon/hisi_hbmdev.c | 34 +++++++++----------------- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] nfc: nci: Fix uninit-value in nci_dev_up and nci_ntf_packet
by Zheng Zucheng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.26 commit a946ebee45b09294c8b0b0e77410b763c4d2817a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9QG8F CVE: CVE-2024-35915 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d24b03535e5eb82e025219c2f632b485409c898f ] syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1][2]: nci_rx_work() parses and processes received packet. When the payload length is zero, each message type handler reads uninitialized payload and KMSAN detects this issue. The receipt of a packet with a zero-size payload is considered unexpected, and therefore, such packets should be silently discarded. This patch resolved this issue by checking payload size before calling each message type handler codes. Fixes: 6a2968aaf50c ("NFC: basic NCI protocol implementation") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+7ea9413ea6749baf5574(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7ea9413ea6749baf5574 [1] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=29b5ca705d2e0f4a44d2 [2] Signed-off-by: Ryosuke Yasuoka <ryasuoka(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeremy Cline <jeremy(a)jcline.org> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zucheng <zhengzucheng(a)huawei.com> --- net/nfc/nci/core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/nfc/nci/core.c b/net/nfc/nci/core.c index 9e524884d4ac..8bfc87a6a4f6 100644 --- a/net/nfc/nci/core.c +++ b/net/nfc/nci/core.c @@ -1498,6 +1498,11 @@ static void nci_rx_work(struct work_struct *work) nfc_send_to_raw_sock(ndev->nfc_dev, skb, RAW_PAYLOAD_NCI, NFC_DIRECTION_RX); + if (!nci_plen(skb->data)) { + kfree_skb(skb); + break; + } + /* Process frame */ switch (nci_mt(skb->data)) { case NCI_MT_RSP_PKT: -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/mlx5e: Fix use-after-free of encap entry in neigh update handler
by Zhang Changzhong 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Vlad Buslov <vladbu(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc7 commit fb1a3132ee1ac968316e45d21a48703a6db0b6c3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9R4FV CVE: CVE-2021-47247 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Function mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() wasn't updated to accommodate rtnl lock removal from TC filter update path and properly handle concurrent encap entry insertion/deletion which can lead to following use-after-free: [23827.464923] ================================================================== [23827.469446] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.470971] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881d132228c by task kworker/u20:6/21635 [23827.472251] [23827.472615] CPU: 9 PID: 21635 Comm: kworker/u20:6 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc3+ #5 [23827.473788] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [23827.475639] Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_rep_neigh_update [mlx5_core] [23827.476731] Call Trace: [23827.477260] dump_stack+0xbb/0x107 [23827.477906] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x18/0x140 [23827.478896] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.479879] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.480905] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 [23827.481701] ? mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.482744] kasan_check_range+0x145/0x1a0 [23827.493112] mlx5e_encap_take+0x72/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.494054] ? mlx5e_tc_tun_encap_info_equal_generic+0x140/0x140 [mlx5_core] [23827.495296] mlx5e_rep_neigh_update+0x41e/0x5e0 [mlx5_core] [23827.496338] ? mlx5e_rep_neigh_entry_release+0xb80/0xb80 [mlx5_core] [23827.497486] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [23827.498250] ? strscpy+0xa0/0x2a0 [23827.498889] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.499638] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 [23827.500537] ? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2c0/0x2c0 [23827.501359] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90 [23827.502116] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.502831] ? process_one_work+0x14e0/0x14e0 [23827.503627] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.504254] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 [23827.505065] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x90/0x90 [23827.505912] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.506621] [23827.506987] Allocated by task 28248: [23827.507694] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.508476] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7c/0x90 [23827.509197] mlx5e_attach_encap+0xde1/0x1d40 [mlx5_core] [23827.510194] mlx5e_tc_add_fdb_flow+0x397/0xc40 [mlx5_core] [23827.511218] __mlx5e_add_fdb_flow+0x519/0xb30 [mlx5_core] [23827.512234] mlx5e_configure_flower+0x191c/0x4870 [mlx5_core] [23827.513298] tc_setup_cb_add+0x1d5/0x420 [23827.514023] fl_hw_replace_filter+0x382/0x6a0 [cls_flower] [23827.514975] fl_change+0x2ceb/0x4a51 [cls_flower] [23827.515821] tc_new_tfilter+0x89a/0x2070 [23827.516548] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.517300] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.518021] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.518742] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.519467] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.520131] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.520851] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.521552] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.522238] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.522907] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.523797] [23827.524163] Freed by task 25948: [23827.524780] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.525488] kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 [23827.526187] kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 [23827.526968] __kasan_slab_free+0xed/0x130 [23827.527709] slab_free_freelist_hook+0xcf/0x1d0 [23827.528528] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x33a/0x6e0 [23827.529317] kfree_rcu_work+0x55f/0xb70 [23827.530024] process_one_work+0x8ac/0x14e0 [23827.530770] worker_thread+0x53b/0x1220 [23827.531480] kthread+0x328/0x3f0 [23827.532114] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [23827.532785] [23827.533147] Last potentially related work creation: [23827.534007] kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 [23827.534710] kasan_record_aux_stack+0xab/0xc0 [23827.535492] kvfree_call_rcu+0x31/0x7b0 [23827.536206] mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x577/0xef0 [mlx5_core] [23827.537305] mlx5e_flow_put+0x49/0x80 [mlx5_core] [23827.538290] mlx5e_delete_flower+0x6d1/0xe60 [mlx5_core] [23827.539300] tc_setup_cb_destroy+0x18e/0x2f0 [23827.540144] fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x1d2/0x310 [cls_flower] [23827.541148] __fl_delete+0x4dc/0x660 [cls_flower] [23827.541985] fl_delete+0x97/0x160 [cls_flower] [23827.542782] tc_del_tfilter+0x7ab/0x13d0 [23827.543503] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x644/0x8c0 [23827.544257] netlink_rcv_skb+0x11d/0x340 [23827.544981] netlink_unicast+0x42b/0x700 [23827.545700] netlink_sendmsg+0x743/0xc20 [23827.546424] sock_sendmsg+0xb2/0xe0 [23827.547084] ____sys_sendmsg+0x590/0x770 [23827.547850] ___sys_sendmsg+0xd8/0x160 [23827.548606] __sys_sendmsg+0xb7/0x140 [23827.549303] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x70 [23827.549969] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [23827.550853] [23827.551217] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881d1322200 [23827.551217] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 [23827.553341] The buggy address is located 140 bytes inside of [23827.553341] 256-byte region [ffff8881d1322200, ffff8881d1322300) [23827.555747] The buggy address belongs to the page: [23827.556847] page:00000000898762aa refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1d1320 [23827.558651] head:00000000898762aa order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [23827.559961] flags: 0x2ffff800010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) [23827.561243] raw: 002ffff800010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888100042b40 [23827.562653] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [23827.564112] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [23827.565439] [23827.565932] Memory state around the buggy address: [23827.566917] ffff8881d1322180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.568485] ffff8881d1322200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.569818] >ffff8881d1322280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [23827.571143] ^ [23827.571879] ffff8881d1322300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.573283] ffff8881d1322380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [23827.574654] ================================================================== Most of the necessary logic is already correctly implemented by mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() helper that is used in neigh stats update handler. Make the handler generic by renaming it to mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() and use callback to test whether flow is matching instead of hardcoded check for 'valid' flag value. Implement mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap() by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID flag. Implement new mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() helper by calling mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap() with callback that tests encap completion result to be non-error and use it in mlx5e_rep_neigh_update() to safely iterate over nhe->encap_list. Remove encap completion logic from mlx5e_rep_update_flows() since the encap entries passed to this function are already guaranteed to be properly initialized by similar code in mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(). Fixes: 2a1f1768fa17 ("net/mlx5e: Refactor neigh update for concurrent execution") Signed-off-by: Vlad Buslov <vladbu(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Roi Dayan <roid(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/tc_tun_encap.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h [Adjust context because patchset 08cbabb77e90 ("Merge tag 'mlx5-updates-2021-02-04' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/saeed/linux") not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c | 15 ++++------ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c | 6 +--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h | 3 ++ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c index 58e2703..bbc182e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/neigh.c @@ -129,9 +129,8 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(struct work_struct *work) work); struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe = update_work->nhe; struct neighbour *n = update_work->n; - struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e; + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e = NULL; unsigned char ha[ETH_ALEN]; - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; bool neigh_connected; u8 nud_state, dead; @@ -152,14 +151,12 @@ static void mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(struct work_struct *work) trace_mlx5e_rep_neigh_update(nhe, ha, neigh_connected); - list_for_each_entry(e, &nhe->encap_list, encap_list) { - if (!mlx5e_encap_take(e)) - continue; + /* mlx5e_get_next_init_encap() releases previous encap before returning + * the next one. + */ + while ((e = mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(nhe, e)) != NULL) + mlx5e_rep_update_flows(netdev_priv(e->out_dev), e, neigh_connected, ha); - priv = netdev_priv(e->out_dev); - mlx5e_rep_update_flows(priv, e, neigh_connected, ha); - mlx5e_encap_put(priv, e); - } rtnl_unlock(); mlx5e_release_neigh_update_work(update_work); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c index 2fdea05..552c07e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/rep/tc.c @@ -91,13 +91,9 @@ void mlx5e_rep_update_flows(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, ASSERT_RTNL(); - /* wait for encap to be fully initialized */ - wait_for_completion(&e->res_ready); - mutex_lock(&esw->offloads.encap_tbl_lock); encap_connected = !!(e->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID); - if (e->compl_result < 0 || (encap_connected == neigh_connected && - ether_addr_equal(e->h_dest, ha))) + if (encap_connected == neigh_connected && ether_addr_equal(e->h_dest, ha)) goto unlock; mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows(e, &flow_list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c index f7ccca7..5ca5c3d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.c @@ -1653,9 +1653,12 @@ void mlx5e_put_encap_flow_list(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct list_head *flow_l mlx5e_flow_put(priv, flow); } +typedef bool (match_cb)(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *); + static struct mlx5e_encap_entry * -mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, - struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e, + match_cb match) { struct mlx5e_encap_entry *next = NULL; @@ -1690,7 +1693,7 @@ mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, /* wait for encap to be fully initialized */ wait_for_completion(&next->res_ready); /* continue searching if encap entry is not in valid state after completion */ - if (!(next->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID)) { + if (!match(next)) { e = next; goto retry; } @@ -1698,6 +1701,30 @@ mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, return next; } +static bool mlx5e_encap_valid(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return e->flags & MLX5_ENCAP_ENTRY_VALID; +} + +static struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_valid_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(nhe, e, mlx5e_encap_valid); +} + +static bool mlx5e_encap_initialized(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return e->compl_result >= 0; +} + +struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e) +{ + return mlx5e_get_next_matching_encap(nhe, e, mlx5e_encap_initialized); +} + void mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe) { struct mlx5e_neigh *m_neigh = &nhe->m_neigh; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h index 4a2ce24..e7e5f0c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_tc.h @@ -161,6 +161,9 @@ void mlx5e_take_all_encap_flows(struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e, struct list_head *f void mlx5e_put_encap_flow_list(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct list_head *flow_list); struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry; +struct mlx5e_encap_entry * +mlx5e_get_next_init_encap(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe, + struct mlx5e_encap_entry *e); void mlx5e_tc_update_neigh_used_value(struct mlx5e_neigh_hash_entry *nhe); void mlx5e_tc_reoffload_flows_work(struct work_struct *work); -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

2 1

[OLK-5.10 PATCH] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

1 0

[openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 PATCH] ALSA: scarlett2: Add missing error checks to *_ctl_get()
by Yu Liao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: "Geoffrey D. Bennett" <g(a)b4.vu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.148 commit 3a09488f4f67f7ade59b8ac62a6c7fb29439cf51 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9F0 CVE: CVE-2023-52680 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 50603a67daef161c78c814580d57f7f0be57167e ] The *_ctl_get() functions which call scarlett2_update_*() were not checking the return value. Fix to check the return value and pass to the caller. Signed-off-by: Geoffrey D. Bennett <g(a)b4.vu> Fixes: 9e4d5c1be21f ("ALSA: usb-audio: Scarlett Gen 2 mixer interface") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/32a5fdc83b05fa74e0fcdd672fbf71d75c5f0a6d.17030010… Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c [Follow the patch logic and adapt the patch.] Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c index 6b7c8b8d7111..d1c0d2bf4b6f 100644 --- a/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c +++ b/sound/usb/mixer_scarlett_gen2.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,20 @@ static int scarlett2_master_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->master_vol; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1049,14 +1055,19 @@ static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; int index = elem->control; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); - + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] = private->vol[index]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_volume_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, @@ -1322,14 +1333,20 @@ static int scarlett2_button_ctl_get(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, struct usb_mixer_elem_info *elem = kctl->private_data; struct usb_mixer_interface *mixer = elem->head.mixer; struct scarlett2_mixer_data *private = mixer->private_data; + int err = 0; mutex_lock(&private->data_mutex); - if (private->vol_updated) - scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); - mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + if (private->vol_updated) { + err = scarlett2_update_volumes(mixer); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock; + } ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] = private->buttons[elem->control]; - return 0; + +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&private->data_mutex); + return err; } static int scarlett2_button_ctl_put(struct snd_kcontrol *kctl, -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI
by Shengjie Li 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/IA45I1 -------------------------------- Fix security issue for Confidential cVM TSI: 1. Init TSI driver when config cvm_guest. 2. Modify the token structure to reduce the variables that are exposed to the user state. 3. Add a lock for obtaining the remote attestation report. Fixes: 31071f4b2a0b ("cvm_tsi: add cvm tsi interface") Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 89 ++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..252fe5352a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; + if (!is_cvm_world()) + return -EIO; + ver = tsi_get_version(); if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); @@ -56,6 +59,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +73,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +109,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + spin_lock(&lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + spin_unlock(&lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +148,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + spin_lock(&lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EFAULT; } + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; } -- 2.37.2.windows.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] block: fix module reference leakage from bdev_open_by_dev error path
by Li Lingfeng 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc6 commit 9617cd6f24b294552a817f80f5225431ef67b540 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q9I0 CVE: CVE-2024-35859 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- At the time bdev_may_open() is called, module reference is grabbed already, hence module reference should be released if bdev_may_open() failed. This problem is found by code review. Fixes: ed5cc702d311 ("block: Add config option to not allow writing to mounted devices") Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240406090930.2252838-22-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- block/bdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/block/bdev.c b/block/bdev.c index b555deef0d76..07e8e3686aea 100644 --- a/block/bdev.c +++ b/block/bdev.c @@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ struct bdev_handle *bdev_open_by_dev(dev_t dev, blk_mode_t mode, void *holder, goto abort_claiming; ret = -EBUSY; if (!bdev_may_open(bdev, mode)) - goto abort_claiming; + goto put_module; if (bdev_is_partition(bdev)) ret = blkdev_get_part(bdev, mode); else -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tipc: fix a possible memleak in tipc_buf_append
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 614c5a5ae45a921595952117b2e2bd4d4bf9b574 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9US4T CVE: CVE-2024-36954 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 97bf6f81b29a8efaf5d0983251a7450e5794370d ] __skb_linearize() doesn't free the skb when it fails, so move '*buf = NULL' after __skb_linearize(), so that the skb can be freed on the err path. Fixes: b7df21cf1b79 ("tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen(a)dektech.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90710748c29a1521efac4f75ea01b3b7e61414cf.17144858… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/tipc/msg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c index 5c9fd4791c4b..c52ab423082c 100644 --- a/net/tipc/msg.c +++ b/net/tipc/msg.c @@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) if (fragid == FIRST_FRAGMENT) { if (unlikely(head)) goto err; - *buf = NULL; if (skb_has_frag_list(frag) && __skb_linearize(frag)) goto err; + *buf = NULL; frag = skb_unshare(frag, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!frag)) goto err; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH] tipc: fix a possible memleak in tipc_buf_append
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 97bf6f81b29a8efaf5d0983251a7450e5794370d ] __skb_linearize() doesn't free the skb when it fails, so move '*buf = NULL' after __skb_linearize(), so that the skb can be freed on the err path. Fixes: b7df21cf1b79 ("tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs") Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.q.nguyen(a)dektech.com.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/90710748c29a1521efac4f75ea01b3b7e61414cf.17144858… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- net/tipc/msg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/msg.c b/net/tipc/msg.c index 5c9fd4791c4b..c52ab423082c 100644 --- a/net/tipc/msg.c +++ b/net/tipc/msg.c @@ -142,9 +142,9 @@ int tipc_buf_append(struct sk_buff **headbuf, struct sk_buff **buf) if (fragid == FIRST_FRAGMENT) { if (unlikely(head)) goto err; - *buf = NULL; if (skb_has_frag_list(frag) && __skb_linearize(frag)) goto err; + *buf = NULL; frag = skb_unshare(frag, GFP_ATOMIC); if (unlikely(!frag)) goto err; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] gpiolib: cdev: Fix use after free in lineinfo_changed_notify
by Wupeng Ma 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 95ca7c90eaf5ea8a8460536535101e3e81160e2a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UG5Z CVE: CVE-2024-36899 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 02f6b0e1ec7e0e7d059dddc893645816552039da ] The use-after-free issue occurs as follows: when the GPIO chip device file is being closed by invoking gpio_chrdev_release(), watched_lines is freed by bitmap_free(), but the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain failed due to waiting write rwsem. Additionally, one of the GPIO chip's lines is also in the release process and holds the notifier chain's read rwsem. Consequently, a race condition leads to the use-after-free of watched_lines. Here is the typical stack when issue happened: [free] gpio_chrdev_release() --> bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines) <-- freed --> blocking_notifier_chain_unregister() --> down_write(&nh->rwsem) <-- waiting rwsem --> __down_write_common() --> rwsem_down_write_slowpath() --> schedule_preempt_disabled() --> schedule() [use] st54spi_gpio_dev_release() --> gpio_free() --> gpiod_free() --> gpiod_free_commit() --> gpiod_line_state_notify() --> blocking_notifier_call_chain() --> down_read(&nh->rwsem); <-- held rwsem --> notifier_call_chain() --> lineinfo_changed_notify() --> test_bit(xxxx, cdev->watched_lines) <-- use after free The side effect of the use-after-free issue is that a GPIO line event is being generated for userspace where it shouldn't. However, since the chrdev is being closed, userspace won't have the chance to read that event anyway. To fix the issue, call the bitmap_free() function after the unregistration of lineinfo_changed_nb notifier chain. Fixes: 51c1064e82e7 ("gpiolib: add new ioctl() for monitoring changes in line info") Signed-off-by: Zhongqiu Han <quic_zhonhan(a)quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240505141156.2944912-1-quic_zhonhan@quicinc.com Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c index 84125e55de10..ebf5b8ef3b5d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c +++ b/drivers/gpio/gpiolib-cdev.c @@ -2816,11 +2816,11 @@ static int gpio_chrdev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) struct gpio_chardev_data *cdev = file->private_data; struct gpio_device *gdev = cdev->gdev; - bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&gdev->device_notifier, &cdev->device_unregistered_nb); blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&gdev->line_state_notifier, &cdev->lineinfo_changed_nb); + bitmap_free(cdev->watched_lines); gpio_device_put(gdev); kfree(cdev); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2] bpf, skmsg: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
by Liu Jian 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Jason Xing <kernelxing(a)tencent.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit b397a0ab8582c533ec0c6b732392f141fc364f87 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U1UZ CVE: CVE-2024-36938 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6648e613226e18897231ab5e42ffc29e63fa3365 ] Fix NULL pointer data-races in sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue() which syzbot reported [1]. [1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in sk_psock_drop / sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue write to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10724 on cpu 1: sk_psock_stop_verdict net/core/skmsg.c:1257 [inline] sk_psock_drop+0x13e/0x1f0 net/core/skmsg.c:843 sk_psock_put include/linux/skmsg.h:459 [inline] sock_map_close+0x1a7/0x260 net/core/sock_map.c:1648 unix_release+0x4b/0x80 net/unix/af_unix.c:1048 __sock_release net/socket.c:659 [inline] sock_close+0x68/0x150 net/socket.c:1421 __fput+0x2c1/0x660 fs/file_table.c:422 __fput_sync+0x44/0x60 fs/file_table.c:507 __do_sys_close fs/open.c:1556 [inline] __se_sys_close+0x101/0x1b0 fs/open.c:1541 __x64_sys_close+0x1f/0x30 fs/open.c:1541 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 read to 0xffff88814b3278b8 of 8 bytes by task 10713 on cpu 0: sk_psock_data_ready include/linux/skmsg.h:464 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x32d/0x390 net/core/skmsg.c:555 sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x185/0x1e0 net/core/skmsg.c:606 sk_psock_verdict_apply net/core/skmsg.c:1008 [inline] sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x3e4/0x4a0 net/core/skmsg.c:1202 unix_read_skb net/unix/af_unix.c:2546 [inline] unix_stream_read_skb+0x9e/0xf0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2682 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x77/0x220 net/core/skmsg.c:1223 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x527/0x860 net/unix/af_unix.c:2339 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x140/0x180 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x312/0x410 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x1e9/0x280 net/socket.c:2667 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x46/0x50 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x1d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 value changed: 0xffffffff83d7feb0 -> 0x0000000000000000 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 10713 Comm: syz-executor.4 Tainted: G W 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Prior to this, commit 4cd12c6065df ("bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()") fixed one NULL pointer similarly due to no protection of saved_data_ready. Here is another different caller causing the same issue because of the same reason. So we should protect it with sk_callback_lock read lock because the writer side in the sk_psock_drop() uses "write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);". To avoid errors that could happen in future, I move those two pairs of lock into the sk_psock_data_ready(), which is suggested by John Fastabend. Fixes: 604326b41a6f ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface") Reported-by: syzbot+aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Xing <kernelxing(a)tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aa8c8ec2538929f18f2d Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240329134037.92124-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240404021001.94815-1-kerneljasonxing@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- v2: update cve id. include/linux/skmsg.h | 2 ++ net/core/skmsg.c | 5 +---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h index f69af3de0da0..fdedb7a29c0e 100644 --- a/include/linux/skmsg.h +++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h @@ -467,10 +467,12 @@ static inline void sk_psock_put(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock) static inline void sk_psock_data_ready(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock) { + read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); if (psock->saved_data_ready) psock->saved_data_ready(sk); else sk->sk_data_ready(sk); + read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); } static inline void psock_set_prog(struct bpf_prog **pprog, diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 6f774de8f6b2..f2e7ce81fef0 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -1234,11 +1234,8 @@ static void sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(struct sock *sk) rcu_read_lock(); psock = sk_psock(sk); - if (psock) { - read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); + if (psock) sk_psock_data_ready(sk, psock); - read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock); - } rcu_read_unlock(); } } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.314 commit 3cdc34d76c4f777579e28ad373979d36c030cfd3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TMCC CVE: CVE-2024-36883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream. net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index 975cf8cebc34..94dc7e99e200 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -63,12 +63,15 @@ static unsigned int max_gen_ptrs = INITIAL_NET_GEN_PTRS; static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { + unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs); + unsigned int generic_size; struct net_generic *ng; - unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]); + + generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]); ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (ng) - ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs; + ng->s.len = gen_ptrs; return ng; } @@ -1018,7 +1021,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list, if (error < 0) return error; *ops->id = error; - max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1); + /* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold + * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect + * net_alloc_generic. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1)); } error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops); if (error) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm: enhance security for cvm host feature
by Ju Fu 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TM0T -------------------------------- enhance security for cvm host feature Signed-off-by: Ju Fu <fuju1(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h | 4 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h | 34 ++------------------ arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h index 540563623..1271df56c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h @@ -571,7 +571,9 @@ static inline enum cvm_state kvm_cvm_state(struct kvm *kvm) { struct cvm *cvm = kvm->arch.cvm; - return cvm && READ_ONCE(cvm->state); + if (!cvm) + return 0; + return READ_ONCE(cvm->state); } #endif #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h index 536594017..b89680f31 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmi.h @@ -18,22 +18,6 @@ #define TMM_TTT_LEVEL_2 2 #define TMM_TTT_LEVEL_3 3 -#ifdef CONFIG_CVM_HOST_FVP_PLAT -#define CVM_MEM_BASE ULL(0x8800000000) /* choose FVP platform to run cVM */ -#define VQ_NUM 3 -#else -#define CVM_MEM_BASE ULL(0x800000000) /* choose qemu platform to run cVM */ -#define VQ_NUM 3 -#endif - -#define MEM_SEG_NUMS 2 - -/* define in QEMU hw/arm/virt.c */ -#define VIRT_PCIE_MMIO 0x10000000 /* 256MB */ -#define VIRT_PCIE_MMIO_SIZE 0x1000000 /* 16MB */ -#define VIRT_HIGH_PCIE_ECAM 0x8000000000 /* 512GB */ -#define VIRT_HIGH_PCIE_ECAM_SIZE 0x12000000 /* 288MB */ - /* TMI error codes. */ #define TMI_SUCCESS 0 #define TMI_ERROR_INPUT 1 @@ -214,6 +198,8 @@ struct tmi_tec_run { #define TMI_NO_MEASURE_CONTENT U(0) #define TMI_MEASURE_CONTENT U(1) +#define CVM_IPA_MAX_VAL (1UL << 48) + /* * SMC_TMM_INIT_COMPLETE is the only function in the TMI that originates from * the CVM world and is handled by the SPMD. The remaining functions are @@ -264,7 +250,7 @@ struct tmi_tec_run { #define TMI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(_version) ((_version) >> 16) #define TMI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(_version) ((_version) & 0xFFFF) -#define TMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR U(0x0) +#define TMI_ABI_VERSION_MAJOR U(0x1) /* KVM_CAP_ARM_TMM on VM fd */ #define KVM_CAP_ARM_TMM_CONFIG_CVM_HOST 0 @@ -330,20 +316,6 @@ struct kvm_cap_arm_tmm_populate_region_args { __u32 reserved[3]; }; -enum tmi_tmm_mem_type { - TMM_MEM_TYPE_RD, - TMM_MEM_TYPE_TEC, - TMM_MEM_TYPE_TTT, - TMM_MEM_TYPE_CVM_PA, -}; - -enum tmi_tmm_map_size { - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_4K, - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_2M, - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_1G, - TMM_MEM_MAP_SIZE_MAX, -}; - static inline bool tmm_is_addr_ttt_level_aligned(uint64_t addr, int level) { uint64_t mask = (1 << (12 + 9 * (3 - level))) - 1; diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h index 88fa0873c..8cc7a35c9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_tmm.h @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ #include <uapi/linux/kvm.h> enum cvm_state { - CVM_STATE_NONE, + CVM_STATE_NONE = 1, CVM_STATE_NEW, CVM_STATE_ACTIVE, CVM_STATE_DYING diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c index 70521fec8..e91178945 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/cvm.c @@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ int kvm_arm_create_cvm(struct kvm *kvm) memcpy(cvm->params->rpv, &cvm->cvm_vmid, sizeof(cvm->cvm_vmid)); cvm->rd = tmi_cvm_create(__pa(cvm->params), numa_set); if (!cvm->rd) { - kvm_err("KVM creates cVM: %d\n", cvm->cvm_vmid); + kvm_err("KVM creates cVM failed: %d\n", cvm->cvm_vmid); ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; } WRITE_ONCE(cvm->state, CVM_STATE_NEW); @@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ int kvm_cvm_populate_par_region(struct kvm *kvm, u64 numa_set, */ ipa = ALIGN_DOWN(ipa, map_size); - if (is_data_create_region(ipa_base, args)) { + if (is_data_create_region(ipa, args)) { pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot(memslot, gpa_to_gfn(ipa)); if (is_error_pfn(pfn)) { ret = -EFAULT; @@ -602,6 +603,7 @@ static int kvm_populate_ram_region(struct kvm *kvm, u64 map_size, static int kvm_populate_ipa_cvm_range(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_cap_arm_tmm_populate_region_args *args) { + struct cvm *cvm = (struct cvm *)kvm->arch.cvm; u64 l2_granule = cvm_granule_size(TMM_TTT_LEVEL_2); phys_addr_t ipa_base1, ipa_end2; @@ -612,7 +614,10 @@ static int kvm_populate_ipa_cvm_range(struct kvm *kvm, !IS_ALIGNED(args->populate_ipa_base2, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(args->populate_ipa_size2, PAGE_SIZE)) return -EINVAL; - if (args->populate_ipa_base2 < args->populate_ipa_base1 + args->populate_ipa_size1) + + if (args->populate_ipa_base1 < cvm->loader_start || + args->populate_ipa_base2 < args->populate_ipa_base1 + args->populate_ipa_size1 || + cvm->dtb_end < args->populate_ipa_base2 + args->populate_ipa_size2) return -EINVAL; if (args->flags & ~TMI_MEASURE_CONTENT) @@ -755,6 +760,26 @@ int kvm_init_tmm(void) return 0; } +bool is_numa_ipa_range_valid(struct kvm_numa_info *numa_info) +{ + unsigned long i; + struct kvm_numa_node *numa_node, *prev_numa_node; + + prev_numa_node = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < numa_info->numa_cnt; i++) { + numa_node = &numa_info->numa_nodes[i]; + if (numa_node->ipa_start + numa_node->ipa_size < numa_node->ipa_start) + return false; + if (prev_numa_node && + numa_node->ipa_start < prev_numa_node->ipa_start + prev_numa_node->ipa_size) + return false; + prev_numa_node = numa_node; + } + if (numa_node->ipa_start + numa_node->ipa_size > CVM_IPA_MAX_VAL) + return false; + return true; +} + int kvm_load_user_data(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long arg) { struct kvm_user_data user_data; @@ -766,26 +791,34 @@ int kvm_load_user_data(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long arg) return -EFAULT; if (copy_from_user(&user_data, argp, sizeof(user_data))) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; numa_info = &user_data.numa_info; if (numa_info->numa_cnt > MAX_NUMA_NODE) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; if (numa_info->numa_cnt > 0) { unsigned long i, total_size = 0; struct kvm_numa_node *numa_node = &numa_info->numa_nodes[0]; unsigned long ipa_end = numa_node->ipa_start + numa_node->ipa_size; + if (!is_numa_ipa_range_valid(numa_info)) + return -EINVAL; if (user_data.loader_start < numa_node->ipa_start || user_data.dtb_end > ipa_end) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < numa_info->numa_cnt; i++) total_size += numa_info->numa_nodes[i].ipa_size; if (total_size != user_data.ram_size) - return -EFAULT; + return -EINVAL; } + if (user_data.image_end <= user_data.loader_start || + user_data.initrd_start < user_data.image_end || + user_data.dtb_end < user_data.initrd_start || + user_data.ram_size < user_data.dtb_end - user_data.loader_start) + return -EINVAL; + cvm->loader_start = user_data.loader_start; cvm->image_end = user_data.image_end; cvm->initrd_start = user_data.initrd_start; @@ -871,6 +904,7 @@ int kvm_init_cvm_vm(struct kvm *kvm) return -ENOMEM; cvm->params = params; + WRITE_ONCE(cvm->state, CVM_STATE_NONE); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c index 2c2f23f35..153930d01 100644 --- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c +++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c @@ -2905,7 +2905,7 @@ static void its_free_tables(struct its_node *its) for (i = 0; i < GITS_BASER_NR_REGS; i++) { if (its->tables[i].base) { #ifdef CONFIG_CVM_GUEST - if (!is_cvm_world()) + if (is_cvm_world()) its_free_shared_pages(its->tables[i].base, its->tables[i].order); else -- 2.25.1.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit 0c3248bc708a7797be573214065cf908ff1f54c7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TMCC CVE: CVE-2024-36883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream. net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index cbff7d94b993..15995cbe6b74 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -86,12 +86,15 @@ u64 __net_gen_cookie(struct net *net) static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { + unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs); + unsigned int generic_size; struct net_generic *ng; - unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]); + + generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]); ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (ng) - ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs; + ng->s.len = gen_ptrs; return ng; } @@ -1234,7 +1237,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list, if (error < 0) return error; *ops->id = error; - max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1); + /* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold + * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect + * net_alloc_generic. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1)); } error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops); if (error) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit 0c3248bc708a7797be573214065cf908ff1f54c7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TMCC CVE: CVE-2024-36883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream. net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index 20a0fc4d059b..cd867cb408c9 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -74,12 +74,15 @@ DEFINE_COOKIE(net_cookie); static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { + unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs); + unsigned int generic_size; struct net_generic *ng; - unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]); + + generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]); ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (ng) - ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs; + ng->s.len = gen_ptrs; return ng; } @@ -1228,7 +1231,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list, if (error < 0) return error; *ops->id = error; - max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1); + /* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold + * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect + * net_alloc_generic. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1)); } error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops); if (error) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: fix out-of-bounds access in ops_init
by Zhengchao Shao 11 Jun '24

11 Jun '24

From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit b6dbfd5bcc267a95a0bf1bf96af46243f96ec6cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9TMCC CVE: CVE-2024-36883 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a26ff37e624d12e28077e5b24d2b264f62764ad6 upstream. net_alloc_generic is called by net_alloc, which is called without any locking. It reads max_gen_ptrs, which is changed under pernet_ops_rwsem. It is read twice, first to allocate an array, then to set s.len, which is later used to limit the bounds of the array access. It is possible that the array is allocated and another thread is registering a new pernet ops, increments max_gen_ptrs, which is then used to set s.len with a larger than allocated length for the variable array. Fix it by reading max_gen_ptrs only once in net_alloc_generic. If max_gen_ptrs is later incremented, it will be caught in net_assign_generic. Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo(a)igalia.com> Fixes: 073862ba5d24 ("netns: fix net_alloc_generic()") Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240502132006.3430840-1-cascardo@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/net_namespace.c | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/net_namespace.c b/net/core/net_namespace.c index f4183c4c1ec8..ebea4fa69976 100644 --- a/net/core/net_namespace.c +++ b/net/core/net_namespace.c @@ -69,12 +69,15 @@ DEFINE_COOKIE(net_cookie); static struct net_generic *net_alloc_generic(void) { + unsigned int gen_ptrs = READ_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs); + unsigned int generic_size; struct net_generic *ng; - unsigned int generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[max_gen_ptrs]); + + generic_size = offsetof(struct net_generic, ptr[gen_ptrs]); ng = kzalloc(generic_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (ng) - ng->s.len = max_gen_ptrs; + ng->s.len = gen_ptrs; return ng; } @@ -1229,7 +1232,11 @@ static int register_pernet_operations(struct list_head *list, if (error < 0) return error; *ops->id = error; - max_gen_ptrs = max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1); + /* This does not require READ_ONCE as writers already hold + * pernet_ops_rwsem. But WRITE_ONCE is needed to protect + * net_alloc_generic. + */ + WRITE_ONCE(max_gen_ptrs, max(max_gen_ptrs, *ops->id + 1)); } error = __register_pernet_operations(list, ops); if (error) { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[openeuler:openEuler-1.0-LTS 18534/22827] drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c:614:3-8: WARNING: NULL check before some freeing functions is not needed.
by kernel test robot 10 Jun '24

10 Jun '24

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git openEuler-1.0-LTS head: 6a98543755cf2f636ae3169f3774d226d328d2cf commit: b8815fbbe89b0d15fa3296c3e57d2197a92f5bc0 [18534/22827] ACPI: CPPC: Fix cppc_cpufreq_init failed in CPU Hotplug situation config: x86_64-randconfig-103-20240609 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240610/202406100658.RXAKSKac-lkp@…) compiler: clang version 18.1.5 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 617a15a9eac96088ae5e9134248d8236e34b91b1) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202406100658.RXAKSKac-lkp@intel.com/ cocci warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>) >> drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c:614:3-8: WARNING: NULL check before some freeing functions is not needed. vim +614 drivers/acpi/cppc_acpi.c 576 577 int acpi_get_psd_map(struct cppc_cpudata **all_cpu_data) 578 { 579 struct cpc_desc **cpc_pptr, *cpc_ptr; 580 int parsed_core_num = 0; 581 int i, ret; 582 583 cpc_pptr = kcalloc(num_possible_cpus(), sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL); 584 if (!cpc_pptr) 585 return -ENOMEM; 586 for_each_possible_cpu(i) { 587 cpc_pptr[i] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cpc_desc), GFP_KERNEL); 588 if (!cpc_pptr[i]) { 589 ret = -ENOMEM; 590 goto out; 591 } 592 } 593 594 /* 595 * We can not use acpi_get_devices() to walk the processor devices 596 * because some processor device is not present. 597 */ 598 ret = acpi_walk_namespace(ACPI_TYPE_DEVICE, ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT, 599 ACPI_UINT32_MAX, acpi_parse_cpc, NULL, 600 cpc_pptr, (void **)&parsed_core_num); 601 if (ret) 602 goto out; 603 if (parsed_core_num != num_possible_cpus()) { 604 ret = -EINVAL; 605 goto out; 606 } 607 608 ret = __acpi_get_psd_map(all_cpu_data, cpc_pptr); 609 610 out: 611 for_each_possible_cpu(i) { 612 cpc_ptr = cpc_pptr[i]; 613 if (cpc_ptr) > 614 kfree(cpc_ptr); 615 } 616 kfree(cpc_pptr); 617 618 return ret; 619 } 620 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(acpi_get_psd_map); 621 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nsh: Restore skb->{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in nsh_gso_segment().
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit 696d18bb59727a2e0526c0802a812620be1c9340 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U8MH CVE: CVE-2024-36933 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4b911a9690d72641879ea6d13cce1de31d346d79 ] syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols: ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS. As the inner protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers. nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before calling skb_mac_gso_segment() 1. reset skb->network_header 2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable 3. pull the NSH header 4. resets skb->mac_header 5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol. and does the following for the segmented skb 6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol 7. push the NSH header 8. restore skb->mac_header 9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header 10. restore skb->mac_len There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9. (a) After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev. Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH), skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment(). (b) While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9, nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear buffer is shifted. However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot. If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to the middle of the outer header. It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far. At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header. To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651 skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647 udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6ad3b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/nsh/nsh.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/nsh/nsh.c b/net/nsh/nsh.c index f4a38bd6a7e04..bfb7758063f31 100644 --- a/net/nsh/nsh.c +++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c @@ -77,13 +77,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nsh_pop); static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t features) { + unsigned int outer_hlen, mac_len, nsh_len; struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header; - unsigned int nsh_len, mac_len; - __be16 proto; + __be16 outer_proto, proto; skb_reset_network_header(skb); + outer_proto = skb->protocol; + outer_hlen = skb_mac_header_len(skb); mac_len = skb->mac_len; if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN))) @@ -113,10 +115,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, } for (skb = segs; skb; skb = skb->next) { - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_NSH); - __skb_push(skb, nsh_len); - skb->mac_header = mac_offset; - skb->network_header = skb->mac_header + mac_len; + skb->protocol = outer_proto; + __skb_push(skb, nsh_len + outer_hlen); + skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + skb_set_network_header(skb, outer_hlen); skb->mac_len = mac_len; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] nsh: Restore skb->{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in nsh_gso_segment().
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.314 commit a7c2c3c1caabcb4a3d6c47284c397507aaf54fe9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U8MH CVE: CVE-2024-36933 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4b911a9690d72641879ea6d13cce1de31d346d79 ] syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols: ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS. As the inner protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers. nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before calling skb_mac_gso_segment() 1. reset skb->network_header 2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable 3. pull the NSH header 4. resets skb->mac_header 5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol. and does the following for the segmented skb 6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol 7. push the NSH header 8. restore skb->mac_header 9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header 10. restore skb->mac_len There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9. (a) After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev. Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH), skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment(). (b) While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9, nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear buffer is shifted. However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot. If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to the middle of the outer header. It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far. At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header. To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651 skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647 udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6ad3b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/nsh/nsh.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/nsh/nsh.c b/net/nsh/nsh.c index a5fa25555d7eb..a2285b050f6aa 100644 --- a/net/nsh/nsh.c +++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c @@ -79,13 +79,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nsh_pop); static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t features) { + unsigned int outer_hlen, mac_len, nsh_len; struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header; - unsigned int nsh_len, mac_len; - __be16 proto; + __be16 outer_proto, proto; skb_reset_network_header(skb); + outer_proto = skb->protocol; + outer_hlen = skb_mac_header_len(skb); mac_len = skb->mac_len; if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN))) @@ -115,10 +117,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, } for (skb = segs; skb; skb = skb->next) { - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_NSH); - __skb_push(skb, nsh_len); - skb->mac_header = mac_offset; - skb->network_header = skb->mac_header + mac_len; + skb->protocol = outer_proto; + __skb_push(skb, nsh_len + outer_hlen); + skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + skb_set_network_header(skb, outer_hlen); skb->mac_len = mac_len; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nsh: Restore skb->{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in nsh_gso_segment().
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit bbccf0caef2fa917d6d0692385a06ce3c262a216 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U8MH CVE: CVE-2024-36933 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 4b911a9690d72641879ea6d13cce1de31d346d79 ] syzbot triggered various splats (see [0] and links) by a crafted GSO packet of VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_UDP layering the following protocols: ETH_P_8021AD + ETH_P_NSH + ETH_P_IPV6 + IPPROTO_UDP NSH can encapsulate IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, NSH, and MPLS. As the inner protocol can be Ethernet, NSH GSO handler, nsh_gso_segment(), calls skb_mac_gso_segment() to invoke inner protocol GSO handlers. nsh_gso_segment() does the following for the original skb before calling skb_mac_gso_segment() 1. reset skb->network_header 2. save the original skb->{mac_heaeder,mac_len} in a local variable 3. pull the NSH header 4. resets skb->mac_header 5. set up skb->mac_len and skb->protocol for the inner protocol. and does the following for the segmented skb 6. set ntohs(ETH_P_NSH) to skb->protocol 7. push the NSH header 8. restore skb->mac_header 9. set skb->mac_header + mac_len to skb->network_header 10. restore skb->mac_len There are two problems in 6-7 and 8-9. (a) After 6 & 7, skb->data points to the NSH header, so the outer header (ETH_P_8021AD in this case) is stripped when skb is sent out of netdev. Also, if NSH is encapsulated by NSH + Ethernet (so NSH-Ethernet-NSH), skb_pull() in the first nsh_gso_segment() will make skb->data point to the middle of the outer NSH or Ethernet header because the Ethernet header is not pulled by the second nsh_gso_segment(). (b) While restoring skb->{mac_header,network_header} in 8 & 9, nsh_gso_segment() does not assume that the data in the linear buffer is shifted. However, udp6_ufo_fragment() could shift the data and change skb->mac_header accordingly as demonstrated by syzbot. If this happens, even the restored skb->mac_header points to the middle of the outer header. It seems nsh_gso_segment() has never worked with outer headers so far. At the end of nsh_gso_segment(), the outer header must be restored for the segmented skb, instead of the NSH header. To do that, let's calculate the outer header position relatively from the inner header and set skb->{data,mac_header,protocol} properly. [0]: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_process_outbound drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:524 [inline] ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602 [inline] ipvlan_queue_xmit+0xf44/0x16b0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:668 ipvlan_start_xmit+0x5c/0x1a0 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:222 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4989 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:5003 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3547 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x244/0xa10 net/core/dev.c:3563 __dev_queue_xmit+0x33ed/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4351 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3819 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x705/0x1000 mm/slub.c:4001 kmalloc_reserve+0x249/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:582 __alloc_skb+0x352/0x790 net/core/skbuff.c:651 skb_segment+0x20aa/0x7080 net/core/skbuff.c:4647 udp6_ufo_fragment+0xcab/0x1150 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x14be/0x2ca0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:152 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 nsh_gso_segment+0x6f4/0xf70 net/nsh/nsh.c:108 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x3e8/0x760 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x4b0/0x730 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x107f/0x1930 net/core/dev.c:3628 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f28/0x51c0 net/core/dev.c:4343 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3171 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6b0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8aef/0x9f10 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x735/0xa10 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcf/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b CPU: 1 PID: 5101 Comm: syz-executor421 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc5-syzkaller-00297-gf2e367d6ad3b #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 Fixes: c411ed854584 ("nsh: add GSO support") Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+42a0dc856239de4de60e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=42a0dc856239de4de60e Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c298c9f0e46a3c86332b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c298c9f0e46a3c86332b Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240415222041.18537-1-kuniyu@amazon.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240424023549.21862-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/nsh/nsh.c | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/nsh/nsh.c b/net/nsh/nsh.c index 0f23e5e8e03eb..3e0fc71d95a14 100644 --- a/net/nsh/nsh.c +++ b/net/nsh/nsh.c @@ -76,13 +76,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nsh_pop); static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t features) { + unsigned int outer_hlen, mac_len, nsh_len; struct sk_buff *segs = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); u16 mac_offset = skb->mac_header; - unsigned int nsh_len, mac_len; - __be16 proto; + __be16 outer_proto, proto; skb_reset_network_header(skb); + outer_proto = skb->protocol; + outer_hlen = skb_mac_header_len(skb); mac_len = skb->mac_len; if (unlikely(!pskb_may_pull(skb, NSH_BASE_HDR_LEN))) @@ -112,10 +114,10 @@ static struct sk_buff *nsh_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, } for (skb = segs; skb; skb = skb->next) { - skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_NSH); - __skb_push(skb, nsh_len); - skb->mac_header = mac_offset; - skb->network_header = skb->mac_header + mac_len; + skb->protocol = outer_proto; + __skb_push(skb, nsh_len + outer_hlen); + skb_reset_mac_header(skb); + skb_set_network_header(skb, outer_hlen); skb->mac_len = mac_len; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/2] CVE-2024-36933
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

Patchset of CVE-2024-36933. Dong Chenchen (1): net: nsh: Use correct mac_offset to unwind gso skb in nsh_gso_segment() Kuniyuki Iwashima (1): nsh: Restore skb->{protocol,data,mac_header} for outer header in nsh_gso_segment(). net/nsh/nsh.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 V1] scsi: lpfc: Move NPIV's transport unregistration to after resource clean up
by Cheng Yu 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc2 commit 4ddf01f2f1504fa08b766e8cfeec558e9f8eef6c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UMD0 CVE: CVE-2024-36952 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There are cases after NPIV deletion where the fabric switch still believes the NPIV is logged into the fabric. This occurs when a vport is unregistered before the Remove All DA_ID CT and LOGO ELS are sent to the fabric. Currently fc_remove_host(), which calls dev_loss_tmo for all D_IDs including the fabric D_ID, removes the last ndlp reference and frees the ndlp rport object. This sometimes causes the race condition where the final DA_ID and LOGO are skipped from being sent to the fabric switch. Fix by moving the fc_remove_host() and scsi_remove_host() calls after DA_ID and LOGO are sent. Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305200503.57317-3-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c index 6c7559cf1a4b..9e0e9e02d2c4 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c @@ -683,10 +683,6 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) lpfc_free_sysfs_attr(vport); lpfc_debugfs_terminate(vport); - /* Remove FC host to break driver binding. */ - fc_remove_host(shost); - scsi_remove_host(shost); - /* Send the DA_ID and Fabric LOGO to cleanup Nameserver entries. */ ndlp = lpfc_findnode_did(vport, Fabric_DID); if (!ndlp) @@ -730,6 +726,10 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) skip_logo: + /* Remove FC host to break driver binding. */ + fc_remove_host(shost); + scsi_remove_host(shost); + lpfc_cleanup(vport); /* Remove scsi host now. The nodes are cleaned up. */ -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 V1] scsi: lpfc: Move NPIV's transport unregistration to after resource clean up
by Cheng Yu 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc2 commit 4ddf01f2f1504fa08b766e8cfeec558e9f8eef6c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UMD0 CVE: CVE-2024-36952 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There are cases after NPIV deletion where the fabric switch still believes the NPIV is logged into the fabric. This occurs when a vport is unregistered before the Remove All DA_ID CT and LOGO ELS are sent to the fabric. Currently fc_remove_host(), which calls dev_loss_tmo for all D_IDs including the fabric D_ID, removes the last ndlp reference and frees the ndlp rport object. This sometimes causes the race condition where the final DA_ID and LOGO are skipped from being sent to the fabric switch. Fix by moving the fc_remove_host() and scsi_remove_host() calls after DA_ID and LOGO are sent. Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305200503.57317-3-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c [There are only context conficts, no code logic conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c index aa4e451d5dc1..02871d73a502 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c @@ -668,10 +668,6 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) ns_ndlp_referenced = true; } - /* Remove FC host and then SCSI host with the vport */ - fc_remove_host(shost); - scsi_remove_host(shost); - ndlp = lpfc_findnode_did(phba->pport, Fabric_DID); /* In case of driver unload, we shall not perform fabric logo as the @@ -774,6 +770,10 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) skip_logo: + /* Remove FC host and then SCSI host with the vport */ + fc_remove_host(shost); + scsi_remove_host(shost); + /* * If the NameServer ndlp has been incremented to allow the DA_ID CT * command to be sent, decrement the ndlp now. -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] scsi: lpfc: Move NPIV's transport unregistration to after resource clean up
by Cheng Yu 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc2 commit 4ddf01f2f1504fa08b766e8cfeec558e9f8eef6c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UMD0 CVE: CVE-2024-36952 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There are cases after NPIV deletion where the fabric switch still believes the NPIV is logged into the fabric. This occurs when a vport is unregistered before the Remove All DA_ID CT and LOGO ELS are sent to the fabric. Currently fc_remove_host(), which calls dev_loss_tmo for all D_IDs including the fabric D_ID, removes the last ndlp reference and frees the ndlp rport object. This sometimes causes the race condition where the final DA_ID and LOGO are skipped from being sent to the fabric switch. Fix by moving the fc_remove_host() and scsi_remove_host() calls after DA_ID and LOGO are sent. Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305200503.57317-3-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c [There are only context conficts, no code logic conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c index 1ff0f7de9105..0b60ae657030 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c @@ -690,10 +690,6 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) ns_ndlp_referenced = true; } - /* Remove FC host and then SCSI host with the vport */ - fc_remove_host(shost); - scsi_remove_host(shost); - ndlp = lpfc_findnode_did(phba->pport, Fabric_DID); /* In case of driver unload, we shall not perform fabric logo as the @@ -796,6 +792,10 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) skip_logo: + /* Remove FC host and then SCSI host with the vport */ + fc_remove_host(shost); + scsi_remove_host(shost); + /* * If the NameServer ndlp has been incremented to allow the DA_ID CT * command to be sent, decrement the ndlp now. -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 V1] scsi: lpfc: Move NPIV's transport unregistration to after resource clean up
by Cheng Yu 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc2 commit 4ddf01f2f1504fa08b766e8cfeec558e9f8eef6c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UMD0 CVE: CVE-2024-36952 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- There are cases after NPIV deletion where the fabric switch still believes the NPIV is logged into the fabric. This occurs when a vport is unregistered before the Remove All DA_ID CT and LOGO ELS are sent to the fabric. Currently fc_remove_host(), which calls dev_loss_tmo for all D_IDs including the fabric D_ID, removes the last ndlp reference and frees the ndlp rport object. This sometimes causes the race condition where the final DA_ID and LOGO are skipped from being sent to the fabric switch. Fix by moving the fc_remove_host() and scsi_remove_host() calls after DA_ID and LOGO are sent. Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240305200503.57317-3-justintee8345@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c [There are only context conficts, no code logic conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c index aa4e451d5dc1..02871d73a502 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_vport.c @@ -668,10 +668,6 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) ns_ndlp_referenced = true; } - /* Remove FC host and then SCSI host with the vport */ - fc_remove_host(shost); - scsi_remove_host(shost); - ndlp = lpfc_findnode_did(phba->pport, Fabric_DID); /* In case of driver unload, we shall not perform fabric logo as the @@ -774,6 +770,10 @@ lpfc_vport_delete(struct fc_vport *fc_vport) skip_logo: + /* Remove FC host and then SCSI host with the vport */ + fc_remove_host(shost); + scsi_remove_host(shost); + /* * If the NameServer ndlp has been incremented to allow the DA_ID CT * command to be sent, decrement the ndlp now. -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cvm_tsi: enhance security for cvm tsi
by Shengjie Li 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

virtcca inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I9Q85J -------------------------------- enhance security for Confidential cVM tsi: Signed-off-by: Shengjie Li <lishengjie12(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h | 22 +++---- arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h | 11 ++-- arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c | 89 ++++++++++++++------------- 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h index c4d56333e3..91688bc169 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cvm_smc.h @@ -124,30 +124,30 @@ static inline unsigned long tsi_measurement_read(struct cvm_measurement *cvm_mea return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_init(unsigned char *challenge) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - unsigned char *challenge; + unsigned char *buf; - challenge = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!challenge) + buf = kmalloc(CHALLENGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(challenge, attest_cmd->challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); + memcpy(buf, challenge, CHALLENGE_SIZE); - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(challenge), &res); - kfree(challenge); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_INIT, virt_to_phys(buf), &res); + kfree(buf); return res.a0; } -static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_attestation_cmd *attest_cmd) +static inline unsigned long tsi_attestation_token_continue(struct cvm_token_granule *token_granule) { struct arm_smccc_res res; - arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(attest_cmd->granule_ipa), - attest_cmd->offset, attest_cmd->size, &res); + arm_smccc_1_1_smc(SMC_TSI_ATTESTATION_TOKEN_CONTINUE, virt_to_phys(token_granule->ipa), + token_granule->offset, token_granule->size, &res); - attest_cmd->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; + token_granule->num_wr_bytes = res.a1; return res.a0; } diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h index 43e17a0da0..1ed4386db2 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/cvm_tsi.h @@ -55,10 +55,13 @@ struct cvm_measurement_extend { struct cvm_attestation_cmd { unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; /* input: challenge value */ - unsigned long token_size; /* return: challenge value */ - void *granule_head; - void *granule_ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ - unsigned long granule_count; + unsigned long token_size; /* return: token size */ +}; + +struct cvm_token_granule { + void *head; + void *ipa; /* IPA of the Granule to which the token will be written */ + unsigned long count; unsigned long offset; /* Offset within Granule to start of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long size; /* Size of buffer in bytes */ unsigned long num_wr_bytes; /* Number of bytes written to buffer */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c index b48e5b17f4..252fe5352a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cvm_tsi.c @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/preempt.h> +#include <asm/cvm_guest.h> #include <asm/cvm_smc.h> #include <asm/cvm_tsi.h> @@ -16,20 +17,19 @@ struct attestation_token { static struct attestation_token token; +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock); + static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg); -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file); static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, size_t size, loff_t *offset); static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg); -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token); +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg); static int tmm_get_device_cert(struct cca_device_cert __user *arg); static const struct file_operations tmm_tsi_fops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .read = tmm_token_read, - .release = tmm_tsi_release, .unlocked_ioctl = tmm_tsi_ioctl }; @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) unsigned long ver; int ret; + if (!is_cvm_world()) + return -EIO; + ver = tsi_get_version(); if (ver == SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: SMC return not supported!\n"); @@ -56,6 +59,11 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) return ret; } + /* Allocate a large memory */ + token.buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!token.buf) + return -ENOMEM; + pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module loaded (version %lu.%lu).\n", TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MAJOR(ver), TSI_ABI_VERSION_GET_MINOR(ver)); @@ -65,8 +73,10 @@ static int __init tmm_tsi_init(void) static void __exit tmm_tsi_exit(void) { - if (token.buf != NULL) + if (token.buf != NULL) { + memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); kfree(token.buf); + } misc_deregister(&ioctl_dev); pr_warn("tmm_tsi: module unloaded.\n"); } @@ -80,7 +90,7 @@ static long tmm_tsi_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg ret = tmm_get_tsi_version((struct cvm_tsi_version *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_ATTESTATION_TOKEN: - ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg, &token); + ret = tmm_get_attestation_token((struct cvm_attestation_cmd *)arg); break; case TMM_GET_DEVICE_CERT: ret = tmm_get_device_cert((struct cca_device_cert *)arg); @@ -99,28 +109,25 @@ static ssize_t tmm_token_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buffer, int ret; int to_copy; - if (*offset >= token.size) + spin_lock(&lock); + if (*offset >= token.size) { + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; + } to_copy = min((int)size, (int)(token.size - *offset)); ret = copy_to_user(user_buffer, token.buf + *offset, to_copy); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy token to user failed (%d)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -1; } *offset += to_copy; + spin_unlock(&lock); return to_copy; } -static int tmm_tsi_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) -{ - if (token.buf != NULL) { - memset(token.buf, 0, GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); - kfree(token.buf); - } - return 0; -} static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) { @@ -141,65 +148,61 @@ static int tmm_get_tsi_version(struct cvm_tsi_version __user *arg) return 0; } -static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg, - struct attestation_token *attest_token) +static int tmm_get_attestation_token(struct cvm_attestation_cmd __user *arg) { unsigned long ret; - struct cvm_attestation_cmd cmd = {0}; + struct cvm_token_granule token_granule = {0}; + unsigned char challenge[CHALLENGE_SIZE]; - ret = copy_from_user(&(cmd.challenge), &(arg->challenge), sizeof(cmd.challenge)); + ret = copy_from_user(challenge, &(arg->challenge), CHALLENGE_SIZE); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data from user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); return -EFAULT; } - /* Allocate a large memory */ - attest_token->buf = kmalloc(GRANULE_SIZE * MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!attest_token->buf) - return -ENOMEM; - cmd.granule_head = attest_token->buf; - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head; + spin_lock(&lock); + token_granule.head = token.buf; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head; - /* preempt_disable(); */ - - ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(&cmd); + ret = tsi_attestation_token_init(challenge); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: tsi call tsi_attestation_token_init failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EIO; } do { /* Retrieve one Granule of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.granule_ipa = cmd.granule_head + - (unsigned long)(cmd.granule_count * GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.offset = 0; + token_granule.ipa = token_granule.head + + (unsigned long)(token_granule.count * GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.offset = 0; do { /* Retrieve sub-Granule chunk of data per loop iteration */ - cmd.size = GRANULE_SIZE - cmd.offset; - ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&cmd); - cmd.offset += cmd.num_wr_bytes; - } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && cmd.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); + token_granule.size = GRANULE_SIZE - token_granule.offset; + ret = tsi_attestation_token_continue(&token_granule); + token_granule.offset += token_granule.num_wr_bytes; + } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE && token_granule.offset < GRANULE_SIZE); - cmd.granule_count += 1; - if (cmd.granule_count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { + token_granule.count += 1; + if (token_granule.count >= MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE && ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: macro MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE (%d) is too small!\n", MAX_TOKEN_GRANULE_PAGE); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -ENOMEM; } } while (ret == TSI_INCOMPLETE); - /* preempt_enable(); */ - /* Send to user space the total size of the token */ - cmd.granule_count = cmd.granule_count - 1; - cmd.token_size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * cmd.granule_count) + cmd.offset; - attest_token->size = cmd.token_size; + token_granule.count = token_granule.count - 1; + token.size = (unsigned long)(GRANULE_SIZE * token_granule.count) + token_granule.offset; - ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(cmd.token_size), sizeof(cmd.token_size)); + ret = copy_to_user(&(arg->token_size), &(token.size), sizeof(token.size)); if (ret) { pr_err("tmm_tsi: copy data to user failed (%lu)!\n", ret); + spin_unlock(&lock); return -EFAULT; } + spin_unlock(&lock); return 0; } -- 2.37.2.windows.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit faa83a7797f06cefed86731ba4baa3b4dfdc06c1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U9P7 CVE: CVE-2024-36929 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d091e579b864fa790dd6a0cd537a22c383126681 ] SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later call to skb_gso_segment. Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skbuff.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 5197b286ef18d..120290a9d2078 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -1534,11 +1534,17 @@ static inline int skb_alloc_rx_flag(const struct sk_buff *skb) struct sk_buff *skb_copy(const struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { - int headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); - unsigned int size = skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len; - struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, - skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), NUMA_NO_NODE); + struct sk_buff *n; + unsigned int size; + int headerlen; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)) + return NULL; + headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); + size = skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len; + n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, + skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), NUMA_NO_NODE); if (!n) return NULL; @@ -1799,12 +1805,17 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_copy_expand(const struct sk_buff *skb, /* * Allocate the copy buffer */ - struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom, - gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), - NUMA_NO_NODE); - int oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb); int head_copy_len, head_copy_off; + struct sk_buff *n; + int oldheadroom; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)) + return NULL; + oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb); + n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom, + gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), + NUMA_NO_NODE); if (!n) return NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.217 commit faa83a7797f06cefed86731ba4baa3b4dfdc06c1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U9P7 CVE: CVE-2024-36929 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d091e579b864fa790dd6a0cd537a22c383126681 ] SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later call to skb_gso_segment. Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skbuff.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 779a860e00731..de0229b8a920c 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -1540,11 +1540,17 @@ static inline int skb_alloc_rx_flag(const struct sk_buff *skb) struct sk_buff *skb_copy(const struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { - int headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); - unsigned int size = skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len; - struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, - skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), NUMA_NO_NODE); + struct sk_buff *n; + unsigned int size; + int headerlen; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)) + return NULL; + headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); + size = skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len; + n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, + skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), NUMA_NO_NODE); if (!n) return NULL; @@ -1856,12 +1862,17 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_copy_expand(const struct sk_buff *skb, /* * Allocate the copy buffer */ - struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom, - gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), - NUMA_NO_NODE); - int oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb); int head_copy_len, head_copy_off; + struct sk_buff *n; + int oldheadroom; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)) + return NULL; + oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb); + n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom, + gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), + NUMA_NO_NODE); if (!n) return NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: core: reject skb_copy(_expand) for fraglist GSO skbs
by Ziyang Xuan 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.31 commit cfe34d86ef9765c388f145039006bb79b6c81ac6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9U9P7 CVE: CVE-2024-36929 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d091e579b864fa790dd6a0cd537a22c383126681 ] SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs must not be linearized, otherwise they become invalid. Return NULL if such an skb is passed to skb_copy or skb_copy_expand, in order to prevent a crash on a potential later call to skb_gso_segment. Fixes: 3a1296a38d0c ("net: Support GRO/GSO fraglist chaining.") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skbuff.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index 60876262b3fb3..f0a9ef1aeaa29 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -1971,11 +1971,17 @@ static inline int skb_alloc_rx_flag(const struct sk_buff *skb) struct sk_buff *skb_copy(const struct sk_buff *skb, gfp_t gfp_mask) { - int headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); - unsigned int size = skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len; - struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, - skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), NUMA_NO_NODE); + struct sk_buff *n; + unsigned int size; + int headerlen; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)) + return NULL; + headerlen = skb_headroom(skb); + size = skb_end_offset(skb) + skb->data_len; + n = __alloc_skb(size, gfp_mask, + skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), NUMA_NO_NODE); if (!n) return NULL; @@ -2303,12 +2309,17 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_copy_expand(const struct sk_buff *skb, /* * Allocate the copy buffer */ - struct sk_buff *n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom, - gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), - NUMA_NO_NODE); - int oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb); int head_copy_len, head_copy_off; + struct sk_buff *n; + int oldheadroom; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)) + return NULL; + oldheadroom = skb_headroom(skb); + n = __alloc_skb(newheadroom + skb->len + newtailroom, + gfp_mask, skb_alloc_rx_flag(skb), + NUMA_NO_NODE); if (!n) return NULL; -- 2.25.1

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[openeuler:OLK-5.10] BUILD SUCCESS 9e1339f3705f9326a4594db2783ca5d7522d1a9c
by kernel test robot 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

tree/branch: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-5.10 branch HEAD: 9e1339f3705f9326a4594db2783ca5d7522d1a9c !8684 tcp: properly terminate timers for kernel sockets Warning ids grouped by kconfigs: clang_recent_errors `-- x86_64-allnoconfig |-- drivers-arm-spe-spe.c:linux-perf-arm_pmu.h-is-included-more-than-once. |-- drivers-net-ethernet-yunsilicon-xsc-net-main.c:common-qp.h-is-included-more-than-once. |-- drivers-ub-urma-ubcore-ubcore_cdev_file.c:linux-version.h-not-needed. |-- drivers-ub-urma-ubcore-ubcore_device.c:linux-version.h-not-needed. |-- drivers-ub-urma-ubcore-ubcore_genl.c:linux-version.h-not-needed. |-- drivers-ub-urma-ubcore-ubcore_genl_admin.c:linux-version.h-not-needed. |-- drivers-ub-urma-ubcore-ubcore_uvs_cmd.c:ubcore_device.h-is-included-more-than-once. `-- drivers-ub-urma-uburma-uburma_mmap.c:linux-version.h-not-needed. elapsed time: 1237m configs tested: 35 configs skipped: 131 The following configs have been built successfully. More configs may be tested in the coming days. tested configs: arm64 allmodconfig clang arm64 allnoconfig gcc arm64 defconfig gcc arm64 randconfig-001-20240609 gcc arm64 randconfig-002-20240609 clang arm64 randconfig-003-20240609 gcc arm64 randconfig-004-20240609 gcc x86_64 allnoconfig clang x86_64 allyesconfig clang x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-001-20240609 clang x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-002-20240609 clang x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-003-20240609 clang x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-004-20240609 gcc x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-005-20240609 clang x86_64 buildonly-randconfig-006-20240609 gcc x86_64 defconfig gcc x86_64 randconfig-001-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-002-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-003-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-004-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-005-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-006-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-011-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-012-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-013-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-014-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-015-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-016-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-071-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-072-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-073-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-074-20240609 clang x86_64 randconfig-075-20240609 gcc x86_64 randconfig-076-20240609 gcc x86_64 rhel-8.3-rust clang -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 V1] drm/vmwgfx: Fix invalid reads in fence signaled events
by Cheng Yu 09 Jun '24

09 Jun '24

From: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc7 commit a37ef7613c00f2d72c8fc08bd83fb6cc76926c8c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9UNUO CVE: CVE-2024-36960 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Correctly set the length of the drm_event to the size of the structure that's actually used. The length of the drm_event was set to the parent structure instead of to the drm_vmw_event_fence which is supposed to be read. drm_read uses the length parameter to copy the event to the user space thus resuling in oob reads. Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> Fixes: 8b7de6aa8468 ("vmwgfx: Rework fence event action") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-23566 Cc: David Airlie <airlied(a)gmail.com> CC: Daniel Vetter <daniel(a)ffwll.ch> Cc: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> Cc: Broadcom internal kernel review list <bcm-kernel-feedback-list(a)broadcom.com> Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+ Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala <maaz.mombasawala(a)broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Martin Krastev <martin.krastev(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240425192748.1761522-1-zack… Signed-off-by: Cheng Yu <serein.chengyu(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c index 2a0cda324703..5efc6a766f64 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_fence.c @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ static int vmw_event_fence_action_create(struct drm_file *file_priv, } event->event.base.type = DRM_VMW_EVENT_FENCE_SIGNALED; - event->event.base.length = sizeof(*event); + event->event.base.length = sizeof(event->event); event->event.user_data = user_data; ret = drm_event_reserve_init(dev, file_priv, &event->base, &event->event.base); -- 2.25.1

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