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[PATCH OLK-5.10] wifi: mac80211: validate extension-frame layout before RX
by Gaosheng Cui 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

From: Zhao Li <enderaoelyther(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc4 commit 57d503ce32eccfa7650065ca4c560f7e29a2e676 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17512 CVE: CVE-2026-68470 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- Extension frames only have the extension header at the regular 802.11 header offset. The generic RX path can still reach helpers and interface dispatch code that read regular header address fields before unsupported extension subtypes are dropped. mac80211 currently only handles S1G beacon extension frames. Drop other extension subtypes before they can reach regular-header RX processing. For S1G beacons, linearize the SKB with the management-frame path and require the fixed S1G beacon header, including optional fixed fields indicated by frame control, before generic RX dispatch. Route S1G beacons through the station/default-link RX path without regular-header station lookup. Avoid regular-header address reads in the mac80211 RX paths that process S1G extension beacons, including accept-frame, duplicate-detection, address-copy, and MLO address-translation paths. Also make ieee80211_get_bssid() length-safe before returning the S1G source-address pointer. Fixes: 09a740ce352e ("mac80211: receive and process S1G beacons") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Zhao Li <enderaoelyther(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260611161943.91069-5-enderaoelyther@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Conflicts: net/mac80211/rx.c [Commit 57d503ce32ec built the S1G-beacon handling on top of ieee80211_rx_for_interface() and ieee80211_s1g_optional_len(), which do not exist in this tree (no include/linux/ieee80211-s1g.h). The equivalent logic is inlined into __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(): S1G beacons are dispatched with a NULL sta (skipping the regular-header addr2 station lookup), and the optional-header length check is expressed with the existing ieee80211_next_tbtt_present(). ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle() needs no S1G shortcut because this tree does not have the SW-crypto/MLO address-copy paths.] Co-authored-by: BackportAgent@deepseek-v4-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- net/mac80211/rx.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- net/mac80211/util.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 65fea564c9c0..ba25540c4013 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -1429,6 +1429,9 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_check_dup(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DUP_VALIDATED) return RX_CONTINUE; + if (ieee80211_is_ext(hdr->frame_control)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + /* * Drop duplicate 802.11 retransmissions * (IEEE 802.11-2012: 9.3.2.10 "Duplicate detection and recovery") @@ -4051,8 +4054,12 @@ static bool ieee80211_accept_frame(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data; struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); u8 *bssid = ieee80211_get_bssid(hdr, skb->len, sdata->vif.type); - bool multicast = is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) || - ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(hdr->frame_control); + bool multicast; + + if (ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(hdr->frame_control)) + return sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION && bssid; + + multicast = is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1); switch (sdata->vif.type) { case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION: @@ -4639,6 +4646,19 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, err = -ENOBUFS; else err = skb_linearize(skb); + } else if (ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(fc)) { + size_t s1g_hdr_len = offsetof(struct ieee80211_ext, + u.s1g_beacon.variable); + + if (ieee80211_next_tbtt_present(fc)) + s1g_hdr_len += 3; + + if (skb->len < s1g_hdr_len) + err = -ENOBUFS; + else + err = skb_linearize(skb); + } else if (ieee80211_is_ext(fc)) { + err = -EINVAL; } else { err = !pskb_may_pull(skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc)); } @@ -4714,7 +4734,8 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, continue; } - rx.sta = sta_info_get_bss(prev, hdr->addr2); + rx.sta = ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(hdr->frame_control) ? + NULL : sta_info_get_bss(prev, hdr->addr2); rx.sdata = prev; ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle(&rx, skb, false); @@ -4722,7 +4743,8 @@ static void __ieee80211_rx_handle_packet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, } if (prev) { - rx.sta = sta_info_get_bss(prev, hdr->addr2); + rx.sta = ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(hdr->frame_control) ? + NULL : sta_info_get_bss(prev, hdr->addr2); rx.sdata = prev; if (ieee80211_prepare_and_rx_handle(&rx, skb, true)) diff --git a/net/mac80211/util.c b/net/mac80211/util.c index e49355cbb1ce..8e27e191945d 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/util.c +++ b/net/mac80211/util.c @@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ u8 *ieee80211_get_bssid(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, size_t len, if (ieee80211_is_s1g_beacon(fc)) { struct ieee80211_ext *ext = (void *) hdr; + if (len < offsetofend(struct ieee80211_ext, u.s1g_beacon.sa)) + return NULL; + return ext->u.s1g_beacon.sa; } -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division
by Hongtao Zhang 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

From: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.151 commit 2666cddf0dd218aa9bd1f99db688d1b532eac21a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17884 CVE: CVE-2026-74444 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 85891d174707d8bddcec7a888fb4e1d17def34f3 upstream. vmw_cmd_draw() computes maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl); where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum. Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory. Reject undersized headers up front. Fixes: 7a73ba7469cb ("drm/vmwgfx: Use TTM handles instead of SIDs as user-space surface handles.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.7 Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Ian Forbes <ian.forbes(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260505222728.519626-7-zack.rusin@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c index 6e75adaae0bcd..e690751698307 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_execbuf.c @@ -1563,11 +1563,17 @@ static int vmw_cmd_draw(struct vmw_private *dev_priv, uint32_t maxnum; int ret; + cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header); + + if (unlikely(header->size < sizeof(cmd->body))) { + VMW_DEBUG_USER("Illegal DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret = vmw_cmd_cid_check(dev_priv, sw_context, header); if (unlikely(ret != 0)) return ret; - cmd = container_of(header, typeof(*cmd), header); maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl); if (unlikely(cmd->body.numVertexDecls > maxnum)) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] serial: amba-pl011: synchronize DMA teardown
by Cai Xinchen 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

From: Fan Wu <fanwu01(a)zju.edu.cn> stable inclusion from stable-6.6.154 commit c8c8e895f65fbf71ea6224e27cf8dab91b776e0d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18582 CVE: CVE-2026-80737 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------ [ Upstream commit 440915499231e9db1c361aa45bb702e8fd3b4a32 ] dmaengine_terminate_all() does not wait for a running callback, so the TX callback can still touch the TX buffer after it is freed. The RX poll timer reads the RX buffers without the port lock. Switch to dmaengine_terminate_sync() and delete the RX timer before freeing the buffers. Fixes: ead76f329f77 ("ARM: 6763/1: pl011: add optional RX DMA to PL011 v2") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01(a)zju.edu.cn> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731085915.326775-4-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ changed upstream's `timer_delete_sync()` deletion to match this tree's `del_timer_sync()` spelling at the old call site ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c index 8aa71a51cdab..4c107556ae31 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c @@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static void pl011_dma_shutdown(struct uart_amba_port *uap) if (uap->using_tx_dma) { /* In theory, this should already be done by pl011_dma_flush_buffer */ - dmaengine_terminate_all(uap->dmatx.chan); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(uap->dmatx.chan); if (uap->dmatx.queued) { dma_unmap_single(uap->dmatx.chan->device->dev, uap->dmatx.dma, uap->dmatx.len, @@ -1206,12 +1206,12 @@ static void pl011_dma_shutdown(struct uart_amba_port *uap) } if (uap->using_rx_dma) { - dmaengine_terminate_all(uap->dmarx.chan); + if (uap->dmarx.poll_rate) + timer_delete_sync(&uap->dmarx.timer); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(uap->dmarx.chan); /* Clean up the RX DMA */ pl011_dmabuf_free(uap->dmarx.chan, &uap->dmarx.dbuf_a, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); pl011_dmabuf_free(uap->dmarx.chan, &uap->dmarx.dbuf_b, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - if (uap->dmarx.poll_rate) - del_timer_sync(&uap->dmarx.timer); uap->using_rx_dma = false; } } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
by Cai Xinchen 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity(a)proton.me> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc7 commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18602 CVE: CVE-2026-80755 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1] into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the nested per-class permission table is not. Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 55fcf09b3fe4 ("selinux: add support for querying object classes and permissions from the running policy") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity(a)proton.me> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work(a)gmail.com> [PM: tweak comment for line length] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Conflicts: security/selinux/ss/policydb.c [Add rc = -ENVAL to init rc before goto bad;] Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index f70399373588..d58c9b77505a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -1109,6 +1109,11 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp) len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]); + rc = -EINVAL; + /* indexes an nprim-sized array in security_get_permissions() */ + if (perdatum->value > s->nprim) + goto bad; + rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len); if (rc) goto bad; -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH] serial: amba-pl011: synchronize DMA teardown
by Cai Xinchen 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

From: Fan Wu <fanwu01(a)zju.edu.cn> stable inclusion from stable-6.6.154 commit c8c8e895f65fbf71ea6224e27cf8dab91b776e0d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18582 CVE: CVE-2026-80737 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------ [ Upstream commit 440915499231e9db1c361aa45bb702e8fd3b4a32 ] dmaengine_terminate_all() does not wait for a running callback, so the TX callback can still touch the TX buffer after it is freed. The RX poll timer reads the RX buffers without the port lock. Switch to dmaengine_terminate_sync() and delete the RX timer before freeing the buffers. Fixes: ead76f329f77 ("ARM: 6763/1: pl011: add optional RX DMA to PL011 v2") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6 Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <fanwu01(a)zju.edu.cn> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260731085915.326775-4-fanwu01@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ changed upstream's `timer_delete_sync()` deletion to match this tree's `del_timer_sync()` spelling at the old call site ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c index 8aa71a51cdab..4c107556ae31 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c +++ b/drivers/tty/serial/amba-pl011.c @@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static void pl011_dma_shutdown(struct uart_amba_port *uap) if (uap->using_tx_dma) { /* In theory, this should already be done by pl011_dma_flush_buffer */ - dmaengine_terminate_all(uap->dmatx.chan); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(uap->dmatx.chan); if (uap->dmatx.queued) { dma_unmap_single(uap->dmatx.chan->device->dev, uap->dmatx.dma, uap->dmatx.len, @@ -1206,12 +1206,12 @@ static void pl011_dma_shutdown(struct uart_amba_port *uap) } if (uap->using_rx_dma) { - dmaengine_terminate_all(uap->dmarx.chan); + if (uap->dmarx.poll_rate) + timer_delete_sync(&uap->dmarx.timer); + dmaengine_terminate_sync(uap->dmarx.chan); /* Clean up the RX DMA */ pl011_dmabuf_free(uap->dmarx.chan, &uap->dmarx.dbuf_a, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); pl011_dmabuf_free(uap->dmarx.chan, &uap->dmarx.dbuf_b, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); - if (uap->dmarx.poll_rate) - del_timer_sync(&uap->dmarx.timer); uap->using_rx_dma = false; } } -- 2.18.0.huawei.25

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size
by Hongtao Zhang 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

From: Ian Forbes <ian.forbes(a)broadcom.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.265 commit e949adf2d42678fb391a41db277e2fcb12090566 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17161 CVE: CVE-2026-68446 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a4f55260f7f7d4dc4d0ee55063dfb0c457b77991 upstream. This field comes from userspace and should be validated against specific limits depending on which Shader Model (SM) is available. Fixes: 504901dbb0b5 ("drm/vmwgfx: Refactor surface_define to use vmw_surface_metadata") Reported-by: Zero Day Initiative <zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ian Forbes <ian.forbes(a)broadcom.com> Reviewed-by: Maaz Mombasawala <maaz.mombasawala(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Zack Rusin <zack.rusin(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260623193314.506257-1-ian.forbes@broadcom.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhang Hongtao <zhanghongtao35(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c index f1a51371de5b1..0005016a9be75 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_surface.c @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static int vmw_gb_surface_unbind(struct vmw_resource *res, static int vmw_gb_surface_destroy(struct vmw_resource *res); static int vmw_gb_surface_define_internal(struct drm_device *dev, - struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_ext_req *req, + const struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_ext_req *req, struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep, struct drm_file *file_priv); static int @@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ int vmw_gb_surface_reference_ext_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, */ static int vmw_gb_surface_define_internal(struct drm_device *dev, - struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_ext_req *req, + const struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_ext_req *req, struct drm_vmw_gb_surface_create_rep *rep, struct drm_file *file_priv) { @@ -1469,9 +1469,21 @@ vmw_gb_surface_define_internal(struct drm_device *dev, req->base.svga3d_flags); /* array_size must be null for non-GL3 host. */ - if (req->base.array_size > 0 && !has_sm4_context(dev_priv)) { - VMW_DEBUG_USER("SM4 surface not supported.\n"); - return -EINVAL; + if (req->base.array_size > 0) { + if (has_sm5_context(dev_priv)) { + if (req->base.array_size > SVGA3D_SM5_MAX_SURFACE_ARRAYSIZE) { + VMW_DEBUG_USER("Invalid Surface Array Size.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else if (has_sm4_context(dev_priv)) { + if (req->base.array_size > SVGA3D_SM4_MAX_SURFACE_ARRAYSIZE) { + VMW_DEBUG_USER("Invalid Surface Array Size.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + } else { + VMW_DEBUG_USER("SM4+ surface not supported.\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } } if (!has_sm4_1_context(dev_priv)) { -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] PCI: Check ROM header and data structure addr before accessing
by Hongtao Zhang 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Guixin Liu (2): PCI: Introduce named defines for PCI ROM PCI: Check ROM header and data structure addr before accessing drivers/pci/rom.c | 149 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 126 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] PCI: Check ROM header and data structure addr before accessing
by Hongtao Zhang 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Guixin Liu (2): PCI: Introduce named defines for PCI ROM PCI: Check ROM header and data structure addr before accessing drivers/pci/rom.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 125 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] ocfs2: validate fast symlink target during inode read
by Lai Zewei 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit e234973f286ed2e8961a24561ec91594ec3e3ff8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18148 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ocfs2_validate_inode_block() already rejects several inconsistent self-contained dinodes before they are exposed to the rest of the filesystem. Fast symlinks need the same treatment. A zero-cluster symlink is treated as a fast symlink and later read through page_get_link() and ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio(). That path uses strnlen() on the inline payload and then copies len + 1 bytes into the folio. If a corrupt dinode stores an i_size that does not fit the inline area or omits the terminating NUL at i_size, that copy reads past the end of the inode block buffer. Reject zero-cluster symlink dinodes whose i_size exceeds the inline fast-symlink capacity or whose inline payload is not NUL-terminated exactly at i_size when the inode block is validated. This keeps malformed fast symlinks from reaching the read path. Validation reproduced this kernel report: KASAN use-after-free in ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 RIP: 0033:0x7f5c6d859aa7 Read of size 3905 Call trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 (?:?) print_report+0xce/0x630 (?:?) ocfs2_fast_symlink_read_folio+0x12c/0x1f0 (fs/ocfs2/inode.c:?) srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 (?:?) __virt_addr_valid+0x19f/0x330 (?:?) kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 (?:?) kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 (?:?) __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 (?:?) filemap_read_folio+0x27/0xe0 (?:?) filemap_read_folio+0x35/0xe0 (?:?) do_read_cache_folio+0x138/0x230 (?:?) __page_get_link+0x26/0x110 (?:?) page_get_link+0x2e/0x70 (?:?) vfs_readlink+0x15e/0x250 (?:?) touch_atime+0x4d/0x370 (?:?) do_readlinkat+0x186/0x200 (?:?) do_user_addr_fault+0x65a/0x890 (?:?) __x64_sys_readlink+0x46/0x60 (?:?) do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:87) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (?:?) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260528151230.361127-1-rollkingzzc@gmail.com Fixes: ea022dfb3c2a ("ocfs: simplify symlink handling") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.5 Signed-off-by: Zhang Cen <rollkingzzc(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Gui-Dong Han <2045gemini(a)gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark(a)fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec(a)evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi(a)oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei(a)live.cn> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun(a)huawei.com> Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: fs/ocfs2/inode.c [ctx conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lai Zewei <laizewei3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c index 7c9dfd50c1c1..e5fa0070016f 100644 --- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c @@ -1418,6 +1418,29 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb, goto bail; } + if (S_ISLNK(le16_to_cpu(di->i_mode)) && + !le32_to_cpu(di->i_clusters)) { + int max_inline = ocfs2_fast_symlink_chars(sb); + u64 i_size = le64_to_cpu(di->i_size); + + if (i_size >= max_inline) { + rc = ocfs2_error(sb, + "Invalid dinode #%llu: fast symlink i_size %llu exceeds max %d\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + (unsigned long long)i_size, + max_inline - 1); + goto bail; + } + + if (strnlen((char *)di->id2.i_symlink, i_size + 1) != i_size) { + rc = ocfs2_error(sb, + "Invalid dinode #%llu: fast symlink is not NUL-terminated at i_size %llu\n", + (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr, + (unsigned long long)i_size); + goto bail; + } + } + rc = 0; bail: -- 2.52.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] perf: Fix refcount race between perf_event_open() and perf_mmap_close()
by Luo Gengkun 07 Sep '26

07 Sep '26

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18563 -------------------------------- perf_event_set_output() can succeed and add the event to a ring buffer's event_list, making it visible to concurrent perf_mmap_close(). The latter raises the event refcount via atomic_long_inc_not_zero() during its RCU-protected iteration of rb->event_list. If a subsequent check in sys_perf_event_open() fails, the error path calls free_event() which expects refcount==1. When perf_mmap_close() has already incremented it to 2, free_event() triggers a WARN. Fixes: 9bb5d40cd93c ("perf: Fix mmap() accounting hole") Signed-off-by: Luo Gengkun <luogengkun2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index ff875ddf4aeb..292419dc2ec5 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -11149,7 +11149,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, * and that will take care of freeing the event. */ if (!event_file) - free_event(event); + put_event(event); err_cred: if (task) mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); -- 2.34.1

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