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[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2] scsi: fnic: Move fnic_fnic_flush_tx() to a work queue
by Li Lingfeng 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Lee Duncan <lduncan(a)suse.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc5 commit 379a58caa19930e010b7efa1c1f3b9411d3d2ca3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HL6L CVE: CVE-2024-26917 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Rather than call 'fnic_flush_tx()' from interrupt context we should be moving it onto a work queue to avoid any locking issues. Fixes: 1a1975551943 ("scsi: fcoe: Fix potential deadlock on &fip->ctlr_lock") Co-developed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan(a)suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ce5ffa5d0ff82c2b2e283b3b4bff23291d49b05c.17075007… Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Conflict: drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic.h Commit 554a14826020 ("scsi: fnic: Refactor and redefine fnic.h for multiqueue") in mainline add copy_wq_base in fnic. Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- v1->v2: Change bugzilla to issue at gitee. drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic.h | 3 ++- drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_fcs.c | 5 +++-- drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_main.c | 1 + drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic.h b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic.h index 22cef283b2b9..dd1d248445d2 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic.h @@ -286,6 +286,7 @@ struct fnic { struct work_struct link_work; struct work_struct frame_work; + struct work_struct flush_work; struct sk_buff_head frame_queue; struct sk_buff_head tx_queue; @@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ void fnic_handle_event(struct work_struct *work); int fnic_rq_cmpl_handler(struct fnic *fnic, int); int fnic_alloc_rq_frame(struct vnic_rq *rq); void fnic_free_rq_buf(struct vnic_rq *rq, struct vnic_rq_buf *buf); -void fnic_flush_tx(struct fnic *); +void fnic_flush_tx(struct work_struct *work); void fnic_eth_send(struct fcoe_ctlr *, struct sk_buff *skb); void fnic_set_port_id(struct fc_lport *, u32, struct fc_frame *); void fnic_update_mac(struct fc_lport *, u8 *new); diff --git a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_fcs.c b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_fcs.c index 79ddfaaf71a4..daebe808579a 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_fcs.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_fcs.c @@ -1174,7 +1174,7 @@ int fnic_send(struct fc_lport *lp, struct fc_frame *fp) /** * fnic_flush_tx() - send queued frames. - * @fnic: fnic device + * @work: pointer to work element * * Send frames that were waiting to go out in FC or Ethernet mode. * Whenever changing modes we purge queued frames, so these frames should @@ -1182,8 +1182,9 @@ int fnic_send(struct fc_lport *lp, struct fc_frame *fp) * * Called without fnic_lock held. */ -void fnic_flush_tx(struct fnic *fnic) +void fnic_flush_tx(struct work_struct *work) { + struct fnic *fnic = container_of(work, struct fnic, flush_work); struct sk_buff *skb; struct fc_frame *fp; diff --git a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_main.c b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_main.c index f27f9319e0b2..de369bb03e3e 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_main.c @@ -792,6 +792,7 @@ static int fnic_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent) spin_lock_init(&fnic->vlans_lock); INIT_WORK(&fnic->fip_frame_work, fnic_handle_fip_frame); INIT_WORK(&fnic->event_work, fnic_handle_event); + INIT_WORK(&fnic->flush_work, fnic_flush_tx); skb_queue_head_init(&fnic->fip_frame_queue); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fnic->evlist); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&fnic->vlans); diff --git a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c index 416d81954819..d8b11880e19f 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/fnic/fnic_scsi.c @@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ static int fnic_fcpio_fw_reset_cmpl_handler(struct fnic *fnic, spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fnic->fnic_lock, flags); - fnic_flush_tx(fnic); + queue_work(fnic_event_queue, &fnic->flush_work); reset_cmpl_handler_end: fnic_clear_state_flags(fnic, FNIC_FLAGS_FWRESET); @@ -737,7 +737,7 @@ static int fnic_fcpio_flogi_reg_cmpl_handler(struct fnic *fnic, } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fnic->fnic_lock, flags); - fnic_flush_tx(fnic); + queue_work(fnic_event_queue, &fnic->flush_work); queue_work(fnic_event_queue, &fnic->frame_work); } else { spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fnic->fnic_lock, flags); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] bpf: Fix hashtab overflow check on 32-bit arches
by Pu Lehui 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.311 commit 33ec04cadb77605b71d9298311919303d390c4d5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I9HK6X CVE: CVE-2024-26884 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6787d916c2cf9850c97a0a3f73e08c43e7d973b1 ] The hashtab code relies on roundup_pow_of_two() to compute the number of hash buckets, and contains an overflow check by checking if the resulting value is 0. However, on 32-bit arches, the roundup code itself can overflow by doing a 32-bit left-shift of an unsigned long value, which is undefined behaviour, so it is not guaranteed to truncate neatly. This was triggered by syzbot on the DEVMAP_HASH type, which contains the same check, copied from the hashtab code. So apply the same fix to hashtab, by moving the overflow check to before the roundup. Fixes: daaf427c6ab3 ("bpf: fix arraymap NULL deref and missing overflow and zero size checks") Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Message-ID: <20240307120340.99577-3-toke(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/hashtab.c | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c index 3f3ed33bd2fd..5d1310fc1441 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/hashtab.c @@ -330,7 +330,13 @@ static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) num_possible_cpus()); } - /* hash table size must be power of 2 */ + /* hash table size must be power of 2; roundup_pow_of_two() can overflow + * into UB on 32-bit arches, so check that first + */ + err = -E2BIG; + if (htab->map.max_entries > 1UL << 31) + goto free_htab; + htab->n_buckets = roundup_pow_of_two(htab->map.max_entries); htab->elem_size = sizeof(struct htab_elem) + @@ -340,10 +346,8 @@ static struct bpf_map *htab_map_alloc(union bpf_attr *attr) else htab->elem_size += round_up(htab->map.value_size, 8); - err = -E2BIG; - /* prevent zero size kmalloc and check for u32 overflow */ - if (htab->n_buckets == 0 || - htab->n_buckets > U32_MAX / sizeof(struct bucket)) + /* check for u32 overflow */ + if (htab->n_buckets > U32_MAX / sizeof(struct bucket)) goto free_htab; cost = (u64) htab->n_buckets * sizeof(struct bucket) + -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] do_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak
by ZhaoLong Wang 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189815 CVE: CVE-2024-26901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1]. [1] "BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380 Data copied to user address 0000000020000240" Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to solve the problem. Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support") Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fhandle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index 718defdf1e0e..744ae0dba99c 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path, if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) return -EINVAL; - handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, + handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, GFP_KERNEL); if (!handle) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] do_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak
by ZhaoLong Wang 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189815 CVE: CVE-2024-26901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1]. [1] "BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380 Data copied to user address 0000000020000240" Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to solve the problem. Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support") Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fhandle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index 718defdf1e0e..744ae0dba99c 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path, if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) return -EINVAL; - handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, + handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, GFP_KERNEL); if (!handle) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] do_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak
by ZhaoLong Wang 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189815 CVE: CVE-2024-26901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1]. [1] "BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380 Data copied to user address 0000000020000240" Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to solve the problem. Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support") Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fhandle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index 718defdf1e0e..744ae0dba99c 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path, if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) return -EINVAL; - handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, + handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, GFP_KERNEL); if (!handle) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP2] do_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak
by ZhaoLong Wang 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189815 CVE: CVE-2024-26901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1]. [1] "BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380 Data copied to user address 0000000020000240" Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to solve the problem. Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support") Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fhandle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index 718defdf1e0e..744ae0dba99c 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path, if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) return -EINVAL; - handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, + handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, GFP_KERNEL); if (!handle) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] do_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak
by ZhaoLong Wang 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189815 CVE: CVE-2024-26901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1]. [1] "BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380 Data copied to user address 0000000020000240" Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to solve the problem. Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support") Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fhandle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index 718defdf1e0e..744ae0dba99c 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path, if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) return -EINVAL; - handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, + handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, GFP_KERNEL); if (!handle) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] do_sys_name_to_handle(): use kzalloc() to fix kernel-infoleak
by ZhaoLong Wang 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.9-rc1 commit 3948abaa4e2be938ccdfc289385a27342fb13d43 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189815 CVE: CVE-2024-26901 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- syzbot identified a kernel information leak vulnerability in do_sys_name_to_handle() and issued the following report [1]. [1] "BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] _copy_to_user+0xbc/0x100 lib/usercopy.c:40 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:191 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:73 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x949/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook+0x129/0xa70 mm/slab.h:768 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3478 [inline] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x5c9/0x970 mm/slub.c:3517 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:1006 [inline] __kmalloc+0x121/0x3c0 mm/slab_common.c:1020 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:604 [inline] do_sys_name_to_handle fs/fhandle.c:39 [inline] __do_sys_name_to_handle_at fs/fhandle.c:112 [inline] __se_sys_name_to_handle_at+0x441/0xb10 fs/fhandle.c:94 __x64_sys_name_to_handle_at+0xe4/0x140 fs/fhandle.c:94 ... Bytes 18-19 of 20 are uninitialized Memory access of size 20 starts at ffff888128a46380 Data copied to user address 0000000020000240" Per Chuck Lever's suggestion, use kzalloc() instead of kmalloc() to solve the problem. Fixes: 990d6c2d7aee ("vfs: Add name to file handle conversion support") Suggested-by: Chuck Lever III <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+09b349b3066c2e0b1e96(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich(a)fintech.ru> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119153906.4367-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/fhandle.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/fhandle.c b/fs/fhandle.c index 0ee727485615..cb78dbfd7cd5 100644 --- a/fs/fhandle.c +++ b/fs/fhandle.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static long do_sys_name_to_handle(struct path *path, if (f_handle.handle_bytes > MAX_HANDLE_SZ) return -EINVAL; - handle = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, + handle = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_handle) + f_handle.handle_bytes, GFP_KERNEL); if (!handle) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.39.2

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2024-26813
by Liu Mingrui 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

CVE-2024-26813 Alex Williamson (2): vfio/platform: Disable virqfds on cleanup vfio/platform: Create persistent IRQ handlers drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_irq.c | 106 +++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] CVE-2024-26813
by Liu Mingrui 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

CVE-2024-26813 Alex Williamson (2): vfio/platform: Disable virqfds on cleanup vfio/platform: Create persistent IRQ handlers drivers/vfio/platform/vfio_platform_irq.c | 106 +++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 72 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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