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[PATCH OLK-6.6] parse_longname(): strrchr() expects NUL-terminated string
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.42 commit bb80f7618832d26f7e395f52f82b1dac76223e5f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9111 CVE: CVE-2025-38660 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit 101841c38346f4ca41dc1802c867da990ffb32eb ] ... and parse_longname() is not guaranteed that. That's the reason why it uses kmemdup_nul() to build the argument for kstrtou64(); the problem is, kstrtou64() is not the only thing that need it. Just get a NUL-terminated copy of the entire thing and be done with that... Fixes: dd66df0053ef ("ceph: add support for encrypted snapshot names") Tested-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko(a)ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro(a)zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c index 08c385610731..fa2aaf1d30f8 100644 --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c @@ -213,35 +213,31 @@ static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, { struct inode *dir = NULL; struct ceph_vino vino = { .snap = CEPH_NOSNAP }; - char *inode_number; - char *name_end; - int orig_len = *name_len; + char *name_end, *inode_number; int ret = -EIO; - + /* NUL-terminate */ + char *str __free(kfree) = kmemdup_nul(name, *name_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!str) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); /* Skip initial '_' */ - name++; - name_end = strrchr(name, '_'); + str++; + name_end = strrchr(str, '_'); if (!name_end) { - dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", name); + dout("Failed to parse long snapshot name: %s\n", str); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } - *name_len = (name_end - name); + *name_len = (name_end - str); if (*name_len <= 0) { pr_err("Failed to parse long snapshot name\n"); return ERR_PTR(-EIO); } /* Get the inode number */ - inode_number = kmemdup_nul(name_end + 1, - orig_len - *name_len - 2, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!inode_number) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + inode_number = name_end + 1; ret = kstrtou64(inode_number, 10, &vino.ino); if (ret) { - dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", name); - dir = ERR_PTR(ret); - goto out; + dout("Failed to parse inode number: %s\n", str); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } /* And finally the inode */ @@ -252,9 +248,6 @@ static struct inode *parse_longname(const struct inode *parent, if (IS_ERR(dir)) dout("Can't find inode %s (%s)\n", inode_number, name); } - -out: - kfree(inode_number); return dir; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: imon: make send_packet() more robust
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 8231e80118463be5598daaf266c1c83650f1948b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11614 CVE: CVE-2025-68194 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit eecd203ada43a4693ce6fdd3a58ae10c7819252c ] syzbot is reporting that imon has three problems which result in hung tasks due to forever holding device lock [1]. First problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() once got -EPROTO error after ictx->dev_present_intf0 became true, usb_rx_callback_intf0() resubmits urb after printk(), and resubmitted urb causes usb_rx_callback_intf0() to again get -EPROTO error. This results in printk() flooding (RCU stalls). Alan Stern commented [2] that In theory it's okay to resubmit _if_ the driver has a robust error-recovery scheme (such as giving up after some fixed limit on the number of errors or after some fixed time has elapsed, perhaps with a time delay to prevent a flood of errors). Most drivers don't bother to do this; they simply give up right away. This makes them more vulnerable to short-term noise interference during USB transfers, but in reality such interference is quite rare. There's nothing really wrong with giving up right away. but imon has a poor error-recovery scheme which just retries forever; this behavior should be fixed. Since I'm not sure whether it is safe for imon users to give up upon any error code, this patch takes care of only union of error codes chosen from modules in drivers/media/rc/ directory which handle -EPROTO error (i.e. ir_toy, mceusb and igorplugusb). Second problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() once got -EPROTO error before ictx->dev_present_intf0 becomes true, usb_rx_callback_intf0() always resubmits urb due to commit 8791d63af0cf ("[media] imon: don't wedge hardware after early callbacks"). Move the ictx->dev_present_intf0 test introduced by commit 6f6b90c9231a ("[media] imon: don't parse scancodes until intf configured") to immediately before imon_incoming_packet(), or the first problem explained above happens without printk() flooding (i.e. hung task). Third problem is that when usb_rx_callback_intf0() is not called for some reason (e.g. flaky hardware; the reproducer for this problem sometimes prevents usb_rx_callback_intf0() from being called), wait_for_completion_interruptible() in send_packet() never returns (i.e. hung task). As a workaround for such situation, change send_packet() to wait for completion with timeout of 10 seconds. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=592e2ab8775dbe0bf09a [1] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d6da6709-d799-4be3-a695-850bddd6eb24@rowland.harv… [2] Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Sean Young <sean(a)mess.org> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/rc/imon.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c index f4deca8894e0..bb4aabb08c06 100644 --- a/drivers/media/rc/imon.c +++ b/drivers/media/rc/imon.c @@ -650,12 +650,15 @@ static int send_packet(struct imon_context *ictx) smp_rmb(); /* ensure later readers know we're not busy */ pr_err_ratelimited("error submitting urb(%d)\n", retval); } else { - /* Wait for transmission to complete (or abort) */ - retval = wait_for_completion_interruptible( - &ictx->tx.finished); - if (retval) { + /* Wait for transmission to complete (or abort or timeout) */ + retval = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&ictx->tx.finished, 10 * HZ); + if (retval <= 0) { usb_kill_urb(ictx->tx_urb); pr_err_ratelimited("task interrupted\n"); + if (retval < 0) + ictx->tx.status = retval; + else + ictx->tx.status = -ETIMEDOUT; } ictx->tx.busy = false; @@ -1754,14 +1757,6 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf0(struct urb *urb) if (!ictx) return; - /* - * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we - * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we - * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware - */ - if (!ictx->dev_present_intf0) - goto out; - switch (urb->status) { case -ENOENT: /* usbcore unlink successful! */ return; @@ -1770,16 +1765,29 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf0(struct urb *urb) break; case 0: - imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); + /* + * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we + * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we + * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware + */ + if (ictx->dev_present_intf0) + imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); break; + case -ECONNRESET: + case -EILSEQ: + case -EPROTO: + case -EPIPE: + dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d)\n", + __func__, urb->status); + return; + default: dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d): ignored\n", __func__, urb->status); break; } -out: usb_submit_urb(ictx->rx_urb_intf0, GFP_ATOMIC); } @@ -1795,14 +1803,6 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf1(struct urb *urb) if (!ictx) return; - /* - * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we - * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we - * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware - */ - if (!ictx->dev_present_intf1) - goto out; - switch (urb->status) { case -ENOENT: /* usbcore unlink successful! */ return; @@ -1811,16 +1811,29 @@ static void usb_rx_callback_intf1(struct urb *urb) break; case 0: - imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); + /* + * if we get a callback before we're done configuring the hardware, we + * can't yet process the data, as there's nowhere to send it, but we + * still need to submit a new rx URB to avoid wedging the hardware + */ + if (ictx->dev_present_intf1) + imon_incoming_packet(ictx, urb, intfnum); break; + case -ECONNRESET: + case -EILSEQ: + case -EPROTO: + case -EPIPE: + dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d)\n", + __func__, urb->status); + return; + default: dev_warn(ictx->dev, "imon %s: status(%d): ignored\n", __func__, urb->status); break; } -out: usb_submit_urb(ictx->rx_urb_intf1, GFP_ATOMIC); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ksm: use range-walk function to jump over holes in scan_get_next_rmap_item
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Pedro Demarchi Gomes <pedrodemargomes(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 9c2f8a9b68024e5ebb4813665845ec0a95f2eac3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11569 CVE: CVE-2025-68211 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f5548c318d6520d4fa3c5ed6003eeb710763cbc5 upstream. Currently, scan_get_next_rmap_item() walks every page address in a VMA to locate mergeable pages. This becomes highly inefficient when scanning large virtual memory areas that contain mostly unmapped regions, causing ksmd to use large amount of cpu without deduplicating much pages. This patch replaces the per-address lookup with a range walk using walk_page_range(). The range walker allows KSM to skip over entire unmapped holes in a VMA, avoiding unnecessary lookups. This problem was previously discussed in [1]. Consider the following test program which creates a 32 TiB mapping in the virtual address space but only populates a single page: /* 32 TiB */ const size_t size = 32ul * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; int main() { char *area = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_NORESERVE | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); if (area == MAP_FAILED) { perror("mmap() failed\n"); return -1; } /* Populate a single page such that we get an anon_vma. */ *area = 0; /* Enable KSM. */ madvise(area, size, MADV_MERGEABLE); pause(); return 0; } $ ./ksm-sparse & $ echo 1 > /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run Without this patch ksmd uses 100% of the cpu for a long time (more then 1 hour in my test machine) scanning all the 32 TiB virtual address space that contain only one mapped page. This makes ksmd essentially deadlocked not able to deduplicate anything of value. With this patch ksmd walks only the one mapped page and skips the rest of the 32 TiB virtual address space, making the scan fast using little cpu. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251023035841.41406-1-pedrodemargomes@gmail.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251022153059.22763-1-pedrodemargomes@gmail.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/423de7a3-1c62-4e72-8e79-19a6413e420c@redha… [1] Fixes: 31dbd01f3143 ("ksm: Kernel SamePage Merging") Signed-off-by: Pedro Demarchi Gomes <pedrodemargomes(a)gmail.com> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reported-by: craftfever <craftfever(a)airmail.cc> Closes: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/020cf8de6e773bb78ba7614ef250129f11a63781@murena.io Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Chengming Zhou <chengming.zhou(a)linux.dev> Cc: xu xin <xu.xin16(a)zte.com.cn> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> [ change page to folios ] Signed-off-by: Pedro Demarchi Gomes <pedrodemargomes(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> --- mm/ksm.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/ksm.c b/mm/ksm.c index eca4c3078383..0cf19d0647b4 100644 --- a/mm/ksm.c +++ b/mm/ksm.c @@ -2310,6 +2310,95 @@ static struct ksm_rmap_item *get_next_rmap_item(struct ksm_mm_slot *mm_slot, return rmap_item; } +struct ksm_next_page_arg { + struct folio *folio; + struct page *page; + unsigned long addr; +}; + +static int ksm_next_page_pmd_entry(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end, + struct mm_walk *walk) +{ + struct ksm_next_page_arg *private = walk->private; + struct vm_area_struct *vma = walk->vma; + pte_t *start_ptep = NULL, *ptep, pte; + struct mm_struct *mm = walk->mm; + struct folio *folio; + struct page *page; + spinlock_t *ptl; + pmd_t pmd; + + if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) + return 0; + + cond_resched(); + + pmd = pmdp_get_lockless(pmdp); + if (!pmd_present(pmd)) + return 0; + + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE) && pmd_leaf(pmd)) { + ptl = pmd_lock(mm, pmdp); + pmd = pmdp_get(pmdp); + + if (!pmd_present(pmd)) { + goto not_found_unlock; + } else if (pmd_leaf(pmd)) { + page = vm_normal_page_pmd(vma, addr, pmd); + if (!page) + goto not_found_unlock; + folio = page_folio(page); + + if (folio_is_zone_device(folio) || !folio_test_anon(folio)) + goto not_found_unlock; + + page += ((addr & (PMD_SIZE - 1)) >> PAGE_SHIFT); + goto found_unlock; + } + spin_unlock(ptl); + } + + start_ptep = pte_offset_map_lock(mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl); + if (!start_ptep) + return 0; + + for (ptep = start_ptep; addr < end; ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE) { + pte = ptep_get(ptep); + + if (!pte_present(pte)) + continue; + + page = vm_normal_page(vma, addr, pte); + if (!page) + continue; + folio = page_folio(page); + + if (folio_is_zone_device(folio) || !folio_test_anon(folio)) + continue; + goto found_unlock; + } + +not_found_unlock: + spin_unlock(ptl); + if (start_ptep) + pte_unmap(start_ptep); + return 0; +found_unlock: + folio_get(folio); + spin_unlock(ptl); + if (start_ptep) + pte_unmap(start_ptep); + private->page = page; + private->folio = folio; + private->addr = addr; + return 1; +} + +static struct mm_walk_ops ksm_next_page_ops = { + .pmd_entry = ksm_next_page_pmd_entry, + .walk_lock = PGWALK_RDLOCK, +}; + static struct ksm_rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page) { struct mm_struct *mm; @@ -2396,32 +2485,43 @@ static struct ksm_rmap_item *scan_get_next_rmap_item(struct page **page) ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end; while (ksm_scan.address < vma->vm_end) { + struct ksm_next_page_arg ksm_next_page_arg; + struct page *tmp_page = NULL; + struct folio *folio; + if (ksm_test_exit(mm)) break; - *page = follow_page(vma, ksm_scan.address, FOLL_GET); - if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*page)) { - ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE; - cond_resched(); - continue; + + int found; + + found = walk_page_range_vma(vma, ksm_scan.address, + vma->vm_end, + &ksm_next_page_ops, + &ksm_next_page_arg); + + if (found > 0) { + folio = ksm_next_page_arg.folio; + tmp_page = ksm_next_page_arg.page; + ksm_scan.address = ksm_next_page_arg.addr; + } else { + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(found < 0); + ksm_scan.address = vma->vm_end - PAGE_SIZE; } - if (is_zone_device_page(*page)) - goto next_page; - if (PageAnon(*page)) { - flush_anon_page(vma, *page, ksm_scan.address); - flush_dcache_page(*page); + if (tmp_page) { + flush_anon_page(vma, tmp_page, ksm_scan.address); + flush_dcache_page(tmp_page); rmap_item = get_next_rmap_item(mm_slot, ksm_scan.rmap_list, ksm_scan.address); if (rmap_item) { ksm_scan.rmap_list = &rmap_item->rmap_list; ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE; + *page = tmp_page; } else - put_page(*page); + folio_put(folio); mmap_read_unlock(mm); return rmap_item; } -next_page: - put_page(*page); ksm_scan.address += PAGE_SIZE; cond_resched(); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fbcon: Set fb_display[i]->mode to NULL when the mode is released
by Quanmin Yan 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 468f78276a37f4c6499385a4ce28f4f57be6655d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11306 CVE: CVE-2025-40323 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a1f3058930745d2b938b6b4f5bd9630dc74b26b7 upstream. Recently, we discovered the following issue through syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fb_mode_is_equal+0x285/0x2f0 Read of size 4 at addr ff11000001b3c69c by task syz.xxx ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xab/0xe0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x390 print_report+0xb9/0x280 kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0 fb_mode_is_equal+0x285/0x2f0 fbcon_mode_deleted+0x129/0x180 fb_set_var+0xe7f/0x11d0 do_fb_ioctl+0x6a0/0x750 fb_ioctl+0xe0/0x140 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x210 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x9c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Based on experimentation and analysis, during framebuffer unregistration, only the memory of fb_info->modelist is freed, without setting the corresponding fb_display[i]->mode to NULL for the freed modes. This leads to UAF issues during subsequent accesses. Here's an example of reproduction steps: 1. With /dev/fb0 already registered in the system, load a kernel module to register a new device /dev/fb1; 2. Set fb1's mode to the global fb_display[] array (via FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP); 3. Switch console from fb to VGA (to allow normal rmmod of the ko); 4. Unload the kernel module, at this point fb1's modelist is freed, leaving a wild pointer in fb_display[]; 5. Trigger the bug via system calls through fb0 attempting to delete a mode from fb0. Add a check in do_unregister_framebuffer(): if the mode to be freed exists in fb_display[], set the corresponding mode pointer to NULL. Signed-off-by: Quanmin Yan <yanquanmin1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 1 + include/linux/fbcon.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 9757276e8182..fc9df4accd47 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -2825,6 +2825,25 @@ int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, return found; } +static void fbcon_delete_mode(struct fb_videomode *m) +{ + struct fbcon_display *p; + + for (int i = first_fb_vc; i <= last_fb_vc; i++) { + p = &fb_display[i]; + if (p->mode == m) + p->mode = NULL; + } +} + +void fbcon_delete_modelist(struct list_head *head) +{ + struct fb_modelist *modelist; + + list_for_each_entry(modelist, head, list) + fbcon_delete_mode(&modelist->mode); +} + #ifdef CONFIG_VT_HW_CONSOLE_BINDING static void fbcon_unbind(void) { diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c index 515a9ab711ec..aad127738272 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c @@ -1027,6 +1027,7 @@ static void do_unregister_framebuffer(struct fb_info *fb_info) fb_info->pixmap.addr = NULL; } + fbcon_delete_modelist(&fb_info->modelist); fb_destroy_modelist(&fb_info->modelist); registered_fb[fb_info->node] = NULL; num_registered_fb--; diff --git a/include/linux/fbcon.h b/include/linux/fbcon.h index 2382dec6d6ab..fb0fc2736b80 100644 --- a/include/linux/fbcon.h +++ b/include/linux/fbcon.h @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ void fbcon_suspended(struct fb_info *info); void fbcon_resumed(struct fb_info *info); int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_videomode *mode); +void fbcon_delete_modelist(struct list_head *head); void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info); void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps); @@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ static inline void fbcon_suspended(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline void fbcon_resumed(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline int fbcon_mode_deleted(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_videomode *mode) { return 0; } +static inline void fbcon_delete_modelist(struct list_head *head) {} static inline void fbcon_new_modelist(struct fb_info *info) {} static inline void fbcon_get_requirement(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_blit_caps *caps) {} -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/1] CVE-2025-39957
by Yongqiang Liu 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

Lachlan Hodges (1): wifi: mac80211: increase scan_ies_len for S1G net/mac80211/main.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.43.0

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/CPU/AMD: Add RDSEED fix for Zen5
by Bowen You 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.57 commit e980de2ff109dacb6d9d3a77f01b27c467115ecb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11500 CVE: CVE-2025-68313 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 607b9fb2ce248cc5b633c5949e0153838992c152 upstream. There's an issue with RDSEED's 16-bit and 32-bit register output variants on Zen5 which return a random value of 0 "at a rate inconsistent with randomness while incorrectly signaling success (CF=1)". Search the web for AMD-SB-7055 for more detail. Add a fix glue which checks microcode revisions. [ bp: Add microcode revisions checking, rewrite. ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251018024010.4112396-1-gourry@gourry.net [ bp: 6.12 backport: use the alternative microcode version checking. ] Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Bowen You <youbowen2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index d7a8f8bb9026..1c7e60b5a7cb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -1128,8 +1128,43 @@ static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static bool check_rdseed_microcode(void) +{ + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data; + union zen_patch_rev p; + u32 min_rev = 0; + + p.ext_fam = c->x86 - 0xf; + p.model = c->x86_model; + p.ext_model = c->x86_model >> 4; + p.stepping = c->x86_stepping; + /* reserved bits are expected to be 0 in test below */ + p.__reserved = 0; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN5)) { + switch (p.ucode_rev >> 8) { + case 0xb0021: min_rev = 0xb00215a; break; + case 0xb1010: min_rev = 0xb101054; break; + default: + pr_debug("%s: ucode_rev: 0x%x, current revision: 0x%x\n", + __func__, p.ucode_rev, c->microcode); + return false; + } + } + + if (!min_rev) + return false; + + return c->microcode >= min_rev; +} + static void init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { + if (!check_rdseed_microcode()) { + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED); + msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_7, 18); + pr_emerg_once("RDSEED32 is broken. Disabling the corresponding CPUID bit.\n"); + } } static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mtdchar: fix integer overflow in read/write ioctls
by Cui GaoSheng 06 Feb '26

06 Feb '26

From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.118 commit 457376c6fbf0c69326a9bf1f72416225f681192b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11582 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e4185bed738da755b191aa3f2e16e8b48450e1b8 upstream. The "req.start" and "req.len" variables are u64 values that come from the user at the start of the function. We mask away the high 32 bits of "req.len" so that's capped at U32_MAX but the "req.start" variable can go up to U64_MAX which means that the addition can still integer overflow. Use check_add_overflow() to fix this bug. Fixes: 095bb6e44eb1 ("mtdchar: add MEMREAD ioctl") Fixes: 6420ac0af95d ("mtdchar: prevent unbounded allocation in MEMWRITE ioctl") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal(a)bootlin.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cui GaoSheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c b/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c index 8dc4f5c493fc..335c702633ff 100644 --- a/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c +++ b/drivers/mtd/mtdchar.c @@ -599,6 +599,7 @@ mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_write_req __user *argp) uint8_t *datbuf = NULL, *oobbuf = NULL; size_t datbuf_len, oobbuf_len; int ret = 0; + u64 end; if (copy_from_user(&req, argp, sizeof(req))) return -EFAULT; @@ -618,7 +619,7 @@ mtdchar_write_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_write_req __user *argp) req.len &= 0xffffffff; req.ooblen &= 0xffffffff; - if (req.start + req.len > mtd->size) + if (check_add_overflow(req.start, req.len, &end) || end > mtd->size) return -EINVAL; datbuf_len = min_t(size_t, req.len, mtd->erasesize); @@ -698,6 +699,7 @@ mtdchar_read_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_read_req __user *argp) size_t datbuf_len, oobbuf_len; size_t orig_len, orig_ooblen; int ret = 0; + u64 end; if (copy_from_user(&req, argp, sizeof(req))) return -EFAULT; @@ -724,7 +726,7 @@ mtdchar_read_ioctl(struct mtd_info *mtd, struct mtd_read_req __user *argp) req.len &= 0xffffffff; req.ooblen &= 0xffffffff; - if (req.start + req.len > mtd->size) { + if (check_add_overflow(req.start, req.len, &end) || end > mtd->size) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iio: common: st_sensors: Fix use of uninitialize device structs
by Wang Hai 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Maud Spierings <maudspierings(a)gocontroll.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc7 commit 9f92e93e257b33e73622640a9205f8642ec16ddd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9273 CVE: CVE-2025-38531 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Throughout the various probe functions &indio_dev->dev is used before it is initialized. This caused a kernel panic in st_sensors_power_enable() when the call to devm_regulator_bulk_get_enable() fails and then calls dev_err_probe() with the uninitialized device. This seems to only cause a panic with dev_err_probe(), dev_err(), dev_warn() and dev_info() don't seem to cause a panic, but are fixed as well. The issue is reported and traced here: [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/AM7P189MB100986A83D2F28AF3FFAF976E39EA@AM7P189M… [1] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Maud Spierings <maudspierings(a)gocontroll.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy(a)kernel.org> Link: https://... [1] Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250527-st_iio_fix-v4-1-12d89801c761@gocontroll.c… Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com> Conflicts: drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c [just context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iio/accel/st_accel_core.c | 10 +++--- .../iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c | 36 +++++++++---------- .../common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c | 20 +++++------ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iio/accel/st_accel_core.c b/drivers/iio/accel/st_accel_core.c index d2104e14e255..6c031accad86 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/accel/st_accel_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/accel/st_accel_core.c @@ -1270,10 +1270,11 @@ static int apply_acpi_orientation(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) struct acpi_buffer buffer = {ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER, NULL}; struct acpi_device *adev; union acpi_object *ont; union acpi_object *elements; acpi_status status; + struct device *parent = indio_dev->dev.parent; int ret = -EINVAL; unsigned int val; int i, j; int final_ont[3][3] = { { 0 }, }; @@ -1288,21 +1289,20 @@ static int apply_acpi_orientation(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) { -1, 0, 0 }, { 0, 0, -1 }, }; - adev = ACPI_COMPANION(indio_dev->dev.parent); + adev = ACPI_COMPANION(parent); if (!adev) return -ENXIO; /* Read _ONT data, which should be a package of 6 integers. */ status = acpi_evaluate_object(adev->handle, "_ONT", NULL, &buffer); if (status == AE_NOT_FOUND) { return -ENXIO; } else if (ACPI_FAILURE(status)) { - dev_warn(&indio_dev->dev, "failed to execute _ONT: %d\n", - status); + dev_warn(parent, "failed to execute _ONT: %d\n", status); return status; } ont = buffer.pointer; if (ont->type != ACPI_TYPE_PACKAGE || ont->package.count != 6) @@ -1374,16 +1374,16 @@ static int apply_acpi_orientation(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) adata->mount_matrix.rotation[i * 3 + j] = str_value; } } ret = 0; - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, "computed mount matrix from ACPI\n"); + dev_info(parent, "computed mount matrix from ACPI\n"); out: kfree(buffer.pointer); if (ret) - dev_dbg(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_dbg(parent, "failed to apply ACPI orientation data: %d\n", ret); return ret; } #else /* !CONFIG_ACPI */ diff --git a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c index c77d7bdcc121..dc2aeda4e472 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c +++ b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_core.c @@ -152,11 +152,11 @@ static int st_sensors_set_fullscale(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, unsigned int fs) sdata->current_fullscale = &sdata->sensor_settings->fs.fs_avl[i]; return err; st_accel_set_fullscale_error: - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, "failed to set new fullscale.\n"); + dev_err(indio_dev->dev.parent, "failed to set new fullscale.\n"); return err; } int st_sensors_set_enable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, bool enable) { @@ -229,58 +229,56 @@ int st_sensors_power_enable(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) /* Regulators not mandatory, but if requested we should enable them. */ err = devm_regulator_bulk_get_enable(parent, ARRAY_SIZE(regulator_names), regulator_names); if (err) - return dev_err_probe(&indio_dev->dev, err, - "unable to enable supplies\n"); + return dev_err_probe(parent, err, "unable to enable supplies\n"); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(st_sensors_power_enable, IIO_ST_SENSORS); static int st_sensors_set_drdy_int_pin(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, struct st_sensors_platform_data *pdata) { + struct device *parent = indio_dev->dev.parent; struct st_sensor_data *sdata = iio_priv(indio_dev); /* Sensor does not support interrupts */ if (!sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int1.addr && !sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int2.addr) { if (pdata->drdy_int_pin) - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_info(parent, "DRDY on pin INT%d specified, but sensor does not support interrupts\n", pdata->drdy_int_pin); return 0; } switch (pdata->drdy_int_pin) { case 1: if (!sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int1.mask) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, - "DRDY on INT1 not available.\n"); + dev_err(parent, "DRDY on INT1 not available.\n"); return -EINVAL; } sdata->drdy_int_pin = 1; break; case 2: if (!sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int2.mask) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, - "DRDY on INT2 not available.\n"); + dev_err(parent, "DRDY on INT2 not available.\n"); return -EINVAL; } sdata->drdy_int_pin = 2; break; default: - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, "DRDY on pdata not valid.\n"); + dev_err(parent, "DRDY on pdata not valid.\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (pdata->open_drain) { if (!sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int1.addr_od && !sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int2.addr_od) - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_err(parent, "open drain requested but unsupported.\n"); else sdata->int_pin_open_drain = true; } @@ -334,18 +332,19 @@ void st_sensors_dev_name_probe(struct device *dev, char *name, int len) EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(st_sensors_dev_name_probe, IIO_ST_SENSORS); int st_sensors_init_sensor(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, struct st_sensors_platform_data *pdata) { + struct device *parent = indio_dev->dev.parent; struct st_sensor_data *sdata = iio_priv(indio_dev); struct st_sensors_platform_data *of_pdata; int err = 0; mutex_init(&sdata->odr_lock); /* If OF/DT pdata exists, it will take precedence of anything else */ - of_pdata = st_sensors_dev_probe(indio_dev->dev.parent, pdata); + of_pdata = st_sensors_dev_probe(parent, pdata); if (IS_ERR(of_pdata)) return PTR_ERR(of_pdata); if (of_pdata) pdata = of_pdata; @@ -368,11 +367,11 @@ int st_sensors_init_sensor(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, err = st_sensors_set_fullscale(indio_dev, sdata->current_fullscale->num); if (err < 0) return err; } else - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, "Full-scale not possible\n"); + dev_info(parent, "Full-scale not possible\n"); err = st_sensors_set_odr(indio_dev, sdata->odr); if (err < 0) return err; @@ -403,11 +402,11 @@ int st_sensors_init_sensor(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, } else { addr = sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int2.addr_od; mask = sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.int2.mask_od; } - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_info(parent, "set interrupt line to open drain mode on pin %d\n", sdata->drdy_int_pin); err = st_sensors_write_data_with_mask(indio_dev, addr, mask, 1); if (err < 0) @@ -592,25 +591,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(st_sensors_get_settings_index, IIO_ST_SENSORS); * Return: 0 on success (valid sensor ID), else a negative error code. */ int st_sensors_verify_id(struct iio_dev *indio_dev) { struct st_sensor_data *sdata = iio_priv(indio_dev); + struct device *parent = indio_dev->dev.parent; int wai, err; if (sdata->sensor_settings->wai_addr) { err = regmap_read(sdata->regmap, sdata->sensor_settings->wai_addr, &wai); if (err < 0) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, - "failed to read Who-Am-I register.\n"); - return err; + return dev_err_probe(parent, err, + "failed to read Who-Am-I register.\n"); } if (sdata->sensor_settings->wai != wai) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, - "%s: WhoAmI mismatch (0x%x).\n", - indio_dev->name, wai); + dev_err(parent, "%s: WhoAmI mismatch (0x%x).\n", + indio_dev->name, wai); return -EINVAL; } } return 0; diff --git a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c index a0df9250a69f..b900acd471bd 100644 --- a/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c +++ b/drivers/iio/common/st_sensors/st_sensors_trigger.c @@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ int st_sensors_allocate_trigger(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, int err; sdata->trig = devm_iio_trigger_alloc(parent, "%s-trigger", indio_dev->name); if (sdata->trig == NULL) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, "failed to allocate iio trigger.\n"); + dev_err(parent, "failed to allocate iio trigger.\n"); return -ENOMEM; } iio_trigger_set_drvdata(sdata->trig, indio_dev); sdata->trig->ops = trigger_ops; @@ -141,11 +141,11 @@ int st_sensors_allocate_trigger(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, */ switch(irq_trig) { case IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING: case IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW: if (!sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.addr_ihl) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_err(parent, "falling/low specified for IRQ but hardware supports only rising/high: will request rising/high\n"); if (irq_trig == IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING) irq_trig = IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING; if (irq_trig == IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW) irq_trig = IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH; @@ -154,34 +154,32 @@ int st_sensors_allocate_trigger(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, err = st_sensors_write_data_with_mask(indio_dev, sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.addr_ihl, sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.mask_ihl, 1); if (err < 0) return err; - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_info(parent, "interrupts on the falling edge or active low level\n"); } break; case IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING: - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, - "interrupts on the rising edge\n"); + dev_info(parent, "interrupts on the rising edge\n"); break; case IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH: - dev_info(&indio_dev->dev, - "interrupts active high level\n"); + dev_info(parent, "interrupts active high level\n"); break; default: /* This is the most preferred mode, if possible */ - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_err(parent, "unsupported IRQ trigger specified (%lx), enforce rising edge\n", irq_trig); irq_trig = IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING; } /* Tell the interrupt handler that we're dealing with edges */ if (irq_trig == IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING || irq_trig == IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING) { if (!sdata->sensor_settings->drdy_irq.stat_drdy.addr) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, + dev_err(parent, "edge IRQ not supported w/o stat register.\n"); return -EOPNOTSUPP; } sdata->edge_irq = true; } else { @@ -212,17 +210,17 @@ int st_sensors_allocate_trigger(struct iio_dev *indio_dev, st_sensors_irq_thread, irq_trig, sdata->trig->name, sdata->trig); if (err) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, "failed to request trigger IRQ.\n"); + dev_err(parent, "failed to request trigger IRQ.\n"); return err; } err = devm_iio_trigger_register(parent, sdata->trig); if (err < 0) { - dev_err(&indio_dev->dev, "failed to register iio trigger.\n"); + dev_err(parent, "failed to register iio trigger.\n"); return err; } indio_dev->trig = iio_trigger_get(sdata->trig); return 0; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ipv6: BUG() in pskb_expand_head() as part of calipso_skbuff_setattr()
by Dong Chenchen 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Will Rosenberg <whrosenb(a)asu.edu> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.248 commit 86f365897068d09418488165a68b23cb5baa37f2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13396 CVE: CVE-2025-71085 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 58fc7342b529803d3c221101102fe913df7adb83 ] There exists a kernel oops caused by a BUG_ON(nhead < 0) at net/core/skbuff.c:2232 in pskb_expand_head(). This bug is triggered as part of the calipso_skbuff_setattr() routine when skb_cow() is passed headroom > INT_MAX (i.e. (int)(skb_headroom(skb) + len_delta) < 0). The root cause of the bug is due to an implicit integer cast in __skb_cow(). The check (headroom > skb_headroom(skb)) is meant to ensure that delta = headroom - skb_headroom(skb) is never negative, otherwise we will trigger a BUG_ON in pskb_expand_head(). However, if headroom > INT_MAX and delta <= -NET_SKB_PAD, the check passes, delta becomes negative, and pskb_expand_head() is passed a negative value for nhead. Fix the trigger condition in calipso_skbuff_setattr(). Avoid passing "negative" headroom sizes to skb_cow() within calipso_skbuff_setattr() by only using skb_cow() to grow headroom. PoC: Using `netlabelctl` tool: netlabelctl map del default netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:7 netlabelctl map add default address:0::1/128 protocol:calipso,7 Then run the following PoC: int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP); // setup msghdr int cmsg_size = 2; int cmsg_len = 0x60; struct msghdr msg; struct sockaddr_in6 dest_addr; struct cmsghdr * cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *) calloc(1, sizeof(struct cmsghdr) + cmsg_len); msg.msg_name = &dest_addr; msg.msg_namelen = sizeof(dest_addr); msg.msg_iov = NULL; msg.msg_iovlen = 0; msg.msg_control = cmsg; msg.msg_controllen = cmsg_len; msg.msg_flags = 0; // setup sockaddr dest_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; dest_addr.sin6_port = htons(31337); dest_addr.sin6_flowinfo = htonl(31337); dest_addr.sin6_addr = in6addr_loopback; dest_addr.sin6_scope_id = 31337; // setup cmsghdr cmsg->cmsg_len = cmsg_len; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_IPV6; cmsg->cmsg_type = IPV6_HOPOPTS; char * hop_hdr = (char *)cmsg + sizeof(struct cmsghdr); hop_hdr[1] = 0x9; //set hop size - (0x9 + 1) * 8 = 80 sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); Fixes: 2917f57b6bc1 ("calipso: Allow the lsm to label the skbuff directly.") Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Will Rosenberg <whrosenb(a)asu.edu> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251219173637.797418-1-whrosenb@asu.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809(a)h-partners.com> --- net/ipv6/calipso.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/calipso.c b/net/ipv6/calipso.c index b24afbf3dbe4..23304346b537 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/calipso.c +++ b/net/ipv6/calipso.c @@ -1330,7 +1330,8 @@ static int calipso_skbuff_setattr(struct sk_buff *skb, /* At this point new_end aligns to 4n, so (new_end & 4) pads to 8n */ pad = ((new_end & 4) + (end & 7)) & 7; len_delta = new_end - (int)end + pad; - ret_val = skb_cow(skb, skb_headroom(skb) + len_delta); + ret_val = skb_cow(skb, + skb_headroom(skb) + (len_delta > 0 ? len_delta : 0)); if (ret_val < 0) return ret_val; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/sched: sch_qfq: do not free existing class in qfq_change_class()
by Dong Chenchen 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 3879cffd9d07aa0377c4b8835c4f64b4fb24ac78 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13510 CVE: CVE-2026-22999 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Fixes qfq_change_class() error case. cl->qdisc and cl should only be freed if a new class and qdisc were allocated, or we risk various UAF. Fixes: 462dbc9101ac ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: syzbot+07f3f38f723c335f106d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6965351d.050a0220.eaf7.00c5.GAE@google.com/T… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112175656.17605-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index e90cbc47414c..e24b88869e52 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ static int qfq_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, return 0; destroy_class: - qdisc_put(cl->qdisc); - kfree(cl); + if (!existing) { + qdisc_put(cl->qdisc); + kfree(cl); + } return err; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] macvlan: fix possible UAF in macvlan_forward_source()
by Dong Chenchen 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 7470a7a63dc162f07c26dbf960e41ee1e248d80e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13512 CVE: CVE-2026-23001 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Add RCU protection on (struct macvlan_source_entry)->vlan. Whenever macvlan_hash_del_source() is called, we must clear entry->vlan pointer before RCU grace period starts. This allows macvlan_forward_source() to skip over entries queued for freeing. Note that macvlan_dev are already RCU protected, as they are embedded in a standard netdev (netdev_priv(ndev)). Fixes: 79cf79abce71 ("macvlan: add source mode") Reported-by: syzbot+7182fbe91e58602ec1fe(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/695fb1e8.050a0220.1c677c.039f.GAE(a)google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108133651.1130486-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/macvlan.c [commit bb23ffa1015c is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/macvlan.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/macvlan.c b/drivers/net/macvlan.c index 9c77e6ab2b30..2ed99251d5e0 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macvlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/macvlan.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ struct macvlan_port { struct macvlan_source_entry { struct hlist_node hlist; - struct macvlan_dev *vlan; + struct macvlan_dev __rcu *vlan; unsigned char addr[6+2] __aligned(sizeof(u16)); struct rcu_head rcu; }; @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ static struct macvlan_source_entry *macvlan_hash_lookup_source( hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, h, hlist, lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) { if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(entry->addr, addr) && - entry->vlan == vlan) + rcu_access_pointer(entry->vlan) == vlan) return entry; } return NULL; @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int macvlan_hash_add_source(struct macvlan_dev *vlan, return -ENOMEM; ether_addr_copy(entry->addr, addr); - entry->vlan = vlan; + RCU_INIT_POINTER(entry->vlan, vlan); h = &port->vlan_source_hash[macvlan_eth_hash(addr)]; hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->hlist, h); vlan->macaddr_count++; @@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ static void macvlan_hash_add(struct macvlan_dev *vlan) static void macvlan_hash_del_source(struct macvlan_source_entry *entry) { + RCU_INIT_POINTER(entry->vlan, NULL); hlist_del_rcu(&entry->hlist); kfree_rcu(entry, rcu); } @@ -388,7 +389,7 @@ static void macvlan_flush_sources(struct macvlan_port *port, entry = hlist_entry(h, struct macvlan_source_entry, hlist); - if (entry->vlan == vlan) + if (rcu_access_pointer(entry->vlan) == vlan) macvlan_hash_del_source(entry); } } @@ -430,8 +431,13 @@ static void macvlan_forward_source(struct sk_buff *skb, struct hlist_head *h = &port->vlan_source_hash[idx]; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, h, hlist) { - if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(entry->addr, addr)) - macvlan_forward_source_one(skb, entry->vlan); + if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(entry->addr, addr)) { + struct macvlan_dev *vlan = rcu_dereference(entry->vlan); + + if (!vlan) + continue; + macvlan_forward_source_one(skb, vlan); + } } } @@ -1615,7 +1621,7 @@ static int macvlan_fill_info_macaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macvlan_source_entry *entry; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, h, hlist, lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) { - if (entry->vlan != vlan) + if (rcu_access_pointer(entry->vlan) != vlan) continue; if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MACVLAN_MACADDR, ETH_ALEN, entry->addr)) return 1; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] fix CVE-2025-68231
by Qi Xi 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Fabio M. De Francesco (2): mm/mempool: replace kmap_atomic() with kmap_local_page() mm/page_poison: replace kmap_atomic() with kmap_local_page() Vlastimil Babka (1): mm/mempool: fix poisoning order>0 pages with HIGHMEM mm/mempool.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ mm/page_poison.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] usb: gadget: udc: fix use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work
by Qi Xi 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Jimmy Hu <hhhuuu(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18 commit baeb66fbd4201d1c4325074e78b1f557dff89b5b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11530 CVE: CVE-2025-68282 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A race condition during gadget teardown can lead to a use-after-free in usb_gadget_state_work(), as reported by KASAN: BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in sysfs_notify+0x2c/0xd0 Workqueue: events usb_gadget_state_work The fundamental race occurs because a concurrent event (e.g., an interrupt) can call usb_gadget_set_state() and schedule gadget->work at any time during the cleanup process in usb_del_gadget(). Commit 399a45e5237c ("usb: gadget: core: flush gadget workqueue after device removal") attempted to fix this by moving flush_work() to after device_del(). However, this does not fully solve the race, as a new work item can still be scheduled *after* flush_work() completes but before the gadget's memory is freed, leading to the same use-after-free. This patch fixes the race condition robustly by introducing a 'teardown' flag and a 'state_lock' spinlock to the usb_gadget struct. The flag is set during cleanup in usb_del_gadget() *before* calling flush_work() to prevent any new work from being scheduled once cleanup has commenced. The scheduling site, usb_gadget_set_state(), now checks this flag under the lock before queueing the work, thus safely closing the race window. Fixes: 5702f75375aa9 ("usb: gadget: udc-core: move sysfs_notify() to a workqueue") Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jimmy Hu <hhhuuu(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023054945.233861-1-hhhuuu@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c [Context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- include/linux/usb/gadget.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c index a4120a25428e..00362ec876a4 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c @@ -1118,8 +1118,13 @@ static void usb_gadget_state_work(struct work_struct *work) void usb_gadget_set_state(struct usb_gadget *gadget, enum usb_device_state state) { + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&gadget->state_lock, flags); gadget->state = state; - schedule_work(&gadget->work); + if (!gadget->teardown) + schedule_work(&gadget->work); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gadget->state_lock, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_gadget_set_state); @@ -1352,6 +1357,8 @@ static void usb_udc_nop_release(struct device *dev) void usb_initialize_gadget(struct device *parent, struct usb_gadget *gadget, void (*release)(struct device *dev)) { + spin_lock_init(&gadget->state_lock); + gadget->teardown = false; INIT_WORK(&gadget->work, usb_gadget_state_work); gadget->dev.parent = parent; @@ -1526,6 +1533,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_add_gadget_udc); void usb_del_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget) { struct usb_udc *udc = gadget->udc; + unsigned long flags; if (!udc) return; @@ -1539,6 +1547,13 @@ void usb_del_gadget(struct usb_gadget *gadget) kobject_uevent(&udc->dev.kobj, KOBJ_REMOVE); sysfs_remove_link(&udc->dev.kobj, "gadget"); device_del(&gadget->dev); + /* + * Set the teardown flag before flushing the work to prevent new work + * from being scheduled while we are cleaning up. + */ + spin_lock_irqsave(&gadget->state_lock, flags); + gadget->teardown = true; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gadget->state_lock, flags); flush_work(&gadget->work); ida_free(&gadget_id_numbers, gadget->id_number); cancel_work_sync(&udc->vbus_work); diff --git a/include/linux/usb/gadget.h b/include/linux/usb/gadget.h index 75bda0783395..2548ccf72222 100644 --- a/include/linux/usb/gadget.h +++ b/include/linux/usb/gadget.h @@ -349,6 +349,9 @@ struct usb_gadget_ops { * can handle. The UDC must support this and all slower speeds and lower * number of lanes. * @state: the state we are now (attached, suspended, configured, etc) + * @state_lock: Spinlock protecting the `state` and `teardown` members. + * @teardown: True if the device is undergoing teardown, used to prevent + * new work from being scheduled during cleanup. * @name: Identifies the controller hardware type. Used in diagnostics * and sometimes configuration. * @dev: Driver model state for this abstract device. @@ -424,6 +427,8 @@ struct usb_gadget { enum usb_ssp_rate max_ssp_rate; enum usb_device_state state; + spinlock_t state_lock; + bool teardown; const char *name; struct device dev; unsigned isoch_delay; -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: dsa: properly keep track of conduit reference
by Qi Xi 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc4 commit 06e219f6a706c367c93051f408ac61417643d2f9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13476 CVE: CVE-2025-71152 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Problem description ------------------- DSA has a mumbo-jumbo of reference handling of the conduit net device and its kobject which, sadly, is just wrong and doesn't make sense. There are two distinct problems. 1. The OF path, which uses of_find_net_device_by_node(), never releases the elevated refcount on the conduit's kobject. Nominally, the OF and non-OF paths should result in objects having identical reference counts taken, and it is already suspicious that dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a put_device() call which is missing in dsa_port_parse_of(), but we can actually even verify that an issue exists. With CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y, if we run this command "before" and "after" applying this patch: (unbind the conduit driver for net device eno2) echo 0000:00:00.2 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/fsl_enetc/unbind we see these lines in the output diff which appear only with the patch applied: kobject: 'eno2' (ffff002009a3a6b8): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000) kobject: '109' (ffff0020099d59a0): kobject_release, parent 0000000000000000 (delayed 1000) 2. After we find the conduit interface one way (OF) or another (non-OF), it can get unregistered at any time, and DSA remains with a long-lived, but in this case stale, cpu_dp->conduit pointer. Holding the net device's underlying kobject isn't actually of much help, it just prevents it from being freed (but we never need that kobject directly). What helps us to prevent the net device from being unregistered is the parallel netdev reference mechanism (dev_hold() and dev_put()). Actually we actually use that netdev tracker mechanism implicitly on user ports since commit 2f1e8ea726e9 ("net: dsa: link interfaces with the DSA master to get rid of lockdep warnings"), via netdev_upper_dev_link(). But time still passes at DSA switch probe time between the initial of_find_net_device_by_node() code and the user port creation time, time during which the conduit could unregister itself and DSA wouldn't know about it. So we have to run of_find_net_device_by_node() under rtnl_lock() to prevent that from happening, and release the lock only with the netdev tracker having acquired the reference. Do we need to keep the reference until dsa_unregister_switch() / dsa_switch_shutdown()? 1: Maybe yes. A switch device will still be registered even if all user ports failed to probe, see commit 86f8b1c01a0a ("net: dsa: Do not make user port errors fatal"), and the cpu_dp->conduit pointers remain valid. I haven't audited all call paths to see whether they will actually use the conduit in lack of any user port, but if they do, it seems safer to not rely on user ports for that reference. 2. Definitely yes. We support changing the conduit which a user port is associated to, and we can get into a situation where we've moved all user ports away from a conduit, thus no longer hold any reference to it via the net device tracker. But we shouldn't let it go nonetheless - see the next change in relation to dsa_tree_find_first_conduit() and LAG conduits which disappear. We have to be prepared to return to the physical conduit, so the CPU port must explicitly keep another reference to it. This is also to say: the user ports and their CPU ports may not always keep a reference to the same conduit net device, and both are needed. As for the conduit's kobject for the /sys/class/net/ entry, we don't care about it, we can release it as soon as we hold the net device object itself. History and blame attribution ----------------------------- The code has been refactored so many times, it is very difficult to follow and properly attribute a blame, but I'll try to make a short history which I hope to be correct. We have two distinct probing paths: - one for OF, introduced in 2016 in commit 83c0afaec7b7 ("net: dsa: Add new binding implementation") - one for non-OF, introduced in 2017 in commit 71e0bbde0d88 ("net: dsa: Add support for platform data") These are both complete rewrites of the original probing paths (which used struct dsa_switch_driver and other weird stuff, instead of regular devices on their respective buses for register access, like MDIO, SPI, I2C etc): - one for OF, introduced in 2013 in commit 5e95329b701c ("dsa: add device tree bindings to register DSA switches") - one for non-OF, introduced in 2008 in commit 91da11f870f0 ("net: Distributed Switch Architecture protocol support") except for tiny bits and pieces like dsa_dev_to_net_device() which were seemingly carried over since the original commit, and used to this day. The point is that the original probing paths received a fix in 2015 in the form of commit 679fb46c5785 ("net: dsa: Add missing master netdev dev_put() calls"), but the fix never made it into the "new" (dsa2) probing paths that can still be traced to today, and the fixed probing path was later deleted in 2019 in commit 93e86b3bc842 ("net: dsa: Remove legacy probing support"). That is to say, the new probing paths were never quite correct in this area. The existence of the legacy probing support which was deleted in 2019 explains why dsa_dev_to_net_device() returns a conduit with elevated refcount (because it was supposed to be released during dsa_remove_dst()). After the removal of the legacy code, the only user of dsa_dev_to_net_device() calls dev_put(conduit) immediately after this function returns. This pattern makes no sense today, and can only be interpreted historically to understand why dev_hold() was there in the first place. Change details -------------- Today we have a better netdev tracking infrastructure which we should use. Logically netdev_hold() belongs in common code (dsa_port_parse_cpu(), where dp->conduit is assigned), but there is a tradeoff to be made with the rtnl_lock() section which would become a bit too long if we did that - dsa_port_parse_cpu() also calls request_module(). So we duplicate a bit of logic in order for the callers of dsa_port_parse_cpu() to be the ones responsible of holding the conduit reference and releasing it on error. This shortens the rtnl_lock() section significantly. In the dsa_switch_probe() error path, dsa_switch_release_ports() will be called in a number of situations, one being where dsa_port_parse_cpu() maybe didn't get the chance to run at all (a different port failed earlier, etc). So we have to test for the conduit being NULL prior to calling netdev_put(). There have still been so many transformations to the code since the blamed commits (rename master -> conduit, commit 0650bf52b31f ("net: dsa: be compatible with masters which unregister on shutdown")), that it only makes sense to fix the code using the best methods available today and see how it can be backported to stable later. I suspect the fix cannot even be backported to kernels which lack dsa_switch_shutdown(), and I suspect this is also maybe why the long-lived conduit reference didn't make it into the new DSA probing paths at the time (problems during shutdown). Because dsa_dev_to_net_device() has a single call site and has to be changed anyway, the logic was just absorbed into the non-OF dsa_port_parse(). Tested on the ocelot/felix switch and on dsa_loop, both on the NXP LS1028A with CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE=y. Reported-by: Ma Ke <make24(a)iscas.ac.cn> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20251214131204.4684-1-make24@iscas.ac.cn/ Fixes: 83c0afaec7b7 ("net: dsa: Add new binding implementation") Fixes: 71e0bbde0d88 ("net: dsa: Add support for platform data") Reviewed-by: Jonas Gorski <jonas.gorski(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean(a)nxp.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251215150236.3931670-1-vladimir.oltean@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: net/dsa/dsa.c [Context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/dsa.h | 1 + net/dsa/dsa.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/dsa.h b/include/net/dsa.h index 0b9c6aa27047..3b9cb8e7e25f 100644 --- a/include/net/dsa.h +++ b/include/net/dsa.h @@ -297,6 +297,7 @@ struct dsa_port { struct devlink_port devlink_port; struct phylink *pl; struct phylink_config pl_config; + netdevice_tracker conduit_tracker; struct dsa_lag *lag; struct net_device *hsr_dev; diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa.c b/net/dsa/dsa.c index c9bf1a9a6c99..291efcaf75ab 100644 --- a/net/dsa/dsa.c +++ b/net/dsa/dsa.c @@ -1257,14 +1257,25 @@ static int dsa_port_parse_of(struct dsa_port *dp, struct device_node *dn) if (ethernet) { struct net_device *master; const char *user_protocol; + int err; + rtnl_lock(); master = of_find_net_device_by_node(ethernet); of_node_put(ethernet); - if (!master) + if (!master) { + rtnl_unlock(); return -EPROBE_DEFER; + } + + netdev_hold(master, &dp->conduit_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); + put_device(&master->dev); + rtnl_unlock(); user_protocol = of_get_property(dn, "dsa-tag-protocol", NULL); - return dsa_port_parse_cpu(dp, master, user_protocol); + err = dsa_port_parse_cpu(dp, master, user_protocol); + if (err) + netdev_put(master, &dp->conduit_tracker); + return err; } if (link) @@ -1397,37 +1408,30 @@ static struct device *dev_find_class(struct device *parent, char *class) return device_find_child(parent, class, dev_is_class); } -static struct net_device *dsa_dev_to_net_device(struct device *dev) -{ - struct device *d; - - d = dev_find_class(dev, "net"); - if (d != NULL) { - struct net_device *nd; - - nd = to_net_dev(d); - dev_hold(nd); - put_device(d); - - return nd; - } - - return NULL; -} - static int dsa_port_parse(struct dsa_port *dp, const char *name, struct device *dev) { if (!strcmp(name, "cpu")) { struct net_device *master; + struct device *d; + int err; - master = dsa_dev_to_net_device(dev); - if (!master) + rtnl_lock(); + d = dev_find_class(dev, "net"); + if (!d) { + rtnl_unlock(); return -EPROBE_DEFER; + } - dev_put(master); + master = to_net_dev(d); + netdev_hold(master, &dp->conduit_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); + put_device(d); + rtnl_unlock(); - return dsa_port_parse_cpu(dp, master, NULL); + err = dsa_port_parse_cpu(dp, master, NULL); + if (err) + netdev_put(master, &dp->conduit_tracker); + return err; } if (!strcmp(name, "dsa")) @@ -1495,6 +1499,9 @@ static void dsa_switch_release_ports(struct dsa_switch *ds) struct dsa_vlan *v, *n; dsa_switch_for_each_port_safe(dp, next, ds) { + if (dsa_port_is_cpu(dp) && dp->master) + netdev_put(dp->master, &dp->conduit_tracker); + /* These are either entries that upper layers lost track of * (probably due to bugs), or installed through interfaces * where one does not necessarily have to remove them, like @@ -1639,8 +1646,10 @@ void dsa_switch_shutdown(struct dsa_switch *ds) /* Disconnect from further netdevice notifiers on the master, * since netdev_uses_dsa() will now return false. */ - dsa_switch_for_each_cpu_port(dp, ds) + dsa_switch_for_each_cpu_port(dp, ds) { dp->master->dsa_ptr = NULL; + netdev_put(dp->master, &dp->conduit_tracker); + } rtnl_unlock(); out: -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/sched: sch_qfq: do not free existing class in qfq_change_class()
by Dong Chenchen 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 3879cffd9d07aa0377c4b8835c4f64b4fb24ac78 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13510 CVE: CVE-2026-22999 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Fixes qfq_change_class() error case. cl->qdisc and cl should only be freed if a new class and qdisc were allocated, or we risk various UAF. Fixes: 462dbc9101ac ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: syzbot+07f3f38f723c335f106d(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6965351d.050a0220.eaf7.00c5.GAE@google.com/T… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112175656.17605-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index 2e91207dabf0..59d21b5e8ad1 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -532,8 +532,10 @@ static int qfq_change_class(struct Qdisc *sch, u32 classid, u32 parentid, return 0; destroy_class: - qdisc_put(cl->qdisc); - kfree(cl); + if (!existing) { + qdisc_put(cl->qdisc); + kfree(cl); + } return err; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] macvlan: fix possible UAF in macvlan_forward_source()
by Dong Chenchen 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 7470a7a63dc162f07c26dbf960e41ee1e248d80e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13512 CVE: CVE-2026-23001 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Add RCU protection on (struct macvlan_source_entry)->vlan. Whenever macvlan_hash_del_source() is called, we must clear entry->vlan pointer before RCU grace period starts. This allows macvlan_forward_source() to skip over entries queued for freeing. Note that macvlan_dev are already RCU protected, as they are embedded in a standard netdev (netdev_priv(ndev)). Fixes: 79cf79abce71 ("macvlan: add source mode") Reported-by: syzbot+7182fbe91e58602ec1fe(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com https: //lore.kernel.org/netdev/695fb1e8.050a0220.1c677c.039f.GAE(a)google.com/T/#u Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108133651.1130486-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/macvlan.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/macvlan.c b/drivers/net/macvlan.c index c8da94af4161..09db43ce3176 100644 --- a/drivers/net/macvlan.c +++ b/drivers/net/macvlan.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ struct macvlan_port { struct macvlan_source_entry { struct hlist_node hlist; - struct macvlan_dev *vlan; + struct macvlan_dev __rcu *vlan; unsigned char addr[6+2] __aligned(sizeof(u16)); struct rcu_head rcu; }; @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static struct macvlan_source_entry *macvlan_hash_lookup_source( hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, h, hlist, lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) { if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(entry->addr, addr) && - entry->vlan == vlan) + rcu_access_pointer(entry->vlan) == vlan) return entry; } return NULL; @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int macvlan_hash_add_source(struct macvlan_dev *vlan, return -ENOMEM; ether_addr_copy(entry->addr, addr); - entry->vlan = vlan; + RCU_INIT_POINTER(entry->vlan, vlan); h = &port->vlan_source_hash[macvlan_eth_hash(addr)]; hlist_add_head_rcu(&entry->hlist, h); vlan->macaddr_count++; @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static void macvlan_hash_add(struct macvlan_dev *vlan) static void macvlan_hash_del_source(struct macvlan_source_entry *entry) { + RCU_INIT_POINTER(entry->vlan, NULL); hlist_del_rcu(&entry->hlist); kfree_rcu(entry, rcu); } @@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ static void macvlan_flush_sources(struct macvlan_port *port, int i; hash_for_each_safe(port->vlan_source_hash, i, next, entry, hlist) - if (entry->vlan == vlan) + if (rcu_access_pointer(entry->vlan) == vlan) macvlan_hash_del_source(entry); vlan->macaddr_count = 0; @@ -432,9 +433,14 @@ static bool macvlan_forward_source(struct sk_buff *skb, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, h, hlist) { if (ether_addr_equal_64bits(entry->addr, addr)) { - if (entry->vlan->flags & MACVLAN_FLAG_NODST) + struct macvlan_dev *vlan = rcu_dereference(entry->vlan); + + if (!vlan) + continue; + + if (vlan->flags & MACVLAN_FLAG_NODST) consume = true; - macvlan_forward_source_one(skb, entry->vlan); + macvlan_forward_source_one(skb, vlan); } } @@ -1685,7 +1691,7 @@ static int macvlan_fill_info_macaddr(struct sk_buff *skb, struct macvlan_source_entry *entry; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(entry, h, hlist, lockdep_rtnl_is_held()) { - if (entry->vlan != vlan) + if (rcu_access_pointer(entry->vlan) != vlan) continue; if (nla_put(skb, IFLA_MACVLAN_MACADDR, ETH_ALEN, entry->addr)) return 1; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/11] net: LTS-6.6 bugfix backport
by Dong Chenchen 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

net LTS-6.6 patches backport Dong Chenchen (1): Revert "netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions" Eric Dumazet (2): ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust arp: do not assume dev_hard_header() does not change skb->head Fernando Fernandez Mancera (1): netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nf_tables: drop unused 3rd argument from validate callback ops netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible Gal Pressman (1): ethtool: Avoid overflowing userspace buffer on stats query Slavin Liu (1): ipvs: fix ipv4 null-ptr-deref in route error path Tetsuo Handa (1): bpf: Fix reference count leak in bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() Will Rosenberg (1): ipv6: BUG() in pskb_expand_head() as part of calipso_skbuff_setattr() Xiang Mei (1): net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix NULL deref when deactivating inactive aggregate in qfq_reset include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h | 37 ++++++++---- include/net/netfilter/nft_fib.h | 4 +- include/net/netfilter/nft_meta.h | 3 +- include/net/netfilter/nft_reject.h | 3 +- net/bpf/test_run.c | 7 ++- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_meta_bridge.c | 5 +- net/bridge/netfilter/nft_reject_bridge.c | 3 +- net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 30 ++++++++-- net/ipv4/arp.c | 7 ++- net/ipv6/calipso.c | 3 +- net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c | 9 ++- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_xmit.c | 3 + net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nft_compat.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_fib.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_flow_offload.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_fwd_netdev.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_immediate.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_masq.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_objref.c | 6 +- net/netfilter/nft_osf.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_queue.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_redir.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_reject.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_reject_netdev.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_rt.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_socket.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_synproxy.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_tproxy.c | 3 +- net/netfilter/nft_xfrm.c | 3 +- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 2 +- 35 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 12

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/9] CVE-2024-50102
by Qi Xi 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

David Gow (1): x86/uaccess: Zero the 8-byte get_range case on failure on 32-bit David Laight (1): x86: fix off-by-one in access_ok() Linus Torvalds (5): runtime constants: deal with old decrepit linkers runtime constants: add x86 architecture support x86: fix whitespace in runtime-const assembler output x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue Stephen Brennan (1): dcache: keep dentry_hashtable or d_hash_shift even when not used Thomas Gleixner (1): x86/uaccess: Add missing __force to casts in __access_ok() and valid_user_address() arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 49 ++++++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 80 ++++++++++------------------ fs/dcache.c | 9 +++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 7 +++ 7 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h -- 2.33.0

2 10

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2025-39910
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Fix CVE-2025-39910. Alexander Gordeev (1): kasan: avoid sleepable page allocation from atomic context Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) (1): mm/vmalloc, mm/kasan: respect gfp mask in kasan_populate_vmalloc() include/linux/kasan.h | 6 +-- mm/kasan/shadow.c | 111 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ mm/vmalloc.c | 8 +-- 3 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fixes CVE-2025-38627
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Fixes CVE-2025-38627. Zhiguo Niu (2): f2fs: compress: change the first parameter of page_array_{alloc,free} to sbi f2fs: compress: fix UAF of f2fs_inode_info in f2fs_free_dic fs/f2fs/compress.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fixs CVE-2025-22090
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Fixs CVE-2025-22090 David Hildenbrand (2): x86/mm/pat: Fix VM_PAT handling when fork() fails in copy_page_range() mm: (un)track_pfn_copy() fix + doc improvements arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ include/linux/pgtable.h | 31 ++++++++++++++++++----- kernel/fork.c | 4 +++ mm/memory.c | 11 +++------ 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/9] CVE-2024-50102
by Qi Xi 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

David Gow (1): x86/uaccess: Zero the 8-byte get_range case on failure on 32-bit David Laight (1): x86: fix off-by-one in access_ok() Linus Torvalds (5): runtime constants: deal with old decrepit linkers runtime constants: add x86 architecture support x86: fix whitespace in runtime-const assembler output x86/uaccess: Improve the 8-byte getuser() case x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue Stephen Brennan (1): dcache: keep dentry_hashtable or d_hash_shift even when not used Thomas Gleixner (1): x86/uaccess: Add missing __force to casts in __access_ok() and valid_user_address() arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 49 ++++++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++ arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 80 ++++++++++------------------ fs/dcache.c | 9 +++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 7 +++ 7 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/runtime-const.h -- 2.33.0

2 10

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2025-21696
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Fix CVE-2025-21696. Lokesh Gidra (1): userfaultfd: move userfaultfd_ctx struct to header file Ryan Roberts (1): mm: clear uffd-wp PTE/PMD state on mremap() fs/userfaultfd.c | 39 --------------------------- include/linux/userfaultfd_k.h | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ mm/huge_memory.c | 12 +++++++++ mm/hugetlb.c | 14 +++++++++- mm/mremap.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 00/18] backport some net bugfix from 6.6 lts
by Zhang Changzhong 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Alexey Simakov (1): sctp: avoid NULL dereference when chunk data buffer is missing Eric Dumazet (2): sctp: initialize more fields in sctp_v6_from_sk() sctp: prevent possible shift-out-of-bounds in sctp_transport_update_rto Hans de Goede (1): net: rfkill: gpio: Fix crash due to dereferencering uninitialized pointer Ido Schimmel (1): nexthop: Forbid FDB status change while nexthop is in a group Ilya Dryomov (1): libceph: fix potential use-after-free in have_mon_and_osd_map() Jakub Kicinski (1): tls: fix handling of zero-length records on the rx_list Jakub Ramaseuski (1): net: gso: Forbid IPv6 TSO with extensions on devices with only IPV6_CSUM Kuniyuki Iwashima (2): tcp: Clear tcp_sk(sk)->fastopen_rsk in tcp_disconnect(). tipc: Fix use-after-free in tipc_mon_reinit_self(). Paul Chaignon (1): bpf: Explicitly check accesses to bpf_sock_addr Slavin Liu (1): ipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup Stefan Wiehler (3): sctp: Hold RCU read lock while iterating over address list sctp: Prevent TOCTOU out-of-bounds write sctp: Hold sock lock while iterating over address list Wang Liang (1): netfilter: br_netfilter: do not check confirmed bit in br_nf_local_in() after confirm ziming zhang (2): libceph: prevent potential out-of-bounds writes in handle_auth_session_key() libceph: replace BUG_ON with bounds check for map->max_osd net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c | 3 --- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 2 ++ net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- net/ceph/debugfs.c | 14 +++++++---- net/ceph/osdmap.c | 18 ++++++++------ net/core/dev.c | 12 ++++++++++ net/core/filter.c | 16 ++++++++----- net/ipv4/nexthop.c | 7 ++++++ net/ipv4/tcp.c | 5 ++++ net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ftp.c | 4 +++- net/rfkill/rfkill-gpio.c | 4 ++-- net/sctp/diag.c | 21 ++++++++++++---- net/sctp/inqueue.c | 13 +++++----- net/sctp/ipv6.c | 2 ++ net/sctp/transport.c | 13 ++++++---- net/tipc/net.c | 2 ++ net/tls/tls_sw.c | 7 +++++- 17 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-) -- 2.9.5

2 19

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/CPU/AMD: Add RDSEED fix for Zen5
by Bowen You 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18-rc3 commit 607b9fb2ce248cc5b633c5949e0153838992c152 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11500 CVE: CVE-2025-68313 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… There's an issue with RDSEED's 16-bit and 32-bit register output variants on Zen5 which return a random value of 0 "at a rate inconsistent with randomness while incorrectly signaling success (CF=1)". Search the web for AMD-SB-7055 for more detail. Add a fix glue which checks microcode revisions. [ bp: Add microcode revisions checking, rewrite. ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251018024010.4112396-1-gourry@gourry.net Signed-off-by: Bowen You <youbowen2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index d7a8f8bb9026..9990e058b6e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -1128,8 +1128,18 @@ static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static const struct x86_cpu_id zen5_rdseed_microcode[] = { + ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x02, 0x1, 0x0b00215a), + ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x11, 0x0, 0x0b101054), +}; + static void init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { + if (!x86_match_min_microcode_rev(zen5_rdseed_microcode)) { + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED); + msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_7, 18); + pr_emerg_once("RDSEED32 is broken. Disabling the corresponding CPUID bit.\n"); + } } static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] nohz_full stall
by Zicheng Qu 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Vincent Guittot (1): sched/fair: Prevent unlimited runtime on throttled group Zicheng Qu (1): sched: Re-evaluate scheduling when migrating queued tasks out of throttled cgroups kernel/sched/core.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/CPU/AMD: Add RDSEED fix for Zen5
by Bowen You 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.57 commit e980de2ff109dacb6d9d3a77f01b27c467115ecb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11500 CVE: CVE-2025-68313 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… There's an issue with RDSEED's 16-bit and 32-bit register output variants on Zen5 which return a random value of 0 "at a rate inconsistent with randomness while incorrectly signaling success (CF=1)". Search the web for AMD-SB-7055 for more detail. Add a fix glue which checks microcode revisions. [ bp: Add microcode revisions checking, rewrite. ] Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gregory Price <gourry(a)gourry.net> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251018024010.4112396-1-gourry@gourry.net Signed-off-by: Bowen You <youbowen2(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index d7a8f8bb9026..9990e058b6e8 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -1128,8 +1128,18 @@ static void init_amd_zen4(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static const struct x86_cpu_id zen5_rdseed_microcode[] = { + ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x02, 0x1, 0x0b00215a), + ZEN_MODEL_STEP_UCODE(0x1a, 0x11, 0x0, 0x0b101054), +}; + static void init_amd_zen5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { + if (!x86_match_min_microcode_rev(zen5_rdseed_microcode)) { + clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED); + msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_7, 18); + pr_emerg_once("RDSEED32 is broken. Disabling the corresponding CPUID bit.\n"); + } } static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] pmdomain: arm: scmi: Fix genpd leak on provider registration failure
by Bowen You 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.118 commit ad120c08b89a81d41d091490bbe150343473b659 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11572 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- If of_genpd_add_provider_onecell() fails during probe, the previously created generic power domains are not removed, leading to a memory leak and potential kernel crash later in genpd_debug_add(). Add proper error handling to unwind the initialized domains before returning from probe to ensure all resources are correctly released on failure. Example crash trace observed without this fix: | Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffffffffc70 | CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1 #405 PREEMPT | Hardware name: ARM LTD ARM Juno Development Platform/ARM Juno Development Platform | pstate: 00000005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) | pc : genpd_debug_add+0x2c/0x160 | lr : genpd_debug_init+0x74/0x98 | Call trace: | genpd_debug_add+0x2c/0x160 (P) | genpd_debug_init+0x74/0x98 | do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x2d8 | do_initcall_level+0xa0/0x140 | do_initcalls+0x60/0xa8 | do_basic_setup+0x28/0x40 | kernel_init_freeable+0xe8/0x170 | kernel_init+0x2c/0x140 | ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 Fixes: 898216c97ed2 ("firmware: arm_scmi: add device power domain support using genpd") Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Reviewed-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Bowen You <youbowen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/scmi_pm_domain.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/scmi_pm_domain.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/scmi_pm_domain.c index 0e05a79de82d..82d923a9d75d 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/scmi_pm_domain.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_scmi/scmi_pm_domain.c @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int scmi_pd_power_off(struct generic_pm_domain *domain) static int scmi_pm_domain_probe(struct scmi_device *sdev) { - int num_domains, i; + int num_domains, i, ret; struct device *dev = &sdev->dev; struct device_node *np = dev->of_node; struct scmi_pm_domain *scmi_pd; @@ -112,9 +112,18 @@ static int scmi_pm_domain_probe(struct scmi_device *sdev) scmi_pd_data->domains = domains; scmi_pd_data->num_domains = num_domains; + ret = of_genpd_add_provider_onecell(np, scmi_pd_data); + if (ret) + goto err_rm_genpds; + dev_set_drvdata(dev, scmi_pd_data); - return of_genpd_add_provider_onecell(np, scmi_pd_data); + return 0; +err_rm_genpds: + for (i = num_domains - 1; i >= 0; i--) + pm_genpd_remove(domains[i]); + + return ret; } static void scmi_pm_domain_remove(struct scmi_device *sdev) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] powerpc/64s/slb: Fix SLB multihit issue during SLB preload
by Zeng Heng 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Donet Tom <donettom(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit b13a3dbfa196af68eae2031f209743735ad416bf category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/13389 CVE: CVE-2025-71078 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 00312419f0863964625d6dcda8183f96849412c6 upstream. On systems using the hash MMU, there is a software SLB preload cache that mirrors the entries loaded into the hardware SLB buffer. This preload cache is subject to periodic eviction — typically after every 256 context switches — to remove old entry. To optimize performance, the kernel skips switch_mmu_context() in switch_mm_irqs_off() when the prev and next mm_struct are the same. However, on hash MMU systems, this can lead to inconsistencies between the hardware SLB and the software preload cache. If an SLB entry for a process is evicted from the software cache on one CPU, and the same process later runs on another CPU without executing switch_mmu_context(), the hardware SLB may retain stale entries. If the kernel then attempts to reload that entry, it can trigger an SLB multi-hit error. The following timeline shows how stale SLB entries are created and can cause a multi-hit error when a process moves between CPUs without a MMU context switch. CPU 0 CPU 1 ----- ----- Process P exec swapper/1 load_elf_binary begin_new_exc activate_mm switch_mm_irqs_off switch_mmu_context switch_slb /* * This invalidates all * the entries in the HW * and setup the new HW * SLB entries as per the * preload cache. */ context_switch sched_migrate_task migrates process P to cpu-1 Process swapper/0 context switch (to process P) (uses mm_struct of Process P) switch_mm_irqs_off() switch_slb load_slb++ /* * load_slb becomes 0 here * and we evict an entry from * the preload cache with * preload_age(). We still * keep HW SLB and preload * cache in sync, that is * because all HW SLB entries * anyways gets evicted in * switch_slb during SLBIA. * We then only add those * entries back in HW SLB, * which are currently * present in preload_cache * (after eviction). */ load_elf_binary continues... setup_new_exec() slb_setup_new_exec() sched_switch event sched_migrate_task migrates process P to cpu-0 context_switch from swapper/0 to Process P switch_mm_irqs_off() /* * Since both prev and next mm struct are same we don't call * switch_mmu_context(). This will cause the HW SLB and SW preload * cache to go out of sync in preload_new_slb_context. Because there * was an SLB entry which was evicted from both HW and preload cache * on cpu-1. Now later in preload_new_slb_context(), when we will try * to add the same preload entry again, we will add this to the SW * preload cache and then will add it to the HW SLB. Since on cpu-0 * this entry was never invalidated, hence adding this entry to the HW * SLB will cause a SLB multi-hit error. */ load_elf_binary continues... START_THREAD start_thread preload_new_slb_context /* * This tries to add a new EA to preload cache which was earlier * evicted from both cpu-1 HW SLB and preload cache. This caused the * HW SLB of cpu-0 to go out of sync with the SW preload cache. The * reason for this was, that when we context switched back on CPU-0, * we should have ideally called switch_mmu_context() which will * bring the HW SLB entries on CPU-0 in sync with SW preload cache * entries by setting up the mmu context properly. But we didn't do * that since the prev mm_struct running on cpu-0 was same as the * next mm_struct (which is true for swapper / kernel threads). So * now when we try to add this new entry into the HW SLB of cpu-0, * we hit a SLB multi-hit error. */ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1810970 at arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c:62 assert_slb_presence+0x2c/0x50(48 results) 02:47:29 [20157/42149] Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1810970 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3-dirty #12 VOLUNTARY Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER8 (architected) 0x4d0200 0xf000004 of:SLOF,HEAD hv:linux,kvm pSeries NIP: c00000000015426c LR: c0000000001543b4 CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000000497c77e0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.16.0-rc3-dirty) MSR: 8000000002823033 <SF,VEC,VSX,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 28888482 XER: 00000000 CFAR: c0000000001543b0 IRQMASK: 3 <...> NIP [c00000000015426c] assert_slb_presence+0x2c/0x50 LR [c0000000001543b4] slb_insert_entry+0x124/0x390 Call Trace: 0x7fffceb5ffff (unreliable) preload_new_slb_context+0x100/0x1a0 start_thread+0x26c/0x420 load_elf_binary+0x1b04/0x1c40 bprm_execve+0x358/0x680 do_execveat_common+0x1f8/0x240 sys_execve+0x58/0x70 system_call_exception+0x114/0x300 system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4 >From the above analysis, during early exec the hardware SLB is cleared, and entries from the software preload cache are reloaded into hardware by switch_slb. However, preload_new_slb_context and slb_setup_new_exec also attempt to load some of the same entries, which can trigger a multi-hit. In most cases, these additional preloads simply hit existing entries and add nothing new. Removing these functions avoids redundant preloads and eliminates the multi-hit issue. This patch removes these two functions. We tested process switching performance using the context_switch benchmark on POWER9/hash, and observed no regression. Without this patch: 129041 ops/sec With this patch: 129341 ops/sec We also measured SLB faults during boot, and the counts are essentially the same with and without this patch. SLB faults without this patch: 19727 SLB faults with this patch: 19786 Fixes: 5434ae74629a ("powerpc/64s/hash: Add a SLB preload cache") cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Donet Tom <donettom(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ritesh Harjani (IBM) <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy(a)linux.ibm.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/0ac694ae683494fe8cadbd911a1a5018d5d3c541.176183416… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h | 1 - arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c | 5 -- arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/internal.h | 2 - arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c | 2 - arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c | 88 ------------------- 5 files changed, 98 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h index 1c4eebbc69c9..e1f77e2eead4 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/mmu-hash.h @@ -524,7 +524,6 @@ void slb_save_contents(struct slb_entry *slb_ptr); void slb_dump_contents(struct slb_entry *slb_ptr); extern void slb_vmalloc_update(void); -void preload_new_slb_context(unsigned long start, unsigned long sp); #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_64S_HASH_MMU void slb_set_size(u16 size); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c index 9452a54d356c..dd23025ef2e1 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/process.c @@ -1882,8 +1882,6 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args) return 0; } -void preload_new_slb_context(unsigned long start, unsigned long sp); - /* * Set up a thread for executing a new program */ @@ -1891,9 +1889,6 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long start, unsigned long sp) { #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 unsigned long load_addr = regs->gpr[2]; /* saved by ELF_PLAT_INIT */ - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64) && !radix_enabled()) - preload_new_slb_context(start, sp); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/internal.h b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/internal.h index a57a25f06a21..c26a6f0c90fc 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/internal.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/internal.h @@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ static inline bool stress_hpt(void) void hpt_do_stress(unsigned long ea, unsigned long hpte_group); -void slb_setup_new_exec(void); - void exit_lazy_flush_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, bool always_flush); #endif /* ARCH_POWERPC_MM_BOOK3S64_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c index 1715b07c630c..997bc13a690e 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c @@ -150,8 +150,6 @@ static int hash__init_new_context(struct mm_struct *mm) void hash__setup_new_exec(void) { slice_setup_new_exec(); - - slb_setup_new_exec(); } #else static inline int hash__init_new_context(struct mm_struct *mm) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c index f2708c8629a5..8e8d5da7b482 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/slb.c @@ -328,94 +328,6 @@ static void preload_age(struct thread_info *ti) ti->slb_preload_tail = (ti->slb_preload_tail + 1) % SLB_PRELOAD_NR; } -void slb_setup_new_exec(void) -{ - struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - unsigned long exec = 0x10000000; - - WARN_ON(irqs_disabled()); - - /* - * preload cache can only be used to determine whether a SLB - * entry exists if it does not start to overflow. - */ - if (ti->slb_preload_nr + 2 > SLB_PRELOAD_NR) - return; - - hard_irq_disable(); - - /* - * We have no good place to clear the slb preload cache on exec, - * flush_thread is about the earliest arch hook but that happens - * after we switch to the mm and have already preloaded the SLBEs. - * - * For the most part that's probably okay to use entries from the - * previous exec, they will age out if unused. It may turn out to - * be an advantage to clear the cache before switching to it, - * however. - */ - - /* - * preload some userspace segments into the SLB. - * Almost all 32 and 64bit PowerPC executables are linked at - * 0x10000000 so it makes sense to preload this segment. - */ - if (!is_kernel_addr(exec)) { - if (preload_add(ti, exec)) - slb_allocate_user(mm, exec); - } - - /* Libraries and mmaps. */ - if (!is_kernel_addr(mm->mmap_base)) { - if (preload_add(ti, mm->mmap_base)) - slb_allocate_user(mm, mm->mmap_base); - } - - /* see switch_slb */ - asm volatile("isync" : : : "memory"); - - local_irq_enable(); -} - -void preload_new_slb_context(unsigned long start, unsigned long sp) -{ - struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); - struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; - unsigned long heap = mm->start_brk; - - WARN_ON(irqs_disabled()); - - /* see above */ - if (ti->slb_preload_nr + 3 > SLB_PRELOAD_NR) - return; - - hard_irq_disable(); - - /* Userspace entry address. */ - if (!is_kernel_addr(start)) { - if (preload_add(ti, start)) - slb_allocate_user(mm, start); - } - - /* Top of stack, grows down. */ - if (!is_kernel_addr(sp)) { - if (preload_add(ti, sp)) - slb_allocate_user(mm, sp); - } - - /* Bottom of heap, grows up. */ - if (heap && !is_kernel_addr(heap)) { - if (preload_add(ti, heap)) - slb_allocate_user(mm, heap); - } - - /* see switch_slb */ - asm volatile("isync" : : : "memory"); - - local_irq_enable(); -} - static void slb_cache_slbie_kernel(unsigned int index) { unsigned long slbie_data = get_paca()->slb_cache[index]; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/huge_memory: fix NULL pointer deference when splitting folio
by Zeng Heng 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18 commit cff47b9e39a6abf03dde5f4f156f841b0c54bba0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitcode.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11518 CVE: CVE-2025-68293 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Commit c010d47f107f ("mm: thp: split huge page to any lower order pages") introduced an early check on the folio's order via mapping->flags before proceeding with the split work. This check introduced a bug: for shmem folios in the swap cache and truncated folios, the mapping pointer can be NULL. Accessing mapping->flags in this state leads directly to a NULL pointer dereference. This commit fixes the issue by moving the check for mapping != NULL before any attempt to access mapping->flags. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251119235302.24773-1-richard.weiyang@gmail.com Fixes: c010d47f107f ("mm: thp: split huge page to any lower order pages") Signed-off-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand (Red Hat) <david(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang(a)linux.alibaba.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: mm/huge_memory.c [Fix context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- mm/huge_memory.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/huge_memory.c b/mm/huge_memory.c index 2bd84157869e..8ed51bf8a3b4 100644 --- a/mm/huge_memory.c +++ b/mm/huge_memory.c @@ -3599,6 +3599,16 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list_to_order(struct page *page, struct list_head *list, VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio), folio); VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_large(folio), folio); + /* + * Folios that just got truncated cannot get split. Signal to the + * caller that there was a race. + * + * TODO: this will also currently refuse shmem folios that are in the + * swapcache. + */ + if (!is_anon && !folio->mapping) + return -EBUSY; + if (new_order >= folio_order(folio)) return -EINVAL; @@ -3664,12 +3674,6 @@ int split_huge_page_to_list_to_order(struct page *page, struct list_head *list, mapping = folio->mapping; - /* Truncated ? */ - if (!mapping) { - ret = -EBUSY; - goto out; - } - gfp = current_gfp_context(mapping_gfp_mask(mapping) & GFP_RECLAIM_MASK); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] nohz_full stall
by Zicheng Qu 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

Vincent Guittot (1): sched/fair: Prevent unlimited runtime on throttled group Zicheng Qu (1): sched: Re-evaluate scheduling when migrating queued tasks out of throttled cgroups kernel/sched/core.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] team: fix check for port enabled in team_queue_override_port_prio_changed()
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 6bfb62b6010a16112dcae52f490e5e0e6abe12a3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13402 CVE: CVE-2025-71091 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 932ac51d9953eaf77a1252f79b656d4ca86163c6 ] There has been a syzkaller bug reported recently with the following trace: list_del corruption, ffff888058bea080->prev is LIST_POISON2 (dead000000000122) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:59! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 21246 Comm: syz.0.2928 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x13e/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:59 Code: 48 c7 c7 e0 71 f0 8b e8 30 08 ef fc 90 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 a5 02 55 fd 48 89 ea 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 40 72 f0 8b e8 13 08 ef fc 90 <0f> 0b 48 89 ef e8 88 02 55 fd 48 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d49f370 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff888058bea080 RCX: ffffc9002817d000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff819becc6 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: dead000000000122 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888039e9c230 R13: ffff888058bea088 R14: ffff888058bea080 R15: ffff888055461480 FS: 00007fbbcfe6f6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d6d0a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000110c3afcb0 CR3: 00000000382c7000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:223 [inline] list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:178 [inline] __team_queue_override_port_del drivers/net/team/team_core.c:826 [inline] __team_queue_override_port_del drivers/net/team/team_core.c:821 [inline] team_queue_override_port_prio_changed drivers/net/team/team_core.c:883 [inline] team_priority_option_set+0x171/0x2f0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1534 team_option_set drivers/net/team/team_core.c:376 [inline] team_nl_options_set_doit+0x8ae/0xe60 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2653 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x209/0x2f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x55c/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x5aa/0x870 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c8/0xdd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xa98/0xc70 net/socket.c:2630 ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2684 __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220 net/socket.c:2716 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The problem is in this flow: 1) Port is enabled, queue_id != 0, in qom_list 2) Port gets disabled -> team_port_disable() -> team_queue_override_port_del() -> del (removed from list) 3) Port is disabled, queue_id != 0, not in any list 4) Priority changes -> team_queue_override_port_prio_changed() -> checks: port disabled && queue_id != 0 -> calls del - hits the BUG as it is removed already To fix this, change the check in team_queue_override_port_prio_changed() so it returns early if port is not enabled. Reported-by: syzbot+422806e5f4cce722a71f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=422806e5f4cce722a71f Fixes: 6c31ff366c11 ("team: remove synchronize_rcu() called during queue override change") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251212102953.167287-1-jiri@resnulli.us Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/team/team.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/team/team.c b/drivers/net/team/team.c index 1ce3bccd4ebd..9baa13808933 100644 --- a/drivers/net/team/team.c +++ b/drivers/net/team/team.c @@ -876,7 +876,7 @@ static void __team_queue_override_enabled_check(struct team *team) static void team_queue_override_port_prio_changed(struct team *team, struct team_port *port) { - if (!port->queue_id || team_port_enabled(port)) + if (!port->queue_id || !team_port_enabled(port)) return; __team_queue_override_port_del(team, port); __team_queue_override_port_add(team, port); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] team: fix check for port enabled in team_queue_override_port_prio_changed()
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 6bfb62b6010a16112dcae52f490e5e0e6abe12a3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13402 CVE: CVE-2025-71091 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 932ac51d9953eaf77a1252f79b656d4ca86163c6 ] There has been a syzkaller bug reported recently with the following trace: list_del corruption, ffff888058bea080->prev is LIST_POISON2 (dead000000000122) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:59! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 21246 Comm: syz.0.2928 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x13e/0x200 lib/list_debug.c:59 Code: 48 c7 c7 e0 71 f0 8b e8 30 08 ef fc 90 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 a5 02 55 fd 48 89 ea 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 40 72 f0 8b e8 13 08 ef fc 90 <0f> 0b 48 89 ef e8 88 02 55 fd 48 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d49f370 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 000000000000004e RBX: ffff888058bea080 RCX: ffffc9002817d000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff819becc6 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: dead000000000122 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888039e9c230 R13: ffff888058bea088 R14: ffff888058bea080 R15: ffff888055461480 FS: 00007fbbcfe6f6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880d6d0a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000110c3afcb0 CR3: 00000000382c7000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __list_del_entry_valid include/linux/list.h:132 [inline] __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:223 [inline] list_del_rcu include/linux/rculist.h:178 [inline] __team_queue_override_port_del drivers/net/team/team_core.c:826 [inline] __team_queue_override_port_del drivers/net/team/team_core.c:821 [inline] team_queue_override_port_prio_changed drivers/net/team/team_core.c:883 [inline] team_priority_option_set+0x171/0x2f0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1534 team_option_set drivers/net/team/team_core.c:376 [inline] team_nl_options_set_doit+0x8ae/0xe60 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2653 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x209/0x2f0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x55c/0x800 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210 netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2552 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x5aa/0x870 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346 netlink_sendmsg+0x8c8/0xdd0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:742 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0xa98/0xc70 net/socket.c:2630 ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2684 __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220 net/socket.c:2716 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The problem is in this flow: 1) Port is enabled, queue_id != 0, in qom_list 2) Port gets disabled -> team_port_disable() -> team_queue_override_port_del() -> del (removed from list) 3) Port is disabled, queue_id != 0, not in any list 4) Priority changes -> team_queue_override_port_prio_changed() -> checks: port disabled && queue_id != 0 -> calls del - hits the BUG as it is removed already To fix this, change the check in team_queue_override_port_prio_changed() so it returns early if port is not enabled. Reported-by: syzbot+422806e5f4cce722a71f(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=422806e5f4cce722a71f Fixes: 6c31ff366c11 ("team: remove synchronize_rcu() called during queue override change") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251212102953.167287-1-jiri@resnulli.us Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/team/team.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/team/team.c b/drivers/net/team/team.c index 49d7030ddc1b..ea5a75e7ee53 100644 --- a/drivers/net/team/team.c +++ b/drivers/net/team/team.c @@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static void __team_queue_override_enabled_check(struct team *team) static void team_queue_override_port_prio_changed(struct team *team, struct team_port *port) { - if (!port->queue_id || team_port_enabled(port)) + if (!port->queue_id || !team_port_enabled(port)) return; __team_queue_override_port_del(team, port); __team_queue_override_port_add(team, port); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/page_alloc: prevent pcp corruption with SMP=n
by Ze Zuo 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

From: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.122 commit 4a04ff9cd816e7346fcc8126f00ed80481f6569d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13530 CVE: CVE-2026-23025 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 038a102535eb49e10e93eafac54352fcc5d78847 ] The kernel test robot has reported: BUG: spinlock trylock failure on UP on CPU#0, kcompactd0/28 lock: 0xffff888807e35ef0, .magic: dead4ead, .owner: kcompactd0/28, .owner_cpu: 0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28 Comm: kcompactd0 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5-00127-ga06157804399 #1 PREEMPT 8cc09ef94dcec767faa911515ce9e609c45db470 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:95) dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:123) dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:130) spin_dump (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:71) do_raw_spin_trylock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:?) _raw_spin_trylock (include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:89 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:138) __free_frozen_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2973) ___free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5295) __free_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:5334) tlb_remove_table_rcu (include/linux/mm.h:? include/linux/mm.h:3122 include/asm-generic/tlb.h:220 mm/mmu_gather.c:227 mm/mmu_gather.c:290) ? __cfi_tlb_remove_table_rcu (mm/mmu_gather.c:289) ? rcu_core (kernel/rcu/tree.c:?) rcu_core (include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2607 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2861) rcu_core_si (kernel/rcu/tree.c:2879) handle_softirqs (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:623) __irq_exit_rcu (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:36 kernel/softirq.c:725) irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:741) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052) </IRQ> <TASK> RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:152 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194) free_pcppages_bulk (mm/page_alloc.c:1494) drain_pages_zone (include/linux/spinlock.h:391 mm/page_alloc.c:2632) __drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2731) drain_all_pages (mm/page_alloc.c:2747) kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3115) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:465) ? __cfi_kcompactd (mm/compaction.c:3166) ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164) ? __cfi_kthread (kernel/kthread.c:412) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:255) </TASK> Matthew has analyzed the report and identified that in drain_page_zone() we are in a section protected by spin_lock(&pcp->lock) and then get an interrupt that attempts spin_trylock() on the same lock. The code is designed to work this way without disabling IRQs and occasionally fail the trylock with a fallback. However, the SMP=n spinlock implementation assumes spin_trylock() will always succeed, and thus it's normally a no-op. Here the enabled lock debugging catches the problem, but otherwise it could cause a corruption of the pcp structure. The problem has been introduced by commit 574907741599 ("mm/page_alloc: leave IRQs enabled for per-cpu page allocations"). The pcp locking scheme recognizes the need for disabling IRQs to prevent nesting spin_trylock() sections on SMP=n, but the need to prevent the nesting in spin_lock() has not been recognized. Fix it by introducing local wrappers that change the spin_lock() to spin_lock_iqsave() with SMP=n and use them in all places that do spin_lock(&pcp->lock). [vbabka(a)suse.cz: add pcp_ prefix to the spin_lock_irqsave wrappers, per Steven] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260105-fix-pcp-up-v1-1-5579662d2071@suse.cz Fixes: 574907741599 ("mm/page_alloc: leave IRQs enabled for per-cpu page allocations") Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang(a)intel.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202512101320.e2f2dd6f-lkp@intel.com Analyzed-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy(a)infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aUW05pyc9nZkvY-1@casper.infradead.org/ Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Brendan Jackman <jackmanb(a)google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy(a)linutronix.de> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Cc: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Cc: Zi Yan <ziy(a)nvidia.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> [ drop changes to decay_pcp_high() and zone_pcp_update_cacheinfo() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ze Zuo <zuoze1(a)huawei.com> --- mm/page_alloc.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 2bc511aa784c..aeb4ad15f751 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -164,6 +164,33 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcp_batch_high_lock); #define pcp_spin_unlock(ptr) \ pcpu_spin_unlock(lock, ptr) +/* + * With the UP spinlock implementation, when we spin_lock(&pcp->lock) (for i.e. + * a potentially remote cpu drain) and get interrupted by an operation that + * attempts pcp_spin_trylock(), we can't rely on the trylock failure due to UP + * spinlock assumptions making the trylock a no-op. So we have to turn that + * spin_lock() to a spin_lock_irqsave(). This works because on UP there are no + * remote cpu's so we can only be locking the only existing local one. + */ +#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) || defined(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) +static inline void __flags_noop(unsigned long *flags) { } +#define pcp_spin_lock_maybe_irqsave(ptr, flags) \ +({ \ + __flags_noop(&(flags)); \ + spin_lock(&(ptr)->lock); \ +}) +#define pcp_spin_unlock_maybe_irqrestore(ptr, flags) \ +({ \ + spin_unlock(&(ptr)->lock); \ + __flags_noop(&(flags)); \ +}) +#else +#define pcp_spin_lock_maybe_irqsave(ptr, flags) \ + spin_lock_irqsave(&(ptr)->lock, flags) +#define pcp_spin_unlock_maybe_irqrestore(ptr, flags) \ + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&(ptr)->lock, flags) +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, numa_node); EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(numa_node); @@ -2391,14 +2418,15 @@ int decay_pcp_high(struct zone *zone, struct per_cpu_pages *pcp) */ void drain_zone_pages(struct zone *zone, struct per_cpu_pages *pcp) { + unsigned long UP_flags; int to_drain, batch; batch = READ_ONCE(pcp->batch); to_drain = min(pcp->count, batch); if (to_drain > 0) { - spin_lock(&pcp->lock); + pcp_spin_lock_maybe_irqsave(pcp, UP_flags); free_pcppages_bulk(zone, to_drain, pcp, 0); - spin_unlock(&pcp->lock); + pcp_spin_unlock_maybe_irqrestore(pcp, UP_flags); } } #endif @@ -2409,10 +2437,11 @@ void drain_zone_pages(struct zone *zone, struct per_cpu_pages *pcp) static void drain_pages_zone(unsigned int cpu, struct zone *zone) { struct per_cpu_pages *pcp = per_cpu_ptr(zone->per_cpu_pageset, cpu); + unsigned long UP_flags; int count; do { - spin_lock(&pcp->lock); + pcp_spin_lock_maybe_irqsave(pcp, UP_flags); count = pcp->count; if (count) { int to_drain = min(count, @@ -2421,7 +2450,7 @@ static void drain_pages_zone(unsigned int cpu, struct zone *zone) free_pcppages_bulk(zone, to_drain, pcp, 0); count -= to_drain; } - spin_unlock(&pcp->lock); + pcp_spin_unlock_maybe_irqrestore(pcp, UP_flags); } while (count); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 05 Feb '26

05 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + 11 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2025-39744 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Frederic Weisbecker (1): rcu: Fix racy re-initialization of irq_work causing hangs Joel Fernandes (1): rcu: Fix rcu_read_unlock() deadloop due to IRQ work kernel/rcu/tree.c | 2 ++ kernel/rcu/tree.h | 14 +++++++++++++- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] CVE-2025-39744 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Frederic Weisbecker (1): rcu: Fix racy re-initialization of irq_work causing hangs Joel Fernandes (1): rcu: Fix rcu_read_unlock() deadloop due to IRQ work Zqiang (1): rcu: Use IRQ_WORK_INIT_HARD() to avoid rcu_read_unlock() hangs kernel/rcu/tree.c | 1 + kernel/rcu/tree.h | 14 +++++++++++++- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2025-71141 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Kory Maincent (TI.com) (1): drm/tilcdc: Fix removal actions in case of failed probe Philipp Stanner (1): drm/tilcdc: request and mapp iomem with devres drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_crtc.c | 2 +- drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_drv.c | 72 +++++++++++++++------------- drivers/gpu/drm/tilcdc/tilcdc_drv.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] dmaengine: stm32: dmamux: fix device leak on route allocation
by Yin Tirui 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.122 commit 1a179ac01ff3993ab97e33cc77c316ed7415cda1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13527 CVE: CVE-2025-71186 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit dd6e4943889fb354efa3f700e42739da9bddb6ef ] Make sure to drop the reference taken when looking up the DMA mux platform device during route allocation. Note that holding a reference to a device does not prevent its driver data from going away so there is no point in keeping the reference. Fixes: df7e762db5f6 ("dmaengine: Add STM32 DMAMUX driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 4.15 Cc: Pierre-Yves MORDRET <pierre-yves.mordret(a)foss.st.com> Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Amelie Delaunay <amelie.delaunay(a)foss.st.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251117161258.10679-11-johan@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vinod Koul <vkoul(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yin Tirui <yintirui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/dma/stm32-dmamux.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/dma/stm32-dmamux.c b/drivers/dma/stm32-dmamux.c index 8d77e2a7939a..791179760782 100644 --- a/drivers/dma/stm32-dmamux.c +++ b/drivers/dma/stm32-dmamux.c @@ -90,23 +90,25 @@ static void *stm32_dmamux_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, struct stm32_dmamux_data *dmamux = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); struct stm32_dmamux *mux; u32 i, min, max; - int ret; + int ret = -EINVAL; unsigned long flags; if (dma_spec->args_count != 3) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "invalid number of dma mux args\n"); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto err_put_pdev; } if (dma_spec->args[0] > dmamux->dmamux_requests) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "invalid mux request number: %d\n", dma_spec->args[0]); - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + goto err_put_pdev; } mux = kzalloc(sizeof(*mux), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!mux) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + if (!mux) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto err_put_pdev; + } spin_lock_irqsave(&dmamux->lock, flags); mux->chan_id = find_first_zero_bit(dmamux->dma_inuse, @@ -133,7 +135,6 @@ static void *stm32_dmamux_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dma_spec->np = of_parse_phandle(ofdma->of_node, "dma-masters", i - 1); if (!dma_spec->np) { dev_err(&pdev->dev, "can't get dma master\n"); - ret = -EINVAL; goto error; } @@ -160,6 +161,8 @@ static void *stm32_dmamux_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, dev_dbg(&pdev->dev, "Mapping DMAMUX(%u) to DMA%u(%u)\n", mux->request, mux->master, mux->chan_id); + put_device(&pdev->dev); + return mux; error: @@ -167,6 +170,9 @@ static void *stm32_dmamux_route_allocate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec, error_chan_id: kfree(mux); +err_put_pdev: + put_device(&pdev->dev); + return ERR_PTR(ret); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH v3 0/3] arm64/riscv: Add support for crashkernel CMA reservation
by Jinjie Ruan 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

Add support for crashkernel CMA reservation for arm64 and riscv. By the way, exclude crash kernel memory in crash core to avoid duplication. Changs in v3: - Exclude crash kernel memory in crash core as Mike suggested. - Add acked-by. Jinjie Ruan (3): crash: Exclude crash kernel memory in crash core arm64: kexec: Add support for crashkernel CMA reservation riscv: kexec: Add support for crashkernel CMA reservation .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 16 ++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 16 +++----- arch/arm64/mm/init.c | 5 ++- arch/loongarch/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 12 ------ arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c | 16 ++------ arch/riscv/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 15 ++++--- arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 5 ++- arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 39 +------------------ kernel/crash_core.c | 28 +++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + 11 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6] null_blk: fix kmemleak by releasing references to fault configfs items
by Zheng Qixing 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Nilay Shroff <nilay(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.122 commit 1a3286edf4d48ce37f8982ff3c3b65159a5ecbb2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13556 CVE: CVE-2026-23032 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ commit 40b94ec7edbbb867c4e26a1a43d2b898f04b93c5 upstream. When CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK_FAULT_INJECTION is enabled, the null-blk driver sets up fault injection support by creating the timeout_inject, requeue_inject, and init_hctx_fault_inject configfs items as children of the top-level nullbX configfs group. However, when the nullbX device is removed, the references taken to these fault-config configfs items are not released. As a result, kmemleak reports a memory leak, for example: unreferenced object 0xc00000021ff25c40 (size 32): comm "mkdir", pid 10665, jiffies 4322121578 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 69 6e 69 74 5f 68 63 74 78 5f 66 61 75 6c 74 5f init_hctx_fault_ 69 6e 6a 65 63 74 00 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 inject.......... backtrace (crc 1a018c86): __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x494/0xbd8 kvasprintf+0x74/0xf4 config_item_set_name+0xf0/0x104 config_group_init_type_name+0x48/0xfc fault_config_init+0x48/0xf0 0xc0080000180559e4 configfs_mkdir+0x304/0x814 vfs_mkdir+0x49c/0x604 do_mkdirat+0x314/0x3d0 sys_mkdir+0xa0/0xd8 system_call_exception+0x1b0/0x4f0 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec Fix this by explicitly releasing the references to the fault-config configfs items when dropping the reference to the top-level nullbX configfs group. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Fixes: bb4c19e030f4 ("block: null_blk: make fault-injection dynamically configurable per device") Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/null_blk/main.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c index 97ed3bd9707f..217a6b788dfa 100644 --- a/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c +++ b/drivers/block/null_blk/main.c @@ -622,12 +622,22 @@ static void nullb_add_fault_config(struct nullb_device *dev) configfs_add_default_group(&dev->init_hctx_fault_config.group, &dev->group); } +static void nullb_del_fault_config(struct nullb_device *dev) +{ + config_item_put(&dev->init_hctx_fault_config.group.cg_item); + config_item_put(&dev->requeue_config.group.cg_item); + config_item_put(&dev->timeout_config.group.cg_item); +} + #else static void nullb_add_fault_config(struct nullb_device *dev) { } +static void nullb_del_fault_config(struct nullb_device *dev) +{ +} #endif static struct @@ -659,7 +669,7 @@ nullb_group_drop_item(struct config_group *group, struct config_item *item) null_del_dev(dev->nullb); mutex_unlock(&lock); } - + nullb_del_fault_config(dev); config_item_put(item); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/core: Check for the presence of LS_NLA_TYPE_DGID correctly
by Wang Tao 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 9d85524789c2f17c0e87de8d596bcccc3683a1fc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13407 CVE: CVE-2025-71096 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit a7b8e876e0ef0232b8076972c57ce9a7286b47ca upstream. The netlink response for RDMA_NL_LS_OP_IP_RESOLVE should always have a LS_NLA_TYPE_DGID attribute, it is invalid if it does not. Use the nl parsing logic properly and call nla_parse_deprecated() to fill the nlattrs array and then directly index that array to get the data for the DGID. Just fail if it is NULL. Remove the for loop searching for the nla, and squash the validation and parsing into one function. Fixes an uninitialized read from the stack triggered by userspace if it does not provide the DGID to a kernel initiated RDMA_NL_LS_OP_IP_RESOLVE query. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hex_byte_pack include/linux/hex.h:13 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ip6_string+0xef4/0x13a0 lib/vsprintf.c:1490 hex_byte_pack include/linux/hex.h:13 [inline] ip6_string+0xef4/0x13a0 lib/vsprintf.c:1490 ip6_addr_string+0x18a/0x3e0 lib/vsprintf.c:1509 ip_addr_string+0x245/0xee0 lib/vsprintf.c:1633 pointer+0xc09/0x1bd0 lib/vsprintf.c:2542 vsnprintf+0xf8a/0x1bd0 lib/vsprintf.c:2930 vprintk_store+0x3ae/0x1530 kernel/printk/printk.c:2279 vprintk_emit+0x307/0xcd0 kernel/printk/printk.c:2426 vprintk_default+0x3f/0x50 kernel/printk/printk.c:2465 vprintk+0x36/0x50 kernel/printk/printk_safe.c:82 _printk+0x17e/0x1b0 kernel/printk/printk.c:2475 ib_nl_process_good_ip_rsep drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:128 [inline] ib_nl_handle_ip_res_resp+0x963/0x9d0 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:141 rdma_nl_rcv_msg drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:-1 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv_skb drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:239 [inline] rdma_nl_rcv+0xefa/0x11c0 drivers/infiniband/core/netlink.c:259 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1320 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf04/0x12b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1346 netlink_sendmsg+0x10b3/0x1250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1896 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x333/0x3d0 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x7e0/0xd80 net/socket.c:2617 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2671 __sys_sendmsg+0x1aa/0x300 net/socket.c:2703 __compat_sys_sendmsg net/compat.c:346 [inline] __do_compat_sys_sendmsg net/compat.c:353 [inline] __se_compat_sys_sendmsg net/compat.c:350 [inline] __ia32_compat_sys_sendmsg+0xa4/0x100 net/compat.c:350 ia32_sys_call+0x3f6c/0x4310 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_32.h:371 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline] __do_fast_syscall_32+0xb0/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:306 do_fast_syscall_32+0x38/0x80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:331 do_SYSENTER_32+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:3 Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/0-v1-3fbaef094271+2cf-rdma_op_ip_rslv_syz_jgg@nv… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ae43f8286730 ("IB/core: Add IP to GID netlink offload") Reported-by: syzbot+938fcd548c303fe33c1a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/68dc3dac.a00a0220.102ee.004f.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Tao <wangtao554(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c | 33 ++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c index f20dfe70f..0b58349b7 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c @@ -80,37 +80,25 @@ static const struct nla_policy ib_nl_addr_policy[LS_NLA_TYPE_MAX] = { .min = sizeof(struct rdma_nla_ls_gid)}, }; -static inline bool ib_nl_is_good_ip_resp(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) +static void ib_nl_process_ip_rsep(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) { struct nlattr *tb[LS_NLA_TYPE_MAX] = {}; + union ib_gid gid; + struct addr_req *req; + int found = 0; int ret; if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & RDMA_NL_LS_F_ERR) - return false; + return; ret = nla_parse_deprecated(tb, LS_NLA_TYPE_MAX - 1, nlmsg_data(nlh), nlmsg_len(nlh), ib_nl_addr_policy, NULL); if (ret) - return false; - - return true; -} - -static void ib_nl_process_good_ip_rsep(const struct nlmsghdr *nlh) -{ - const struct nlattr *head, *curr; - union ib_gid gid; - struct addr_req *req; - int len, rem; - int found = 0; - - head = (const struct nlattr *)nlmsg_data(nlh); - len = nlmsg_len(nlh); + return; - nla_for_each_attr(curr, head, len, rem) { - if (curr->nla_type == LS_NLA_TYPE_DGID) - memcpy(&gid, nla_data(curr), nla_len(curr)); - } + if (!tb[LS_NLA_TYPE_DGID]) + return; + memcpy(&gid, nla_data(tb[LS_NLA_TYPE_DGID]), sizeof(gid)); spin_lock_bh(&lock); list_for_each_entry(req, &req_list, list) { @@ -137,8 +125,7 @@ int ib_nl_handle_ip_res_resp(struct sk_buff *skb, !(NETLINK_CB(skb).sk)) return -EPERM; - if (ib_nl_is_good_ip_resp(nlh)) - ib_nl_process_good_ip_rsep(nlh); + ib_nl_process_ip_rsep(nlh); return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2025-68768
by Li Xiasong 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Jakub Kicinski (2): inet: frags: add inet_frag_queue_flush() inet: frags: flush pending skbs in fqdir_pre_exit() include/net/inet_frag.h | 18 +++----------- include/net/ipv6_frag.h | 9 ++++--- net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- net/ipv4/ip_fragment.c | 18 +++++++------- 4 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
by Li Xiasong 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 81c734dae203757fb3c9eee6f9896386940776bd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13513 CVE: CVE-2026-23003 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Blamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations as spotted by syzbot [1]. Use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull(). [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321 __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321 ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729 __ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860 ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903 gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500 ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590 dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397 tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485 tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746 x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586 __alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995 tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline] tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746 x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Fixes: 8d975c15c0cd ("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()") Reported-by: syzbot+d4dda070f833dc5dc89a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/695e88b2.050a0220.1c677c.036d.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260107163109.4188620-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c [conflicts due to not merge 9990ddf47d41 ("net: tunnel: make skb_vlan_inet_prepare() return drop reasons").] Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index c70ff45649ad..8348b7e43c13 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ static int __ip6_tnl_rcv(struct ip6_tnl *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb, skb_reset_network_header(skb); - if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb)) { + if (!skb_vlan_inet_prepare(skb, true)) { DEV_STATS_INC(tunnel->dev, rx_length_errors); DEV_STATS_INC(tunnel->dev, rx_errors); goto drop; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/5] CVE-2026-23003
by Li Xiasong 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Eric Dumazet (2): geneve: fix header validation in geneve[6]_xmit_skb ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv() Gal Pressman (1): geneve: Fix incorrect inner network header offset when innerprotoinherit is set Phillip Potter (2): net: geneve: check skb is large enough for IPv4/IPv6 header net: geneve: modify IP header check in geneve6_xmit_skb and geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c | 6 ++++++ include/net/ip_tunnels.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-6.6] media: dvb-usb: dtv5100: fix out-of-bounds in dtv5100_i2c_msg()
by Liu Kai 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 4a54d8fcb093761e4c56eb211cf4e39bf8401fa1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13371 CVE: CVE-2025-68819 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b91e6aafe8d356086cc621bc03e35ba2299e4788 upstream. rlen value is a user-controlled value, but dtv5100_i2c_msg() does not check the size of the rlen value. Therefore, if it is set to a value larger than sizeof(st->data), an out-of-bounds vuln occurs for st->data. Therefore, we need to add proper range checking to prevent this vuln. Fixes: 60688d5e6e6e ("V4L/DVB (8735): dtv5100: replace dummy frontend by zl10353") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c index 56c9d521a34a..ee8a76fb5cc1 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c @@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ static int dtv5100_i2c_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d, u8 addr, } index = (addr << 8) + wbuf[0]; + if (rlen > sizeof(st->data)) { + warn("rlen = %x is too big!\n", rlen); + return -EINVAL; + } + memcpy(st->data, rbuf, rlen); msleep(1); /* avoid I2C errors */ return usb_control_msg(d->udev, pipe, request, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] RDMA/cm: Fix leaking the multicast GID table reference
by Liu Kai 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit c0acdee513239e1d6e1b490f56be0e6837dfd162 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13395 CVE: CVE-2025-71084 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 57f3cb6c84159d12ba343574df2115fb18dd83ca upstream. If the CM ID is destroyed while the CM event for multicast creating is still queued the cancel_work_sync() will prevent the work from running which also prevents destroying the ah_attr. This leaks a refcount and triggers a WARN: GID entry ref leak for dev syz1 index 2 ref=573 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 655 at drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:809 release_gid_table drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:806 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 655 at drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:809 gid_table_release_one+0x284/0x3cc drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:886 Destroy the ah_attr after canceling the work, it is safe to call this twice. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/0-v1-4285d070a6b2+20a-rdma_mc_gid_leak_syz_jgg@n… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: fe454dc31e84 ("RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free bug in ucma_create_uevent") Reported-by: syzbot+b0da83a6c0e2e2bddbd4(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68232e7b.050a0220.f2294.09f6.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c index a5ceae2e075a..7db79ff3fa06 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c @@ -1993,6 +1993,7 @@ static void destroy_mc(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, ib_sa_free_multicast(mc->sa_mc); if (rdma_protocol_roce(id_priv->id.device, id_priv->id.port_num)) { + struct rdma_cm_event *event = &mc->iboe_join.event; struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr = &id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr; struct net_device *ndev = NULL; @@ -2015,6 +2016,8 @@ static void destroy_mc(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, dev_put(ndev); cancel_work_sync(&mc->iboe_join.work); + if (event->event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_MULTICAST_JOIN) + rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&event->param.ud.ah_attr); } kfree(mc); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/cm: Fix leaking the multicast GID table reference
by Liu Kai 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.248 commit d5ce588a9552878859a4d44b70b724216c188a5f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13395 CVE: CVE-2025-71084 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 57f3cb6c84159d12ba343574df2115fb18dd83ca upstream. If the CM ID is destroyed while the CM event for multicast creating is still queued the cancel_work_sync() will prevent the work from running which also prevents destroying the ah_attr. This leaks a refcount and triggers a WARN: GID entry ref leak for dev syz1 index 2 ref=573 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 655 at drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:809 release_gid_table drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:806 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 655 at drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:809 gid_table_release_one+0x284/0x3cc drivers/infiniband/core/cache.c:886 Destroy the ah_attr after canceling the work, it is safe to call this twice. Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/0-v1-4285d070a6b2+20a-rdma_mc_gid_leak_syz_jgg@n… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: fe454dc31e84 ("RDMA/ucma: Fix use-after-free bug in ucma_create_uevent") Reported-by: syzbot+b0da83a6c0e2e2bddbd4(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68232e7b.050a0220.f2294.09f6.GAE@google.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c index a203ee7b053b..483a37f9fa12 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c @@ -1841,6 +1841,7 @@ static void destroy_mc(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, ib_sa_free_multicast(mc->sa_mc); if (rdma_protocol_roce(id_priv->id.device, id_priv->id.port_num)) { + struct rdma_cm_event *event = &mc->iboe_join.event; struct rdma_dev_addr *dev_addr = &id_priv->id.route.addr.dev_addr; struct net_device *ndev = NULL; @@ -1863,6 +1864,8 @@ static void destroy_mc(struct rdma_id_private *id_priv, dev_put(ndev); cancel_work_sync(&mc->iboe_join.work); + if (event->event == RDMA_CM_EVENT_MULTICAST_JOIN) + rdma_destroy_ah_attr(&event->param.ud.ah_attr); } kfree(mc); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] media: dvb-usb: dtv5100: fix out-of-bounds in dtv5100_i2c_msg()
by Liu Kai 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.248 commit c2c293ea7b61f12cdaad1e99a5b4efc58c88960a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13371 CVE: CVE-2025-68819 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b91e6aafe8d356086cc621bc03e35ba2299e4788 upstream. rlen value is a user-controlled value, but dtv5100_i2c_msg() does not check the size of the rlen value. Therefore, if it is set to a value larger than sizeof(st->data), an out-of-bounds vuln occurs for st->data. Therefore, we need to add proper range checking to prevent this vuln. Fixes: 60688d5e6e6e ("V4L/DVB (8735): dtv5100: replace dummy frontend by zl10353") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil+cisco(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c index 1c13e493322c..89b3a5a790d8 100644 --- a/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c +++ b/drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dtv5100.c @@ -55,6 +55,11 @@ static int dtv5100_i2c_msg(struct dvb_usb_device *d, u8 addr, } index = (addr << 8) + wbuf[0]; + if (rlen > sizeof(st->data)) { + warn("rlen = %x is too big!\n", rlen); + return -EINVAL; + } + memcpy(st->data, rbuf, rlen); msleep(1); /* avoid I2C errors */ return usb_control_msg(d->udev, pipe, request, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + 11 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + 11 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] fix cve-2025-40300
by Bowen You 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Bowen You (1): config: enable CONFIG_MITIGATION_VMESCAPE by default on x86 Pawan Gupta (3): x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation x86/vmscape: Enumerate VMSCAPE bug x86/vmscape: Enable the mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 11 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 9 ++ arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 58 +++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++ drivers/base/cpu.c | 3 + 11 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 9

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] CVE-2024-35808
by linan666＠huaweicloud.com 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> Li Nan (1): md/dm-raid: don't clear MD_RECOVERY_FROZEN after setting frozen Yu Kuai (1): md/dm-raid: don't call md_reap_sync_thread() directly drivers/md/dm-raid.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] crypto: lzo - Fix compression buffer overrun
by Zhao Yipeng 04 Feb '26

04 Feb '26

From: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit cc47f07234f72cbd8e2c973cdbf2a6730660a463 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9780 CVE: CVE-2025-38068 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Unlike the decompression code, the compression code in LZO never checked for output overruns. It instead assumes that the caller always provides enough buffer space, disregarding the buffer length provided by the caller. Add a safe compression interface that checks for the end of buffer before each write. Use the safe interface in crypto/lzo. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Conflicts: lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c [The context conflict is due to the mainline commit 33fb626be08f3 and a10c9ede9913f not being merged.] Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5(a)huawei.com> --- crypto/lzo-rle.c | 2 +- crypto/lzo.c | 2 +- include/linux/lzo.h | 8 +++ lib/lzo/Makefile | 2 +- lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c | 18 ++++++ 6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c diff --git a/crypto/lzo-rle.c b/crypto/lzo-rle.c index 0631d975bfac..0abc2d87f042 100644 --- a/crypto/lzo-rle.c +++ b/crypto/lzo-rle.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int __lzorle_compress(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */ int err; - err = lzorle1x_1_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); + err = lzorle1x_1_compress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); if (err != LZO_E_OK) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/crypto/lzo.c b/crypto/lzo.c index ebda132dd22b..8338851c7406 100644 --- a/crypto/lzo.c +++ b/crypto/lzo.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int __lzo_compress(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */ int err; - err = lzo1x_1_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); + err = lzo1x_1_compress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); if (err != LZO_E_OK) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/include/linux/lzo.h b/include/linux/lzo.h index e95c7d1092b2..4d30e3624acd 100644 --- a/include/linux/lzo.h +++ b/include/linux/lzo.h @@ -24,10 +24,18 @@ int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); +/* Same as above but does not write more than dst_len to dst. */ +int lzo1x_1_compress_safe(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); + /* This requires 'wrkmem' of size LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS */ int lzorle1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); +/* Same as above but does not write more than dst_len to dst. */ +int lzorle1x_1_compress_safe(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); + /* safe decompression with overrun testing */ int lzo1x_decompress_safe(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len); diff --git a/lib/lzo/Makefile b/lib/lzo/Makefile index 2f58fafbbddd..fc7b2b7ef4b2 100644 --- a/lib/lzo/Makefile +++ b/lib/lzo/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -lzo_compress-objs := lzo1x_compress.o +lzo_compress-objs := lzo1x_compress.o lzo1x_compress_safe.o lzo_decompress-objs := lzo1x_decompress_safe.o obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS) += lzo_compress.o diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c index 8ad5ba2b86e2..469c143f7585 100644 --- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c @@ -18,11 +18,22 @@ #include <linux/lzo.h> #include "lzodefs.h" -static noinline size_t -lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - size_t ti, void *wrkmem, signed char *state_offset, - const unsigned char bitstream_version) +#undef LZO_UNSAFE + +#ifndef LZO_SAFE +#define LZO_UNSAFE 1 +#define LZO_SAFE(name) name +#define HAVE_OP(x) 1 +#endif + +#define NEED_OP(x) if (!HAVE_OP(x)) goto output_overrun + +static noinline int +LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_do_compress)(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char **out, unsigned char *op_end, + size_t *tp, void *wrkmem, + signed char *state_offset, + const unsigned char bitstream_version) { const unsigned char *ip; unsigned char *op; @@ -30,8 +41,9 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char * const ip_end = in + in_len - 20; const unsigned char *ii; lzo_dict_t * const dict = (lzo_dict_t *) wrkmem; + size_t ti = *tp; - op = out; + op = *out; ip = in; ii = ip; ip += ti < 4 ? 4 - ti : 0; @@ -118,25 +130,32 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, if (t != 0) { if (t <= 3) { op[*state_offset] |= t; + NEED_OP(4); COPY4(op, ii); op += t; } else if (t <= 16) { + NEED_OP(17); *op++ = (t - 3); COPY8(op, ii); COPY8(op + 8, ii + 8); op += t; } else { if (t <= 18) { + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (t - 3); } else { size_t tt = t - 18; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; while (unlikely(tt > 255)) { tt -= 255; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = tt; } + NEED_OP(t); do { COPY8(op, ii); COPY8(op + 8, ii + 8); @@ -153,6 +172,7 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, if (unlikely(run_length)) { ip += run_length; run_length -= MIN_ZERO_RUN_LENGTH; + NEED_OP(4); put_unaligned_le32((run_length << 21) | 0xfffc18 | (run_length & 0x7), op); op += 4; @@ -245,10 +265,12 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, ip += m_len; if (m_len <= M2_MAX_LEN && m_off <= M2_MAX_OFFSET) { m_off -= 1; + NEED_OP(2); *op++ = (((m_len - 1) << 5) | ((m_off & 7) << 2)); *op++ = (m_off >> 3); } else if (m_off <= M3_MAX_OFFSET) { m_off -= 1; + NEED_OP(1); if (m_len <= M3_MAX_LEN) *op++ = (M3_MARKER | (m_len - 2)); else { @@ -256,14 +278,18 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, *op++ = M3_MARKER | 0; while (unlikely(m_len > 255)) { m_len -= 255; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (m_len); } + NEED_OP(2); *op++ = (m_off << 2); *op++ = (m_off >> 6); } else { m_off -= 0x4000; + NEED_OP(1); if (m_len <= M4_MAX_LEN) *op++ = (M4_MARKER | ((m_off >> 11) & 8) | (m_len - 2)); @@ -284,11 +310,14 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, m_len -= M4_MAX_LEN; *op++ = (M4_MARKER | ((m_off >> 11) & 8)); while (unlikely(m_len > 255)) { + NEED_OP(1); m_len -= 255; *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (m_len); } + NEED_OP(2); *op++ = (m_off << 2); *op++ = (m_off >> 6); } @@ -297,14 +326,20 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, ii = ip; goto next; } - *out_len = op - out; - return in_end - (ii - ti); + *out = op; + *tp = in_end - (ii - ti); + return LZO_E_OK; + +output_overrun: + return LZO_E_OUTPUT_OVERRUN; } -int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - void *wrkmem, const unsigned char bitstream_version) +static int LZO_SAFE(lzogeneric1x_1_compress)( + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + void *wrkmem, const unsigned char bitstream_version) { + unsigned char * const op_end = out + *out_len; const unsigned char *ip = in; unsigned char *op = out; unsigned char *data_start; @@ -328,14 +363,18 @@ int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, while (l > 20) { size_t ll = l <= (m4_max_offset + 1) ? l : (m4_max_offset + 1); uintptr_t ll_end = (uintptr_t) ip + ll; + int err; + if ((ll_end + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= ll_end) break; BUILD_BUG_ON(D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t) > LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS); memset(wrkmem, 0, D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t)); - t = lzo1x_1_do_compress(ip, ll, op, out_len, t, wrkmem, - &state_offset, bitstream_version); + err = LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_do_compress)( + ip, ll, &op, op_end, &t, wrkmem, + &state_offset, bitstream_version); + if (err != LZO_E_OK) + return err; ip += ll; - op += *out_len; l -= ll; } t += l; @@ -344,20 +383,26 @@ int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ii = in + in_len - t; if (op == data_start && t <= 238) { + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (17 + t); } else if (t <= 3) { op[state_offset] |= t; } else if (t <= 18) { + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (t - 3); } else { size_t tt = t - 18; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; while (tt > 255) { tt -= 255; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = tt; } + NEED_OP(t); if (t >= 16) do { COPY8(op, ii); COPY8(op + 8, ii + 8); @@ -370,31 +415,38 @@ int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, } while (--t > 0); } + NEED_OP(3); *op++ = M4_MARKER | 1; *op++ = 0; *op++ = 0; *out_len = op - out; return LZO_E_OK; + +output_overrun: + return LZO_E_OUTPUT_OVERRUN; } -int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - void *wrkmem) +int LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_compress)(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + void *wrkmem) { - return lzogeneric1x_1_compress(in, in_len, out, out_len, wrkmem, 0); + return LZO_SAFE(lzogeneric1x_1_compress)( + in, in_len, out, out_len, wrkmem, 0); } -int lzorle1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - void *wrkmem) +int LZO_SAFE(lzorle1x_1_compress)(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + void *wrkmem) { - return lzogeneric1x_1_compress(in, in_len, out, out_len, - wrkmem, LZO_VERSION); + return LZO_SAFE(lzogeneric1x_1_compress)( + in, in_len, out, out_len, wrkmem, LZO_VERSION); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lzo1x_1_compress); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lzorle1x_1_compress); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_compress)); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(LZO_SAFE(lzorle1x_1_compress)); +#ifndef LZO_UNSAFE MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LZO1X-1 Compressor"); +#endif diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..371c9f849492 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * LZO1X Compressor from LZO + * + * Copyright (C) 1996-2012 Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer <markus(a)oberhumer.com> + * + * The full LZO package can be found at: + * http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/ + * + * Changed for Linux kernel use by: + * Nitin Gupta <nitingupta910(a)gmail.com> + * Richard Purdie <rpurdie(a)openedhand.com> + */ + +#define LZO_SAFE(name) name##_safe +#define HAVE_OP(x) ((size_t)(op_end - op) >= (size_t)(x)) + +#include "lzo1x_compress.c" -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v12 00/13] arm64: entry: Convert to Generic Entry
by Jinjie Ruan 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

Currently, x86, Riscv, Loongarch use the Generic Entry which makes maintainers' work easier and codes more elegant. arm64 has already successfully switched to the Generic IRQ Entry in commit b3cf07851b6c ("arm64: entry: Switch to generic IRQ entry"), it is time to completely convert arm64 to Generic Entry. The goal is to bring arm64 in line with other architectures that already use the generic entry infrastructure, reducing duplicated code and making it easier to share future changes in entry/exit paths, such as "Syscall User Dispatch". This patch set is rebased on "sched/core". And the performance was measured on Kunpeng 920 using "perf bench basic syscall" with "arm64.nopauth selinux=0 audit=1". On the basis of optimizing syscall_get_arguments()[1], el0_svc_common(), the performance are below: | Metric | W/O Generic Entry | With Generic Entry opt| Change | | ---------- | ----------------- | ------------------ | ------ | | Total time | 2.487 [sec] | 2.264 [sec] | ↓9.0% | | usecs/op | 0.248780 | 0.226481 | ↓9.0% | | ops/sec | 4,019,620 | 4,415,383 | ↑9.8% | Therefore, after the optimization, ARM64 System Call performance improved by approximately 9%. It was tested ok with following test cases on kunpeng920 and QEMU virt platform: - Perf tests. - Different `dynamic preempt` mode switch. - Pseudo NMI tests. - Stress-ng CPU stress test. - Hackbench stress test. - MTE test case in Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst and all test cases in tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/*. - "sud" selftest testcase. - get_set_sud, get_syscall_info, set_syscall_info, peeksiginfo in tools/testing/selftests/ptrace. - breakpoint_test_arm64 in selftests/breakpoints. - syscall-abi and ptrace in tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi - fp-ptrace, sve-ptrace, za-ptrace in selftests/arm64/fp. - vdso_test_getrandom in tools/testing/selftests/vDSO - Strace tests. The test QEMU configuration is as follows: qemu-system-aarch64 \ -M virt,gic-version=3,virtualization=on,mte=on \ -cpu max,pauth-impdef=on \ -kernel Image \ -smp 8,sockets=1,cores=4,threads=2 \ -m 512m \ -nographic \ -no-reboot \ -device virtio-rng-pci \ -append "root=/dev/vda rw console=ttyAMA0 kgdboc=ttyAMA0,115200 \ earlycon preempt=voluntary irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1" \ -drive if=none,file=images/rootfs.ext4,format=raw,id=hd0 \ -device virtio-blk-device,drive=hd0 \ [1]: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm/+/89bf683c… Changes in v12: - Rebased on "sched/core", so remove the four generic entry patches. - Move "Expand secure_computing() in place" and "Use syscall_get_arguments() helper" patch forward, which will group all non-functional cleanups at the front. - Adjust the explanation for moving rseq_syscall() before audit_syscall_exit(). - Link to v11: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260128031934.3906955-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v11: - Remove unused syscall in syscall_trace_enter(). - Update and provide a detailed explanation of the differences after moving rseq_syscall() before audit_syscall_exit(). - Rebased on arm64 (for-next/entry), and remove the first applied 3 patchs. - syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work() for arch reuse instead of adding new syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work_prepare() helper. - Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251222114737.1334364-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v10: - Rebased on v6.19-rc1, rename syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() to syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work_prepare() to avoid conflict. - Also inline syscall_trace_enter(). - Support aarch64 for sud_benchmark. - Update and correct the commit message. - Add Reviewed-by. - Link to v9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251204082123.2792067-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v9: - Move "Return early for ptrace_report_syscall_entry() error" patch ahead to make it not introduce a regression. - Not check _TIF_SECCOMP/SYSCALL_EMU for syscall_exit_work() in a separate patch. - Do not report_syscall_exit() for PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP in a separate patch. - Add two performance patch to improve the arm64 performance. - Add Reviewed-by. - Link to v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251126071446.3234218-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v8: - Rename "report_syscall_enter()" to "report_syscall_entry()". - Add ptrace_save_reg() to avoid duplication. - Remove unused _TIF_WORK_MASK in a standalone patch. - Align syscall_trace_enter() return value with the generic version. - Use "scno" instead of regs->syscallno in el0_svc_common(). - Move rseq_syscall() ahead in a standalone patch to clarify it clearly. - Rename "syscall_trace_exit()" to "syscall_exit_work()". - Keep the goto in el0_svc_common(). - No argument was passed to __secure_computing() and check -1 not -1L. - Remove "Add has_syscall_work() helper" patch. - Move "Add syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() helper" patch later. - Add miss header for asm/entry-common.h. - Update the implementation of arch_syscall_is_vdso_sigreturn(). - Add "ARCH_SYSCALL_WORK_EXIT" to be defined as "SECCOMP | SYSCALL_EMU" to keep the behaviour unchanged. - Add more testcases test. - Add Reviewed-by. - Update the commit message. - Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117133048.53182-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Jinjie Ruan (12): arm64: Remove unused _TIF_WORK_MASK arm64/ptrace: Split report_syscall() arm64/ptrace: Return early for ptrace_report_syscall_entry() error arm64/ptrace: Refactor syscall_trace_enter/exit() arm64/ptrace: Expand secure_computing() in place arm64/ptrace: Use syscall_get_arguments() helper arm64: ptrace: Move rseq_syscall() before audit_syscall_exit() arm64: syscall: Rework el0_svc_common() arm64/ptrace: Not check _TIF_SECCOMP/SYSCALL_EMU for syscall_exit_work() arm64/ptrace: Do not report_syscall_exit() for PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP arm64: entry: Convert to generic entry arm64: Inline el0_svc_common() kemal (1): selftests: sud_test: Support aarch64 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/entry-common.h | 76 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 19 +++- arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 22 +---- arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 7 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 94 ------------------- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 29 ++---- .../syscall_user_dispatch/sud_benchmark.c | 2 +- .../syscall_user_dispatch/sud_test.c | 4 + 10 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 142 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

1 13

[PATCH OLK-6.6] LoongArch: BPF: Sign extend kfunc call arguments
by Lin Yujun 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit fd43edf357a3a1f5ed1c4bf450b60001c9091c39 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13443 CVE: CVE-2025-71129 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 3f5a238f24d7b75f9efe324d3539ad388f58536e upstream. The kfunc calls are native calls so they should follow LoongArch calling conventions. Sign extend its arguments properly to avoid kernel panic. This is done by adding a new emit_abi_ext() helper. The emit_abi_ext() helper performs extension in place meaning a value already store in the target register (Note: this is different from the existing sign_extend() helper and thus we can't reuse it). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5dc615520c4d ("LoongArch: Add BPF JIT support") Signed-off-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai(a)loongson.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809(a)h-partners.com> --- arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c index c6d4f2200cc1..2258624a3247 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c +++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.c @@ -830,10 +830,26 @@ static int build_insn(const struct bpf_insn *insn, struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool ext ret = bpf_jit_get_func_addr(ctx->prog, insn, extra_pass, &func_addr, &func_addr_fixed); if (ret < 0) return ret; + if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL) { + const struct btf_func_model *m; + int i; + + m = bpf_jit_find_kfunc_model(ctx->prog, insn); + if (!m) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < m->nr_args; i++) { + u8 reg = regmap[BPF_REG_1 + i]; + bool sign = m->arg_flags[i] & BTF_FMODEL_SIGNED_ARG; + + emit_abi_ext(ctx, reg, m->arg_size[i], sign); + } + } + move_addr(ctx, t1, func_addr); emit_insn(ctx, jirl, LOONGARCH_GPR_RA, t1, 0); if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) move_reg(ctx, regmap[BPF_REG_0], LOONGARCH_GPR_A0); diff --git a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.h b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.h index f9c569f53949..9352ea554530 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.h +++ b/arch/loongarch/net/bpf_jit.h @@ -85,10 +85,36 @@ static inline void emit_sext_32(struct jit_ctx *ctx, enum loongarch_gpr reg, boo return; emit_insn(ctx, addiw, reg, reg, 0); } +/* Emit proper extension according to ABI requirements. + * Note that it requires a value of size `size` already resides in register `reg`. + */ +static inline void emit_abi_ext(struct jit_ctx *ctx, int reg, u8 size, bool sign) +{ + /* ABI requires unsigned char/short to be zero-extended */ + if (!sign && (size == 1 || size == 2)) + return; + + switch (size) { + case 1: + emit_insn(ctx, extwb, reg, reg); + break; + case 2: + emit_insn(ctx, extwh, reg, reg); + break; + case 4: + emit_insn(ctx, addiw, reg, reg, 0); + break; + case 8: + break; + default: + pr_warn("bpf_jit: invalid size %d for extension\n", size); + } +} + static inline void move_addr(struct jit_ctx *ctx, enum loongarch_gpr rd, u64 addr) { u64 imm_11_0, imm_31_12, imm_51_32, imm_63_52; /* lu12iw rd, imm_31_12 */ -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] dm flakey: don't corrupt the zero page
by Yuan can 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.276 commit 98e311be44dbe31ad9c42aa067b2359bac451fda category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13114 CVE: CVE-2023-54317 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f50714b57aecb6b3dc81d578e295f86d9c73f078 upstream. When we need to zero some range on a block device, the function __blkdev_issue_zero_pages submits a write bio with the bio vector pointing to the zero page. If we use dm-flakey with corrupt bio writes option, it will corrupt the content of the zero page which results in crashes of various userspace programs. Glibc assumes that memory returned by mmap is zeroed and it uses it for calloc implementation; if the newly mapped memory is not zeroed, calloc will return non-zeroed memory. Fix this bug by testing if the page is equal to ZERO_PAGE(0) and avoiding the corruption in this case. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: a00f5276e266 ("dm flakey: Properly corrupt multi-page bios.") Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel(a)dorminy.me> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/dm-flakey.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-flakey.c b/drivers/md/dm-flakey.c index 9a955b8cf378..6a8c7ec21219 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-flakey.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-flakey.c @@ -299,12 +299,15 @@ static void corrupt_bio_data(struct bio *bio, struct flakey_c *fc) * Overwrite the Nth byte of the bio's data, on whichever page * it falls. */ bio_for_each_segment(bvec, bio, iter) { if (bio_iter_len(bio, iter) > corrupt_bio_byte) { - char *segment = (page_address(bio_iter_page(bio, iter)) - + bio_iter_offset(bio, iter)); + char *segment; + struct page *page = bio_iter_page(bio, iter); + if (unlikely(page == ZERO_PAGE(0))) + break; + segment = (page_address(page) + bio_iter_offset(bio, iter)); segment[corrupt_bio_byte] = fc->corrupt_bio_value; DMDEBUG("Corrupting data bio=%p by writing %u to byte %u " "(rw=%c bi_opf=%u bi_sector=%llu size=%u)\n", bio, fc->corrupt_bio_value, fc->corrupt_bio_byte, (bio_data_dir(bio) == WRITE) ? 'w' : 'r', bio->bi_opf, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.242 commit 0a6a6d4fb333f7afe22e59ffed18511a7a98efc8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12387 CVE: CVE-2025-39828 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ec79003c5f9d2c7f9576fc69b8dbda80305cbe3a ] syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline] RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297 Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250 </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+1741b56d54536f4ec349(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/68a6767c.050a0220.3d78fd.0011.GAE@google.com/ Tested-by: syzbot+1741b56d54536f4ec349(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250821021901.2814721-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/atm/atmtcp.c net/atm/common.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/atm/atmtcp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ include/linux/atmdev.h | 1 + net/atm/common.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c b/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c index 96bea1ab1ecc..df2b47472de4 100644 --- a/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c +++ b/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c @@ -279,6 +279,19 @@ static struct atm_vcc *find_vcc(struct atm_dev *dev, short vpi, int vci) return NULL; } +static int atmtcp_c_pre_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct atmtcp_hdr *hdr; + + if (skb->len < sizeof(struct atmtcp_hdr)) + return -EINVAL; + + hdr = (struct atmtcp_hdr *)skb->data; + if (hdr->length == ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} static int atmtcp_c_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc,struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -345,6 +358,7 @@ static const struct atmdev_ops atmtcp_v_dev_ops = { static const struct atmdev_ops atmtcp_c_dev_ops = { .close = atmtcp_c_close, + .pre_send = atmtcp_c_pre_send, .send = atmtcp_c_send }; diff --git a/include/linux/atmdev.h b/include/linux/atmdev.h index 5d5ff2203fa2..cedf880259d3 100644 --- a/include/linux/atmdev.h +++ b/include/linux/atmdev.h @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ struct atmdev_ops { /* only send is required */ int (*compat_ioctl)(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg); #endif + int (*pre_send)(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*send)(struct atm_vcc *vcc,struct sk_buff *skb); int (*send_oam)(struct atm_vcc *vcc,void *cell,int flags); void (*phy_put)(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned char value, diff --git a/net/atm/common.c b/net/atm/common.c index 1cfa9bf1d187..cb153d6e6745 100644 --- a/net/atm/common.c +++ b/net/atm/common.c @@ -635,17 +635,26 @@ int vcc_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t size) skb->dev = NULL; /* for paths shared with net_device interfaces */ if (!copy_from_iter_full(skb_put(skb, size), size, &m->msg_iter)) { - kfree_skb(skb); error = -EFAULT; - goto out; + goto free_skb; } if (eff != size) memset(skb->data + size, 0, eff-size); + + if (vcc->dev->ops->pre_send) { + error = vcc->dev->ops->pre_send(vcc, skb); + if (error) + goto free_skb; + } + error = vcc->dev->ops->send(vcc, skb); error = error ? error : size; out: release_sock(sk); return error; +free_skb: + kfree_skb(skb); + goto out; } __poll_t vcc_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain
by Lin Ruifeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit ecda483339a5151e3ca30d6b82691ef6f1d17912 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/1633 CVE: CVE-2024-53232 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------------------------------------------- This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking domain to use this handling. With this change, the crash is fixed but we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked device. Fixes: c76c067e488c ("s390/pci: Use dma-iommu layer") Co-developed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910211516.137933-1-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c arch/s390/pci/pci.c [Some context differences] Signed-off-by: Zhang Zekun <zhangzekun11(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h | 4 +- arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c | 10 ++++- drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h index 3f74f1cf37df..e0fae2739994 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ struct zpci_bar_struct { u8 size; /* order 2 exponent */ }; -struct s390_domain; struct kvm_zdev; #define ZPCI_FUNCTIONS_PER_BUS 256 @@ -184,9 +183,10 @@ struct zpci_dev { struct dentry *debugfs_dev; /* IOMMU and passthrough */ - struct s390_domain *s390_domain; /* s390 IOMMU domain data */ + struct iommu_domain *s390_domain; /* attached IOMMU domain */ struct kvm_zdev *kzdev; struct mutex kzdev_lock; + spinlock_t dom_lock; /* protect s390_domain change */ }; static inline bool zdev_enabled(struct zpci_dev *zdev) diff --git a/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c b/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c index 6dde2263c79d..ac4d172f2740 100644 --- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c +++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c @@ -71,17 +71,23 @@ static void pci_fmb_show(struct seq_file *m, char *name[], int length, static void pci_sw_counter_show(struct seq_file *m) { - struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *ctrs = zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(m->private); + struct zpci_dev *zdev = m->private; + struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *ctrs; atomic64_t *counter; + unsigned long flags; int i; + spin_lock_irqsave(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); + ctrs = zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(m->private); if (!ctrs) - return; + goto unlock; counter = &ctrs->mapped_pages; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pci_sw_names); i++, counter++) seq_printf(m, "%26s:\t%llu\n", pci_sw_names[i], atomic64_read(counter)); +unlock: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); } static int pci_perf_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c index 9a5196f523de..db9fc74f9027 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ struct s390_domain { struct rcu_head rcu; }; +static struct iommu_domain blocking_domain; + static inline unsigned int calc_rtx(dma_addr_t ptr) { return ((unsigned long)ptr >> ZPCI_RT_SHIFT) & ZPCI_INDEX_MASK; @@ -369,20 +371,36 @@ static void s390_domain_free(struct iommu_domain *domain) call_rcu(&s390_domain->rcu, s390_iommu_rcu_free_domain); } -static void s390_iommu_detach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, - struct device *dev) +static void zdev_s390_domain_update(struct zpci_dev *zdev, + struct iommu_domain *domain) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); + zdev->s390_domain = domain; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); +} + +static int blocking_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, + struct device *dev) { - struct s390_domain *s390_domain = to_s390_domain(domain); struct zpci_dev *zdev = to_zpci_dev(dev); + struct s390_domain *s390_domain; unsigned long flags; + if (zdev->s390_domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) + return 0; + + s390_domain = to_s390_domain(zdev->s390_domain); spin_lock_irqsave(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); list_del_rcu(&zdev->iommu_list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); zpci_unregister_ioat(zdev, 0); - zdev->s390_domain = NULL; zdev->dma_table = NULL; + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, domain); + + return 0; } static int s390_iommu_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, @@ -401,20 +419,15 @@ static int s390_iommu_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, domain->geometry.aperture_end < zdev->start_dma)) return -EINVAL; - if (zdev->s390_domain) - s390_iommu_detach_device(&zdev->s390_domain->domain, dev); + blocking_domain_attach_device(&blocking_domain, dev); + /* If we fail now DMA remains blocked via blocking domain */ cc = zpci_register_ioat(zdev, 0, zdev->start_dma, zdev->end_dma, virt_to_phys(s390_domain->dma_table), &status); - /* - * If the device is undergoing error recovery the reset code - * will re-establish the new domain. - */ if (cc && status != ZPCI_PCI_ST_FUNC_NOT_AVAIL) return -EIO; - zdev->dma_table = s390_domain->dma_table; - zdev->s390_domain = s390_domain; + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, domain); spin_lock_irqsave(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); list_add_rcu(&zdev->iommu_list, &s390_domain->devices); @@ -466,19 +479,11 @@ static struct iommu_device *s390_iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev) if (zdev->tlb_refresh) dev->iommu->shadow_on_flush = 1; - return &zdev->iommu_dev; -} + /* Start with DMA blocked */ + spin_lock_init(&zdev->dom_lock); + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, &blocking_domain); -static void s390_iommu_release_device(struct device *dev) -{ - struct zpci_dev *zdev = to_zpci_dev(dev); - - /* - * release_device is expected to detach any domain currently attached - * to the device, but keep it attached to other devices in the group. - */ - if (zdev) - s390_iommu_detach_device(&zdev->s390_domain->domain, dev); + return &zdev->iommu_dev; } static int zpci_refresh_all(struct zpci_dev *zdev) @@ -702,9 +707,15 @@ static void s390_iommu_probe_finalize(struct device *dev) struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(struct zpci_dev *zdev) { - if (!zdev || !zdev->s390_domain) + struct s390_domain *s390_domain; + + lockdep_assert_held(&zdev->dom_lock); + + if (zdev->s390_domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) return NULL; - return &zdev->s390_domain->ctrs; + + s390_domain = to_s390_domain(zdev->s390_domain); + return &s390_domain->ctrs; } int zpci_init_iommu(struct zpci_dev *zdev) @@ -781,12 +792,20 @@ static int __init s390_iommu_init(void) } subsys_initcall(s390_iommu_init); +static struct iommu_domain blocking_domain = { + .type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED, + .ops = &(const struct iommu_domain_ops) { + .attach_dev = blocking_domain_attach_device, + } +}; + static const struct iommu_ops s390_iommu_ops = { + .blocked_domain = &blocking_domain, + .release_domain = &blocking_domain, .capable = s390_iommu_capable, .domain_alloc_paging = s390_domain_alloc_paging, .probe_device = s390_iommu_probe_device, .probe_finalize = s390_iommu_probe_finalize, - .release_device = s390_iommu_release_device, .device_group = generic_device_group, .pgsize_bitmap = SZ_4K, .get_resv_regions = s390_iommu_get_resv_regions, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix CVE-2025-68785
by Zhao Yipeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

Patch #1 is the prerequisite patch, and Patch #2 fixes CVE-2025-68785. Ilya Maximets (2): net: openvswitch: remove never-working support for setting nsh fields net: openvswitch: fix middle attribute validation in push_nsh() action net/openvswitch/actions.c | 68 +------------------------------- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.c | 71 +++++++--------------------------- net/openvswitch/flow_netlink.h | 2 - 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v4 00/13] net: LTS-6.6 backport
by Dong Chenchen 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

net LTS-6.6 patches backport Aakash Kumar S (1): xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling Bui Quang Minh (1): virtio-net: fix received length check in big packets Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_reject: don't leak dst refcount for loopback packets Jakub Kicinski (3): tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus page_pool: always add GFP_NOWARN for ATOMIC allocations Jiayuan Chen (1): bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls Kuniyuki Iwashima (1): Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush() Maher Azzouzi (1): net/sched: mqprio: fix stack out-of-bounds write in tc entry parsing Michal Luczaj (1): vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established Nikolay Aleksandrov (1): net: bridge: fix use-after-free due to MST port state bypass Nishanth Menon (1): net: ethernet: ti: netcp: Standardize knav_dma_open_channel to return NULL on error Sabrina Dubroca (1): xfrm: xfrm_alloc_spi shouldn't use 0 as SPI drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 10 ++-- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 25 +++++----- drivers/soc/ti/knav_dma.c | 14 +++--- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 34 +++++++++++-- net/bridge/br_forward.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_input.c | 4 +- net/bridge/br_private.h | 8 +-- net/core/page_pool.c | 6 +++ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 +-- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 +- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 2 +- net/tls/tls.h | 3 +- net/tls/tls_strp.c | 25 +++++++--- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 19 +++++-- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 40 +++++++++++---- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 75 +++++++++++++++++----------- 17 files changed, 186 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 14

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix NFS deadlock
by Li Lingfeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

Revert the patch from hulk and apply the one from mainline. Trond Myklebust (1): NFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio() Wang Zhaolong (1): Revert "[Huawei] Revert "NFS: fix up nfs_release_folio() to try to release the page"" fs/nfs/file.c | 11 +++++++++-- fs/nfs/nfstrace.h | 3 +++ fs/nfs/write.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/nfs_fs.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: usb: rtl8150: fix memory leak on usb_submit_urb() failure
by Jinjiang Tu 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Deepakkumar Karn <dkarn(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 4bd4ea3eb326608ffc296db12c105f92dc2f2190 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13480 CVE: CVE-2025-71154 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 12cab1191d9890097171156d06bfa8d31f1e39c8 ] In async_set_registers(), when usb_submit_urb() fails, the allocated async_req structure and URB are not freed, causing a memory leak. The completion callback async_set_reg_cb() is responsible for freeing these allocations, but it is only called after the URB is successfully submitted and completes (successfully or with error). If submission fails, the callback never runs and the memory is leaked. Fix this by freeing both the URB and the request structure in the error path when usb_submit_urb() fails. Reported-by: syzbot+8dd915c7cb0490fc8c52(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=8dd915c7cb0490fc8c52 Fixes: 4d12997a9bb3 ("drivers: net: usb: rtl8150: concurrent URB bugfix") Signed-off-by: Deepakkumar Karn <dkarn(a)redhat.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251216151304.59865-2-dkarn@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c b/drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c index 92add3daadbb..f840fc374a29 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/rtl8150.c @@ -211,6 +211,8 @@ static int async_set_registers(rtl8150_t *dev, u16 indx, u16 size, u16 reg) if (res == -ENODEV) netif_device_detach(dev->netdev); dev_err(&dev->udev->dev, "%s failed with %d\n", __func__, res); + kfree(req); + usb_free_urb(async_urb); } return res; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] wifi: avoid kernel-infoleak from struct iw_point
by Jinjiang Tu 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit d21ec867d84c9f3a9845d7d8c90c9ce35dbe48f8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13487 CVE: CVE-2026-22978 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 21cbf883d073abbfe09e3924466aa5e0449e7261 upstream. struct iw_point has a 32bit hole on 64bit arches. struct iw_point { void __user *pointer; /* Pointer to the data (in user space) */ __u16 length; /* number of fields or size in bytes */ __u16 flags; /* Optional params */ }; Make sure to zero the structure to avoid disclosing 32bits of kernel data to user space. Fixes: 87de87d5e47f ("wext: Dispatch and handle compat ioctls entirely in net/wireless/wext.c") Reported-by: syzbot+bfc7323743ca6dbcc3d3(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/695f83f3.050a0220.1c677c.0392.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108101927.857582-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/wext-core.c | 4 ++++ net/wireless/wext-priv.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-core.c b/net/wireless/wext-core.c index 838ad6541a17..73a29ee3eff2 100644 --- a/net/wireless/wext-core.c +++ b/net/wireless/wext-core.c @@ -1103,6 +1103,10 @@ static int compat_standard_call(struct net_device *dev, return ioctl_standard_call(dev, iwr, cmd, info, handler); iwp_compat = (struct compat_iw_point *) &iwr->u.data; + + /* struct iw_point has a 32bit hole on 64bit arches. */ + memset(&iwp, 0, sizeof(iwp)); + iwp.pointer = compat_ptr(iwp_compat->pointer); iwp.length = iwp_compat->length; iwp.flags = iwp_compat->flags; diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-priv.c b/net/wireless/wext-priv.c index 674d426a9d24..37d1147019c2 100644 --- a/net/wireless/wext-priv.c +++ b/net/wireless/wext-priv.c @@ -228,6 +228,10 @@ int compat_private_call(struct net_device *dev, struct iwreq *iwr, struct iw_point iwp; iwp_compat = (struct compat_iw_point *) &iwr->u.data; + + /* struct iw_point has a 32bit hole on 64bit arches. */ + memset(&iwp, 0, sizeof(iwp)); + iwp.pointer = compat_ptr(iwp_compat->pointer); iwp.length = iwp_compat->length; iwp.flags = iwp_compat->flags; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/secretmem: fix use-after-free race in fault handler
by Jinjiang Tu 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 42d486d35a4143cc37fc72ee66edc99d942dd367 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11252 CVE: CVE-2025-40272 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 6f86d0534fddfbd08687fa0f01479d4226bc3c3d upstream. When a page fault occurs in a secret memory file created with `memfd_secret(2)`, the kernel will allocate a new folio for it, mark the underlying page as not-present in the direct map, and add it to the file mapping. If two tasks cause a fault in the same page concurrently, both could end up allocating a folio and removing the page from the direct map, but only one would succeed in adding the folio to the file mapping. The task that failed undoes the effects of its attempt by (a) freeing the folio again and (b) putting the page back into the direct map. However, by doing these two operations in this order, the page becomes available to the allocator again before it is placed back in the direct mapping. If another task attempts to allocate the page between (a) and (b), and the kernel tries to access it via the direct map, it would result in a supervisor not-present page fault. Fix the ordering to restore the direct map before the folio is freed. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251031120955.92116-1-lance.yang@linux.dev Fixes: 1507f51255c9 ("mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas") Signed-off-by: Lance Yang <lance.yang(a)linux.dev> Reported-by: Google Big Sleep <big-sleep-vuln-reports(a)google.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAEXGt5QeDpiHTu3K9tvjUTPqo+d-=wuCNYPa+6sWK… Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes(a)oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- mm/secretmem.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/secretmem.c b/mm/secretmem.c index 88fbd3598207..987def80d810 100644 --- a/mm/secretmem.c +++ b/mm/secretmem.c @@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ static vm_fault_t secretmem_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf) __folio_mark_uptodate(folio); err = filemap_add_folio(mapping, folio, offset, gfp); if (unlikely(err)) { - folio_put(folio); /* * If a split of large page was required, it * already happened when we marked the page invalid * which guarantees that this call won't fail */ set_direct_map_default_noflush(page); + folio_put(folio); if (err == -EEXIST) goto retry; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mm/page_alloc: change all pageblocks migrate type on coalescing
by Jinjiang Tu 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc4 commit 7838a4eb8a1d23160bd3f588ea7f2b8f7c00c55b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13448 CVE: CVE-2025-71134 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When a page is freed it coalesces with a buddy into a higher order page while possible. When the buddy page migrate type differs, it is expected to be updated to match the one of the page being freed. However, only the first pageblock of the buddy page is updated, while the rest of the pageblocks are left unchanged. That causes warnings in later expand() and other code paths (like below), since an inconsistency between migration type of the list containing the page and the page-owned pageblocks migration types is introduced. [ 308.986589] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 308.987227] page type is 0, passed migratetype is 1 (nr=256) [ 308.987275] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5224 at mm/page_alloc.c:812 expand+0x23c/0x270 [ 308.987293] Modules linked in: algif_hash(E) af_alg(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) s390_trng(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) loop(E) nfnetlink(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vsock(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_generic(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha_common(E) paes_s390(E) crypto_engine(E) pkey_cca(E) pkey_ep11(E) zcrypt(E) rng_core(E) pkey_pckmo(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E) [ 308.987439] Unloaded tainted modules: hmac_s390(E):2 [ 308.987650] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5224 Comm: mempig_verify Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.18.0-gcc-bpf-debug #431 PREEMPT [ 308.987657] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 308.987661] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.3.0) [ 308.987666] Krnl PSW : 0404f00180000000 00000349976fa600 (expand+0x240/0x270) [ 308.987676] R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 308.987682] Krnl GPRS: 0000034980000004 0000000000000005 0000000000000030 000003499a0e6d88 [ 308.987688] 0000000000000005 0000034980000005 000002be803ac000 0000023efe6c8300 [ 308.987692] 0000000000000008 0000034998d57290 000002be00000100 0000023e00000008 [ 308.987696] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000349976fa5fc 000002c99b1eb6f0 [ 308.987708] Krnl Code: 00000349976fa5f0: c020008a02f2 larl %r2,000003499883abd4 00000349976fa5f6: c0e5ffe3f4b5 brasl %r14,0000034997378f60 #00000349976fa5fc: af000000 mc 0,0 >00000349976fa600: a7f4ff4c brc 15,00000349976fa498 00000349976fa604: b9040026 lgr %r2,%r6 00000349976fa608: c0300088317f larl %r3,0000034998800906 00000349976fa60e: c0e5fffdb6e1 brasl %r14,00000349976b13d0 00000349976fa614: af000000 mc 0,0 [ 308.987734] Call Trace: [ 308.987738] [<00000349976fa600>] expand+0x240/0x270 [ 308.987744] ([<00000349976fa5fc>] expand+0x23c/0x270) [ 308.987749] [<00000349976ff95e>] rmqueue_bulk+0x71e/0x940 [ 308.987754] [<00000349976ffd7e>] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x1fe/0x2a0 [ 308.987759] [<0000034997700966>] rmqueue.isra.0+0xb46/0xf40 [ 308.987763] [<0000034997703ec8>] get_page_from_freelist+0x198/0x8d0 [ 308.987768] [<0000034997706fa8>] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x198/0x400 [ 308.987774] [<00000349977536f8>] alloc_pages_mpol+0xb8/0x220 [ 308.987781] [<0000034997753bf6>] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x26/0xc0 [ 308.987786] [<0000034997753e4c>] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0x6c/0xa0 [ 308.987791] [<0000034997775b22>] vma_alloc_anon_folio_pmd+0x42/0x240 [ 308.987799] [<000003499777bfea>] __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x3a/0x210 [ 308.987804] [<00000349976cb08e>] __handle_mm_fault+0x4de/0x500 [ 308.987809] [<00000349976cb14c>] handle_mm_fault+0x9c/0x3a0 [ 308.987813] [<000003499734d70e>] do_exception+0x1de/0x540 [ 308.987822] [<0000034998387390>] __do_pgm_check+0x130/0x220 [ 308.987830] [<000003499839a934>] pgm_check_handler+0x114/0x160 [ 308.987838] 3 locks held by mempig_verify/5224: [ 308.987842] #0: 0000023ea44c1e08 (vm_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0xb2/0x2a0 [ 308.987859] #1: 0000023ee4d41b18 (&pcp->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue.isra.0+0xad6/0xf40 [ 308.987871] #2: 0000023efe6c8998 (&zone->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0x5a/0x940 [ 308.987886] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 308.987890] [<0000034997379096>] __warn_printk+0x136/0x140 [ 308.987897] irq event stamp: 52330356 [ 308.987901] hardirqs last enabled at (52330355): [<000003499838742e>] __do_pgm_check+0x1ce/0x220 [ 308.987907] hardirqs last disabled at (52330356): [<000003499839932e>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x9e/0xe0 [ 308.987913] softirqs last enabled at (52329882): [<0000034997383786>] handle_softirqs+0x2c6/0x530 [ 308.987922] softirqs last disabled at (52329859): [<0000034997382f86>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x126/0x140 [ 308.987929] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 308.987936] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 308.987940] page type is 0, passed migratetype is 1 (nr=256) [ 308.987951] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5224 at mm/page_alloc.c:860 __del_page_from_free_list+0x1be/0x1e0 [ 308.987960] Modules linked in: algif_hash(E) af_alg(E) nft_fib_inet(E) nft_fib_ipv4(E) nft_fib_ipv6(E) nft_fib(E) nft_reject_inet(E) nf_reject_ipv4(E) nf_reject_ipv6(E) nft_reject(E) nft_ct(E) nft_chain_nat(E) nf_nat(E) nf_conntrack(E) nf_defrag_ipv6(E) nf_defrag_ipv4(E) nf_tables(E) s390_trng(E) vfio_ccw(E) mdev(E) vfio_iommu_type1(E) vfio(E) sch_fq_codel(E) drm(E) i2c_core(E) drm_panel_orientation_quirks(E) loop(E) nfnetlink(E) vsock_loopback(E) vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common(E) vsock(E) ctcm(E) fsm(E) diag288_wdt(E) watchdog(E) zfcp(E) scsi_transport_fc(E) ghash_s390(E) prng(E) aes_s390(E) des_generic(E) des_s390(E) libdes(E) sha3_512_s390(E) sha3_256_s390(E) sha_common(E) paes_s390(E) crypto_engine(E) pkey_cca(E) pkey_ep11(E) zcrypt(E) rng_core(E) pkey_pckmo(E) pkey(E) autofs4(E) [ 308.988070] Unloaded tainted modules: hmac_s390(E):2 [ 308.988087] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5224 Comm: mempig_verify Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W E 6.18.0-gcc-bpf-debug #431 PREEMPT [ 308.988095] Tainted: [W]=WARN, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 308.988100] Hardware name: IBM 3906 M04 704 (z/VM 7.3.0) [ 308.988105] Krnl PSW : 0404f00180000000 00000349976f9e32 (__del_page_from_free_list+0x1c2/0x1e0) [ 308.988118] R:0 T:1 IO:0 EX:0 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:3 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 [ 308.988127] Krnl GPRS: 0000034980000004 0000000000000005 0000000000000030 000003499a0e6d88 [ 308.988133] 0000000000000005 0000034980000005 0000034998d57290 0000023efe6c8300 [ 308.988139] 0000000000000001 0000000000000008 000002be00000100 000002be803ac000 [ 308.988144] 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 00000349976f9e2e 000002c99b1eb728 [ 308.988153] Krnl Code: 00000349976f9e22: c020008a06d9 larl %r2,000003499883abd4 00000349976f9e28: c0e5ffe3f89c brasl %r14,0000034997378f60 #00000349976f9e2e: af000000 mc 0,0 >00000349976f9e32: a7f4ff4e brc 15,00000349976f9cce 00000349976f9e36: b904002b lgr %r2,%r11 00000349976f9e3a: c030008a06e7 larl %r3,000003499883ac08 00000349976f9e40: c0e5fffdbac8 brasl %r14,00000349976b13d0 00000349976f9e46: af000000 mc 0,0 [ 308.988184] Call Trace: [ 308.988188] [<00000349976f9e32>] __del_page_from_free_list+0x1c2/0x1e0 [ 308.988195] ([<00000349976f9e2e>] __del_page_from_free_list+0x1be/0x1e0) [ 308.988202] [<00000349976ff946>] rmqueue_bulk+0x706/0x940 [ 308.988208] [<00000349976ffd7e>] __rmqueue_pcplist+0x1fe/0x2a0 [ 308.988214] [<0000034997700966>] rmqueue.isra.0+0xb46/0xf40 [ 308.988221] [<0000034997703ec8>] get_page_from_freelist+0x198/0x8d0 [ 308.988227] [<0000034997706fa8>] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x198/0x400 [ 308.988233] [<00000349977536f8>] alloc_pages_mpol+0xb8/0x220 [ 308.988240] [<0000034997753bf6>] folio_alloc_mpol_noprof+0x26/0xc0 [ 308.988247] [<0000034997753e4c>] vma_alloc_folio_noprof+0x6c/0xa0 [ 308.988253] [<0000034997775b22>] vma_alloc_anon_folio_pmd+0x42/0x240 [ 308.988260] [<000003499777bfea>] __do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x3a/0x210 [ 308.988267] [<00000349976cb08e>] __handle_mm_fault+0x4de/0x500 [ 308.988273] [<00000349976cb14c>] handle_mm_fault+0x9c/0x3a0 [ 308.988279] [<000003499734d70e>] do_exception+0x1de/0x540 [ 308.988286] [<0000034998387390>] __do_pgm_check+0x130/0x220 [ 308.988293] [<000003499839a934>] pgm_check_handler+0x114/0x160 [ 308.988300] 3 locks held by mempig_verify/5224: [ 308.988305] #0: 0000023ea44c1e08 (vm_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0xb2/0x2a0 [ 308.988322] #1: 0000023ee4d41b18 (&pcp->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue.isra.0+0xad6/0xf40 [ 308.988334] #2: 0000023efe6c8998 (&zone->lock){..-.}-{2:2}, at: rmqueue_bulk+0x5a/0x940 [ 308.988346] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [ 308.988350] [<0000034997379096>] __warn_printk+0x136/0x140 [ 308.988356] irq event stamp: 52330356 [ 308.988360] hardirqs last enabled at (52330355): [<000003499838742e>] __do_pgm_check+0x1ce/0x220 [ 308.988366] hardirqs last disabled at (52330356): [<000003499839932e>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x9e/0xe0 [ 308.988373] softirqs last enabled at (52329882): [<0000034997383786>] handle_softirqs+0x2c6/0x530 [ 308.988380] softirqs last disabled at (52329859): [<0000034997382f86>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x126/0x140 [ 308.988388] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251215081002.3353900A9c-agordeev@linux.ibm.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251212151457.3898073Add-agordeev@linux.ibm.com Fixes: e6cf9e1c4cde ("mm: page_alloc: fix up block types when merging compatible blocks") Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev(a)linux.ibm.com> Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/87wmalyktd.fsf@linux.ibm.com/ Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Cc: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: <stable(a)vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: mm/page_allo.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- mm/page_alloc.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index b70a7f657853..2bc511aa784c 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -748,6 +748,17 @@ buddy_merge_likely(unsigned long pfn, unsigned long buddy_pfn, NULL) != NULL; } +static void change_pageblock_range(struct page *pageblock_page, + int start_order, int migratetype) +{ + int nr_pageblocks = 1 << (start_order - pageblock_order); + + while (nr_pageblocks--) { + set_pageblock_migratetype(pageblock_page, migratetype); + pageblock_page += pageblock_nr_pages; + } +} + /* * Freeing function for a buddy system allocator. * @@ -835,7 +846,7 @@ static inline void __free_one_page(struct page *page, * expand() down the line puts the sub-blocks * on the right freelists. */ - set_pageblock_migratetype(buddy, migratetype); + change_pageblock_range(buddy, order, migratetype); } combined_pfn = buddy_pfn & pfn; @@ -1813,17 +1824,6 @@ bool move_freepages_block_isolate(struct zone *zone, struct page *page, } #endif /* CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION */ -static void change_pageblock_range(struct page *pageblock_page, - int start_order, int migratetype) -{ - int nr_pageblocks = 1 << (start_order - pageblock_order); - - while (nr_pageblocks--) { - set_pageblock_migratetype(pageblock_page, migratetype); - pageblock_page += pageblock_nr_pages; - } -} - /* * When we are falling back to another migratetype during allocation, should we * try to claim an entire block to satisfy further allocations, instead of -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] libceph: make decode_pool() more resilient against corrupted osdmaps
by Jinjiang Tu 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit e927ab132b87ba3f076705fc2684d94b24201ed1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13431 CVE: CVE-2025-71116 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 8c738512714e8c0aa18f8a10c072d5b01c83db39 upstream. If the osdmap is (maliciously) corrupted such that the encoded length of ceph_pg_pool envelope is less than what is expected for a particular encoding version, out-of-bounds reads may ensue because the only bounds check that is there is based on that length value. This patch adds explicit bounds checks for each field that is decoded or skipped. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: ziming zhang <ezrakiez(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: ziming zhang <ezrakiez(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/ceph/osdmap.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/osdmap.c b/net/ceph/osdmap.c index 295098873861..b0a08a537012 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osdmap.c +++ b/net/ceph/osdmap.c @@ -806,51 +806,49 @@ static int decode_pool(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_pg_pool_info *pi) ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, bad); pool_end = *p + len; + ceph_decode_need(p, end, 4 + 4 + 4, bad); pi->type = ceph_decode_8(p); pi->size = ceph_decode_8(p); pi->crush_ruleset = ceph_decode_8(p); pi->object_hash = ceph_decode_8(p); - pi->pg_num = ceph_decode_32(p); pi->pgp_num = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += 4 + 4; /* skip lpg* */ - *p += 4; /* skip last_change */ - *p += 8 + 4; /* skip snap_seq, snap_epoch */ + /* lpg*, last_change, snap_seq, snap_epoch */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 8 + 4 + 8 + 4, bad); /* skip snaps */ - num = ceph_decode_32(p); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, num, bad); while (num--) { - *p += 8; /* snapid key */ - *p += 1 + 1; /* versions */ - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; + /* snapid key, pool snap (with versions) */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 8 + 2, bad); + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); } - /* skip removed_snaps */ - num = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += num * (8 + 8); + /* removed_snaps */ + ceph_decode_skip_map(p, end, 64, 64, bad); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, 8 + 8 + 4, bad); *p += 8; /* skip auid */ pi->flags = ceph_decode_64(p); *p += 4; /* skip crash_replay_interval */ if (ev >= 7) - pi->min_size = ceph_decode_8(p); + ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, pi->min_size, bad); else pi->min_size = pi->size - pi->size / 2; if (ev >= 8) - *p += 8 + 8; /* skip quota_max_* */ + /* quota_max_* */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 8 + 8, bad); if (ev >= 9) { - /* skip tiers */ - num = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += num * 8; + /* tiers */ + ceph_decode_skip_set(p, end, 64, bad); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, 8 + 1 + 8 + 8, bad); *p += 8; /* skip tier_of */ *p += 1; /* skip cache_mode */ - pi->read_tier = ceph_decode_64(p); pi->write_tier = ceph_decode_64(p); } else { @@ -858,86 +856,76 @@ static int decode_pool(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_pg_pool_info *pi) pi->write_tier = -1; } - if (ev >= 10) { - /* skip properties */ - num = ceph_decode_32(p); - while (num--) { - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* key */ - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; /* val */ - } - } + if (ev >= 10) + /* properties */ + ceph_decode_skip_map(p, end, string, string, bad); if (ev >= 11) { - /* skip hit_set_params */ - *p += 1 + 1; /* versions */ - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; + /* hit_set_params (with versions) */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 2, bad); + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); - *p += 4; /* skip hit_set_period */ - *p += 4; /* skip hit_set_count */ + /* hit_set_period, hit_set_count */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 4 + 4, bad); } if (ev >= 12) - *p += 4; /* skip stripe_width */ + /* stripe_width */ + ceph_decode_skip_32(p, end, bad); - if (ev >= 13) { - *p += 8; /* skip target_max_bytes */ - *p += 8; /* skip target_max_objects */ - *p += 4; /* skip cache_target_dirty_ratio_micro */ - *p += 4; /* skip cache_target_full_ratio_micro */ - *p += 4; /* skip cache_min_flush_age */ - *p += 4; /* skip cache_min_evict_age */ - } + if (ev >= 13) + /* target_max_*, cache_target_*, cache_min_* */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 16 + 8 + 8, bad); - if (ev >= 14) { - /* skip erasure_code_profile */ - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; - } + if (ev >= 14) + /* erasure_code_profile */ + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); /* * last_force_op_resend_preluminous, will be overridden if the * map was encoded with RESEND_ON_SPLIT */ if (ev >= 15) - pi->last_force_request_resend = ceph_decode_32(p); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, pi->last_force_request_resend, bad); else pi->last_force_request_resend = 0; if (ev >= 16) - *p += 4; /* skip min_read_recency_for_promote */ + /* min_read_recency_for_promote */ + ceph_decode_skip_32(p, end, bad); if (ev >= 17) - *p += 8; /* skip expected_num_objects */ + /* expected_num_objects */ + ceph_decode_skip_64(p, end, bad); if (ev >= 19) - *p += 4; /* skip cache_target_dirty_high_ratio_micro */ + /* cache_target_dirty_high_ratio_micro */ + ceph_decode_skip_32(p, end, bad); if (ev >= 20) - *p += 4; /* skip min_write_recency_for_promote */ + /* min_write_recency_for_promote */ + ceph_decode_skip_32(p, end, bad); if (ev >= 21) - *p += 1; /* skip use_gmt_hitset */ + /* use_gmt_hitset */ + ceph_decode_skip_8(p, end, bad); if (ev >= 22) - *p += 1; /* skip fast_read */ + /* fast_read */ + ceph_decode_skip_8(p, end, bad); - if (ev >= 23) { - *p += 4; /* skip hit_set_grade_decay_rate */ - *p += 4; /* skip hit_set_search_last_n */ - } + if (ev >= 23) + /* hit_set_grade_decay_rate, hit_set_search_last_n */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 4 + 4, bad); if (ev >= 24) { - /* skip opts */ - *p += 1 + 1; /* versions */ - len = ceph_decode_32(p); - *p += len; + /* opts (with versions) */ + ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 2, bad); + ceph_decode_skip_string(p, end, bad); } if (ev >= 25) - pi->last_force_request_resend = ceph_decode_32(p); + ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, pi->last_force_request_resend, bad); /* ignore the rest */ -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix NFS deadlock
by Li Lingfeng 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

Revert the patch from hulk and apply the one from mainline. Trond Myklebust (1): NFS: Fix a deadlock involving nfs_release_folio() Wang Zhaolong (1): Revert "[Huawei] Revert "NFS: fix up nfs_release_folio() to try to release the page"" fs/nfs/file.c | 11 +++++++++-- fs/nfs/nfstrace.h | 3 +++ fs/nfs/write.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/nfs_fs.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.52.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/1] CVE-2025-68172
by Liu Mingrui 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

From: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> CVE-2025-68172 Haotian Zhang (1): crypto: aspeed - fix double free caused by devm drivers/crypto/aspeed/aspeed-acry.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2025-39981 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 03 Feb '26

03 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Luiz Augusto von Dentz (1): Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs Pavel Shpakovskiy (1): Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix set_local_name race condition Roman Smirnov (1): Bluetooth: mgmt: remove NULL check in mgmt_set_connectable_complete() include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 6 +- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 261 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c | 46 ++++++ net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h | 3 + 5 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5: fw_tracer, Validate format string parameters
by Chen Ridong 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Shay Drory <shayd(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 8ac688c0e430dab19f6a9b70df94b1f635612c1a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13368 CVE: CVE-2025-68816 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b35966042d20b14e2d83330049f77deec5229749 ] Add validation for format string parameters in the firmware tracer to prevent potential security vulnerabilities and crashes from malformed format strings received from firmware. The firmware tracer receives format strings from the device firmware and uses them to format trace messages. Without proper validation, bad firmware could provide format strings with invalid format specifiers (e.g., %s, %p, %n) that could lead to crashes, or other undefined behavior. Add mlx5_tracer_validate_params() to validate that all format specifiers in trace strings are limited to safe integer/hex formats (%x, %d, %i, %u, %llx, %lx, etc.). Reject strings containing other format types that could be used to access arbitrary memory or cause crashes. Invalid format strings are added to the trace output for visibility with "BAD_FORMAT: " prefix. Fixes: 70dd6fdb8987 ("net/mlx5: FW tracer, parse traces and kernel tracing support") Signed-off-by: Shay Drory <shayd(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Reported-by: Breno Leitao <leitao(a)debian.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/hanz6rzrb2bqbplryjrakvkbmv4y5jlmtthnvi3thg5s… Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1765284977-1363052-4-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.… Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> --- .../mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++--- .../mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c index 85d3bfa0780c6..197c306d350bf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include "lib/eq.h" #include "fw_tracer.h" #include "fw_tracer_tracepoint.h" +#include <linux/ctype.h> static int mlx5_query_mtrc_caps(struct mlx5_fw_tracer *tracer) { @@ -358,6 +359,43 @@ static const char *VAL_PARM = "%llx"; static const char *REPLACE_64_VAL_PARM = "%x%x"; static const char *PARAM_CHAR = "%"; +static bool mlx5_is_valid_spec(const char *str) +{ + /* Parse format specifiers to find the actual type. + * Structure: %[flags][width][.precision][length]type + * Skip flags, width, precision & length. + */ + while (isdigit(*str) || *str == '#' || *str == '.' || *str == 'l') + str++; + + /* Check if it's a valid integer/hex specifier: + * Valid formats: %x, %d, %i, %u, etc. + */ + if (*str != 'x' && *str != 'X' && *str != 'd' && *str != 'i' && + *str != 'u' && *str != 'c') + return false; + + return true; +} + +static bool mlx5_tracer_validate_params(const char *str) +{ + const char *substr = str; + + if (!str) + return false; + + substr = strstr(substr, PARAM_CHAR); + while (substr) { + if (!mlx5_is_valid_spec(substr + 1)) + return false; + + substr = strstr(substr + 1, PARAM_CHAR); + } + + return true; +} + static int mlx5_tracer_message_hash(u32 message_id) { return jhash_1word(message_id, 0) & (MESSAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1); @@ -419,6 +457,10 @@ static int mlx5_tracer_get_num_of_params(char *str) char *substr, *pstr = str; int num_of_params = 0; + /* Validate that all parameters are valid before processing */ + if (!mlx5_tracer_validate_params(str)) + return -EINVAL; + /* replace %llx with %x%x */ substr = strstr(pstr, VAL_PARM); while (substr) { @@ -570,14 +612,17 @@ void mlx5_tracer_print_trace(struct tracer_string_format *str_frmt, { char tmp[512]; - snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), str_frmt->string, - str_frmt->params[0], - str_frmt->params[1], - str_frmt->params[2], - str_frmt->params[3], - str_frmt->params[4], - str_frmt->params[5], - str_frmt->params[6]); + if (str_frmt->invalid_string) + snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "BAD_FORMAT: %s", str_frmt->string); + else + snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), str_frmt->string, + str_frmt->params[0], + str_frmt->params[1], + str_frmt->params[2], + str_frmt->params[3], + str_frmt->params[4], + str_frmt->params[5], + str_frmt->params[6]); trace_mlx5_fw(dev->tracer, trace_timestamp, str_frmt->lost, str_frmt->event_id, tmp); @@ -609,6 +654,13 @@ static int mlx5_tracer_handle_raw_string(struct mlx5_fw_tracer *tracer, return 0; } +static void mlx5_tracer_handle_bad_format_string(struct mlx5_fw_tracer *tracer, + struct tracer_string_format *cur_string) +{ + cur_string->invalid_string = true; + list_add_tail(&cur_string->list, &tracer->ready_strings_list); +} + static int mlx5_tracer_handle_string_trace(struct mlx5_fw_tracer *tracer, struct tracer_event *tracer_event) { @@ -619,12 +671,18 @@ static int mlx5_tracer_handle_string_trace(struct mlx5_fw_tracer *tracer, if (!cur_string) return mlx5_tracer_handle_raw_string(tracer, tracer_event); - cur_string->num_of_params = mlx5_tracer_get_num_of_params(cur_string->string); - cur_string->last_param_num = 0; cur_string->event_id = tracer_event->event_id; cur_string->tmsn = tracer_event->string_event.tmsn; cur_string->timestamp = tracer_event->string_event.timestamp; cur_string->lost = tracer_event->lost_event; + cur_string->last_param_num = 0; + cur_string->num_of_params = mlx5_tracer_get_num_of_params(cur_string->string); + if (cur_string->num_of_params < 0) { + pr_debug("%s Invalid format string parameters\n", + __func__); + mlx5_tracer_handle_bad_format_string(tracer, cur_string); + return 0; + } if (cur_string->num_of_params == 0) /* trace with no params */ list_add_tail(&cur_string->list, &tracer->ready_strings_list); } else { @@ -634,6 +692,11 @@ static int mlx5_tracer_handle_string_trace(struct mlx5_fw_tracer *tracer, __func__, tracer_event->string_event.tmsn); return mlx5_tracer_handle_raw_string(tracer, tracer_event); } + if (cur_string->num_of_params < 0) { + pr_debug("%s string parameter of invalid string, dumping\n", + __func__); + return 0; + } cur_string->last_param_num += 1; if (cur_string->last_param_num > TRACER_MAX_PARAMS) { pr_debug("%s Number of params exceeds the max (%d)\n", diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.h index 5c548bb74f07b..30d0bcba88479 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/diag/fw_tracer.h @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ struct tracer_string_format { struct list_head list; u32 timestamp; bool lost; + bool invalid_string; }; enum mlx5_fw_tracer_ownership_state { -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2022-50616
by Liu Mingrui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> CVE-2022-50616 ChiYuan Huang (2): regulator: core: Use different devices for resource allocation and DT lookup regulator: core: Fix resolve supply lookup issue drivers/regulator/core.c | 10 +++++----- drivers/regulator/devres.c | 2 +- drivers/regulator/dummy.c | 2 +- drivers/regulator/of_regulator.c | 2 +- drivers/regulator/stm32-vrefbuf.c | 2 +- drivers/staging/hikey9xx/hi6421v600-regulator.c | 2 +- include/linux/regulator/driver.h | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 1/1] crypto: aspeed - fix double free caused by devm
by Liu Mingrui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Haotian Zhang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 0dd6474ced33489076e6c0f3fe5077bf12e85b28 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8287 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3c9bf72cc1ced1297b235f9422d62b613a3fdae9 ] The clock obtained via devm_clk_get_enabled() is automatically managed by devres and will be disabled and freed on driver detach. Manually calling clk_disable_unprepare() in error path and remove function causes double free. Remove the manual clock cleanup in both aspeed_acry_probe()'s error path and aspeed_acry_remove(). Fixes: 2f1cf4e50c95 ("crypto: aspeed - Add ACRY RSA driver") Signed-off-by: Haotian Zhang <vulab(a)iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert(a)gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/crypto/aspeed/aspeed-acry.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/aspeed/aspeed-acry.c b/drivers/crypto/aspeed/aspeed-acry.c index 247c568aa8df..64facdfaff2a 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/aspeed/aspeed-acry.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/aspeed/aspeed-acry.c @@ -789,7 +789,6 @@ static int aspeed_acry_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) err_engine_rsa_start: crypto_engine_exit(acry_dev->crypt_engine_rsa); clk_exit: - clk_disable_unprepare(acry_dev->clk); return rc; } @@ -801,7 +800,6 @@ static int aspeed_acry_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) aspeed_acry_unregister(acry_dev); crypto_engine_exit(acry_dev->crypt_engine_rsa); tasklet_kill(&acry_dev->done_task); - clk_disable_unprepare(acry_dev->clk); return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] CVE-2025-39744 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Frederic Weisbecker (1): rcu: Fix racy re-initialization of irq_work causing hangs Joel Fernandes (1): rcu: Fix rcu_read_unlock() deadloop due to IRQ work Paul E. McKenney (1): rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race Zqiang (1): rcu: Use IRQ_WORK_INIT_HARD() to avoid rcu_read_unlock() hangs kernel/rcu/tree.c | 1 + kernel/rcu/tree.h | 14 +++++++++++++- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 5

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2025-39744 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Frederic Weisbecker (1): rcu: Fix racy re-initialization of irq_work causing hangs Joel Fernandes (1): rcu: Fix rcu_read_unlock() deadloop due to IRQ work Paul E. McKenney (1): rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race kernel/rcu/tree.c | 2 ++ kernel/rcu/tree.h | 14 ++++++++++++- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 3 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2022-50616
by Liu Mingrui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Mingrui Liu <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> CVE-2022-50616 ChiYuan Huang (2): regulator: core: Use different devices for resource allocation and DT lookup regulator: core: Fix resolve supply lookup issue drivers/regulator/core.c | 10 +++++----- drivers/regulator/devres.c | 2 +- drivers/regulator/dummy.c | 2 +- drivers/regulator/of_regulator.c | 2 +- drivers/regulator/stm32-vrefbuf.c | 2 +- drivers/staging/hikey9xx/hi6421v600-regulator.c | 2 +- include/linux/regulator/driver.h | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: bcsp: receive data only if registered
by Yin Tirui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 799cd62cbcc3f12ee04b33ef390ff7d41c37d671 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11320 CVE: CVE-2025-40308 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ca94b2b036c22556c3a66f1b80f490882deef7a6 ] Currently, bcsp_recv() can be called even when the BCSP protocol has not been registered. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference, as shown in the following stack trace: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000108-0x000000000000010f] RIP: 0010:bcsp_recv+0x13d/0x1740 drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c:590 Call Trace: <TASK> hci_uart_tty_receive+0x194/0x220 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:627 tiocsti+0x23c/0x2c0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2290 tty_ioctl+0x626/0xde0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2706 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f To prevent this, ensure that the HCI_UART_REGISTERED flag is set before processing received data. If the protocol is not registered, return -EUNATCH. Reported-by: syzbot+4ed6852d4da4606c93da(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4ed6852d4da4606c93da Tested-by: syzbot+4ed6852d4da4606c93da(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yin Tirui <yintirui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c index 2a5a27d713f8..e991d9e62486 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c @@ -582,6 +582,9 @@ static int bcsp_recv(struct hci_uart *hu, const void *data, int count) struct bcsp_struct *bcsp = hu->priv; const unsigned char *ptr; + if (!test_bit(HCI_UART_REGISTERED, &hu->flags)) + return -EUNATCH; + BT_DBG("hu %p count %d rx_state %d rx_count %ld", hu, count, bcsp->rx_state, bcsp->rx_count); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: bcsp: receive data only if registered
by Yin Tirui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit 799cd62cbcc3f12ee04b33ef390ff7d41c37d671 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IDBAE0 CVE: CVE-2025-40308 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ca94b2b036c22556c3a66f1b80f490882deef7a6 ] Currently, bcsp_recv() can be called even when the BCSP protocol has not been registered. This leads to a NULL pointer dereference, as shown in the following stack trace: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000108-0x000000000000010f] RIP: 0010:bcsp_recv+0x13d/0x1740 drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c:590 Call Trace: <TASK> hci_uart_tty_receive+0x194/0x220 drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c:627 tiocsti+0x23c/0x2c0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2290 tty_ioctl+0x626/0xde0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2706 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f To prevent this, ensure that the HCI_UART_REGISTERED flag is set before processing received data. If the protocol is not registered, return -EUNATCH. Reported-by: syzbot+4ed6852d4da4606c93da(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4ed6852d4da4606c93da Tested-by: syzbot+4ed6852d4da4606c93da(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ivan Pravdin <ipravdin.official(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yin Tirui <yintirui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c index 2a5a27d713f8..e991d9e62486 100644 --- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcsp.c @@ -582,6 +582,9 @@ static int bcsp_recv(struct hci_uart *hu, const void *data, int count) struct bcsp_struct *bcsp = hu->priv; const unsigned char *ptr; + if (!test_bit(HCI_UART_REGISTERED, &hu->flags)) + return -EUNATCH; + BT_DBG("hu %p count %d rx_state %d rx_count %ld", hu, count, bcsp->rx_state, bcsp->rx_count); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] XSched: Update XSched manual
by Liu Kai 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

hulk inclusion category: doc bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8423 -------------------------------- Update the patch link Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284(a)huawei.com> --- Documentation/scheduler/xsched.md | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/scheduler/xsched.md b/Documentation/scheduler/xsched.md index 89ef01d42fc0..11dc0c964e0a 100644 --- a/Documentation/scheduler/xsched.md +++ b/Documentation/scheduler/xsched.md @@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ mkdir <new_driver_dir> ./Ascend-hdk-910b-npu-driver_xx.x.x_linux-aarch64.run --tar -xvf -C <new_driver_dir> ``` -下载驱动补丁 [XSched driver patch](https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/commit/8d50448f11b697a177b63d3ccb… 适配 NPU 驱动 +下载驱动补丁 [XSched driver patch](https://gitcode.com/openeuler/kernel/commit/58e645cf8fd8d96573b70153… 适配 NPU 驱动 ```shell cp 0001-Adapt-910b-npu-driver-for-xsched.patch <new_driver_dir>/driver/kernel/ @@ -94,8 +94,10 @@ cd <new_driver_dir>/driver/kernel/ git init git add . git commit -m "npu init" +# 使用下载的 patch 文件 +git am 58e645cf8fd8d96573b7015385bf52522ebfee67.patch --reject # 如果有冲突则根据 .rej 文件适配冲突代码 -git am 0001-Adapt-910b-npu-driver-for-xsched.patch --reject +git am drivers/xcu/0001-Adapt-910_93-npu-driver-for-xsched.txt --reject ``` #### 1.3.2 替换驱动 -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] adapt LTS patch 5ba723cc37230e616fe47ec19d441ba3168b4c4c
by Quanmin Yan 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

The original LTS patch is incompatible with the atomic mode of the mm counter. Therefore, the patch needs to be reverted and adapted again. Baolin Wang (1): mm: fix the inaccurate memory statistics issue for users Quanmin Yan (2): Revert "mm: fix the inaccurate memory statistics issue for users" mm: add config option for atomic mode in mm counter arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + include/linux/mm.h | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++------ include/trace/events/kmem.h | 2 +- kernel/fork.c | 26 ++++++++++--- mm/Kconfig | 12 ++++++ 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-6.6] arch_topology: Fix incorrect error check in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()
by Wang Wensheng 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.115 commit 3373f263bb647fcc3b5237cfaef757633b9ee25e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11599 CVE: CVE-2025-40346 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 2eead19334516c8e9927c11b448fbe512b1f18a1 upstream. Fix incorrect use of PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() in topology_parse_cpu_capacity() which causes the code to proceed with NULL clock pointers. The current logic uses !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) which evaluates to true for both valid pointers and NULL, leading to potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate(). Per include/linux/err.h documentation, PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ptr) returns: "The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise." This means PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() returns 0 for both valid pointers AND NULL pointers. Therefore !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) evaluates to true (proceed) when cpu_clk is either valid or NULL, causing clk_get_rate(NULL) to be called when of_clk_get() returns NULL. Replace with !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk) which only proceeds for valid pointers, preventing potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate(). Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Fixes: b8fe128dad8f ("arch_topology: Adjust initial CPU capacities with current freq") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250923174308.1771906-1-kaushlendra.kumar@intel.c… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/arch_topology.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/arch_topology.c b/drivers/base/arch_topology.c index 998aefb44315..14aade8b591d 100644 --- a/drivers/base/arch_topology.c +++ b/drivers/base/arch_topology.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ bool __init topology_parse_cpu_capacity(struct device_node *cpu_node, int cpu) * frequency (by keeping the initial capacity_freq_ref value). */ cpu_clk = of_clk_get(cpu_node, 0); - if (!PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk)) { + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk)) { per_cpu(capacity_freq_ref, cpu) = clk_get_rate(cpu_clk) / HZ_PER_KHZ; clk_put(cpu_clk); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/sched: Fix potential double free in drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies
by Wang Wensheng 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)igalia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.114 commit 57239762aa90ad768dac055021f27705dae73344 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12320 CVE: CVE-2025-40096 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5801e65206b065b0b2af032f7f1eef222aa2fd83 upstream. When adding dependencies with drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), that function consumes the fence reference both on success and failure, so in the latter case the dma_fence_put() on the error path (xarray failed to expand) is a double free. Interestingly this bug appears to have been present ever since commit ebd5f74255b9 ("drm/sched: Add dependency tracking"), since the code back then looked like this: drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies(): ... for (i = 0; i < fence_count; i++) { ret = drm_sched_job_add_dependency(job, fences[i]); if (ret) break; } for (; i < fence_count; i++) dma_fence_put(fences[i]); Which means for the failing 'i' the dma_fence_put was already a double free. Possibly there were no users at that time, or the test cases were insufficient to hit it. The bug was then only noticed and fixed after commit 9c2ba265352a ("drm/scheduler: use new iterator in drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies v2") landed, with its fixup of commit 4eaf02d6076c ("drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies"). At that point it was a slightly different flavour of a double free, which commit 963d0b356935 ("drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies harder") noticed and attempted to fix. But it only moved the double free from happening inside the drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), when releasing the reference not yet obtained, to the caller, when releasing the reference already released by the former in the failure case. As such it is not easy to identify the right target for the fixes tag so lets keep it simple and just continue the chain. While fixing we also improve the comment and explain the reason for taking the reference and not dropping it. Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin(a)igalia.com> Fixes: 963d0b356935 ("drm/scheduler: fix drm_sched_job_add_implicit_dependencies harder") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter(a)linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/aNFbXq8OeYl3QSdm@stanley.mountain/ Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig(a)amd.com> Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark(a)chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter(a)ffwll.ch> Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost(a)intel.com> Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr(a)kernel.org> Cc: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org> Cc: Christian König <ckoenig.leichtzumerken(a)gmail.com> Cc: dri-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.16+ Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251015084015.6273-1-tvrtko.ursulin@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c index fa4652f23471..4faa2108c0a7 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c @@ -783,13 +783,14 @@ int drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies(struct drm_sched_job *job, dma_resv_assert_held(resv); dma_resv_for_each_fence(&cursor, resv, usage, fence) { - /* Make sure to grab an additional ref on the added fence */ - dma_fence_get(fence); - ret = drm_sched_job_add_dependency(job, fence); - if (ret) { - dma_fence_put(fence); + /* + * As drm_sched_job_add_dependency always consumes the fence + * reference (even when it fails), and dma_resv_for_each_fence + * is not obtaining one, we need to grab one before calling. + */ + ret = drm_sched_job_add_dependency(job, dma_fence_get(fence)); + if (ret) return ret; - } } return 0; } -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline
by Wang Wensheng 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit 8f80c633cba144f721d38d9380f23d23ab7db10e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9098 CVE: CVE-2025-38676 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8503d0fcb1086a7cfe26df67ca4bd9bd9e99bdec ] While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments, avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is maximum length. Reported-by: Simcha Kosman <simcha.kosman(a)cyberark.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/AS8P193MB2271C4B24BCEDA31830F37AE84A52@AS8P193M… Fixes: b6b26d86c61c ("iommu/amd: Add a length limitation for the ivrs_acpihid command-line parameter") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250804154023.work.970-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index e3d4a23b66fd..090b88a4b1e3 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -3633,7 +3633,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(char *str) { u32 seg = 0, bus, dev, fn; char *hid, *uid, *p, *addr; - char acpiid[ACPIID_LEN] = {0}; + char acpiid[ACPIID_LEN + 1] = { }; /* size with NULL terminator */ int i; addr = strchr(str, '@'); @@ -3659,7 +3659,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(char *str) /* We have the '@', make it the terminator to get just the acpiid */ *addr++ = 0; - if (strlen(str) > ACPIID_LEN + 1) + if (strlen(str) > ACPIID_LEN) goto not_found; if (sscanf(str, "=%s", acpiid) != 1) -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits
by Wang Wensheng 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit a6b87bfc2ab5bccb7ad953693c85d9062aef3fdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9186 CVE: CVE-2025-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that. Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/68753a08.050a0220.33d347.0008.GAE@google.… Tested-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: dde5845a529f ("[PATCH] Generic HID layer - code split") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/613a66cd-4309-4bce-a4f7-2905f9bce0c9@rowland.harva… Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-core.c [Only context conflict because of commit c653ffc283404 is not applied] Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index 266cd56dec50..d8fda282d049 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1351,7 +1351,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_snto32); static u32 s32ton(__s32 value, unsigned n) { - s32 a = value >> (n - 1); + s32 a; + + if (!value || !n) + return 0; + + a = value >> (n - 1); if (a && a != -1) return value < 0 ? 1 << (n - 1) : (1 << (n - 1)) - 1; return value & ((1 << n) - 1); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu: Fix two issues in iommu_copy_struct_from_user()
by Wang Wensheng 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc5 commit 30a3f2f3e4bd6335b727c83c08a982d969752bc1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10084 CVE: CVE-2025-37900 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In the review for iommu_copy_struct_to_user() helper, Matt pointed out that a NULL pointer should be rejected prior to dereferencing it: https://lore.kernel.org/all/86881827-8E2D-461C-BDA3-FA8FD14C343C@nvidia.com And Alok pointed out a typo at the same time: https://lore.kernel.org/all/480536af-6830-43ce-a327-adbd13dc3f1d@oracle.com Since both issues were copied from iommu_copy_struct_from_user(), fix them first in the current header. Fixes: e9d36c07bb78 ("iommu: Add iommu_copy_struct_from_user helper") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Nicolin Chen <nicolinc(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthew R. Ochs <mochs(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250414191635.450472-1-nicolinc@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/iommu.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/iommu.h b/include/linux/iommu.h index ceecbc5ba759..974c3b94365f 100644 --- a/include/linux/iommu.h +++ b/include/linux/iommu.h @@ -517,10 +517,10 @@ static inline int __iommu_copy_struct_from_user( void *dst_data, const struct iommu_user_data *src_data, unsigned int data_type, size_t data_len, size_t min_len) { - if (src_data->type != data_type) - return -EINVAL; if (WARN_ON(!dst_data || !src_data)) return -EINVAL; + if (src_data->type != data_type) + return -EINVAL; if (src_data->len < min_len || data_len < src_data->len) return -EINVAL; return copy_struct_from_user(dst_data, data_len, src_data->uptr, @@ -533,8 +533,8 @@ static inline int __iommu_copy_struct_from_user( * include/uapi/linux/iommufd.h * @user_data: Pointer to a struct iommu_user_data for user space data info * @data_type: The data type of the @kdst. Must match with @user_data->type - * @min_last: The last memember of the data structure @kdst points in the - * initial version. + * @min_last: The last member of the data structure @kdst points in the initial + * version. * Return 0 for success, otherwise -error. */ #define iommu_copy_struct_from_user(kdst, user_data, data_type, min_last) \ -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: leapraid: add RAID disk hide/show events and fix misc issues
by haodongdong 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

LeapIO inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8462 ------------------------------------------ This change introduces RAID disk hide/show events to allow dynamic visibility control of RAID devices. It also updates the MSI-X vector count retrieval logic and unifies driver naming from LeapRaid to LeapRAID for consistency. In addition, fix an issue where the fw_log workqueue was not properly released during system shutdown, which could lead to resource leaks. Signed-off-by: haodongdong <doubled(a)leap-io.com> --- drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h | 2 + drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h | 47 ++++++------ drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h index 842810d41542..77bb93b79254 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h @@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_UNHIDDEN_TO_DELETE 0x04 #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_CREATED_TO_HIDE 0x05 #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_DELETED_TO_EXPOSE 0x06 +#define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE 0x0A +#define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE 0x0B /* sas topology change event */ #define LEAPRAID_EVT_SAS_TOPO_ES_NO_EXPANDER 0x00 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c index 2fc142fff982..ad8aee40e2c1 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c @@ -4132,6 +4132,66 @@ static void leapraid_sas_pd_expose( } } +static void leapraid_sas_vol_visibility(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, + struct leapraid_evt_data_ir_change *evt_data) +{ + struct leapraid_raid_volume *raid_volume = NULL; + struct scsi_device *sdev = NULL; + u16 hdl = 0; + unsigned long flags; + u8 rc = 0; + u8 reprobe_flg = 0; + + hdl = le16_to_cpu(evt_data->vol_dev_hdl); + rc = evt_data->reason_code; + spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, flags); + raid_volume = leapraid_raid_volume_find_by_hdl(adapter, hdl); + if (!raid_volume) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, + flags); + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:%d: volume handle 0x%x not found\n", + __func__, __LINE__, hdl); + return; + } + + reprobe_flg = 0; + sdev = raid_volume->sdev; + if (sdev) { + if (sdev->no_uld_attach) { + if (rc == LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE) { + sdev->no_uld_attach = 0; + reprobe_flg = 1; + } + } else { + if (rc == LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE) { + sdev->no_uld_attach = 1; + reprobe_flg = 1; + } + } + + if (reprobe_flg) { + if (sdev->no_uld_attach) + sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "hide vol\n"); + else + sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "unhide vol\n"); + + WARN_ON(scsi_device_reprobe(sdev)); + } else { + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:rc(0x%x):request matches, skipping.\n", + __func__, rc); + } + + } else { + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:%d: volume handle 0x%x has no sdev\n", + __func__, __LINE__, hdl); + } + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, flags); +} + static void leapraid_sas_volume_add(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, struct leapraid_evt_data_ir_change *evt_data) { @@ -4250,6 +4310,10 @@ static void leapraid_sas_ir_chg_evt(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_DELETED_TO_EXPOSE: leapraid_sas_pd_expose(adapter, evt_data); break; + case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE: + case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE: + leapraid_sas_vol_visibility(adapter, evt_data); + break; default: break; } @@ -6397,6 +6461,8 @@ static int leapraid_get_adapter_features(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) le16_to_cpu(leap_mpi_rep.hp_slot); adapter->adapter_attr.features.adapter_caps = le32_to_cpu(leap_mpi_rep.adapter_caps); + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors = + leap_mpi_rep.max_msix_vectors; adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_volumes = leap_mpi_rep.max_volumes; if (!adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_volumes) @@ -6754,11 +6820,15 @@ static int leapraid_set_msix(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) goto legacy_int; msix_cnt = leapraid_msix_cnt(adapter->pdev); - if (msix_cnt <= 0) { + if (msix_cnt <= 0 || + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors == 0) { dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msix unsupported!\n"); goto legacy_int; } + msix_cnt = min_t(int, msix_cnt, + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors); + if (reset_devices) adapter->adapter_attr.rq_cnt = 1; else @@ -6859,11 +6929,15 @@ static int leapraid_set_msi(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) goto legacy_int1; msi_cnt = leapraid_msi_cnt(adapter->pdev); - if (msi_cnt <= 0) { - dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msix unsupported!\n"); + if (msi_cnt <= 0 || + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors == 0) { + dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msi unsupported!\n"); goto legacy_int1; } + msi_cnt = min_t(int, msi_cnt, + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors); + if (reset_devices) adapter->adapter_attr.rq_cnt = 1; else @@ -7015,6 +7089,18 @@ int leapraid_set_pcie_and_notification(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) leapraid_mask_int(adapter); + rc = leapraid_make_adapter_ready(adapter, PART_RESET); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "make adapter ready failure\n"); + goto out_fail; + } + + rc = leapraid_get_adapter_features(adapter); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "get adapter feature failure\n"); + goto out_fail; + } + rc = leapraid_set_notification(adapter); if (rc) goto out_fail; @@ -8185,18 +8271,6 @@ int leapraid_ctrl_init(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_EXT_TAG); } - rc = leapraid_make_adapter_ready(adapter, PART_RESET); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "make adapter ready failure\n"); - goto out_free_resources; - } - - rc = leapraid_get_adapter_features(adapter); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "get adapter feature failure\n"); - goto out_free_resources; - } - rc = leapraid_fw_log_init(adapter); if (rc) { dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "fw log init failure\n"); diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h index 2c51ef359b7e..f7072d078315 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h @@ -46,15 +46,15 @@ #define LEAPRAID_SYS_LOG_BUF_RESERVE 0x1000 /* Driver version and name */ -#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_NAME "LeapRaid" +#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_NAME "LeapRAID" #define LEAPRAID_NAME_LENGTH 48 #define LEAPRAID_AUTHOR "LeapIO Inc." -#define LEAPRAID_DESCRIPTION "LeapRaid Driver" -#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_VERSION "2.00.00.05" +#define LEAPRAID_DESCRIPTION "LeapRAID Driver" +#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_VERSION "2.00.00.06" #define LEAPRAID_MAJOR_VERSION 2 #define LEAPRAID_MINOR_VERSION 00 #define LEAPRAID_BUILD_VERSION 00 -#define LEAPRAID_RELEASE_VERSION 05 +#define LEAPRAID_RELEASE_VERSION 06 /* Device ID */ #define LEAPRAID_VENDOR_ID 0xD405 @@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct leapraid_adapter_features { u16 hp_slot; u32 adapter_caps; u32 fw_version; + u8 max_msix_vectors; u8 max_volumes; u16 max_dev_handle; u16 min_dev_handle; @@ -349,7 +350,7 @@ struct leapraid_rep_desc_seg_maint { }; /** - * struct leapraid_mem_desc - Memory descriptor for LeapRaid adapter + * struct leapraid_mem_desc - Memory descriptor for LeapRAID adapter * * @task_desc: Pointer to task descriptor * @task_desc_dma: DMA address of task descriptor @@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ struct leapraid_mem_desc { #define LEAPRAID_CMD_RESET 0x0008 /** - * enum LEAPRAID_CB_INDEX - Callback index for LeapRaid driver + * enum LEAPRAID_CB_INDEX - Callback index for LeapRAID driver * * @LEAPRAID_SCAN_DEV_CB_IDX: Scan device callback index * @LEAPRAID_CONFIG_CB_IDX: Configuration callback index @@ -513,7 +514,7 @@ struct leapraid_dynamic_task_desc { * struct leapraid_fw_evt_work - Firmware event work structure * * @list: Linked list node for queuing the work - * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRaid adapter + * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRAID adapter * @work: Work structure used by the kernel workqueue * @refcnt: Reference counter for managing the lifetime of this work * @evt_data: Pointer to firmware event data @@ -554,9 +555,9 @@ struct leapraid_fw_evt_struct { }; /** - * struct leapraid_rq - Represents a LeapRaid request queue + * struct leapraid_rq - Represents a LeapRAID request queue * - * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRaid adapter + * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRAID adapter * @msix_idx: MSI-X vector index used by this queue * @rep_post_host_idx: Index of the last processed reply descriptor * @rep_desc: Pointer to the reply descriptor associated with this queue @@ -576,7 +577,7 @@ struct leapraid_rq { * struct leapraid_int_rq - Internal request queue for a CPU * * @affinity_hint: CPU affinity mask for the queue - * @rq: Underlying LeapRaid request queue structure + * @rq: Underlying LeapRAID request queue structure */ struct leapraid_int_rq { cpumask_var_t affinity_hint; @@ -584,11 +585,11 @@ struct leapraid_int_rq { }; /** - * struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq - Polling request for LeapRaid blk-mq + * struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq - Polling request for LeapRAID blk-mq * * @busy: Atomic flag indicating request is being processed * @pause: Atomic flag to temporarily suspend polling - * @rq: The underlying LeapRaid request structure + * @rq: The underlying LeapRAID request structure */ struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq { atomic_t busy; @@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq { /** * struct leapraid_notification_desc - Notification - * descriptor for LeapRaid + * descriptor for LeapRAID * * @iopoll_qdex: Index of the I/O polling queue * @iopoll_qcnt: Count of I/O polling queues @@ -621,7 +622,7 @@ struct leapraid_notification_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_reset_desc - Reset descriptor for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_reset_desc - Reset descriptor for LeapRAID * * @fault_reset_wq: Workqueue for fault reset operations * @fault_reset_work: Delayed work structure for fault reset @@ -651,7 +652,7 @@ struct leapraid_reset_desc { /** * struct leapraid_scan_dev_desc - Scan device descriptor - * for LeapRaid + * for LeapRAID * * @wait_scan_dev_done: Flag indicating if scan device operation is done * @driver_loading: Flag indicating if driver is loading @@ -670,7 +671,7 @@ struct leapraid_scan_dev_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_access_ctrl - Access control structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_access_ctrl - Access control structure for LeapRAID * * @pci_access_lock: Mutex for PCI access control * @adapter_thermal_alert: Flag indicating if adapter thermal alert is active @@ -687,7 +688,7 @@ struct leapraid_access_ctrl { }; /** - * struct leapraid_fw_log_desc - Firmware log descriptor for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_fw_log_desc - Firmware log descriptor for LeapRAID * * @fw_log_buffer: Buffer for firmware log data * @fw_log_buffer_dma: DMA address of the firmware log buffer @@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ struct leapraid_fw_log_desc { #define LEAPRAID_CARD_PORT_FLG_NEW 0x02 #define LEAPRAID_DISABLE_MP_PORT_ID 0xFF /** - * struct leapraid_card_port - Card port structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_card_port - Card port structure for LeapRAID * * @list: List head for card port * @vphys_list: List head for virtual phy list @@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ struct leapraid_card_port { }; /** - * struct leapraid_card_phy - Card phy structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_card_phy - Card phy structure for LeapRAID * * @port_siblings: List head for port siblings * @card_port: Pointer to the card port @@ -759,7 +760,7 @@ struct leapraid_card_phy { }; /** - * struct leapraid_topo_node - SAS topology node for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_topo_node - SAS topology node for LeapRAID * * @list: List head for linking nodes * @sas_port_list: List of SAS ports @@ -792,7 +793,7 @@ struct leapraid_topo_node { }; /** - * struct leapraid_dev_topo - LeapRaid device topology management structure + * struct leapraid_dev_topo - LeapRAID device topology management structure * * @topo_node_lock: Spinlock for protecting topology node operations * @sas_dev_lock: Spinlock for SAS device list access @@ -832,7 +833,7 @@ struct leapraid_dev_topo { }; /** - * struct leapraid_boot_dev - Boot device structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_boot_dev - Boot device structure for LeapRAID * * @dev: Device pointer * @chnl: Channel number @@ -871,7 +872,7 @@ struct leapraid_smart_poll_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_adapter - Main LeapRaid adapter structure + * struct leapraid_adapter - Main LeapRAID adapter structure * @list: List head for adapter management * @shost: SCSI host structure * @pdev: PCI device structure diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c index be0f7cbb6684..f8354c68ab71 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c @@ -2124,7 +2124,7 @@ static void leapraid_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev) adapter->access_ctrl.host_removing = true; leapraid_wait_cmds_done(adapter); leapraid_clean_active_fw_evt(adapter); - + leapraid_fw_log_stop(adapter); spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_lock, flags); wq = adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_thread; adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_thread = NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] scsi: leapraid: add RAID disk hide/show events and fix misc issues
by haodongdong 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

LeapIO inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8463 ------------------------------------------ This change introduces RAID disk hide/show events to allow dynamic visibility control of RAID devices. It also updates the MSI-X vector count retrieval logic and unifies driver naming from LeapRaid to LeapRAID for consistency. In addition, fix an issue where the fw_log workqueue was not properly released during system shutdown, which could lead to resource leaks. Signed-off-by: haodongdong <doubled(a)leap-io.com> --- drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h | 2 + drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h | 47 ++++++------ drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h index 842810d41542..77bb93b79254 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h @@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_UNHIDDEN_TO_DELETE 0x04 #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_CREATED_TO_HIDE 0x05 #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_DELETED_TO_EXPOSE 0x06 +#define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE 0x0A +#define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE 0x0B /* sas topology change event */ #define LEAPRAID_EVT_SAS_TOPO_ES_NO_EXPANDER 0x00 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c index c83c30f56805..5dfe95a8dd84 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c @@ -4117,6 +4117,66 @@ static void leapraid_sas_pd_expose( } } +static void leapraid_sas_vol_visibility(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, + struct leapraid_evt_data_ir_change *evt_data) +{ + struct leapraid_raid_volume *raid_volume = NULL; + struct scsi_device *sdev = NULL; + u16 hdl = 0; + unsigned long flags; + u8 rc = 0; + u8 reprobe_flg = 0; + + hdl = le16_to_cpu(evt_data->vol_dev_hdl); + rc = evt_data->reason_code; + spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, flags); + raid_volume = leapraid_raid_volume_find_by_hdl(adapter, hdl); + if (!raid_volume) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, + flags); + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:%d: volume handle 0x%x not found\n", + __func__, __LINE__, hdl); + return; + } + + reprobe_flg = 0; + sdev = raid_volume->sdev; + if (sdev) { + if (sdev->no_uld_attach) { + if (rc == LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE) { + sdev->no_uld_attach = 0; + reprobe_flg = 1; + } + } else { + if (rc == LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE) { + sdev->no_uld_attach = 1; + reprobe_flg = 1; + } + } + + if (reprobe_flg) { + if (sdev->no_uld_attach) + sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "hide vol\n"); + else + sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "unhide vol\n"); + + WARN_ON(scsi_device_reprobe(sdev)); + } else { + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:rc(0x%x):request matches, skipping.\n", + __func__, rc); + } + + } else { + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:%d: volume handle 0x%x has no sdev\n", + __func__, __LINE__, hdl); + } + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, flags); +} + static void leapraid_sas_volume_add(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, struct leapraid_evt_data_ir_change *evt_data) { @@ -4235,6 +4295,10 @@ static void leapraid_sas_ir_chg_evt(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_DELETED_TO_EXPOSE: leapraid_sas_pd_expose(adapter, evt_data); break; + case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE: + case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE: + leapraid_sas_vol_visibility(adapter, evt_data); + break; default: break; } @@ -6382,6 +6446,8 @@ static int leapraid_get_adapter_features(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) le16_to_cpu(leap_mpi_rep.hp_slot); adapter->adapter_attr.features.adapter_caps = le32_to_cpu(leap_mpi_rep.adapter_caps); + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors = + leap_mpi_rep.max_msix_vectors; adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_volumes = leap_mpi_rep.max_volumes; if (!adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_volumes) @@ -6741,11 +6807,15 @@ static int leapraid_set_msix(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) goto legacy_int; msix_cnt = leapraid_msix_cnt(adapter->pdev); - if (msix_cnt <= 0) { + if (msix_cnt <= 0 || + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors == 0) { dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msix unsupported!\n"); goto legacy_int; } + msix_cnt = min_t(int, msix_cnt, + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors); + if (reset_devices) adapter->adapter_attr.rq_cnt = 1; else @@ -6839,11 +6909,15 @@ static int leapraid_set_msi(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) goto legacy_int1; msi_cnt = leapraid_msi_cnt(adapter->pdev); - if (msi_cnt <= 0) { - dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msix unsupported!\n"); + if (msi_cnt <= 0 || + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors == 0) { + dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msi unsupported!\n"); goto legacy_int1; } + msi_cnt = min_t(int, msi_cnt, + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors); + if (reset_devices) adapter->adapter_attr.rq_cnt = 1; else @@ -6988,6 +7062,18 @@ int leapraid_set_pcie_and_notification(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) leapraid_mask_int(adapter); + rc = leapraid_make_adapter_ready(adapter, PART_RESET); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "make adapter ready failure\n"); + goto out_fail; + } + + rc = leapraid_get_adapter_features(adapter); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "get adapter feature failure\n"); + goto out_fail; + } + rc = leapraid_set_notification(adapter); if (rc) goto out_fail; @@ -8185,18 +8271,6 @@ int leapraid_ctrl_init(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_EXT_TAG); } - rc = leapraid_make_adapter_ready(adapter, PART_RESET); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "make adapter ready failure\n"); - goto out_free_resources; - } - - rc = leapraid_get_adapter_features(adapter); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "get adapter feature failure\n"); - goto out_free_resources; - } - rc = leapraid_fw_log_init(adapter); if (rc) { dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "fw log init failure\n"); diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h index 9f42763bda72..15293922aefa 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h @@ -45,15 +45,15 @@ #define LEAPRAID_SYS_LOG_BUF_RESERVE 0x1000 /* Driver version and name */ -#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_NAME "LeapRaid" +#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_NAME "LeapRAID" #define LEAPRAID_NAME_LENGTH 48 #define LEAPRAID_AUTHOR "LeapIO Inc." -#define LEAPRAID_DESCRIPTION "LeapRaid Driver" -#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_VERSION "2.00.00.05" +#define LEAPRAID_DESCRIPTION "LeapRAID Driver" +#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_VERSION "2.00.00.06" #define LEAPRAID_MAJOR_VERSION 2 #define LEAPRAID_MINOR_VERSION 00 #define LEAPRAID_BUILD_VERSION 00 -#define LEAPRAID_RELEASE_VERSION 05 +#define LEAPRAID_RELEASE_VERSION 06 /* Device ID */ #define LEAPRAID_VENDOR_ID 0xD405 @@ -242,6 +242,7 @@ struct leapraid_adapter_features { u16 hp_slot; u32 adapter_caps; u32 fw_version; + u8 max_msix_vectors; u8 max_volumes; u16 max_dev_handle; u16 min_dev_handle; @@ -348,7 +349,7 @@ struct leapraid_rep_desc_seg_maint { }; /** - * struct leapraid_mem_desc - Memory descriptor for LeapRaid adapter + * struct leapraid_mem_desc - Memory descriptor for LeapRAID adapter * * @task_desc: Pointer to task descriptor * @task_desc_dma: DMA address of task descriptor @@ -394,7 +395,7 @@ struct leapraid_mem_desc { #define LEAPRAID_CMD_RESET 0x0008 /** - * enum LEAPRAID_CB_INDEX - Callback index for LeapRaid driver + * enum LEAPRAID_CB_INDEX - Callback index for LeapRAID driver * * @LEAPRAID_SCAN_DEV_CB_IDX: Scan device callback index * @LEAPRAID_CONFIG_CB_IDX: Configuration callback index @@ -512,7 +513,7 @@ struct leapraid_dynamic_task_desc { * struct leapraid_fw_evt_work - Firmware event work structure * * @list: Linked list node for queuing the work - * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRaid adapter + * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRAID adapter * @work: Work structure used by the kernel workqueue * @refcnt: Reference counter for managing the lifetime of this work * @evt_data: Pointer to firmware event data @@ -553,9 +554,9 @@ struct leapraid_fw_evt_struct { }; /** - * struct leapraid_rq - Represents a LeapRaid request queue + * struct leapraid_rq - Represents a LeapRAID request queue * - * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRaid adapter + * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRAID adapter * @msix_idx: MSI-X vector index used by this queue * @rep_post_host_idx: Index of the last processed reply descriptor * @rep_desc: Pointer to the reply descriptor associated with this queue @@ -575,7 +576,7 @@ struct leapraid_rq { * struct leapraid_int_rq - Internal request queue for a CPU * * @affinity_hint: CPU affinity mask for the queue - * @rq: Underlying LeapRaid request queue structure + * @rq: Underlying LeapRAID request queue structure */ struct leapraid_int_rq { cpumask_var_t affinity_hint; @@ -583,11 +584,11 @@ struct leapraid_int_rq { }; /** - * struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq - Polling request for LeapRaid blk-mq + * struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq - Polling request for LeapRAID blk-mq * * @busy: Atomic flag indicating request is being processed * @pause: Atomic flag to temporarily suspend polling - * @rq: The underlying LeapRaid request structure + * @rq: The underlying LeapRAID request structure */ struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq { atomic_t busy; @@ -597,7 +598,7 @@ struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq { /** * struct leapraid_notification_desc - Notification - * descriptor for LeapRaid + * descriptor for LeapRAID * * @iopoll_qdex: Index of the I/O polling queue * @iopoll_qcnt: Count of I/O polling queues @@ -620,7 +621,7 @@ struct leapraid_notification_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_reset_desc - Reset descriptor for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_reset_desc - Reset descriptor for LeapRAID * * @fault_reset_wq: Workqueue for fault reset operations * @fault_reset_work: Delayed work structure for fault reset @@ -650,7 +651,7 @@ struct leapraid_reset_desc { /** * struct leapraid_scan_dev_desc - Scan device descriptor - * for LeapRaid + * for LeapRAID * * @wait_scan_dev_done: Flag indicating if scan device operation is done * @driver_loading: Flag indicating if driver is loading @@ -669,7 +670,7 @@ struct leapraid_scan_dev_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_access_ctrl - Access control structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_access_ctrl - Access control structure for LeapRAID * * @pci_access_lock: Mutex for PCI access control * @adapter_thermal_alert: Flag indicating if adapter thermal alert is active @@ -686,7 +687,7 @@ struct leapraid_access_ctrl { }; /** - * struct leapraid_fw_log_desc - Firmware log descriptor for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_fw_log_desc - Firmware log descriptor for LeapRAID * * @fw_log_buffer: Buffer for firmware log data * @fw_log_buffer_dma: DMA address of the firmware log buffer @@ -710,7 +711,7 @@ struct leapraid_fw_log_desc { #define LEAPRAID_CARD_PORT_FLG_NEW 0x02 #define LEAPRAID_DISABLE_MP_PORT_ID 0xFF /** - * struct leapraid_card_port - Card port structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_card_port - Card port structure for LeapRAID * * @list: List head for card port * @vphys_list: List head for virtual phy list @@ -731,7 +732,7 @@ struct leapraid_card_port { }; /** - * struct leapraid_card_phy - Card phy structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_card_phy - Card phy structure for LeapRAID * * @port_siblings: List head for port siblings * @card_port: Pointer to the card port @@ -758,7 +759,7 @@ struct leapraid_card_phy { }; /** - * struct leapraid_topo_node - SAS topology node for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_topo_node - SAS topology node for LeapRAID * * @list: List head for linking nodes * @sas_port_list: List of SAS ports @@ -791,7 +792,7 @@ struct leapraid_topo_node { }; /** - * struct leapraid_dev_topo - LeapRaid device topology management structure + * struct leapraid_dev_topo - LeapRAID device topology management structure * * @topo_node_lock: Spinlock for protecting topology node operations * @sas_dev_lock: Spinlock for SAS device list access @@ -831,7 +832,7 @@ struct leapraid_dev_topo { }; /** - * struct leapraid_boot_dev - Boot device structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_boot_dev - Boot device structure for LeapRAID * * @dev: Device pointer * @chnl: Channel number @@ -870,7 +871,7 @@ struct leapraid_smart_poll_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_adapter - Main LeapRaid adapter structure + * struct leapraid_adapter - Main LeapRAID adapter structure * @list: List head for adapter management * @shost: SCSI host structure * @pdev: PCI device structure diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c index 44ec2615648f..6635e74fd8ff 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c @@ -2029,7 +2029,7 @@ static void leapraid_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev) adapter->access_ctrl.host_removing = true; leapraid_wait_cmds_done(adapter); leapraid_clean_active_fw_evt(adapter); - + leapraid_fw_log_stop(adapter); spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_lock, flags); wq = adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_thread; adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_thread = NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 2

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: leapraid: add RAID disk hide/show events and fix misc issues
by haodongdong 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

LeapIO inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8462 This change introduces RAID disk hide/show events to allow dynamic visibility control of RAID devices. It also updates the MSI-X vector count retrieval logic and unifies driver naming from LeapRaid to LeapRAID for consistency. In addition, fix an issue where the fw_log workqueue was not properly released during system shutdown, which could lead to resource leaks. Signed-off-by: haodongdong <doubled(a)leap-io.com> --- drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h | 2 + drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h | 47 ++++++------ drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h index 842810d41542..77bb93b79254 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid.h @@ -310,6 +310,8 @@ #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_UNHIDDEN_TO_DELETE 0x04 #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_CREATED_TO_HIDE 0x05 #define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_DELETED_TO_EXPOSE 0x06 +#define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE 0x0A +#define LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE 0x0B /* sas topology change event */ #define LEAPRAID_EVT_SAS_TOPO_ES_NO_EXPANDER 0x00 diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c index 2fc142fff982..ad8aee40e2c1 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.c @@ -4132,6 +4132,66 @@ static void leapraid_sas_pd_expose( } } +static void leapraid_sas_vol_visibility(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, + struct leapraid_evt_data_ir_change *evt_data) +{ + struct leapraid_raid_volume *raid_volume = NULL; + struct scsi_device *sdev = NULL; + u16 hdl = 0; + unsigned long flags; + u8 rc = 0; + u8 reprobe_flg = 0; + + hdl = le16_to_cpu(evt_data->vol_dev_hdl); + rc = evt_data->reason_code; + spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, flags); + raid_volume = leapraid_raid_volume_find_by_hdl(adapter, hdl); + if (!raid_volume) { + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, + flags); + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:%d: volume handle 0x%x not found\n", + __func__, __LINE__, hdl); + return; + } + + reprobe_flg = 0; + sdev = raid_volume->sdev; + if (sdev) { + if (sdev->no_uld_attach) { + if (rc == LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE) { + sdev->no_uld_attach = 0; + reprobe_flg = 1; + } + } else { + if (rc == LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE) { + sdev->no_uld_attach = 1; + reprobe_flg = 1; + } + } + + if (reprobe_flg) { + if (sdev->no_uld_attach) + sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "hide vol\n"); + else + sdev_printk(KERN_INFO, sdev, "unhide vol\n"); + + WARN_ON(scsi_device_reprobe(sdev)); + } else { + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:rc(0x%x):request matches, skipping.\n", + __func__, rc); + } + + } else { + dev_warn(&adapter->pdev->dev, + "%s:%d: volume handle 0x%x has no sdev\n", + __func__, __LINE__, hdl); + } + + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->dev_topo.raid_volume_lock, flags); +} + static void leapraid_sas_volume_add(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, struct leapraid_evt_data_ir_change *evt_data) { @@ -4250,6 +4310,10 @@ static void leapraid_sas_ir_chg_evt(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter, case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_PD_DELETED_TO_EXPOSE: leapraid_sas_pd_expose(adapter, evt_data); break; + case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_HIDE: + case LEAPRAID_EVT_IR_RC_VOLUME_UNHIDE: + leapraid_sas_vol_visibility(adapter, evt_data); + break; default: break; } @@ -6397,6 +6461,8 @@ static int leapraid_get_adapter_features(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) le16_to_cpu(leap_mpi_rep.hp_slot); adapter->adapter_attr.features.adapter_caps = le32_to_cpu(leap_mpi_rep.adapter_caps); + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors = + leap_mpi_rep.max_msix_vectors; adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_volumes = leap_mpi_rep.max_volumes; if (!adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_volumes) @@ -6754,11 +6820,15 @@ static int leapraid_set_msix(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) goto legacy_int; msix_cnt = leapraid_msix_cnt(adapter->pdev); - if (msix_cnt <= 0) { + if (msix_cnt <= 0 || + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors == 0) { dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msix unsupported!\n"); goto legacy_int; } + msix_cnt = min_t(int, msix_cnt, + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors); + if (reset_devices) adapter->adapter_attr.rq_cnt = 1; else @@ -6859,11 +6929,15 @@ static int leapraid_set_msi(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) goto legacy_int1; msi_cnt = leapraid_msi_cnt(adapter->pdev); - if (msi_cnt <= 0) { - dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msix unsupported!\n"); + if (msi_cnt <= 0 || + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors == 0) { + dev_info(&adapter->pdev->dev, "msi unsupported!\n"); goto legacy_int1; } + msi_cnt = min_t(int, msi_cnt, + adapter->adapter_attr.features.max_msix_vectors); + if (reset_devices) adapter->adapter_attr.rq_cnt = 1; else @@ -7015,6 +7089,18 @@ int leapraid_set_pcie_and_notification(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) leapraid_mask_int(adapter); + rc = leapraid_make_adapter_ready(adapter, PART_RESET); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "make adapter ready failure\n"); + goto out_fail; + } + + rc = leapraid_get_adapter_features(adapter); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "get adapter feature failure\n"); + goto out_fail; + } + rc = leapraid_set_notification(adapter); if (rc) goto out_fail; @@ -8185,18 +8271,6 @@ int leapraid_ctrl_init(struct leapraid_adapter *adapter) PCI_EXP_DEVCTL_EXT_TAG); } - rc = leapraid_make_adapter_ready(adapter, PART_RESET); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "make adapter ready failure\n"); - goto out_free_resources; - } - - rc = leapraid_get_adapter_features(adapter); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "get adapter feature failure\n"); - goto out_free_resources; - } - rc = leapraid_fw_log_init(adapter); if (rc) { dev_err(&adapter->pdev->dev, "fw log init failure\n"); diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h index 2c51ef359b7e..f7072d078315 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_func.h @@ -46,15 +46,15 @@ #define LEAPRAID_SYS_LOG_BUF_RESERVE 0x1000 /* Driver version and name */ -#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_NAME "LeapRaid" +#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_NAME "LeapRAID" #define LEAPRAID_NAME_LENGTH 48 #define LEAPRAID_AUTHOR "LeapIO Inc." -#define LEAPRAID_DESCRIPTION "LeapRaid Driver" -#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_VERSION "2.00.00.05" +#define LEAPRAID_DESCRIPTION "LeapRAID Driver" +#define LEAPRAID_DRIVER_VERSION "2.00.00.06" #define LEAPRAID_MAJOR_VERSION 2 #define LEAPRAID_MINOR_VERSION 00 #define LEAPRAID_BUILD_VERSION 00 -#define LEAPRAID_RELEASE_VERSION 05 +#define LEAPRAID_RELEASE_VERSION 06 /* Device ID */ #define LEAPRAID_VENDOR_ID 0xD405 @@ -243,6 +243,7 @@ struct leapraid_adapter_features { u16 hp_slot; u32 adapter_caps; u32 fw_version; + u8 max_msix_vectors; u8 max_volumes; u16 max_dev_handle; u16 min_dev_handle; @@ -349,7 +350,7 @@ struct leapraid_rep_desc_seg_maint { }; /** - * struct leapraid_mem_desc - Memory descriptor for LeapRaid adapter + * struct leapraid_mem_desc - Memory descriptor for LeapRAID adapter * * @task_desc: Pointer to task descriptor * @task_desc_dma: DMA address of task descriptor @@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ struct leapraid_mem_desc { #define LEAPRAID_CMD_RESET 0x0008 /** - * enum LEAPRAID_CB_INDEX - Callback index for LeapRaid driver + * enum LEAPRAID_CB_INDEX - Callback index for LeapRAID driver * * @LEAPRAID_SCAN_DEV_CB_IDX: Scan device callback index * @LEAPRAID_CONFIG_CB_IDX: Configuration callback index @@ -513,7 +514,7 @@ struct leapraid_dynamic_task_desc { * struct leapraid_fw_evt_work - Firmware event work structure * * @list: Linked list node for queuing the work - * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRaid adapter + * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRAID adapter * @work: Work structure used by the kernel workqueue * @refcnt: Reference counter for managing the lifetime of this work * @evt_data: Pointer to firmware event data @@ -554,9 +555,9 @@ struct leapraid_fw_evt_struct { }; /** - * struct leapraid_rq - Represents a LeapRaid request queue + * struct leapraid_rq - Represents a LeapRAID request queue * - * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRaid adapter + * @adapter: Pointer to the associated LeapRAID adapter * @msix_idx: MSI-X vector index used by this queue * @rep_post_host_idx: Index of the last processed reply descriptor * @rep_desc: Pointer to the reply descriptor associated with this queue @@ -576,7 +577,7 @@ struct leapraid_rq { * struct leapraid_int_rq - Internal request queue for a CPU * * @affinity_hint: CPU affinity mask for the queue - * @rq: Underlying LeapRaid request queue structure + * @rq: Underlying LeapRAID request queue structure */ struct leapraid_int_rq { cpumask_var_t affinity_hint; @@ -584,11 +585,11 @@ struct leapraid_int_rq { }; /** - * struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq - Polling request for LeapRaid blk-mq + * struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq - Polling request for LeapRAID blk-mq * * @busy: Atomic flag indicating request is being processed * @pause: Atomic flag to temporarily suspend polling - * @rq: The underlying LeapRaid request structure + * @rq: The underlying LeapRAID request structure */ struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq { atomic_t busy; @@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ struct leapraid_blk_mq_poll_rq { /** * struct leapraid_notification_desc - Notification - * descriptor for LeapRaid + * descriptor for LeapRAID * * @iopoll_qdex: Index of the I/O polling queue * @iopoll_qcnt: Count of I/O polling queues @@ -621,7 +622,7 @@ struct leapraid_notification_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_reset_desc - Reset descriptor for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_reset_desc - Reset descriptor for LeapRAID * * @fault_reset_wq: Workqueue for fault reset operations * @fault_reset_work: Delayed work structure for fault reset @@ -651,7 +652,7 @@ struct leapraid_reset_desc { /** * struct leapraid_scan_dev_desc - Scan device descriptor - * for LeapRaid + * for LeapRAID * * @wait_scan_dev_done: Flag indicating if scan device operation is done * @driver_loading: Flag indicating if driver is loading @@ -670,7 +671,7 @@ struct leapraid_scan_dev_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_access_ctrl - Access control structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_access_ctrl - Access control structure for LeapRAID * * @pci_access_lock: Mutex for PCI access control * @adapter_thermal_alert: Flag indicating if adapter thermal alert is active @@ -687,7 +688,7 @@ struct leapraid_access_ctrl { }; /** - * struct leapraid_fw_log_desc - Firmware log descriptor for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_fw_log_desc - Firmware log descriptor for LeapRAID * * @fw_log_buffer: Buffer for firmware log data * @fw_log_buffer_dma: DMA address of the firmware log buffer @@ -711,7 +712,7 @@ struct leapraid_fw_log_desc { #define LEAPRAID_CARD_PORT_FLG_NEW 0x02 #define LEAPRAID_DISABLE_MP_PORT_ID 0xFF /** - * struct leapraid_card_port - Card port structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_card_port - Card port structure for LeapRAID * * @list: List head for card port * @vphys_list: List head for virtual phy list @@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ struct leapraid_card_port { }; /** - * struct leapraid_card_phy - Card phy structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_card_phy - Card phy structure for LeapRAID * * @port_siblings: List head for port siblings * @card_port: Pointer to the card port @@ -759,7 +760,7 @@ struct leapraid_card_phy { }; /** - * struct leapraid_topo_node - SAS topology node for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_topo_node - SAS topology node for LeapRAID * * @list: List head for linking nodes * @sas_port_list: List of SAS ports @@ -792,7 +793,7 @@ struct leapraid_topo_node { }; /** - * struct leapraid_dev_topo - LeapRaid device topology management structure + * struct leapraid_dev_topo - LeapRAID device topology management structure * * @topo_node_lock: Spinlock for protecting topology node operations * @sas_dev_lock: Spinlock for SAS device list access @@ -832,7 +833,7 @@ struct leapraid_dev_topo { }; /** - * struct leapraid_boot_dev - Boot device structure for LeapRaid + * struct leapraid_boot_dev - Boot device structure for LeapRAID * * @dev: Device pointer * @chnl: Channel number @@ -871,7 +872,7 @@ struct leapraid_smart_poll_desc { }; /** - * struct leapraid_adapter - Main LeapRaid adapter structure + * struct leapraid_adapter - Main LeapRAID adapter structure * @list: List head for adapter management * @shost: SCSI host structure * @pdev: PCI device structure diff --git a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c index be0f7cbb6684..f8354c68ab71 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/leapraid/leapraid_os.c @@ -2124,7 +2124,7 @@ static void leapraid_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev) adapter->access_ctrl.host_removing = true; leapraid_wait_cmds_done(adapter); leapraid_clean_active_fw_evt(adapter); - + leapraid_fw_log_stop(adapter); spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_lock, flags); wq = adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_thread; adapter->fw_evt_s.fw_evt_thread = NULL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] interference: Fix uninitialized ifs_clock compiling issue
by Pu Lehui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/7429 -------------------------------- When compiling with clang, it will occur the warning: 623 | if (__mutex_trylock(lock)) { | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ kernel/locking/mutex.c:725:24: note: uninitialized use occurs here 725 | cgroup_ifs_leave_lock(ifs_clock, IFS_MUTEX); | ^~~~~~~~~ kernel/locking/mutex.c:623:2: note: remove the 'if' if its condition is always false 623 | if (__mutex_trylock(lock)) { | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 624 | if (ww_ctx) | ~~~~~~~~~~~ 625 | __ww_mutex_check_waiters(lock, ww_ctx); | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 626 | 627 | goto skip_wait; | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 628 | } | ~ kernel/locking/mutex.c:576:15: note: initialize the variable 'ifs_clock' to silence this warning 576 | u64 ifs_clock; | ^ | = 0 2 warnings generated. Let's fix it by zero initialize ifs_clock. Fixes: a1ad9b2ed459 ("interference: Add mutex interference track support") Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/cgroup.h | 3 +++ kernel/locking/mutex.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h index 05a9cef2edac..d4f69e89b3fb 100644 --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h @@ -1000,6 +1000,9 @@ static inline void cgroup_ifs_leave_lock(u64 clock, enum ifs_types t) if (!cgroup_ifs_enabled()) return; + if (unlikely(!clock)) + return; + ifs = current_ifs(); if (ifs) { ifsc = this_cpu_ptr(ifs->pcpu); diff --git a/kernel/locking/mutex.c b/kernel/locking/mutex.c index 1003afe8dd74..038c6fb9d71d 100644 --- a/kernel/locking/mutex.c +++ b/kernel/locking/mutex.c @@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ __mutex_lock_common(struct mutex *lock, unsigned int state, unsigned int subclas { struct mutex_waiter waiter; struct ww_mutex *ww; - u64 ifs_clock; + u64 ifs_clock = 0; int ret; if (!use_ww_ctx) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: fix pin_assignment_show
by Yin Tirui 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.284 commit 0e61a7432fcd4bca06f05b7f1c7d7cb461880fe2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13216 CVE: CVE-2023-54186 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit d8f28269dd4bf9b55c3fb376ae31512730a96fce upstream. This patch fixes negative indexing of buf array in pin_assignment_show when get_current_pin_assignments returns 0 i.e. no compatible pin assignments are found. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pin_assignment_show+0x26c/0x33c ... Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x110/0x204 dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xbc print_report+0x358/0x974 kasan_report+0x9c/0xfc __do_kernel_fault+0xd4/0x2d4 do_bad_area+0x48/0x168 do_tag_check_fault+0x24/0x38 do_mem_abort+0x6c/0x14c el1_abort+0x44/0x68 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x64/0xa4 el1h_64_sync+0x78/0x7c pin_assignment_show+0x26c/0x33c dev_attr_show+0x50/0xc0 Fixes: 0e3bb7d6894d ("usb: typec: Add driver for DisplayPort alternate mode") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Heikki Krogerus <heikki.krogerus(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230508214443.893436-1-badhri@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yin Tirui <yintirui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/typec/altmodes/displayport.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/usb/typec/altmodes/displayport.c b/drivers/usb/typec/altmodes/displayport.c index 90bb0baed624..3be3a1942b5f 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/typec/altmodes/displayport.c +++ b/drivers/usb/typec/altmodes/displayport.c @@ -495,6 +495,10 @@ static ssize_t pin_assignment_show(struct device *dev, mutex_unlock(&dp->lock); + /* get_current_pin_assignments can return 0 when no matching pin assignments are found */ + if (len == 0) + len++; + buf[len - 1] = '\n'; return len; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race
by Jiacheng Yu 02 Feb '26

02 Feb '26

From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit b55947b725f190396f475d5d0c59aa855a4d8895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8987 CVE: CVE-2025-39749 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 90c09d57caeca94e6f3f87c49e96a91edd40cbfd ] On kernels built with CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y, when rcu_read_unlock() is invoked within an interrupts-disabled region of code [1], it will invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(), which uses an irq-work handler to force the system to notice when the RCU read-side critical section actually ends. That end won't happen until interrupts are enabled at the soonest. In some kernels, such as those booted with rcutree.use_softirq=y, the irq-work handler is used unconditionally. The per-CPU rcu_data structure's ->defer_qs_iw_pending field is updated by the irq-work handler and is both read and updated by rcu_read_unlock_special(). This resulted in the following KCSAN splat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler / rcu_read_unlock_special read to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 90 on cpu 8: rcu_read_unlock_special+0x175/0x260 __rcu_read_unlock+0x92/0xa0 rt_spin_unlock+0x9b/0xc0 __local_bh_enable+0x10d/0x170 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfb/0x150 rcu_do_batch+0x595/0xc40 rcu_cpu_kthread+0x4e9/0x830 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 write to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 88 on cpu 8: rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler+0x1e/0x30 irq_work_single+0xaf/0x160 run_irq_workd+0x91/0xc0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 no locks held by irq_work/8/88. irq event stamp: 200272 hardirqs last enabled at (200272): [<ffffffffb0f56121>] finish_task_switch+0x131/0x320 hardirqs last disabled at (200271): [<ffffffffb25c7859>] __schedule+0x129/0xd70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0ee093f>] copy_process+0x4df/0x1cc0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The problem is that irq-work handlers run with interrupts enabled, which means that rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() could be interrupted, and that interrupt handler might contain an RCU read-side critical section, which might invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(). In the strict KCSAN mode of operation used by RCU, this constitutes a data race on the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This commit therefore disables interrupts across the portion of the rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() that updates the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This suffices because this handler is not a fast path. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay (AMD) <neeraj.upadhyay(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h index 94b715139f52..de727f2568bf 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h @@ -612,10 +612,13 @@ notrace void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs(struct task_struct *t) */ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler(struct irq_work *iwp) { + unsigned long flags; struct rcu_data *rdp; rdp = container_of(iwp, struct rcu_data, defer_qs_iw); + local_irq_save(flags); rdp->defer_qs_iw_pending = false; + local_irq_restore(flags); } /* -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] f2fs: fix to avoid potential deadlock
by Pan Taixi 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 8bd6dff8b801abaa362272894bda795bf0cf1307 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13377/ CVE: CVE-2025-71065 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ca8b201f28547e28343a6f00a6e91fa8c09572fe ] As Jiaming Zhang and syzbot reported, there is potential deadlock in f2fs as below: Chain exists of: &sbi->cp_rwsem --> fs_reclaim --> sb_internal#2 Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- rlock(sb_internal#2); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(sb_internal#2); rlock(&sbi->cp_rwsem); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/73: #0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7015 [inline] #0: ffffffff8e247a40 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kswapd+0x951/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389 #1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_trylock_shared fs/super.c:562 [inline] #1: ffff8880118400e0 (&type->s_umount_key#50){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: super_cache_scan+0x91/0x4b0 fs/super.c:197 #2: ffff888011840610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: f2fs_evict_inode+0x8d9/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:890 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 73 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_circular_bug+0x2ee/0x310 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2043 check_noncircular+0x134/0x160 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2175 check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3165 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3284 [inline] validate_chain+0xb9b/0x2140 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3908 __lock_acquire+0xab9/0xd20 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x120/0x360 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 down_read+0x46/0x2e0 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1537 f2fs_down_read fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2278 [inline] f2fs_lock_op fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2357 [inline] f2fs_do_truncate_blocks+0x21c/0x10c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:791 f2fs_truncate_blocks+0x10a/0x300 fs/f2fs/file.c:867 f2fs_truncate+0x489/0x7c0 fs/f2fs/file.c:925 f2fs_evict_inode+0x9f2/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:897 evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 f2fs_evict_inode+0x1dc/0x1b60 fs/f2fs/inode.c:853 evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 dispose_list fs/inode.c:852 [inline] prune_icache_sb+0x21b/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1000 super_cache_scan+0x39b/0x4b0 fs/super.c:224 do_shrink_slab+0x6ef/0x1110 mm/shrinker.c:437 shrink_slab_memcg mm/shrinker.c:550 [inline] shrink_slab+0x7ef/0x10d0 mm/shrinker.c:628 shrink_one+0x28a/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4955 shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:5016 [inline] lru_gen_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5094 [inline] shrink_node+0x315d/0x3780 mm/vmscan.c:6081 kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6941 [inline] balance_pgdat mm/vmscan.c:7124 [inline] kswapd+0x147c/0x2800 mm/vmscan.c:7389 kthread+0x70e/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x4bc/0x870 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> The root cause is deadlock among four locks as below: kswapd - fs_reclaim --- Lock A - shrink_one - evict - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B - iput - evict - f2fs_evict_inode - sb_start_intwrite --- Lock B - f2fs_truncate - f2fs_truncate_blocks - f2fs_do_truncate_blocks - f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C ioctl - f2fs_ioc_commit_atomic_write - f2fs_lock_op --- Lock C - __f2fs_commit_atomic_write - __replace_atomic_write_block - f2fs_get_dnode_of_data - __get_node_folio - f2fs_check_nid_range - f2fs_handle_error - f2fs_record_errors - f2fs_down_write --- Lock D open - do_open - do_truncate - security_inode_need_killpriv - f2fs_getxattr - lookup_all_xattrs - f2fs_handle_error - f2fs_record_errors - f2fs_down_write --- Lock D - f2fs_commit_super - read_mapping_folio - filemap_alloc_folio_noprof - prepare_alloc_pages - fs_reclaim_acquire --- Lock A In order to avoid such deadlock, we need to avoid grabbing sb_lock in f2fs_handle_error(), so, let's use asynchronous method instead: - remove f2fs_handle_error() implementation - rename f2fs_handle_error_async() to f2fs_handle_error() - spread f2fs_handle_error() Fixes: 95fa90c9e5a7 ("f2fs: support recording errors into superblock") Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+14b90e1156b9f6fc1266(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/68eae49b.050a0220.ac43.0001.GAE@go… Reported-by: Jiaming Zhang <r772577952(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CANypQFa-Gy9sD-N35o3PC+FystOWkNuN8pv6S75HLT0ga… Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/f2fs/super.c [Context conflicts due to ummerged commit: 0b8eb814e058 ("f2fs: use f2fs_err_ratelimited() to avoid redundant logs")] Signed-off-by: Pan Taixi <pantaixi1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/f2fs/compress.c | 5 +---- fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 1 - fs/f2fs/super.c | 40 ---------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 45 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/compress.c b/fs/f2fs/compress.c index 1dd043330b00..89890f54e781 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/compress.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/compress.c @@ -755,10 +755,7 @@ void f2fs_decompress_cluster(struct decompress_io_ctx *dic, bool in_task) ret = -EFSCORRUPTED; /* Avoid f2fs_commit_super in irq context */ - if (!in_task) - f2fs_handle_error_async(sbi, ERROR_FAIL_DECOMPRESSION); - else - f2fs_handle_error(sbi, ERROR_FAIL_DECOMPRESSION); + f2fs_handle_error(sbi, ERROR_FAIL_DECOMPRESSION); goto out_release; } diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h index fa9d1b3efcce..df30000e7f18 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h +++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h @@ -3633,7 +3633,6 @@ void f2fs_quota_off_umount(struct super_block *sb); void f2fs_save_errors(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char flag); void f2fs_handle_critical_error(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char reason); void f2fs_handle_error(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char error); -void f2fs_handle_error_async(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char error); int f2fs_commit_super(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool recover); int f2fs_sync_fs(struct super_block *sb, int sync); int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi); diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index 92a3b592e936..2981d11ed2e8 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -4083,47 +4083,7 @@ void f2fs_save_errors(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char flag) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sbi->error_lock, flags); } -static bool f2fs_update_errors(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) -{ - unsigned long flags; - bool need_update = false; - - spin_lock_irqsave(&sbi->error_lock, flags); - if (sbi->error_dirty) { - memcpy(F2FS_RAW_SUPER(sbi)->s_errors, sbi->errors, - MAX_F2FS_ERRORS); - sbi->error_dirty = false; - need_update = true; - } - spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sbi->error_lock, flags); - - return need_update; -} - -static void f2fs_record_errors(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char error) -{ - int err; - - f2fs_down_write(&sbi->sb_lock); - - if (!f2fs_update_errors(sbi)) - goto out_unlock; - - err = f2fs_commit_super(sbi, false); - if (err) - f2fs_err(sbi, "f2fs_commit_super fails to record errors:%u, err:%d", - error, err); -out_unlock: - f2fs_up_write(&sbi->sb_lock); -} - void f2fs_handle_error(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char error) -{ - f2fs_save_errors(sbi, error); - f2fs_record_errors(sbi, error); -} - -void f2fs_handle_error_async(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, unsigned char error) { f2fs_save_errors(sbi, error); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] svcrdma: bound check rq_pages index in inline path
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 7ba826aae1d43212f3baa53a2175ad949e21926e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13379 CVE: CVE-2025-71068 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d1bea0ce35b6095544ee82bb54156fc62c067e58 ] svc_rdma_copy_inline_range indexed rqstp->rq_pages[rc_curpage] without verifying rc_curpage stays within the allocated page array. Add guards before the first use and after advancing to a new page. Fixes: d7cc73972661 ("svcrdma: support multiple Read chunks per RPC") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> [ adapted rc_curpage and rq_maxpages fields to ri_pageno and RPCSVC_MAXPAGES constant ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c index e460e25a1d6d..249a17c7e82b 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/svc_rdma_rw.c @@ -815,6 +815,9 @@ static int svc_rdma_copy_inline_range(struct svc_rdma_read_info *info, for (page_no = 0; page_no < numpages; page_no++) { unsigned int page_len; + if (info->ri_pageno >= RPCSVC_MAXPAGES) + return -EINVAL; + page_len = min_t(unsigned int, remaining, PAGE_SIZE - info->ri_pageoff); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ipv6: Fix use-after-free in inet6_addr_del().
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit ddf96c393a33aef4887e2e406c76c2f8cda1419c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13520 CVE: CVE-2026-23010 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot reported use-after-free of inet6_ifaddr in inet6_addr_del(). [0] The cited commit accidentally moved ipv6_del_addr() for mngtmpaddr before reading its ifp->flags for temporary addresses in inet6_addr_del(). Let's move ipv6_del_addr() down to fix the UAF. [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88807b89c86c by task syz.3.1618/9593 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9593 Comm: syz.3.1618 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595 inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117 addrconf_del_ifaddr+0x11e/0x190 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3181 inet6_ioctl+0x1e5/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:582 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f164cf8f749 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f164de64038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f164d1e5fa0 RCX: 00007f164cf8f749 RDX: 0000200000000000 RSI: 0000000000008936 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f164d013f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f164d1e6038 R14: 00007f164d1e5fa0 R15: 00007ffde15c8288 </TASK> Allocated by task 9593: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:397 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:414 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] ipv6_add_addr+0x4e3/0x2010 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1120 inet6_addr_add+0x256/0x9b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3050 addrconf_add_ifaddr+0x1fc/0x450 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3160 inet6_ioctl+0x103/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:580 sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254 sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 6099: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:252 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:284 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:234 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:2569 [inline] slab_free_bulk mm/slub.c:6696 [inline] kmem_cache_free_bulk mm/slub.c:7383 [inline] kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x2bf/0x680 mm/slub.c:7362 kfree_bulk include/linux/slab.h:830 [inline] kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1b7/0x1e0 mm/slab_common.c:1523 kvfree_rcu_drain_ready mm/slab_common.c:1728 [inline] kfree_rcu_monitor+0x1d0/0x2f0 mm/slab_common.c:1801 process_one_work+0x9ba/0x1b20 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x3c5/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x983/0xb10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 Fixes: 00b5b7aab9e42 ("net/ipv6: delete temporary address if mngtmpaddr is removed or unmanaged") Reported-by: syzbot+72e610f4f1a930ca9d8a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/696598e9.050a0220.3be5c5.0009.GAE@google.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260113010538.2019411-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/addrconf.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c index f6188bd9f55b..1bf67ea03cf3 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/addrconf.c +++ b/net/ipv6/addrconf.c @@ -3094,12 +3094,12 @@ static int inet6_addr_del(struct net *net, int ifindex, u32 ifa_flags, in6_ifa_hold(ifp); read_unlock_bh(&idev->lock); - ipv6_del_addr(ifp); - if (!(ifp->flags & IFA_F_TEMPORARY) && (ifp->flags & IFA_F_MANAGETEMPADDR)) delete_tempaddrs(idev, ifp); + ipv6_del_addr(ifp); + addrconf_verify_rtnl(net); if (ipv6_addr_is_multicast(pfx)) { ipv6_mc_config(net->ipv6.mc_autojoin_sk, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ip6_tunnel: use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() in __ip6_tnl_rcv()
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 81c734dae203757fb3c9eee6f9896386940776bd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13513 CVE: CVE-2026-23003 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Blamed commit did not take care of VLAN encapsulations as spotted by syzbot [1]. Use skb_vlan_inet_prepare() instead of pskb_inet_may_pull(). [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321 __INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:253 [inline] INET_ECN_decapsulate include/net/inet_ecn.h:275 [inline] IP6_ECN_decapsulate+0x7a8/0x1fa0 include/net/inet_ecn.h:321 ip6ip6_dscp_ecn_decapsulate+0x16f/0x1b0 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:729 __ip6_tnl_rcv+0xed9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:860 ip6_tnl_rcv+0xc3/0x100 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c:903 gre_rcv+0x1529/0x1b90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:-1 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x1c89/0x2c60 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input_finish+0x1f4/0x4a0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:489 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ip6_input+0x9c/0x330 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500 ip6_mc_input+0x7ca/0xc10 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:590 dst_input include/net/dst.h:474 [inline] ip6_rcv_finish+0x958/0x990 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:318 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xf1/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:6139 [inline] __netif_receive_skb+0x1df/0xac0 net/core/dev.c:6252 netif_receive_skb_internal net/core/dev.c:6338 [inline] netif_receive_skb+0x57/0x630 net/core/dev.c:6397 tun_rx_batched+0x1df/0x980 drivers/net/tun.c:1485 tun_get_user+0x5c0e/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1953 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746 x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4960 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x9e7/0x17a0 mm/slub.c:5315 kmalloc_reserve+0x13c/0x4b0 net/core/skbuff.c:586 __alloc_skb+0x805/0x1040 net/core/skbuff.c:690 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1383 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc5/0xa60 net/core/skbuff.c:6712 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xacc/0xc60 net/core/sock.c:2995 tun_alloc_skb drivers/net/tun.c:1461 [inline] tun_get_user+0x1142/0x6c60 drivers/net/tun.c:1794 tun_chr_write_iter+0x3e9/0x5c0 drivers/net/tun.c:1999 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:593 [inline] vfs_write+0xbe2/0x15d0 fs/read_write.c:686 ksys_write fs/read_write.c:738 [inline] __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:749 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:746 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x1fb/0x4d0 fs/read_write.c:746 x64_sys_call+0x30ab/0x3e70 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:2 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6465 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(none) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Fixes: 8d975c15c0cd ("ip6_tunnel: make sure to pull inner header in __ip6_tnl_rcv()") Reported-by: syzbot+d4dda070f833dc5dc89a(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/695e88b2.050a0220.1c677c.036d.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260107163109.4188620-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c index c70ff45649ad..2d9a7fa13c5f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c @@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ static int __ip6_tnl_rcv(struct ip6_tnl *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb, skb_reset_network_header(skb); - if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb)) { + if (skb_vlan_inet_prepare(skb, true)) { DEV_STATS_INC(tunnel->dev, rx_length_errors); DEV_STATS_INC(tunnel->dev, rx_errors); goto drop; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] dst: fix races in rt6_uncached_list_del() and rt_del_uncached_list()
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 9a6f0c4d5796ab89b5a28a890ce542344d58bd69 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13515 CVE: CVE-2026-23004 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- syzbot was able to crash the kernel in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev() in an interesting way [1] Crash happens in list_del_init()/INIT_LIST_HEAD() while writing list->prev, while the prior write on list->next went well. static inline void INIT_LIST_HEAD(struct list_head *list) { WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list); // This went well WRITE_ONCE(list->prev, list); // Crash, @list has been freed. } Issue here is that rt6_uncached_list_del() did not attempt to lock ul->lock, as list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached) returned true because the WRITE_ONCE(list->next, list) happened on the other CPU. We might use list_del_init_careful() and list_empty_careful(), or make sure rt6_uncached_list_del() always grabs the spinlock whenever rt->dst.rt_uncached_list has been set. A similar fix is neeed for IPv4. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880294cfa78 by task kworker/u8:14/3450 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 3450 Comm: kworker/u8:14 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)} Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xca/0x240 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 INIT_LIST_HEAD include/linux/list.h:46 [inline] list_del_init include/linux/list.h:296 [inline] rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev net/ipv6/route.c:191 [inline] rt6_disable_ip+0x633/0x730 net/ipv6/route.c:5020 addrconf_ifdown+0x143/0x18a0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3853 addrconf_notify+0x1bc/0x1050 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:-1 notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2268 [inline] call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2282 [inline] netif_close_many+0x29c/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1785 unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0xb50/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:12353 ops_exit_rtnl_list net/core/net_namespace.c:187 [inline] ops_undo_list+0x3dc/0x990 net/core/net_namespace.c:248 cleanup_net+0x4de/0x7b0 net/core/net_namespace.c:696 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 </TASK> Allocated by task 803: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270 dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89 ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline] icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333 mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 Freed by task 20: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:6670 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x18f/0x8d0 mm/slub.c:6781 dst_destroy+0x235/0x350 net/core/dst.c:121 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2605 [inline] rcu_core kernel/rcu/tree.c:2857 [inline] rcu_cpu_kthread+0xba5/0x1af0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2945 smpboot_thread_fn+0x542/0xa60 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x3e/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbd/0xd0 mm/kasan/generic.c:556 __call_rcu_common kernel/rcu/tree.c:3119 [inline] call_rcu+0xee/0x890 kernel/rcu/tree.c:3239 refdst_drop include/net/dst.h:266 [inline] skb_dst_drop include/net/dst.h:278 [inline] skb_release_head_state+0x71/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:1156 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1180 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1196 [inline] sk_skb_reason_drop+0xe9/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1234 kfree_skb_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline] tcf_kfree_skb_list include/net/sch_generic.h:1127 [inline] __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:4260 [inline] __dev_queue_xmit+0x26aa/0x3210 net/core/dev.c:4785 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247 NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318 mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880294cfa00 which belongs to the cache ip6_dst_cache of size 232 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of freed 232-byte region [ffff8880294cfa00, ffff8880294cfae8) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x294cf memcg:ffff88803536b781 flags: 0x80000000000000(node=0|zone=1) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0080000000000000 ffff88802ff1c8c0 ffffea0000bf2bc0 dead000000000006 raw: 0000000000000000 00000000800c000c 00000000f5000000 ffff88803536b781 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as allocated page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52820(GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP), pid 9, tgid 9 (kworker/0:0), ts 91119585830, free_ts 91088628818 set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline] post_alloc_hook+0x234/0x290 mm/page_alloc.c:1857 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1865 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0x28c0/0x2960 mm/page_alloc.c:3915 __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x181/0x370 mm/page_alloc.c:5210 alloc_pages_mpol+0xd1/0x380 mm/mempolicy.c:2486 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:3075 [inline] allocate_slab+0x86/0x3b0 mm/slub.c:3248 new_slab mm/slub.c:3302 [inline] ___slab_alloc+0xb10/0x13e0 mm/slub.c:4656 __slab_alloc+0xc6/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:4779 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4855 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5251 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x101/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270 dst_alloc+0x105/0x170 net/core/dst.c:89 ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline] icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x460 net/ipv6/route.c:3333 mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 page last free pid 5859 tgid 5859 stack trace: reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline] free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1406 [inline] __free_frozen_pages+0xfe1/0x1170 mm/page_alloc.c:2943 discard_slab mm/slub.c:3346 [inline] __put_partials+0x149/0x170 mm/slub.c:3886 __slab_free+0x2af/0x330 mm/slub.c:5952 qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline] qlist_free_all+0x97/0x100 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:350 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x18d/0x6c0 mm/slub.c:5270 getname_flags+0xb8/0x540 fs/namei.c:146 getname include/linux/fs.h:2498 [inline] do_sys_openat2+0xbc/0x200 fs/open.c:1426 do_sys_open fs/open.c:1436 [inline] __do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1452 [inline] __se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1447 [inline] __x64_sys_openat+0x138/0x170 fs/open.c:1447 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 Fixes: 8d0b94afdca8 ("ipv6: Keep track of DST_NOCACHE routes in case of iface down/unregister") Fixes: 78df76a065ae ("ipv4: take rt_uncached_lock only if needed") Reported-by: syzbot+179fc225724092b8b2b2(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6964cdf2.050a0220.eaf7.009d.GAE@google.com/T… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260112103825.3810713-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/dst.c | 1 + net/ipv4/route.c | 4 ++-- net/ipv6/route.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/dst.c b/net/core/dst.c index 6f7a2a4d3ad2..f34bd06b75cd 100644 --- a/net/core/dst.c +++ b/net/core/dst.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ void dst_init(struct dst_entry *dst, struct dst_ops *ops, dst->lwtstate = NULL; rcuref_init(&dst->__rcuref, initial_ref); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dst->rt_uncached); + dst->rt_uncached_list = NULL; dst->__use = 0; dst->lastuse = jiffies; dst->flags = flags; diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index 24f09972c9c5..e3482568997b 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -1546,9 +1546,9 @@ void rt_add_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt) void rt_del_uncached_list(struct rtable *rt) { - if (!list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached)) { - struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list; + struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list; + if (ul) { spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock); list_del_init(&rt->dst.rt_uncached); spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock); diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index 41d358dd58c0..40bf2df40c19 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -149,9 +149,9 @@ void rt6_uncached_list_add(struct rt6_info *rt) void rt6_uncached_list_del(struct rt6_info *rt) { - if (!list_empty(&rt->dst.rt_uncached)) { - struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list; + struct uncached_list *ul = rt->dst.rt_uncached_list; + if (ul) { spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock); list_del_init(&rt->dst.rt_uncached); spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ipv4: ip_gre: make ipgre_header() robust
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit e67c577d89894811ce4dcd1a9ed29d8b63476667 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13522 CVE: CVE-2026-23011 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Analog to commit db5b4e39c4e6 ("ip6_gre: make ip6gre_header() robust") Over the years, syzbot found many ways to crash the kernel in ipgre_header() [1]. This involves team or bonding drivers ability to dynamically change their dev->needed_headroom and/or dev->hard_header_len In this particular crash mld_newpack() allocated an skb with a too small reserve/headroom, and by the time mld_sendpack() was called, syzbot managed to attach an ipgre device. [1] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff89ea3cb7 len:2030915468 put:2030915372 head:ffff888058b43000 data:ffff887fdfa6e194 tail:0x120 end:0x6c0 dev:team0 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:213 ! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1322 Comm: kworker/1:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x157/0x160 net/core/skbuff.c:213 Call Trace: <TASK> skb_under_panic net/core/skbuff.c:223 [inline] skb_push+0xc3/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:2641 ipgre_header+0x67/0x290 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:897 dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3436 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x286/0x460 net/core/neighbour.c:1618 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:307 [inline] ip6_output+0x340/0x550 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247 NF_HOOK+0x9e/0x380 include/linux/netfilter.h:318 mld_sendpack+0x8d4/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1855 mld_send_cr net/ipv6/mcast.c:2154 [inline] mld_ifc_work+0x83e/0xd60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2693 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340 worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 Fixes: c54419321455 ("GRE: Refactor GRE tunneling code.") Reported-by: syzbot+7c134e1c3aa3283790b9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg1147302.html Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108190214.1667040-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c index f261e29adc7c..75d388dd5ac6 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c @@ -860,10 +860,17 @@ static int ipgre_header(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev, const void *daddr, const void *saddr, unsigned int len) { struct ip_tunnel *t = netdev_priv(dev); - struct iphdr *iph; struct gre_base_hdr *greh; + struct iphdr *iph; + int needed; + + needed = t->hlen + sizeof(*iph); + if (skb_headroom(skb) < needed && + pskb_expand_head(skb, HH_DATA_ALIGN(needed - skb_headroom(skb)), + 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) + return -needed; - iph = skb_push(skb, t->hlen + sizeof(*iph)); + iph = skb_push(skb, needed); greh = (struct gre_base_hdr *)(iph+1); greh->flags = gre_tnl_flags_to_gre_flags(t->parms.o_flags); greh->protocol = htons(type); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: fix memory leak in skb_segment_list for GRO packets
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Mohammad Heib <mheib(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 88bea149db2057112af3aaf63534b24fab5858ab category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13488 CVE: CVE-2026-22979 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 238e03d0466239410b72294b79494e43d4fabe77 ] When skb_segment_list() is called during packet forwarding, it handles packets that were aggregated by the GRO engine. Historically, the segmentation logic in skb_segment_list assumes that individual segments are split from a parent SKB and may need to carry their own socket memory accounting. Accordingly, the code transfers truesize from the parent to the newly created segments. Prior to commit ed4cccef64c1 ("gro: fix ownership transfer"), this truesize subtraction in skb_segment_list() was valid because fragments still carry a reference to the original socket. However, commit ed4cccef64c1 ("gro: fix ownership transfer") changed this behavior by ensuring that fraglist entries are explicitly orphaned (skb->sk = NULL) to prevent illegal orphaning later in the stack. This change meant that the entire socket memory charge remained with the head SKB, but the corresponding accounting logic in skb_segment_list() was never updated. As a result, the current code unconditionally adds each fragment's truesize to delta_truesize and subtracts it from the parent SKB. Since the fragments are no longer charged to the socket, this subtraction results in an effective under-count of memory when the head is freed. This causes sk_wmem_alloc to remain non-zero, preventing socket destruction and leading to a persistent memory leak. The leak can be observed via KMEMLEAK when tearing down the networking environment: unreferenced object 0xffff8881e6eb9100 (size 2048): comm "ping", pid 6720, jiffies 4295492526 backtrace: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x5c6/0x800 sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220 sk_alloc+0x35/0xa00 inet6_create.part.0+0x303/0x10d0 __sock_create+0x248/0x640 __sys_socket+0x11b/0x1d0 Since skb_segment_list() is exclusively used for SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST packets constructed by GRO, the truesize adjustment is removed. The call to skb_release_head_state() must be preserved. As documented in commit cf673ed0e057 ("net: fix fraglist segmentation reference count leak"), it is still required to correctly drop references to SKB extensions that may be overwritten during __copy_skb_header(). Fixes: ed4cccef64c1 ("gro: fix ownership transfer") Signed-off-by: Mohammad Heib <mheib(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260104213101.352887-1-mheib@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skbuff.c | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index ea5e9d46d4c4..b115544fde66 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -4348,12 +4348,14 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment_list(struct sk_buff *skb, { struct sk_buff *list_skb = skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list; unsigned int tnl_hlen = skb_tnl_header_len(skb); - unsigned int delta_truesize = 0; unsigned int delta_len = 0; struct sk_buff *tail = NULL; struct sk_buff *nskb, *tmp; int len_diff, err; + /* Only skb_gro_receive_list generated skbs arrive here */ + DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!(skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST)); + skb_push(skb, -skb_network_offset(skb) + offset); /* Ensure the head is writeable before touching the shared info */ @@ -4367,8 +4369,9 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment_list(struct sk_buff *skb, nskb = list_skb; list_skb = list_skb->next; + DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(nskb->sk); + err = 0; - delta_truesize += nskb->truesize; if (skb_shared(nskb)) { tmp = skb_clone(nskb, GFP_ATOMIC); if (tmp) { @@ -4411,7 +4414,6 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment_list(struct sk_buff *skb, goto err_linearize; } - skb->truesize = skb->truesize - delta_truesize; skb->data_len = skb->data_len - delta_len; skb->len = skb->len - delta_len; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.121 commit 582a5e922a9652fcbb7d0165c95d5b20aa37575d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13464 CVE: CVE-2026-22977 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2a71a1a8d0ed718b1c7a9ac61f07e5755c47ae20 ] skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region, [1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field. [2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg(). The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone() (from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1] 2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone [3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) 5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb [4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no usercopy whitelist [5] When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation: [ 5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)! [ 5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7 [ 5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 [ 5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490 [ 5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0 [ 5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00 [ 5.384903] FS: 0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5.384903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 5.384903] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5.384903] Call Trace: [ 5.384903] <TASK> [ 5.384903] __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0 [ 5.384903] __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690 [ 5.384903] put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0 [ 5.384903] sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380 [ 5.384903] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? schedule+0x6d/0x270 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones: - sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 - offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 = 272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee) This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure. [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885 [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104 [3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566 [4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491 [5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719 Fixes: 6d07d1cd300f ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0") Reported-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251223203534.1392218-2-bestswngs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/sock.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index b5a2fea5237e..d5175f9e515b 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -3655,7 +3655,7 @@ void sock_enable_timestamp(struct sock *sk, enum sock_flags flag) int sock_recv_errqueue(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, int level, int type) { - struct sock_exterr_skb *serr; + struct sock_extended_err ee; struct sk_buff *skb; int copied, err; @@ -3675,8 +3675,9 @@ int sock_recv_errqueue(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len, sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb); - serr = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb); - put_cmsg(msg, level, type, sizeof(serr->ee), &serr->ee); + /* We must use a bounce buffer for CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y */ + ee = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb)->ee; + put_cmsg(msg, level, type, sizeof(ee), &ee); msg->msg_flags |= MSG_ERRQUEUE; err = copied; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ipv4: Fix reference count leak when using error routes with nexthop objects
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 5979338c83012110ccd45cae6517591770bfe536 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13408 CVE: CVE-2025-71097 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ac782f4e3bfcde145b8a7f8af31d9422d94d172a ] When a nexthop object is deleted, it is marked as dead and then fib_table_flush() is called to flush all the routes that are using the dead nexthop. The current logic in fib_table_flush() is to only flush error routes (e.g., blackhole) when it is called as part of network namespace dismantle (i.e., with flush_all=true). Therefore, error routes are not flushed when their nexthop object is deleted: # ip link add name dummy1 up type dummy # ip nexthop add id 1 dev dummy1 # ip route add 198.51.100.1/32 nhid 1 # ip route add blackhole 198.51.100.2/32 nhid 1 # ip nexthop del id 1 # ip route show blackhole 198.51.100.2 nhid 1 dev dummy1 As such, they keep holding a reference on the nexthop object which in turn holds a reference on the nexthop device, resulting in a reference count leak: # ip link del dev dummy1 [ 70.516258] unregister_netdevice: waiting for dummy1 to become free. Usage count = 2 Fix by flushing error routes when their nexthop is marked as dead. IPv6 does not suffer from this problem. Fixes: 493ced1ac47c ("ipv4: Allow routes to use nexthop objects") Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/d943f806-4da6-4970-ac28-b9373b0e63ac@I-love.… Reported-by: syzbot+881d65229ca4f9ae8c84(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251221144829.197694-1-idosch@nvidia.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/fib_trie.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c index fa54b36b241a..4d148d089232 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c +++ b/net/ipv4/fib_trie.c @@ -2059,10 +2059,11 @@ int fib_table_flush(struct net *net, struct fib_table *tb, bool flush_all) continue; } - /* Do not flush error routes if network namespace is - * not being dismantled + /* When not flushing the entire table, skip error + * routes that are not marked for deletion. */ - if (!flush_all && fib_props[fa->fa_type].error) { + if (!flush_all && fib_props[fa->fa_type].error && + !(fi->fib_flags & RTNH_F_DEAD)) { slen = fa->fa_slen; continue; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: avoid NULL deref on zero length gss_token in gss_read_proxy_verf
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc3 commit d4b69a6186b215d2dc1ebcab965ed88e8d41768d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13435 CVE: CVE-2025-71120 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A zero length gss_token results in pages == 0 and in_token->pages[0] is NULL. The code unconditionally evaluates page_address(in_token->pages[0]) for the initial memcpy, which can dereference NULL even when the copy length is 0. Guard the first memcpy so it only runs when length > 0. Fixes: 5866efa8cbfb ("SUNRPC: Fix svcauth_gss_proxy_init()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index d063b63516f8..49a8623cc1d5 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -1093,7 +1093,8 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, } length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, (char *)xdr->end - (char *)xdr->p); - memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), xdr->p, length); + if (length) + memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), xdr->p, length); inlen -= length; to_offs = length; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/i915/gem: Zero-initialize the eb.vma array in i915_gem_do_execbuffer
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Krzysztof Niemiec <krzysztof.niemiec(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 0336188cc85d0eab8463bd1bbd4ded4e9602de8b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13444 CVE: CVE-2025-71130 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4fe2bd195435e71c117983d87f278112c5ab364c upstream. Initialize the eb.vma array with values of 0 when the eb structure is first set up. In particular, this sets the eb->vma[i].vma pointers to NULL, simplifying cleanup and getting rid of the bug described below. During the execution of eb_lookup_vmas(), the eb->vma array is successively filled up with struct eb_vma objects. This process includes calling eb_add_vma(), which might fail; however, even in the event of failure, eb->vma[i].vma is set for the currently processed buffer. If eb_add_vma() fails, eb_lookup_vmas() returns with an error, which prompts a call to eb_release_vmas() to clean up the mess. Since eb_lookup_vmas() might fail during processing any (possibly not first) buffer, eb_release_vmas() checks whether a buffer's vma is NULL to know at what point did the lookup function fail. In eb_lookup_vmas(), eb->vma[i].vma is set to NULL if either the helper function eb_lookup_vma() or eb_validate_vma() fails. eb->vma[i+1].vma is set to NULL in case i915_gem_object_userptr_submit_init() fails; the current one needs to be cleaned up by eb_release_vmas() at this point, so the next one is set. If eb_add_vma() fails, neither the current nor the next vma is set to NULL, which is a source of a NULL deref bug described in the issue linked in the Closes tag. When entering eb_lookup_vmas(), the vma pointers are set to the slab poison value, instead of NULL. This doesn't matter for the actual lookup, since it gets overwritten anyway, however the eb_release_vmas() function only recognizes NULL as the stopping value, hence the pointers are being set to NULL as they go in case of intermediate failure. This patch changes the approach to filling them all with NULL at the start instead, rather than handling that manually during failure. Reported-by: Gangmin Kim <km.kim1503(a)gmail.com> Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/15062 Fixes: 544460c33821 ("drm/i915: Multi-BB execbuf") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # 5.16.x Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Niemiec <krzysztof.niemiec(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <janusz.krzysztofik(a)linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <krzysztof.karas(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251216180900.54294-2-krzysztof.niemiec@intel.com (cherry picked from commit 08889b706d4f0b8d2352b7ca29c2d8df4d0787cd) Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- .../gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c | 37 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c index 5a687a3686bd..e208cc8c2ac1 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_execbuffer.c @@ -950,13 +950,13 @@ static int eb_lookup_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb) vma = eb_lookup_vma(eb, eb->exec[i].handle); if (IS_ERR(vma)) { err = PTR_ERR(vma); - goto err; + return err; } err = eb_validate_vma(eb, &eb->exec[i], vma); if (unlikely(err)) { i915_vma_put(vma); - goto err; + return err; } err = eb_add_vma(eb, &current_batch, i, vma); @@ -965,19 +965,8 @@ static int eb_lookup_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb) if (i915_gem_object_is_userptr(vma->obj)) { err = i915_gem_object_userptr_submit_init(vma->obj); - if (err) { - if (i + 1 < eb->buffer_count) { - /* - * Execbuffer code expects last vma entry to be NULL, - * since we already initialized this entry, - * set the next value to NULL or we mess up - * cleanup handling. - */ - eb->vma[i + 1].vma = NULL; - } - + if (err) return err; - } eb->vma[i].flags |= __EXEC_OBJECT_USERPTR_INIT; eb->args->flags |= __EXEC_USERPTR_USED; @@ -985,10 +974,6 @@ static int eb_lookup_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb) } return 0; - -err: - eb->vma[i].vma = NULL; - return err; } static int eb_lock_vmas(struct i915_execbuffer *eb) @@ -3381,7 +3366,8 @@ i915_gem_do_execbuffer(struct drm_device *dev, eb.exec = exec; eb.vma = (struct eb_vma *)(exec + args->buffer_count + 1); - eb.vma[0].vma = NULL; + memset(eb.vma, 0, (args->buffer_count + 1) * sizeof(struct eb_vma)); + eb.batch_pool = NULL; eb.invalid_flags = __EXEC_OBJECT_UNKNOWN_FLAGS; @@ -3590,7 +3576,18 @@ i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl(struct drm_device *dev, void *data, if (err) return err; - /* Allocate extra slots for use by the command parser */ + /* + * Allocate extra slots for use by the command parser. + * + * Note that this allocation handles two different arrays (the + * exec2_list array, and the eventual eb.vma array introduced in + * i915_gem_do_execbuffer()), that reside in virtually contiguous + * memory. Also note that the allocation intentionally doesn't fill the + * area with zeros, because the exec2_list part doesn't need to be, as + * it's immediately overwritten by user data a few lines below. + * However, the eb.vma part is explicitly zeroed later in + * i915_gem_do_execbuffer(). + */ exec2_list = kvmalloc_array(count + 2, eb_element_size(), __GFP_NOWARN | GFP_KERNEL); if (exec2_list == NULL) { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/3] CVE-2025-39981 fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

*** BLURB HERE *** Luiz Augusto von Dentz (1): Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible UAFs Pavel Shpakovskiy (1): Bluetooth: hci_sync: fix set_local_name race condition Roman Smirnov (1): Bluetooth: mgmt: remove NULL check in mgmt_set_connectable_complete() include/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 6 +- net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 261 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c | 46 ++++++ net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h | 3 + 5 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 81 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] pptp: ensure minimal skb length in pptp_xmit()
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit de9c4861fb42f0cd72da844c3c34f692d5895b7b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9204 CVE: CVE-2025-38574 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Commit aabc6596ffb3 ("net: ppp: Add bound checking for skb data on ppp_sync_txmung") fixed ppp_sync_txmunge() We need a similar fix in pptp_xmit(), otherwise we might read uninit data as reported by syzbot. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 pptp_xmit+0xc34/0x2720 drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c:193 ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2290 [inline] ppp_input+0x1d6/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2314 pppoe_rcv_core+0x1e8/0x760 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148 __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213 release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767 pppoe_sendmsg+0x15d/0xcb0 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:904 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x330/0x3d0 net/socket.c:727 ____sys_sendmsg+0x893/0xd80 net/socket.c:2566 ___sys_sendmsg+0x271/0x3b0 net/socket.c:2620 __sys_sendmmsg+0x2d9/0x7c0 net/socket.c:2709 Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+afad90ffc8645324afe5(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/68887d86.a00a0220.b12ec.00cd.GAE@google.com/… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Dawid Osuchowski <dawid.osuchowski(a)linux.intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250729080207.1863408-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c index 05a75b5a8b68..1b306562f916 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ppp/pptp.c @@ -159,9 +159,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) int len; unsigned char *data; __u32 seq_recv; - - - struct rtable *rt; + struct rtable *rt = NULL; struct net_device *tdev; struct iphdr *iph; int max_headroom; @@ -179,16 +177,20 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) if (skb_headroom(skb) < max_headroom || skb_cloned(skb) || skb_shared(skb)) { struct sk_buff *new_skb = skb_realloc_headroom(skb, max_headroom); - if (!new_skb) { - ip_rt_put(rt); + + if (!new_skb) goto tx_error; - } + if (skb->sk) skb_set_owner_w(new_skb, skb->sk); consume_skb(skb); skb = new_skb; } + /* Ensure we can safely access protocol field and LCP code */ + if (!pskb_may_pull(skb, 3)) + goto tx_error; + data = skb->data; islcp = ((data[0] << 8) + data[1]) == PPP_LCP && 1 <= data[2] && data[2] <= 7; @@ -262,6 +264,7 @@ static int pptp_xmit(struct ppp_channel *chan, struct sk_buff *skb) return 1; tx_error: + ip_rt_put(rt); kfree_skb(skb); return 1; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: avoid NULL deref on zero length gss_token in gss_read_proxy_verf
by Li Xiasong 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc3 commit d4b69a6186b215d2dc1ebcab965ed88e8d41768d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13435 CVE: CVE-2025-71120 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A zero length gss_token results in pages == 0 and in_token->pages[0] is NULL. The code unconditionally evaluates page_address(in_token->pages[0]) for the initial memcpy, which can dereference NULL even when the copy length is 0. Guard the first memcpy so it only runs when length > 0. Fixes: 5866efa8cbfb ("SUNRPC: Fix svcauth_gss_proxy_init()") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joshua Rogers <linux(a)joshua.hu> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c [conflicts due to not merge c020fa695af6 ("SUNRPC: Convert server-side GSS upcall helpers to use xdr_stream").] Signed-off-by: Li Xiasong <lixiasong1(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 406ff7f8b156..9cc7221d8693 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -1179,7 +1179,8 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, } length = min_t(unsigned int, inlen, argv->iov_len); - memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), argv->iov_base, length); + if (length) + memcpy(page_address(in_token->pages[0]), argv->iov_base, length); inlen -= length; to_offs = length; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.241 commit f937759c7432d6151b73e1393b6517661813d506 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8987 CVE: CVE-2025-39749 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 90c09d57caeca94e6f3f87c49e96a91edd40cbfd ] On kernels built with CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y, when rcu_read_unlock() is invoked within an interrupts-disabled region of code [1], it will invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(), which uses an irq-work handler to force the system to notice when the RCU read-side critical section actually ends. That end won't happen until interrupts are enabled at the soonest. In some kernels, such as those booted with rcutree.use_softirq=y, the irq-work handler is used unconditionally. The per-CPU rcu_data structure's ->defer_qs_iw_pending field is updated by the irq-work handler and is both read and updated by rcu_read_unlock_special(). This resulted in the following KCSAN splat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler / rcu_read_unlock_special read to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 90 on cpu 8: rcu_read_unlock_special+0x175/0x260 __rcu_read_unlock+0x92/0xa0 rt_spin_unlock+0x9b/0xc0 __local_bh_enable+0x10d/0x170 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfb/0x150 rcu_do_batch+0x595/0xc40 rcu_cpu_kthread+0x4e9/0x830 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 write to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 88 on cpu 8: rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler+0x1e/0x30 irq_work_single+0xaf/0x160 run_irq_workd+0x91/0xc0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 no locks held by irq_work/8/88. irq event stamp: 200272 hardirqs last enabled at (200272): [<ffffffffb0f56121>] finish_task_switch+0x131/0x320 hardirqs last disabled at (200271): [<ffffffffb25c7859>] __schedule+0x129/0xd70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0ee093f>] copy_process+0x4df/0x1cc0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The problem is that irq-work handlers run with interrupts enabled, which means that rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() could be interrupted, and that interrupt handler might contain an RCU read-side critical section, which might invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(). In the strict KCSAN mode of operation used by RCU, this constitutes a data race on the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This commit therefore disables interrupts across the portion of the rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() that updates the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This suffices because this handler is not a fast path. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay (AMD) <neeraj.upadhyay(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h index 87fe7f423b28..8f6afaec70db 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h @@ -585,10 +585,13 @@ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs(struct task_struct *t) */ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler(struct irq_work *iwp) { + unsigned long flags; struct rcu_data *rdp; rdp = container_of(iwp, struct rcu_data, defer_qs_iw); + local_irq_save(flags); rdp->defer_qs_iw_pending = false; + local_irq_restore(flags); } /* -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] rcu: Protect ->defer_qs_iw_pending from data race
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.103 commit b55947b725f190396f475d5d0c59aa855a4d8895 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICXMAN CVE: CVE-2025-39749 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 90c09d57caeca94e6f3f87c49e96a91edd40cbfd ] On kernels built with CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y, when rcu_read_unlock() is invoked within an interrupts-disabled region of code [1], it will invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(), which uses an irq-work handler to force the system to notice when the RCU read-side critical section actually ends. That end won't happen until interrupts are enabled at the soonest. In some kernels, such as those booted with rcutree.use_softirq=y, the irq-work handler is used unconditionally. The per-CPU rcu_data structure's ->defer_qs_iw_pending field is updated by the irq-work handler and is both read and updated by rcu_read_unlock_special(). This resulted in the following KCSAN splat: ------------------------------------------------------------------------ BUG: KCSAN: data-race in rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler / rcu_read_unlock_special read to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 90 on cpu 8: rcu_read_unlock_special+0x175/0x260 __rcu_read_unlock+0x92/0xa0 rt_spin_unlock+0x9b/0xc0 __local_bh_enable+0x10d/0x170 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xfb/0x150 rcu_do_batch+0x595/0xc40 rcu_cpu_kthread+0x4e9/0x830 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 write to 0xffff96b95f42d8d8 of 1 bytes by task 88 on cpu 8: rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler+0x1e/0x30 irq_work_single+0xaf/0x160 run_irq_workd+0x91/0xc0 smpboot_thread_fn+0x24d/0x3b0 kthread+0x3bd/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 no locks held by irq_work/8/88. irq event stamp: 200272 hardirqs last enabled at (200272): [<ffffffffb0f56121>] finish_task_switch+0x131/0x320 hardirqs last disabled at (200271): [<ffffffffb25c7859>] __schedule+0x129/0xd70 softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb0ee093f>] copy_process+0x4df/0x1cc0 softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ The problem is that irq-work handlers run with interrupts enabled, which means that rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() could be interrupted, and that interrupt handler might contain an RCU read-side critical section, which might invoke rcu_read_unlock_special(). In the strict KCSAN mode of operation used by RCU, this constitutes a data race on the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This commit therefore disables interrupts across the portion of the rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler() that updates the ->defer_qs_iw_pending field. This suffices because this handler is not a fast path. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay (AMD) <neeraj.upadhyay(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h index 94b715139f52..de727f2568bf 100644 --- a/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h @@ -612,10 +612,13 @@ notrace void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs(struct task_struct *t) */ static void rcu_preempt_deferred_qs_handler(struct irq_work *iwp) { + unsigned long flags; struct rcu_data *rdp; rdp = container_of(iwp, struct rcu_data, defer_qs_iw); + local_irq_save(flags); rdp->defer_qs_iw_pending = false; + local_irq_restore(flags); } /* -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] fbdev: Fix vmalloc out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit
by Jiacheng Yu 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Sravan Kumar Gundu <sravankumarlpu(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit af0db3c1f898144846d4c172531a199bb3ca375d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9085 CVE: CVE-2025-38685 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This issue triggers when a userspace program does an ioctl FBIOPUT_CON2FBMAP by passing console number and frame buffer number. Ideally this maps console to frame buffer and updates the screen if console is visible. As part of mapping it has to do resize of console according to frame buffer info. if this resize fails and returns from vc_do_resize() and continues further. At this point console and new frame buffer are mapped and sets display vars. Despite failure still it continue to proceed updating the screen at later stages where vc_data is related to previous frame buffer and frame buffer info and display vars are mapped to new frame buffer and eventully leading to out-of-bounds write in fast_imageblit(). This bheviour is excepted only when fg_console is equal to requested console which is a visible console and updates screen with invalid struct references in fbcon_putcs(). Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+c4b7aa0513823e2ea880(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c4b7aa0513823e2ea880 Signed-off-by: Sravan Kumar Gundu <sravankumarlpu(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller(a)gmx.de> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c index 9757276e8182..5a38f3de4ad8 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c @@ -810,7 +810,8 @@ static void con2fb_init_display(struct vc_data *vc, struct fb_info *info, fg_vc->vc_rows); } - update_screen(vc_cons[fg_console].d); + if (fg_console != unit) + update_screen(vc_cons[fg_console].d); } /** @@ -1355,6 +1356,7 @@ static void fbcon_set_disp(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, struct vc_data *svc; struct fbcon_ops *ops = info->fbcon_par; int rows, cols; + unsigned long ret = 0; p = &fb_display[unit]; @@ -1405,11 +1407,10 @@ static void fbcon_set_disp(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var, rows = FBCON_SWAP(ops->rotate, info->var.yres, info->var.xres); cols /= vc->vc_font.width; rows /= vc->vc_font.height; - vc_resize(vc, cols, rows); + ret = vc_resize(vc, cols, rows); - if (con_is_visible(vc)) { + if (con_is_visible(vc) && !ret) update_screen(vc); - } } static __inline__ void ywrap_up(struct vc_data *vc, int count) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi-break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] scsi/hiraid: Support New Raid feature
by LinKun 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8290 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Set single hw queue as default Add stream detect Signed-off-by: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h | 35 ++ drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c | 483 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h index 04b2e25..17858dc 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ #ifndef __HIRAID_H_ #define __HIRAID_H_ +#include <linux/mutex.h> + #define HIRAID_HDD_PD_QD 64 #define HIRAID_HDD_VD_QD 256 #define HIRAID_SSD_PD_QD 64 @@ -760,5 +762,38 @@ struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata { u16 pend_count; }; +enum stream_type { + TYPE_TOTAL, + TYPE_WRITE, + TYPE_READ, + TYPE_CLEAN, + TYPE_BOTTOM +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S { + /* recog-window */ + u64 stream_lba; + u32 stream_len; + u16 did; + u16 type; + /* aging ctrl */ + int aging_credit; + int aging_grade; + u16 stream_id; + u16 using; +}; + +struct IO_LIST_S { + struct list_head list; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; + struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue; + unsigned int sector_size; +}; + +struct mutex_list_head_s { + struct list_head list; + struct mutex lock; +}; + #endif diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c index 2f33339..2deadba 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ #include <scsi/scsi_transport.h> #include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h> #include <scsi/sg.h> +#include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/prio.h> #include "hiraid.h" @@ -54,9 +58,7 @@ static bool max_io_force; module_param(max_io_force, bool, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_io_force, "force max_hw_sectors_kb = 1024, default false(performance first)"); -static bool work_mode; -module_param(work_mode, bool, 0444); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(work_mode, "work mode switch, default false for multi hw queues"); +static bool work_mode = true; #define MAX_IO_QUEUES 128 #define MIN_IO_QUEUES 1 @@ -152,7 +154,7 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) -#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.1" +#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.2" #define ADMIN_TIMEOUT (admin_tmout * HZ) #define USRCMD_TIMEOUT (180 * HZ) @@ -169,6 +171,15 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; #define MAX_CAN_QUEUE (4096 - 1) #define MIN_CAN_QUEUE (1024 - 1) +#define MAX_DECREASE_GRADE (-8) +#define MAX_INCREASE_GRADE 8 +#define INC_GRADE 1 +#define MIN_CREDIT 0 +#define MAX_CREDIT 64 +#define CREDIT_THRES 32 +#define MIN(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define MAX(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + enum SENSE_STATE_CODE { SENSE_STATE_OK = 0, SENSE_STATE_NEED_CHECK, @@ -749,6 +760,400 @@ static int hiraid_build_sgl(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd * return 0; } +#define MAX_PD_NUM (40 + 1) +#define MAX_STREAM_NUM 8 +#define PER_MB (1024 * 1024) +#define MAX_IO_NUM (200 * PER_MB) +#define STREAM_LEN (4 * PER_MB) +#define MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE 100 +#define IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT 100 +#define MAX_AGING_NUM 100 + +#define MIN_IO_SEND_TIME 10 +#define MAX_IO_SEND_TIME 50 + +enum io_operation_type { + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO = 1, + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST, + TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S stream_array[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +struct mutex_list_head_s io_heads_per_stream[MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM]; +spinlock_t stream_array_lock; +DEFINE_MUTEX(g_stream_operation_mutex); + +u64 g_io_transport_num[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM][TYPE_BOTTOM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_count = 1; + +void hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id, u16 nlb) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] += nlb; +} + +void hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] = 0; +} + +void hiraid_inc_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]++; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +void hiraid_dec_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + if (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] > 0) + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]--; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +static bool hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(u16 disk_id) +{ + bool exceed_flag; + + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + exceed_flag = (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] >= MAX_STREAM_NUM); + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); + return exceed_flag; +} + +static u16 hiraid_get_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + return g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]; +} + +static inline struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_get_stream(u16 disk_id, + u16 stream_id) +{ + return &stream_array[disk_id][stream_id]; +} + +static inline struct mutex_list_head_s *hiraid_get_io_head(u16 disk_id) +{ + return &(io_heads_per_stream[disk_id]); +} + +static bool hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(const struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream) +{ + return (stream->aging_credit >= CREDIT_THRES) ? true : false; +} + +void hiraid_io_recognition_init(void) +{ + u16 i; + + spin_lock_init(&stream_array_lock); + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); + mutex_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->lock); + } +} + +static void hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream, + int direction) +{ + stream->aging_grade = stream->aging_grade + direction * INC_GRADE; + stream->aging_grade = MAX(stream->aging_grade, MAX_DECREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_grade = MIN(stream->aging_grade, MAX_INCREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_credit = stream->aging_credit + stream->aging_grade; + stream->aging_credit = MAX(stream->aging_credit, MIN_CREDIT); + stream->aging_credit = MIN(stream->aging_credit, MAX_CREDIT); +} + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_io_pick_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *first_hit_stream = NULL; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + u16 pick_flag = 0; + u8 i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_stream = &stream_array[actual_id][i]; + temp_stream->stream_id = i; + if (req->slba < temp_stream->stream_lba || + req->slba >= temp_stream->stream_lba + + temp_stream->stream_len || + temp_stream->type != type) { + continue; + } + if (!pick_flag) { + temp_stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + first_hit_stream = temp_stream; + pick_flag = 1; + continue; + } + hiraid_dec_stream_num(actual_id); + memset(temp_stream, 0, + sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 去重影 + } + return first_hit_stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_init_flow_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + int i; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + stream = hiraid_get_stream(actual_id, i); + if (!stream->using) { + stream->using = 1; + stream->stream_id = i; + break; + } + } + stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + stream->did = actual_id; + stream->type = type; + stream->aging_credit = 0; + stream->aging_grade = 0; + stream->stream_len = STREAM_LEN; + return stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_stream_detect(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *io_cmd, u16 actual_id) +{ + u16 type = io_cmd->opcode == HIRAID_CMD_WRITE ? TYPE_WRITE : TYPE_READ; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = hiraid_io_pick_stream(io_cmd, type, + actual_id); + + if (stream != NULL) { /* 可以命中一个stream */ + return stream; + } + + if (hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(actual_id)) + return NULL; + stream = hiraid_init_flow_stream(io_cmd, type, actual_id); + hiraid_inc_stream_num(actual_id); + return stream; +} + +u64 g_io_last_pull_time[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + +static u16 hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(u16 did, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u64 temp_num, i; + static u16 stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + + if (g_io_last_pull_time[did] == 0) + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_num = g_io_transport_num[did][i]; + if (temp_num != 0) { + if ((temp_num < MAX_IO_NUM) && + ((jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies) - g_io_last_pull_time[did]) + < IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT)) { + stream_num[did] = i; + return i; + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(did, i); + stream_num[did] = ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + return ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + } + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + return ((stream_num[did]++) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_stream(u16 hdid, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct list_head temp_header; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd = {0}; + u16 submit_stream_id; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + u16 count = 0; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_header); + submit_stream_id = hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(hdid, hdev); + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(hdid * MAX_STREAM_NUM + submit_stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + list_del(node); + list_add_tail(node, &temp_header); + if (++count >= MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE) + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &temp_header) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = temp_io_stream->io_cmd; + hiraid_submit_cmd(temp_io_stream->submit_queue, &io_cmd); + hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(hdid, submit_stream_id, + io_cmd.rw.nlb * temp_io_stream->sector_size); + list_del(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + } + temp_io_stream = NULL; + list_del_init(&temp_header); +} + +static u8 hiraid_detect_if_aging(void) +{ + if (++g_io_count == MAX_AGING_NUM) { + g_io_count = 0; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void hiraid_aging(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + int i = 0; + int j = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + temp_stream = hiraid_get_stream(i, j); + if (temp_stream->using) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(temp_stream, -1); + if (temp_stream->aging_credit <= 0) { + hiraid_dec_stream_num(i); + memset(temp_stream, + 0, sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 老化 + } + } + } + } +} + +static u8 hiraid_io_list_operation(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq, u8 operation) +{ + int i, j; + + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd = NULL; + struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + + u8 max_hd_num = operation == TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST ? + MAX_PD_NUM : hdid + 1; + for (i = hdid; i < max_hd_num; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(i * MAX_STREAM_NUM + j); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, + struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = &(temp_io_stream->io_cmd); + hiraidq = temp_io_stream->submit_queue; + if (operation >= TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST) { + list_del_init(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + temp_io_stream = NULL; + } else { + if ((io_cmd->rw.cmd_id == cid) && + (hiraidq->qid == hwq)) { + list_del_init(node); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + return 1; + } + } + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static u8 hiraid_check_io_list(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, cid, hwq, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(u32 hdid) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_all_io_list(void) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(0, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_add_io_to_list(struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue, + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stream, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd, + unsigned int sector_size, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *new_io_node = NULL; + + new_io_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct IO_LIST_S), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_io_node) + return 0; + new_io_node->io_cmd = io_cmd; + new_io_node->submit_queue = submit_queue; + new_io_node->sector_size = sector_size; + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(actual_id * + MAX_STREAM_NUM + tmp_stream->stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(new_io_node->list)); + list_add_tail(&(new_io_node->list), &io_slist->list); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + return 1; +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_threading(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + int i = 0; + + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) + hiraid_submit_io_stream(i, hdev); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + usleep_range(MIN_IO_SEND_TIME, MAX_IO_SEND_TIME); + } +} + +static void hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u16 i; + + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) + list_del_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); +} + +struct task_struct *g_hiraid_submit_task; +static void hiraid_init_io_stream(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + hiraid_io_recognition_init(); + g_hiraid_submit_task = kthread_run((void *)hiraid_submit_io_threading, + hdev, "hiraid_submit_thread"); +} + #define HIRAID_RW_FUA BIT(14) #define RW_LENGTH_ZERO (67) @@ -871,6 +1276,30 @@ static int hiraid_setup_nonrw_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, return 0; } +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + static int hiraid_setup_io_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd, struct hiraid_mapmange *mapbuf) @@ -1025,6 +1454,7 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; struct hiraid_queue *ioq; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stm = NULL; u16 hwq, cid; int ret; @@ -1092,6 +1522,23 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) } WRITE_ONCE(mapbuf->state, CMD_FLIGHT); + + if (hiraid_is_rw_scmd(scmd) && + hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(hostdata->attr)) { + if (hiraid_detect_if_aging()) + hiraid_aging(hdev); + tmp_stm = hiraid_stream_detect(hdev, &(io_cmd.rw), sdev->id); + if (tmp_stm != NULL) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(tmp_stm, 1); + if (hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(tmp_stm) && + (hiraid_get_stream_num(sdev->id) > 1)) { + if (hiraid_add_io_to_list(ioq, + tmp_stm, io_cmd, sdev->sector_size, sdev->id)) { + return 0; + } + } + } + } hiraid_submit_cmd(ioq, &io_cmd); return 0; @@ -1141,19 +1588,6 @@ static int hiraid_disk_qd(u8 attr) } } -static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) -{ - switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: - return true; - default: - return false; - } -} - static int hiraid_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev) { struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; @@ -1939,6 +2373,7 @@ static int hiraid_create_queue(struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq, u16 qid) hiraidq->cq_vector = cq_vector; ret = pci_request_irq(hdev->pdev, cq_vector, hiraid_handle_irq, NULL, hiraidq, "hiraid%d_q%d", hdev->instance, qid); + if (ret) { hiraidq->cq_vector = -1; dev_err(hdev->dev, "request queue[%d] irq failed\n", qid); @@ -3232,6 +3667,12 @@ static int hiraid_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) cid = mapbuf->cid; hwq = mapbuf->hiraidq->qid; + if (hiraid_check_io_list(hostdata->hdid, cid, hwq)) { + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "find cid[%d] qid[%d] in host, abort succ\n", + cid, hwq); + return SUCCESS; + } + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "cid[%d] qid[%d] timeout, send abort\n", cid, hwq); ret = hiraid_send_abort_cmd(hdev, hostdata->hdid, hwq, cid); if (ret != -ETIME) { @@ -3263,6 +3704,7 @@ static int hiraid_scsi_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd, enum hiraid_rst_type rst) ret = hiraid_send_reset_cmd(hdev, rst, hostdata->hdid); if ((ret == 0) || (ret == FW_EH_DEV_NONE && rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET)) { if (rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET) { + hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(hostdata->hdid); ret = wait_tgt_reset_io_done(scmd); if (ret) { dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] target has %d peding cmd, target reset failed\n", @@ -3300,6 +3742,7 @@ static int hiraid_host_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] send host reset\n", scmd->device->channel, scmd->device->id); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); if (hiraid_reset_work_sync(hdev) == -EBUSY) flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); @@ -3333,6 +3776,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t hiraid_pci_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, scsi_block_requests(hdev->shost); hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_RESETTING); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); return PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET; case pci_channel_io_perm_failure: @@ -3906,6 +4350,7 @@ static int hiraid_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) goto unregist_bsg; scsi_scan_host(hdev->shost); + hiraid_init_io_stream(hdev); return 0; @@ -3937,6 +4382,10 @@ static void hiraid_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) dev_info(hdev->dev, "enter hiraid remove\n"); + kthread_stop(g_hiraid_submit_task); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); + hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(hdev); + hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_DELETING); flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); -- 2.45.1.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] scsi/hiraid: Support New Raid feature
by LinKun 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> driver inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8291 CVE: NA -------------------------------- Set single hw queue as default Add stream detect Signed-off-by: 岳智超 <yuezhichao1(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h | 35 ++ drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c | 485 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 501 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h index 1ebc3dd..cb90d3d 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid.h @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ #ifndef __HIRAID_H_ #define __HIRAID_H_ +#include <linux/mutex.h> + #define HIRAID_HDD_PD_QD 64 #define HIRAID_HDD_VD_QD 256 #define HIRAID_SSD_PD_QD 64 @@ -756,5 +758,38 @@ struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata { u16 pend_count; }; +enum stream_type { + TYPE_TOTAL, + TYPE_WRITE, + TYPE_READ, + TYPE_CLEAN, + TYPE_BOTTOM +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S { + /* recog-window */ + u64 stream_lba; + u32 stream_len; + u16 did; + u16 type; + /* aging ctrl */ + int aging_credit; + int aging_grade; + u16 stream_id; + u16 using; +}; + +struct IO_LIST_S { + struct list_head list; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; + struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue; + unsigned int sector_size; +}; + +struct mutex_list_head_s { + struct list_head list; + struct mutex lock; +}; + #endif diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c index f84182f..cdba466 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/hisi_raid/hiraid_main.c @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ #include <scsi/scsi_transport.h> #include <scsi/scsi_dbg.h> #include <scsi/sg.h> +#include <linux/kthread.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/sched/prio.h> #include "hiraid.h" @@ -54,9 +58,7 @@ static bool max_io_force; module_param(max_io_force, bool, 0644); MODULE_PARM_DESC(max_io_force, "force max_hw_sectors_kb = 1024, default false(performance first)"); -static bool work_mode; -module_param(work_mode, bool, 0444); -MODULE_PARM_DESC(work_mode, "work mode switch, default false for multi hw queues"); +static bool work_mode = true; #define MAX_IO_QUEUES 128 #define MIN_IO_QUEUES 1 @@ -153,7 +155,7 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) -#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.0" +#define HIRAID_DRV_VERSION "1.1.0.1" #define ADMIN_TIMEOUT (admin_tmout * HZ) #define USRCMD_TIMEOUT (180 * HZ) @@ -170,6 +172,15 @@ static struct workqueue_struct *work_queue; #define MAX_CAN_QUEUE (4096 - 1) #define MIN_CAN_QUEUE (1024 - 1) +#define MAX_DECREASE_GRADE (-8) +#define MAX_INCREASE_GRADE 8 +#define INC_GRADE 1 +#define MIN_CREDIT 0 +#define MAX_CREDIT 64 +#define CREDIT_THRES 32 +#define MIN(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) +#define MAX(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + enum SENSE_STATE_CODE { SENSE_STATE_OK = 0, SENSE_STATE_NEED_CHECK, @@ -765,6 +776,400 @@ static int hiraid_build_sgl(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, return 0; } +#define MAX_PD_NUM (40 + 1) +#define MAX_STREAM_NUM 8 +#define PER_MB (1024 * 1024) +#define MAX_IO_NUM (200 * PER_MB) +#define STREAM_LEN (4 * PER_MB) +#define MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE 100 +#define IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT 100 +#define MAX_AGING_NUM 100 + +#define MIN_IO_SEND_TIME 10 +#define MAX_IO_SEND_TIME 50 + +enum io_operation_type { + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO = 1, + TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST, + TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST +}; + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S stream_array[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +struct mutex_list_head_s io_heads_per_stream[MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM]; +spinlock_t stream_array_lock; +DEFINE_MUTEX(g_stream_operation_mutex); + +u64 g_io_transport_num[MAX_PD_NUM][MAX_STREAM_NUM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM][TYPE_BOTTOM] = {0}; +u16 g_io_count = 1; + +void hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id, u16 nlb) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] += nlb; +} + +void hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(u16 disk_id, u16 streamd_id) +{ + g_io_transport_num[disk_id][streamd_id] = 0; +} + +void hiraid_inc_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]++; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +void hiraid_dec_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + if (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] > 0) + g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]--; + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); +} + +static bool hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(u16 disk_id) +{ + bool exceed_flag; + + spin_lock(&stream_array_lock); + exceed_flag = (g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL] >= MAX_STREAM_NUM); + spin_unlock(&stream_array_lock); + return exceed_flag; +} + +static u16 hiraid_get_stream_num(u16 disk_id) +{ + return g_io_stream_num[disk_id][TYPE_TOTAL]; +} + +static inline struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_get_stream(u16 disk_id, + u16 stream_id) +{ + return &stream_array[disk_id][stream_id]; +} + +static inline struct mutex_list_head_s *hiraid_get_io_head(u16 disk_id) +{ + return &(io_heads_per_stream[disk_id]); +} + +static bool hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(const struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream) +{ + return (stream->aging_credit >= CREDIT_THRES) ? true : false; +} + +void hiraid_io_recognition_init(void) +{ + u16 i; + + spin_lock_init(&stream_array_lock); + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) { + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); + mutex_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->lock); + } +} + +static void hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream, + int direction) +{ + stream->aging_grade = stream->aging_grade + direction * INC_GRADE; + stream->aging_grade = MAX(stream->aging_grade, MAX_DECREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_grade = MIN(stream->aging_grade, MAX_INCREASE_GRADE); + stream->aging_credit = stream->aging_credit + stream->aging_grade; + stream->aging_credit = MAX(stream->aging_credit, MIN_CREDIT); + stream->aging_credit = MIN(stream->aging_credit, MAX_CREDIT); +} + +struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_io_pick_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *first_hit_stream = NULL; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + u16 pick_flag = 0; + u8 i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_stream = &stream_array[actual_id][i]; + temp_stream->stream_id = i; + if (req->slba < temp_stream->stream_lba || + req->slba >= temp_stream->stream_lba + + temp_stream->stream_len || + temp_stream->type != type) { + continue; + } + if (!pick_flag) { + temp_stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + first_hit_stream = temp_stream; + pick_flag = 1; + continue; + } + hiraid_dec_stream_num(actual_id); + memset(temp_stream, 0, + sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 去重影 + } + return first_hit_stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_init_flow_stream( + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *req, u16 type, u16 actual_id) +{ + int i; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = NULL; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + stream = hiraid_get_stream(actual_id, i); + if (!stream->using) { + stream->using = 1; + stream->stream_id = i; + break; + } + } + stream->stream_lba = req->slba; + stream->did = actual_id; + stream->type = type; + stream->aging_credit = 0; + stream->aging_grade = 0; + stream->stream_len = STREAM_LEN; + return stream; +} + +static struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *hiraid_stream_detect(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, + struct hiraid_scsi_rw_cmd *io_cmd, u16 actual_id) +{ + u16 type = io_cmd->opcode == HIRAID_CMD_WRITE ? TYPE_WRITE : TYPE_READ; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *stream = hiraid_io_pick_stream(io_cmd, type, + actual_id); + + if (stream != NULL) { /* 可以命中一个stream */ + return stream; + } + + if (hiraid_io_recog_check_stream_exceed(actual_id)) + return NULL; + stream = hiraid_init_flow_stream(io_cmd, type, actual_id); + hiraid_inc_stream_num(actual_id); + return stream; +} + +u64 g_io_last_pull_time[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + +static u16 hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(u16 did, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u64 temp_num, i; + static u16 stream_num[MAX_PD_NUM] = {0}; + + if (g_io_last_pull_time[did] == 0) + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_STREAM_NUM; i++) { + temp_num = g_io_transport_num[did][i]; + if (temp_num != 0) { + if ((temp_num < MAX_IO_NUM) && + ((jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies) - g_io_last_pull_time[did]) + < IO_SUBMIT_TIME_OUT)) { + stream_num[did] = i; + return i; + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + hiraid_refresh_io_transport_num(did, i); + stream_num[did] = ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + return ((i+1) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); + } + } + g_io_last_pull_time[did] = jiffies_to_msecs(jiffies); + return ((stream_num[did]++) % MAX_STREAM_NUM); +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_stream(u16 hdid, struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct list_head temp_header; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd = {0}; + u16 submit_stream_id; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + u16 count = 0; + + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&temp_header); + submit_stream_id = hiraid_get_submit_io_stream(hdid, hdev); + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(hdid * MAX_STREAM_NUM + submit_stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + list_del(node); + list_add_tail(node, &temp_header); + if (++count >= MAX_IO_NUM_ONCE) + break; + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &temp_header) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = temp_io_stream->io_cmd; + hiraid_submit_cmd(temp_io_stream->submit_queue, &io_cmd); + hiraid_inc_io_transport_num(hdid, submit_stream_id, + io_cmd.rw.nlb * temp_io_stream->sector_size); + list_del(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + } + temp_io_stream = NULL; + list_del_init(&temp_header); +} + +static u8 hiraid_detect_if_aging(void) +{ + if (++g_io_count == MAX_AGING_NUM) { + g_io_count = 0; + return 1; + } + return 0; +} + +static void hiraid_aging(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *temp_stream = NULL; + int i = 0; + int j = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + temp_stream = hiraid_get_stream(i, j); + if (temp_stream->using) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(temp_stream, -1); + if (temp_stream->aging_credit <= 0) { + hiraid_dec_stream_num(i); + memset(temp_stream, + 0, sizeof(struct HIRAID_STREAM_S)); // 老化 + } + } + } + } +} + +static u8 hiraid_io_list_operation(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq, u8 operation) +{ + int i, j; + + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct list_head *node = NULL; + struct list_head *next_node = NULL; + struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd = NULL; + struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *temp_io_stream = NULL; + + u8 max_hd_num = operation == TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST ? + MAX_PD_NUM : hdid + 1; + for (i = hdid; i < max_hd_num; i++) { + for (j = 0; j < MAX_STREAM_NUM; j++) { + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(i * MAX_STREAM_NUM + j); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + list_for_each_safe(node, next_node, &io_slist->list) { + temp_io_stream = list_entry(node, + struct IO_LIST_S, list); + io_cmd = &(temp_io_stream->io_cmd); + hiraidq = temp_io_stream->submit_queue; + if (operation >= TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST) { + list_del_init(node); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + temp_io_stream = NULL; + } else { + if ((io_cmd->rw.cmd_id == cid) && + (hiraidq->qid == hwq)) { + list_del_init(node); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + kfree(temp_io_stream); + return 1; + } + } + } + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static u8 hiraid_check_io_list(u32 hdid, u16 cid, u16 hwq) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, cid, hwq, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(u32 hdid) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(hdid, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_SINGLE_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_delete_all_io_list(void) +{ + u8 ret; + + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + ret = hiraid_io_list_operation(0, 0, 0, TYPE_DELETE_ALL_IO_LIST); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + return ret; +} + +static u8 hiraid_add_io_to_list(struct hiraid_queue *submit_queue, + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stream, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd, + unsigned int sector_size, u16 actual_id) +{ + struct mutex_list_head_s *io_slist = NULL; + struct IO_LIST_S *new_io_node = NULL; + + new_io_node = kmalloc(sizeof(struct IO_LIST_S), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!new_io_node) + return 0; + new_io_node->io_cmd = io_cmd; + new_io_node->submit_queue = submit_queue; + new_io_node->sector_size = sector_size; + io_slist = hiraid_get_io_head(actual_id * + MAX_STREAM_NUM + tmp_stream->stream_id); + mutex_lock(&io_slist->lock); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&(new_io_node->list)); + list_add_tail(&(new_io_node->list), &io_slist->list); + mutex_unlock(&io_slist->lock); + return 1; +} + +static void hiraid_submit_io_threading(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + int i = 0; + + while (!kthread_should_stop()) { + mutex_lock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_PD_NUM; i++) + hiraid_submit_io_stream(i, hdev); + mutex_unlock(&g_stream_operation_mutex); + usleep_range(MIN_IO_SEND_TIME, MAX_IO_SEND_TIME); + } +} + +static void hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + u16 i; + + for (i = 0; i < (MAX_PD_NUM * MAX_STREAM_NUM); i++) + list_del_init(&hiraid_get_io_head(i)->list); +} + +struct task_struct *g_hiraid_submit_task; +static void hiraid_init_io_stream(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) +{ + hiraid_io_recognition_init(); + g_hiraid_submit_task = kthread_run((void *)hiraid_submit_io_threading, + hdev, "hiraid_submit_thread"); +} + #define HIRAID_RW_FUA BIT(14) static int hiraid_setup_rw_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, @@ -866,6 +1271,30 @@ static int hiraid_setup_nonrw_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, return 0; } +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + +static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(u8 attr) +{ + switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { + case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: + case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: + return true; + default: + return false; + } +} + static int hiraid_setup_io_cmd(struct hiraid_dev *hdev, struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd *io_cmd, struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) @@ -1023,6 +1452,7 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; struct hiraid_scsi_io_cmd io_cmd; struct hiraid_queue *ioq; + struct HIRAID_STREAM_S *tmp_stm = NULL; u16 hwq, cid; int ret; @@ -1085,6 +1515,23 @@ static int hiraid_queue_command(struct Scsi_Host *shost, } WRITE_ONCE(mapbuf->state, CMD_FLIGHT); + + if (hiraid_is_rw_scmd(scmd) && + hiraid_disk_is_hdd_rawdrive(hostdata->attr)) { + if (hiraid_detect_if_aging()) + hiraid_aging(hdev); + tmp_stm = hiraid_stream_detect(hdev, &(io_cmd.rw), sdev->id); + if (tmp_stm != NULL) { + hiraid_io_recognition_iterator(tmp_stm, 1); + if (hiraid_recognition_acknowledge(tmp_stm) && + (hiraid_get_stream_num(sdev->id) > 1)) { + if (hiraid_add_io_to_list(ioq, + tmp_stm, io_cmd, sdev->sector_size, sdev->id)) { + return 0; + } + } + } + } hiraid_submit_cmd(ioq, &io_cmd); return 0; @@ -1135,19 +1582,6 @@ static int hiraid_disk_qd(u8 attr) } } -static bool hiraid_disk_is_hdd(u8 attr) -{ - switch (HIRAID_DEV_DISK_TYPE(attr)) { - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_VD: - case HIRAID_SAS_HDD_PD: - case HIRAID_SATA_HDD_PD: - return true; - default: - return false; - } -} - static int hiraid_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev) { struct hiraid_sdev_hostdata *hostdata; @@ -1593,7 +2027,6 @@ static inline bool hiraid_process_cq(struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq, u16 *start, u16 *end, int tag) { bool found = false; - *start = hiraidq->cq_head; while (!found && hiraid_cqe_pending(hiraidq)) { if (le16_to_cpu(hiraidq->cqes[hiraidq->cq_head].cmd_id) == tag) @@ -1960,6 +2393,7 @@ static int hiraid_create_queue(struct hiraid_queue *hiraidq, u16 qid) hiraidq->cq_vector = cq_vector; ret = pci_request_irq(hdev->pdev, cq_vector, hiraid_handle_irq, NULL, hiraidq, "hiraid%d_q%d", hdev->instance, qid); + if (ret) { hiraidq->cq_vector = -1; dev_err(hdev->dev, "request queue[%d] irq failed\n", qid); @@ -2125,7 +2559,6 @@ static int hiraid_setup_io_queues(struct hiraid_dev *hdev) adminq->cq_vector = -1; return ret; } - hdev->online_queues++; for (i = hdev->queue_count; i <= hdev->max_qid; i++) { @@ -3304,6 +3737,12 @@ static int hiraid_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) cid = mapbuf->cid; hwq = mapbuf->hiraidq->qid; + if (hiraid_check_io_list(hostdata->hdid, cid, hwq)) { + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "find cid[%d] qid[%d] in host, abort succ\n", + cid, hwq); + return SUCCESS; + } + dev_warn(hdev->dev, "cid[%d] qid[%d] timeout, send abort\n", cid, hwq); ret = hiraid_send_abort_cmd(hdev, hostdata->hdid, hwq, cid); if (ret != -ETIME) { @@ -3339,6 +3778,7 @@ static int hiraid_scsi_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd, enum hiraid_rst_type rst) if ((ret == 0) || (ret == FW_EH_DEV_NONE && rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET)) { if (rst == HIRAID_RESET_TARGET) { + hiraid_delete_single_pd_io_list(hostdata->hdid); ret = wait_tgt_reset_io_done(scmd); if (ret) { dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] target has %d peding cmd, target reset failed\n", @@ -3378,6 +3818,7 @@ static int hiraid_host_reset(struct scsi_cmnd *scmd) dev_warn(hdev->dev, "sdev[%d:%d] send host reset\n", scmd->device->channel, scmd->device->id); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); if (hiraid_reset_work_sync(hdev) == -EBUSY) flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); @@ -3411,6 +3852,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t hiraid_pci_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev, scsi_block_requests(hdev->shost); hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_RESETTING); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); return PCI_ERS_RESULT_NEED_RESET; case pci_channel_io_perm_failure: @@ -4044,6 +4486,7 @@ static int hiraid_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id) goto unregist_bsg; scsi_scan_host(hdev->shost); + hiraid_init_io_stream(hdev); return 0; @@ -4075,6 +4518,10 @@ static void hiraid_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev) dev_info(hdev->dev, "enter hiraid remove\n"); + kthread_stop(g_hiraid_submit_task); + hiraid_delete_all_io_list(); + hiraid_destroy_io_stream_resource(hdev); + hiraid_dev_state_trans(hdev, DEV_DELETING); flush_work(&hdev->reset_work); -- 2.45.1.windows.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/s390: Implement blocking domain
by Lin Ruifeng 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit ecda483339a5151e3ca30d6b82691ef6f1d17912 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/1633 CVE: CVE-2024-53232 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------------------------------------------- This fixes a crash when surprise hot-unplugging a PCI device. This crash happens because during hot-unplug __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() attaching the default domain fails when the platform no longer recognizes the device as it has already been removed and we end up with a NULL domain pointer and UAF. This is exactly the case referred to in the second comment in __iommu_device_set_domain() and just as stated there if we can instead attach the blocking domain the UAF is prevented as this can handle the already removed device. Implement the blocking domain to use this handling. With this change, the crash is fixed but we still hit a warning attempting to change DMA ownership on a blocked device. Fixes: c76c067e488c ("s390/pci: Use dma-iommu layer") Co-developed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Rosato <mjrosato(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240910211516.137933-1-mjrosato@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel(a)suse.de> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c arch/s390/pci/pci.c [Some context differences] Signed-off-by: Zhang Zekun <zhangzekun11(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h | 4 +- arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c | 10 ++++- drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h index 3f74f1cf37df..e0fae2739994 100644 --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/pci.h @@ -96,7 +96,6 @@ struct zpci_bar_struct { u8 size; /* order 2 exponent */ }; -struct s390_domain; struct kvm_zdev; #define ZPCI_FUNCTIONS_PER_BUS 256 @@ -184,9 +183,10 @@ struct zpci_dev { struct dentry *debugfs_dev; /* IOMMU and passthrough */ - struct s390_domain *s390_domain; /* s390 IOMMU domain data */ + struct iommu_domain *s390_domain; /* attached IOMMU domain */ struct kvm_zdev *kzdev; struct mutex kzdev_lock; + spinlock_t dom_lock; /* protect s390_domain change */ }; static inline bool zdev_enabled(struct zpci_dev *zdev) diff --git a/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c b/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c index 6dde2263c79d..ac4d172f2740 100644 --- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c +++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_debug.c @@ -71,17 +71,23 @@ static void pci_fmb_show(struct seq_file *m, char *name[], int length, static void pci_sw_counter_show(struct seq_file *m) { - struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *ctrs = zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(m->private); + struct zpci_dev *zdev = m->private; + struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *ctrs; atomic64_t *counter; + unsigned long flags; int i; + spin_lock_irqsave(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); + ctrs = zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(m->private); if (!ctrs) - return; + goto unlock; counter = &ctrs->mapped_pages; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pci_sw_names); i++, counter++) seq_printf(m, "%26s:\t%llu\n", pci_sw_names[i], atomic64_read(counter)); +unlock: + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); } static int pci_perf_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c index 9a5196f523de..db9fc74f9027 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/s390-iommu.c @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ struct s390_domain { struct rcu_head rcu; }; +static struct iommu_domain blocking_domain; + static inline unsigned int calc_rtx(dma_addr_t ptr) { return ((unsigned long)ptr >> ZPCI_RT_SHIFT) & ZPCI_INDEX_MASK; @@ -369,20 +371,36 @@ static void s390_domain_free(struct iommu_domain *domain) call_rcu(&s390_domain->rcu, s390_iommu_rcu_free_domain); } -static void s390_iommu_detach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, - struct device *dev) +static void zdev_s390_domain_update(struct zpci_dev *zdev, + struct iommu_domain *domain) +{ + unsigned long flags; + + spin_lock_irqsave(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); + zdev->s390_domain = domain; + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&zdev->dom_lock, flags); +} + +static int blocking_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, + struct device *dev) { - struct s390_domain *s390_domain = to_s390_domain(domain); struct zpci_dev *zdev = to_zpci_dev(dev); + struct s390_domain *s390_domain; unsigned long flags; + if (zdev->s390_domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) + return 0; + + s390_domain = to_s390_domain(zdev->s390_domain); spin_lock_irqsave(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); list_del_rcu(&zdev->iommu_list); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); zpci_unregister_ioat(zdev, 0); - zdev->s390_domain = NULL; zdev->dma_table = NULL; + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, domain); + + return 0; } static int s390_iommu_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, @@ -401,20 +419,15 @@ static int s390_iommu_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain, domain->geometry.aperture_end < zdev->start_dma)) return -EINVAL; - if (zdev->s390_domain) - s390_iommu_detach_device(&zdev->s390_domain->domain, dev); + blocking_domain_attach_device(&blocking_domain, dev); + /* If we fail now DMA remains blocked via blocking domain */ cc = zpci_register_ioat(zdev, 0, zdev->start_dma, zdev->end_dma, virt_to_phys(s390_domain->dma_table), &status); - /* - * If the device is undergoing error recovery the reset code - * will re-establish the new domain. - */ if (cc && status != ZPCI_PCI_ST_FUNC_NOT_AVAIL) return -EIO; - zdev->dma_table = s390_domain->dma_table; - zdev->s390_domain = s390_domain; + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, domain); spin_lock_irqsave(&s390_domain->list_lock, flags); list_add_rcu(&zdev->iommu_list, &s390_domain->devices); @@ -466,19 +479,11 @@ static struct iommu_device *s390_iommu_probe_device(struct device *dev) if (zdev->tlb_refresh) dev->iommu->shadow_on_flush = 1; - return &zdev->iommu_dev; -} + /* Start with DMA blocked */ + spin_lock_init(&zdev->dom_lock); + zdev_s390_domain_update(zdev, &blocking_domain); -static void s390_iommu_release_device(struct device *dev) -{ - struct zpci_dev *zdev = to_zpci_dev(dev); - - /* - * release_device is expected to detach any domain currently attached - * to the device, but keep it attached to other devices in the group. - */ - if (zdev) - s390_iommu_detach_device(&zdev->s390_domain->domain, dev); + return &zdev->iommu_dev; } static int zpci_refresh_all(struct zpci_dev *zdev) @@ -702,9 +707,15 @@ static void s390_iommu_probe_finalize(struct device *dev) struct zpci_iommu_ctrs *zpci_get_iommu_ctrs(struct zpci_dev *zdev) { - if (!zdev || !zdev->s390_domain) + struct s390_domain *s390_domain; + + lockdep_assert_held(&zdev->dom_lock); + + if (zdev->s390_domain->type == IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED) return NULL; - return &zdev->s390_domain->ctrs; + + s390_domain = to_s390_domain(zdev->s390_domain); + return &s390_domain->ctrs; } int zpci_init_iommu(struct zpci_dev *zdev) @@ -781,12 +792,20 @@ static int __init s390_iommu_init(void) } subsys_initcall(s390_iommu_init); +static struct iommu_domain blocking_domain = { + .type = IOMMU_DOMAIN_BLOCKED, + .ops = &(const struct iommu_domain_ops) { + .attach_dev = blocking_domain_attach_device, + } +}; + static const struct iommu_ops s390_iommu_ops = { + .blocked_domain = &blocking_domain, + .release_domain = &blocking_domain, .capable = s390_iommu_capable, .domain_alloc_paging = s390_domain_alloc_paging, .probe_device = s390_iommu_probe_device, .probe_finalize = s390_iommu_probe_finalize, - .release_device = s390_iommu_release_device, .device_group = generic_device_group, .pgsize_bitmap = SZ_4K, .get_resv_regions = s390_iommu_get_resv_regions, -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix KABI break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: Fix crash on profile change rollback failure
by Yi Yang 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 4dadc4077e3f77d6d31e199a925fc7a705e7adeb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13511 CVE: CVE-2026-23000 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- mlx5e_netdev_change_profile can fail to attach a new profile and can fail to rollback to old profile, in such case, we could end up with a dangling netdev with a fully reset netdev_priv. A retry to change profile, e.g. another attempt to call mlx5e_netdev_change_profile via switchdev mode change, will crash trying to access the now NULL priv->mdev. This fix allows mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() to handle previous failures and an empty priv, by not assuming priv is valid. Pass netdev and mdev to all flows requiring mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() and avoid passing priv. In mlx5e_netdev_change_profile() check if current priv is valid, and if not, just attach the new profile without trying to access the old one. This fixes the following oops, when enabling switchdev mode for the 2nd time after first time failure: ## Enabling switchdev mode first time: mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12 workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12 ^^^^^^^^ mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Disable: mode(LEGACY), nvfs(0), necvfs(0), active vports(0) ## retry: Enabling switchdev mode 2nd time: mlx5_core 0000:00:03.0: E-Switch: Supported tc chains and prios offload BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000038 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 520 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4+ #91 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_detach_netdev+0x3c/0x90 Code: 50 00 00 f0 80 4f 78 02 48 8b bf e8 07 00 00 48 85 ff 74 16 48 8b 73 78 48 d1 ee 83 e6 01 83 f6 01 40 0f b6 f6 e8 c4 42 00 00 <48> 8b 45 38 48 85 c0 74 08 48 89 df e8 cc 47 40 1e 48 8b bb f0 07 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000673890 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8881036a89c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff888113f63800 RSI: ffffffff822fe720 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000002dcd R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc900006738e8 R11: 00000000ffffffff R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8881036a89c0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007fdfb8384740(0000) GS:ffff88856a9d6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000038 CR3: 0000000112ae0005 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> mlx5e_netdev_change_profile+0x45/0xb0 mlx5e_vport_rep_load+0x27b/0x2d0 mlx5_esw_offloads_rep_load+0x72/0xf0 esw_offloads_enable+0x5d0/0x970 mlx5_eswitch_enable_locked+0x349/0x430 ? is_mp_supported+0x57/0xb0 mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set+0x26b/0x430 devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x6f/0xf0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140 genl_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x290 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_pre_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_eswitch_set_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_devlink_nl_post_doit+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 netlink_rcv_skb+0x52/0x100 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x282/0x3e0 ? __alloc_skb+0xd6/0x190 netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430 __sys_sendto+0x213/0x220 ? __sys_recvmsg+0x6a/0xd0 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x50/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fdfb8495047 Fixes: c4d7eb57687f ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method") Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108212657.25090-2-saeed@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h | 9 ++-- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 48 +++++++++++++------ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c | 11 ++--- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h index 455d02b6500d..363809dcb4f1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h @@ -1203,9 +1203,12 @@ mlx5e_create_netdev(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, const struct mlx5e_profile *prof int mlx5e_attach_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); void mlx5e_detach_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); void mlx5e_destroy_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); -int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, - const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, void *new_ppriv); -void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); +int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, + const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, + void *new_ppriv); +void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev); void mlx5e_set_netdev_mtu_boundaries(struct mlx5e_priv *priv); void mlx5e_build_nic_params(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, struct mlx5e_xsk *xsk, u16 mtu); void mlx5e_rx_dim_work(struct work_struct *work); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index ec1b582cb9d5..c18512dd4a83 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -5938,19 +5938,28 @@ mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile(struct net_device *netdev, struct mlx5_core_dev *mde return err; } -int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, - const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, void *new_ppriv) +int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, + const struct mlx5e_profile *new_profile, + void *new_ppriv) { - const struct mlx5e_profile *orig_profile = priv->profile; - struct net_device *netdev = priv->netdev; - struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev; - void *orig_ppriv = priv->ppriv; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); + const struct mlx5e_profile *orig_profile; int err, rollback_err; + void *orig_ppriv; - /* cleanup old profile */ - mlx5e_detach_netdev(priv); - priv->profile->cleanup(priv); - mlx5e_priv_cleanup(priv); + orig_profile = priv->profile; + orig_ppriv = priv->ppriv; + + /* NULL could happen if previous change_profile failed to rollback */ + if (priv->profile) { + WARN_ON_ONCE(priv->mdev != mdev); + /* cleanup old profile */ + mlx5e_detach_netdev(priv); + priv->profile->cleanup(priv); + mlx5e_priv_cleanup(priv); + } + /* priv members are not valid from this point ... */ if (mdev->state == MLX5_DEVICE_STATE_INTERNAL_ERROR) { mlx5e_netdev_init_profile(netdev, mdev, new_profile, new_ppriv); @@ -5967,16 +5976,25 @@ int mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, return 0; rollback: + if (!orig_profile) { + netdev_warn(netdev, "no original profile to rollback to\n"); + priv->profile = NULL; + return err; + } + rollback_err = mlx5e_netdev_attach_profile(netdev, mdev, orig_profile, orig_ppriv); - if (rollback_err) - netdev_err(netdev, "%s: failed to rollback to orig profile, %d\n", - __func__, rollback_err); + if (rollback_err) { + netdev_err(netdev, "failed to rollback to orig profile, %d\n", + rollback_err); + priv->profile = NULL; + } return err; } -void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) +void mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(struct net_device *netdev, + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev) { - mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(priv, &mlx5e_nic_profile, NULL); + mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(netdev, mdev, &mlx5e_nic_profile, NULL); } void mlx5e_destroy_netdev(struct mlx5e_priv *priv) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c index 656a7b65f4c7..3708d57d757a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_rep.c @@ -1450,17 +1450,16 @@ mlx5e_vport_uplink_rep_load(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_eswitch_rep * { struct mlx5e_rep_priv *rpriv = mlx5e_rep_to_rep_priv(rep); struct net_device *netdev; - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; int err; netdev = mlx5_uplink_netdev_get(dev); if (!netdev) return 0; - priv = netdev_priv(netdev); - rpriv->netdev = priv->netdev; - err = mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(priv, &mlx5e_uplink_rep_profile, - rpriv); + /* must not use netdev_priv(netdev), it might not be initialized yet */ + rpriv->netdev = netdev; + err = mlx5e_netdev_change_profile(netdev, dev, + &mlx5e_uplink_rep_profile, rpriv); mlx5_uplink_netdev_put(dev, netdev); return err; } @@ -1473,7 +1472,7 @@ mlx5e_vport_uplink_rep_unload(struct mlx5e_rep_priv *rpriv) priv = netdev_priv(netdev); - mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(priv); + mlx5e_netdev_attach_nic_profile(netdev, priv->mdev); } static int -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/mlx4: Prevent shift wrapping in set_user_sq_size()
by Yao Kai 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Dan Carpenter <error27(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.283 commit 3d5ae269c4bd392ec1edbfb3bd031b8f42d7feff category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13202 CVE: CVE-2023-54168 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d50b3c73f1ac20dabc53dc6e9d64ce9c79a331eb ] The ucmd->log_sq_bb_count variable is controlled by the user so this shift can wrap. Fix it by using check_shl_overflow() in the same way that it was done in commit 515f60004ed9 ("RDMA/hns: Prevent undefined behavior in hns_roce_set_user_sq_size()"). Fixes: 839041329fd3 ("IB/mlx4: Sanity check userspace send queue sizes") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/a8dfbd1d-c019-4556-930b-bab1ded73b10@kili.mountain Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c index 6dd3cd2c2f80..e262389a05dc 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx4/qp.c @@ -436,9 +436,13 @@ static int set_user_sq_size(struct mlx4_ib_dev *dev, struct mlx4_ib_qp *qp, struct mlx4_ib_create_qp *ucmd) { + u32 cnt; + /* Sanity check SQ size before proceeding */ - if ((1 << ucmd->log_sq_bb_count) > dev->dev->caps.max_wqes || - ucmd->log_sq_stride > + if (check_shl_overflow(1, ucmd->log_sq_bb_count, &cnt) || + cnt > dev->dev->caps.max_wqes) + return -EINVAL; + if (ucmd->log_sq_stride > ilog2(roundup_pow_of_two(dev->dev->caps.max_sq_desc_sz)) || ucmd->log_sq_stride < MLX4_IB_MIN_SQ_STRIDE) return -EINVAL; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: Don't store mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink priv
by Yi Yang 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc6 commit 123eda2e5b1638e298e3a66bb1e64a8da92de5e1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13507 CVE: CVE-2026-22996 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- mlx5e_priv is an unstable structure that can be memset(0) if profile attaching fails, mlx5e_priv in mlx5e_dev devlink private is used to reference the netdev and mdev associated with that struct. Instead, store netdev directly into mlx5e_dev and get mdev from the containing mlx5_adev aux device structure. This fixes a kernel oops in mlx5e_remove when switchdev mode fails due to change profile failure. $ devlink dev eswitch set pci/0000:00:03.0 mode switchdev Error: mlx5_core: Failed setting eswitch to offloads. dmesg: workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12 workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6214:(pid 37199): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 mlx5_core 0012:03:00.1 gpu3rdma1: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12 $ devlink dev reload pci/0000:00:03.0 ==> oops BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000520 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 521 Comm: devlink Not tainted 6.18.0-rc5+ #117 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:mlx5e_remove+0x68/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffffc900034838f0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88810283c380 RBX: ffff888101874400 RCX: ffffffff826ffc45 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff888102d789c0 R08: ffff8881007137f0 R09: ffff888100264e10 R10: ffffc90003483898 R11: ffffc900034838a0 R12: ffff888100d261a0 R13: ffff888100d261a0 R14: ffff8881018749a0 R15: ffff888101874400 FS: 00007f8565fea740(0000) GS:ffff88856a759000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000520 CR3: 000000010b11a004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> device_release_driver_internal+0x19c/0x200 bus_remove_device+0xc6/0x130 device_del+0x160/0x3d0 ? devl_param_driverinit_value_get+0x2d/0x90 mlx5_detach_device+0x89/0xe0 mlx5_unload_one_devl_locked+0x3a/0x70 mlx5_devlink_reload_down+0xc8/0x220 devlink_reload+0x7d/0x260 devlink_nl_reload_doit+0x45b/0x5a0 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xe8/0x140 Fixes: ee75f1fc44dd ("net/mlx5e: Create separate devlink instance for ethernet auxiliary device") Fixes: c4d7eb57687f ("net/mxl5e: Add change profile method") Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260108212657.25090-3-saeed@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c [Commit 381978d28317 ("net/mlx5e: Create single netdev per SD group") was not merged.] Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h | 2 +- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h index 455d02b6500d..ee671e16f344 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en.h @@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ struct mlx5e_priv { }; struct mlx5e_dev { - struct mlx5e_priv *priv; + struct net_device *netdev; struct devlink_port dl_port; }; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index ec1b582cb9d5..0dd817780a2e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -5991,8 +5991,8 @@ static int mlx5e_resume(struct auxiliary_device *adev) { struct mlx5_adev *edev = container_of(adev, struct mlx5_adev, adev); struct mlx5e_dev *mlx5e_dev = auxiliary_get_drvdata(adev); - struct mlx5e_priv *priv = mlx5e_dev->priv; - struct net_device *netdev = priv->netdev; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(mlx5e_dev->netdev); + struct net_device *netdev = mlx5e_dev->netdev; struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = edev->mdev; int err; @@ -6014,10 +6014,11 @@ static int mlx5e_resume(struct auxiliary_device *adev) static int _mlx5e_suspend(struct auxiliary_device *adev, bool pre_netdev_reg) { + struct mlx5_adev *edev = container_of(adev, struct mlx5_adev, adev); struct mlx5e_dev *mlx5e_dev = auxiliary_get_drvdata(adev); - struct mlx5e_priv *priv = mlx5e_dev->priv; - struct net_device *netdev = priv->netdev; - struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = priv->mdev; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(mlx5e_dev->netdev); + struct net_device *netdev = mlx5e_dev->netdev; + struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev = edev->mdev; if (!pre_netdev_reg && !netif_device_present(netdev)) { if (test_bit(MLX5E_STATE_DESTROYING, &priv->state)) @@ -6063,11 +6064,11 @@ static int _mlx5e_probe(struct auxiliary_device *adev) goto err_devlink_port_unregister; } SET_NETDEV_DEVLINK_PORT(netdev, &mlx5e_dev->dl_port); + mlx5e_dev->netdev = netdev; mlx5e_build_nic_netdev(netdev); priv = netdev_priv(netdev); - mlx5e_dev->priv = priv; priv->profile = profile; priv->ppriv = NULL; @@ -6117,11 +6118,12 @@ static int mlx5e_probe(struct auxiliary_device *adev, static void mlx5e_remove(struct auxiliary_device *adev) { struct mlx5e_dev *mlx5e_dev = auxiliary_get_drvdata(adev); - struct mlx5e_priv *priv = mlx5e_dev->priv; + struct net_device *netdev = mlx5e_dev->netdev; + struct mlx5e_priv *priv = netdev_priv(netdev); mlx5_core_uplink_netdev_set(priv->mdev, NULL); mlx5e_dcbnl_delete_app(priv); - unregister_netdev(priv->netdev); + unregister_netdev(netdev); _mlx5e_suspend(adev, false); /* Avoid cleanup if profile rollback failed. */ if (priv->profile) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] PCI/AER: Fix NULL pointer access by aer_info
by Ziming Du 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Vernon Yang <yanglincheng(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v6.17.8 commit 6618243bcc3f60825f761a41ed65fef9fe97eb25 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11501 CVE: CVE-2025-68309 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0a27bdb14b028fed30a10cec2f945c38cb5ca4fa ] The kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) may return NULL, so all accesses to aer_info->xxx will result in kernel panic. Fix it. Signed-off-by: Vernon Yang <yanglincheng(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250904182527.67371-1-vernon2gm@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c [Ziming Du: context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Ziming Du <duziming2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c index 67d36680d834..fae1b96fdaab 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pcie/aer.c @@ -373,6 +373,10 @@ void pci_aer_init(struct pci_dev *dev) return; dev->aer_stats = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aer_stats), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dev->aer_stats) { + dev->aer_cap = 0; + return; + } /* * We save/restore PCI_ERR_UNCOR_MASK, PCI_ERR_UNCOR_SEVER, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] fix CVE-2026-22998
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

fix CVE-2026-22998 Maurizio Lombardi (1): nvmet-tcp: remove boilerplate code Shivam Kumar (1): nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] fix CVE-2026-22998
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

fix CVE-2026-22998 Maurizio Lombardi (1): nvmet-tcp: remove boilerplate code Shivam Kumar (1): nvme-tcp: fix NULL pointer dereferences in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] md/raid10: fix memleak of md thread
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.283 commit abf4d67060c8f63caff096e5fca1564bfef1e5d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13133 CVE: CVE-2023-54294 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit f0ddb83da3cbbf8a1f9087a642c448ff52ee9abd ] In raid10_run(), if setup_conf() succeed and raid10_run() failed before setting 'mddev->thread', then in the error path 'conf->thread' is not freed. Fix the problem by setting 'mddev->thread' right after setup_conf(). Fixes: 43a521238aca ("md-cluster: choose correct label when clustered layout is not supported") Signed-off-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Song Liu <song(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230310073855.1337560-7-yukuai1@huaweicloud.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/md/raid10.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/raid10.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/raid10.c b/drivers/md/raid10.c index 8b7de02f5796..b46713e7e3c9 100644 --- a/drivers/md/raid10.c +++ b/drivers/md/raid10.c @@ -3824,6 +3824,9 @@ static int raid10_run(struct mddev *mddev) if (!conf) goto out; + mddev->thread = conf->thread; + conf->thread = NULL; + if (mddev_is_clustered(conf->mddev)) { int fc, fo; @@ -3836,9 +3839,6 @@ static int raid10_run(struct mddev *mddev) } } - mddev->thread = conf->thread; - conf->thread = NULL; - chunk_size = mddev->chunk_sectors << 9; if (mddev->queue) { blk_queue_max_discard_sectors(mddev->queue, -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: target: Reset t_task_cdb pointer in error case
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin(a)crpt.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit 0260ad551b0815eb788d47f32899fbcd65d6f128 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13335 CVE: CVE-2025-68782 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ commit 5053eab38a4c4543522d0c320c639c56a8b59908 upstream. If allocation of cmd->t_task_cdb fails, it remains NULL but is later dereferenced in the 'err' path. In case of error, reset NULL t_task_cdb value to point at the default fixed-size buffer. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 9e95fb805dc0 ("scsi: target: Fix NULL pointer dereference") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Andrey Vatoropin <a.vatoropin(a)crpt.ru> Reviewed-by: Mike Christie <michael.christie(a)oracle.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251118084014.324940-1-a.vatoropin@crpt.ru Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/target/target_core_transport.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c index fb93d74c5d0b..b9a144a59dff 100644 --- a/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_transport.c @@ -1524,6 +1524,7 @@ target_cmd_init_cdb(struct se_cmd *cmd, unsigned char *cdb, gfp_t gfp) if (scsi_command_size(cdb) > sizeof(cmd->__t_task_cdb)) { cmd->t_task_cdb = kzalloc(scsi_command_size(cdb), gfp); if (!cmd->t_task_cdb) { + cmd->t_task_cdb = &cmd->__t_task_cdb[0]; pr_err("Unable to allocate cmd->t_task_cdb" " %u > sizeof(cmd->__t_task_cdb): %lu ops\n", scsi_command_size(cdb), -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] scsi: Revert "scsi: qla2xxx: Perform lockless command completion in abort path"
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Tony Battersby <tonyb(a)cybernetics.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit e9e601b7df58ba0c667baf30263331df2c02ffe1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13370 CVE: CVE-2025-68818 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ commit b57fbc88715b6d18f379463f48a15b560b087ffe upstream. This reverts commit 0367076b0817d5c75dfb83001ce7ce5c64d803a9. The commit being reverted added code to __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds() to call sp->done() without holding a spinlock. But unlike the older code below it, this new code failed to check sp->cmd_type and just assumed TYPE_SRB, which results in a jump to an invalid pointer in target-mode with TYPE_TGT_CMD: qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d034:8: qla24xx_do_nack_work create sess success 0000000009f7a79b qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-5003:8: ISP System Error - mbx1=1ff5h mbx2=10h mbx3=0h mbx4=0h mbx5=191h mbx6=0h mbx7=0h. qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-d01e:8: -> fwdump no buffer qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-f03a:8: qla_target(0): System error async event 0x8002 occurred qla2xxx [0000:65:00.0]-00af:8: Performing ISP error recovery - ha=0000000058183fda. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP CPU: 2 PID: 9446 Comm: qla2xxx_8_dpc Tainted: G O 6.1.133 #1 Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/X11SPL-F, BIOS 4.2 12/15/2023 RIP: 0010:0x0 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6. RSP: 0018:ffffc90001f93dc8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000282 RBX: 0000000000000355 RCX: ffff88810d16a000 RDX: ffff88810dbadaa8 RSI: 0000000000080000 RDI: ffff888169dc38c0 RBP: ffff888169dc38c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000045 R10: ffffffffa034bdf0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88810800bb40 R13: 0000000000001aa8 R14: ffff888100136610 R15: ffff8881070f7400 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88bf80080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000010c8ff006 CR4: 00000000003706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x4d/0x8b ? page_fault_oops+0x91/0x180 ? trace_buffer_unlock_commit_regs+0x38/0x1a0 ? exc_page_fault+0x391/0x5e0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0xcb/0x3e0 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x50/0x70 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x3b7/0x4b0 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_abort_isp+0xfd/0x860 [qla2xxx_scst] qla2x00_do_dpc+0x581/0xa40 [qla2xxx_scst] kthread+0xa8/0xd0 </TASK> Then commit 4475afa2646d ("scsi: qla2xxx: Complete command early within lock") added the spinlock back, because not having the lock caused a race and a crash. But qla2x00_abort_srb() in the switch below already checks for qla2x00_chip_is_down() and handles it the same way, so the code above the switch is now redundant and still buggy in target-mode. Remove it. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb(a)cybernetics.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3a8022dc-bcfd-4b01-9f9b-7a9ec61fa2a3@cybernetics.c… Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c index 91d12198cc6c..ef02ea87e415 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c @@ -1874,12 +1874,6 @@ __qla2x00_abort_all_cmds(struct qla_qpair *qp, int res) for (cnt = 1; cnt < req->num_outstanding_cmds; cnt++) { sp = req->outstanding_cmds[cnt]; if (sp) { - if (qla2x00_chip_is_down(vha)) { - req->outstanding_cmds[cnt] = NULL; - sp->done(sp, res); - continue; - } - switch (sp->cmd_type) { case TYPE_SRB: qla2x00_abort_srb(qp, sp, res, &flags); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] block: Use RCU in blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() instead of set->tag_list_lock
by Zheng Qixing 31 Jan '26

31 Jan '26

From: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella(a)purestorage.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.120 commit ca8764c0ea1fb825f17f19704af55e9e02c9f768 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13291 CVE: CVE-2025-68756 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------ [ Upstream commit 59e25ef2b413c72da6686d431e7759302cfccafa ] blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() functions add and remove queues from tagset, the functions make sure that tagset and queues are marked as shared when two or more queues are attached to the same tagset. Initially a tagset starts as unshared and when the number of added queues reaches two, blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set() marks it as shared along with all the queues attached to it. When the number of attached queues drops to 1 blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() need to mark both the tagset and the remaining queues as unshared. Both functions need to freeze current queues in tagset before setting on unsetting BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED flag. While doing so, both functions hold set->tag_list_lock mutex, which makes sense as we do not want queues to be added or deleted in the process. This used to work fine until commit 98d81f0df70c ("nvme: use blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset") made the nvme driver quiesce tagset instead of quiscing individual queues. blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() does the job and quiesce the queues in set->tag_list while holding set->tag_list_lock also. This results in deadlock between two threads with these stacktraces: __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0 ? timerqueue_add+0x66/0xb0 schedule+0x1c/0xa0 schedule_preempt_disabled+0xa/0x10 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x271/0x600 blk_mq_quiesce_tagset+0x25/0xc0 nvme_dev_disable+0x9c/0x250 nvme_timeout+0x1fc/0x520 blk_mq_handle_expired+0x5c/0x90 bt_iter+0x7e/0x90 blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x27e/0x550 ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10 ? __blk_mq_complete_request_remote+0x10/0x10 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x1c0/0x210 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x12d/0x170 process_one_work+0x12e/0x2d0 worker_thread+0x288/0x3a0 ? rescuer_thread+0x480/0x480 kthread+0xb8/0xe0 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? kthread_park+0x80/0x80 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 __schedule+0x47c/0xbb0 ? xas_find+0x161/0x1a0 schedule+0x1c/0xa0 blk_mq_freeze_queue_wait+0x3d/0x70 ? destroy_sched_domains_rcu+0x30/0x30 blk_mq_update_tag_set_shared+0x44/0x80 blk_mq_exit_queue+0x141/0x150 del_gendisk+0x25a/0x2d0 nvme_ns_remove+0xc9/0x170 nvme_remove_namespaces+0xc7/0x100 nvme_remove+0x62/0x150 pci_device_remove+0x23/0x60 device_release_driver_internal+0x159/0x200 unbind_store+0x99/0xa0 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x112/0x1e0 vfs_write+0x2b1/0x3d0 ksys_write+0x4e/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 The top stacktrace is showing nvme_timeout() called to handle nvme command timeout. timeout handler is trying to disable the controller and as a first step, it needs to blk_mq_quiesce_tagset() to tell blk-mq not to call queue callback handlers. The thread is stuck waiting for set->tag_list_lock as it tries to walk the queues in set->tag_list. The lock is held by the second thread in the bottom stack which is waiting for one of queues to be frozen. The queue usage counter will drop to zero after nvme_timeout() finishes, and this will not happen because the thread will wait for this mutex forever. Given that [un]quiescing queue is an operation that does not need to sleep, update blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset() to use RCU instead of taking set->tag_list_lock, update blk_mq_{add,del}_queue_tag_set() to use RCU safe list operations. Also, delete INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->tag_set_list) in blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set() because we can not re-initialize it while the list is being traversed under RCU. The deleted queue will not be added/deleted to/from a tagset and it will be freed in blk_free_queue() after the end of RCU grace period. Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella(a)purestorage.com> Fixes: 98d81f0df70c ("nvme: use blk_mq_[un]quiesce_tagset") Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche(a)acm.org> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Qixing <zhengqixing(a)huawei.com> --- block/blk-mq.c | 17 ++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index 9281c00aa8a9..8b52aa4f371f 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -281,12 +281,12 @@ void blk_mq_quiesce_tagset(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set) { struct request_queue *q; - mutex_lock(&set->tag_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { if (!blk_queue_skip_tagset_quiesce(q)) blk_mq_quiesce_queue_nowait(q); } - mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); blk_mq_wait_quiesce_done(set); } @@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ void blk_mq_unquiesce_tagset(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set) { struct request_queue *q; - mutex_lock(&set->tag_list_lock); - list_for_each_entry(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { + rcu_read_lock(); + list_for_each_entry_rcu(q, &set->tag_list, tag_set_list) { if (!blk_queue_skip_tagset_quiesce(q)) blk_mq_unquiesce_queue(q); } - mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); + rcu_read_unlock(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_mq_unquiesce_tagset); @@ -4198,7 +4198,7 @@ static void blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set(struct request_queue *q) struct blk_mq_tag_set *set = q->tag_set; mutex_lock(&set->tag_list_lock); - list_del(&q->tag_set_list); + list_del_rcu(&q->tag_set_list); if (list_is_singular(&set->tag_list)) { /* just transitioned to unshared */ set->flags &= ~BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED; @@ -4206,7 +4206,6 @@ static void blk_mq_del_queue_tag_set(struct request_queue *q) blk_mq_update_tag_set_shared(set, false); } mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&q->tag_set_list); } static void blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, @@ -4226,7 +4225,7 @@ static void blk_mq_add_queue_tag_set(struct blk_mq_tag_set *set, } if (set->flags & BLK_MQ_F_TAG_QUEUE_SHARED) queue_set_hctx_shared(q, true); - list_add_tail(&q->tag_set_list, &set->tag_list); + list_add_tail_rcu(&q->tag_set_list, &set->tag_list); mutex_unlock(&set->tag_list_lock); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/4] Fix CVE-2025-39942
by Long Li 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-39942 Namjae Jeon (1): ksmbd: smbdirect: validate data_offset and data_length field of smb_direct_data_transfer Stefan Metzmacher (3): smb: server: remove separate empty_recvmsg_queue smb: server: let recv_done() consistently call put_recvmsg/smb_direct_disconnect_rdma_connection ksmbd: smbdirect: verify remaining_data_length respects max_fragmented_recv_size fs/smb/server/transport_rdma.c | 98 +++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] wifi: mt76: do not run mt76u_status_worker if the device is not running
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.86 commit 69346de0eb956fb92949b9473de4647d9c34a54f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12848 CVE: CVE-2022-50735 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit bd5dac7ced5a7c9faa4dc468ac9560c3256df845 ] Fix the following NULL pointer dereference avoiding to run mt76u_status_worker thread if the device is not running yet. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.14.0+ #78 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mt76 mt76u_tx_status_data RIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0 Code: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a RBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8 R13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: mt76x02_send_tx_status+0x1d2/0xeb0 mt76x02_tx_status_data+0x8e/0xd0 mt76u_tx_status_data+0xe1/0x240 process_one_work+0x92b/0x1460 worker_thread+0x95/0xe00 kthread+0x3a1/0x480 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 Modules linked in: --[ end trace 8df5d20fc5040f65 ]-- RIP: 0010:mt76x02_mac_fill_tx_status.isra.0+0x82c/0x9e0 Code: c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 94 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 34 24 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 89 01 00 00 41 8b 16 41 0f b7 RSP: 0018:ffffc900005af988 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffc900005afae8 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff832fc661 RDI: ffffc900005afc2a RBP: ffffc900005afae0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff520000b5f3c R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff520000b5f3b R12: ffff88810b6132d8 R13: 000000000000ffff R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc900005afc28 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88811aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fa0eda6a000 CR3: 0000000118f17000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Moreover move stat_work schedule out of the for loop. Reported-by: Dokyung Song <dokyungs(a)yonsei.ac.kr> Co-developed-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Deren Wu <deren.wu(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenzo Bianconi <lorenzo(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd(a)nbd.name> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c index f1ae9ff835b2..7426fc0894b1 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/usb.c @@ -800,6 +800,9 @@ static void mt76u_tx_worker(struct mt76_worker *w) bool wake; int i; + if (!test_bit(MT76_STATE_RUNNING, &dev->phy.state)) + return; + for (i = 0; i < IEEE80211_NUM_ACS; i++) { q = dev->q_tx[i]; @@ -821,13 +824,13 @@ static void mt76u_tx_worker(struct mt76_worker *w) wake_up(&dev->tx_wait); mt76_txq_schedule(&dev->phy, i); - - if (dev->drv->tx_status_data && - !test_and_set_bit(MT76_READING_STATS, &dev->phy.state)) - queue_work(dev->wq, &dev->usb.stat_work); if (wake) ieee80211_wake_queue(dev->hw, i); } + + if (dev->drv->tx_status_data && + !test_and_set_bit(MT76_READING_STATS, &dev->phy.state)) + queue_work(dev->wq, &dev->usb.stat_work); } static void mt76u_tx_status_data(struct work_struct *work) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/bnxt_re: Prevent handling any completions after qp destroy
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai(a)broadcom.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.124 commit b79a0e71d6e8692e0b6da05f8aaa7d69191cf7e7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12854 CVE: CVE-2023-54048 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b5bbc6551297447d3cca55cf907079e206e9cd82 ] HW may generate completions that indicates QP is destroyed. Driver should not be scheduling any more completion handlers for this QP, after the QP is destroyed. Since CQs are active during the QP destroy, driver may still schedule completion handlers. This can cause a race where the destroy_cq and poll_cq running simultaneously. Snippet of kernel panic while doing bnxt_re driver load unload in loop. This indicates a poll after the CQ is freed. [77786.481636] Call Trace: [77786.481640] <TASK> [77786.481644] bnxt_re_poll_cq+0x14a/0x620 [bnxt_re] [77786.481658] ? kvm_clock_read+0x14/0x30 [77786.481693] __ib_process_cq+0x57/0x190 [ib_core] [77786.481728] ib_cq_poll_work+0x26/0x80 [ib_core] [77786.481761] process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3f0 [77786.481768] worker_thread+0x50/0x3a0 [77786.481785] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [77786.481790] kthread+0xe2/0x110 [77786.481794] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [77786.481797] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 To avoid this, complete all completion handlers before returning the destroy QP. If free_cq is called soon after destroy_qp, IB stack will cancel the CQ work before invoking the destroy_cq verb and this will prevent any race mentioned. Fixes: 1ac5a4047975 ("RDMA/bnxt_re: Add bnxt_re RoCE driver") Signed-off-by: Kashyap Desai <kashyap.desai(a)broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Selvin Xavier <selvin.xavier(a)broadcom.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1689322969-25402-2-git-send-email-selvin.xavier@b… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c [context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c | 12 ++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c index a0d7777acb6d..867f7fadbb25 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c @@ -788,7 +788,10 @@ static int bnxt_re_destroy_gsi_sqp(struct bnxt_re_qp *qp) int bnxt_re_destroy_qp(struct ib_qp *ib_qp, struct ib_udata *udata) { struct bnxt_re_qp *qp = container_of(ib_qp, struct bnxt_re_qp, ib_qp); + struct bnxt_qplib_qp *qplib_qp = &qp->qplib_qp; struct bnxt_re_dev *rdev = qp->rdev; + struct bnxt_qplib_nq *scq_nq = NULL; + struct bnxt_qplib_nq *rcq_nq = NULL; unsigned int flags; int rc; @@ -822,6 +825,15 @@ int bnxt_re_destroy_qp(struct ib_qp *ib_qp, struct ib_udata *udata) ib_umem_release(qp->rumem); ib_umem_release(qp->sumem); + /* Flush all the entries of notification queue associated with + * given qp. + */ + scq_nq = qplib_qp->scq->nq; + rcq_nq = qplib_qp->rcq->nq; + bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(scq_nq); + if (scq_nq != rcq_nq) + bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(rcq_nq); + kfree(qp); return 0; sh_fail: diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c index fc560e846b47..5d4ce0a6dc69 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.c @@ -386,6 +386,24 @@ static void bnxt_qplib_service_nq(struct tasklet_struct *t) spin_unlock_bh(&hwq->lock); } +/* bnxt_re_synchronize_nq - self polling notification queue. + * @nq - notification queue pointer + * + * This function will start polling entries of a given notification queue + * for all pending entries. + * This function is useful to synchronize notification entries while resources + * are going away. + */ + +void bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(struct bnxt_qplib_nq *nq) +{ + int budget = nq->budget; + + nq->budget = nq->hwq.max_elements; + bnxt_qplib_service_nq(&nq->nq_tasklet); + nq->budget = budget; +} + static irqreturn_t bnxt_qplib_nq_irq(int irq, void *dev_instance) { struct bnxt_qplib_nq *nq = dev_instance; diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h index 667f93d90045..98f156a876ee 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/qplib_fp.h @@ -546,6 +546,7 @@ int bnxt_qplib_process_flush_list(struct bnxt_qplib_cq *cq, struct bnxt_qplib_cqe *cqe, int num_cqes); void bnxt_qplib_flush_cqn_wq(struct bnxt_qplib_qp *qp); +void bnxt_re_synchronize_nq(struct bnxt_qplib_nq *nq); static inline void *bnxt_qplib_get_swqe(struct bnxt_qplib_q *que, u32 *swq_idx) { -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: usb: qmi_wwan: initialize MAC header offset in qmimux_rx_fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.247 commit 0aabccdcec1f4a36f95829ea2263f845bbc77223 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11602 CVE: CVE-2025-68192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e120f46768d98151ece8756ebd688b0e43dc8b29 ] Raw IP packets have no MAC header, leaving skb->mac_header uninitialized. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM64 when xfrm or other subsystems access the offset due to strict alignment checks. Initialize the MAC header to prevent such crashes. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM when running IPsec over the qmimux0 interface. Example trace: Internal error: Oops: 000000009600004f [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.34-gbe78e49cb433 #1 Hardware name: LS1028A RDB Board (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 lr : xfrm_input+0x61c/0x1318 sp : ffff800080003b20 Call trace: xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 xfrm6_rcv+0x38/0x44 xfrm6_esp_rcv+0x48/0xa8 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x94/0x4b0 ip6_input_finish+0x44/0x70 ip6_input+0x44/0xc0 ipv6_rcv+0x6c/0x114 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5c/0x8c __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 process_backlog+0x78/0x17c __napi_poll+0x38/0x180 net_rx_action+0x168/0x2f0 Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Signed-off-by: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029075744.105113-1-qendrim.maxhuni@garderos.c… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index 306ff69a10f0..0aab7a1b9886 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -207,6 +207,12 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) return 0; skbn->dev = net; + /* Raw IP packets don't have a MAC header, but other subsystems + * (like xfrm) may still access MAC header offsets, so they must + * be initialized. + */ + skb_reset_mac_header(skbn); + switch (skb->data[offset + qmimux_hdr_sz] & 0xf0) { case 0x40: skbn->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] mlx5: Fix default values in create CQ
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.17.9 commit 08469f5393a1a39f26a6e2eb2e8c33187665c1f4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11579 CVE: CVE-2025-68209 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e5eba42f01340f73888dfe560be2806057c25913 ] Currently, CQs without a completion function are assigned the mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet function by default. This is problematic since only user CQs created through the mlx5_ib driver are intended to use this function. Additionally, all CQs that will use doorbells instead of polling for completions must call mlx5_cq_arm. However, the default CQ creation flow leaves a valid value in the CQ's arm_db field, allowing FW to send interrupts to polling-only CQs in certain corner cases. These two factors would allow a polling-only kernel CQ to be triggered by an EQ interrupt and call a completion function intended only for user CQs, causing a null pointer exception. Some areas in the driver have prevented this issue with one-off fixes but did not address the root cause. This patch fixes the described issue by adding defaults to the create CQ flow. It adds a default dummy completion function to protect against null pointer exceptions, and it sets an invalid command sequence number by default in kernel CQs to prevent the FW from sending an interrupt to the CQ until it is armed. User CQs are responsible for their own initialization values. Callers of mlx5_core_create_cq are responsible for changing the completion function and arming the CQ per their needs. Fixes: cdd04f4d4d71 ("net/mlx5: Add support to create SQ and CQ for ASO") Signed-off-by: Akiva Goldberger <agoldberger(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Moshe Shemesh <moshe(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Acked-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1762681743-1084694-1-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.… Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/hws/send.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/sws/dr_send.c drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c [cq.c, conn.c context conflicts. send.c 2ca62599aa0bbc0e61595531614e0989ba6b3194 not committed. dr_send.c e03cf321882badadc77dfc428f465173523d5f79 not committed] Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c | 11 ++++--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c | 23 ++++++++++++-- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 1 - .../ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c | 17 +++++------ .../mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c | 30 +++++-------------- drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c | 6 ++-- include/linux/mlx5/cq.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c index ee9acd58c512..0e2177323154 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/cq.c @@ -1011,15 +1011,18 @@ int mlx5_ib_create_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, const struct ib_cq_init_attr *attr, if (cq->create_flags & IB_UVERBS_CQ_FLAGS_IGNORE_OVERRUN) MLX5_SET(cqc, cqc, oi, 1); + if (udata) { + cq->mcq.comp = mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet; + cq->mcq.tasklet_ctx.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; + } else { + cq->mcq.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; + } + err = mlx5_core_create_cq(dev->mdev, &cq->mcq, cqb, inlen, out, sizeof(out)); if (err) goto err_cqb; mlx5_ib_dbg(dev, "cqn 0x%x\n", cq->mcq.cqn); - if (udata) - cq->mcq.tasklet_ctx.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; - else - cq->mcq.comp = mlx5_ib_cq_comp; cq->mcq.event = mlx5_ib_cq_event; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cq->wc_list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c index 4caa1b6f40ba..d21c14bb3ecf 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/cq.c @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ void mlx5_cq_tasklet_cb(struct tasklet_struct *t) tasklet_schedule(&ctx->task); } -static void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, - struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) +void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, + struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) { unsigned long flags; struct mlx5_eq_tasklet *tasklet_ctx = cq->tasklet_ctx.priv; @@ -84,7 +84,15 @@ static void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklet_ctx->lock, flags); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL(mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet); +static void mlx5_core_cq_dummy_cb(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) +{ + mlx5_core_err(cq->eq->core.dev, + "CQ default completion callback, CQ #%u\n", cq->cqn); +} + +#define MLX5_CQ_INIT_CMD_SN cpu_to_be32(2 << 28) /* Callers must verify outbox status in case of err */ int mlx5_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, u32 *in, int inlen, u32 *out, int outlen) @@ -110,10 +118,19 @@ int mlx5_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, cq->arm_sn = 0; cq->eq = eq; cq->uid = MLX5_GET(create_cq_in, in, uid); + + /* Kernel CQs must set the arm_db address prior to calling + * this function, allowing for the proper value to be + * initialized. User CQs are responsible for their own + * initialization since they do not use the arm_db field. + */ + if (cq->arm_db) + *cq->arm_db = MLX5_CQ_INIT_CMD_SN; + refcount_set(&cq->refcount, 1); init_completion(&cq->free); if (!cq->comp) - cq->comp = mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet; + cq->comp = mlx5_core_cq_dummy_cb; /* assuming CQ will be deleted before the EQ */ cq->tasklet_ctx.priv = &eq->tasklet_ctx; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&cq->tasklet_ctx.list); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index ec1b582cb9d5..08f771b60014 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -1936,7 +1936,6 @@ static int mlx5e_alloc_cq_common(struct mlx5e_priv *priv, mcq->set_ci_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db; mcq->arm_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; *mcq->set_ci_db = 0; - *mcq->arm_db = 0; mcq->vector = param->eq_ix; mcq->comp = mlx5e_completion_event; mcq->event = mlx5e_cq_error_event; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c index c4de6bf8d1b6..4db17fa397be 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/fpga/conn.c @@ -421,6 +421,14 @@ static int mlx5_fpga_conn_create_cq(struct mlx5_fpga_conn *conn, int cq_size) __be64 *pas; u32 i; + conn->cq.mcq.cqe_sz = 64; + conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db; + conn->cq.mcq.arm_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; + *conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = 0; + conn->cq.mcq.vector = 0; + conn->cq.mcq.comp = mlx5_fpga_conn_cq_complete; + conn->cq.mcq.uar = fdev->conn_res.uar; + cq_size = roundup_pow_of_two(cq_size); MLX5_SET(cqc, temp_cqc, log_cq_size, ilog2(cq_size)); @@ -468,16 +476,7 @@ static int mlx5_fpga_conn_create_cq(struct mlx5_fpga_conn *conn, int cq_size) if (err) goto err_cqwq; - conn->cq.mcq.cqe_sz = 64; - conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db; - conn->cq.mcq.arm_db = conn->cq.wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; - *conn->cq.mcq.set_ci_db = 0; - *conn->cq.mcq.arm_db = 0; - conn->cq.mcq.vector = 0; - conn->cq.mcq.comp = mlx5_fpga_conn_cq_complete; - conn->cq.mcq.uar = fdev->conn_res.uar; tasklet_setup(&conn->cq.tasklet, mlx5_fpga_conn_cq_tasklet); - mlx5_fpga_dbg(fdev, "Created CQ #0x%x\n", conn->cq.mcq.cqn); goto out; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c index f57c84e5128b..30401ed45b17 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/steering/dr_send.c @@ -1049,12 +1049,6 @@ static int dr_prepare_qp_to_rts(struct mlx5dr_domain *dmn) return 0; } -static void dr_cq_complete(struct mlx5_core_cq *mcq, - struct mlx5_eqe *eqe) -{ - pr_err("CQ completion CQ: #%u\n", mcq->cqn); -} - static struct mlx5dr_cq *dr_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, struct mlx5_uars_page *uar, size_t ncqe) @@ -1089,6 +1083,14 @@ static struct mlx5dr_cq *dr_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, cqe->op_own = MLX5_CQE_INVALID << 4 | MLX5_CQE_OWNER_MASK; } + cq->mcq.cqe_sz = 64; + cq->mcq.set_ci_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db; + cq->mcq.arm_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; + *cq->mcq.set_ci_db = 0; + cq->mcq.vector = 0; + cq->mcq.uar = uar; + cq->mdev = mdev; + inlen = MLX5_ST_SZ_BYTES(create_cq_in) + sizeof(u64) * cq->wq_ctrl.buf.npages; in = kvzalloc(inlen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -1112,28 +1114,12 @@ static struct mlx5dr_cq *dr_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *mdev, pas = (__be64 *)MLX5_ADDR_OF(create_cq_in, in, pas); mlx5_fill_page_frag_array(&cq->wq_ctrl.buf, pas); - cq->mcq.comp = dr_cq_complete; - err = mlx5_core_create_cq(mdev, &cq->mcq, in, inlen, out, sizeof(out)); kvfree(in); if (err) goto err_cqwq; - cq->mcq.cqe_sz = 64; - cq->mcq.set_ci_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db; - cq->mcq.arm_db = cq->wq_ctrl.db.db + 1; - *cq->mcq.set_ci_db = 0; - - /* set no-zero value, in order to avoid the HW to run db-recovery on - * CQ that used in polling mode. - */ - *cq->mcq.arm_db = cpu_to_be32(2 << 28); - - cq->mcq.vector = 0; - cq->mcq.uar = uar; - cq->mdev = mdev; - return cq; err_cqwq: diff --git a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c index e538e7e0874f..743ced205fca 100644 --- a/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c +++ b/drivers/vdpa/mlx5/net/mlx5_vnet.c @@ -553,6 +553,8 @@ static int cq_create(struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev, u16 idx, u32 num_ent) vcq->mcq.set_ci_db = vcq->db.db; vcq->mcq.arm_db = vcq->db.db + 1; vcq->mcq.cqe_sz = 64; + vcq->mcq.comp = mlx5_vdpa_cq_comp; + vcq->cqe = num_ent; err = cq_frag_buf_alloc(ndev, &vcq->buf, num_ent); if (err) @@ -592,10 +594,6 @@ static int cq_create(struct mlx5_vdpa_net *ndev, u16 idx, u32 num_ent) if (err) goto err_vec; - vcq->mcq.comp = mlx5_vdpa_cq_comp; - vcq->cqe = num_ent; - vcq->mcq.set_ci_db = vcq->db.db; - vcq->mcq.arm_db = vcq->db.db + 1; mlx5_cq_arm(&mvq->cq.mcq, MLX5_CQ_DB_REQ_NOT, uar_page, mvq->cq.mcq.cons_index); kfree(in); return 0; diff --git a/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h b/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h index cb15308b5cb0..804432fd0f27 100644 --- a/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h +++ b/include/linux/mlx5/cq.h @@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ static inline void mlx5_cq_put(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq) complete(&cq->free); } +void mlx5_add_cq_to_tasklet(struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, struct mlx5_eqe *eqe); int mlx5_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, u32 *in, int inlen, u32 *out, int outlen); int mlx5_core_create_cq(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev, struct mlx5_core_cq *cq, -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: usb: qmi_wwan: initialize MAC header offset in qmimux_rx_fixup
by Jiacheng Yu 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit dd03780c29f87c26c0e0bb7e0db528c8109461fb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11602 CVE: CVE-2025-68192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e120f46768d98151ece8756ebd688b0e43dc8b29 ] Raw IP packets have no MAC header, leaving skb->mac_header uninitialized. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM64 when xfrm or other subsystems access the offset due to strict alignment checks. Initialize the MAC header to prevent such crashes. This can trigger kernel panics on ARM when running IPsec over the qmimux0 interface. Example trace: Internal error: Oops: 000000009600004f [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.34-gbe78e49cb433 #1 Hardware name: LS1028A RDB Board (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 lr : xfrm_input+0x61c/0x1318 sp : ffff800080003b20 Call trace: xfrm_input+0xde8/0x1318 xfrm6_rcv+0x38/0x44 xfrm6_esp_rcv+0x48/0xa8 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x94/0x4b0 ip6_input_finish+0x44/0x70 ip6_input+0x44/0xc0 ipv6_rcv+0x6c/0x114 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x5c/0x8c __netif_receive_skb+0x18/0x60 process_backlog+0x78/0x17c __napi_poll+0x38/0x180 net_rx_action+0x168/0x2f0 Fixes: c6adf77953bc ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: add qmap mux protocol support") Signed-off-by: Qendrim Maxhuni <qendrim.maxhuni(a)garderos.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251029075744.105113-1-qendrim.maxhuni@garderos.c… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Yu <yujiacheng3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c index dc84d9029c2c..fff4e8fc72e9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c @@ -192,6 +192,12 @@ static int qmimux_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!skbn) return 0; + /* Raw IP packets don't have a MAC header, but other subsystems + * (like xfrm) may still access MAC header offsets, so they must + * be initialized. + */ + skb_reset_mac_header(skbn); + switch (skb->data[offset + qmimux_hdr_sz] & 0xf0) { case 0x40: skbn->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday
by Xinyu Zheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Jisheng Zhang (1): arm64: vdso: remove two .altinstructions related symbols Joey Gouly (3): arm64: module: move find_section to header arm64: alternative: patch alternatives in the vDSO arm64: vdso: use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday Yang Yingliang (1): vdso: do cntvct workaround in the VDSO arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 15 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 5 +++ 7 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] driver core: fix potential null-ptr-deref in device_add()
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit f6837f34a34973ef6600c08195ed300e24e97317 category: bugfix bugzilla: CVE-2023-54321 CVE: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13118 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- I got the following null-ptr-deref report while doing fault injection test: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 CPU: 2 PID: 278 Comm: 37-i2c-ds2482 Tainted: G B W N 6.1.0-rc3+ RIP: 0010:klist_put+0x2d/0xd0 Call Trace: <TASK> klist_remove+0xf1/0x1c0 device_release_driver_internal+0x196/0x210 bus_remove_device+0x1bd/0x240 device_add+0xd3d/0x1100 w1_add_master_device+0x476/0x490 [wire] ds2482_probe+0x303/0x3e0 [ds2482] This is how it happened: w1_alloc_dev() // The dev->driver is set to w1_master_driver. memcpy(&dev->dev, device, sizeof(struct device)); device_add() bus_add_device() dpm_sysfs_add() // It fails, calls bus_remove_device. // error path bus_remove_device() // The dev->driver is not null, but driver is not bound. __device_release_driver() klist_remove(&dev->p->knode_driver) <-- It causes null-ptr-deref. // normal path bus_probe_device() // It's not called yet. device_bind_driver() If dev->driver is set, in the error path after calling bus_add_device() in device_add(), bus_remove_device() is called, then the device will be detached from driver. But device_bind_driver() is not called yet, so it causes null-ptr-deref while access the 'knode_driver'. To fix this, set dev->driver to null in the error path before calling bus_remove_device(). Fixes: 57eee3d23e88 ("Driver core: Call device_pm_add() after bus_add_device() in device_add()") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221205034904.2077765-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index 81889d8ccbd1..7c4b4add4485 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -3052,6 +3052,7 @@ int device_add(struct device *dev) device_pm_remove(dev); dpm_sysfs_remove(dev); DPMError: + dev->driver = NULL; bus_remove_device(dev); BusError: device_remove_attrs(dev); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arch_topology: Fix incorrect error check in topology_parse_cpu_capacity()
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.246 commit 64da320252e43456cc9ec3055ff567f168467b37 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11599 CVE: CVE-2025-40346 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2eead19334516c8e9927c11b448fbe512b1f18a1 ] Fix incorrect use of PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() in topology_parse_cpu_capacity() which causes the code to proceed with NULL clock pointers. The current logic uses !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) which evaluates to true for both valid pointers and NULL, leading to potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate(). Per include/linux/err.h documentation, PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(ptr) returns: "The error code within @ptr if it is an error pointer; 0 otherwise." This means PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO() returns 0 for both valid pointers AND NULL pointers. Therefore !PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk) evaluates to true (proceed) when cpu_clk is either valid or NULL, causing clk_get_rate(NULL) to be called when of_clk_get() returns NULL. Replace with !IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk) which only proceeds for valid pointers, preventing potential NULL pointer dereference in clk_get_rate(). Cc: stable <stable(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kaushlendra Kumar <kaushlendra.kumar(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> Fixes: b8fe128dad8f ("arch_topology: Adjust initial CPU capacities with current freq") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250923174308.1771906-1-kaushlendra.kumar@intel.c… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/base/arch_topology.c [46db6d4797f18 has not merged] Signed-off-by: Zhang Yuwei <zhangyuwei20(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/arch_topology.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/arch_topology.c b/drivers/base/arch_topology.c index ef77b53c2f3d..58359e7ac7e6 100644 --- a/drivers/base/arch_topology.c +++ b/drivers/base/arch_topology.c @@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ bool __init topology_parse_cpu_capacity(struct device_node *cpu_node, int cpu) * frequency (by keeping the initial capacity_freq_ref value). */ cpu_clk = of_clk_get(cpu_node, 0); - if (!PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(cpu_clk)) { + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(cpu_clk)) { per_cpu(capacity_freq_ref, cpu) = clk_get_rate(cpu_clk) / HZ_PER_KHZ; clk_put(cpu_clk); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] usb: early: xhci-dbc: Fix a potential out-of-bound memory access
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit a4a97ab3db5c081eb6e7dba91306adefb461e0bd category: bugfix bugzilla: hhttps://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11438 CVE: CVE-2023-53840 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- If xdbc_bulk_write() fails, the values in 'buf' can be anything. So the string is not guaranteed to be NULL terminated when xdbc_trace() is called. Reserve an extra byte, which will be zeroed automatically because 'buf' is a static variable, in order to avoid troubles, should it happen. Fixes: aeb9dd1de98c ("usb/early: Add driver for xhci debug capability") Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d6a7562c5e839a195cee85db6dc81817f9372cb1.16750161… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c b/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c index 6c0434100e38..b0c4071f0b16 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c +++ b/drivers/usb/early/xhci-dbc.c @@ -871,7 +871,8 @@ static int xdbc_bulk_write(const char *bytes, int size) static void early_xdbc_write(struct console *con, const char *str, u32 n) { - static char buf[XDBC_MAX_PACKET]; + /* static variables are zeroed, so buf is always NULL terminated */ + static char buf[XDBC_MAX_PACKET + 1]; int chunk, ret; int use_cr = 0; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday
by Xinyu Zheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Jisheng Zhang (1): arm64: vdso: remove two .altinstructions related symbols Joey Gouly (3): arm64: module: move find_section to header arm64: alternative: patch alternatives in the vDSO arm64: vdso: use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday Yang Yingliang (1): vdso: do cntvct workaround in the VDSO arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 15 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 5 +++ 7 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: David Gow <davidgow(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 699fb50d99039a50e7494de644f96c889279aca3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8116 CVE: CVE-2023-53596 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In the current code, devres_release_all() only gets called if the device has a bus and has been probed. This leads to issues when using bus-less or driver-less devices where the device might never get freed if a managed resource holds a reference to the device. This is happening in the DRM framework for example. We should thus call devres_release_all() in the device_del() function to make sure that the device-managed actions are properly executed when the device is unregistered, even if it has neither a bus nor a driver. This is effectively the same change than commit 2f8d16a996da ("devres: release resources on device_del()") that got reverted by commit a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") over memory leaks concerns. This patch effectively combines the two commits mentioned above to release the resources both on device_del() and device_release() and get the best of both worlds. Fixes: a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") Signed-off-by: David Gow <davidgow(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <mripard(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-kunit-devm-inconsistencies-test-v3-3-6aa… Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/base/core.c drivers/base/test/platform-device-test.c drivers/base/test/root-device-test.c [context conflicts: platform-device-test.c and root-device-test.c do not exist. ed9f918174cb "driver core: bus: move bus notifier logic into bus.c" not merged] Signed-off-by: Chen Jun <chenjun102(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index eb82b43181be..81889d8ccbd1 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -3210,6 +3210,17 @@ void device_del(struct device *dev) device_remove_properties(dev); device_links_purge(dev); + /* + * If a device does not have a driver attached, we need to clean + * up any managed resources. We do this in device_release(), but + * it's never called (and we leak the device) if a managed + * resource holds a reference to the device. So release all + * managed resources here, like we do in driver_detach(). We + * still need to do so again in device_release() in case someone + * adds a new resource after this point, though. + */ + devres_release_all(dev); + if (dev->bus) blocking_notifier_call_chain(&dev->bus->p->bus_notifier, BUS_NOTIFY_REMOVED_DEVICE, dev); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] driver core: fix resource leak in device_add()
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit 6977b1a5d67097eaa4d02b0c126c04cc6e8917c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/8108 CVE: CVE-2023-53594 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When calling kobject_add() failed in device_add(), it will call cleanup_glue_dir() to free resource. But in kobject_add(), dev->kobj.parent has been set to NULL. This will cause resource leak. The process is as follows: device_add() get_device_parent() class_dir_create_and_add() kobject_add() //kobject_get() ... dev->kobj.parent = kobj; ... kobject_add() //failed, but set dev->kobj.parent = NULL ... glue_dir = get_glue_dir(dev) //glue_dir = NULL, and goto //"Error" label ... cleanup_glue_dir() //becaues glue_dir is NULL, not call //kobject_put() The preceding problem may cause insmod mac80211_hwsim.ko to failed. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/virtual/mac80211_hwsim' Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x8e/0xd1 sysfs_warn_dup.cold+0x1c/0x29 sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x224/0x280 kobject_add_internal+0x2aa/0x880 kobject_add+0x135/0x1a0 get_device_parent+0x3d7/0x590 device_add+0x2aa/0x1cb0 device_create_groups_vargs+0x1eb/0x260 device_create+0xdc/0x110 mac80211_hwsim_new_radio+0x31e/0x4790 [mac80211_hwsim] init_mac80211_hwsim+0x48d/0x1000 [mac80211_hwsim] do_one_initcall+0x10f/0x630 do_init_module+0x19f/0x5e0 load_module+0x64b7/0x6eb0 __do_sys_finit_module+0x140/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0 </TASK> kobject_add_internal failed for mac80211_hwsim with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory. Fixes: cebf8fd16900 ("driver core: fix race between creating/querying glue dir and its cleanup") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123012042.335252-1-shaozhengchao@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yuan Can <yuancan(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/base/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/base/core.c b/drivers/base/core.c index cdd46fe88fc7..eb82b43181be 100644 --- a/drivers/base/core.c +++ b/drivers/base/core.c @@ -2959,7 +2959,7 @@ int device_add(struct device *dev) /* we require the name to be set before, and pass NULL */ error = kobject_add(&dev->kobj, dev->kobj.parent, NULL); if (error) { - glue_dir = get_glue_dir(dev); + glue_dir = kobj; goto Error; } -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix CVE-2022-49309
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

The cve itself and its later fixes. Duoming Zhou (1): drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix deadlock in rtw_surveydone_event_callback() Hans de Goede (1): drivers: staging: rtl8723bs: Fix locking in rtw_scan_timeout_handler() drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.22.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] kernel/resource: fix kfree() of bootmem memory again
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit 0cbcc92917c5de80f15c24d033566539ad696892 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/486 CVE: CVE-2022-49190 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Since commit ebff7d8f270d ("mem hotunplug: fix kfree() of bootmem memory"), we could get a resource allocated during boot via alloc_resource(). And it's required to release the resource using free_resource(). Howerver, many people use kfree directly which will result in kernel BUG. In order to fix this without fixing every call site, just leak a couple of bytes in such corner case. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220217083619.19305-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com Fixes: ebff7d8f270d ("mem hotunplug: fix kfree() of bootmem memory") Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david(a)redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams(a)intel.com> Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflicts: kernel/resource.c [Just contexts conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/resource.c | 41 ++++++++--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index 1087f33d70c4..ea4d7a02b8e8 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -53,14 +53,6 @@ struct resource_constraint { static DEFINE_RWLOCK(resource_lock); -/* - * For memory hotplug, there is no way to free resource entries allocated - * by boot mem after the system is up. So for reusing the resource entry - * we need to remember the resource. - */ -static struct resource *bootmem_resource_free; -static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootmem_resource_lock); - static struct resource *next_resource(struct resource *p, bool sibling_only) { /* Caller wants to traverse through siblings only */ @@ -149,36 +141,19 @@ __initcall(ioresources_init); static void free_resource(struct resource *res) { - if (!res) - return; - - if (!PageSlab(virt_to_head_page(res))) { - spin_lock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - res->sibling = bootmem_resource_free; - bootmem_resource_free = res; - spin_unlock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - } else { + /** + * If the resource was allocated using memblock early during boot + * we'll leak it here: we can only return full pages back to the + * buddy and trying to be smart and reusing them eventually in + * alloc_resource() overcomplicates resource handling. + */ + if (res && PageSlab(virt_to_head_page(res))) kfree(res); - } } static struct resource *alloc_resource(gfp_t flags) { - struct resource *res = NULL; - - spin_lock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - if (bootmem_resource_free) { - res = bootmem_resource_free; - bootmem_resource_free = res->sibling; - } - spin_unlock(&bootmem_resource_lock); - - if (res) - memset(res, 0, sizeof(struct resource)); - else - res = kzalloc(sizeof(struct resource), flags); - - return res; + return kzalloc(sizeof(struct resource), flags); } /* Return the conflict entry if you can't request it */ -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal: Prevent division by zero
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.237 commit ce773dd844ee19a605af27f11470887e0f2044a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10438 CVE: CVE-2025-37766 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4e3d9508c056d7e0a56b58d5c81253e2a0d22b6c upstream. The user can set any speed value. If speed is greater than UINT_MAX/8, division by zero is possible. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. Fixes: 031db09017da ("drm/amd/powerplay/vega20: enable fan RPM and pwm settings V2") Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev(a)swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Mingrui <liumingrui(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c index 364162ddaa9c..87b7baa9492b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/pm/powerplay/hwmgr/vega20_thermal.c @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ int vega20_fan_ctrl_set_fan_speed_rpm(struct pp_hwmgr *hwmgr, uint32_t speed) uint32_t tach_period, crystal_clock_freq; int result = 0; - if (!speed) + if (!speed || speed > UINT_MAX/8) return -EINVAL; if (PP_CAP(PHM_PlatformCaps_MicrocodeFanControl)) { -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav(a)linux.ibm.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc1 commit cbf9c4b9617b6767886a913705ca14b7600c77db category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9735 CVE: CVE-2022-50159 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Presently ima_get_kexec_buffer() doesn't check if the previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer lies outside the addressable memory range. This can result in a kernel panic if the new kernel is booted with 'mem=X' arg and the ima-kexec-buffer was allocated beyond that range by the previous kernel. The panic is usually of the form below: $ sudo kexec --initrd initrd vmlinux --append='mem=16G' <snip> BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc000c01fff7f0000 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000837974 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] <snip> NIP [c000000000837974] ima_restore_measurement_list+0x94/0x6c0 LR [c00000000083b55c] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0xac/0x160 Call Trace: [c00000000371fa80] [c00000000083b55c] ima_load_kexec_buffer+0xac/0x160 [c00000000371fb00] [c0000000020512c4] ima_init+0x80/0x108 [c00000000371fb70] [c0000000020514dc] init_ima+0x4c/0x120 [c00000000371fbf0] [c000000000012240] do_one_initcall+0x60/0x2c0 [c00000000371fcc0] [c000000002004ad0] kernel_init_freeable+0x344/0x3ec [c00000000371fda0] [c0000000000128a4] kernel_init+0x34/0x1b0 [c00000000371fe10] [c00000000000ce64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64 Instruction dump: f92100b8 f92100c0 90e10090 910100a0 4182050c 282a0017 3bc00000 40810330 7c0802a6 fb610198 7c9b2378 f80101d0 <a1240000> 2c090001 40820614 e9240010 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fix this issue by checking returned PFN range of previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer with page_is_ram() to ensure correct memory bounds. Fixes: 467d27824920 ("powerpc: ima: get the kexec buffer passed by the previous kernel") Cc: Frank Rowand <frowand.list(a)gmail.com> Cc: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas(a)linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman(a)linux.ibm.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Cc: Ritesh Harjani <ritesh.list(a)gmail.com> Cc: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Vaibhav Jain <vaibhav(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Rob Herring <robh(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220531041446.3334259-1-vaibhav@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/of/kexec.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/of/kexec.c b/drivers/of/kexec.c index d8231c34e873..f0e6495d0536 100644 --- a/drivers/of/kexec.c +++ b/drivers/of/kexec.c @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) { int ret, len; unsigned long tmp_addr; + unsigned long start_pfn, end_pfn; size_t tmp_size; const void *prop; @@ -147,6 +148,22 @@ int ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size) if (ret) return ret; + /* Do some sanity on the returned size for the ima-kexec buffer */ + if (!tmp_size) + return -ENOENT; + + /* + * Calculate the PFNs for the buffer and ensure + * they are with in addressable memory. + */ + start_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr); + end_pfn = PHYS_PFN(tmp_addr + tmp_size - 1); + if (!page_is_ram(start_pfn) || !page_is_ram(end_pfn)) { + pr_warn("IMA buffer at 0x%lx, size = 0x%zx beyond memory\n", + tmp_addr, tmp_size); + return -EINVAL; + } + *addr = __va(tmp_addr); *size = tmp_size; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] HID: core: Harden s32ton() against conversion to 0 bits
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit a6b87bfc2ab5bccb7ad953693c85d9062aef3fdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9186 CVE: CVE-2025-38556 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- Testing by the syzbot fuzzer showed that the HID core gets a shift-out-of-bounds exception when it tries to convert a 32-bit quantity to a 0-bit quantity. Ideally this should never occur, but there are buggy devices and some might have a report field with size set to zero; we shouldn't reject the report or the device just because of that. Instead, harden the s32ton() routine so that it returns a reasonable result instead of crashing when it is called with the number of bits set to 0 -- the same as what snto32() does. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern(a)rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-usb/68753a08.050a0220.33d347.0008.GAE@google.… Tested-by: syzbot+b63d677d63bcac06cf90(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: dde5845a529f ("[PATCH] Generic HID layer - code split") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/613a66cd-4309-4bce-a4f7-2905f9bce0c9@rowland.harva… Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-core.c [Only context conflict because of commit c653ffc283404 is not applied] Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index 3094c33bb8f9..a602f572d458 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1347,7 +1347,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hid_snto32); static u32 s32ton(__s32 value, unsigned n) { - s32 a = value >> (n - 1); + s32 a; + + if (!value || !n) + return 0; + + a = value >> (n - 1); if (a && a != -1) return value < 0 ? 1 << (n - 1) : (1 << (n - 1)) - 1; return value & ((1 << n) - 1); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] iommu/amd: Avoid stack buffer overflow from kernel cmdline
by Wang Wensheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.241 commit a732502bf3bbe859613b6d7b2b0313b11f0474ac category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9098 CVE: CVE-2025-38676 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8503d0fcb1086a7cfe26df67ca4bd9bd9e99bdec ] While the kernel command line is considered trusted in most environments, avoid writing 1 byte past the end of "acpiid" if the "str" argument is maximum length. Reported-by: Simcha Kosman <simcha.kosman(a)cyberark.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/AS8P193MB2271C4B24BCEDA31830F37AE84A52@AS8P193M… Fixes: b6b26d86c61c ("iommu/amd: Add a length limitation for the ivrs_acpihid command-line parameter") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ankit Soni <Ankit.Soni(a)amd.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250804154023.work.970-kees@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Wensheng <wangwensheng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/init.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c index d0a4ec42fd12..8e3570b77798 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/init.c @@ -3223,7 +3223,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(char *str) { u32 seg = 0, bus, dev, fn; char *hid, *uid, *p, *addr; - char acpiid[ACPIID_LEN] = {0}; + char acpiid[ACPIID_LEN + 1] = { }; /* size with NULL terminator */ int i; addr = strchr(str, '@'); @@ -3249,7 +3249,7 @@ static int __init parse_ivrs_acpihid(char *str) /* We have the '@', make it the terminator to get just the acpiid */ *addr++ = 0; - if (strlen(str) > ACPIID_LEN + 1) + if (strlen(str) > ACPIID_LEN) goto not_found; if (sscanf(str, "=%s", acpiid) != 1) -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/5] Use CNTVCTSS_EL0 in gettimeofday()
by Xinyu Zheng 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Jisheng Zhang (1): arm64: vdso: remove two .altinstructions related symbols Joey Gouly (3): arm64: module: move find_section to header arm64: alternative: patch alternatives in the vDSO arm64: vdso: use SYS_CNTVCTSS_EL0 for gettimeofday Yang Yingliang (1): vdso: do cntvct workaround in the VDSO arch/arm64/include/asm/module.h | 15 ++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso.h | 3 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/vdso/gettimeofday.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++---- arch/arm64/kernel/alternative.c | 28 +++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/module.c | 15 -------- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso.c | 2 -- arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/vdso.lds.S | 5 +++ 7 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 6

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-40215
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-40215 Sabrina Dubroca (2): xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x xfrm: also call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel at destroy time for states that were never added include/net/xfrm.h | 1 - net/ipv4/ipcomp.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 1 - net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 20 +++++++++----------- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-39797
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-39797 Aakash Kumar S (1): xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling Sabrina Dubroca (1): xfrm: xfrm_alloc_spi shouldn't use 0 as SPI net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: allow exp not to be removed in nf_ct_find_expectation
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 4914109a8e1e494c6aa9852f9e84ec77a5fc643f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11115 CVE: CVE-2023-52927 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Currently nf_conntrack_in() calling nf_ct_find_expectation() will remove the exp from the hash table. However, in some scenario, we expect the exp not to be removed when the created ct will not be confirmed, like in OVS and TC conntrack in the following patches. This patch allows exp not to be removed by setting IPS_CONFIRMED in the status of the tmpl. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Aaron Conole <aconole(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c net/netfilter/nft_ct.c [commit 50bfbb8957ab remove pr_debug calls, which lead to conflicts in init_conntrack(). commit c53bd0e96662 move ct counter to net_generic data which not merged lead to conflict in nf_ct_find_expectation(). commit 719774377 convert to refcount_t api in conntrack, which not merged lead to conflicts] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h index 0855b60fba17..f642a87ea330 100644 --- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h +++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ nf_ct_expect_find_get(struct net *net, struct nf_conntrack_expect * nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, - const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple); + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, bool unlink); void nf_ct_unlink_expect_report(struct nf_conntrack_expect *exp, u32 portid, int report); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index 9090d677ddfa..371aef7774f6 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ init_conntrack(struct net *net, struct nf_conn *tmpl, local_bh_disable(); if (net->ct.expect_count) { spin_lock(&nf_conntrack_expect_lock); - exp = nf_ct_find_expectation(net, zone, tuple); + exp = nf_ct_find_expectation(net, zone, tuple, !tmpl || nf_ct_is_confirmed(tmpl)); if (exp) { pr_debug("expectation arrives ct=%p exp=%p\n", ct, exp); diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c index 42557d2b6a90..45f29e28aba3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.c @@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_ct_expect_find_get); struct nf_conntrack_expect * nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone, - const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) + const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple, bool unlink) { struct nf_conntrack_expect *i, *exp = NULL; unsigned int h; @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ nf_ct_find_expectation(struct net *net, !atomic_inc_not_zero(&exp->master->ct_general.use))) return NULL; - if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT) { + if (exp->flags & NF_CT_EXPECT_PERMANENT || !unlink) { refcount_inc(&exp->use); return exp; } else if (del_timer(&exp->timeout)) { diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index 2a8dfa68f6e2..32b83333e834 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ static void nft_ct_set_zone_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, regs->verdict.code = NF_DROP; return; } + __set_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &ct->status); } atomic_inc(&ct->ct_general.use); @@ -375,6 +376,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_tmpl_alloc_pcpu(void) return false; } + __set_bit(IPS_CONFIRMED_BIT, &tmp->status); atomic_set(&tmp->ct_general.use, 1); per_cpu(nft_ct_pcpu_template, cpu) = tmp; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc4 commit 8259eb0e06d8f64c700f5fbdb28a5c18e10de291 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9634 CVE: CVE-2025-38154 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The sk->sk_socket is not locked or referenced in backlog thread, and during the call to skb_send_sock(), there is a race condition with the release of sk_socket. All types of sockets(tcp/udp/unix/vsock) will be affected. Race conditions: ''' CPU0 CPU1 backlog::skb_send_sock sendmsg_unlocked sock_sendmsg sock_sendmsg_nosec close(fd): ... ops->release() -> sock_map_close() sk_socket->ops = NULL free(socket) sock->ops->sendmsg ^ panic here ''' The ref of psock become 0 after sock_map_close() executed. ''' void sock_map_close() { ... if (likely(psock)) { ... // !! here we remove psock and the ref of psock become 0 sock_map_remove_links(sk, psock) psock = sk_psock_get(sk); if (unlikely(!psock)) goto no_psock; <=== Control jumps here via goto ... cancel_delayed_work_sync(&psock->work); <=== not executed sk_psock_put(sk, psock); ... } ''' Based on the fact that we already wait for the workqueue to finish in sock_map_close() if psock is held, we simply increase the psock reference count to avoid race conditions. With this patch, if the backlog thread is running, sock_map_close() will wait for the backlog thread to complete and cancel all pending work. If no backlog running, any pending work that hasn't started by then will fail when invoked by sk_psock_get(), as the psock reference count have been zeroed, and sk_psock_drop() will cancel all jobs via cancel_delayed_work_sync(). In summary, we require synchronization to coordinate the backlog thread and close() thread. The panic I catched: ''' Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog RIP: 0010:sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc9000521fad8 RCX: 0000000000000001 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x40/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x14c/0x230 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? sock_sendmsg+0x21d/0x440 ? sock_sendmsg+0x3e0/0x440 ? __pfx_sock_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 __skb_send_sock+0x543/0xb70 sk_psock_backlog+0x247/0xb80 ... ''' Fixes: 4b4647add7d3 ("sock_map: avoid race between sock_map_close and sk_psock_put") Reported-by: Michal Luczaj <mhal(a)rbox.co> Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250516141713.291150-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Conflicts: net/core/skmsg.c [commit 3b4f14b79428 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skmsg.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index cc6570d71911..5150fc93dd9b 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -543,6 +543,13 @@ static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work) u32 len, off; int ret; + /* Increment the psock refcnt to synchronize with close(fd) path in + * sock_map_close(), ensuring we wait for backlog thread completion + * before sk_socket freed. If refcnt increment fails, it indicates + * sock_map_close() completed with sk_socket potentially already freed. + */ + if (!sk_psock_get(psock->sk)) + return; mutex_lock(&psock->work_mutex); if (unlikely(state->skb)) { spin_lock_bh(&psock->ingress_lock); @@ -586,6 +593,7 @@ static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work) } end: mutex_unlock(&psock->work_mutex); + sk_psock_put(psock->sk, psock); } struct sk_psock *sk_psock_init(struct sock *sk, int node) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.238 commit 7595de7bc56e0e52b74e56c90f7e247bf626d628 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10070 CVE: CVE-2025-38004 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit c2aba69d0c36a496ab4f2e81e9c2b271f2693fd7 upstream. The CAN broadcast manager (CAN BCM) can send a sequence of CAN frames via hrtimer. The content and also the length of the sequence can be changed resp reduced at runtime where the 'currframe' counter is then set to zero. Although this appeared to be a safe operation the updates of 'currframe' can be triggered from user space and hrtimer context in bcm_can_tx(). Anderson Nascimento created a proof of concept that triggered a KASAN slab-out-of-bounds read access which can be prevented with a spin_lock_bh. At the rework of bcm_can_tx() the 'count' variable has been moved into the protected section as this variable can be modified from both contexts too. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Reported-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson(a)allelesecurity.com> Tested-by: Anderson Nascimento <anderson(a)allelesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250519125027.11900-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/can/bcm.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index cb849b5a8c14..9ce1e5c777f2 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ #include <linux/can/skb.h> #include <linux/can/bcm.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> @@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ struct bcm_op { struct canfd_frame last_sframe; struct sock *sk; struct net_device *rx_reg_dev; + spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */ }; struct bcm_sock { @@ -273,13 +275,18 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) { struct sk_buff *skb; struct net_device *dev; - struct canfd_frame *cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe; + struct canfd_frame *cf; int err; /* no target device? => exit */ if (!op->ifindex) return; + /* read currframe under lock protection */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe; + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), op->ifindex); if (!dev) { /* RFC: should this bcm_op remove itself here? */ @@ -300,6 +307,10 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) skb->dev = dev; can_skb_set_owner(skb, op->sk); err = can_send(skb, 1); + + /* update currframe and count under lock protection */ + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + if (!err) op->frames_abs++; @@ -308,6 +319,11 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op) /* reached last frame? */ if (op->currframe >= op->nframes) op->currframe = 0; + + if (op->count > 0) + op->count--; + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); out: dev_put(dev); } @@ -404,7 +420,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) struct bcm_msg_head msg_head; if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) { - op->count--; + bcm_can_tx(op); if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) { /* create notification to user */ @@ -419,7 +435,6 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer) bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0); } - bcm_can_tx(op); } else if (op->kt_ival2) { bcm_can_tx(op); @@ -909,6 +924,27 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, } op->flags = msg_head->flags; + /* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */ + if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes || + op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX || + op->flags & SETTIMER) { + + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + + if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes || + op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) { + /* potentially update changed nframes */ + op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; + /* restart multiple frame transmission */ + op->currframe = 0; + } + + if (op->flags & SETTIMER) + op->count = msg_head->count; + + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock); + } + } else { /* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */ @@ -916,9 +952,14 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, if (!op) return -ENOMEM; + spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_tx_lock); op->can_id = msg_head->can_id; op->cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head->flags); op->flags = msg_head->flags; + op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; + + if (op->flags & SETTIMER) + op->count = msg_head->count; /* create array for CAN frames and copy the data */ if (msg_head->nframes > 1) { @@ -977,22 +1018,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, } /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */ - if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes) { - op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; - /* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */ - op->currframe = 0; - } - - /* check flags */ - - if (op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) { - /* start multiple frame transmission with index 0 */ - op->currframe = 0; - } - if (op->flags & SETTIMER) { /* set timer values */ - op->count = msg_head->count; op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1; op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2; op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1); @@ -1009,11 +1036,8 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg, op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE; } - if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) { + if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE) bcm_can_tx(op); - if (op->count) - op->count--; - } if (op->flags & STARTTIMER) bcm_tx_start_timer(op); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] RDMA/rxe: Fix slab-use-after-free Read in rxe_queue_cleanup bug
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.238 commit 3a3b73e135e3bd18423d0baa72571319c7feb759 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9719 CVE: CVE-2025-38024 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f81b33582f9339d2dc17c69b92040d3650bb4bae ] Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcf/0x610 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0xb5/0xe0 mm/kasan/report.c:602 rxe_queue_cleanup+0xd0/0xe0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_queue.c:195 rxe_cq_cleanup+0x3f/0x50 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c:132 __rxe_cleanup+0x168/0x300 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_pool.c:232 rxe_create_cq+0x22e/0x3a0 drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_verbs.c:1109 create_cq+0x658/0xb90 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1052 ib_uverbs_create_cq+0xc7/0x120 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_cmd.c:1095 ib_uverbs_write+0x969/0xc90 drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:679 vfs_write fs/read_write.c:677 [inline] vfs_write+0x26a/0xcc0 fs/read_write.c:659 ksys_write+0x1b8/0x200 fs/read_write.c:731 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f In the function rxe_create_cq, when rxe_cq_from_init fails, the function rxe_cleanup will be called to handle the allocated resources. In fact, some memory resources have already been freed in the function rxe_cq_from_init. Thus, this problem will occur. The solution is to let rxe_cleanup do all the work. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://paste.ubuntu.com/p/tJgC42wDf6/ Tested-by: liuyi <liuy22(a)mails.tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250412075714.3257358-1-yanjun.zhu@linux.dev Reviewed-by: Daisuke Matsuda <matsuda-daisuke(a)fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c index 43394c3f29d4..129576a79698 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_cq.c @@ -69,11 +69,8 @@ int rxe_cq_from_init(struct rxe_dev *rxe, struct rxe_cq *cq, int cqe, err = do_mmap_info(rxe, uresp ? &uresp->mi : NULL, udata, cq->queue->buf, cq->queue->buf_size, &cq->queue->ip); - if (err) { - vfree(cq->queue->buf); - kfree(cq->queue); + if (err) return err; - } if (uresp) cq->is_user = 1; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Check skb->transport_header is set in bpf_skb_check_mtu
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit d946f3c98328171fa50ddb908593cf833587f725 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12719 CVE: CVE-2025-68363 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The bpf_skb_check_mtu helper needs to use skb->transport_header when the BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag is used: bpf_skb_check_mtu(skb, ifindex, &mtu_len, 0, BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS) The transport_header is not always set. There is a WARN_ON_ONCE report when CONFIG_DEBUG_NET is enabled + skb->gso_size is set + bpf_prog_test_run is used: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2216 at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3071 skb_gso_validate_network_len bpf_skb_check_mtu bpf_prog_3920e25740a41171_tc_chk_segs_flag # A test in the next patch bpf_test_run bpf_prog_test_run_skb For a normal ingress skb (not test_run), skb_reset_transport_header is performed but there is plan to avoid setting it as described in commit 2170a1f09148 ("net: no longer reset transport_header in __netif_receive_skb_core()"). This patch fixes the bpf helper by checking skb_transport_header_was_set(). The check is done just before skb->transport_header is used, to avoid breaking the existing bpf prog. The WARN_ON_ONCE is limited to bpf_prog_test_run, so targeting bpf-next. Fixes: 34b2021cc616 ("bpf: Add BPF-helper for MTU checking") Cc: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk(a)kernel.org> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd(a)hust.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251112232331.1566074-1-martin.lau@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/filter.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index c9d4910f3f55..c8bb4537e0fc 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -6360,9 +6360,12 @@ BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_check_mtu, struct sk_buff *, skb, */ if (skb_is_gso(skb)) { ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS; - if (flags & BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS && - !skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu)) - ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG; + if (flags & BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS) { + if (!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)) + return -EINVAL; + if (!skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu)) + ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG; + } } out: *mtu_len = mtu; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Do not let BPF test infra emit invalid GSO types to stack
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc1 commit 04a899573fb87273a656f178b5f920c505f68875 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12743 CVE: CVE-2025-68725 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Yinhao et al. reported that their fuzzer tool was able to trigger a skb_warn_bad_offload() from netif_skb_features() -> gso_features_check(). When a BPF program - triggered via BPF test infra - pushes the packet to the loopback device via bpf_clone_redirect() then mentioned offload warning can be seen. GSO-related features are then rightfully disabled. We get into this situation due to convert___skb_to_skb() setting gso_segs and gso_size but not gso_type. Technically, it makes sense that this warning triggers since the GSO properties are malformed due to the gso_type. Potentially, the gso_type could be marked non-trustworthy through setting it at least to SKB_GSO_DODGY without any other specific assumptions, but that also feels wrong given we should not go further into the GSO engine in the first place. The checks were added in 121d57af308d ("gso: validate gso_type in GSO handlers") because there were malicious (syzbot) senders that combine a protocol with a non-matching gso_type. If we would want to drop such packets, gso_features_check() currently only returns feature flags via netif_skb_features(), so one location for potentially dropping such skbs could be validate_xmit_unreadable_skb(), but then otoh it would be an additional check in the fast-path for a very corner case. Given bpf_clone_redirect() is the only place where BPF test infra could emit such packets, lets reject them right there. Fixes: 850a88cc4096 ("bpf: Expose __sk_buff wire_len/gso_segs to BPF_PROG_TEST_RUN") Fixes: cf62089b0edd ("bpf: Add gso_size to __sk_buff") Reported-by: Yinhao Hu <dddddd(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei <M202472210(a)hust.edu.cn> Reported-by: Dongliang Mu <dzm91(a)hust.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel(a)iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251020075441.127980-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bpf/test_run.c | 5 +++++ net/core/filter.c | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bpf/test_run.c b/net/bpf/test_run.c index 73fb9db55798..5394313c04ef 100644 --- a/net/bpf/test_run.c +++ b/net/bpf/test_run.c @@ -914,6 +914,11 @@ static int convert___skb_to_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct __sk_buff *__skb) if (__skb->gso_segs > GSO_MAX_SEGS) return -EINVAL; + + /* Currently GSO type is zero/unset. If this gets extended with + * a small list of accepted GSO types in future, the filter for + * an unset GSO type in bpf_clone_redirect() can be lifted. + */ skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_segs = __skb->gso_segs; skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_size = __skb->gso_size; skb_shinfo(skb)->hwtstamps.hwtstamp = __skb->hwtstamp; diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index c9d4910f3f55..f3ae3f1babac 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -2451,6 +2451,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_clone_redirect, struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, ifindex, u64, flags) if (unlikely(flags & (~(BPF_F_INGRESS) | BPF_F_REDIRECT_INTERNAL))) return -EINVAL; + /* BPF test infra's convert___skb_to_skb() can create type-less + * GSO packets. gso_features_check() will detect this as a bad + * offload. However, lets not leak them out in the first place. + */ + if (unlikely(skb_is_gso(skb) && !skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type)) + return -EBADMSG; + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(dev_net(skb->dev), ifindex); if (unlikely(!dev)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tcp: use dst_dev_rcu() in tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check()
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18-rc1 commit b62a59c18b692f892dcb8109c1c2e653b2abc95c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11624 CVE: CVE-2025-68188 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Use RCU to avoid a pair of atomic operations and a potential UAF on dst_dev()->flags. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250828195823.3958522-8-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c [commit a74fc62eec15 is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c index 408985eb74ee..f9460e7531ba 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_fastopen.c @@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ bool tcp_fastopen_active_should_disable(struct sock *sk) void tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); + struct net_device *dev; struct dst_entry *dst; struct sk_buff *skb; @@ -574,10 +575,12 @@ void tcp_fastopen_active_disable_ofo_check(struct sock *sk) } } else if (tp->syn_fastopen_ch && atomic_read(&sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times)) { - dst = sk_dst_get(sk); - if (!(dst && dst->dev && (dst->dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) + rcu_read_lock(); + dst = __sk_dst_get(sk); + dev = dst ? dst_dev_rcu(dst) : NULL; + if (!(dev && (dev->flags & IFF_LOOPBACK))) atomic_set(&sock_net(sk)->ipv4.tfo_active_disable_times, 0); - dst_release(dst); + rcu_read_unlock(); } } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: nft_ct: add seqadj extension for natted connections
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Andrii Melnychenko <a.melnychenko(a)vyos.io> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18-rc4 commit 90918e3b6404c2a37837b8f11692471b4c512de2 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11571 CVE: CVE-2025-68206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Sequence adjustment may be required for FTP traffic with PASV/EPSV modes. due to need to re-write packet payload (IP, port) on the ftp control connection. This can require changes to the TCP length and expected seq / ack_seq. The easiest way to reproduce this issue is with PASV mode. Example ruleset: table inet ftp_nat { ct helper ftp_helper { type "ftp" protocol tcp l3proto inet } chain prerouting { type filter hook prerouting priority 0; policy accept; tcp dport 21 ct state new ct helper set "ftp_helper" } } table ip nat { chain prerouting { type nat hook prerouting priority -100; policy accept; tcp dport 21 dnat ip prefix to ip daddr map { 192.168.100.1 : 192.168.13.2/32 } } chain postrouting { type nat hook postrouting priority 100 ; policy accept; tcp sport 21 snat ip prefix to ip saddr map { 192.168.13.2 : 192.168.100.1/32 } } } Note that the ftp helper gets assigned *after* the dnat setup. The inverse (nat after helper assign) is handled by an existing check in nf_nat_setup_info() and will not show the problem. Topoloy: +-------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | FTP: 192.168.13.2 | <-> | NAT: 192.168.13.3, 192.168.100.1 | +-------------------+ +----------------------------------+ | +-----------------------+ | Client: 192.168.100.2 | +-----------------------+ ftp nat changes do not work as expected in this case: Connected to 192.168.100.1. [..] ftp> epsv EPSV/EPRT on IPv4 off. ftp> ls 227 Entering passive mode (192,168,100,1,209,129). 421 Service not available, remote server has closed connection. Kernel logs: Missing nfct_seqadj_ext_add() setup call WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.c:41 [..] __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet+0x100/0x160 [nf_nat] nf_nat_ftp+0x142/0x280 [nf_nat_ftp] help+0x4d1/0x880 [nf_conntrack_ftp] nf_confirm+0x122/0x2e0 [nf_conntrack] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0xb0 .. Fix this by adding the required extension when a conntrack helper is assigned to a connection that has a nat binding. Fixes: 1a64edf54f55 ("netfilter: nft_ct: add helper set support") Signed-off-by: Andrii Melnychenko <a.melnychenko(a)vyos.io> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c index ab1214da99ff..a3750cc7099a 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_l4proto.h> #include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_expect.h> +#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_seqadj.h> struct nft_ct_helper_obj { struct nf_conntrack_helper *helper4; @@ -1173,6 +1174,10 @@ static void nft_ct_helper_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, if (help) { rcu_assign_pointer(help->helper, to_assign); set_bit(IPS_HELPER_BIT, &ct->status); + + if ((ct->status & IPS_NAT_MASK) && !nfct_seqadj(ct)) + if (!nfct_seqadj_ext_add(ct)) + regs->verdict.code = NF_DROP; } } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-40215
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-40215 Sabrina Dubroca (2): xfrm: delete x->tunnel as we delete x xfrm: also call xfrm_state_delete_tunnel at destroy time for states that were never added include/net/xfrm.h | 1 - net/ipv4/ipcomp.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/ipcomp6.c | 2 ++ net/ipv6/xfrm6_tunnel.c | 2 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_ipcomp.c | 1 - net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 20 +++++++++----------- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/sched: sch_qfq: Fix null-deref in agg_dequeue
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc6 commit dd831ac8221e691e9e918585b1003c7071df0379 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7786 CVE: CVE-2025-40083 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- To prevent a potential crash in agg_dequeue (net/sched/sch_qfq.c) when cl->qdisc->ops->peek(cl->qdisc) returns NULL, we check the return value before using it, similar to the existing approach in sch_hfsc.c. To avoid code duplication, the following changes are made: 1. Changed qdisc_warn_nonwc(include/net/pkt_sched.h) into a static inline function. 2. Moved qdisc_peek_len from net/sched/sch_hfsc.c to include/net/pkt_sched.h so that sch_qfq can reuse it. 3. Applied qdisc_peek_len in agg_dequeue to avoid crashing. Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250705212143.3982664-1-xmei5@asu.edu Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/pkt_sched.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- net/sched/sch_api.c | 10 ---------- net/sched/sch_hfsc.c | 16 ---------------- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/pkt_sched.h b/include/net/pkt_sched.h index 15960564e0c3..4d72d24b1f33 100644 --- a/include/net/pkt_sched.h +++ b/include/net/pkt_sched.h @@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ struct qdisc_rate_table *qdisc_get_rtab(struct tc_ratespec *r, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack); void qdisc_put_rtab(struct qdisc_rate_table *tab); void qdisc_put_stab(struct qdisc_size_table *tab); -void qdisc_warn_nonwc(const char *txt, struct Qdisc *qdisc); bool sch_direct_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *q, struct net_device *dev, struct netdev_queue *txq, spinlock_t *root_lock, bool validate); @@ -306,4 +305,28 @@ static inline bool tc_qdisc_stats_dump(struct Qdisc *sch, return true; } +static inline void qdisc_warn_nonwc(const char *txt, struct Qdisc *qdisc) +{ + if (!(qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC)) { + pr_warn("%s: %s qdisc %X: is non-work-conserving?\n", + txt, qdisc->ops->id, qdisc->handle >> 16); + qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC; + } +} + +static inline unsigned int qdisc_peek_len(struct Qdisc *sch) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + unsigned int len; + + skb = sch->ops->peek(sch); + if (unlikely(skb == NULL)) { + qdisc_warn_nonwc("qdisc_peek_len", sch); + return 0; + } + len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb); + + return len; +} + #endif diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c index 13055d6069b3..ff7bad762496 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_api.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c @@ -599,16 +599,6 @@ void __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len(struct sk_buff *skb, qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len = pkt_len; } -void qdisc_warn_nonwc(const char *txt, struct Qdisc *qdisc) -{ - if (!(qdisc->flags & TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC)) { - pr_warn("%s: %s qdisc %X: is non-work-conserving?\n", - txt, qdisc->ops->id, qdisc->handle >> 16); - qdisc->flags |= TCQ_F_WARN_NONWC; - } -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(qdisc_warn_nonwc); - static enum hrtimer_restart qdisc_watchdog(struct hrtimer *timer) { struct qdisc_watchdog *wd = container_of(timer, struct qdisc_watchdog, diff --git a/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c b/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c index afcb83d469ff..751b1e2c35b3 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_hfsc.c @@ -835,22 +835,6 @@ update_vf(struct hfsc_class *cl, unsigned int len, u64 cur_time) } } -static unsigned int -qdisc_peek_len(struct Qdisc *sch) -{ - struct sk_buff *skb; - unsigned int len; - - skb = sch->ops->peek(sch); - if (unlikely(skb == NULL)) { - qdisc_warn_nonwc("qdisc_peek_len", sch); - return 0; - } - len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb); - - return len; -} - static void hfsc_adjust_levels(struct hfsc_class *cl) { diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index 042200066a79..a9db57d29739 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *agg_dequeue(struct qfq_aggregate *agg, if (cl->qdisc->q.qlen == 0) /* no more packets, remove from list */ list_del_init(&cl->alist); - else if (cl->deficit < qdisc_pkt_len(cl->qdisc->ops->peek(cl->qdisc))) { + else if (cl->deficit < qdisc_peek_len(cl->qdisc)) { cl->deficit += agg->lmax; list_move_tail(&cl->alist, &agg->active); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Reject narrower access to pointer ctx fields
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.17-rc1 commit e09299225d5ba3916c91ef70565f7d2187e4cca0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12429 CVE: CVE-2025-38591 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The following BPF program, simplified from a syzkaller repro, causes a kernel warning: r0 = *(u8 *)(r1 + 169); exit; With pointer field sk being at offset 168 in __sk_buff. This access is detected as a narrower read in bpf_skb_is_valid_access because it doesn't match offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk). It is therefore allowed and later proceeds to bpf_convert_ctx_access. Note that for the "is_narrower_load" case in the convert_ctx_accesses(), the insn->off is aligned, so the cnt may not be 0 because it matches the offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk) in the bpf_convert_ctx_access. However, the target_size stays 0 and the verifier errors with a kernel warning: verifier bug: error during ctx access conversion(1) This patch fixes that to return a proper "invalid bpf_context access off=X size=Y" error on the load instruction. The same issue affects multiple other fields in context structures that allow narrow access. Some other non-affected fields (for sk_msg, sk_lookup, and sockopt) were also changed to use bpf_ctx_range_ptr for consistency. Note this syzkaller crash was reported in the "Closes" link below, which used to be about a different bug, fixed in commit fce7bd8e385a ("bpf/verifier: Handle BPF_LOAD_ACQ instructions in insn_def_regno()"). Because syzbot somehow confused the two bugs, the new crash and repro didn't get reported to the mailing list. Fixes: f96da09473b52 ("bpf: simplify narrower ctx access") Fixes: 0df1a55afa832 ("bpf: Warn on internal verifier errors") Reported-by: syzbot+0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0ef84a7bdf5301d4cbec Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau(a)kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3b8dcee67ff4296903351a974ddd9c4dca768b64.175319459… Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/cgroup.c | 8 ++++---- net/core/filter.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c index 90cc73c762cf..1082f5906967 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/cgroup.c @@ -2446,22 +2446,22 @@ static bool cg_sockopt_is_valid_access(int off, int size, } switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sockopt, optval_end): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): + case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sockopt, retval): if (size != size_default) return false; return prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_GETSOCKOPT; diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index c9d4910f3f55..b706fc1260b0 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -8678,7 +8678,7 @@ static bool bpf_skb_is_valid_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct __sk_buff, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct __sk_buff, sk): if (type == BPF_WRITE || size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL; @@ -9282,7 +9282,7 @@ static bool sock_addr_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return false; } break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_addr, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_addr, sk): if (type != BPF_READ) return false; if (size != sizeof(__u64)) @@ -9337,17 +9337,17 @@ static bool sock_ops_is_valid_access(int off, int size, if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; break; - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_data_end): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; @@ -9356,7 +9356,7 @@ static bool sock_ops_is_valid_access(int off, int size, bpf_ctx_record_field_size(info, size_default); return bpf_ctx_narrow_access_ok(off, size, size_default); - case offsetof(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp): + case bpf_ctx_range(struct bpf_sock_ops, skb_hwtstamp): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; @@ -9426,17 +9426,17 @@ static bool sk_msg_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return false; switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, data): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, data): info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET; if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, data_end): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, data_end): info->reg_type = PTR_TO_PACKET_END; if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; break; - case offsetof(struct sk_msg_md, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct sk_msg_md, sk): if (size != sizeof(__u64)) return false; info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; @@ -11665,7 +11665,7 @@ static bool sk_lookup_is_valid_access(int off, int size, return false; switch (off) { - case offsetof(struct bpf_sk_lookup, sk): + case bpf_ctx_range_ptr(struct bpf_sk_lookup, sk): info->reg_type = PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL; return size == sizeof(__u64); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] Bluetooth: eir: Fix possible crashes on eir_create_adv_data
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc2 commit 47c03902269aff377f959dc3fd94a9733aa31d6e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9488 CVE: CVE-2025-38303 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- eir_create_adv_data may attempt to add EIR_FLAGS and EIR_TX_POWER without checking if that would fit. Link: https://github.com/bluez/bluez/issues/1117#issuecomment-2958244066 Fixes: 01ce70b0a274 ("Bluetooth: eir: Move EIR/Adv Data functions to its own file") Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Conflicts: net/bluetooth/eir.h net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c [commit e77f43d531af and 5f60d5f6bbc1 are not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/eir.c | 7 ++++--- net/bluetooth/eir.h | 2 +- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/eir.c b/net/bluetooth/eir.c index 3e1713673ecc..3f72111ba651 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/eir.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/eir.c @@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ u8 eir_create_per_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) return ad_len; } -u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) +u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr, u8 size) { struct adv_info *adv = NULL; u8 ad_len = 0, flags = 0; @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) /* If flags would still be empty, then there is no need to * include the "Flags" AD field". */ - if (flags) { + if (flags && (ad_len + eir_precalc_len(1) <= size)) { ptr[0] = 0x02; ptr[1] = EIR_FLAGS; ptr[2] = flags; @@ -316,7 +316,8 @@ u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr) } /* Provide Tx Power only if we can provide a valid value for it */ - if (adv_tx_power != HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID) { + if (adv_tx_power != HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID && + (ad_len + eir_precalc_len(1) <= size)) { ptr[0] = 0x02; ptr[1] = EIR_TX_POWER; ptr[2] = (u8)adv_tx_power; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/eir.h b/net/bluetooth/eir.h index 0df19f2f4af9..4497f8fd5fef 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/eir.h +++ b/net/bluetooth/eir.h @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ void eir_create(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *data); -u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); +u8 eir_create_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr, u8 size); u8 eir_create_scan_rsp(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); u8 eir_create_per_adv_data(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance, u8 *ptr); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index cdd4e8ac8991..44e15af4410a 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -1883,7 +1883,8 @@ static int hci_set_ext_adv_data_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) return 0; } - len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, pdu.data); + len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, pdu.data, + HCI_MAX_EXT_AD_LENGTH); pdu.cp.length = len; pdu.cp.handle = instance; @@ -1914,7 +1915,7 @@ static int hci_set_adv_data_sync(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 instance) memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); - len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, cp.data); + len = eir_create_adv_data(hdev, instance, cp.data, sizeof(cp.data)); /* There's nothing to do if the data hasn't changed */ if (hdev->adv_data_len == len && -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] IB/mlx5: Fix potential deadlock in MR deregistration
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Or Har-Toov <ohartoov(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc5 commit 2ed25aa7f7711f508b6120e336f05cd9d49943c0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9417 CVE: CVE-2025-38373 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The issue arises when kzalloc() is invoked while holding umem_mutex or any other lock acquired under umem_mutex. This is problematic because kzalloc() can trigger fs_reclaim_aqcuire(), which may, in turn, invoke mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start(). This function can lead to mlx5_ib_invalidate_range(), which attempts to acquire umem_mutex again, resulting in a deadlock. The problematic flow: CPU0 | CPU1 ---------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------ mlx5_ib_dereg_mr() | → revoke_mr() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) | | mlx5_mkey_cache_init() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | → mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked() | → kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) | → fs_reclaim() | → mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start() | → mlx5_ib_invalidate_range() | → mutex_lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex) → cache_ent_find_and_store() | → mutex_lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock) | Additionally, when kzalloc() is called from within cache_ent_find_and_store(), we encounter the same deadlock due to re-acquisition of umem_mutex. Solve by releasing umem_mutex in dereg_mr() after umr_revoke_mr() and before acquiring rb_lock. This ensures that we don't hold umem_mutex while performing memory allocations that could trigger the reclaim path. This change prevents the deadlock by ensuring proper lock ordering and avoiding holding locks during memory allocation operations that could trigger the reclaim path. The following lockdep warning demonstrates the deadlock: python3/20557 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888387542128 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] but task is already holding lock: ffffffff82f6b840 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: unmap_vmas+0x7b/0x1a0 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x60/0xd0 mem_cgroup_css_alloc+0x6f/0x9b0 cgroup_init_subsys+0xa4/0x240 cgroup_init+0x1c8/0x510 start_kernel+0x747/0x760 x86_64_start_reservations+0x25/0x30 x86_64_start_kernel+0x73/0x80 common_startup_64+0x129/0x138 -> #2 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}: fs_reclaim_acquire+0x91/0xd0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4d/0x4c0 mlx5r_cache_create_ent_locked+0x75/0x620 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_mkey_cache_init+0x186/0x360 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_stage_post_ib_reg_umr_init+0x3c/0x60 [mlx5_ib] __mlx5_ib_add+0x4b/0x190 [mlx5_ib] mlx5r_probe+0xd9/0x320 [mlx5_ib] auxiliary_bus_probe+0x42/0x70 really_probe+0xdb/0x360 __driver_probe_device+0x8f/0x130 driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xb0 __driver_attach+0xd4/0x1f0 bus_for_each_dev+0x79/0xd0 bus_add_driver+0xf0/0x200 driver_register+0x6e/0xc0 __auxiliary_driver_register+0x6a/0xc0 do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x390 do_init_module+0x88/0x240 init_module_from_file+0x85/0xc0 idempotent_init_module+0x104/0x300 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x68/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #1 (&dev->cache.rb_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}: __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 __mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x6f2/0x890 [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_dereg_mr+0x21/0x110 [mlx5_ib] ib_dereg_mr_user+0x85/0x1f0 [ib_core] uverbs_free_mr+0x19/0x30 [ib_uverbs] destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x21/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x60/0x3d0 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x57/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x4d5/0x1210 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x129/0x230 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x596/0xaa0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 -> #0 (&umem_odp->umem_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x1826/0x2f00 lock_acquire+0xd3/0x2e0 __mutex_lock+0x98/0xf10 mlx5_ib_invalidate_range+0x5b/0x550 [mlx5_ib] __mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start+0x18e/0x1f0 unmap_vmas+0x182/0x1a0 exit_mmap+0xf3/0x4a0 mmput+0x3a/0x100 do_exit+0x2b9/0xa90 do_group_exit+0x32/0xa0 get_signal+0xc32/0xcb0 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x29/0x1d0 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x105/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 Chain exists of: &dev->cache.rb_lock --> mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start --> &umem_odp->umem_mutex Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(mmu_notifier_invalidate_range_start); lock(&umem_odp->umem_mutex); lock(&dev->cache.rb_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** Fixes: abb604a1a9c8 ("RDMA/mlx5: Fix a race for an ODP MR which leads to CQE with error") Signed-off-by: Or Har-Toov <ohartoov(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3c8f225a8a9fade647d19b014df1172544643e4a.175006161… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c [commit cc668a11e6ac is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c index 5881d8e69aa4..22aa33550465 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/mr.c @@ -1873,18 +1873,35 @@ static int cache_ent_find_and_store(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, return ret; } -static int mlx5_revoke_mr(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) +static int mlx5_umr_revoke_mr_with_lock(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) { - struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(mr->ibmr.device); - struct mlx5_cache_ent *ent = mr->mmkey.cache_ent; bool is_odp = is_odp_mr(mr); - int ret = 0; + int ret; if (is_odp) mutex_lock(&to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->umem_mutex); - if (mr->mmkey.cacheable && !mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr(mr) && !cache_ent_find_and_store(dev, mr)) - goto out; + ret = mlx5r_umr_revoke_mr(mr); + + if (is_odp) { + if (!ret) + to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->private = NULL; + mutex_unlock(&to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->umem_mutex); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int mlx5r_handle_mkey_cleanup(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) +{ + struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev = to_mdev(mr->ibmr.device); + struct mlx5_cache_ent *ent = mr->mmkey.cache_ent; + bool is_odp = is_odp_mr(mr); + int ret; + + if (mr->mmkey.cacheable && !mlx5_umr_revoke_mr_with_lock(mr) && + !cache_ent_find_and_store(dev, mr)) + return 0; if (ent) { xa_lock_irq(&ent->mkeys); @@ -1892,8 +1909,11 @@ static int mlx5_revoke_mr(struct mlx5_ib_mr *mr) mr->mmkey.cache_ent = NULL; xa_unlock_irq(&ent->mkeys); } + + if (is_odp) + mutex_lock(&to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->umem_mutex); + ret = destroy_mkey(dev, mr); -out: if (is_odp) { if (!ret) to_ib_umem_odp(mr->umem)->private = NULL; @@ -1948,7 +1968,7 @@ int mlx5_ib_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ibmr, struct ib_udata *udata) } /* Stop DMA */ - rc = mlx5_revoke_mr(mr); + rc = mlx5r_handle_mkey_cleanup(mr); if (rc) return rc; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v3 00/21] net: LTS-6.6 backport
by Dong Chenchen 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

net lts patches backport Aakash Kumar S (1): xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling Bui Quang Minh (1): virtio-net: fix received length check in big packets David Howells (1): rxrpc: Fix recv-recv race of completed call Florian Westphal (1): netfilter: nf_reject: don't leak dst refcount for loopback packets Jakub Kicinski (3): tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP tls: make sure to abort the stream if headers are bogus page_pool: always add GFP_NOWARN for ATOMIC allocations Jiayuan Chen (1): bpf, ktls: Fix data corruption when using bpf_msg_pop_data() in ktls Kuniyuki Iwashima (1): Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush() Maher Azzouzi (1): net/sched: mqprio: fix stack out-of-bounds write in tc entry parsing Marc Kleine-Budde (4): can: dev: can_restart(): reverse logic to remove need for goto can: dev: can_restart(): move debug message and stats after successful restart can: netlink: can_changelink(): fix NULL pointer deref of struct can_priv::do_set_mode can: netlink: can_changelink(): allow disabling of automatic restart Michal Luczaj (3): vsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU vsock: Fix transport_* TOCTOU vsock: Ignore signal/timeout on connect() if already established Nikolay Aleksandrov (1): net: bridge: fix use-after-free due to MST port state bypass Nishanth Menon (1): net: ethernet: ti: netcp: Standardize knav_dma_open_channel to return NULL on error Sabrina Dubroca (1): xfrm: xfrm_alloc_spi shouldn't use 0 as SPI William Liu (1): net/sched: Return NULL when htb_lookup_leaf encounters an empty rbtree drivers/net/can/dev/dev.c | 31 +++++---- drivers/net/can/dev/netlink.c | 16 ++++- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/netcp_core.c | 10 +-- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 25 ++++---- drivers/soc/ti/knav_dma.c | 14 ++-- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 3 + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 34 ++++++++-- net/bridge/br_forward.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_input.c | 4 +- net/bridge/br_private.h | 8 ++- net/core/page_pool.c | 6 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 6 +- net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 5 +- net/rxrpc/call_accept.c | 1 + net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c | 19 +++++- net/sched/sch_htb.c | 4 +- net/sched/sch_mqprio.c | 2 +- net/tls/tls.h | 3 +- net/tls/tls_strp.c | 25 +++++--- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 19 +++++- net/vmw_vsock/af_vsock.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 75 +++++++++++++--------- 23 files changed, 286 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 22

[PATCH OLK-6.6] vfs: Don't leak disconnected dentries on umount
by Zizhi Wo 30 Jan '26

30 Jan '26

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.114 commit cebfbf40056a4d858b2a3ca59a69936d599bd209 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7768 CVE: CVE-2025-40105 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 56094ad3eaa21e6621396cc33811d8f72847a834 ] When user calls open_by_handle_at() on some inode that is not cached, we will create disconnected dentry for it. If such dentry is a directory, exportfs_decode_fh_raw() will then try to connect this dentry to the dentry tree through reconnect_path(). It may happen for various reasons (such as corrupted fs or race with rename) that the call to lookup_one_unlocked() in reconnect_one() will fail to find the dentry we are trying to reconnect and instead create a new dentry under the parent. Now this dentry will not be marked as disconnected although the parent still may well be disconnected (at least in case this inconsistency happened because the fs is corrupted and .. doesn't point to the real parent directory). This creates inconsistency in disconnected flags but AFAICS it was mostly harmless. At least until commit f1ee616214cb ("VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon") which removed adding of most disconnected dentries to sb->s_anon list. Thus after this commit cleanup of disconnected dentries implicitely relies on the fact that dput() will immediately reclaim such dentries. However when some leaf dentry isn't marked as disconnected, as in the scenario described above, the reclaim doesn't happen and the dentries are "leaked". Memory reclaim can eventually reclaim them but otherwise they stay in memory and if umount comes first, we hit infamous "Busy inodes after unmount" bug. Make sure all dentries created under a disconnected parent are marked as disconnected as well. Reported-by: syzbot+1d79ebe5383fc016cf07(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: f1ee616214cb ("VFS: don't keep disconnected dentries on d_anon") CC: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner(a)kernel.org> [ relocated DCACHE_DISCONNECTED propagation from d_alloc_parallel() to d_alloc() ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/dcache.c [Simple context conflicts, adapted directly.] Signed-off-by: Zizhi Wo <wozizhi(a)huawei.com> --- fs/dcache.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c index fe9140b0d0eb..d7a0672d04f7 100644 --- a/fs/dcache.c +++ b/fs/dcache.c @@ -1948,6 +1948,8 @@ struct dentry *d_alloc(struct dentry * parent, const struct qstr *name) __dget_dlock(parent); dentry->d_parent = parent; list_add(&dentry->d_child, &parent->d_subdirs); + if (parent->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED) + dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_DISCONNECTED; spin_unlock(&parent->d_lock); out: return dentry; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] drm/radeon: delete radeon_fence_process in is_signaled, no deadlock
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Robert McClinton <rbmccav(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.60 commit 73bc12d6a547f9571ce4393acfd73c004e2df9e5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11558 CVE: CVE-2025-68223 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9eb00b5f5697bd56baa3222c7a1426fa15bacfb5 upstream. Delete the attempt to progress the queue when checking if fence is signaled. This avoids deadlock. dma-fence_ops::signaled can be called with the fence lock in unknown state. For radeon, the fence lock is also the wait queue lock. This can cause a self deadlock when signaled() tries to make forward progress on the wait queue. But advancing the queue is unneeded because incorrectly returning false from signaled() is perfectly acceptable. Link: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/49182 Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/4641 Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Robert McClinton <rbmccav(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher(a)amd.com> (cherry picked from commit 527ba26e50ec2ca2be9c7c82f3ad42998a75d0db) Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c index 8735bf2bb8b5..b6210460f39b 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_fence.c @@ -370,14 +370,6 @@ static bool radeon_fence_is_signaled(struct dma_fence *f) return true; } - if (down_read_trylock(&rdev->exclusive_lock)) { - radeon_fence_process(rdev, ring); - up_read(&rdev->exclusive_lock); - - if (atomic64_read(&rdev->fence_drv[ring].last_seq) >= seq) { - return true; - } - } return false; } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] gfs2: Prevent recursive memory reclaim
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.63 commit edb2b255618621dc83d0ec23150e16b2c697077f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12714 CVE: CVE-2025-68356 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 2c5f4a53476e3cab70adc77b38942c066bd2c17c ] Function new_inode() returns a new inode with inode->i_mapping->gfp_mask set to GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. This value includes the __GFP_FS flag, so allocations in that address space can recurse into filesystem memory reclaim. We don't want that to happen because it can consume a significant amount of stack memory. Worse than that is that it can also deadlock: for example, in several places, gfs2_unstuff_dinode() is called inside filesystem transactions. This calls filemap_grab_folio(), which can allocate a new folio, which can trigger memory reclaim. If memory reclaim recurses into the filesystem and starts another transaction, a deadlock will ensue. To fix these kinds of problems, prevent memory reclaim from recursing into filesystem code by making sure that the gfp_mask of inode address spaces doesn't include __GFP_FS. The "meta" and resource group address spaces were already using GFP_NOFS as their gfp_mask (which doesn't include __GFP_FS). The default value of GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE is less restrictive than GFP_NOFS, though. To avoid being overly limiting, use the default value and only knock off the __GFP_FS flag. I'm not sure if this will actually make a difference, but it also shouldn't hurt. This patch is loosely based on commit ad22c7a043c2 ("xfs: prevent stack overflows from page cache allocation"). Fixes xfstest generic/273. Fixes: dc0b9435238c ("gfs: Don't use GFP_NOFS in gfs2_unstuff_dinode") Reviewed-by: Andrew Price <anprice(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/gfs2/glock.c fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/gfs2/glock.c | 5 ++++- fs/gfs2/inode.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ fs/gfs2/inode.h | 1 + fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/gfs2/glock.c b/fs/gfs2/glock.c index 7606e983a2ca..8fb9f1bba384 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/glock.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/glock.c @@ -1254,10 +1254,13 @@ int gfs2_glock_get(struct gfs2_sbd *sdp, u64 number, mapping = gfs2_glock2aspace(gl); if (mapping) { + gfp_t gfp_mask; + mapping->a_ops = &gfs2_meta_aops; mapping->host = s->s_bdev->bd_inode; mapping->flags = 0; - mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, GFP_NOFS); + gfp_mask = mapping_gfp_mask(&sdp->sd_aspace); + mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, gfp_mask); mapping->private_data = NULL; mapping->writeback_index = 0; } diff --git a/fs/gfs2/inode.c b/fs/gfs2/inode.c index 1cb5ce63fbf6..8627c85c6bf0 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/inode.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/inode.c @@ -89,6 +89,19 @@ static int iget_set(struct inode *inode, void *opaque) return 0; } +void gfs2_setup_inode(struct inode *inode) +{ + gfp_t gfp_mask; + + /* + * Ensure all page cache allocations are done from GFP_NOFS context to + * prevent direct reclaim recursion back into the filesystem and blowing + * stacks or deadlocking. + */ + gfp_mask = mapping_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping); + mapping_set_gfp_mask(inode->i_mapping, gfp_mask & ~__GFP_FS); +} + /** * gfs2_inode_lookup - Lookup an inode * @sb: The super block @@ -132,6 +145,7 @@ struct inode *gfs2_inode_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned int type, struct gfs2_glock *io_gl; int extra_flags = 0; + gfs2_setup_inode(inode); error = gfs2_glock_get(sdp, no_addr, &gfs2_inode_glops, CREATE, &ip->i_gl); if (unlikely(error)) @@ -684,6 +698,7 @@ static int gfs2_create_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, error = -ENOMEM; if (!inode) goto fail_gunlock; + gfs2_setup_inode(inode); ip = GFS2_I(inode); error = posix_acl_create(dir, &mode, &default_acl, &acl); diff --git a/fs/gfs2/inode.h b/fs/gfs2/inode.h index ce70cf26b497..6f7c9ec21bbf 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/inode.h +++ b/fs/gfs2/inode.h @@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ static inline int gfs2_check_internal_file_size(struct inode *inode, return -EIO; } +void gfs2_setup_inode(struct inode *inode); struct inode *gfs2_inode_lookup(struct super_block *sb, unsigned type, u64 no_addr, u64 no_formal_ino, unsigned int blktype); diff --git a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c index f4c066aa24b9..1f6dd91180e0 100644 --- a/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c +++ b/fs/gfs2/ops_fstype.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static struct gfs2_sbd *init_sbd(struct super_block *sb) mapping->a_ops = &gfs2_rgrp_aops; mapping->host = sb->s_bdev->bd_inode; mapping->flags = 0; - mapping_set_gfp_mask(mapping, GFP_NOFS); + gfs2_setup_inode(mapping->host); mapping->private_data = NULL; mapping->writeback_index = 0; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] *** fix CVE-2025-38062 ***
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

*** fix CVE-2025-38062 *** Jason Gunthorpe (1): genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie Lin Ruifeng (1): genirq/msi:: Fix kabi break of struct msi_desc drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- include/linux/msi.h | 35 +++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) -- 2.43.0

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: SVM: Don't skip unrelated instruction if INT3/INTO is replaced
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.62 commit 87cc1622c88a4888959d64fa1fc9ba1e264aa3d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11544 CVE: CVE-2025-68259 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4da3768e1820cf15cced390242d8789aed34f54d upstream. When re-injecting a soft interrupt from an INT3, INT0, or (select) INTn instruction, discard the exception and retry the instruction if the code stream is changed (e.g. by a different vCPU) between when the CPU executes the instruction and when KVM decodes the instruction to get the next RIP. As effectively predicted by commit 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction"), failure to verify that the correct INTn instruction was decoded can effectively clobber guest state due to decoding the wrong instruction and thus specifying the wrong next RIP. The bug most often manifests as "Oops: int3" panics on static branch checks in Linux guests. Enabling or disabling a static branch in Linux uses the kernel's "text poke" code patching mechanism. To modify code while other CPUs may be executing that code, Linux (temporarily) replaces the first byte of the original instruction with an int3 (opcode 0xcc), then patches in the new code stream except for the first byte, and finally replaces the int3 with the first byte of the new code stream. If a CPU hits the int3, i.e. executes the code while it's being modified, then the guest kernel must look up the RIP to determine how to handle the #BP, e.g. by emulating the new instruction. If the RIP is incorrect, then this lookup fails and the guest kernel panics. The bug reproduces almost instantly by hacking the guest kernel to repeatedly check a static branch[1] while running a drgn script[2] on the host to constantly swap out the memory containing the guest's TSS. [1]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/44d17c51c28c0ac998ea0334edf90b5a [2]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/10e45e45afa29b11e0c7209247afc00b Fixes: 6ef88d6e36c2 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov(a)fb.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1cc6dcdf36e3add7ee7c8d90ad58414eeb6c3d34.176227876… Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 24 +++++++++++++----------- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 3936da6febce..e54edd378230 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -1974,6 +1974,11 @@ u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); * the gfn, i.e. retrying the instruction will hit a * !PRESENT fault, which results in a new shadow page * and sends KVM back to square one. + * + * EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT - Set in combination with EMULTYPE_SKIP to only skip + * an instruction if it could generate a given software + * interrupt, which must be encoded via + * EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(). */ #define EMULTYPE_NO_DECODE (1 << 0) #define EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD (1 << 1) @@ -1984,6 +1989,10 @@ u64 vcpu_tsc_khz(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); #define EMULTYPE_PF (1 << 6) #define EMULTYPE_COMPLETE_USER_EXIT (1 << 7) #define EMULTYPE_WRITE_PF_TO_SP (1 << 8) +#define EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT (1 << 9) + +#define EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(v) ((u32)((v) & 0xff) << 16) +#define EMULTYPE_GET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(e) (((e) >> 16) & 0xff) int kvm_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emulation_type); int kvm_emulate_instruction_from_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c index dfe7ed5e567f..e6b9118943f1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c @@ -384,6 +384,7 @@ static bool svm_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int emul_type, void *insn, int insn_len); static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + int emul_type, bool commit_side_effects) { struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); @@ -413,7 +414,7 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects)) old_rflags = svm->vmcb->save.rflags; - if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP)) + if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, emul_type)) return 0; if (unlikely(!commit_side_effects)) @@ -431,11 +432,13 @@ static int __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int svm_skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { - return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, true); + return __svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP, true); } -static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector) { + const int emul_type = EMULTYPE_SKIP | EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT | + EMULTYPE_SET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(vector); unsigned long rip, old_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); @@ -451,7 +454,7 @@ static int svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) * in use, the skip must not commit any side effects such as clearing * the interrupt shadow or RFLAGS.RF. */ - if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, !nrips)) + if (!__svm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu, emul_type, !nrips)) return -EIO; rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu); @@ -487,7 +490,7 @@ static void svm_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu, ex); if (kvm_exception_is_soft(ex->vector) && - svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu)) + svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, ex->vector)) return; svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = ex->vector @@ -3713,11 +3716,12 @@ static bool svm_set_vnmi_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected) { + struct kvm_queued_interrupt *intr = &vcpu->arch.interrupt; struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu); u32 type; - if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) { - if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu)) + if (intr->soft) { + if (svm_update_soft_interrupt_rip(vcpu, intr->nr)) return; type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_SOFT; @@ -3725,12 +3729,10 @@ static void svm_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool reinjected) type = SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR; } - trace_kvm_inj_virq(vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr, - vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft, reinjected); + trace_kvm_inj_virq(intr->nr, intr->soft, reinjected); ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections; - svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr | - SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; + svm->vmcb->control.event_inj = intr->nr | SVM_EVTINJ_VALID | type; } void svm_complete_interrupt_delivery(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int delivery_mode, diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 2139f728aecc..8f4911acde42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -9023,6 +9023,23 @@ static bool is_vmware_backdoor_opcode(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt) return false; } +static bool is_soft_int_instruction(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, + int emulation_type) +{ + u8 vector = EMULTYPE_GET_SOFT_INT_VECTOR(emulation_type); + + switch (ctxt->b) { + case 0xcc: + return vector == BP_VECTOR; + case 0xcd: + return vector == ctxt->src.val; + case 0xce: + return vector == OF_VECTOR; + default: + return false; + } +} + /* * Decode an instruction for emulation. The caller is responsible for handling * code breakpoints. Note, manually detecting code breakpoints is unnecessary @@ -9113,6 +9130,10 @@ int x86_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa, * injecting single-step #DBs. */ if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP) { + if (emulation_type & EMULTYPE_SKIP_SOFT_INT && + !is_soft_int_instruction(ctxt, emulation_type)) + return 0; + if (ctxt->mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64) ctxt->eip = (u32)ctxt->_eip; else -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] pinctrl: check the return value of pinmux_ops::get_function_name()
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.112 commit 1a2ea887a5cd7d47bab599f733d89444df018b1a category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12323 CVE: CVE-2025-40030 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 4002ee98c022d671ecc1e4a84029e9ae7d8a5603 upstream. While the API contract in docs doesn't specify it explicitly, the generic implementation of the get_function_name() callback from struct pinmux_ops - pinmux_generic_get_function_name() - can fail and return NULL. This is already checked in pinmux_check_ops() so add a similar check in pinmux_func_name_to_selector() instead of passing the returned pointer right down to strcmp() where the NULL can get dereferenced. This is normal operation when adding new pinfunctions. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Tested-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/pinctrl/pinmux.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/pinmux.c b/drivers/pinctrl/pinmux.c index ab853d6c586b..1c324d216ad7 100644 --- a/drivers/pinctrl/pinmux.c +++ b/drivers/pinctrl/pinmux.c @@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int pinmux_func_name_to_selector(struct pinctrl_dev *pctldev, while (selector < nfuncs) { const char *fname = ops->get_function_name(pctldev, selector); - if (!strcmp(function, fname)) + if (fname && !strcmp(function, fname)) return selector; selector++; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level
by Lin Ruifeng 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.108 commit 075abf0b1a958acfbea2435003d228e738e90346 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7970 CVE: CVE-2025-39961 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1e56310b40fd2e7e0b9493da9ff488af145bdd0c ] The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels (up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations. The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU driver increases page table level. But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case, when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte() reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON. CPU 0 CPU 1 ------ ------ map pages unmap pages alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte() pgtable->root = pte (new root value) READ pgtable->[mode/root] Reads new root, old mode Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1) Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path. Fixes: 754265bcab7 ("iommu/amd: Fix race in increase_address_space()") Reported-by: Alejandro Jimenez <alejandro.j.jimenez(a)oracle.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins(a)oracle.com> Cc: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel(a)amd.com> [ Adapted pgtable->mode and pgtable->root to use domain->iop.mode and domain->iop.root ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c [Context Conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h index dec4e5c2b66b..be4a5b16b187 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/amd_iommu_types.h @@ -551,6 +551,7 @@ struct amd_irte_ops; container_of((x), struct amd_io_pgtable, pgtbl_cfg) struct amd_io_pgtable { + seqcount_t seqcount; /* Protects root/mode update */ struct io_pgtable_cfg pgtbl_cfg; struct io_pgtable iop; int mode; diff --git a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c index 6c0621f6f572..ca41da139d86 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/amd/io_pgtable.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/seqlock.h> #include <asm/barrier.h> @@ -171,8 +172,11 @@ static bool increase_address_space(struct protection_domain *domain, *pte = PM_LEVEL_PDE(domain->iop.mode, iommu_virt_to_phys(domain->iop.root)); + write_seqcount_begin(&domain->iop.seqcount); domain->iop.root = pte; domain->iop.mode += 1; + write_seqcount_end(&domain->iop.seqcount); + amd_iommu_update_and_flush_device_table(domain); amd_iommu_domain_flush_complete(domain); @@ -199,6 +203,7 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct protection_domain *domain, gfp_t gfp, bool *updated) { + unsigned int seqcount; int level, end_lvl; u64 *pte, *page; @@ -214,8 +219,14 @@ static u64 *alloc_pte(struct protection_domain *domain, } - level = domain->iop.mode - 1; - pte = &domain->iop.root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&domain->iop.seqcount); + + level = domain->iop.mode - 1; + pte = &domain->iop.root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&domain->iop.seqcount, seqcount)); + + address = PAGE_SIZE_ALIGN(address, page_size); end_lvl = PAGE_SIZE_LEVEL(page_size); @@ -292,6 +303,7 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, unsigned long *page_size) { int level; + unsigned int seqcount; u64 *pte; *page_size = 0; @@ -299,8 +311,12 @@ static u64 *fetch_pte(struct amd_io_pgtable *pgtable, if (address > PM_LEVEL_SIZE(pgtable->mode)) return NULL; - level = pgtable->mode - 1; - pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + do { + seqcount = read_seqcount_begin(&pgtable->seqcount); + level = pgtable->mode - 1; + pte = &pgtable->root[PM_LEVEL_INDEX(level, address)]; + } while (read_seqcount_retry(&pgtable->seqcount, seqcount)); + *page_size = PTE_LEVEL_PAGE_SIZE(level); while (level > 0) { @@ -591,6 +607,8 @@ static struct io_pgtable *v1_alloc_pgtable(struct io_pgtable_cfg *cfg, void *coo cfg->oas = IOMMU_OUT_ADDR_BIT_SIZE, cfg->tlb = &v1_flush_ops; + seqcount_init(&pgtable->seqcount); + pgtable->iop.ops.map_pages = iommu_v1_map_pages; pgtable->iop.ops.unmap_pages = iommu_v1_unmap_pages; pgtable->iop.ops.iova_to_phys = iommu_v1_iova_to_phys; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] usb: cdns3: fix random warning message when driver load
by Zhang Yuwei 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Frank Li <Frank.Li(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.63 commit 8e142744f0e96abc69ccd99e6d6c7eb662267f21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10097 CVE: CVE-2022-50151 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8659ab3d936fcf0084676f98b75b317017aa8f82 ] Warning log: [ 4.141392] Unexpected gfp: 0x4 (GFP_DMA32). Fixing up to gfp: 0xa20 (GFP_ATOMIC). Fix your code! [ 4.150340] CPU: 1 PID: 175 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 5.15.5-00039-g2fd9ae1b568c #20 [ 4.158010] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT) [ 4.163155] Call trace: [ 4.165600] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0 [ 4.169286] show_stack+0x18/0x68 [ 4.172611] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 4.176286] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 4.179613] kmalloc_fix_flags+0x60/0x88 [ 4.183550] new_slab+0x334/0x370 [ 4.186878] ___slab_alloc.part.108+0x4d4/0x748 [ 4.191419] __slab_alloc.isra.109+0x30/0x78 [ 4.195702] kmem_cache_alloc+0x40c/0x420 [ 4.199725] dma_pool_alloc+0xac/0x1f8 [ 4.203486] cdns3_allocate_trb_pool+0xb4/0xd0 pool_alloc_page(struct dma_pool *pool, gfp_t mem_flags) { ... page = kmalloc(sizeof(*page), mem_flags); page->vaddr = dma_alloc_coherent(pool->dev, pool->allocation, &page->dma, mem_flags); ... } kmalloc was called with mem_flags, which is passed down in cdns3_allocate_trb_pool() and have GFP_DMA32 flags. kmall_fix_flags() report warning. GFP_DMA32 is not useful at all. dma_alloc_coherent() will handle DMA memory region correctly by pool->dev. GFP_DMA32 can be removed safely. Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li(a)nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609154456.2871672-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-gadget.c [file name is different] Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c index eeea892248b5..2bd24fb806fb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ int cdns3_allocate_trb_pool(struct cdns3_endpoint *priv_ep) priv_ep->trb_pool = dma_alloc_coherent(priv_dev->sysdev, ring_size, &priv_ep->trb_pool_dma, - GFP_DMA32 | GFP_ATOMIC); + GFP_ATOMIC); if (!priv_ep->trb_pool) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] usb: cdns3: fix random warning message when driver load
by Zhang Yuwei 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Frank Li <Frank.Li(a)nxp.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.63 commit 8e142744f0e96abc69ccd99e6d6c7eb662267f21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICG794 CVE: CVE-2022-50151 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8659ab3d936fcf0084676f98b75b317017aa8f82 ] Warning log: [ 4.141392] Unexpected gfp: 0x4 (GFP_DMA32). Fixing up to gfp: 0xa20 (GFP_ATOMIC). Fix your code! [ 4.150340] CPU: 1 PID: 175 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 5.15.5-00039-g2fd9ae1b568c #20 [ 4.158010] Hardware name: Freescale i.MX8QXP MEK (DT) [ 4.163155] Call trace: [ 4.165600] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b0 [ 4.169286] show_stack+0x18/0x68 [ 4.172611] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 4.176286] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 4.179613] kmalloc_fix_flags+0x60/0x88 [ 4.183550] new_slab+0x334/0x370 [ 4.186878] ___slab_alloc.part.108+0x4d4/0x748 [ 4.191419] __slab_alloc.isra.109+0x30/0x78 [ 4.195702] kmem_cache_alloc+0x40c/0x420 [ 4.199725] dma_pool_alloc+0xac/0x1f8 [ 4.203486] cdns3_allocate_trb_pool+0xb4/0xd0 pool_alloc_page(struct dma_pool *pool, gfp_t mem_flags) { ... page = kmalloc(sizeof(*page), mem_flags); page->vaddr = dma_alloc_coherent(pool->dev, pool->allocation, &page->dma, mem_flags); ... } kmalloc was called with mem_flags, which is passed down in cdns3_allocate_trb_pool() and have GFP_DMA32 flags. kmall_fix_flags() report warning. GFP_DMA32 is not useful at all. dma_alloc_coherent() will handle DMA memory region correctly by pool->dev. GFP_DMA32 can be removed safely. Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li(a)nxp.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609154456.2871672-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c drivers/usb/cdns3/cdns3-gadget.c [file name is different] Signed-off-by: Guo Mengqi <guomengqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c b/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c index eeea892248b5..2bd24fb806fb 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c +++ b/drivers/usb/cdns3/gadget.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ int cdns3_allocate_trb_pool(struct cdns3_endpoint *priv_ep) priv_ep->trb_pool = dma_alloc_coherent(priv_dev->sysdev, ring_size, &priv_ep->trb_pool_dma, - GFP_DMA32 | GFP_ATOMIC); + GFP_ATOMIC); if (!priv_ep->trb_pool) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.22.0

2 2

[PATCH v1 openEuler-26.09] Add copy to/from/in user with vectorization support
by Nikita Panov 29 Jan '26

29 Jan '26

From: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8445 ------------------------------------------------- 1. This implementation uses st1/ld1 4-vector instructions which allow to copy 64 bytes at once 2. Copy code is used only if size of data block to copy is more than 128 bytes 4. To use this functionality you need to set configuration switch CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y 5. Code can be used on any ARMv8 variant 6. In kernel copy functions like memcpy are not supported now, but can be enabled in future 7. For now we use lightweght version of register context saving/restoration (4-registers) We introduce support of vectorization for copy_from/to/in_user functions. Nowadays it works in parallel with original FPSIMD/SVE vectorization and doesn't affect it anyhow. We have special flag in task struct - TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD, that set if currently we use lightweight vectorization in kernel. Task struct has been updated by two fields: user space fpsimd state and kernel fpsimd state. User space fpsimd state used by kernel_fpsimd_begin(), kernel_fpsimd_end() functions that wrap lightweight FPSIMD contexts usage in kernel space. Kernel fpsimd state is used to manage threads switch. Now there is no support of nested calls of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_fpsimd_begin() and there is no plans to support this in future. This is not necessary. We save lightweight FPSIMD context in kernel_fpsimd_begin(), and restore it in /kernel_fpsimd_end(). On thread switch we preserve kernel FPSIMD context and restore user space one if any. This prevens curruption of user space FPSIMD state. Before switching to the next thread we restore it's kernel FPSIMD context if any. It is allowed to use FPSIMD in bottom halves, due to in case of BH preemption we check TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag and save/restore contexts. Context management if quite lightweight and executed only in case of TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag is set. To enable this feature, you need to manually modify one of the appropriate entries: /proc/sys/vm/copy_from_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_in_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_to_user_threshold Allowed values are following: -1 - feature enabled 0 - feature always enabled n (n >0) - feature enabled, if copied size is greater than n KB. P.S.: What I am personally don't like in current approach: 1. Additional fields and flag in task struct look quite ugly 2. No way to configure the size of chunk to copy using FPSIMD from user space 3. FPSIMD-based memory movement is not generic, need to enable for memmove(), memcpy() and friends in future. Co-developed-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 15 ++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h | 28 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 10 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 218 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 22 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 102 +++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 30 ++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 30 ++++ kernel/softirq.c | 34 ++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 34 ++++ 16 files changed, 734 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index c3b38c890b45..8904e6476e3b 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1870,6 +1870,21 @@ config ARM64_ILP32 is an ABI where long and pointers are 32bits but it uses the AARCH64 instruction set. +config USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + bool "Use vectorized instructions in copy_to/from user" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + default y + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + +config VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + bool "Validate result of vectorized copy using regular implementation" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + default n + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + menuconfig AARCH32_EL0 bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig index 9e7bc82cba3a..9843dec071bf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -527,6 +527,8 @@ CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY=y # CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED is not set # CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is not set CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI=y +CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y +# CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE is not set CONFIG_AARCH32_EL0=y # CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS is not set # CONFIG_COMPAT_ALIGNMENT_FIXUPS is not set diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index b6c6949984d8..1fc9089b4a47 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ struct task_struct; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +extern void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +extern void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +static inline void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +static inline void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + extern void fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); extern void fpsimd_load_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index cdf6a35e3994..df9d3ed91931 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* Lightweight fpsimd context saving/restoration. + * Necessary for vectorized kernel memory movement + * implementation + */ +.macro fpsimd_save_light state + st1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm + +.macro fpsimd_restore_light state + ld1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm +#endif + .macro fpsimd_save state, tmpnr stp q0, q1, [\state, #16 * 0] stp q2, q3, [\state, #16 * 2] diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h index d4b1d172a79b..ab84b194d7b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h @@ -16,4 +16,32 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void); void kernel_neon_end(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void); +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void); +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state); +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + return false; +} + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ +} + +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + #endif /* ! __ASM_NEON_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 9e688b1b13d4..9b81dbcd2126 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ struct cpu_context { unsigned long pc; }; +struct fpsimd_state { + __uint128_t v[4]; +}; + struct thread_struct { struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */ @@ -196,6 +200,12 @@ struct thread_struct { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + KABI_EXTEND( + struct fpsimd_state ustate; + struct fpsimd_state kstate; + ) +#endif }; static inline unsigned int thread_get_vl(struct thread_struct *thread, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 379d24059f5b..60d0be8a2d58 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define TIF_SME 27 /* SME in use */ #define TIF_SME_VL_INHERIT 28 /* Inherit SME vl_onexec across exec */ #define TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 29 /* 32 bit process on AArch64(ILP32) */ +#define TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD 31 /* Use FPSIMD in kernel */ +#define TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED 32 /* Whether priviliged uaccess was manually enabled */ + #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) @@ -107,6 +110,8 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT (1 << TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) #define _TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL) #define _TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 (1 << TIF_32BIT_AARCH64) +#define _TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD (1 << TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD) +#define _TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED (1 << TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index dd0877a75922..fc9f1a40624d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/extable.h> +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ +#include <asm/neon.h> +#endif + static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size); /* @@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); } -static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +static inline void __uaccess_disable_privileged(void) { mte_disable_tco(); @@ -144,7 +148,22 @@ static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); } -static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (!test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void __uaccess_enable_privileged(void) { mte_enable_tco(); @@ -154,6 +173,47 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); } +static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + bool curr_enabled = !!test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + bool next_enabled = !!test_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + + if (curr_enabled == next_enabled) + return; + + if (curr_enabled) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + else + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_save(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + /* * Sanitize a uaccess pointer such that it cannot reach any kernel address. * @@ -391,7 +451,97 @@ do { \ } while (0); \ } while(0) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +#define USER_COPY_CHUNK_SIZE 4096 + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold; + +#define verify_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +#define compare_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret_fpsimd, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + if (ret_fpsimd != ret) { \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s difference between FPSIMD %lu and regular %lu\n", __func__, n - ret_fpsimd, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= 1; \ + } else { \ + __verify_ret = 0; \ + } \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __acfu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user(to, + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __acfu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + __acfu_ret = __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + kernel_fpsimd_end(); +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret)) { + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret_fpsimd, __acfu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + + return __acfu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ @@ -402,7 +552,66 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u __acfu_ret; \ }) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __actu_ret; + + + if (sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __actu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __actu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __actu_ret = __actu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret_fpsimd, __actu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __actu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ @@ -412,6 +621,7 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) +#endif static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 6325db1a2179..6660465f1b7c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -11,6 +11,28 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/fpsimdmacros.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* + * Save the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_save_state_light) + fpsimd_save_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_save_state_light) + +/* + * Load the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state_light) + fpsimd_restore_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state_light) +#endif + /* * Save the FP registers. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index 998906b75075..1b6b1accfbbc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -1579,6 +1579,11 @@ void do_fpsimd_exc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) current); } +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void); +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk); +#endif + void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { bool wrong_task, wrong_cpu; @@ -1587,10 +1592,11 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) return; __get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); - +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(); +#endif /* Save unsaved fpsimd state, if any: */ fpsimd_save(); - /* * Fix up TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE to correctly describe next's * state. For kernel threads, FPSIMD registers are never loaded @@ -1603,6 +1609,9 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) update_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, wrong_task || wrong_cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(next); +#endif __put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); } @@ -1933,6 +1942,95 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_neon_end); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!system_capabilities_finalized()) || + !system_supports_fpsimd() || + in_irq() || irqs_disabled() || in_nmi()) + return false; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + preempt_enable(); + + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + + /* + * Leaving streaming mode enabled will cause issues for any kernel + * NEON and leaving streaming mode or ZA enabled may increase power + * consumption. + */ + if (system_supports_sme()) + sme_smstop(); + + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + preempt_enable(); + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_begin); + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + + preempt_enable(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_end); + +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_save_state_light(state); +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(state); +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.kstate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + } +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(tsk), TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&tsk->thread.ustate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&tsk->thread.kstate); + } +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, efi_fpsimd_state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index e9e5ce956f15..fd895189cb7e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct task_struct *last; - + uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(next); fpsimd_thread_switch(next); tls_thread_switch(next); hw_breakpoint_thread_switch(next); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index 34e317907524..60dc63e10233 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -71,3 +71,33 @@ USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user) + + + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret + + // Exception fixups +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) + strb tmp1w, [dst], #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b2e7ce1e4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + +V_a .req v20 +V_b .req v21 +V_c .req v22 +V_d .req v23 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15_fpsimd + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned_fpsimd: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64_fpsimd + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63_fpsimd: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15_fpsimd + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +1: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +2: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15_fpsimd: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + +.Lcpy_over64_fpsimd: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp1 C_l, C_h, src, #16 + stp1 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp1 C_l, C_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 D_l, D_h, src, #16 + stp1 D_l, D_h, dst, #16 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd: + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add src, src, #64 + +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd +.Lexitfunc_fpsimd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 2ac716c0d6d8..c190e5f8a989 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -71,3 +71,33 @@ USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user) + + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret + + // Exception fixups +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, ldrb tmp1w, [srcin]) +USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) + add dst, dst, #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +#endif diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c index f8cf88cc46c6..39b84ffbf4e5 100644 --- a/kernel/softirq.c +++ b/kernel/softirq.c @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ #include <asm/softirq_stack.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#endif + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/irq.h> @@ -524,6 +528,9 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) __u32 pending; int softirq_bit; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif /* * Mask out PF_MEMALLOC as the current task context is borrowed for the * softirq. A softirq handled, such as network RX, might set PF_MEMALLOC @@ -533,10 +540,16 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) pending = local_softirq_pending(); + softirq_handle_begin(); in_hardirq = lockdep_softirq_start(); account_softirq_enter(current); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + restart: /* Reset the pending bitmask before enabling irqs */ set_softirq_pending(0); @@ -585,7 +598,14 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) account_softirq_exit(current); lockdep_softirq_end(in_hardirq); + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif + softirq_handle_end(); + current_restore_flags(old_flags, PF_MEMALLOC); } @@ -819,12 +839,21 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, { struct tasklet_struct *list; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif + local_irq_disable(); list = tl_head->head; tl_head->head = NULL; tl_head->tail = &tl_head->head; local_irq_enable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + while (list) { struct tasklet_struct *t = list; @@ -856,6 +885,11 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, __raise_softirq_irqoff(softirq_nr); local_irq_enable(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif } static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index e84df0818517..6f8e22102bdc 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -137,6 +137,17 @@ int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold); +#endif + /* * /proc/sys support */ @@ -2250,6 +2261,29 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min, .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max, }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + { + .procname = "copy_to_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_from_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_in_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, #endif { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v1 openEuler-25.03] Add copy to/from/in user with vectorization support
by Nikita Panov 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8445 ------------------------------------------------- 1. This implementation uses st1/ld1 4-vector instructions which allow to copy 64 bytes at once 2. Copy code is used only if size of data block to copy is more than 128 bytes 4. To use this functionality you need to set configuration switch CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y 5. Code can be used on any ARMv8 variant 6. In kernel copy functions like memcpy are not supported now, but can be enabled in future 7. For now we use lightweght version of register context saving/restoration (4-registers) We introduce support of vectorization for copy_from/to/in_user functions. Nowadays it works in parallel with original FPSIMD/SVE vectorization and doesn't affect it anyhow. We have special flag in task struct - TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD, that set if currently we use lightweight vectorization in kernel. Task struct has been updated by two fields: user space fpsimd state and kernel fpsimd state. User space fpsimd state used by kernel_fpsimd_begin(), kernel_fpsimd_end() functions that wrap lightweight FPSIMD contexts usage in kernel space. Kernel fpsimd state is used to manage threads switch. Now there is no support of nested calls of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_fpsimd_begin() and there is no plans to support this in future. This is not necessary. We save lightweight FPSIMD context in kernel_fpsimd_begin(), and restore it in /kernel_fpsimd_end(). On thread switch we preserve kernel FPSIMD context and restore user space one if any. This prevens curruption of user space FPSIMD state. Before switching to the next thread we restore it's kernel FPSIMD context if any. It is allowed to use FPSIMD in bottom halves, due to in case of BH preemption we check TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag and save/restore contexts. Context management if quite lightweight and executed only in case of TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag is set. To enable this feature, you need to manually modify one of the appropriate entries: /proc/sys/vm/copy_from_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_in_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_to_user_threshold Allowed values are following: -1 - feature enabled 0 - feature always enabled n (n >0) - feature enabled, if copied size is greater than n KB. P.S.: What I am personally don't like in current approach: 1. Additional fields and flag in task struct look quite ugly 2. No way to configure the size of chunk to copy using FPSIMD from user space 3. FPSIMD-based memory movement is not generic, need to enable for memmove(), memcpy() and friends in future. Co-developed-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 15 ++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h | 28 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 10 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 218 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 22 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 102 +++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 30 ++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 30 ++++ kernel/softirq.c | 34 ++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 34 ++++ 16 files changed, 734 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index d3ce44c166ce..0cf5ab2d7574 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1828,6 +1828,21 @@ config ARM64_ILP32 is an ABI where long and pointers are 32bits but it uses the AARCH64 instruction set. +config USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + bool "Use vectorized instructions in copy_to/from user" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + default y + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + +config VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + bool "Validate result of vectorized copy using regular implementation" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + default n + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + menuconfig AARCH32_EL0 bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig index 8f97574813ca..dbad22bcbd57 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -499,6 +499,8 @@ CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY=y # CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED is not set # CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is not set CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI=y +CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y +# CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE is not set CONFIG_AARCH32_EL0=y # CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS is not set # CONFIG_COMPAT_ALIGNMENT_FIXUPS is not set diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index 40a99d8607fe..f71b3ac578c1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ struct task_struct; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +extern void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +extern void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +static inline void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +static inline void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + extern void fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); extern void fpsimd_load_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index cdf6a35e3994..df9d3ed91931 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* Lightweight fpsimd context saving/restoration. + * Necessary for vectorized kernel memory movement + * implementation + */ +.macro fpsimd_save_light state + st1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm + +.macro fpsimd_restore_light state + ld1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm +#endif + .macro fpsimd_save state, tmpnr stp q0, q1, [\state, #16 * 0] stp q2, q3, [\state, #16 * 2] diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h index d4b1d172a79b..ab84b194d7b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h @@ -16,4 +16,32 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void); void kernel_neon_end(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void); +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void); +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state); +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + return false; +} + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ +} + +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + #endif /* ! __ASM_NEON_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 9e688b1b13d4..9b81dbcd2126 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ struct cpu_context { unsigned long pc; }; +struct fpsimd_state { + __uint128_t v[4]; +}; + struct thread_struct { struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */ @@ -196,6 +200,12 @@ struct thread_struct { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + KABI_EXTEND( + struct fpsimd_state ustate; + struct fpsimd_state kstate; + ) +#endif }; static inline unsigned int thread_get_vl(struct thread_struct *thread, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 379d24059f5b..60d0be8a2d58 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define TIF_SME 27 /* SME in use */ #define TIF_SME_VL_INHERIT 28 /* Inherit SME vl_onexec across exec */ #define TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 29 /* 32 bit process on AArch64(ILP32) */ +#define TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD 31 /* Use FPSIMD in kernel */ +#define TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED 32 /* Whether priviliged uaccess was manually enabled */ + #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) @@ -107,6 +110,8 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT (1 << TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) #define _TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL) #define _TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 (1 << TIF_32BIT_AARCH64) +#define _TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD (1 << TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD) +#define _TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED (1 << TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index dd0877a75922..fc9f1a40624d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/extable.h> +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ +#include <asm/neon.h> +#endif + static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size); /* @@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); } -static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +static inline void __uaccess_disable_privileged(void) { mte_disable_tco(); @@ -144,7 +148,22 @@ static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); } -static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (!test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void __uaccess_enable_privileged(void) { mte_enable_tco(); @@ -154,6 +173,47 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); } +static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + bool curr_enabled = !!test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + bool next_enabled = !!test_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + + if (curr_enabled == next_enabled) + return; + + if (curr_enabled) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + else + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_save(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + /* * Sanitize a uaccess pointer such that it cannot reach any kernel address. * @@ -391,7 +451,97 @@ do { \ } while (0); \ } while(0) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +#define USER_COPY_CHUNK_SIZE 4096 + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold; + +#define verify_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +#define compare_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret_fpsimd, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + if (ret_fpsimd != ret) { \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s difference between FPSIMD %lu and regular %lu\n", __func__, n - ret_fpsimd, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= 1; \ + } else { \ + __verify_ret = 0; \ + } \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __acfu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user(to, + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __acfu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + __acfu_ret = __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + kernel_fpsimd_end(); +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret)) { + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret_fpsimd, __acfu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + + return __acfu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ @@ -402,7 +552,66 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u __acfu_ret; \ }) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __actu_ret; + + + if (sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __actu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __actu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __actu_ret = __actu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret_fpsimd, __actu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __actu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ @@ -412,6 +621,7 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) +#endif static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 6325db1a2179..6660465f1b7c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -11,6 +11,28 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/fpsimdmacros.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* + * Save the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_save_state_light) + fpsimd_save_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_save_state_light) + +/* + * Load the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state_light) + fpsimd_restore_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state_light) +#endif + /* * Save the FP registers. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index 0137d987631e..19fcf3a3ac66 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -1577,6 +1577,11 @@ void do_fpsimd_exc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) current); } +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void); +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk); +#endif + void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { bool wrong_task, wrong_cpu; @@ -1585,10 +1590,11 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) return; __get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); - +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(); +#endif /* Save unsaved fpsimd state, if any: */ fpsimd_save(); - /* * Fix up TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE to correctly describe next's * state. For kernel threads, FPSIMD registers are never loaded @@ -1601,6 +1607,9 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) update_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, wrong_task || wrong_cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(next); +#endif __put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); } @@ -1956,6 +1965,95 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_neon_end); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!system_capabilities_finalized()) || + !system_supports_fpsimd() || + in_irq() || irqs_disabled() || in_nmi()) + return false; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + preempt_enable(); + + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + + /* + * Leaving streaming mode enabled will cause issues for any kernel + * NEON and leaving streaming mode or ZA enabled may increase power + * consumption. + */ + if (system_supports_sme()) + sme_smstop(); + + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + preempt_enable(); + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_begin); + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + + preempt_enable(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_end); + +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_save_state_light(state); +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(state); +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.kstate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + } +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(tsk), TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&tsk->thread.ustate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&tsk->thread.kstate); + } +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, efi_fpsimd_state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index 068e5bb2661b..bbeb36e671de 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct task_struct *last; - + uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(next); fpsimd_thread_switch(next); tls_thread_switch(next); hw_breakpoint_thread_switch(next); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index 34e317907524..60dc63e10233 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -71,3 +71,33 @@ USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user) + + + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret + + // Exception fixups +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) + strb tmp1w, [dst], #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b2e7ce1e4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + +V_a .req v20 +V_b .req v21 +V_c .req v22 +V_d .req v23 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15_fpsimd + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned_fpsimd: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64_fpsimd + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63_fpsimd: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15_fpsimd + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +1: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +2: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15_fpsimd: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + +.Lcpy_over64_fpsimd: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp1 C_l, C_h, src, #16 + stp1 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp1 C_l, C_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 D_l, D_h, src, #16 + stp1 D_l, D_h, dst, #16 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd: + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add src, src, #64 + +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd +.Lexitfunc_fpsimd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 2ac716c0d6d8..c190e5f8a989 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -71,3 +71,33 @@ USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user) + + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret + + // Exception fixups +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, ldrb tmp1w, [srcin]) +USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) + add dst, dst, #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +#endif diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c index cd8770b2f76c..e8ce3275a099 100644 --- a/kernel/softirq.c +++ b/kernel/softirq.c @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ #include <asm/softirq_stack.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#endif + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/irq.h> @@ -517,6 +521,9 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) __u32 pending; int softirq_bit; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif /* * Mask out PF_MEMALLOC as the current task context is borrowed for the * softirq. A softirq handled, such as network RX, might set PF_MEMALLOC @@ -526,10 +533,16 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) pending = local_softirq_pending(); + softirq_handle_begin(); in_hardirq = lockdep_softirq_start(); account_softirq_enter(current); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + restart: /* Reset the pending bitmask before enabling irqs */ set_softirq_pending(0); @@ -578,7 +591,14 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) account_softirq_exit(current); lockdep_softirq_end(in_hardirq); + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif + softirq_handle_end(); + current_restore_flags(old_flags, PF_MEMALLOC); } @@ -812,12 +832,21 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, { struct tasklet_struct *list; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif + local_irq_disable(); list = tl_head->head; tl_head->head = NULL; tl_head->tail = &tl_head->head; local_irq_enable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + while (list) { struct tasklet_struct *t = list; @@ -849,6 +878,11 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, __raise_softirq_irqoff(softirq_nr); local_irq_enable(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif } static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index e84df0818517..6f8e22102bdc 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -137,6 +137,17 @@ int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold); +#endif + /* * /proc/sys support */ @@ -2250,6 +2261,29 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min, .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max, }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + { + .procname = "copy_to_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_from_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_in_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, #endif { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v1 OLK-6.6] Add copy to/from/in user with vectorization support
by Nikita Panov 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8445 ------------------------------------------------- 1. This implementation uses st1/ld1 4-vector instructions which allow to copy 64 bytes at once 2. Copy code is used only if size of data block to copy is more than 128 bytes 4. To use this functionality you need to set configuration switch CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y 5. Code can be used on any ARMv8 variant 6. In kernel copy functions like memcpy are not supported now, but can be enabled in future 7. For now we use lightweght version of register context saving/restoration (4-registers) We introduce support of vectorization for copy_from/to/in_user functions. Nowadays it works in parallel with original FPSIMD/SVE vectorization and doesn't affect it anyhow. We have special flag in task struct - TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD, that set if currently we use lightweight vectorization in kernel. Task struct has been updated by two fields: user space fpsimd state and kernel fpsimd state. User space fpsimd state used by kernel_fpsimd_begin(), kernel_fpsimd_end() functions that wrap lightweight FPSIMD contexts usage in kernel space. Kernel fpsimd state is used to manage threads switch. Now there is no support of nested calls of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_fpsimd_begin() and there is no plans to support this in future. This is not necessary. We save lightweight FPSIMD context in kernel_fpsimd_begin(), and restore it in /kernel_fpsimd_end(). On thread switch we preserve kernel FPSIMD context and restore user space one if any. This prevens curruption of user space FPSIMD state. Before switching to the next thread we restore it's kernel FPSIMD context if any. It is allowed to use FPSIMD in bottom halves, due to in case of BH preemption we check TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag and save/restore contexts. Context management if quite lightweight and executed only in case of TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag is set. To enable this feature, you need to manually modify one of the appropriate entries: /proc/sys/vm/copy_from_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_in_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_to_user_threshold Allowed values are following: -1 - feature enabled 0 - feature always enabled n (n >0) - feature enabled, if copied size is greater than n KB. P.S.: What I am personally don't like in current approach: 1. Additional fields and flag in task struct look quite ugly 2. No way to configure the size of chunk to copy using FPSIMD from user space 3. FPSIMD-based memory movement is not generic, need to enable for memmove(), memcpy() and friends in future. Co-developed-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 15 ++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h | 28 ++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 10 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 5 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 218 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 22 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 102 +++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 30 ++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S | 180 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 30 ++++ kernel/softirq.c | 34 ++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 34 ++++ 16 files changed, 734 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index ef8c524a296d..15ec2232994a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1870,6 +1870,21 @@ config ARM64_ILP32 is an ABI where long and pointers are 32bits but it uses the AARCH64 instruction set. +config USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + bool "Use vectorized instructions in copy_to/from user" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + default y + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + +config VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + bool "Validate result of vectorized copy using regular implementation" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + default n + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + menuconfig AARCH32_EL0 bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig index 425616aa8422..331077d556ca 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -525,6 +525,8 @@ CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY=y # CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED is not set # CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is not set CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI=y +CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y +# CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE is not set CONFIG_AARCH32_EL0=y # CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS is not set # CONFIG_COMPAT_ALIGNMENT_FIXUPS is not set diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index b6c6949984d8..1fc9089b4a47 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ struct task_struct; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +extern void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +extern void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +static inline void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +static inline void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + extern void fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); extern void fpsimd_load_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index cdf6a35e3994..df9d3ed91931 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* Lightweight fpsimd context saving/restoration. + * Necessary for vectorized kernel memory movement + * implementation + */ +.macro fpsimd_save_light state + st1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm + +.macro fpsimd_restore_light state + ld1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm +#endif + .macro fpsimd_save state, tmpnr stp q0, q1, [\state, #16 * 0] stp q2, q3, [\state, #16 * 2] diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h index d4b1d172a79b..ab84b194d7b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h @@ -16,4 +16,32 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void); void kernel_neon_end(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void); +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void); +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state); +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + return false; +} + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ +} + +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + #endif /* ! __ASM_NEON_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 9e688b1b13d4..9b81dbcd2126 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -153,6 +153,10 @@ struct cpu_context { unsigned long pc; }; +struct fpsimd_state { + __uint128_t v[4]; +}; + struct thread_struct { struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */ @@ -196,6 +200,12 @@ struct thread_struct { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + KABI_EXTEND( + struct fpsimd_state ustate; + struct fpsimd_state kstate; + ) +#endif }; static inline unsigned int thread_get_vl(struct thread_struct *thread, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 379d24059f5b..60d0be8a2d58 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define TIF_SME 27 /* SME in use */ #define TIF_SME_VL_INHERIT 28 /* Inherit SME vl_onexec across exec */ #define TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 29 /* 32 bit process on AArch64(ILP32) */ +#define TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD 31 /* Use FPSIMD in kernel */ +#define TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED 32 /* Whether priviliged uaccess was manually enabled */ + #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) @@ -107,6 +110,8 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void); #define _TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT (1 << TIF_MTE_ASYNC_FAULT) #define _TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL (1 << TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL) #define _TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 (1 << TIF_32BIT_AARCH64) +#define _TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD (1 << TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD) +#define _TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED (1 << TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index dd0877a75922..fc9f1a40624d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/extable.h> +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ +#include <asm/neon.h> +#endif + static inline int __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size); /* @@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); } -static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +static inline void __uaccess_disable_privileged(void) { mte_disable_tco(); @@ -144,7 +148,22 @@ static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); } -static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (!test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void __uaccess_enable_privileged(void) { mte_enable_tco(); @@ -154,6 +173,47 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); } +static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + bool curr_enabled = !!test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + bool next_enabled = !!test_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + + if (curr_enabled == next_enabled) + return; + + if (curr_enabled) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + else + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_save(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + /* * Sanitize a uaccess pointer such that it cannot reach any kernel address. * @@ -391,7 +451,97 @@ do { \ } while (0); \ } while(0) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +#define USER_COPY_CHUNK_SIZE 4096 + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold; + +#define verify_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +#define compare_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret_fpsimd, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + if (ret_fpsimd != ret) { \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s difference between FPSIMD %lu and regular %lu\n", __func__, n - ret_fpsimd, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= 1; \ + } else { \ + __verify_ret = 0; \ + } \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __acfu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user(to, + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __acfu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + __acfu_ret = __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + kernel_fpsimd_end(); +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret)) { + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret_fpsimd, __acfu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + + return __acfu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ @@ -402,7 +552,66 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u __acfu_ret; \ }) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __actu_ret; + + + if (sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __actu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __actu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __actu_ret = __actu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret_fpsimd, __actu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __actu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ @@ -412,6 +621,7 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) +#endif static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __user *ptr, size_t len) { diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 6325db1a2179..6660465f1b7c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -11,6 +11,28 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/fpsimdmacros.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* + * Save the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_save_state_light) + fpsimd_save_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_save_state_light) + +/* + * Load the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state_light) + fpsimd_restore_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state_light) +#endif + /* * Save the FP registers. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index b86a50646700..103559cccb07 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -1579,6 +1579,11 @@ void do_fpsimd_exc(unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) current); } +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void); +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk); +#endif + void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { bool wrong_task, wrong_cpu; @@ -1587,10 +1592,11 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) return; __get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); - +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(); +#endif /* Save unsaved fpsimd state, if any: */ fpsimd_save(); - /* * Fix up TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE to correctly describe next's * state. For kernel threads, FPSIMD registers are never loaded @@ -1603,6 +1609,9 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) update_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, wrong_task || wrong_cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(next); +#endif __put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); } @@ -1933,6 +1942,95 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kernel_neon_end); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!system_capabilities_finalized()) || + !system_supports_fpsimd() || + in_irq() || irqs_disabled() || in_nmi()) + return false; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + preempt_enable(); + + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + + /* + * Leaving streaming mode enabled will cause issues for any kernel + * NEON and leaving streaming mode or ZA enabled may increase power + * consumption. + */ + if (system_supports_sme()) + sme_smstop(); + + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + preempt_enable(); + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_begin); + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + + preempt_enable(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_end); + +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_save_state_light(state); +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(state); +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.kstate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + } +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(tsk), TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&tsk->thread.ustate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&tsk->thread.kstate); + } +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, efi_fpsimd_state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index e9e5ce956f15..fd895189cb7e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct task_struct *last; - + uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(next); fpsimd_thread_switch(next); tls_thread_switch(next); hw_breakpoint_thread_switch(next); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index 34e317907524..60dc63e10233 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -71,3 +71,33 @@ USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user) + + + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret + + // Exception fixups +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +USER(9998f, ldtrb tmp1w, [srcin]) + strb tmp1w, [dst], #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +#endif \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b2e7ce1e4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + +V_a .req v20 +V_b .req v21 +V_c .req v22 +V_d .req v23 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15_fpsimd + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned_fpsimd: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64_fpsimd + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63_fpsimd: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15_fpsimd + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +1: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +2: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15_fpsimd: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + +.Lcpy_over64_fpsimd: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp1 C_l, C_h, src, #16 + stp1 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp1 C_l, C_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 D_l, D_h, src, #16 + stp1 D_l, D_h, dst, #16 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd: + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add src, src, #64 + +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd +.Lexitfunc_fpsimd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 2ac716c0d6d8..c190e5f8a989 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -71,3 +71,33 @@ USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user) + + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret + + // Exception fixups +9997: cmp dst, dstin + b.ne 9998f + // Before being absolutely sure we couldn't copy anything, try harder +KERNEL_ME_SAFE(9998f, ldrb tmp1w, [srcin]) +USER(9998f, sttrb tmp1w, [dst]) + add dst, dst, #1 +9998: sub x0, end, dst // bytes not copied + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +#endif diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c index bd10ff418865..9935a11be1e8 100644 --- a/kernel/softirq.c +++ b/kernel/softirq.c @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ #include <asm/softirq_stack.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#endif + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/irq.h> @@ -542,6 +546,9 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) __u32 pending; int softirq_bit; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif /* * Mask out PF_MEMALLOC as the current task context is borrowed for the * softirq. A softirq handled, such as network RX, might set PF_MEMALLOC @@ -551,10 +558,16 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) pending = local_softirq_pending(); + softirq_handle_begin(); in_hardirq = lockdep_softirq_start(); account_softirq_enter(current); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + restart: /* Reset the pending bitmask before enabling irqs */ set_softirq_pending(0); @@ -603,7 +616,14 @@ static void handle_softirqs(bool ksirqd) account_softirq_exit(current); lockdep_softirq_end(in_hardirq); + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif + softirq_handle_end(); + current_restore_flags(old_flags, PF_MEMALLOC); } @@ -837,12 +857,21 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, { struct tasklet_struct *list; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif + local_irq_disable(); list = tl_head->head; tl_head->head = NULL; tl_head->tail = &tl_head->head; local_irq_enable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + while (list) { struct tasklet_struct *t = list; @@ -874,6 +903,11 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, __raise_softirq_irqoff(softirq_nr); local_irq_enable(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif } static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index e84df0818517..6f8e22102bdc 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -137,6 +137,17 @@ int sysctl_legacy_va_layout; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold); +#endif + /* * /proc/sys support */ @@ -2250,6 +2261,29 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra1 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min, .extra2 = (void *)&mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max, }, +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + { + .procname = "copy_to_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_from_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_in_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, #endif { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v3 OLK-5.10] Add copy to/from/in user with vectorization support
by Nikita Panov 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8445 ------------------------------------------------- 1. This implementation uses st1/ld1 4-vector instructions which allow to copy 64 bytes at once 2. Copy code is used only if size of data block to copy is more than 128 bytes 4. To use this functionality you need to set configuration switch CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y 5. Code can be used on any ARMv8 variant 6. In kernel copy functions like memcpy are not supported now, but can be enabled in future 7. For now we use lightweght version of register context saving/restoration (4-registers) We introduce support of vectorization for copy_from/to/in_user functions. Nowadays it works in parallel with original FPSIMD/SVE vectorization and doesn't affect it anyhow. We have special flag in task struct - TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD, that set if currently we use lightweight vectorization in kernel. Task struct has been updated by two fields: user space fpsimd state and kernel fpsimd state. User space fpsimd state used by kernel_fpsimd_begin(), kernel_fpsimd_end() functions that wrap lightweight FPSIMD contexts usage in kernel space. Kernel fpsimd state is used to manage threads switch. Now there is no support of nested calls of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_fpsimd_begin() and there is no plans to support this in future. This is not necessary. We save lightweight FPSIMD context in kernel_fpsimd_begin(), and restore it in /kernel_fpsimd_end(). On thread switch we preserve kernel FPSIMD context and restore user space one if any. This prevens curruption of user space FPSIMD state. Before switching to the next thread we restore it's kernel FPSIMD context if any. It is allowed to use FPSIMD in bottom halves, due to in case of BH preemption we check TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag and save/restore contexts. Context management if quite lightweight and executed only in case of TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag is set. To enable this feature, you need to manually modify one of the appropriate entries: /proc/sys/vm/copy_from_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_in_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_to_user_threshold Allowed values are following: -1 - feature enabled 0 - feature always enabled n (n >0) - feature enabled, if copied size is greater than n KB. P.S.: What I am personally don't like in current approach: 1. Additional fields and flag in task struct look quite ugly 2. No way to configure the size of chunk to copy using FPSIMD from user space 3. FPSIMD-based memory movement is not generic, need to enable for memmove(), memcpy() and friends in future. Co-developed-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 15 ++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h | 28 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 10 + arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 274 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 22 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 102 ++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 18 ++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 19 ++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S | 180 ++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 19 ++ kernel/softirq.c | 31 ++- kernel/sysctl.c | 35 ++++ 17 files changed, 782 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index eb30ef59aca2..959af31f7e70 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1470,6 +1470,21 @@ config ARM64_ILP32 is an ABI where long and pointers are 32bits but it uses the AARCH64 instruction set. +config USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + bool "Use vectorized instructions in copy_to/from user" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + default y + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + +config VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + bool "Validate result of vectorized copy using regular implementation" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + default n + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + menuconfig AARCH32_EL0 bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig index be1faf2da008..84408352a95e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig @@ -484,6 +484,8 @@ CONFIG_ARM64_PMEM_RESERVE=y CONFIG_ARM64_PMEM_LEGACY=m # CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is not set CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI=y +CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y +# CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE is not set CONFIG_AARCH32_EL0=y # CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS is not set CONFIG_ARMV8_DEPRECATED=y diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index 22f6c6e23441..cb53767105ef 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ struct task_struct; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +extern void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +extern void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +static inline void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +static inline void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + extern void fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); extern void fpsimd_load_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index ea2577e159f6..62f5f8a0540a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* Lightweight fpsimd context saving/restoration. + * Necessary for vectorized kernel memory movement + * implementation + */ +.macro fpsimd_save_light state + st1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm + +.macro fpsimd_restore_light state + ld1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm +#endif + .macro fpsimd_save state, tmpnr stp q0, q1, [\state, #16 * 0] stp q2, q3, [\state, #16 * 2] diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h index d4b1d172a79b..ab84b194d7b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h @@ -16,4 +16,32 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void); void kernel_neon_end(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void); +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void); +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state); +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + return false; +} + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ +} + +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + #endif /* ! __ASM_NEON_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 66186f3ab550..d6ca823f7f0f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ struct cpu_context { unsigned long pc; }; +struct fpsimd_state { + __uint128_t v[4]; +}; + struct thread_struct { struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */ @@ -174,6 +178,12 @@ struct thread_struct { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + KABI_EXTEND( + struct fpsimd_state ustate; + struct fpsimd_state kstate; + ) +#endif }; static inline unsigned int thread_get_vl(struct thread_struct *thread, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 390d9612546b..2e395ebcc856 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 28 /* pending live patching update */ #define TIF_SME 29 /* SME in use */ #define TIF_SME_VL_INHERIT 30 /* Inherit SME vl_onexec across exec */ +#define TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD 31 /* Use FPSIMD in kernel */ +#define TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED 32 /* Whether priviliged uaccess was manually enabled */ #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) @@ -108,6 +110,8 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define _TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 (1 << TIF_32BIT_AARCH64) #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING) #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG) +#define _TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD (1 << TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD) +#define _TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED (1 << TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 03c2db710f92..4e4eec098cbc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/extable.h> +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ +#include <asm/neon.h> +#endif + #define HAVE_GET_KERNEL_NOFAULT /* @@ -174,7 +178,7 @@ static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); } -static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +static inline void __uaccess_disable_privileged(void) { if (uaccess_ttbr0_disable()) return; @@ -182,7 +186,22 @@ static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); } -static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (!test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void __uaccess_enable_privileged(void) { if (uaccess_ttbr0_enable()) return; @@ -190,6 +209,47 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); } +static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + bool curr_enabled = !!test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + bool next_enabled = !!test_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + + if (curr_enabled == next_enabled) + return; + + if (curr_enabled) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + else + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_save(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the maximum * user address. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), untag @@ -386,7 +446,97 @@ do { \ goto err_label; \ } while(0) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +#define USER_COPY_CHUNK_SIZE 4096 + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold; + +#define verify_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +#define compare_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret_fpsimd, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + if (ret_fpsimd != ret) { \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s difference between FPSIMD %lu and regular %lu\n", __func__, n - ret_fpsimd, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= 1; \ + } else { \ + __verify_ret = 0; \ + } \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __acfu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user(to, + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __acfu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + __acfu_ret = __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + kernel_fpsimd_end(); +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret)) { + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret_fpsimd, __acfu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + + return __acfu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ @@ -397,7 +547,66 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u __acfu_ret; \ }) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __actu_ret; + + + if (sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __actu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __actu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __actu_ret = __actu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret_fpsimd, __actu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __actu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ @@ -407,7 +616,62 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __aciu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __aciu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __aciu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __aciu_ret = __aciu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __aciu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __aciu_ret_fpsimd, __aciu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __aciu_ret; +} +#else extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); #define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ @@ -419,6 +683,8 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const voi __aciu_ret; \ }) +#endif + #define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER #define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 8d12aaac7862..848ca6a351d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -11,6 +11,28 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/fpsimdmacros.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* + * Save the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_save_state_light) + fpsimd_save_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_save_state_light) + +/* + * Load the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state_light) + fpsimd_restore_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state_light) +#endif + /* * Save the FP registers. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index c2489a72b0b9..1a08c19a181f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -1492,6 +1492,11 @@ void do_fpsimd_exc(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) current); } +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void); +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk); +#endif + void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { bool wrong_task, wrong_cpu; @@ -1500,10 +1505,11 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) return; __get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); - +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(); +#endif /* Save unsaved fpsimd state, if any: */ fpsimd_save(); - /* * Fix up TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE to correctly describe next's * state. For kernel threads, FPSIMD registers are never loaded @@ -1516,6 +1522,9 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) update_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, wrong_task || wrong_cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(next); +#endif __put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); } @@ -1835,6 +1844,95 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_neon_end); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!system_capabilities_finalized()) || + !system_supports_fpsimd() || + in_irq() || irqs_disabled() || in_nmi()) + return false; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + preempt_enable(); + + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + + /* + * Leaving streaming mode enabled will cause issues for any kernel + * NEON and leaving streaming mode or ZA enabled may increase power + * consumption. + */ + if (system_supports_sme()) + sme_smstop(); + + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + preempt_enable(); + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_begin); + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + + preempt_enable(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_end); + +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_save_state_light(state); +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(state); +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.kstate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + } +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(tsk), TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&tsk->thread.ustate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&tsk->thread.kstate); + } +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, efi_fpsimd_state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index 14300c9e06d5..338d40725a5d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct task_struct *last; - + uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(next); fpsimd_thread_switch(next); tls_thread_switch(next); hw_breakpoint_thread_switch(next); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index dfc33ce09e72..94290069d97d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -63,6 +63,24 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER_MC(9998f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +#endif .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S index dbea3799c3ef..cbc09c377050 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S @@ -64,6 +64,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) +#endif + .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b2e7ce1e4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + +V_a .req v20 +V_b .req v21 +V_c .req v22 +V_d .req v23 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15_fpsimd + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned_fpsimd: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64_fpsimd + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63_fpsimd: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15_fpsimd + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +1: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +2: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15_fpsimd: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + +.Lcpy_over64_fpsimd: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp1 C_l, C_h, src, #16 + stp1 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp1 C_l, C_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 D_l, D_h, src, #16 + stp1 D_l, D_h, dst, #16 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd: + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add src, src, #64 + +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd +.Lexitfunc_fpsimd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 34154e7c8577..d0211fce4923 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -62,6 +62,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER_MC(9998f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +#endif + .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c index 9fc69e6e2c11..e3f73422829d 100644 --- a/kernel/softirq.c +++ b/kernel/softirq.c @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #include <linux/tick.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#endif + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/irq.h> @@ -262,6 +266,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) __u32 pending; int softirq_bit; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif /* * Mask out PF_MEMALLOC as the current task context is borrowed for the * softirq. A softirq handled, such as network RX, might set PF_MEMALLOC @@ -273,8 +280,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) account_irq_enter_time(current); __local_bh_disable_ip(_RET_IP_, SOFTIRQ_OFFSET); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif in_hardirq = lockdep_softirq_start(); - restart: /* Reset the pending bitmask before enabling irqs */ set_softirq_pending(0); @@ -322,6 +332,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) lockdep_softirq_end(in_hardirq); account_irq_exit_time(current); + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif __local_bh_enable(SOFTIRQ_OFFSET); WARN_ON_ONCE(in_interrupt()); current_restore_flags(old_flags, PF_MEMALLOC); @@ -612,12 +627,21 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, { struct tasklet_struct *list; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif + local_irq_disable(); list = tl_head->head; tl_head->head = NULL; tl_head->tail = &tl_head->head; local_irq_enable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + while (list) { struct tasklet_struct *t = list; @@ -645,6 +669,11 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, __raise_softirq_irqoff(softirq_nr); local_irq_enable(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif } static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 0b1c13a05332..9ec07294429b 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -210,6 +210,17 @@ static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold); +#endif + #if defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) static int bpf_stats_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) @@ -3385,6 +3396,30 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, }, #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + { + .procname = "copy_to_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_from_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_in_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, +#endif { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10] Add copy to/from/in user with vectorization support
by Nikita Panov 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8445 ------------------------------------------------- 1. This implementation uses st1/ld1 4-vector instructions which allow to copy 64 bytes at once 2. Copy code is used only if size of data block to copy is more than 128 bytes 4. To use this functionality you need to set configuration switch CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y 5. Code can be used on any ARMv8 variant 6. In kernel copy functions like memcpy are not supported now, but can be enabled in future 7. For now we use lightweght version of register context saving/restoration (4-registers) We introduce support of vectorization for copy_from/to/in_user functions. Nowadays it works in parallel with original FPSIMD/SVE vectorization and doesn't affect it anyhow. We have special flag in task struct - TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD, that set if currently we use lightweight vectorization in kernel. Task struct has been updated by two fields: user space fpsimd state and kernel fpsimd state. User space fpsimd state used by kernel_fpsimd_begin(), kernel_fpsimd_end() functions that wrap lightweight FPSIMD contexts usage in kernel space. Kernel fpsimd state is used to manage threads switch. Now there is no support of nested calls of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_fpsimd_begin() and there is no plans to support this in future. This is not necessary. We save lightweight FPSIMD context in kernel_fpsimd_begin(), and restore it in /kernel_fpsimd_end(). On thread switch we preserve kernel FPSIMD context and restore user space one if any. This prevens curruption of user space FPSIMD state. Before switching to the next thread we restore it's kernel FPSIMD context if any. It is allowed to use FPSIMD in bottom halves, due to in case of BH preemption we check TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag and save/restore contexts. Context management if quite lightweight and executed only in case of TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag is set. To enable this feature, you need to manually modify one of the appropriate entries: /proc/sys/vm/copy_from_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_in_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_to_user_threshold Allowed values are following: -1 - feature enabled 0 - feature always enabled n (n >0) - feature enabled, if copied size is greater than n KB. P.S.: What I am personally don't like in current approach: 1. Additional fields and flag in task struct look quite ugly 2. No way to configure the size of chunk to copy using FPSIMD from user space 3. FPSIMD-based memory movement is not generic, need to enable for memmove(), memcpy() and friends in future. Co-developed-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h | 28 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 10 + arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 274 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 22 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 102 +++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 18 ++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 19 ++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S | 180 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 19 ++ kernel/softirq.c | 31 ++- kernel/sysctl.c | 35 ++++ 16 files changed, 780 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index eb30ef59aca2..959af31f7e70 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1470,6 +1470,21 @@ config ARM64_ILP32 is an ABI where long and pointers are 32bits but it uses the AARCH64 instruction set. +config USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + bool "Use vectorized instructions in copy_to/from user" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + default y + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + +config VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + bool "Validate result of vectorized copy using regular implementation" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + default n + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + menuconfig AARCH32_EL0 bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index 22f6c6e23441..cb53767105ef 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ struct task_struct; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +extern void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +extern void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +static inline void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +static inline void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + extern void fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); extern void fpsimd_load_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index ea2577e159f6..62f5f8a0540a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* Lightweight fpsimd context saving/restoration. + * Necessary for vectorized kernel memory movement + * implementation + */ +.macro fpsimd_save_light state + st1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm + +.macro fpsimd_restore_light state + ld1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm +#endif + .macro fpsimd_save state, tmpnr stp q0, q1, [\state, #16 * 0] stp q2, q3, [\state, #16 * 2] diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h index d4b1d172a79b..ab84b194d7b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h @@ -16,4 +16,32 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void); void kernel_neon_end(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void); +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void); +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state); +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + return false; +} + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ +} + +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + #endif /* ! __ASM_NEON_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 66186f3ab550..d6ca823f7f0f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ struct cpu_context { unsigned long pc; }; +struct fpsimd_state { + __uint128_t v[4]; +}; + struct thread_struct { struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */ @@ -174,6 +178,12 @@ struct thread_struct { KABI_RESERVE(6) KABI_RESERVE(7) KABI_RESERVE(8) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + KABI_EXTEND( + struct fpsimd_state ustate; + struct fpsimd_state kstate; + ) +#endif }; static inline unsigned int thread_get_vl(struct thread_struct *thread, diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 390d9612546b..2e395ebcc856 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 28 /* pending live patching update */ #define TIF_SME 29 /* SME in use */ #define TIF_SME_VL_INHERIT 30 /* Inherit SME vl_onexec across exec */ +#define TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD 31 /* Use FPSIMD in kernel */ +#define TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED 32 /* Whether priviliged uaccess was manually enabled */ #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) @@ -108,6 +110,8 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define _TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 (1 << TIF_32BIT_AARCH64) #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING) #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG) +#define _TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD (1 << TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD) +#define _TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED (1 << TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 03c2db710f92..4e4eec098cbc 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -24,6 +24,10 @@ #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/extable.h> +#ifndef __GENKSYMS__ +#include <asm/neon.h> +#endif + #define HAVE_GET_KERNEL_NOFAULT /* @@ -174,7 +178,7 @@ static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); } -static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +static inline void __uaccess_disable_privileged(void) { if (uaccess_ttbr0_disable()) return; @@ -182,7 +186,22 @@ static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); } -static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (!test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void __uaccess_enable_privileged(void) { if (uaccess_ttbr0_enable()) return; @@ -190,6 +209,47 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); } +static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + bool curr_enabled = !!test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + bool next_enabled = !!test_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + + if (curr_enabled == next_enabled) + return; + + if (curr_enabled) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + else + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_save(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the maximum * user address. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), untag @@ -386,7 +446,97 @@ do { \ goto err_label; \ } while(0) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +#define USER_COPY_CHUNK_SIZE 4096 + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold; + +#define verify_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +#define compare_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret_fpsimd, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + if (ret_fpsimd != ret) { \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s difference between FPSIMD %lu and regular %lu\n", __func__, n - ret_fpsimd, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= 1; \ + } else { \ + __verify_ret = 0; \ + } \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __acfu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user(to, + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __acfu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + __acfu_ret = __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + kernel_fpsimd_end(); +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret)) { + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret_fpsimd, __acfu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + + return __acfu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ @@ -397,7 +547,66 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u __acfu_ret; \ }) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __actu_ret; + + + if (sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __actu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __actu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __actu_ret = __actu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret_fpsimd, __actu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __actu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ @@ -407,7 +616,62 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __aciu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __aciu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __aciu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __aciu_ret = __aciu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __aciu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __aciu_ret_fpsimd, __aciu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __aciu_ret; +} +#else extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); #define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ @@ -419,6 +683,8 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const voi __aciu_ret; \ }) +#endif + #define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER #define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 8d12aaac7862..848ca6a351d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -11,6 +11,28 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/fpsimdmacros.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* + * Save the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_save_state_light) + fpsimd_save_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_save_state_light) + +/* + * Load the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state_light) + fpsimd_restore_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state_light) +#endif + /* * Save the FP registers. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index c2489a72b0b9..1a08c19a181f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -1492,6 +1492,11 @@ void do_fpsimd_exc(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) current); } +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void); +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk); +#endif + void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { bool wrong_task, wrong_cpu; @@ -1500,10 +1505,11 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) return; __get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); - +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(); +#endif /* Save unsaved fpsimd state, if any: */ fpsimd_save(); - /* * Fix up TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE to correctly describe next's * state. For kernel threads, FPSIMD registers are never loaded @@ -1516,6 +1522,9 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) update_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, wrong_task || wrong_cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(next); +#endif __put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); } @@ -1835,6 +1844,95 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_neon_end); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!system_capabilities_finalized()) || + !system_supports_fpsimd() || + in_irq() || irqs_disabled() || in_nmi()) + return false; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + preempt_enable(); + + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + + /* + * Leaving streaming mode enabled will cause issues for any kernel + * NEON and leaving streaming mode or ZA enabled may increase power + * consumption. + */ + if (system_supports_sme()) + sme_smstop(); + + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + preempt_enable(); + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_begin); + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + + preempt_enable(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_end); + +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_save_state_light(state); +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(state); +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.kstate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + } +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(tsk), TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&tsk->thread.ustate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&tsk->thread.kstate); + } +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, efi_fpsimd_state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index 14300c9e06d5..338d40725a5d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct task_struct *last; - + uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(next); fpsimd_thread_switch(next); tls_thread_switch(next); hw_breakpoint_thread_switch(next); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index dfc33ce09e72..94290069d97d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -63,6 +63,24 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER_MC(9998f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +#endif .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S index dbea3799c3ef..cbc09c377050 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S @@ -64,6 +64,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) +#endif + .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b2e7ce1e4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + +V_a .req v20 +V_b .req v21 +V_c .req v22 +V_d .req v23 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15_fpsimd + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned_fpsimd: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64_fpsimd + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63_fpsimd: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15_fpsimd + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +1: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +2: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15_fpsimd: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + +.Lcpy_over64_fpsimd: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp1 C_l, C_h, src, #16 + stp1 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp1 C_l, C_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 D_l, D_h, src, #16 + stp1 D_l, D_h, dst, #16 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd: + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add src, src, #64 + +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd +.Lexitfunc_fpsimd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 34154e7c8577..d0211fce4923 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -62,6 +62,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER_MC(9998f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +#endif + .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c index 9fc69e6e2c11..e3f73422829d 100644 --- a/kernel/softirq.c +++ b/kernel/softirq.c @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #include <linux/tick.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#endif + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/irq.h> @@ -262,6 +266,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) __u32 pending; int softirq_bit; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif /* * Mask out PF_MEMALLOC as the current task context is borrowed for the * softirq. A softirq handled, such as network RX, might set PF_MEMALLOC @@ -273,8 +280,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) account_irq_enter_time(current); __local_bh_disable_ip(_RET_IP_, SOFTIRQ_OFFSET); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif in_hardirq = lockdep_softirq_start(); - restart: /* Reset the pending bitmask before enabling irqs */ set_softirq_pending(0); @@ -322,6 +332,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) lockdep_softirq_end(in_hardirq); account_irq_exit_time(current); + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif __local_bh_enable(SOFTIRQ_OFFSET); WARN_ON_ONCE(in_interrupt()); current_restore_flags(old_flags, PF_MEMALLOC); @@ -612,12 +627,21 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, { struct tasklet_struct *list; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif + local_irq_disable(); list = tl_head->head; tl_head->head = NULL; tl_head->tail = &tl_head->head; local_irq_enable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + while (list) { struct tasklet_struct *t = list; @@ -645,6 +669,11 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, __raise_softirq_irqoff(softirq_nr); local_irq_enable(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif } static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 0b1c13a05332..9ec07294429b 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -210,6 +210,17 @@ static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold); +#endif + #if defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) static int bpf_stats_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) @@ -3385,6 +3396,30 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, }, #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + { + .procname = "copy_to_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_from_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_in_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, +#endif { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v1 OLK-5.10] Add copy to/from/in user with vectorization support
by Nikita Panov 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> kunpeng inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8445 ------------------------------------------------- 1. This implementation uses st1/ld1 4-vector instructions which allow to copy 64 bytes at once 2. Copy code is used only if size of data block to copy is more than 128 bytes 4. To use this functionality you need to set configuration switch CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY=y 5. Code can be used on any ARMv8 variant 6. In kernel copy functions like memcpy are not supported now, but can be enabled in future 7. For now we use lightweght version of register context saving/restoration (4-registers) We introduce support of vectorization for copy_from/to/in_user functions. Nowadays it works in parallel with original FPSIMD/SVE vectorization and doesn't affect it anyhow. We have special flag in task struct - TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD, that set if currently we use lightweight vectorization in kernel. Task struct has been updated by two fields: user space fpsimd state and kernel fpsimd state. User space fpsimd state used by kernel_fpsimd_begin(), kernel_fpsimd_end() functions that wrap lightweight FPSIMD contexts usage in kernel space. Kernel fpsimd state is used to manage threads switch. Now there is no support of nested calls of kernel_neon_begin()/kernel_fpsimd_begin() and there is no plans to support this in future. This is not necessary. We save lightweight FPSIMD context in kernel_fpsimd_begin(), and restore it in /kernel_fpsimd_end(). On thread switch we preserve kernel FPSIMD context and restore user space one if any. This prevens curruption of user space FPSIMD state. Before switching to the next thread we restore it's kernel FPSIMD context if any. It is allowed to use FPSIMD in bottom halves, due to in case of BH preemption we check TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag and save/restore contexts. Context management if quite lightweight and executed only in case of TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD flag is set. To enable this feature, you need to manually modify one of the appropriate entries: /proc/sys/vm/copy_from_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_in_user_threshold /proc/sys/vm/copy_to_user_threshold Allowed values are following: -1 - feature enabled 0 - feature always enabled n (n >0) - feature enabled, if copied size is greater than n KB. P.S.: What I am personally don't like in current approach: 1. Additional fields and flag in task struct look quite ugly 2. No way to configure the size of chunk to copy using FPSIMD from user space 3. FPSIMD-based memory movement is not generic, need to enable for memmove(), memcpy() and friends in future. Co-developed-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Kozhevnikov <alexander.kozhevnikov(a)huawei-partners.com> Co-developed-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Nikita Panov <panov.nikita(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Artem Kuzin <artem.kuzin(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h | 15 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h | 14 ++ arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h | 28 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 7 + arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 4 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 271 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S | 22 +++ arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 102 +++++++++- arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S | 18 ++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 19 ++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S | 180 +++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S | 19 ++ kernel/softirq.c | 31 ++- kernel/sysctl.c | 35 ++++ 16 files changed, 774 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index eb30ef59aca2..959af31f7e70 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -1470,6 +1470,21 @@ config ARM64_ILP32 is an ABI where long and pointers are 32bits but it uses the AARCH64 instruction set. +config USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + bool "Use vectorized instructions in copy_to/from user" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + default y + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + +config VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + bool "Validate result of vectorized copy using regular implementation" + depends on KERNEL_MODE_NEON + depends on USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + default n + help + This option turns on vectorization to speed up copy_to/from_user routines. + menuconfig AARCH32_EL0 bool "Kernel support for 32-bit EL0" depends on ARM64_4K_PAGES || EXPERT diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h index 22f6c6e23441..cb53767105ef 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimd.h @@ -46,6 +46,21 @@ struct task_struct; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +extern void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +extern void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +static inline void fpsimd_save_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +static inline void fpsimd_load_state_light(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + extern void fpsimd_save_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); extern void fpsimd_load_state(struct user_fpsimd_state *state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h index ea2577e159f6..62f5f8a0540a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/fpsimdmacros.h @@ -8,6 +8,20 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* Lightweight fpsimd context saving/restoration. + * Necessary for vectorized kernel memory movement + * implementation + */ +.macro fpsimd_save_light state + st1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm + +.macro fpsimd_restore_light state + ld1 {v20.16b, v21.16b, v22.16b, v23.16b}, [\state] +.endm +#endif + .macro fpsimd_save state, tmpnr stp q0, q1, [\state, #16 * 0] stp q2, q3, [\state, #16 * 2] diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h index d4b1d172a79b..ab84b194d7b3 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/neon.h @@ -16,4 +16,32 @@ void kernel_neon_begin(void); void kernel_neon_end(void); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void); +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void); +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state); +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state); +#else +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + return false; +} + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ +} + +/* Functions to use in non-preemptible context */ +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + (void) state; +} +#endif + #endif /* ! __ASM_NEON_H */ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h index 66186f3ab550..3f6784867508 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h @@ -137,6 +137,10 @@ struct cpu_context { unsigned long pc; }; +struct fpsimd_state { + __uint128_t v[4]; +}; + struct thread_struct { struct cpu_context cpu_context; /* cpu context */ @@ -166,6 +170,9 @@ struct thread_struct { u64 sctlr_tcf0; u64 gcr_user_incl; #endif + struct fpsimd_state ustate; + struct fpsimd_state kstate; + KABI_USE(1, unsigned int vl[ARM64_VEC_MAX]) KABI_USE(2, unsigned int vl_onexec[ARM64_VEC_MAX]) KABI_USE(3, u64 tpidr2_el0) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h index 390d9612546b..2e395ebcc856 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 28 /* pending live patching update */ #define TIF_SME 29 /* SME in use */ #define TIF_SME_VL_INHERIT 30 /* Inherit SME vl_onexec across exec */ +#define TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD 31 /* Use FPSIMD in kernel */ +#define TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED 32 /* Whether priviliged uaccess was manually enabled */ #define _TIF_SIGPENDING (1 << TIF_SIGPENDING) #define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1 << TIF_NEED_RESCHED) @@ -108,6 +110,8 @@ void arch_release_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk); #define _TIF_32BIT_AARCH64 (1 << TIF_32BIT_AARCH64) #define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING) #define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG) +#define _TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD (1 << TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD) +#define _TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED (1 << TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED) #define _TIF_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NEED_RESCHED | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE | \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h index 03c2db710f92..60ffb6aee7bf 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/memory.h> #include <asm/extable.h> +#include <asm/neon.h> #define HAVE_GET_KERNEL_NOFAULT @@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ static inline void __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(void) CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); } -static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +static inline void __uaccess_disable_privileged(void) { if (uaccess_ttbr0_disable()) return; @@ -182,7 +183,22 @@ static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) __uaccess_enable_hw_pan(); } -static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +static inline void uaccess_disable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (!test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void __uaccess_enable_privileged(void) { if (uaccess_ttbr0_enable()) return; @@ -190,6 +206,47 @@ static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) __uaccess_disable_hw_pan(); } +static inline void uaccess_enable_privileged(void) +{ + preempt_disable(); + + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) { + WARN_ON(1); + preempt_enable(); + return; + } + + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); + + preempt_enable(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(struct task_struct *next) +{ + bool curr_enabled = !!test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + bool next_enabled = !!test_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED); + + if (curr_enabled == next_enabled) + return; + + if (curr_enabled) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); + else + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_save(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_disable_privileged(); +} + +static inline void uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(void) +{ + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_PRIV_UACC_ENABLED)) + __uaccess_enable_privileged(); +} + /* * Sanitise a uaccess pointer such that it becomes NULL if above the maximum * user address. In case the pointer is tagged (has the top byte set), untag @@ -386,7 +443,97 @@ do { \ goto err_label; \ } while(0) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); +#define USER_COPY_CHUNK_SIZE 4096 + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold; + +#define verify_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FPSIMD:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +#define compare_fpsimd_copy(to, from, n, ret_fpsimd, ret) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __verify_ret = 0; \ + __verify_ret = memcmp(to, from, ret ? n - ret : n); \ + if (__verify_ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s inconsistent state\n", __func__); \ + if (ret) \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s failed to copy data, expected=%lu, copied=%lu\n", __func__, n, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= ret; \ + if (ret_fpsimd != ret) { \ + pr_err("FIXUP:%s difference between FPSIMD %lu and regular %lu\n", __func__, n - ret_fpsimd, n - ret); \ + __verify_ret |= 1; \ + } else { \ + __verify_ret = 0; \ + } \ + __verify_ret; \ +}) + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __acfu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user(to, + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __acfu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + __acfu_ret = __acfu_ret_fpsimd; + kernel_fpsimd_end(); +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret)) { + + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __acfu_ret_fpsimd, __acfu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __acfu_ret = __arch_copy_from_user((to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + + return __acfu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __acfu_ret; \ @@ -397,7 +544,66 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __u __acfu_ret; \ }) -extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __actu_ret; + + + if (sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __actu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __actu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __actu_ret = __actu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n, + __actu_ret_fpsimd, __actu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __actu_ret = __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + from, n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __actu_ret; +} +#else +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n); + #define raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ unsigned long __actu_ret; \ @@ -407,7 +613,62 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); \ __actu_ret; \ }) +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + +extern int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold; + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +extern unsigned long __must_check +__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +raw_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long __aciu_ret; + + if (sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold == -1 || n < sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } else { + if (kernel_fpsimd_begin()) { + unsigned long __aciu_ret_fpsimd; + + uaccess_enable_privileged(); + __aciu_ret_fpsimd = __arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_disable_privileged(); + + kernel_fpsimd_end(); + __aciu_ret = __aciu_ret_fpsimd; +#ifdef CONFIG_VECTORIZED_COPY_VALIDATE + if (verify_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __aciu_ret)) { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + + compare_fpsimd_copy(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n, + __aciu_ret_fpsimd, __aciu_ret); + } +#endif + } else { + uaccess_ttbr0_enable(); + __aciu_ret = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), + __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n); + uaccess_ttbr0_disable(); + } + } + + return __aciu_ret; +} +#else extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n); #define raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n) \ ({ \ @@ -419,6 +680,8 @@ extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const voi __aciu_ret; \ }) +#endif + #define INLINE_COPY_TO_USER #define INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S index 8d12aaac7862..848ca6a351d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry-fpsimd.S @@ -11,6 +11,28 @@ #include <asm/assembler.h> #include <asm/fpsimdmacros.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +/* + * Save the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_save_state_light) + fpsimd_save_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_save_state_light) + +/* + * Load the FP registers. + * + * x0 - pointer to struct fpsimd_state_light + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(fpsimd_load_state_light) + fpsimd_restore_light x0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(fpsimd_load_state_light) +#endif + /* * Save the FP registers. * diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index c2489a72b0b9..1a08c19a181f 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -1492,6 +1492,11 @@ void do_fpsimd_exc(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs) current); } +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void); +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk); +#endif + void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) { bool wrong_task, wrong_cpu; @@ -1500,10 +1505,11 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) return; __get_cpu_fpsimd_context(); - +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(); +#endif /* Save unsaved fpsimd state, if any: */ fpsimd_save(); - /* * Fix up TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE to correctly describe next's * state. For kernel threads, FPSIMD registers are never loaded @@ -1516,6 +1522,9 @@ void fpsimd_thread_switch(struct task_struct *next) update_tsk_thread_flag(next, TIF_FOREIGN_FPSTATE, wrong_task || wrong_cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(next); +#endif __put_cpu_fpsimd_context(); } @@ -1835,6 +1844,95 @@ void kernel_neon_end(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_neon_end); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +bool kernel_fpsimd_begin(void) +{ + if (WARN_ON(!system_capabilities_finalized()) || + !system_supports_fpsimd() || + in_irq() || irqs_disabled() || in_nmi()) + return false; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_set_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + preempt_enable(); + + WARN_ON(1); + return false; + } + + /* + * Leaving streaming mode enabled will cause issues for any kernel + * NEON and leaving streaming mode or ZA enabled may increase power + * consumption. + */ + if (system_supports_sme()) + sme_smstop(); + + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + preempt_enable(); + + return true; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_begin); + +void kernel_fpsimd_end(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + preempt_disable(); + if (test_and_clear_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + + preempt_enable(); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(kernel_fpsimd_end); + +void _kernel_fpsimd_save(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_save_state_light(state); +} + +void _kernel_fpsimd_load(struct fpsimd_state *state) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) + fpsimd_load_state_light(state); +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_rollback_changes(void) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&current->thread.kstate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&current->thread.ustate); + } +} + +static void kernel_fpsimd_restore_changes(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + if (!system_supports_fpsimd()) + return; + + BUG_ON(preemptible()); + if (test_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(tsk), TIF_KERNEL_FPSIMD)) { + fpsimd_save_state_light(&tsk->thread.ustate); + fpsimd_load_state_light(&tsk->thread.kstate); + } +} +#endif + #ifdef CONFIG_EFI static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct user_fpsimd_state, efi_fpsimd_state); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c index 14300c9e06d5..338d40725a5d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c @@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ __notrace_funcgraph struct task_struct *__switch_to(struct task_struct *prev, struct task_struct *next) { struct task_struct *last; - + uaccess_priviliged_context_switch(next); fpsimd_thread_switch(next); tls_thread_switch(next); hw_breakpoint_thread_switch(next); diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S index dfc33ce09e72..94290069d97d 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_from_user.S @@ -63,6 +63,24 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER_MC(9998f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 // Nothing to copy + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user_fpsimd) +#endif .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S index dbea3799c3ef..cbc09c377050 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S @@ -64,6 +64,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user_fpsimd) +#endif + .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9b2e7ce1e4d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_template_fpsimd.S @@ -0,0 +1,180 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2013 ARM Ltd. + * Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro. + * + * This code is based on glibc cortex strings work originally authored by Linaro + * be found @ + * + * http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~linaro-toolchain-dev/cortex-strings/trunk/ + * files/head:/src/aarch64/ + */ + +/* + * Copy a buffer from src to dest (alignment handled by the hardware) + * + * Parameters: + * x0 - dest + * x1 - src + * x2 - n + * Returns: + * x0 - dest + */ +dstin .req x0 +src .req x1 +count .req x2 +tmp1 .req x3 +tmp1w .req w3 +tmp2 .req x4 +tmp2w .req w4 +dst .req x6 + +A_l .req x7 +A_h .req x8 +B_l .req x9 +B_h .req x10 +C_l .req x11 +C_h .req x12 +D_l .req x13 +D_h .req x14 + +V_a .req v20 +V_b .req v21 +V_c .req v22 +V_d .req v23 + + mov dst, dstin + cmp count, #16 + /*When memory length is less than 16, the accessed are not aligned.*/ + b.lo .Ltiny15_fpsimd + + neg tmp2, src + ands tmp2, tmp2, #15/* Bytes to reach alignment. */ + b.eq .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + sub count, count, tmp2 + /* + * Copy the leading memory data from src to dst in an increasing + * address order.By this way,the risk of overwriting the source + * memory data is eliminated when the distance between src and + * dst is less than 16. The memory accesses here are alignment. + */ + tbz tmp2, #0, 1f + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 +1: + tbz tmp2, #1, 2f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +2: + tbz tmp2, #2, 3f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +3: + tbz tmp2, #3, .LSrcAligned_fpsimd + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 + +.LSrcAligned_fpsimd: + cmp count, #64 + b.ge .Lcpy_over64_fpsimd + /* + * Deal with small copies quickly by dropping straight into the + * exit block. + */ +.Ltail63_fpsimd: + /* + * Copy up to 48 bytes of data. At this point we only need the + * bottom 6 bits of count to be accurate. + */ + ands tmp1, count, #0x30 + b.eq .Ltiny15_fpsimd + cmp tmp1w, #0x20 + b.eq 1f + b.lt 2f + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +1: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +2: + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 +.Ltiny15_fpsimd: + /* + * Prefer to break one ldp/stp into several load/store to access + * memory in an increasing address order,rather than to load/store 16 + * bytes from (src-16) to (dst-16) and to backward the src to aligned + * address,which way is used in original cortex memcpy. If keeping + * the original memcpy process here, memmove need to satisfy the + * precondition that src address is at least 16 bytes bigger than dst + * address,otherwise some source data will be overwritten when memove + * call memcpy directly. To make memmove simpler and decouple the + * memcpy's dependency on memmove, withdrew the original process. + */ + tbz count, #3, 1f + ldr1 tmp1, src, #8 + str1 tmp1, dst, #8 +1: + tbz count, #2, 2f + ldr1 tmp1w, src, #4 + str1 tmp1w, dst, #4 +2: + tbz count, #1, 3f + ldrh1 tmp1w, src, #2 + strh1 tmp1w, dst, #2 +3: + tbz count, #0, .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + ldrb1 tmp1w, src, #1 + strb1 tmp1w, dst, #1 + + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + +.Lcpy_over64_fpsimd: + subs count, count, #128 + b.ge .Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd + /* + * Less than 128 bytes to copy, so handle 64 here and then jump + * to the tail. + */ + ldp1 A_l, A_h, src, #16 + stp1 A_l, A_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 B_l, B_h, src, #16 + ldp1 C_l, C_h, src, #16 + stp1 B_l, B_h, dst, #16 + stp1 C_l, C_h, dst, #16 + ldp1 D_l, D_h, src, #16 + stp1 D_l, D_h, dst, #16 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd + b .Lexitfunc_fpsimd + + /* + * Critical loop. Start at a new cache line boundary. Assuming + * 64 bytes per line this ensures the entire loop is in one line. + */ + .p2align L1_CACHE_SHIFT +.Lcpy_body_large_fpsimd: + /* pre-get 64 bytes data. */ + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add src, src, #64 + +1: + /* + * interlace the load of next 64 bytes data block with store of the last + * loaded 64 bytes data. + */ + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + ldsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, src + add dst, dst, #64 + add src, src, #64 + + subs count, count, #64 + b.ge 1b + + stsve V_a.16b, V_b.16b, V_c.16b, V_d.16b, dst + add dst, dst, #64 + + tst count, #0x3f + b.ne .Ltail63_fpsimd +.Lexitfunc_fpsimd: diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S index 34154e7c8577..d0211fce4923 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_to_user.S @@ -62,6 +62,25 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user) SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user) EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user) +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + .macro stsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER(9997f, st1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + + .macro ldsve reg1, reg2, reg3, reg4, ptr + USER_MC(9998f, ld1 {\reg1, \reg2, \reg3, \reg4}, [\ptr]) + .endm + +SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) + add end, x0, x2 + mov srcin, x1 +#include "copy_template_fpsimd.S" + mov x0, #0 + ret +SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user_fpsimd) +#endif + .section .fixup,"ax" .align 2 9997: cmp dst, dstin diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c index 9fc69e6e2c11..e3f73422829d 100644 --- a/kernel/softirq.c +++ b/kernel/softirq.c @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ #include <linux/tick.h> #include <linux/irq.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +#include <asm/fpsimd.h> +#endif + #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/irq.h> @@ -262,6 +266,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) __u32 pending; int softirq_bit; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif /* * Mask out PF_MEMALLOC as the current task context is borrowed for the * softirq. A softirq handled, such as network RX, might set PF_MEMALLOC @@ -273,8 +280,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) account_irq_enter_time(current); __local_bh_disable_ip(_RET_IP_, SOFTIRQ_OFFSET); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif in_hardirq = lockdep_softirq_start(); - restart: /* Reset the pending bitmask before enabling irqs */ set_softirq_pending(0); @@ -322,6 +332,11 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void) lockdep_softirq_end(in_hardirq); account_irq_exit_time(current); + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif __local_bh_enable(SOFTIRQ_OFFSET); WARN_ON_ONCE(in_interrupt()); current_restore_flags(old_flags, PF_MEMALLOC); @@ -612,12 +627,21 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, { struct tasklet_struct *list; +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + struct fpsimd_state state; +#endif + local_irq_disable(); list = tl_head->head; tl_head->head = NULL; tl_head->tail = &tl_head->head; local_irq_enable(); +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + _kernel_fpsimd_save(&state); + uaccess_priviliged_state_save(); +#endif + while (list) { struct tasklet_struct *t = list; @@ -645,6 +669,11 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a, __raise_softirq_irqoff(softirq_nr); local_irq_enable(); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + uaccess_priviliged_state_restore(); + _kernel_fpsimd_load(&state); +#endif } static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 0b1c13a05332..9ec07294429b 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -210,6 +210,17 @@ static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000; #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY +int sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold); + +int sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold = -1; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold); +#endif + #if defined(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) && defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL) static int bpf_stats_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) @@ -3385,6 +3396,30 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, }, #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_USE_VECTORIZED_COPY + { + .procname = "copy_to_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_to_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_from_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_from_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, + { + .procname = "copy_in_user_threshold", + .data = &sysctl_copy_in_user_threshold, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec + }, +#endif { } }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ext4: fix e4b bitmap inconsistency reports
by Yongjian Sun 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8330 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- A bitmap inconsistency issue was observed during stress tests under mixed huge-page workloads. Ext4 reported multiple e4b bitmap check failures like: ext4_mb_complex_scan_group:2508: group 350, 8179 free clusters as per group info. But got 8192 blocks Analysis and experimentation confirmed that the issue is caused by a race condition between page migration and bitmap modification. Although this timing window is extremely narrow, it is still hit in practice: folio_lock ext4_mb_load_buddy __migrate_folio check ref count folio_mc_copy __filemap_get_folio folio_try_get(folio) ...... mb_mark_used ext4_mb_unload_buddy __folio_migrate_mapping folio_ref_freeze folio_unlock The root cause of this issue is that the fast path of load_buddy only increments the folio's reference count, which is insufficient to prevent concurrent folio migration. We observed that the folio migration process acquires the folio lock. Therefore, we can determine whether to take the fast path in load_buddy by checking the lock status. If the folio is locked, we opt for the slow path (which acquires the lock) to close this concurrency window. Additionally, this change addresses the following issues: When the DOUBLE_CHECK macro is enabled to inspect bitmap-related issues, the following error may be triggered: corruption in group 324 at byte 784(6272): f in copy != ff on disk/prealloc Analysis reveals that this is a false positive. There is a specific race window where the bitmap and the group descriptor become momentarily inconsistent, leading to this error report: ext4_mb_load_buddy ext4_mb_load_buddy __filemap_get_folio(create|lock) folio_lock ext4_mb_init_cache folio_mark_uptodate __filemap_get_folio(no lock) ...... mb_mark_used mb_mark_used_double mb_cmp_bitmaps mb_set_bits(e4b->bd_bitmap) folio_unlock The original logic assumed that since mb_cmp_bitmaps is called when the bitmap is newly loaded from disk, the folio lock would be sufficient to prevent concurrent access. However, this overlooks a specific race condition: if another process attempts to load buddy and finds the folio is already in an uptodate state, it will immediately begin using it without holding folio lock. Fixes: 9bb3fd60f91e ("arm64: mm: Add copy mc support for all migrate_page") Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c index 522d2ec128ef..9d4e8e3c74e2 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/mballoc.c +++ b/fs/ext4/mballoc.c @@ -1217,16 +1217,17 @@ ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group, /* we could use find_or_create_page(), but it locks page * what we'd like to avoid in fast path ... */ page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, pnum, FGP_ACCESSED); - if (page == NULL || !PageUptodate(page)) { + if (page == NULL || !PageUptodate(page) || PageLocked(page)) { + /* + * PageLocked is employed to detect ongoing page + * migrations, since concurrent migrations can lead to + * bitmap inconsistency. And if we are not uptodate that + * implies somebody just created the page but is yet to + * initialize it. We can drop the page reference and + * try to get the page with lock in both cases to avoid + * concurrency. + */ if (page) - /* - * drop the page reference and try - * to get the page with lock. If we - * are not uptodate that implies - * somebody just created the page but - * is yet to initialize the same. So - * wait for it to initialize. - */ put_page(page); page = find_or_create_page(inode->i_mapping, pnum, gfp); if (page) { @@ -1261,7 +1262,7 @@ ext4_mb_load_buddy_gfp(struct super_block *sb, ext4_group_t group, poff = block % blocks_per_page; page = find_get_page_flags(inode->i_mapping, pnum, FGP_ACCESSED); - if (page == NULL || !PageUptodate(page)) { + if (page == NULL || !PageUptodate(page) || PageLocked(page)) { if (page) put_page(page); page = find_or_create_page(inode->i_mapping, pnum, gfp); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] udp: Deal with race between UDP socket address change and rehash
by Zhang Changzhong 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.14-rc1 commit a502ea6fa94b1f7be72a24bcf9e3f5f6b7e6e90c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/10960 CVE: CVE-2024-57974 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------------------------- If a UDP socket changes its local address while it's receiving datagrams, as a result of connect(), there is a period during which a lookup operation might fail to find it, after the address is changed but before the secondary hash (port and address) and the four-tuple hash (local and remote ports and addresses) are updated. Secondary hash chains were introduced by commit 30fff9231fad ("udp: bind() optimisation") and, as a result, a rehash operation became needed to make a bound socket reachable again after a connect(). This operation was introduced by commit 719f835853a9 ("udp: add rehash on connect()") which isn't however a complete fix: the socket will be found once the rehashing completes, but not while it's pending. This is noticeable with a socat(1) server in UDP4-LISTEN mode, and a client sending datagrams to it. After the server receives the first datagram (cf. _xioopen_ipdgram_listen()), it issues a connect() to the address of the sender, in order to set up a directed flow. Now, if the client, running on a different CPU thread, happens to send a (subsequent) datagram while the server's socket changes its address, but is not rehashed yet, this will result in a failed lookup and a port unreachable error delivered to the client, as apparent from the following reproducer: LEN=$(($(cat /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default) / 4)) dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=${LEN} of=tmp.in while :; do taskset -c 1 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc & sleep 0.1 || sleep 1 taskset -c 2 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:localhost:1337,shut-null wait done where the client will eventually get ECONNREFUSED on a write() (typically the second or third one of a given iteration): 2024/11/13 21:28:23 socat[46901] E write(6, 0x556db2e3c000, 8192): Connection refused This issue was first observed as a seldom failure in Podman's tests checking UDP functionality while using pasta(1) to connect the container's network namespace, which leads us to a reproducer with the lookup error resulting in an ICMP packet on a tap device: LOCAL_ADDR="$(ip -j -4 addr show|jq -rM '.[] | .addr_info[0] | select(.scope == "global").local')" while :; do ./pasta --config-net -p pasta.pcap -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc & sleep 0.2 || sleep 1 socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:${LOCAL_ADDR}:1337,shut-null wait cmp tmp.in tmp.out done Once this fails: tmp.in tmp.out differ: char 8193, line 29 we can finally have a look at what's going on: $ tshark -r pasta.pcap 1 0.000000 :: ? ff02::16 ICMPv6 110 Multicast Listener Report Message v2 2 0.168690 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 3 0.168767 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 4 0.168806 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 5 0.168827 c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ? Broadcast ARP 42 Who has 88.198.0.161? Tell 88.198.0.164 6 0.168851 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 ? c6:47:05:8d:dc:04 ARP 42 88.198.0.161 is at 9a:55:9a:55:9a:55 7 0.168875 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 8 0.168896 88.198.0.164 ? 88.198.0.161 ICMP 590 Destination unreachable (Port unreachable) 9 0.168926 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 10 0.168959 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 8234 60260 ? 1337 Len=8192 11 0.168989 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 4138 60260 ? 1337 Len=4096 12 0.169010 88.198.0.161 ? 88.198.0.164 UDP 42 60260 ? 1337 Len=0 On the third datagram received, the network namespace of the container initiates an ARP lookup to deliver the ICMP message. In another variant of this reproducer, starting the client with: strace -f pasta --config-net -u 1337 socat UDP4-LISTEN:1337,null-eof OPEN:tmp.out,create,trunc 2>strace.log & and connecting to the socat server using a loopback address: socat OPEN:tmp.in UDP4:localhost:1337,shut-null we can more clearly observe a sendmmsg() call failing after the first datagram is delivered: [pid 278012] connect(173, 0x7fff96c95fc0, 16) = 0 [...] [pid 278012] recvmmsg(173, 0x7fff96c96020, 1024, MSG_DONTWAIT, NULL) = -1 EAGAIN (Resource temporarily unavailable) [pid 278012] sendmmsg(173, 0x561c5ad0a720, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = 1 [...] [pid 278012] sendmmsg(173, 0x561c5ad0a720, 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) = -1 ECONNREFUSED (Connection refused) and, somewhat confusingly, after a connect() on the same socket succeeded. Until commit 4cdeeee9252a ("net: udp: prefer listeners bound to an address"), the race between receive address change and lookup didn't actually cause visible issues, because, once the lookup based on the secondary hash chain failed, we would still attempt a lookup based on the primary hash (destination port only), and find the socket with the outdated secondary hash. That change, however, dropped port-only lookups altogether, as side effect, making the race visible. To fix this, while avoiding the need to make address changes and rehash atomic against lookups, reintroduce primary hash lookups as fallback, if lookups based on four-tuple and secondary hashes fail. To this end, introduce a simplified lookup implementation, which doesn't take care of SO_REUSEPORT groups: if we have one, there are multiple sockets that would match the four-tuple or secondary hash, meaning that we can't run into this race at all. v2: - instead of synchronising lookup operations against address change plus rehash, reintroduce a simplified version of the original primary hash lookup as fallback v1: - fix build with CONFIG_IPV6=n: add ifdef around sk_v6_rcv_saddr usage (Kuniyuki Iwashima) - directly use sk_rcv_saddr for IPv4 receive addresses instead of fetching inet_rcv_saddr (Kuniyuki Iwashima) - move inet_update_saddr() to inet_hashtables.h and use that to set IPv4/IPv6 addresses as suitable (Kuniyuki Iwashima) - rebase onto net-next, update commit message accordingly Reported-by: Ed Santiago <santiago(a)redhat.com> Link: https://github.com/containers/podman/issues/24147 Analysed-by: David Gibson <david(a)gibson.dropbear.id.au> Fixes: 30fff9231fad ("udp: bind() optimisation") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Conflicts: net/ipv4/udp.c net/ipv6/udp.c [context conflicts, and fix some discards qualifiers error.] Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhang Changzhong <zhangchangzhong(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/udp.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ net/ipv6/udp.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c index 8a34e22..4c1f82f 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c @@ -421,6 +421,49 @@ u32 udp_ehashfn(const struct net *net, const __be32 laddr, const __u16 lport, udp_ehash_secret + net_hash_mix(net)); } +/** + * udp4_lib_lookup1() - Simplified lookup using primary hash (destination port) + * @net: Network namespace + * @saddr: Source address, network order + * @sport: Source port, network order + * @daddr: Destination address, network order + * @hnum: Destination port, host order + * @dif: Destination interface index + * @sdif: Destination bridge port index, if relevant + * @udptable: Set of UDP hash tables + * + * Simplified lookup to be used as fallback if no sockets are found due to a + * potential race between (receive) address change, and lookup happening before + * the rehash operation. This function ignores SO_REUSEPORT groups while scoring + * result sockets, because if we have one, we don't need the fallback at all. + * + * Called under rcu_read_lock(). + * + * Return: socket with highest matching score if any, NULL if none + */ +static struct sock *udp4_lib_lookup1(const struct net *net, + __be32 saddr, __be16 sport, + __be32 daddr, unsigned int hnum, + int dif, int sdif, + const struct udp_table *udptable) +{ + unsigned int slot = udp_hashfn(net, hnum, udptable->mask); + struct udp_hslot *hslot = &udptable->hash[slot]; + struct sock *sk, *result = NULL; + int score, badness = 0; + + sk_for_each_rcu(sk, &hslot->head) { + score = compute_score(sk, (struct net *)net, + saddr, sport, daddr, hnum, dif, sdif); + if (score > badness) { + result = sk; + badness = score; + } + } + + return result; +} + /* called with rcu_read_lock() */ static struct sock *udp4_lib_lookup2(struct net *net, __be32 saddr, __be16 sport, @@ -526,6 +569,19 @@ struct sock *__udp4_lib_lookup(struct net *net, __be32 saddr, result = udp4_lib_lookup2(net, saddr, sport, htonl(INADDR_ANY), hnum, dif, sdif, hslot2, skb); + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(result)) + goto done; + + /* Primary hash (destination port) lookup as fallback for this race: + * 1. __ip4_datagram_connect() sets sk_rcv_saddr + * 2. lookup (this function): new sk_rcv_saddr, hashes not updated yet + * 3. rehash operation updating _secondary and four-tuple_ hashes + * The primary hash doesn't need an update after 1., so, thanks to this + * further step, 1. and 3. don't need to be atomic against the lookup. + */ + result = udp4_lib_lookup1(net, saddr, sport, daddr, hnum, dif, sdif, + udptable); + done: if (IS_ERR(result)) return NULL; diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c index 9ff8e72..7c9f77f 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/udp.c +++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c @@ -162,6 +162,51 @@ static int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, return score; } +/** + * udp6_lib_lookup1() - Simplified lookup using primary hash (destination port) + * @net: Network namespace + * @saddr: Source address, network order + * @sport: Source port, network order + * @daddr: Destination address, network order + * @hnum: Destination port, host order + * @dif: Destination interface index + * @sdif: Destination bridge port index, if relevant + * @udptable: Set of UDP hash tables + * + * Simplified lookup to be used as fallback if no sockets are found due to a + * potential race between (receive) address change, and lookup happening before + * the rehash operation. This function ignores SO_REUSEPORT groups while scoring + * result sockets, because if we have one, we don't need the fallback at all. + * + * Called under rcu_read_lock(). + * + * Return: socket with highest matching score if any, NULL if none + */ +static struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup1(const struct net *net, + const struct in6_addr *saddr, __be16 sport, + const struct in6_addr *daddr, + unsigned int hnum, int dif, int sdif, + const struct udp_table *udptable) +{ + unsigned int slot = udp_hashfn(net, hnum, udptable->mask); + struct udp_hslot *hslot = &udptable->hash[slot]; + struct sock *sk, *result = NULL; + int score, badness = 0; + + sk_for_each_rcu(sk, &hslot->head) { + score = compute_score(sk, (struct net *)net, + (struct in6_addr *)saddr, sport, + (struct in6_addr *)daddr, hnum, + dif, sdif); + if (score > badness) { + result = sk; + badness = score; + } + } + + return result; +} + /* called with rcu_read_lock() */ static struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup2(struct net *net, const struct in6_addr *saddr, __be16 sport, @@ -266,6 +311,13 @@ struct sock *__udp6_lib_lookup(struct net *net, result = udp6_lib_lookup2(net, saddr, sport, &in6addr_any, hnum, dif, sdif, hslot2, skb); + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(result)) + goto done; + + /* Cover address change/lookup/rehash race: see __udp4_lib_lookup() */ + result = udp6_lib_lookup1(net, saddr, sport, daddr, hnum, dif, sdif, + udptable); + done: if (IS_ERR(result)) return NULL; -- 2.9.5

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1
by Zhang Kunbo 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.67 commit f577508cc8a0adb8b4ebe9480bba7683b6149930 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13516 CVE: CVE-2026-23005 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6 upstream. When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1 will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel. E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1, and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's call to fpu_update_guest_xfd(). and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120 kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM, XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD (and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component): If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i, the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1; instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component (the other instructions do not save state component i). Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD. Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features. Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14) Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> [Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo] Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c [Context difference. ] Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 1f0871be9d53..fd53ff26cd42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -296,10 +296,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) { + struct fpstate *fpstate = guest_fpu->fpstate; + fpregs_lock(); - guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd; - if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use) - xfd_update_state(guest_fpu->fpstate); + + /* + * KVM's guest ABI is that setting XFD[i]=1 *can* immediately revert the + * save state to its initial configuration. Likewise, KVM_GET_XSAVE does + * the same as XSAVE and returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 whenever XFD[i]=1. + * + * If the guest's FPU state is in hardware, just update XFD: the XSAVE + * in fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate will clear XSTATE_BV[i] whenever XFD[i]=1. + * + * If however the guest's FPU state is NOT resident in hardware, clear + * disabled components in XSTATE_BV now, or a subsequent XRSTOR will + * attempt to load disabled components and generate #NM _in the host_. + */ + if (xfd && test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~xfd; + + fpstate->xfd = xfd; + if (fpstate->in_use) + xfd_update_state(fpstate); + fpregs_unlock(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd); @@ -407,6 +426,13 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Disabled features must be in their initial state, otherwise XRSTOR + * causes an exception. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & kstate->xfd)) + return -EINVAL; + /* * Nullify @vpkru to preserve its current value if PKRU's bit isn't set * in the header. KVM's odd ABI is to leave PKRU untouched in this diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 2139f728aecc..57fc6916906b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5541,9 +5541,18 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave) { + union fpregs_state *xstate = (union fpregs_state *)guest_xsave->region; + if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu)) return 0; + /* + * For backwards compatibility, do not expect disabled features to be in + * their initial state. XSTATE_BV[i] must still be cleared whenever + * XFD[i]=1, or XRSTOR would cause a #NM. + */ + xstate->xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; + return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, guest_xsave->region, kvm_caps.supported_xcr0, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] x86/fpu: Clear XSTATE_BV[i] in guest XSAVE state whenever XFD[i]=1
by Zhang Kunbo 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.12.67 commit f577508cc8a0adb8b4ebe9480bba7683b6149930 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13516 CVE: CVE-2026-23005 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6 upstream. When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for features that are disabled via the guest's XFD. Because the kernel executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1 will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel. E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #171 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0 kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1, and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's call to fpu_update_guest_xfd(). and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867 Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm #168 NONE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110 Call Trace: <TASK> asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90 fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120 kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture. Per Intel's SDM, XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD (and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component): If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i, the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1; instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state component (the other instructions do not save state component i). Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for a struct fpu_guest. However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD. Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features. Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 820a6ee944e7 ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14) Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> [Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo] Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/kvm/x86.c [Context difference. ] Signed-off-by: Zhang Kunbo <zhangkunbo(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c index 1f0871be9d53..fd53ff26cd42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c @@ -296,10 +296,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_enable_guest_xfd_features); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 void fpu_update_guest_xfd(struct fpu_guest *guest_fpu, u64 xfd) { + struct fpstate *fpstate = guest_fpu->fpstate; + fpregs_lock(); - guest_fpu->fpstate->xfd = xfd; - if (guest_fpu->fpstate->in_use) - xfd_update_state(guest_fpu->fpstate); + + /* + * KVM's guest ABI is that setting XFD[i]=1 *can* immediately revert the + * save state to its initial configuration. Likewise, KVM_GET_XSAVE does + * the same as XSAVE and returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 whenever XFD[i]=1. + * + * If the guest's FPU state is in hardware, just update XFD: the XSAVE + * in fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate will clear XSTATE_BV[i] whenever XFD[i]=1. + * + * If however the guest's FPU state is NOT resident in hardware, clear + * disabled components in XSTATE_BV now, or a subsequent XRSTOR will + * attempt to load disabled components and generate #NM _in the host_. + */ + if (xfd && test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) + fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~xfd; + + fpstate->xfd = xfd; + if (fpstate->in_use) + xfd_update_state(fpstate); + fpregs_unlock(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fpu_update_guest_xfd); @@ -407,6 +426,13 @@ int fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(struct fpu_guest *gfpu, const void *buf, if (ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & ~xcr0) return -EINVAL; + /* + * Disabled features must be in their initial state, otherwise XRSTOR + * causes an exception. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ustate->xsave.header.xfeatures & kstate->xfd)) + return -EINVAL; + /* * Nullify @vpkru to preserve its current value if PKRU's bit isn't set * in the header. KVM's odd ABI is to leave PKRU untouched in this diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 2139f728aecc..57fc6916906b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -5541,9 +5541,18 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_get_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_xsave *guest_xsave) { + union fpregs_state *xstate = (union fpregs_state *)guest_xsave->region; + if (fpstate_is_confidential(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu)) return 0; + /* + * For backwards compatibility, do not expect disabled features to be in + * their initial state. XSTATE_BV[i] must still be cleared whenever + * XFD[i]=1, or XRSTOR would cause a #NM. + */ + xstate->xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.fpstate->xfd; + return fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate(&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu, guest_xsave->region, kvm_caps.supported_xcr0, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v11 00/14] arm64: entry: Convert to Generic Entry
by Jinjie Ruan 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

Currently, x86, Riscv, Loongarch use the Generic Entry which makes maintainers' work easier and codes more elegant. arm64 has already successfully switched to the Generic IRQ Entry in commit b3cf07851b6c ("arm64: entry: Switch to generic IRQ entry"), it is time to completely convert arm64 to Generic Entry. The goal is to bring arm64 in line with other architectures that already use the generic entry infrastructure, reducing duplicated code and making it easier to share future changes in entry/exit paths, such as "Syscall User Dispatch". This patch set is rebased on arm64 (for-next/entry). And the performance was measured on Kunpeng 920 using "perf bench basic syscall" with "arm64.nopauth selinux=0 audit=1". After switch to Generic Entry, the performance are below: | Metric | W/O Generic Framework | With Generic Framework | Change | | ---------- | --------------------- | ---------------------- | ------ | | Total time | 2.487 [sec] | 2.393[sec] | ↓3.8% | | usecs/op | 0.248780 | 0.239361 | ↓3.8% | | ops/sec | 4,019,620 | 4,177,789 | ↑3.9% | Compared to earlier with arch specific handling, the performance improved by approximately 3.9%. On the basis of optimizing syscall_get_arguments()[1], el0_svc_common() and syscall_exit_work(), the performance are below: | Metric | W/O Generic Entry | With Generic Entry opt| Change | | ---------- | ----------------- | ------------------ | ------ | | Total time | 2.487 [sec] | 2.264 [sec] | ↓9.0% | | usecs/op | 0.248780 | 0.226481 | ↓9.0% | | ops/sec | 4,019,620 | 4,415,383 | ↑9.8% | Therefore, after the optimization, ARM64 System Call performance improved by approximately 9%. It was tested ok with following test cases on kunpeng920 and QEMU virt platform: - Perf tests. - Different `dynamic preempt` mode switch. - Pseudo NMI tests. - Stress-ng CPU stress test. - Hackbench stress test. - MTE test case in Documentation/arch/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst and all test cases in tools/testing/selftests/arm64/mte/*. - "sud" selftest testcase. - get_set_sud, get_syscall_info, set_syscall_info, peeksiginfo in tools/testing/selftests/ptrace. - breakpoint_test_arm64 in selftests/breakpoints. - syscall-abi and ptrace in tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi - fp-ptrace, sve-ptrace, za-ptrace in selftests/arm64/fp. - vdso_test_getrandom in tools/testing/selftests/vDSO - Strace tests. The test QEMU configuration is as follows: qemu-system-aarch64 \ -M virt,gic-version=3,virtualization=on,mte=on \ -cpu max,pauth-impdef=on \ -kernel Image \ -smp 8,sockets=1,cores=4,threads=2 \ -m 512m \ -nographic \ -no-reboot \ -device virtio-rng-pci \ -append "root=/dev/vda rw console=ttyAMA0 kgdboc=ttyAMA0,115200 \ earlycon preempt=voluntary irqchip.gicv3_pseudo_nmi=1" \ -drive if=none,file=images/rootfs.ext4,format=raw,id=hd0 \ -device virtio-blk-device,drive=hd0 \ [1]: https://kernel.googlesource.com/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm/+/89bf683c… Changes in v11: - Remove unused syscall in syscall_trace_enter(). - Update and provide a detailed explanation of the differences after moving rseq_syscall() before audit_syscall_exit(). - Rebased on arm64 (for-next/entry), and remove the first applied 3 patchs. - syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work() for arch reuse instead of adding new syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work_prepare() helper. - Link to v10: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251222114737.1334364-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v10: - Rebased on v6.19-rc1, rename syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() to syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work_prepare() to avoid conflict. - Also inline syscall_trace_enter(). - Support aarch64 for sud_benchmark. - Update and correct the commit message. - Add Reviewed-by. - Link to v9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251204082123.2792067-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v9: - Move "Return early for ptrace_report_syscall_entry() error" patch ahead to make it not introduce a regression. - Not check _TIF_SECCOMP/SYSCALL_EMU for syscall_exit_work() in a separate patch. - Do not report_syscall_exit() for PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP in a separate patch. - Add two performance patch to improve the arm64 performance. - Add Reviewed-by. - Link to v8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251126071446.3234218-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v8: - Rename "report_syscall_enter()" to "report_syscall_entry()". - Add ptrace_save_reg() to avoid duplication. - Remove unused _TIF_WORK_MASK in a standalone patch. - Align syscall_trace_enter() return value with the generic version. - Use "scno" instead of regs->syscallno in el0_svc_common(). - Move rseq_syscall() ahead in a standalone patch to clarify it clearly. - Rename "syscall_trace_exit()" to "syscall_exit_work()". - Keep the goto in el0_svc_common(). - No argument was passed to __secure_computing() and check -1 not -1L. - Remove "Add has_syscall_work() helper" patch. - Move "Add syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() helper" patch later. - Add miss header for asm/entry-common.h. - Update the implementation of arch_syscall_is_vdso_sigreturn(). - Add "ARCH_SYSCALL_WORK_EXIT" to be defined as "SECCOMP | SYSCALL_EMU" to keep the behaviour unchanged. - Add more testcases test. - Add Reviewed-by. - Update the commit message. - Link to v7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251117133048.53182-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Chanegs in v7: - Support "Syscall User Dispatch" by implementing arch_syscall_is_vdso_sigreturn() as kemal suggested. - Add aarch64 support for "sud" selftest testcase, which tested ok with the patch series. - Fix the kernel test robot warning for arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry() and arch_ptrace_report_syscall_exit() in asm/entry-common.h. - Add perf syscall performance test. - Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250916082611.2972008-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v6: - Rebased on v6.17-rc5-next as arm64 generic irq entry has merged. - Update the commit message. - Link to v5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241206101744.4161990-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v5: - Not change arm32 and keep inerrupts_enabled() macro for gicv3 driver. - Move irqentry_state definition into arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c. - Avoid removing the __enter_from_*() and __exit_to_*() wrappers. - Update "irqentry_state_t ret/irq_state" to "state" to keep it consistently. - Use generic irq entry header for PREEMPT_DYNAMIC after split the generic entry. - Also refactor the ARM64 syscall code. - Introduce arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry/exit(), instead of arch_pre/post_report_syscall_entry/exit() to simplify code. - Make the syscall patches clear separation. - Update the commit message. - Link to v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241025100700.3714552-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v4: - Rework/cleanup split into a few patches as Mark suggested. - Replace interrupts_enabled() macro with regs_irqs_disabled(), instead of left it here. - Remove rcu and lockdep state in pt_regs by using temporary irqentry_state_t as Mark suggested. - Remove some unnecessary intermediate functions to make it clear. - Rework preempt irq and PREEMPT_DYNAMIC code to make the switch more clear. - arch_prepare_*_entry/exit() -> arch_pre_*_entry/exit(). - Expand the arch functions comment. - Make arch functions closer to its caller. - Declare saved_reg in for block. - Remove arch_exit_to_kernel_mode_prepare(), arch_enter_from_kernel_mode(). - Adjust "Add few arch functions to use generic entry" patch to be the penultimate. - Update the commit message. - Add suggested-by. - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240629085601.470241-1-ruanjinjie@huawei.com/ Changes in v3: - Test the MTE test cases. - Handle forget_syscall() in arch_post_report_syscall_entry() - Make the arch funcs not use __weak as Thomas suggested, so move the arch funcs to entry-common.h, and make arch_forget_syscall() folded in arch_post_report_syscall_entry() as suggested. - Move report_single_step() to thread_info.h for arm64 - Change __always_inline() to inline, add inline for the other arch funcs. - Remove unused signal.h for entry-common.h. - Add Suggested-by. - Update the commit message. Changes in v2: - Add tested-by. - Fix a bug that not call arch_post_report_syscall_entry() in syscall_trace_enter() if ptrace_report_syscall_entry() return not zero. - Refactor report_syscall(). - Add comment for arch_prepare_report_syscall_exit(). - Adjust entry-common.h header file inclusion to alphabetical order. - Update the commit message. Jinjie Ruan (13): entry: Remove unused syscall in syscall_trace_enter() arm64/ptrace: Refactor syscall_trace_enter/exit() arm64: ptrace: Move rseq_syscall() before audit_syscall_exit() arm64: syscall: Rework el0_svc_common() arm64/ptrace: Not check _TIF_SECCOMP/SYSCALL_EMU for syscall_exit_work() arm64/ptrace: Do not report_syscall_exit() for PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP arm64/ptrace: Expand secure_computing() in place arm64/ptrace: Use syscall_get_arguments() helper entry: Rework syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work() for arch reuse entry: Add arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry/exit() arm64: entry: Convert to generic entry arm64: Inline el0_svc_common() entry: Inline syscall_exit_work() and syscall_trace_enter() kemal (1): selftests: sud_test: Support aarch64 arch/arm64/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/entry-common.h | 76 +++++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 19 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 16 +- arch/arm64/kernel/debug-monitors.c | 7 + arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 115 ------------- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 29 +--- include/linux/entry-common.h | 158 ++++++++++++++++-- kernel/entry/common.h | 7 - kernel/entry/syscall-common.c | 96 +---------- kernel/entry/syscall_user_dispatch.c | 4 +- .../syscall_user_dispatch/sud_benchmark.c | 2 +- .../syscall_user_dispatch/sud_test.c | 4 + 14 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 269 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 kernel/entry/common.h -- 2.34.1

1 14

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] Fix exception when umount with release dev fd
by Hongbo Li 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

Fix exception when umount with release dev fd. Hongbo Li (2): mfs: Fix wild-memory-access error when mfs event is destroy. mfs: Do not release the async event immediately when read failed fs/mfs/cache.c | 2 ++ fs/mfs/dev.c | 12 ++++++++---- fs/mfs/super.c | 6 +++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] tracing: Fix crash on synthetic stacktrace field usage
by Tengda Wu 28 Jan '26

28 Jan '26

From: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.19-rc4 commit 90f9f5d64cae4e72defd96a2a22760173cb3c9ec category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8435 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When creating a synthetic event based on an existing synthetic event that had a stacktrace field and the new synthetic event used that field a kernel crash occurred: ~# cd /sys/kernel/tracing ~# echo 's:stack unsigned long stack[];' > dynamic_events ~# echo 'hist:keys=prev_pid:s0=common_stacktrace if prev_state & 3' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger ~# echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:s1=$s0:onmatch(sched.sched_switch).trace(stack,$s1)' >> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger The above creates a synthetic event that takes a stacktrace when a task schedules out in a non-running state and passes that stacktrace to the sched_switch event when that task schedules back in. It triggers the "stack" synthetic event that has a stacktrace as its field (called "stack"). ~# echo 's:syscall_stack s64 id; unsigned long stack[];' >> dynamic_events ~# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:s2=stack' >> events/synthetic/stack/trigger ~# echo 'hist:keys=common_pid:s3=$s2,i0=id:onmatch(synthetic.stack).trace(syscall_stack,$i0,$s3)' >> events/raw_syscalls/sys_exit/trigger The above makes another synthetic event called "syscall_stack" that attaches the first synthetic event (stack) to the sys_exit trace event and records the stacktrace from the stack event with the id of the system call that is exiting. When enabling this event (or using it in a historgram): ~# echo 1 > events/synthetic/syscall_stack/enable Produces a kernel crash! BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000400010 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 1257 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.16.3+deb14-amd64 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Debian 6.16.3-1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_synth+0x90/0x380 Code: c5 00 00 00 00 85 d2 0f 84 e1 00 00 00 31 db eb 34 0f 1f 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 <49> 8b 04 24 48 83 c3 01 8d 0c c5 08 00 00 00 01 cd 41 3b 5d 40 0f RSP: 0018:ffffd2670388f958 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: ffff8ba1065cc100 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: fffff266ffda7b90 RDI: ffffd2670388f9b0 RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: ffff8ba104e76000 R09: ffffd2670388fa50 R10: ffff8ba102dd42e0 R11: ffffffff9a908970 R12: 0000000000400010 R13: ffff8ba10a246400 R14: ffff8ba10a710220 R15: fffff266ffda7b90 FS: 00007fa3bc63f740(0000) GS:ffff8ba2e0f48000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000400010 CR3: 0000000107f9e003 CR4: 0000000000172ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __tracing_map_insert+0x208/0x3a0 action_trace+0x67/0x70 event_hist_trigger+0x633/0x6d0 event_triggers_call+0x82/0x130 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x19d/0x250 trace_event_raw_event_sys_exit+0x62/0xb0 syscall_exit_work+0x9d/0x140 do_syscall_64+0x20a/0x2f0 ? trace_event_raw_event_sched_switch+0x12b/0x170 ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0x3e/0x90 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x97/0x2c0 ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0xad/0x4c0 ? __schedule+0x4b8/0xd00 ? restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x3c/0x90 ? switch_fpu_return+0x5b/0xe0 ? do_syscall_64+0x1ef/0x2f0 ? do_fault+0x2e9/0x540 ? __handle_mm_fault+0x7d1/0xf70 ? count_memcg_events+0x167/0x1d0 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1d7/0x2e0 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2c3/0x7f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The reason is that the stacktrace field is not labeled as such, and is treated as a normal field and not as a dynamic event that it is. In trace_event_raw_event_synth() the event is field is still treated as a dynamic array, but the retrieval of the data is considered a normal field, and the reference is just the meta data: // Meta data is retrieved instead of a dynamic array str_val = (char *)(long)var_ref_vals[val_idx]; // Then when it tries to process it: len = *((unsigned long *)str_val) + 1; It triggers a kernel page fault. To fix this, first when defining the fields of the first synthetic event, set the filter type to FILTER_STACKTRACE. This is used later by the second synthetic event to know that this field is a stacktrace. When creating the field of the new synthetic event, have it use this FILTER_STACKTRACE to know to create a stacktrace field to copy the stacktrace into. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers(a)efficios.com> Cc: Tom Zanussi <zanussi(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260122194824.6905a38e@gandalf.local.home Fixes: 00cf3d672a9d ("tracing: Allow synthetic events to pass around stacktraces") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu <wutengda2(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c | 9 +++++++++ kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c | 8 +++++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c index 2d6f3c63bc62..f22aa4afaa6d 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c @@ -2047,6 +2047,15 @@ static struct hist_field *create_hist_field(struct hist_trigger_data *hist_data, hist_field->fn_num = HIST_FIELD_FN_RELDYNSTRING; else hist_field->fn_num = HIST_FIELD_FN_PSTRING; + } else if (field->filter_type == FILTER_STACKTRACE) { + flags |= HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE; + + hist_field->size = MAX_FILTER_STR_VAL; + hist_field->type = kstrdup_const(field->type, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!hist_field->type) + goto free; + + hist_field->fn_num = HIST_FIELD_FN_STACK; } else { hist_field->size = field->size; hist_field->is_signed = field->is_signed; diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c index 794e72dbb12d..13c2d3ad7185 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_synth.c @@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ static int synth_event_define_fields(struct trace_event_call *call) struct synth_event *event = call->data; unsigned int i, size, n_u64; char *name, *type; + int filter_type; bool is_signed; + bool is_stack; int ret = 0; for (i = 0, n_u64 = 0; i < event->n_fields; i++) { @@ -145,8 +147,12 @@ static int synth_event_define_fields(struct trace_event_call *call) is_signed = event->fields[i]->is_signed; type = event->fields[i]->type; name = event->fields[i]->name; + is_stack = event->fields[i]->is_stack; + + filter_type = is_stack ? FILTER_STACKTRACE : FILTER_OTHER; + ret = trace_define_field(call, type, name, offset, size, - is_signed, FILTER_OTHER); + is_signed, filter_type); if (ret) break; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting or removing non-IMA xattr
by Zhao Yipeng 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Coiby Xu <coxu(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit d2993a7e98eb70c737c6f5365a190e79c72b8407 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11626 CVE: CVE-2025-68183 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 88b4cbcf6b041ae0f2fc8a34554a5b6a83a2b7cd ] Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then writes/removes some other security xattr for the file. For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, installing/reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated, # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash # file: usr/bin/bash security.ima=0x0404... This happens because when setting security.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed. Similarly, IMA signature can be cleared on file close after removing security xattr like security.evm or setting/removing ACL. Prevent replacing the IMA file signature with a file hash, by preventing the IMA_DIGSIG flag from being reset. Here's a minimal C reproducer which sets security.selinux as the last step which can also replaced by removing security.evm or setting ACL, #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd; fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; } ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); } if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } close(fd); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Zhao Yipeng <zhaoyipeng5(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 8a54399d212d..a9e31d8addc6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -809,6 +809,15 @@ static int ima_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; } +/* + * ima_reset_appraise_flags - reset ima_iint_cache flags + * + * @digsig: whether to clear/set IMA_DIGSIG flag, tristate values + * 0: clear IMA_DIGSIG + * 1: set IMA_DIGSIG + * -1: don't change IMA_DIGSIG + * + */ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -821,9 +830,9 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) return; iint->measured_pcrs = 0; set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); - if (digsig) + if (digsig == 1) set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); - else + else if (digsig == 0) clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } @@ -908,6 +917,8 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); + } else { + digsig = -1; } if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); @@ -921,18 +932,20 @@ int ima_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) { if (evm_revalidate_status(acl_name)) - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), -1); return 0; } int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - int result; + int result, digsig = -1; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { - ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA)) + digsig = 0; + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); if (result == 1) result = 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.1.146 commit e2c8a3c0388aef6bfc4aabfba07bc7dff16eea80 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 CVE: CVE-2025-27558 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/wireless/util.c [Fanhua Li: context conflict] Signed-off-by: Fanhua Li <lifanhua5(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 15773db362a1..81ac8d1da085 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -742,6 +742,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -774,8 +819,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit ec6392061de6681148b63ee6c8744da833498cdd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/7758 CVE: CVE-2025-27558 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 7acd8d0db61a..24e5af65da58 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -826,6 +826,52 @@ bool ieee80211_is_valid_amsdu(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 mesh_hdr) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(ieee80211_is_valid_amsdu); + +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -867,8 +913,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(hdr.eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&hdr.eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] wifi: prevent A-MSDU attacks in mesh networks
by Fanhua Li 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> stable inclusion from stable-v6.1.146 commit e2c8a3c0388aef6bfc4aabfba07bc7dff16eea80 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9288 CVE: CVE-2025-38512 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 737bb912ebbe4571195c56eba557c4d7315b26fb upstream. This patch is a mitigation to prevent the A-MSDU spoofing vulnerability for mesh networks. The initial update to the IEEE 802.11 standard, in response to the FragAttacks, missed this case (CVE-2025-27558). It can be considered a variant of CVE-2020-24588 but for mesh networks. This patch tries to detect if a standard MSDU was turned into an A-MSDU by an adversary. This is done by parsing a received A-MSDU as a standard MSDU, calculating the length of the Mesh Control header, and seeing if the 6 bytes after this header equal the start of an rfc1042 header. If equal, this is a strong indication of an ongoing attack attempt. This defense was tested with mac80211_hwsim against a mesh network that uses an empty Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when four addresses are used, and when using a 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field, i.e., when six addresses are used. Functionality of normal MSDUs and A-MSDUs was also tested, and confirmed working, when using both an empty and 12-byte Mesh Address Extension field. It was also tested with mac80211_hwsim that A-MSDU attacks in non-mesh networks keep being detected and prevented. Note that the vulnerability being patched, and the defense being implemented, was also discussed in the following paper and in the following IEEE 802.11 presentation: https://papers.mathyvanhoef.com/wisec2025.pdf https://mentor.ieee.org/802.11/dcn/25/11-25-0949-00-000m-a-msdu-mesh-spoof-… Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef(a)kuleuven.be> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616004635.224344-1-Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: net/wireless/util.c [Fanhua Li: context conflict] Signed-off-by: Fanhua Li <lifanhua5(a)huawei.com> --- net/wireless/util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/wireless/util.c b/net/wireless/util.c index 15773db362a15..81ac8d1da0854 100644 --- a/net/wireless/util.c +++ b/net/wireless/util.c @@ -742,6 +742,51 @@ __ieee80211_amsdu_copy(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int hlen, return frame; } +/* + * Detects if an MSDU frame was maliciously converted into an A-MSDU + * frame by an adversary. This is done by parsing the received frame + * as if it were a regular MSDU, even though the A-MSDU flag is set. + * + * For non-mesh interfaces, detection involves checking whether the + * payload, when interpreted as an MSDU, begins with a valid RFC1042 + * header. This is done by comparing the A-MSDU subheader's destination + * address to the start of the RFC1042 header. + * + * For mesh interfaces, the MSDU includes a 6-byte Mesh Control field + * and an optional variable-length Mesh Address Extension field before + * the RFC1042 header. The position of the RFC1042 header must therefore + * be calculated based on the mesh header length. + * + * Since this function intentionally parses an A-MSDU frame as an MSDU, + * it only assumes that the A-MSDU subframe header is present, and + * beyond this it performs its own bounds checks under the assumption + * that the frame is instead parsed as a non-aggregated MSDU. + */ +static bool +is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(struct ethhdr *eth, struct sk_buff *skb, + enum nl80211_iftype iftype) +{ + int offset; + + /* Non-mesh case can be directly compared */ + if (iftype != NL80211_IFTYPE_MESH_POINT) + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_dest, rfc1042_header); + + offset = __ieee80211_get_mesh_hdrlen(eth->h_dest[0]); + if (offset == 6) { + /* Mesh case with empty address extension field */ + return ether_addr_equal(eth->h_source, rfc1042_header); + } else if (offset + ETH_ALEN <= skb->len) { + /* Mesh case with non-empty address extension field */ + u8 temp[ETH_ALEN]; + + skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, temp, ETH_ALEN); + return ether_addr_equal(temp, rfc1042_header); + } + + return false; +} + void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, const u8 *addr, enum nl80211_iftype iftype, const unsigned int extra_headroom, @@ -774,8 +819,10 @@ void ieee80211_amsdu_to_8023s(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sk_buff_head *list, /* the last MSDU has no padding */ if (subframe_len > remaining) goto purge; - /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks */ - if (ether_addr_equal(eth.h_dest, rfc1042_header)) + /* mitigate A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, to be + * checked when processing first subframe (offset == 0). + */ + if (offset == 0 && is_amsdu_aggregation_attack(&eth, skb, iftype)) goto purge; offset += sizeof(struct ethhdr); -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mlxsw: spectrum_router: Fix neighbour use-after-free
by Cai Xinchen 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.248 commit a2dfe6758fc63e542105bee8b17a3a7485684db0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13354 CVE: CVE-2025-68801 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8b0e69763ef948fb872a7767df4be665d18f5fd4 ] We sometimes observe use-after-free when dereferencing a neighbour [1]. The problem seems to be that the driver stores a pointer to the neighbour, but without holding a reference on it. A reference is only taken when the neighbour is used by a nexthop. Fix by simplifying the reference counting scheme. Always take a reference when storing a neighbour pointer in a neighbour entry. Avoid taking a referencing when the neighbour is used by a nexthop as the neighbour entry associated with the nexthop already holds a reference. Tested by running the test that uncovered the problem over 300 times. Without this patch the problem was reproduced after a handful of iterations. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88817f8e3420 by task ip/3929 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3929 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.18.0-rc4-virtme-g36b21a067510 #3 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Nvidia SN5600/VMOD0013, BIOS 5.13 05/31/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xa0 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6e/0x300 print_report+0xfc/0x1fb kasan_report+0xe4/0x110 mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_update+0x2d4/0x310 mlxsw_sp_router_rif_gone_sync+0x35f/0x510 mlxsw_sp_rif_destroy+0x1ea/0x730 mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_port_vlan_event+0xa1/0x1b0 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_lag_event+0xcc/0x130 __mlxsw_sp_inetaddr_event+0xf5/0x3c0 mlxsw_sp_router_netdevice_event+0x1015/0x1580 notifier_call_chain+0xcc/0x150 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x7e/0x100 __netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x10b/0x210 netdev_upper_dev_unlink+0x79/0xa0 vrf_del_slave+0x18/0x50 do_set_master+0x146/0x7d0 do_setlink.isra.0+0x9a0/0x2880 rtnl_newlink+0x637/0xb20 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x6fe/0xb90 netlink_rcv_skb+0x123/0x380 netlink_unicast+0x4a3/0x770 netlink_sendmsg+0x75b/0xc90 __sock_sendmsg+0xbe/0x160 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5b2/0x7d0 ___sys_sendmsg+0xfd/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0x124/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0xfd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [...] Allocated by task 109: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x2c1/0x790 neigh_alloc+0x6af/0x8f0 ___neigh_create+0x63/0xe90 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_init+0x430/0x7e0 mlxsw_sp_nexthop_type_init+0x212/0x960 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_info_init.constprop.0+0x81f/0x1280 mlxsw_sp_nexthop6_group_get+0x392/0x6a0 mlxsw_sp_fib6_entry_create+0x46a/0xfd0 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_replace+0x1ed/0x5f0 mlxsw_sp_router_fib6_event_work+0x10a/0x2a0 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40 kthread+0x355/0x5b0 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 Freed by task 154: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kmem_cache_free_bulk.part.0+0x1eb/0x5e0 kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1f2/0x260 kfree_rcu_work+0x130/0x1b0 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40 kthread+0x355/0x5b0 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x8c/0xa0 kvfree_call_rcu+0x93/0x5b0 mlxsw_sp_router_neigh_event_work+0x67d/0x860 process_one_work+0xd57/0x1390 worker_thread+0x4d6/0xd40 kthread+0x355/0x5b0 ret_from_fork+0x1d4/0x270 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 Fixes: 6cf3c971dc84 ("mlxsw: spectrum_router: Add private neigh table") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/92d75e21d95d163a41b5cea67a15cd33f547cba6.176469565… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- .../ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c index d2887ae508bb..e22ee1336d74 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c @@ -2032,6 +2032,7 @@ mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_alloc(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, struct neighbour *n, if (!neigh_entry) return NULL; + neigh_hold(n); neigh_entry->key.n = n; neigh_entry->rif = rif; INIT_LIST_HEAD(&neigh_entry->nexthop_list); @@ -2041,6 +2042,7 @@ mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_alloc(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, struct neighbour *n, static void mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_free(struct mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry *neigh_entry) { + neigh_release(neigh_entry->key.n); kfree(neigh_entry); } @@ -3607,6 +3609,8 @@ mlxsw_sp_nexthop_dead_neigh_replace(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, if (err) goto err_neigh_entry_insert; + neigh_release(old_n); + read_lock_bh(&n->lock); nud_state = n->nud_state; dead = n->dead; @@ -3615,14 +3619,10 @@ mlxsw_sp_nexthop_dead_neigh_replace(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, list_for_each_entry(nh, &neigh_entry->nexthop_list, neigh_list_node) { - neigh_release(old_n); - neigh_clone(n); __mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_update(nh, !entry_connected); mlxsw_sp_nexthop_group_refresh(mlxsw_sp, nh->nh_grp); } - neigh_release(n); - return 0; err_neigh_entry_insert: @@ -3711,6 +3711,11 @@ static int mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_init(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, } } + /* Release the reference taken by neigh_lookup() / neigh_create() since + * neigh_entry already holds one. + */ + neigh_release(n); + /* If that is the first nexthop connected to that neigh, add to * nexthop_neighs_list */ @@ -3737,11 +3742,9 @@ static void mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_fini(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, struct mlxsw_sp_nexthop *nh) { struct mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry *neigh_entry = nh->neigh_entry; - struct neighbour *n; if (!neigh_entry) return; - n = neigh_entry->key.n; __mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_update(nh, true); list_del(&nh->neigh_list_node); @@ -3755,8 +3758,6 @@ static void mlxsw_sp_nexthop_neigh_fini(struct mlxsw_sp *mlxsw_sp, if (!neigh_entry->connected && list_empty(&neigh_entry->nexthop_list)) mlxsw_sp_neigh_entry_destroy(mlxsw_sp, neigh_entry); - - neigh_release(n); } static bool mlxsw_sp_ipip_netdev_ul_up(struct net_device *ol_dev) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mlxsw: spectrum_mr: Fix use-after-free when updating multicast route stats
by Cai Xinchen 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.248 commit b957366f5611bbaba03dd10ef861283347ddcc88 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/13353 CVE: CVE-2025-68800 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 8ac1dacec458f55f871f7153242ed6ab60373b90 ] Cited commit added a dedicated mutex (instead of RTNL) to protect the multicast route list, so that it will not change while the driver periodically traverses it in order to update the kernel about multicast route stats that were queried from the device. One instance of list entry deletion (during route replace) was missed and it can result in a use-after-free [1]. Fix by acquiring the mutex before deleting the entry from the list and releasing it afterwards. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mlxsw_sp_mr_stats_update+0x4a5/0x540 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c:1006 [mlxsw_spectrum] Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881523c2fa8 by task kworker/2:5/22043 CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 22043 Comm: kworker/2:5 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-custom-g1a3d6d7cd014 #1 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN2010/SA002610, BIOS 5.6.5 08/24/2017 Workqueue: mlxsw_core mlxsw_sp_mr_stats_update [mlxsw_spectrum] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xba/0x110 print_report+0x174/0x4f5 kasan_report+0xdf/0x110 mlxsw_sp_mr_stats_update+0x4a5/0x540 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c:1006 [mlxsw_spectrum] process_one_work+0x9cc/0x18e0 worker_thread+0x5df/0xe40 kthread+0x3b8/0x730 ret_from_fork+0x3e9/0x560 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 29933: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0 mlxsw_sp_mr_route_add+0xd8/0x4770 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_router_fibmr_event_work+0x371/0xad0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c:7965 [mlxsw_spectrum] process_one_work+0x9cc/0x18e0 worker_thread+0x5df/0xe40 kthread+0x3b8/0x730 ret_from_fork+0x3e9/0x560 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Freed by task 29933: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x70 __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70 kfree+0x14e/0x700 mlxsw_sp_mr_route_add+0x2dea/0x4770 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c:444 [mlxsw_spectrum] mlxsw_sp_router_fibmr_event_work+0x371/0xad0 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_router.c:7965 [mlxsw_spectrum] process_one_work+0x9cc/0x18e0 worker_thread+0x5df/0xe40 kthread+0x3b8/0x730 ret_from_fork+0x3e9/0x560 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 Fixes: f38656d06725 ("mlxsw: spectrum_mr: Protect multicast route list with a lock") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f996feecfd59fde297964bfc85040b6d83ec6089.176469565… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c index ee308d9aedcd..d8a4bbb8e899 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlxsw/spectrum_mr.c @@ -440,7 +440,9 @@ int mlxsw_sp_mr_route_add(struct mlxsw_sp_mr_table *mr_table, rhashtable_remove_fast(&mr_table->route_ht, &mr_orig_route->ht_node, mlxsw_sp_mr_route_ht_params); + mutex_lock(&mr_table->route_list_lock); list_del(&mr_orig_route->node); + mutex_unlock(&mr_table->route_list_lock); mlxsw_sp_mr_route_destroy(mr_table, mr_orig_route); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] memcg: avoid the warning in mem_cgroup_migrate
by Chen Ridong 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/7679 -------------------------------- For a hugetlb folio, the memcg may be null, which will lead to warning, To avoid warning, add !folio_test_hugetlb(old). The mem_cgroup_replace_folio is only used by fuse or shmem, the !folio_test_hugetlb(old) is unnecessary, remove it and keep the same with mainline. Fixes: d151025ac030 ("hugetlb: memcg: account hugetlb-backed memory in memory controller") Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 45352cee74b18..51b438146ceef 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -8803,12 +8803,7 @@ void mem_cgroup_replace_folio(struct folio *old, struct folio *new) return; memcg = folio_memcg(old); - /* - * Note that it is normal to see !memcg for a hugetlb folio. - * For e.g, itt could have been allocated when memory_hugetlb_accounting - * was not selected. - */ - VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!folio_test_hugetlb(old) && !memcg, old); + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!memcg, old); if (!memcg) return; @@ -8852,7 +8847,12 @@ void mem_cgroup_migrate(struct folio *old, struct folio *new) return; memcg = folio_memcg(old); - VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!memcg, old); + /* + * Note that it is normal to see !memcg for a hugetlb folio. + * For e.g, itt could have been allocated when memory_hugetlb_accounting + * was not selected. + */ + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!folio_test_hugetlb(old) && !memcg, old); if (!memcg) return; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Fix CVE-2025-37947
by Long Li 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

Fix CVE-2025-37947 Namjae Jeon (1): ksmbd: fix stream write failure Norbert Szetei (1): ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds stream writes by validating *pos fs/ksmbd/vfs.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Gerd Bayer <gbayer(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit b63c061be622b17b495cbf78a6d5f2d4c3147f8e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11503 CVE: CVE-2025-68310 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0fd20f65df6aa430454a0deed8f43efa91c54835 ] Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and generig PCI AER processing do. During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung: mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30 [<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8 [<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398 [<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0 INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8 [<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88 [<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168 [<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230 [<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there, too: - task: kmcheck mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of pci_cfg_access_lock() - task: kworker mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired the devlink lock. A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a crdump with > devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with > zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF> Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation, the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" - and we get a kernel log message of: mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5 because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying hardware. Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking access to PCI config space. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251007144826.2825134-1-gbayer@linux.ibm.com/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4cdf2f4e24ff ("s390/pci: implement minimal PCI error recovery") Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gerd Bayer <gbayer(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c b/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c index 3291241806bb..4cb77079ef2d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c +++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery(struct pci_dev *pdev) * is unbound or probed and that userspace can't access its * configuration space while we perform recovery. */ - pci_dev_lock(pdev); + device_lock(&pdev->dev); if (pdev->error_state == pci_channel_io_perm_failure) { ers_res = PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; goto out_unlock; @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery(struct pci_dev *pdev) if (driver->err_handler->resume) driver->err_handler->resume(pdev); out_unlock: - pci_dev_unlock(pdev); + device_unlock(&pdev->dev); return ers_res; } -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] s390/pci: Avoid deadlock between PCI error recovery and mlx5 crdump
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Gerd Bayer <gbayer(a)linux.ibm.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit b63c061be622b17b495cbf78a6d5f2d4c3147f8e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8287 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0fd20f65df6aa430454a0deed8f43efa91c54835 ] Do not block PCI config accesses through pci_cfg_access_lock() when executing the s390 variant of PCI error recovery: Acquire just device_lock() instead of pci_dev_lock() as powerpc's EEH and generig PCI AER processing do. During error recovery testing a pair of tasks was reported to be hung: mlx5_core 0000:00:00.1: mlx5_health_try_recover:338:(pid 5553): health recovery flow aborted, PCI reads still not working INFO: task kmcheck:72 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kmcheck state:D stack:0 pid:72 tgid:72 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<000000065256f572>] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x22/0x30 [<0000000652570a94>] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x484/0x8a8 [<000003ff800673a4>] mlx5_unload_one+0x34/0x58 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff8006745c>] mlx5_pci_err_detected+0x94/0x140 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652556c5a>] zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery+0xf2/0x398 [<0000000651b9184a>] __zpci_event_error+0x23a/0x2c0 INFO: task kworker/u1664:6:1514 blocked for more than 122 seconds. Not tainted 5.14.0-570.12.1.bringup7.el9.s390x #1 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. task:kworker/u1664:6 state:D stack:0 pid:1514 tgid:1514 ppid:2 flags:0x00000000 Workqueue: mlx5_health0000:00:00.0 mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work [mlx5_core] Call Trace: [<000000065256f030>] __schedule+0x2a0/0x590 [<000000065256f356>] schedule+0x36/0xe0 [<0000000652172e28>] pci_wait_cfg+0x80/0xe8 [<0000000652172f94>] pci_cfg_access_lock+0x74/0x88 [<000003ff800916b6>] mlx5_vsc_gw_lock+0x36/0x178 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80098824>] mlx5_crdump_collect+0x34/0x1c8 [mlx5_core] [<000003ff80074b62>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_dump+0x6a/0xe8 [mlx5_core] [<0000000652512242>] devlink_health_do_dump.part.0+0x82/0x168 [<0000000652513212>] devlink_health_report+0x19a/0x230 [<000003ff80075a12>] mlx5_fw_fatal_reporter_err_work+0xba/0x1b0 [mlx5_core] No kernel log of the exact same error with an upstream kernel is available - but the very same deadlock situation can be constructed there, too: - task: kmcheck mlx5_unload_one() tries to acquire devlink lock while the PCI error recovery code has set pdev->block_cfg_access by way of pci_cfg_access_lock() - task: kworker mlx5_crdump_collect() tries to set block_cfg_access through pci_cfg_access_lock() while devlink_health_report() had acquired the devlink lock. A similar deadlock situation can be reproduced by requesting a crdump with > devlink health dump show pci/<BDF> reporter fw_fatal while PCI error recovery is executed on the same <BDF> physical function by mlx5_core's pci_error_handlers. On s390 this can be injected with > zpcictl --reset-fw <BDF> Tests with this patch failed to reproduce that second deadlock situation, the devlink command is rejected with "kernel answers: Permission denied" - and we get a kernel log message of: mlx5_core 1ed0:00:00.1: mlx5_crdump_collect:50:(pid 254382): crdump: failed to lock vsc gw err -5 because the config read of VSC_SEMAPHORE is rejected by the underlying hardware. Two prior attempts to address this issue have been discussed and ultimately rejected [see link], with the primary argument that s390's implementation of PCI error recovery is imposing restrictions that neither powerpc's EEH nor PCI AER handling need. Tests show that PCI error recovery on s390 is running to completion even without blocking access to PCI config space. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251007144826.2825134-1-gbayer@linux.ibm.com/ Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: 4cdf2f4e24ff ("s390/pci: implement minimal PCI error recovery") Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gerd Bayer <gbayer(a)linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca(a)linux.ibm.com> [ Adjust context ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c b/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c index 3291241806bb..4cb77079ef2d 100644 --- a/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c +++ b/arch/s390/pci/pci_event.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery(struct pci_dev *pdev) * is unbound or probed and that userspace can't access its * configuration space while we perform recovery. */ - pci_dev_lock(pdev); + device_lock(&pdev->dev); if (pdev->error_state == pci_channel_io_perm_failure) { ers_res = PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT; goto out_unlock; @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static pci_ers_result_t zpci_event_attempt_error_recovery(struct pci_dev *pdev) if (driver->err_handler->resume) driver->err_handler->resume(pdev); out_unlock: - pci_dev_unlock(pdev); + device_unlock(&pdev->dev); return ers_res; } -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] KVM: SVM: Reject SEV{-ES} intra host migration if vCPU creation is in-flight
by Lin Ruifeng 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.99 commit 8c8e8d4d7544bb783e15078eda8ba2580e192246 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/9350 CVE: CVE-2025-38455 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit ecf371f8b02d5e31b9aa1da7f159f1b2107bdb01 upstream. Reject migration of SEV{-ES} state if either the source or destination VM is actively creating a vCPU, i.e. if kvm_vm_ioctl_create_vcpu() is in the section between incrementing created_vcpus and online_vcpus. The bulk of vCPU creation runs _outside_ of kvm->lock to allow creating multiple vCPUs in parallel, and so sev_info.es_active can get toggled from false=>true in the destination VM after (or during) svm_vcpu_create(), resulting in an SEV{-ES} VM effectively having a non-SEV{-ES} vCPU. The issue manifests most visibly as a crash when trying to free a vCPU's NULL VMSA page in an SEV-ES VM, but any number of things can go wrong. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffebde00000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 227 UID: 0 PID: 64063 Comm: syz.5.60023 Tainted: G U O 6.15.0-smp-DEV #2 NONE Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.52.0-0 10/28/2024 RIP: 0010:constant_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:206 [inline] RIP: 0010:arch_test_bit arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:238 [inline] RIP: 0010:_test_bit include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 [inline] RIP: 0010:PageHead include/linux/page-flags.h:866 [inline] RIP: 0010:___free_pages+0x3e/0x120 mm/page_alloc.c:5067 Code: <49> f7 06 40 00 00 00 75 05 45 31 ff eb 0c 66 90 4c 89 f0 4c 39 f0 RSP: 0018:ffff8984551978d0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000777f80000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff918aeb98 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffebde00000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffebde00000007 R09: 1ffffd7bc0000000 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff97bc0000001 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8983e19751a8 R14: ffffebde00000000 R15: 1ffffd7bc0000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff89ee661d3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffebde00000000 CR3: 000000793ceaa000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000b5f DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> sev_free_vcpu+0x413/0x630 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3169 svm_vcpu_free+0x13a/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:1515 kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6a/0x1d0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12396 kvm_vcpu_destroy virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:470 [inline] kvm_destroy_vcpus+0xd1/0x300 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:490 kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x636/0x820 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12895 kvm_put_kvm+0xb8e/0xfb0 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1310 kvm_vm_release+0x48/0x60 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1369 __fput+0x3e4/0x9e0 fs/file_table.c:465 task_work_run+0x1a9/0x220 kernel/task_work.c:227 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0x7f0/0x25b0 kernel/exit.c:953 do_group_exit+0x203/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:1102 get_signal+0x1357/0x1480 kernel/signal.c:3034 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x40/0x690 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:111 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:329 [inline] __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x67/0xb0 kernel/entry/common.c:218 do_syscall_64+0x7c/0x150 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f87a898e969 </TASK> Modules linked in: gq(O) gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03 CR2: ffffebde00000000 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Deliberately don't check for a NULL VMSA when freeing the vCPU, as crashing the host is likely desirable due to the VMSA being consumed by hardware. E.g. if KVM manages to allow VMRUN on the vCPU, hardware may read/write a bogus VMSA page. Accessing PFN 0 is "fine"-ish now that it's sequestered away thanks to L1TF, but panicking in this scenario is preferable to potentially running with corrupted state. Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider(a)google.com> Fixes: 0b020f5af092 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV-ES intra host migration") Fixes: b56639318bb2 ("KVM: SEV: Add support for SEV intra host migration") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: James Houghton <jthoughton(a)google.com> Cc: Peter Gonda <pgonda(a)google.com> Reviewed-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick(a)oracle.com> Tested-by: Liam Merwick <liam.merwick(a)oracle.com> Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250602224459.41505-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c index 63611572ae10..9da6ce316dc4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c @@ -1895,6 +1895,10 @@ static int sev_check_source_vcpus(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src) struct kvm_vcpu *src_vcpu; unsigned long i; + if (src->created_vcpus != atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) || + dst->created_vcpus != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus)) + return -EBUSY; + if (!sev_es_guest(src)) return 0; -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] atm: atmtcp: Prevent arbitrary write in atmtcp_recv_control().
by Lin Ruifeng 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.104 commit 3c80c230d6e3e6f63d43f4c3f0bb344e3e8b119b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/12387 CVE: CVE-2025-39828 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ec79003c5f9d2c7f9576fc69b8dbda80305cbe3a ] syzbot reported the splat below. [0] When atmtcp_v_open() or atmtcp_v_close() is called via connect() or close(), atmtcp_send_control() is called to send an in-kernel special message. The message has ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC in atmtcp_control.hdr.length. Also, a pointer of struct atm_vcc is set to atmtcp_control.vcc. The notable thing is struct atmtcp_control is uAPI but has a space for an in-kernel pointer. struct atmtcp_control { struct atmtcp_hdr hdr; /* must be first */ ... atm_kptr_t vcc; /* both directions */ ... } __ATM_API_ALIGN; typedef struct { unsigned char _[8]; } __ATM_API_ALIGN atm_kptr_t; The special message is processed in atmtcp_recv_control() called from atmtcp_c_send(). atmtcp_c_send() is vcc->dev->ops->send() and called from 2 paths: 1. .ndo_start_xmit() (vcc->send() == atm_send_aal0()) 2. vcc_sendmsg() The problem is sendmsg() does not validate the message length and userspace can abuse atmtcp_recv_control() to overwrite any kptr by atmtcp_control. Let's add a new ->pre_send() hook to validate messages from sendmsg(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00200000ab: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range [0x0000000100000558-0x000000010000055f] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5865 Comm: syz-executor331 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1-syzkaller-00215-gbab3ce404553 #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025 RIP: 0010:atmtcp_recv_control drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:93 [inline] RIP: 0010:atmtcp_c_send+0x1da/0x950 drivers/atm/atmtcp.c:297 Code: 4d 8d 75 1a 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 15 06 00 00 41 0f b7 1e 4d 8d b7 60 05 00 00 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 20 84 c0 0f 85 13 06 00 00 66 41 89 1e 4d 8d 75 1c 4c RSP: 0018:ffffc90003f5f810 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: 00000000200000ab RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff88802a510000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI: ffff888030a6068c RBP: ffff88802699fb40 R08: ffff888030a606eb R09: 1ffff1100614c0dd R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8718fc40 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff888030a60680 R14: 000000010000055f R15: 00000000ffffffff FS: 00007f8d7e9236c0(0000) GS:ffff888125c1c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000045ad50 CR3: 0000000075bde000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc60 net/atm/common.c:645 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:729 ____sys_sendmsg+0x505/0x830 net/socket.c:2614 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2668 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2700 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2705 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2703 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x19b/0x260 net/socket.c:2703 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f8d7e96a4a9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 51 18 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f8d7e923198 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f8d7e9f4308 RCX: 00007f8d7e96a4a9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f8d7e9f4300 R08: 65732f636f72702f R09: 65732f636f72702f R10: 65732f636f72702f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f8d7e9c10ac R13: 00007f8d7e9231a0 R14: 0000200000000200 R15: 0000200000000250 </TASK> Modules linked in: Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: syzbot+1741b56d54536f4ec349(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/68a6767c.050a0220.3d78fd.0011.GAE@google.com/ Tested-by: syzbot+1741b56d54536f4ec349(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250821021901.2814721-1-kuniyu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Ruifeng <linruifeng4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/atm/atmtcp.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- include/linux/atmdev.h | 1 + net/atm/common.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c b/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c index ff558908897f..9c83fb29b2f1 100644 --- a/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c +++ b/drivers/atm/atmtcp.c @@ -279,6 +279,19 @@ static struct atm_vcc *find_vcc(struct atm_dev *dev, short vpi, int vci) return NULL; } +static int atmtcp_c_pre_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct atmtcp_hdr *hdr; + + if (skb->len < sizeof(struct atmtcp_hdr)) + return -EINVAL; + + hdr = (struct atmtcp_hdr *)skb->data; + if (hdr->length == ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} static int atmtcp_c_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc,struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -288,9 +301,6 @@ static int atmtcp_c_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc,struct sk_buff *skb) struct sk_buff *new_skb; int result = 0; - if (skb->len < sizeof(struct atmtcp_hdr)) - goto done; - dev = vcc->dev_data; hdr = (struct atmtcp_hdr *) skb->data; if (hdr->length == ATMTCP_HDR_MAGIC) { @@ -347,6 +357,7 @@ static const struct atmdev_ops atmtcp_v_dev_ops = { static const struct atmdev_ops atmtcp_c_dev_ops = { .close = atmtcp_c_close, + .pre_send = atmtcp_c_pre_send, .send = atmtcp_c_send }; diff --git a/include/linux/atmdev.h b/include/linux/atmdev.h index 45f2f278b50a..70807c679f1a 100644 --- a/include/linux/atmdev.h +++ b/include/linux/atmdev.h @@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ struct atmdev_ops { /* only send is required */ int (*compat_ioctl)(struct atm_dev *dev,unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg); #endif + int (*pre_send)(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*send)(struct atm_vcc *vcc,struct sk_buff *skb); int (*send_bh)(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb); int (*send_oam)(struct atm_vcc *vcc,void *cell,int flags); diff --git a/net/atm/common.c b/net/atm/common.c index 9cc82acbc735..48bb3f66a3f2 100644 --- a/net/atm/common.c +++ b/net/atm/common.c @@ -635,18 +635,27 @@ int vcc_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *m, size_t size) skb->dev = NULL; /* for paths shared with net_device interfaces */ if (!copy_from_iter_full(skb_put(skb, size), size, &m->msg_iter)) { - atm_return_tx(vcc, skb); - kfree_skb(skb); error = -EFAULT; - goto out; + goto free_skb; } if (eff != size) memset(skb->data + size, 0, eff-size); + + if (vcc->dev->ops->pre_send) { + error = vcc->dev->ops->pre_send(vcc, skb); + if (error) + goto free_skb; + } + error = vcc->dev->ops->send(vcc, skb); error = error ? error : size; out: release_sock(sk); return error; +free_skb: + atm_return_tx(vcc, skb); + kfree_skb(skb); + goto out; } __poll_t vcc_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, poll_table *wait) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/mediatek: Disable AFBC support on Mediatek DRM driver
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Ariel D'Alessandro <ariel.dalessandro(a)collabora.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit df1ad5de2197ea1b527d13ae7b699e9ee7d724d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11625 CVE: CVE-2025-68184 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9882a40640036d5bbc590426a78981526d4f2345 ] Commit c410fa9b07c3 ("drm/mediatek: Add AFBC support to Mediatek DRM driver") added AFBC support to Mediatek DRM and enabled the 32x8/split/sparse modifier. However, this is currently broken on Mediatek MT8188 (Genio 700 EVK platform); tested using upstream Kernel and Mesa (v25.2.1), AFBC is used by default since Mesa v25.0. Kernel trace reports vblank timeouts constantly, and the render is garbled: ``` [CRTC:62:crtc-0] vblank wait timed out WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 70 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1835 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c [...] Hardware name: MediaTek Genio-700 EVK (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c lr : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c sp : ffff80008337bca0 x29: ffff80008337bcd0 x28: 0000000000000061 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c9dcc000 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c66f2f80 x20: ffff0000c0d7d880 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000000a x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 005000f2b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 74756f2064656d69 x12: 742074696177206b x11: 0000000000000058 x10: 0000000000000018 x9 : ffff800082396a70 x8 : 0000000000057fa8 x7 : 0000000000000cce x6 : ffff8000823eea70 x5 : ffff0001fef5f408 x4 : ffff80017ccee000 x3 : ffff0000c12cb480 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c12cb480 Call trace: drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c (P) drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm+0x64/0x80 commit_tail+0xa4/0x1a4 commit_work+0x14/0x20 process_one_work+0x150/0x290 worker_thread+0x2d0/0x3ec kthread+0x12c/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ``` Until this gets fixed upstream, disable AFBC support on this platform, as it's currently broken with upstream Mesa. Fixes: c410fa9b07c3 ("drm/mediatek: Add AFBC support to Mediatek DRM driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ariel D'Alessandro <ariel.dalessandro(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Stone <daniels(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: CK Hu <ck.hu(a)mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin(a)mediatek.com> Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/dri-devel/patch/20251024202756.811425-… Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <chunkuang.hu(a)kernel.org> [ Applied to mtk_drm_plane.c instead of mtk_plane.c ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c | 24 +----------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c index f10d4cc6c223..32038cff2730 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c @@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ static const u64 modifiers[] = { DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR, - DRM_FORMAT_MOD_ARM_AFBC(AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_BLOCK_SIZE_32x8 | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPLIT | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPARSE), DRM_FORMAT_MOD_INVALID, }; @@ -71,26 +68,7 @@ static bool mtk_plane_format_mod_supported(struct drm_plane *plane, uint32_t format, uint64_t modifier) { - if (modifier == DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR) - return true; - - if (modifier != DRM_FORMAT_MOD_ARM_AFBC( - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_BLOCK_SIZE_32x8 | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPLIT | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPARSE)) - return false; - - if (format != DRM_FORMAT_XRGB8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_ARGB8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_BGRX8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_BGRA8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_ABGR8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_XBGR8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_RGB888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_BGR888) - return false; - - return true; + return modifier == DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR; } static void mtk_drm_plane_destroy_state(struct drm_plane *plane, -- 2.22.0

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[PATCH OLK-6.6] drm/mediatek: Disable AFBC support on Mediatek DRM driver
by Zhang Yuwei 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Ariel D'Alessandro <ariel.dalessandro(a)collabora.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.117 commit df1ad5de2197ea1b527d13ae7b699e9ee7d724d4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/8287 CVE: CVE-2025-68184 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9882a40640036d5bbc590426a78981526d4f2345 ] Commit c410fa9b07c3 ("drm/mediatek: Add AFBC support to Mediatek DRM driver") added AFBC support to Mediatek DRM and enabled the 32x8/split/sparse modifier. However, this is currently broken on Mediatek MT8188 (Genio 700 EVK platform); tested using upstream Kernel and Mesa (v25.2.1), AFBC is used by default since Mesa v25.0. Kernel trace reports vblank timeouts constantly, and the render is garbled: ``` [CRTC:62:crtc-0] vblank wait timed out WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 70 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_atomic_helper.c:1835 drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c [...] Hardware name: MediaTek Genio-700 EVK (DT) Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c lr : drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c sp : ffff80008337bca0 x29: ffff80008337bcd0 x28: 0000000000000061 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff0000c9dcc000 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c66f2f80 x20: ffff0000c0d7d880 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000000a x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 005000f2b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 74756f2064656d69 x12: 742074696177206b x11: 0000000000000058 x10: 0000000000000018 x9 : ffff800082396a70 x8 : 0000000000057fa8 x7 : 0000000000000cce x6 : ffff8000823eea70 x5 : ffff0001fef5f408 x4 : ffff80017ccee000 x3 : ffff0000c12cb480 x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c12cb480 Call trace: drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_vblanks.part.0+0x24c/0x27c (P) drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail_rpm+0x64/0x80 commit_tail+0xa4/0x1a4 commit_work+0x14/0x20 process_one_work+0x150/0x290 worker_thread+0x2d0/0x3ec kthread+0x12c/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- ``` Until this gets fixed upstream, disable AFBC support on this platform, as it's currently broken with upstream Mesa. Fixes: c410fa9b07c3 ("drm/mediatek: Add AFBC support to Mediatek DRM driver") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ariel D'Alessandro <ariel.dalessandro(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Stone <daniels(a)collabora.com> Reviewed-by: CK Hu <ck.hu(a)mediatek.com> Reviewed-by: Macpaul Lin <macpaul.lin(a)mediatek.com> Link: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/dri-devel/patch/20251024202756.811425-… Signed-off-by: Chun-Kuang Hu <chunkuang.hu(a)kernel.org> [ Applied to mtk_drm_plane.c instead of mtk_plane.c ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c | 24 +----------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c index f10d4cc6c223..32038cff2730 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_plane.c @@ -21,9 +21,6 @@ static const u64 modifiers[] = { DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR, - DRM_FORMAT_MOD_ARM_AFBC(AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_BLOCK_SIZE_32x8 | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPLIT | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPARSE), DRM_FORMAT_MOD_INVALID, }; @@ -71,26 +68,7 @@ static bool mtk_plane_format_mod_supported(struct drm_plane *plane, uint32_t format, uint64_t modifier) { - if (modifier == DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR) - return true; - - if (modifier != DRM_FORMAT_MOD_ARM_AFBC( - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_BLOCK_SIZE_32x8 | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPLIT | - AFBC_FORMAT_MOD_SPARSE)) - return false; - - if (format != DRM_FORMAT_XRGB8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_ARGB8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_BGRX8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_BGRA8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_ABGR8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_XBGR8888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_RGB888 && - format != DRM_FORMAT_BGR888) - return false; - - return true; + return modifier == DRM_FORMAT_MOD_LINEAR; } static void mtk_drm_plane_destroy_state(struct drm_plane *plane, -- 2.22.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime
by Yifan Qiao 27 Jan '26

27 Jan '26

From: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.18-rc7 commit 03b3bcd319b3ab5182bc9aaa0421351572c78ac0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/11536 CVE: CVE-2025-68265 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The namespaces can access the controller's admin request_queue, and stale references on the namespaces may exist after tearing down the controller. Ensure the admin request_queue is active by moving the controller's 'put' to after all controller references have been released to ensure no one is can access the request_queue. This fixes a reported use-after-free bug: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88c0a53819f8 by task nvme/3287 CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 3287 Comm: nvme Tainted: G E 6.13.2-ga1582f1a031e #15 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: Jabil /EGS 2S MB1, BIOS 1.00 06/18/2025 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x60 print_report+0xc4/0x620 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xb0 ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x30 ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 ? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0 ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x75/0x1d0 ? blk_queue_start_drain+0x70/0x70 ? irq_work_queue+0x18/0x20 ? vprintk_emit.part.0+0x1cc/0x350 ? wake_up_klogd_work_func+0x60/0x60 blk_mq_alloc_request+0x2b7/0x6b0 ? __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x1060/0x1060 ? __switch_to+0x5b7/0x1060 nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xa9/0x330 nvme_user_cmd.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0 ? force_sigsegv+0xe0/0xe0 ? nvme_user_cmd64+0x400/0x400 ? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9b0/0x9b0 ? cgroup_update_frozen_flag+0x24/0x1c0 ? cgroup_leave_frozen+0x204/0x330 ? nvme_ioctl+0x7c/0x2c0 blkdev_ioctl+0x1a8/0x4d0 ? blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1930/0x1930 ? fdget+0x54/0x380 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f765f703b0b Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 52 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cefe808 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RCX: 00007f765f703b0b RDX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RSI: 00000000c0484e41 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00007f765f611d50 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003 R13: 00000000c0484e41 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffe2cefea60 </TASK> Reported-by: Casey Chen <cachen(a)purestorage.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare(a)suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yifan Qiao <qiaoyifan4(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c index 081f837f58d6..e79ff52ae0a0 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/core.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/core.c @@ -4330,7 +4330,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_alloc_admin_tag_set); void nvme_remove_admin_tag_set(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl) { blk_mq_destroy_queue(ctrl->admin_q); - blk_put_queue(ctrl->admin_q); if (ctrl->ops->flags & NVME_F_FABRICS) { blk_mq_destroy_queue(ctrl->fabrics_q); blk_put_queue(ctrl->fabrics_q); @@ -4469,6 +4468,8 @@ static void nvme_free_ctrl(struct device *dev) container_of(dev, struct nvme_ctrl, ctrl_device); struct nvme_subsystem *subsys = ctrl->subsys; + if (ctrl->admin_q) + blk_put_queue(ctrl->admin_q); if (!subsys || ctrl->instance != subsys->instance) ida_free(&nvme_instance_ida, ctrl->instance); -- 2.39.2

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