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[PATCH v6 OLK-5.10 0/5] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v6: - move kabi fix code into a separate patch. v5: - adjust tab num for macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v4 - define macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v3: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v2: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Jinjiang Tu (1): mm/tlbbatch: fix kabi change Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 35 ++++++++------- 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: bridge: multicast: notify switchdev driver whenever MC processing gets disabled
by Zhengchao Shao 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

From: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc5 commit c832962ac972082b3a1f89775c9d4274c8cb5670 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7V9UB Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Whenever bridge driver hits the max capacity of MDBs, it disables the MC processing (by setting corresponding bridge option), but never notifies switchdev about such change (the notifiers are called only upon explicit setting of this option, through the registered netlink interface). This could lead to situation when Software MDB processing gets disabled, but this event never gets offloaded to the underlying Hardware. Fix this by adding a notify message in such case. Fixes: 147c1e9b902c ("switchdev: bridge: Offload multicast disabled") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215165303.31908-1-oleksandr.mazur@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/bridge/br_multicast.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index de79fbfe1611..e2b1bb3de4a1 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static const struct rhashtable_params br_sg_port_rht_params = { .automatic_shrinking = true, }; +static void br_mc_disabled_update(struct net_device *dev, bool value); + static void br_multicast_start_querier(struct net_bridge *br, struct bridge_mcast_own_query *query); static void br_multicast_add_router(struct net_bridge *br, @@ -1040,6 +1042,7 @@ struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(struct net_bridge *br, return mp; if (atomic_read(&br->mdb_hash_tbl.nelems) >= br->hash_max) { + br_mc_disabled_update(br->dev, false); br_opt_toggle(br, BROPT_MULTICAST_ENABLED, false); return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] fs: jfs: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in dbFree()
by Li Nan 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 0d4837fdb796f99369cf7691d33de1b856bcaf1f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TT9F CVE: CVE-2023-4385 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In our fault-injection testing, the variable "nblocks" in dbFree() can be zero when kmalloc_array() fails in dtSearch(). In this case, the variable "mp" in dbFree() would be NULL and then it is dereferenced in "write_metapage(mp)". The failure log is listed as follows: [ 13.824137] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 ... [ 13.827416] RIP: 0010:dbFree+0x5f7/0x910 [jfs] [ 13.834341] Call Trace: [ 13.834540] <TASK> [ 13.834713] txFreeMap+0x7b4/0xb10 [jfs] [ 13.835038] txUpdateMap+0x311/0x650 [jfs] [ 13.835375] jfs_lazycommit+0x5f2/0xc70 [jfs] [ 13.835726] ? sched_dynamic_update+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 13.836092] kthread+0x3c2/0x4a0 [ 13.836355] ? txLockFree+0x160/0x160 [jfs] [ 13.836763] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0x160/0x160 [ 13.837106] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 13.837402] </TASK> ... This patch adds a NULL check of "mp" before "write_metapage(mp)" is called. Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- v1 modify the code of funtion dbAllocBottomUp(). It is wrong. Modified dbFree() now. fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index 49263e220dbc..a5b51c2c5e32 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -391,7 +391,8 @@ int dbFree(struct inode *ip, s64 blkno, s64 nblocks) } /* write the last buffer. */ - write_metapage(mp); + if (mp) + write_metapage(mp); IREAD_UNLOCK(ipbmap); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] x86/crash: Disable virt in core NMI crash handler to avoid double shootdown
by Yu Liao 23 Aug '23

23 Aug '23

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.173 commit 8ff2cc2f87750507048d372e8d0f4d27ef446d3b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7V9HD Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 26044aff37a5455b19a91785086914fd33053ef4 upstream. Disable virtualization in crash_nmi_callback() and rework the emergency_vmx_disable_all() path to do an NMI shootdown if and only if a shootdown has not already occurred. NMI crash shootdown fundamentally can't support multiple invocations as responding CPUs are deliberately put into halt state without unblocking NMIs. But, the emergency reboot path doesn't have any work of its own, it simply cares about disabling virtualization, i.e. so long as a shootdown occurred, emergency reboot doesn't care who initiated the shootdown, or when. If "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" is specified on the kernel command line, panic() will invoke crash_smp_send_stop() and result in a second call to nmi_shootdown_cpus() during native_machine_emergency_restart(). Invoke the callback _before_ disabling virtualization, as the current VMCS needs to be cleared before doing VMXOFF. Note, this results in a subtle change in ordering between disabling virtualization and stopping Intel PT on the responding CPUs. While VMX and Intel PT do interact, VMXOFF and writes to MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL do not induce faults between one another, which is all that matters when panicking. Harden nmi_shootdown_cpus() against multiple invocations to try and capture any such kernel bugs via a WARN instead of hanging the system during a crash/dump, e.g. prior to the recent hardening of register_nmi_handler(), re-registering the NMI handler would trigger a double list_add() and hang the system if CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION=y. list_add double add: new=ffffffff82220800, prev=ffffffff8221cfe8, next=ffffffff82220800. WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 1319 at lib/list_debug.c:29 __list_add_valid+0x67/0x70 Call Trace: __register_nmi_handler+0xcf/0x130 nmi_shootdown_cpus+0x39/0x90 native_machine_emergency_restart+0x1c9/0x1d0 panic+0x237/0x29b Extract the disabling logic to a common helper to deduplicate code, and to prepare for doing the shootdown in the emergency reboot path if SVM is supported. Note, prior to commit ed72736183c4 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported"), nmi_shootdown_cpus() was subtly protected against a second invocation by a cpu_vmx_enabled() check as the kdump handler would disable VMX if it ran first. Fixes: ed72736183c4 ("x86/reboot: Force all cpus to exit VMX root if VMX is supported") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli(a)igalia.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets(a)redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini(a)redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220427224924.592546-2-gpiccoli@igalia.com Tested-by: Guilherme G. Piccoli <gpiccoli(a)igalia.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130233650.1404148-2-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 17 +-------- arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 3 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h index 04c17be9b5fd..bc5b4d788c08 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/reboot.h @@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ void __noreturn machine_real_restart(unsigned int type); #define MRR_BIOS 0 #define MRR_APM 1 +void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void); + typedef void (*nmi_shootdown_cb)(int, struct pt_regs*); void nmi_panic_self_stop(struct pt_regs *regs); void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c index 54ce999ed321..bd4b566ec917 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c @@ -37,7 +37,6 @@ #include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/reboot.h> -#include <asm/virtext.h> #include <asm/intel_pt.h> #include <asm/crash.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h> @@ -94,15 +93,6 @@ static void kdump_nmi_callback(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) */ cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(); - /* Disable VMX or SVM if needed. - * - * We need to disable virtualization on all CPUs. - * Having VMX or SVM enabled on any CPU may break rebooting - * after the kdump kernel has finished its task. - */ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); - cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); - /* * Disable Intel PT to stop its logging */ @@ -161,12 +151,7 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) */ cpu_crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss(); - /* Booting kdump kernel with VMX or SVM enabled won't work, - * because (among other limitations) we can't disable paging - * with the virt flags. - */ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); - cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); /* * Disable Intel PT to stop its logging diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c index df951a8f39d2..d68c8b9a3775 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c @@ -528,10 +528,7 @@ static inline void kb_wait(void) } } -static void vmxoff_nmi(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs) -{ - cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); -} +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void); /* Use NMIs as IPIs to tell all CPUs to disable virtualization */ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void) @@ -554,7 +551,7 @@ static void emergency_vmx_disable_all(void) __cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); /* Halt and exit VMX root operation on the other CPUs. */ - nmi_shootdown_cpus(vmxoff_nmi); + nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(); } } @@ -795,6 +792,17 @@ void machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs) /* This is the CPU performing the emergency shutdown work. */ int crashing_cpu = -1; +/* + * Disable virtualization, i.e. VMX or SVM, to ensure INIT is recognized during + * reboot. VMX blocks INIT if the CPU is post-VMXON, and SVM blocks INIT if + * GIF=0, i.e. if the crash occurred between CLGI and STGI. + */ +void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void) +{ + cpu_emergency_vmxoff(); + cpu_emergency_svm_disable(); +} + #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) static nmi_shootdown_cb shootdown_callback; @@ -817,7 +825,14 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) return NMI_HANDLED; local_irq_disable(); - shootdown_callback(cpu, regs); + if (shootdown_callback) + shootdown_callback(cpu, regs); + + /* + * Prepare the CPU for reboot _after_ invoking the callback so that the + * callback can safely use virtualization instructions, e.g. VMCLEAR. + */ + cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(); atomic_dec(&waiting_for_crash_ipi); /* Assume hlt works */ @@ -828,18 +843,32 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs) return NMI_HANDLED; } -/* - * Halt all other CPUs, calling the specified function on each of them +/** + * nmi_shootdown_cpus - Stop other CPUs via NMI + * @callback: Optional callback to be invoked from the NMI handler + * + * The NMI handler on the remote CPUs invokes @callback, if not + * NULL, first and then disables virtualization to ensure that + * INIT is recognized during reboot. * - * This function can be used to halt all other CPUs on crash - * or emergency reboot time. The function passed as parameter - * will be called inside a NMI handler on all CPUs. + * nmi_shootdown_cpus() can only be invoked once. After the first + * invocation all other CPUs are stuck in crash_nmi_callback() and + * cannot respond to a second NMI. */ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) { unsigned long msecs; + local_irq_disable(); + /* + * Avoid certain doom if a shootdown already occurred; re-registering + * the NMI handler will cause list corruption, modifying the callback + * will do who knows what, etc... + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crash_ipi_issued)) + return; + /* Make a note of crashing cpu. Will be used in NMI callback. */ crashing_cpu = safe_smp_processor_id(); @@ -875,7 +904,17 @@ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) msecs--; } - /* Leave the nmi callback set */ + /* + * Leave the nmi callback set, shootdown is a one-time thing. Clearing + * the callback could result in a NULL pointer dereference if a CPU + * (finally) responds after the timeout expires. + */ +} + +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void) +{ + if (!crash_ipi_issued) + nmi_shootdown_cpus(NULL); } /* @@ -905,6 +944,8 @@ void nmi_shootdown_cpus(nmi_shootdown_cb callback) /* No other CPUs to shoot down */ } +static inline void nmi_shootdown_cpus_on_restart(void) { } + void run_crash_ipi_callback(struct pt_regs *regs) { } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: vmxnet3: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in vmxnet3_rq_cleanup()
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit edf410cb74dc612fd47ef5be319c5a0bcd6e6ccd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7UWI8 CVE: CVE-2023-4459 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In vmxnet3_rq_create(), when dma_alloc_coherent() fails, vmxnet3_rq_destroy() is called. It sets rq->rx_ring[i].base to NULL. Then vmxnet3_rq_create() returns an error to its callers mxnet3_rq_create_all() -> vmxnet3_change_mtu(). Then vmxnet3_change_mtu() calls vmxnet3_force_close() -> dev_close() in error handling code. And the driver calls vmxnet3_close() -> vmxnet3_quiesce_dev() -> vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all() -> vmxnet3_rq_cleanup(). In vmxnet3_rq_cleanup(), rq->rx_ring[ring_idx].base is accessed, but this variable is NULL, causing a NULL pointer dereference. To fix this possible bug, an if statement is added to check whether rq->rx_ring[0].base is NULL in vmxnet3_rq_cleanup() and exit early if so. The error log in our fault-injection testing is shown as follows: [ 65.220135] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 ... [ 65.222633] RIP: 0010:vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all+0x396/0x4e0 [vmxnet3] ... [ 65.227977] Call Trace: ... [ 65.228262] vmxnet3_quiesce_dev+0x80f/0x8a0 [vmxnet3] [ 65.228580] vmxnet3_close+0x2c4/0x3f0 [vmxnet3] [ 65.228866] __dev_close_many+0x288/0x350 [ 65.229607] dev_close_many+0xa4/0x480 [ 65.231124] dev_close+0x138/0x230 [ 65.231933] vmxnet3_force_close+0x1f0/0x240 [vmxnet3] [ 65.232248] vmxnet3_change_mtu+0x75d/0x920 [vmxnet3] ... Fixes: d1a890fa37f27 ("net: VMware virtual Ethernet NIC driver: vmxnet3") Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220514050711.2636709-1-r33s3n6@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c index e454dfc9ad8f..f5cf7643289b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c @@ -1584,6 +1584,10 @@ vmxnet3_rq_cleanup(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, u32 i, ring_idx; struct Vmxnet3_RxDesc *rxd; + /* ring has already been cleaned up */ + if (!rq->rx_ring[0].base) + return; + for (ring_idx = 0; ring_idx < 2; ring_idx++) { for (i = 0; i < rq->rx_ring[ring_idx].size; i++) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN_BITFIELD -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: bridge: multicast: notify switchdev driver whenever MC processing gets disabled
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc5 commit c832962ac972082b3a1f89775c9d4274c8cb5670 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7V613 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Whenever bridge driver hits the max capacity of MDBs, it disables the MC processing (by setting corresponding bridge option), but never notifies switchdev about such change (the notifiers are called only upon explicit setting of this option, through the registered netlink interface). This could lead to situation when Software MDB processing gets disabled, but this event never gets offloaded to the underlying Hardware. Fix this by adding a notify message in such case. Fixes: 147c1e9b902c ("switchdev: bridge: Offload multicast disabled") Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Mazur <oleksandr.mazur(a)plvision.eu> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220215165303.31908-1-oleksandr.mazur@plvision.eu Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/bridge/br_multicast.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/bridge/br_multicast.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c index de79fbfe1611..e2b1bb3de4a1 100644 --- a/net/bridge/br_multicast.c +++ b/net/bridge/br_multicast.c @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ static const struct rhashtable_params br_sg_port_rht_params = { .automatic_shrinking = true, }; +static void br_mc_disabled_update(struct net_device *dev, bool value); + static void br_multicast_start_querier(struct net_bridge *br, struct bridge_mcast_own_query *query); static void br_multicast_add_router(struct net_bridge *br, @@ -1040,6 +1042,7 @@ struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *br_multicast_new_group(struct net_bridge *br, return mp; if (atomic_read(&br->mdb_hash_tbl.nelems) >= br->hash_max) { + br_mc_disabled_update(br->dev, false); br_opt_toggle(br, BROPT_MULTICAST_ENABLED, false); return ERR_PTR(-E2BIG); } -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/12] Add SDEI Watchdog Support
by Xiongfeng Wang 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

Xiongfeng Wang (12): watchdog: make hardlockup detect code public firmware: arm_sdei: add interrupt binding api firmware: arm_sdei: make 'sdei_api_event_disable/enable' public lockup_detector: init lockup detector after all the init_calls watchdog: add nmi_watchdog support for arm64 based on SDEI sdei_watchdog: refresh 'last_timestamp' when enabling nmi_watchdog sdei_watchdog: clear EOI of the secure timer before kdump sdei_watchdog: set secure timer period base on 'watchdog_thresh' kprobes/arm64: Blacklist sdei watchdog callback functions sdei_watchdog: avoid possible false hardlockup init: only move down lockup_detector_init() when sdei_watchdog is enabled openeuler_defconfig: Enable SDEI Watchdog arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 2 + arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec.c | 10 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/watchdog_sdei.c | 156 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c | 26 ++++- include/linux/arm_sdei.h | 5 + include/linux/nmi.h | 24 +++- include/uapi/linux/arm_sdei.h | 2 + init/main.c | 7 +- kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/watchdog.c | 2 + kernel/watchdog_hld.c | 61 ++++++---- lib/Kconfig.debug | 8 +- 13 files changed, 278 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/watchdog_sdei.c -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 0/5] fix CVE-2023-20593 for openEuler
by Yu Liao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

AMD Zen2 architecture Zenbleed remote execution vulnerability. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix for openEuler. Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1): tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Borislav Petkov (1): x86/cpu: Restore AMD's DE_CFG MSR after resume Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Cristian Ciocaltea (1): x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 206 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- 10 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 0/5] fix CVE-2023-20593 for openEuler
by Yu Liao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

AMD Zen2 architecture Zenbleed remote execution vulnerability. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix for openEuler. Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1): tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Borislav Petkov (1): x86/cpu: Restore AMD's DE_CFG MSR after resume Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Cristian Ciocaltea (1): x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 206 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c | 4 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 10 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +- arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 9 +- 10 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 6

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.291 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 0c88324..3a55a093 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -602,12 +602,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.190 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 9a5b617..f2585cc 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -663,12 +663,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.190 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 9a5b617..f2585cc 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -663,12 +663,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xsk: Initialise xskb free_list_node
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Ciara Loftus <ciara.loftus(a)intel.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc8 commit 5bec7ca2be6955ca1aa0d7bae2b981de9b1c9844 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7UZT5 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- This commit initialises the xskb's free_list_node when the xskb is allocated. This prevents a potential false negative returned from a call to list_empty for that node, such as the one introduced in commit 199d983bc015 ("xsk: Fix crash on double free in buffer pool") In my environment this issue caused packets to not be received by the xdpsock application if the traffic was running prior to application launch. This happened when the first batch of packets failed the xskmap lookup and XDP_PASS was returned from the bpf program. This action is handled in the i40e zc driver (and others) by allocating an skbuff, freeing the xdp_buff and adding the associated xskb to the xsk_buff_pool's free_list if it hadn't been added already. Without this fix, the xskb is not added to the free_list because the check to determine if it was added already returns an invalid positive result. Later, this caused allocation errors in the driver and the failure to receive packets. Fixes: 199d983bc015 ("xsk: Fix crash on double free in buffer pool") Fixes: 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") Signed-off-by: Ciara Loftus <ciara.loftus(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson(a)intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211220155250.2746-1-ciara.loftus@intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c b/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c index c347e52f58df..383c083faa01 100644 --- a/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c +++ b/net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ struct xsk_buff_pool *xp_create_and_assign_umem(struct xdp_sock *xs, xskb = &pool->heads[i]; xskb->pool = pool; xskb->xdp.frame_sz = umem->chunk_size - umem->headroom; + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xskb->free_list_node); pool->free_heads[i] = xskb; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[openEuler-1.0-LTS] tcp: Reduce chance of collisions in inet6_hashfn().
by Wang Yufen 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.291 commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FUFX CVE: CVE-2023-1206 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d11b0df7ddf1831f3e170972f43186dad520bfcc ] For both IPv4 and IPv6 incoming TCP connections are tracked in a hash table with a hash over the source & destination addresses and ports. However, the IPv6 hash is insufficient and can lead to a high rate of collisions. The IPv6 hash used an XOR to fit everything into the 96 bits for the fast jenkins hash, meaning it is possible for an external entity to ensure the hash collides, thus falling back to a linear search in the bucket, which is slow. We take the approach of hash the full length of IPv6 address in __ipv6_addr_jhash() so that all users can benefit from a more secure version. While this may look like it adds overhead, the reality of modern CPUs means that this is unmeasurable in real world scenarios. In simulating with llvm-mca, the increase in cycles for the hashing code was ~16 cycles on Skylake (from a base of ~155), and an extra ~9 on Nehalem (base of ~173). In commit dd6d2910c5e0 ("netfilter: conntrack: switch to siphash") netfilter switched from a jenkins hash to a siphash, but even the faster hsiphash is a more significant overhead (~20-30%) in some preliminary testing. So, in this patch, we keep to the more conservative approach to ensure we don't add much overhead per SYN. In testing, this results in a consistently even spread across the connection buckets. In both testing and real-world scenarios, we have not found any measurable performance impact. Fixes: 08dcdbf6a7b9 ("ipv6: use a stronger hash for tcp") Signed-off-by: Stewart Smith <trawets(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Samuel Mendoza-Jonas <samjonas(a)amazon.com> Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230721222410.17914-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- include/net/ipv6.h | 8 ++------ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/ipv6.h b/include/net/ipv6.h index 0c88324..3a55a093 100644 --- a/include/net/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/ipv6.h @@ -602,12 +602,8 @@ static inline u32 ipv6_addr_hash(const struct in6_addr *a) /* more secured version of ipv6_addr_hash() */ static inline u32 __ipv6_addr_jhash(const struct in6_addr *a, const u32 initval) { - u32 v = (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[0] ^ (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[1]; - - return jhash_3words(v, - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[2], - (__force u32)a->s6_addr32[3], - initval); + return jhash2((__force const u32 *)a->s6_addr32, + ARRAY_SIZE(a->s6_addr32), initval); } static inline bool ipv6_addr_loopback(const struct in6_addr *a) -- 1.8.3.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] fs: jfs: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in dbFree()
by Li Nan 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 0d4837fdb796f99369cf7691d33de1b856bcaf1f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TT9F CVE: CVE-2023-4385 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In our fault-injection testing, the variable "nblocks" in dbFree() can be zero when kmalloc_array() fails in dtSearch(). In this case, the variable "mp" in dbFree() would be NULL and then it is dereferenced in "write_metapage(mp)". The failure log is listed as follows: [ 13.824137] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020 ... [ 13.827416] RIP: 0010:dbFree+0x5f7/0x910 [jfs] [ 13.834341] Call Trace: [ 13.834540] <TASK> [ 13.834713] txFreeMap+0x7b4/0xb10 [jfs] [ 13.835038] txUpdateMap+0x311/0x650 [jfs] [ 13.835375] jfs_lazycommit+0x5f2/0xc70 [jfs] [ 13.835726] ? sched_dynamic_update+0x1b0/0x1b0 [ 13.836092] kthread+0x3c2/0x4a0 [ 13.836355] ? txLockFree+0x160/0x160 [jfs] [ 13.836763] ? kthread_unuse_mm+0x160/0x160 [ 13.837106] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 13.837402] </TASK> ... This patch adds a NULL check of "mp" before "write_metapage(mp)" is called. Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c index 2c9493011aec..7b2c9e60dabc 100644 --- a/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +++ b/fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c @@ -3262,7 +3262,8 @@ int dbAllocBottomUp(struct inode *ip, s64 blkno, s64 nblocks) } /* write the last buffer. */ - write_metapage(mp); + if (mp) + write_metapage(mp); IREAD_UNLOCK(ipbmap); -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. --- v3: add space after return type for Patch 3/3 v2: modify commit message for Patch 3/3 --- Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 4 ++ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 22 Aug '23

22 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. --- v2: modify commit message for Patch 3/3 --- Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 10 +++- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation
by Zeng Heng 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Arnd Bergmann (1): [Backport] x86/speculation: Add cpu_show_gds() prototype Daniel Sneddon (1): [Backport] x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigation .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 13 +- .../hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst | 99 ++++++++++++++ Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 39 ++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 34 +++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 1 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++ include/linux/cpu.h | 8 +- 11 files changed, 315 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/gather_data_sampling.rst -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS,v2 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. --- v2: modify commit message for Patch 3/3 --- Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 10 +++- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

1 3

[PATCH v5 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v5: - adjust tab num for macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v4 - define macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v3: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v2: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 35 ++++++++------- 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] fix NULL pointer dereference in __nf_nat_mangle_tcp_packet
by Zhengchao Shao 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

When nf_nat_ipv4.ko is not loaded, l3proto is NULL pointer. If the csum_recalc function of l3proto is called, it will cause NULL pointer access issue. Florian Westphal (2): netfilter: nat: remove csum_recalc hook netfilter: nat: fix udp checksum corruption Zhengchao Shao (1): netfilter: nat: fix kabi change include/net/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto.h | 10 +++- net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv4.c | 19 ------ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c | 19 ------ net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_helper.c | 12 ++-- net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) create mode 100644 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto.c -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nbd: pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply() instead of index
by Li Nan 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 189113, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T755 CVE: NA -------------------------------- If a socket is processing ioctl 'NBD_SET_SOCK', config->socks might be krealloc in nbd_add_socket(), and a garbage request is received now, a UAF may occurs. T1 nbd_ioctl __nbd_ioctl nbd_add_socket blk_mq_freeze_queue T2 recv_work nbd_read_reply sock_xmit krealloc config->socks def config->socks Pass nbd_sock to nbd_read_reply(). And introduce a new function sock_xmit_recv(), which differs from sock_xmit only in the way it get socket. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sock_xmit+0x525/0x550 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880188ec428 by task kworker/u12:1/18779 Workqueue: knbd4-recv recv_work Call Trace: __dump_stack dump_stack+0xbe/0xfd print_address_description.constprop.0+0x19/0x170 __kasan_report.cold+0x6c/0x84 kasan_report+0x3a/0x50 sock_xmit+0x525/0x550 nbd_read_reply+0xfe/0x2c0 recv_work+0x1c2/0x750 process_one_work+0x6b6/0xf10 worker_thread+0xdd/0xd80 kthread+0x30a/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 Allocated by task 18784: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track set_alloc_info __kasan_kmalloc __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xf0/0x130 slab_post_alloc_hook slab_alloc_node slab_alloc __kmalloc_track_caller+0x157/0x550 __do_krealloc krealloc+0x37/0xb0 nbd_add_socket +0x2d3/0x880 __nbd_ioctl nbd_ioctl+0x584/0x8e0 __blkdev_driver_ioctl blkdev_ioctl+0x2a0/0x6e0 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Freed by task 18784: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 __kasan_slab_free.part.0+0x13f/0x1b0 slab_free_hook slab_free_freelist_hook slab_free kfree+0xcb/0x6c0 krealloc+0x56/0xb0 nbd_add_socket+0x2d3/0x880 __nbd_ioctl nbd_ioctl+0x584/0x8e0 __blkdev_driver_ioctl blkdev_ioctl+0x2a0/0x6e0 block_ioctl+0xee/0x130 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl+0x138/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/block/nbd.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/block/nbd.c b/drivers/block/nbd.c index e0a21169b4b8..db885f3a2f0f 100644 --- a/drivers/block/nbd.c +++ b/drivers/block/nbd.c @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct nbd_sock { struct recv_thread_args { struct work_struct work; struct nbd_device *nbd; + struct nbd_sock *nsock; int index; }; @@ -500,15 +501,9 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nbd_xmit_timeout(struct request *req, return BLK_EH_DONE; } -/* - * Send or receive packet. Return a positive value on success and - * negtive value on failue, and never return 0. - */ -static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, - struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) +static int __sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, int send, + struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) { - struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; - struct socket *sock = config->socks[index]->sock; int result; struct msghdr msg; unsigned int noreclaim_flag; @@ -550,6 +545,19 @@ static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, return result; } +/* + * Send or receive packet. Return a positive value on success and + * negtive value on failure, and never return 0. + */ +static int sock_xmit(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, int send, + struct iov_iter *iter, int msg_flags, int *sent) +{ + struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; + struct socket *sock = config->socks[index]->sock; + + return __sock_xmit(nbd, sock, send, iter, msg_flags, sent); +} + /* * Different settings for sk->sk_sndtimeo can result in different return values * if there is a signal pending when we enter sendmsg, because reasons? @@ -706,7 +714,7 @@ static int nbd_send_cmd(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct nbd_cmd *cmd, int index) return 0; } -static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, +static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, struct socket *sock, struct nbd_reply *reply) { struct kvec iov = {.iov_base = reply, .iov_len = sizeof(*reply)}; @@ -715,7 +723,7 @@ static int nbd_read_reply(struct nbd_device *nbd, int index, reply->magic = 0; iov_iter_kvec(&to, READ, &iov, 1, sizeof(*reply)); - result = sock_xmit(nbd, index, 0, &to, MSG_WAITALL, NULL); + result = __sock_xmit(nbd, sock, 0, &to, MSG_WAITALL, NULL); if (result < 0) { if (!nbd_disconnected(nbd->config)) dev_err(disk_to_dev(nbd->disk), @@ -837,14 +845,14 @@ static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work) struct nbd_device *nbd = args->nbd; struct nbd_config *config = nbd->config; struct request_queue *q = nbd->disk->queue; - struct nbd_sock *nsock; + struct nbd_sock *nsock = args->nsock; struct nbd_cmd *cmd; struct request *rq; while (1) { struct nbd_reply reply; - if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, args->index, &reply)) + if (nbd_read_reply(nbd, nsock->sock, &reply)) break; /* @@ -879,7 +887,6 @@ static void recv_work(struct work_struct *work) percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter); } - nsock = config->socks[args->index]; mutex_lock(&nsock->tx_lock); nbd_mark_nsock_dead(nbd, nsock, 1); mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); @@ -1223,6 +1230,7 @@ static int nbd_reconnect_socket(struct nbd_device *nbd, unsigned long arg) INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work); args->index = i; args->nbd = nbd; + args->nsock = nsock; nsock->cookie++; mutex_unlock(&nsock->tx_lock); sockfd_put(old); @@ -1413,6 +1421,7 @@ static int nbd_start_device(struct nbd_device *nbd) refcount_inc(&nbd->config_refs); INIT_WORK(&args->work, recv_work); args->nbd = nbd; + args->nsock = config->socks[i]; args->index = i; queue_work(nbd->recv_workq, &args->work); } -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH v3 OLK-5.10] ima: Add macros to isolate the IMA digest list
by Zhou Shuiqing 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

euleros inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I277UJ -------------------------------- Isolate the IMA digest list code by using macros. changelog v2: Exclude some macros for code that has already been merged into upstream kernel. v3: add patch header and fix some simple code warnings Signed-off-by: Zhou Shuiqing <zhoushuiqing2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xattr.c | 4 + include/linux/evm.h | 4 +- include/linux/ima.h | 8 + security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 38 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 79 +++++++- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 80 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 39 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 154 ++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 248 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 6 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 80 ++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +- security/security.c | 2 + 17 files changed, 780 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 149b8cf5f99f..c31266a83391 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/ima.h> +#endif #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> @@ -475,7 +477,9 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); +#endif evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); } diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index e5b7bcb152b9..39bb17a8236b 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, struct xattr *evm); -extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); +extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); #else @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } -static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { return false; } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index f7a088b2579e..713c6f9696cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -144,13 +144,17 @@ extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#endif extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#endif #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { @@ -170,12 +174,14 @@ static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { } +#endif static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) @@ -183,10 +189,12 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { } +#endif #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 92dc64755e53..72941f9b1b99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/verification.h> +#endif #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> @@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (IS_ERR(key)) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY keyring = VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING; @@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) #endif key = search_trusted_key(keyring, &key_type_asymmetric, name); } +#endif if (IS_ERR(key)) { if (keyring) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index ca7ed2e532dc..f8b1627708a1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ struct xattr_list { }; extern int evm_initialized; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo; +#endif #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 7c36dbb96d24..fa8147c2294e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo __ro_after_init = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#else +static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +#endif /** * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel @@ -74,11 +78,13 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) long rc; const char *algo; struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm; - char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; snprintf(evm_hmac, sizeof(evm_hmac), "hmac(%s)", CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); +#endif if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { @@ -156,8 +162,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) { +#else + if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { +#endif hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; } @@ -174,8 +184,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); } @@ -288,8 +302,12 @@ static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) return 0; return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG || xattr_data->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif rc = 1; else rc = 0; @@ -321,15 +339,23 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (rc) return -EPERM; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST data.hdr.algo = evm_hash_algo; +#else + data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#endif rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &data); if (rc == 0) { data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &data.hdr.xattr.data[1], +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1, 0); +#else + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0); +#endif } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); } @@ -341,7 +367,11 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, { struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, evm_hash_algo); +#else + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); +#endif if (IS_ERR(desc)) { pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); @@ -353,9 +383,15 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Get the key from the TPM for the HMAC */ +#else +/* + * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC + */ +#endif int evm_init_key(void) { struct key *evm_key; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index cddfc0e43a80..a3f6729e00ca 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) @@ -73,6 +74,18 @@ static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) return 1; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_param); +#else +static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + evm_fixmode = 1; + else + pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); + + return 0; +} +__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); +#endif static void __init evm_init_config(void) { @@ -98,6 +111,7 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Ignoring INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS is safe if no HMAC key * is loaded and the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag is set. @@ -115,8 +129,13 @@ static bool evm_ignore_error_safe(enum integrity_status evm_status) return true; } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) +#else +static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) +#endif { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; @@ -133,8 +152,10 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) continue; return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA)) *ima_present = 1; +#endif count++; } @@ -163,6 +184,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum integrity_status saved_evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; struct evm_digest digest; struct ima_digest *found_digest; @@ -172,6 +194,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, .version = 2, .hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256 }; int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0, ima_present = 0; +#else + struct evm_digest digest; + struct inode *inode; + int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0; +#endif + if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; @@ -184,7 +212,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, if (rc <= 0) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; if (rc == -ENODATA) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry, &ima_present); +#else + rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); +#endif if (rc > 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; else if (rc == 0) @@ -192,6 +224,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* IMA added a fake xattr, set also EVM fake xattr */ if (!ima_present && xattr_name && !strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) && @@ -206,6 +239,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, goto out; saved_evm_status = evm_status; +#else + goto out; +#endif } xattr_len = rc; @@ -262,6 +298,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } } break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: /* At this point, we cannot determine whether metadata are * immutable or not. However, it is safe to return the @@ -302,11 +339,13 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } break; +#endif default: rc = -EINVAL; break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (rc && xattr_data == (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) { evm_status = saved_evm_status; } else if (rc) { @@ -315,10 +354,22 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = evm_immutable ? INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE : INTEGRITY_FAIL; } +#else + if (rc) { + if (rc == -ENODATA) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; + else if (evm_immutable) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE; + else + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } +#endif out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data != (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) +#endif kfree(xattr_data); return evm_status; } @@ -569,8 +620,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -606,7 +661,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) } /** - * evm_status_revalidate - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary + * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the @@ -614,7 +669,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) * * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. */ -bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_key_loaded()) return false; @@ -646,7 +701,7 @@ bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -669,7 +724,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -714,6 +769,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures * are immutable and can never be updated. @@ -723,6 +779,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))) return 0; +#else + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)) + return 0; +#endif if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) @@ -747,7 +809,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(NULL)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -780,7 +842,9 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, goto out; evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST evm_xattr->value_len = hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1; +#endif evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; return 0; out: @@ -802,6 +866,7 @@ void __init evm_load_x509(void) static int __init init_evm(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int error, i; struct list_head *pos, *q; @@ -809,6 +874,10 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); if (i >= 0) evm_hash_algo = i; +#else + int error; + struct list_head *pos, *q; +#endif evm_init_config(); diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 8953ac6412c3..22dc1eb63f78 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ void __init integrity_load_keys(void) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509)) evm_load_x509(); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_load_digest_lists(); +#endif } static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 46afb6bef45b..72e1843b05e1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init; extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init; extern int ima_appraise; extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; +extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_list_pcr; extern bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; -extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; extern int ima_digest_list_actions; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_db_max_size __ro_after_init; extern int ima_digest_db_size; #endif @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define __ima_hooks(hook) \ hook(NONE, none) \ hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ @@ -205,6 +206,23 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ hook(DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, digest_list) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) +#else +#define __ima_hooks(hook) \ + (hook(NONE, none) \ + hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ + hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \ + hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \ + hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \ + hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \ + hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \ + hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \ + hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \ + hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \ + hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ + hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(MAX_CHECK, none)) +#endif #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, #define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg) @@ -264,12 +282,20 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#endif void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *keyring); @@ -278,9 +304,15 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_entry **entry, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr); +#endif void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); @@ -308,21 +340,41 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST 0x80 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest); +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); +#endif + int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); + +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len); +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +#endif + #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) @@ -330,6 +382,7 @@ static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return 0; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, @@ -338,6 +391,15 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, + const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } @@ -360,6 +422,20 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static inline enum hash_algo +ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) +{ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 6ecaf6834844..1b8d3696d873 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -99,15 +99,23 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, * * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, + int violation, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *duplicated_entry = NULL; +#endif int result; if (!violation) { @@ -121,6 +129,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_plus_standard_pcr && !digest) { duplicated_entry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*entry) + entry->template_desc->num_fields * @@ -130,9 +139,11 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } else if (!ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { pcr = ima_digest_list_pcr; } +#endif entry->pcr = pcr; result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result) { kfree(duplicated_entry); } else if (duplicated_entry) { @@ -141,6 +152,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, if (result < 0) kfree(duplicated_entry); } +#endif return result; } @@ -173,8 +185,13 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, result = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, + filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: @@ -315,18 +332,30 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; +#else + struct ima_template_entry *entry; +#endif struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, .filename = filename, @@ -344,10 +373,12 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig) return; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (digest && !ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { result = -EEXIST; goto out; } +#endif result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); if (result < 0) { @@ -356,14 +387,22 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr, digest); out: +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); +#endif if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result < 0 && entry) +#else + if (result < 0) +#endif ima_free_template_entry(entry); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 956fb0f4c006..9dd8634b9e5a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init; +#endif static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM @@ -45,16 +47,18 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) ima_appraise = appraisal_state; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (strcmp(str, "enforce-evm") == 0 || strcmp(str, "log-evm") == 0) ima_appraise_req_evm = true; +#endif return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); -static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; static int __init appraise_digest_list_setup(char *str) { if (!strncmp(str, "digest", 6)) { @@ -108,9 +112,11 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, } else { offset = 0; iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (test_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags)) iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo; } rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, @@ -189,6 +195,60 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len) +{ + struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; + enum hash_algo ret; + + if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; + + switch (xattr_value->type) { + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; + if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)) + return ima_hash_algo; + return sig->hash_algo; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; + if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return ret; + break; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + /* this is for backward compatibility */ + if (xattr_len == 21) { + unsigned int zero = 0; + + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + } else if (xattr_len == 17) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + break; + } + + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) + ret = 0; + return ret; +} +#endif + /* * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature * @@ -196,18 +256,27 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, + enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) +#endif { int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (found_digest && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); +#endif switch (xattr_value->type) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -217,13 +286,18 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, break; } fallthrough; +#endif case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: /* first byte contains algorithm id */ hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && (!found_digest || !ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest))) { +#else + if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { +#endif if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -352,26 +426,39 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc = xattr_len, rc_evm; char _buf[sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data) + 1 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + int rc = xattr_len; +#endif bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig; /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && xattr_len == sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) rc = -ENODATA; @@ -394,6 +481,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, rc = xattr_len; } } +#endif /* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) { @@ -417,11 +505,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: if (ima_appraise_req_evm && xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && !found_digest) goto out; +#else + case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: +#endif break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ @@ -429,6 +521,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, break; fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * If the digest-nometadata mode is selected, allow access * without metadata check. EVM will eventually create an HMAC @@ -446,6 +539,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest)) break; } +#endif cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: @@ -458,6 +552,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((iint->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) && status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -466,10 +561,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); goto out; } +#endif if (xattr_value) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause, found_digest); +#else + rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, + &cause); +#endif /* * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't @@ -609,6 +710,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -624,7 +726,35 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, } return result; } +#else +int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int digsig = 0; + int result; + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + if (result == 1) { + if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) + return -EINVAL; + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); +#endif + } + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; + } + return result; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -638,10 +768,12 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); - if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; @@ -652,12 +784,28 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) } return result; } +#else +int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + int result; + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; + } + return result; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); } +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index f1bc3e201bd8..345ca9bc5c43 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -21,11 +21,15 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/file.h> +#endif #include <linux/ctype.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex); @@ -36,9 +40,11 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; static struct dentry *violations; static struct dentry *ima_policy; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct dentry *digests_count; static struct dentry *digest_list_data; static struct dentry *digest_list_data_del; +#endif bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) @@ -52,6 +58,7 @@ __setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup); static int valid_policy = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -63,19 +70,55 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, val = &ima_htable.violations; else if (filp->f_path.dentry == runtime_measurements_count) val = &ima_htable.len; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (filp->f_path.dentry == digests_count) val = &ima_digests_htable.len; -#endif len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); } +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) +{ + char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */ + ssize_t len; + + len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static const struct file_operations ima_htable_value_ops = { .read = ima_show_htable_value, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations); +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = { + .read = ima_show_htable_violations, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len); + +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { + .read = ima_show_measurements_count, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) @@ -275,6 +318,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) { void *data = NULL; @@ -320,7 +364,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); } else if (dentry == digest_list_data || dentry == digest_list_data_del) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Only check size when adding digest lists */ if (dentry == digest_list_data && size > ima_digest_db_max_size - ima_digest_db_size) { @@ -328,7 +371,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = -ENOMEM; break; } -#endif /* * Disable usage of digest lists if not measured * or appraised. @@ -343,12 +385,10 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) if (rc < 0) break; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (dentry == digest_list_data) pr_debug("digest imported, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); else if (dentry == digest_list_data_del) pr_debug("digest deleted, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); -#endif size -= rc; } @@ -461,6 +501,104 @@ static enum ima_fs_flags ima_get_dentry_flag(struct dentry *dentry) return flag; } +#else +static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) +{ + void *data = NULL; + char *datap; + size_t size; + int rc, pathlen = strlen(path); + + char *p; + + /* remove \n */ + datap = path; + strsep(&datap, "\n"); + + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL, + READING_POLICY); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); + return rc; + } + size = rc; + rc = 0; + + datap = data; + while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) { + pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p); + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); + if (rc < 0) + break; + size -= rc; + } + + vfree(data); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + else if (size) + return -EINVAL; + else + return pathlen; +} + +static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t result; + + if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) + datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1; + + /* No partial writes. */ + result = -EINVAL; + if (*ppos != 0) + goto out; + + data = memdup_user_nul(buf, datalen); + if (IS_ERR(data)) { + result = PTR_ERR(data); + goto out; + } + + result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex); + if (result < 0) + goto out_free; + + if (data[0] == '/') { + result = ima_read_policy(data); + } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n"); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", "signed policy required", + 1, 0); + result = -EACCES; + } else { + result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); +out_free: + kfree(data); +out: + if (result < 0) + valid_policy = 0; + + return result; +} + +static struct dentry *ima_dir; +static struct dentry *ima_symlink; +static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; +static struct dentry *violations; +static struct dentry *ima_policy; + +enum ima_fs_flags { + IMA_FS_BUSY, +}; +#endif static unsigned long ima_fs_flags; @@ -473,6 +611,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * ima_open_data_upload: sequentialize access to the data upload interface */ @@ -568,6 +707,79 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { .release = ima_release_data_upload, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +/* + * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + */ +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + return -EACCES; +#else + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + return -EACCES; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); +#endif + } + if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) + return -EBUSY; + return 0; +} + +/* + * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules. + * + * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now + * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, + * assuming a valid policy. + */ +static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + + if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + return seq_release(inode, file); + + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + cause = "failed"; + valid_policy = 0; + } + + pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); + + if (!valid_policy) { + ima_delete_rules(); + valid_policy = 1; + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + return 0; + } + + ima_update_policy(); +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + ima_policy = NULL; +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { + .open = ima_open_policy, + .write = ima_write_policy, + .read = seq_read, + .release = ima_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +#endif int __init ima_fs_init(void) { @@ -594,6 +806,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST runtime_measurements_count = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, @@ -613,7 +826,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST digests_count = securityfs_create_file("digests_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_value_ops); @@ -631,12 +843,34 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) &ima_data_upload_ops); if (IS_ERR(digest_list_data_del)) goto out; +#else + runtime_measurements_count = + securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measurements_count_ops); + if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) + goto out; + + violations = + securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); + if (IS_ERR(violations)) + goto out; + + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, + ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measure_policy_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + goto out; + #endif return 0; out: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST securityfs_remove(digest_list_data_del); securityfs_remove(digest_list_data); securityfs_remove(digests_count); +#endif securityfs_remove(ima_policy); securityfs_remove(violations); securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 913d6b879b0b..da47d366a98c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -84,9 +84,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, + boot_aggregate_name, + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) { ima_free_template_entry(entry); audit_cause = "store_entry"; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 999d5904cce0..fc1af21b3ad8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; @@ -38,12 +40,14 @@ int ima_appraise; int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Actions (measure/appraisal) for which digest lists can be used */ int ima_digest_list_actions; /* PCR used for digest list measurements */ int ima_digest_list_pcr = -1; /* Flag to include standard measurement if digest list PCR is specified */ bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; +#endif static int hash_setup_done; @@ -156,6 +160,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { @@ -209,6 +214,7 @@ static int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, ret = 0; return ret; } +#endif static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -268,7 +274,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *found_digest; +#endif struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; struct modsig *modsig = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; @@ -398,28 +406,42 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) pathname = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; found_digest = ima_lookup_digest(iint->ima_hash->digest, hash_algo, COMPACT_FILE); +#endif if (action & IMA_MEASURE) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_MEASURE)); +#else + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, + xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, + template_desc); +#endif if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); if (rc != -EPERM) { inode_lock(inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_APPRAISE)); +#else + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, + pathname, xattr_value, + xattr_len, modsig); +#endif inode_unlock(inode); } if (!rc) @@ -568,15 +590,23 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc; +#endif security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) ima_check_measured_appraised(file); return rc; +#else + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -739,7 +769,9 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST [READING_DIGEST_LIST] = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK +#endif }; /** @@ -941,7 +973,11 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr, NULL); +#else + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); +#endif if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "store_entry"; ima_free_template_entry(entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 274f4c7c99f4..3e14b55ecf0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif /* flags definitions */ #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 @@ -35,7 +37,9 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_PARSER 0x0800 +#endif #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -58,7 +62,11 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB, EXEC_TCB }; +#else +enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; +#endif enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY }; @@ -145,11 +153,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = MEASURE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_measure_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = MEASURE, .flags = IMA_PARSER +#endif }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { @@ -181,12 +191,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #endif }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct ima_rule_entry appraise_exec_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = APPRAISE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +#endif static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS @@ -216,6 +228,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = APPRAISE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; @@ -223,6 +236,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_appraise_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = APPRAISE, .flags = IMA_PARSER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED +#endif }; /* An array of architecture specific rules */ @@ -246,8 +260,10 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable __initdata; +#endif static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) @@ -259,14 +275,18 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) continue; if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = EXEC_TCB; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_immutable") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable = true; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) @@ -569,9 +589,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner)) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((rule->flags & IMA_PARSER) && !ima_current_is_parser()) return false; +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; @@ -752,19 +774,27 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (func == DIGEST_LIST_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#else +static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, + enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#endif { int i = 0; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy == EXEC_TCB) { if (entries == dont_measure_rules) if ((entries[i].flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && @@ -792,6 +822,7 @@ static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, (entries[i].flags & IMA_FUNC) && entries[i].func == BPRM_CHECK) entries[i].flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); @@ -879,8 +910,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EXEC_TCB: fallthrough; +#endif case DEFAULT_TCB: add_rules(default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), @@ -889,8 +922,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy) add_rules(&ima_parser_measure_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif /* * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement @@ -909,7 +944,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_secure_boot) +#endif add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); @@ -929,11 +968,16 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) +#endif add_rules(default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(appraise_exec_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(appraise_exec_rules), @@ -942,6 +986,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(&ima_parser_appraise_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -1002,7 +1047,11 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST Opt_parser, Opt_err +#else + Opt_err +#endif }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -1039,7 +1088,9 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {Opt_parser, "parser"}, +#endif {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1134,9 +1185,14 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->action != APPRAISE && entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + if (entry->action != APPRAISE && + entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; /* @@ -1162,13 +1218,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case POST_SETATTR: case FIRMWARE_CHECK: case POLICY_CHECK: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case DIGEST_LIST_CHECK: +#endif if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED | IMA_PARSER)) +#else + IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1180,8 +1242,12 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1338,8 +1404,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "DIGEST_LIST_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) @@ -1526,8 +1594,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "meta_immutable") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; break; @@ -1546,8 +1616,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr) || entry->pcr == ima_digest_list_pcr) +#else + if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) +#endif result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; @@ -1574,10 +1648,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) &(template_desc->fields), &(template_desc->num_fields)); entry->template = template_desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case Opt_parser: audit_log_format(ab, "parser "); entry->flags |= IMA_PARSER; +#endif break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); @@ -1849,8 +1925,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_PARSER) seq_puts(m, "parser "); +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { @@ -1893,8 +1971,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST) seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist "); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=meta_immutable "); +#endif if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 77e6819e8db8..d9cf29e286a9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/hash_info.h> +#endif /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 @@ -40,7 +43,9 @@ #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED 0x80000000 +#endif #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) @@ -72,7 +77,9 @@ #define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 #define IMA_DIGSIG 3 #define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_DIGEST_LIST 5 +#endif enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -80,7 +87,9 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST, +#endif IMA_XATTR_LAST }; @@ -92,7 +101,11 @@ struct evm_ima_xattr_data { /* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */ struct evm_xattr { struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#endif } __packed; #define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 @@ -144,6 +157,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum compact_types { COMPACT_KEY, COMPACT_PARSER, COMPACT_FILE, COMPACT_METADATA, COMPACT__LAST }; enum compact_modifiers { COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE, COMPACT_MOD__LAST }; @@ -162,7 +176,6 @@ static inline bool ima_digest_is_immutable(struct ima_digest *digest) return (digest->modifiers & (1 << COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE)); } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *ima_lookup_digest(u8 *digest, enum hash_algo algo, enum compact_types type); struct ima_digest *ima_digest_allow(struct ima_digest *digest, int action); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5678d4e334fb..11c859a9b8ed 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1362,7 +1362,9 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); +#endif evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH v4 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v4 - define macro DEFINE_TLB_UBC v3: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v2: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 35 ++++++++------- 9 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb
by Dong Chenchen 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

From: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.189 commit 06f87c96216bc5cd1094c23492274f77f1d5dd3b category: bugfix bugzilla: 189135, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SXVG CVE: CVE-2023-40283 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1728137b33c00d5a2b5110ed7aafb42e7c32e4a1 upstream. l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive and point to the already free'd sk's address. To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276 CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Allocated by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline] __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614 head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10 raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng. Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index d2c678520599..63bfbb5918fe 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops l2cap_sock_ops; static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent); static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern); +static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent); bool l2cap_is_socket(struct socket *sock) { @@ -1414,6 +1415,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock) if (!sk) return 0; + l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(sk); bt_sock_unlink(&l2cap_sk_list, sk); err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] fix CVE-2023-20593 for openEuler
by Yu Liao 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

AMD Zen2 architecture Zenbleed remote execution vulnerability. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix for openEuler. Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (1): [Backport] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Borislav Petkov (AMD) (2): [Backport] x86/cpu/amd: Move the errata checking functionality up [Backport] x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix Cristian Ciocaltea (1): [Backport] x86/cpu/amd: Enable Zenbleed fix for AMD Custom APU 0405 arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] ksmbd: fix cve-2023-38432
by Long Li 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Long Li (1): ksmbd: validate command request size Namjae Jeon (1): ksmbd: validate command payload size fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) -- 2.31.1

2 3

[PATCH v3 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 21 Aug '23

21 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Changelog: v2: - fix kabi breakage for task_struct->tlb_ubc v1: - fix kabi breakage for mm_struct->tlb_flush_batched Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 29 ++++++++++-- include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ mm/rmap.c | 33 ++++++++------ 9 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb
by Dong Chenchen 20 Aug '23

20 Aug '23

From: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.290 commit 82cdb2ccbe43337798393369f0ceb98699fe6037 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189135, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SXVG CVE: CVE-2023-40283 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1728137b33c00d5a2b5110ed7aafb42e7c32e4a1 upstream. l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive and point to the already free'd sk's address. To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276 CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Allocated by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline] __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614 head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10 raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng. Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index b4f6b74c4003..bcada51cb01e 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops l2cap_sock_ops; static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent); static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern); +static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent); bool l2cap_is_socket(struct socket *sock) { @@ -1196,6 +1197,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock) if (!sk) return 0; + l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(sk); bt_sock_unlink(&l2cap_sk_list, sk); err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, 2); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[Patch OLK-5.10] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb
by Dong Chenchen 20 Aug '23

20 Aug '23

From: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.189 commit 06f87c96216bc5cd1094c23492274f77f1d5dd3b category: bugfix bugzilla: 189135, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SXVG CVE: CVE-2023-40283 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 1728137b33c00d5a2b5110ed7aafb42e7c32e4a1 upstream. l2cap_sock_release(sk) frees sk. However, sk's children are still alive and point to the already free'd sk's address. To fix this, l2cap_sock_release(sk) also cleans sk's children. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104617aa8 by task kworker/u3:0/276 CPU: 0 PID: 276 Comm: kworker/u3:0 Not tainted 6.2.0-00001-gef397bd4d5fb-dirty #59 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: hci2 hci_rx_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x72/0x95 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline] print_report+0x175/0x478 mm/kasan/report.c:417 kasan_report+0xb1/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:517 l2cap_sock_ready_cb+0xb7/0x100 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1650 l2cap_chan_ready+0x10e/0x1e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:1386 l2cap_config_req+0x753/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:4480 l2cap_bredr_sig_cmd net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:5739 [inline] l2cap_sig_channel net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:6509 [inline] l2cap_recv_frame+0xe2e/0x43c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7788 l2cap_recv_acldata+0x6ed/0x7e0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:8506 hci_acldata_packet net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:3813 [inline] hci_rx_work+0x66e/0xbc0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4048 process_one_work+0x4ea/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x364/0x8e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x1b9/0x200 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308 </TASK> Allocated by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:374 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x82/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:383 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5a/0x140 mm/slab_common.c:981 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0x113/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2040 sk_alloc+0x36/0x3c0 net/core/sock.c:2093 l2cap_sock_alloc.constprop.0+0x39/0x1c0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1852 l2cap_sock_create+0x10d/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1898 bt_sock_create+0x183/0x290 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x226/0x380 net/socket.c:1518 sock_create net/socket.c:1569 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1606 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1591 [inline] __sys_socket+0x112/0x200 net/socket.c:1639 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1652 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1650 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1650 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc Freed by task 288: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:45 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52 kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:523 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline] ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:200 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:244 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1807 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline] __kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0 mm/slub.c:3800 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2076 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x347/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2168 sk_destruct+0x9c/0xb0 net/core/sock.c:2183 __sk_free+0x82/0x220 net/core/sock.c:2194 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2205 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline] l2cap_sock_kill+0x256/0x2b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1257 l2cap_sock_release+0x1a7/0x220 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c:1428 __sock_release+0x80/0x150 net/socket.c:650 sock_close+0x19/0x30 net/socket.c:1368 __fput+0x17a/0x5c0 fs/file_table.c:320 task_work_run+0x132/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:179 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:171 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 kernel/entry/common.c:203 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x21/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296 do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888104617800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 680 bytes inside of 1024-byte region [ffff888104617800, ffff888104617c00) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000dbca6a80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888104614000 pfn:0x104614 head:00000000dbca6a80 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 subpages_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x200000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=2) raw: 0200000000010200 ffff888100041dc0 ffffea0004212c10 ffffea0004234b10 raw: ffff888104614000 0000000000080002 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888104617980: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617a00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888104617a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888104617b00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888104617b80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Ack: This bug is found by FuzzBT with a modified Syzkaller. Other contributors are Ruoyu Wu and Hui Peng. Signed-off-by: Sungwoo Kim <iam(a)sung-woo.kim> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c index d2c678520599..63bfbb5918fe 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ static const struct proto_ops l2cap_sock_ops; static void l2cap_sock_init(struct sock *sk, struct sock *parent); static struct sock *l2cap_sock_alloc(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, gfp_t prio, int kern); +static void l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(struct sock *parent); bool l2cap_is_socket(struct socket *sock) { @@ -1414,6 +1415,7 @@ static int l2cap_sock_release(struct socket *sock) if (!sk) return 0; + l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen(sk); bt_sock_unlink(&l2cap_sk_list, sk); err = l2cap_sock_shutdown(sock, SHUT_RDWR); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] SUNRPC: Add cond_resched() at the appropriate point in __rpc_execute()
by Liu Jian 19 Aug '23

19 Aug '23

From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.16-rc1 commit 47dd8796a31e132f9e2b93a4f558a9f924a7388f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I65HYE Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Allow tasks that need to pre-empt rpciod/xprtiod to do so when it is safe. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/sunrpc/sched.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sunrpc/sched.c b/net/sunrpc/sched.c index f0f55fbd1375..c939ecb25732 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/sched.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/sched.c @@ -896,8 +896,10 @@ static void __rpc_execute(struct rpc_task *task) /* * Lockless check for whether task is sleeping or not. */ - if (!RPC_IS_QUEUED(task)) + if (!RPC_IS_QUEUED(task)) { + cond_resched(); continue; + } /* * Signalled tasks should exit rather than sleep. -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 18 Aug '23

18 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 4 +- mm/rmap.c | 21 ++++----- 8 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net: vmxnet3: fix possible use-after-free bugs in vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf()
by Lu Wei 18 Aug '23

18 Aug '23

From: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.245 commit 3adaaf3472e8ea410cb1330e5dd8372b0483dc78 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TTDS CVE: CVE-2023-4387 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9e7fef9521e73ca8afd7da9e58c14654b02dfad8 ] In vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf(), when dma_map_single() fails, rbi->skb is freed immediately. Similarly, in another branch, when dma_map_page() fails, rbi->page is also freed. In the two cases, vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() returns an error to its callers vmxnet3_rq_init() -> vmxnet3_rq_init_all() -> vmxnet3_activate_dev(). Then vmxnet3_activate_dev() calls vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all() in error handling code, and rbi->skb or rbi->page are freed again in vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all(), causing use-after-free bugs. To fix these possible bugs, rbi->skb and rbi->page should be cleared after they are freed. The error log in our fault-injection testing is shown as follows: [ 14.319016] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in consume_skb+0x2f/0x150 ... [ 14.321586] Call Trace: ... [ 14.325357] consume_skb+0x2f/0x150 [ 14.325671] vmxnet3_rq_cleanup_all+0x33a/0x4e0 [vmxnet3] [ 14.326150] vmxnet3_activate_dev+0xb9d/0x2ca0 [vmxnet3] [ 14.326616] vmxnet3_open+0x387/0x470 [vmxnet3] ... [ 14.361675] Allocated by task 351: ... [ 14.362688] __netdev_alloc_skb+0x1b3/0x6f0 [ 14.362960] vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf+0x1b0/0x8d0 [vmxnet3] [ 14.363317] vmxnet3_activate_dev+0x3e3/0x2ca0 [vmxnet3] [ 14.363661] vmxnet3_open+0x387/0x470 [vmxnet3] ... [ 14.367309] [ 14.367412] Freed by task 351: ... [ 14.368932] __dev_kfree_skb_any+0xd2/0xe0 [ 14.369193] vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf+0x71e/0x8d0 [vmxnet3] [ 14.369544] vmxnet3_activate_dev+0x3e3/0x2ca0 [vmxnet3] [ 14.369883] vmxnet3_open+0x387/0x470 [vmxnet3] [ 14.370174] __dev_open+0x28a/0x420 [ 14.370399] __dev_change_flags+0x192/0x590 [ 14.370667] dev_change_flags+0x7a/0x180 [ 14.370919] do_setlink+0xb28/0x3570 [ 14.371150] rtnl_newlink+0x1160/0x1740 [ 14.371399] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5bf/0xa50 [ 14.371661] netlink_rcv_skb+0x1cd/0x3e0 [ 14.371913] netlink_unicast+0x5dc/0x840 [ 14.372169] netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xc40 [ 14.372420] ____sys_sendmsg+0x8a7/0x8d0 [ 14.372673] __sys_sendmsg+0x1c2/0x270 [ 14.372914] do_syscall_64+0x41/0x90 [ 14.373145] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae ... Fixes: 5738a09d58d5a ("vmxnet3: fix checks for dma mapping errors") Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab(a)tsinghua.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Zixuan Fu <r33s3n6(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220514050656.2636588-1-r33s3n6@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c index e454dfc9ad8f..925f8e8ade1c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c +++ b/drivers/net/vmxnet3/vmxnet3_drv.c @@ -595,6 +595,7 @@ vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, u32 ring_idx, if (dma_mapping_error(&adapter->pdev->dev, rbi->dma_addr)) { dev_kfree_skb_any(rbi->skb); + rbi->skb = NULL; rq->stats.rx_buf_alloc_failure++; break; } @@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, u32 ring_idx, if (dma_mapping_error(&adapter->pdev->dev, rbi->dma_addr)) { put_page(rbi->page); + rbi->page = NULL; rq->stats.rx_buf_alloc_failure++; break; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10 00/14] zram: Support multiple compression streams
by Jinjiang Tu 18 Aug '23

18 Aug '23

Support multiple compression streams for zram. Alexey Romanov (1): zram: add size class equals check into recompression Andy Shevchenko (1): lib/cmdline: Export next_arg() for being used in modules Ming Lei (1): zram: fix race between zram_reset_device() and disksize_store() Sergey Senozhatsky (11): zram: preparation for multi-zcomp support zram: add recompression algorithm sysfs knob zram: factor out WB and non-WB zram read functions zram: introduce recompress sysfs knob zram: add recompress flag to read_block_state() zram: clarify writeback_store() comment zram: remove redundant checks from zram_recompress() zram: add algo parameter support to zram_recompress() documentation: add zram recompression documentation zram: add incompressible writeback zram: add incompressible flag to read_block_state() Documentation/admin-guide/blockdev/zram.rst | 98 +++- drivers/block/zram/Kconfig | 9 + drivers/block/zram/zcomp.c | 6 +- drivers/block/zram/zcomp.h | 2 +- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 594 +++++++++++++++++--- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.h | 22 +- include/linux/zsmalloc.h | 2 + lib/cmdline.c | 1 + mm/zsmalloc.c | 21 + 9 files changed, 682 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 15

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration
by Jinjiang Tu 18 Aug '23

18 Aug '23

Support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration for arm64. Anshuman Khandual (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_tlbbatch_should_defer() Barry Song (2): mm/tlbbatch: rename and extend some functions arm64: support batched/deferred tlb shootdown during page reclamation/migration Yicong Yang (1): mm/tlbbatch: introduce arch_flush_tlb_batched_pending() .../features/vm/TLB/arch-support.txt | 2 +- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h | 12 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 22 +++++++++- include/linux/mm_types_task.h | 4 +- mm/rmap.c | 21 ++++----- 7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/tlbbatch.h -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10] ima: Add macros to isolate the IMA digest list
by Zhou Shuiqing 18 Aug '23

18 Aug '23

Isolate the IMA digest list code by using macros. v2: Exclude some macros for code that has already been merged into upstream kernel. Signed-off-by: Zhou Shuiqing <zhoushuiqing2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xattr.c | 4 + include/linux/evm.h | 4 +- include/linux/ima.h | 8 + security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 38 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 79 +++++++- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 80 +++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 39 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 154 ++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 6 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 80 ++++++++ security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +- security/security.c | 2 + 17 files changed, 779 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 149b8cf5f99f..c31266a83391 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/ima.h> +#endif #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> @@ -475,7 +477,9 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); +#endif evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); } diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h index e5b7bcb152b9..39bb17a8236b 100644 --- a/include/linux/evm.h +++ b/include/linux/evm.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ extern void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, extern int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr_array, struct xattr *evm); -extern bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name); +extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name); #ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL extern int posix_xattr_acl(const char *xattrname); #else @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, return 0; } -static inline bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +static inline bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { return false; } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index f7a088b2579e..713c6f9696cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -144,13 +144,17 @@ extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#endif extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#endif #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { @@ -170,12 +174,14 @@ static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { } +#endif static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) @@ -183,10 +189,12 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { } +#endif #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 92dc64755e53..72941f9b1b99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/verification.h> +#endif #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> @@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (IS_ERR(key)) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY keyring = VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING; @@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) #endif key = search_trusted_key(keyring, &key_type_asymmetric, name); } +#endif if (IS_ERR(key)) { if (keyring) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index ca7ed2e532dc..f8b1627708a1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ struct xattr_list { }; extern int evm_initialized; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo; +#endif #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 7c36dbb96d24..fa8147c2294e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo __ro_after_init = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#else +static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +#endif /** * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel @@ -74,11 +78,13 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) long rc; const char *algo; struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm; - char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; snprintf(evm_hmac, sizeof(evm_hmac), "hmac(%s)", CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); +#endif if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { @@ -156,8 +162,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) { +#else + if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { +#endif hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; } @@ -174,8 +184,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); } @@ -288,8 +302,12 @@ static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) return 0; return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG || xattr_data->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif rc = 1; else rc = 0; @@ -321,15 +339,23 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (rc) return -EPERM; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST data.hdr.algo = evm_hash_algo; +#else + data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#endif rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &data); if (rc == 0) { data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &data.hdr.xattr.data[1], +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1, 0); +#else + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0); +#endif } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); } @@ -341,7 +367,11 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, { struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, evm_hash_algo); +#else + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); +#endif if (IS_ERR(desc)) { pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); @@ -353,9 +383,15 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Get the key from the TPM for the HMAC */ +#else +/* + * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC + */ +#endif int evm_init_key(void) { struct key *evm_key; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index cddfc0e43a80..46d90da6169d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) @@ -73,6 +74,18 @@ static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) return 1; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_param); +#else +static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + evm_fixmode = 1; + else + pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); + + return 0; +} +__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); +#endif static void __init evm_init_config(void) { @@ -98,6 +111,7 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Ignoring INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS is safe if no HMAC key * is loaded and the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag is set. @@ -115,8 +129,13 @@ static bool evm_ignore_error_safe(enum integrity_status evm_status) return true; } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) +#else +static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) +#endif { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; @@ -133,8 +152,10 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) continue; return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA)) *ima_present = 1; +#endif count++; } @@ -163,6 +184,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum integrity_status saved_evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; struct evm_digest digest; struct ima_digest *found_digest; @@ -172,6 +194,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, .version = 2, .hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256 }; int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0, ima_present = 0; +#else + struct evm_digest digest; + struct inode *inode; + int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0;; +#endif + if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; @@ -184,7 +212,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, if (rc <= 0) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; if (rc == -ENODATA) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry, &ima_present); +#else + rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); +#endif if (rc > 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; else if (rc == 0) @@ -192,6 +224,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* IMA added a fake xattr, set also EVM fake xattr */ if (!ima_present && xattr_name && !strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) && @@ -206,6 +239,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, goto out; saved_evm_status = evm_status; +#else + goto out; +#endif } xattr_len = rc; @@ -262,6 +298,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } } break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: /* At this point, we cannot determine whether metadata are * immutable or not. However, it is safe to return the @@ -302,11 +339,13 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } break; +#endif default: rc = -EINVAL; break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (rc && xattr_data == (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) { evm_status = saved_evm_status; } else if (rc) { @@ -315,10 +354,22 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = evm_immutable ? INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE : INTEGRITY_FAIL; } +#else + if (rc) { + if (rc == -ENODATA) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; + else if (evm_immutable) + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE; + else + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + } +#endif out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data != (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) +#endif kfree(xattr_data); return evm_status; } @@ -569,8 +620,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -606,7 +661,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) } /** - * evm_status_revalidate - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary + * evm_revalidate_status - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Report whether callers of evm_verifyxattr() should re-validate the @@ -614,7 +669,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) * * Return true if re-validation is necessary, false otherwise. */ -bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) +bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_key_loaded()) return false; @@ -646,7 +701,7 @@ bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -669,7 +724,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -714,6 +769,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures * are immutable and can never be updated. @@ -723,6 +779,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE) || (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status))) return 0; +#else + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE)) + return 0; +#endif if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) @@ -747,7 +809,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_status_revalidate(NULL)) + if (!evm_revalidate_status(NULL)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -780,7 +842,9 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, goto out; evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST evm_xattr->value_len = hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1; +#endif evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; return 0; out: @@ -802,6 +866,7 @@ void __init evm_load_x509(void) static int __init init_evm(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int error, i; struct list_head *pos, *q; @@ -809,6 +874,10 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); if (i >= 0) evm_hash_algo = i; +#else + int error; + struct list_head *pos, *q; +#endif evm_init_config(); diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 8953ac6412c3..22dc1eb63f78 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -212,7 +212,9 @@ void __init integrity_load_keys(void) if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509)) evm_load_x509(); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_load_digest_lists(); +#endif } static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 46afb6bef45b..e512a17b09dd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init; extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init; extern int ima_appraise; extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; +extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_list_pcr; extern bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; -extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; extern int ima_digest_list_actions; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_db_max_size __ro_after_init; extern int ima_digest_db_size; #endif @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define __ima_hooks(hook) \ hook(NONE, none) \ hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ @@ -205,6 +206,23 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ hook(DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, digest_list) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) +#else +#define __ima_hooks(hook) \ + hook(NONE, none) \ + hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ + hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \ + hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \ + hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \ + hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \ + hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \ + hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \ + hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \ + hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \ + hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ + hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(MAX_CHECK, none) +#endif #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, #define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg) @@ -264,12 +282,20 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#endif void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *keyring); @@ -278,9 +304,15 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_entry **entry, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr); +#endif void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); @@ -308,21 +340,41 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST 0x80 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest); +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); +#endif + int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); + +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len); +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +#endif + #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) @@ -330,6 +382,7 @@ static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return 0; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, @@ -338,6 +391,15 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, + const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } @@ -360,6 +422,20 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static inline enum hash_algo +ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) +{ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 6ecaf6834844..1b8d3696d873 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -99,15 +99,23 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, * * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, + int violation, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *duplicated_entry = NULL; +#endif int result; if (!violation) { @@ -121,6 +129,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_plus_standard_pcr && !digest) { duplicated_entry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*entry) + entry->template_desc->num_fields * @@ -130,9 +139,11 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } else if (!ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { pcr = ima_digest_list_pcr; } +#endif entry->pcr = pcr; result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result) { kfree(duplicated_entry); } else if (duplicated_entry) { @@ -141,6 +152,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, if (result < 0) kfree(duplicated_entry); } +#endif return result; } @@ -173,8 +185,13 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, result = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, + filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: @@ -315,18 +332,30 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; +#else + struct ima_template_entry *entry; +#endif struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, .filename = filename, @@ -344,10 +373,12 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig) return; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (digest && !ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { result = -EEXIST; goto out; } +#endif result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); if (result < 0) { @@ -356,14 +387,22 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr, digest); out: +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); +#endif if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result < 0 && entry) +#else + if (result < 0) +#endif ima_free_template_entry(entry); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 956fb0f4c006..000b4c338ba4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init; +#endif static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM @@ -45,16 +47,18 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) ima_appraise = appraisal_state; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (strcmp(str, "enforce-evm") == 0 || strcmp(str, "log-evm") == 0) ima_appraise_req_evm = true; +#endif return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); -static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; static int __init appraise_digest_list_setup(char *str) { if (!strncmp(str, "digest", 6)) { @@ -108,9 +112,11 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, } else { offset = 0; iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (test_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags)) iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo; } rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, @@ -189,6 +195,60 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len) +{ + struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; + enum hash_algo ret; + + if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; + + switch (xattr_value->type) { + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; + if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)) + return ima_hash_algo; + return sig->hash_algo; + break; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; + if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return ret; + break; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + /* this is for backward compatibility */ + if (xattr_len == 21) { + unsigned int zero = 0; + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + } else if (xattr_len == 17) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + break; + } + + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) + ret = 0; + return ret; +} +#endif + /* * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature * @@ -196,18 +256,27 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, + enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) +#endif { int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (found_digest && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); +#endif switch (xattr_value->type) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -217,13 +286,18 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, break; } fallthrough; +#endif case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: /* first byte contains algorithm id */ hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && (!found_digest || !ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest))) { +#else + if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { +#endif if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -352,26 +426,39 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc = xattr_len, rc_evm; char _buf[sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data) + 1 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + int rc = xattr_len; +#endif bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig; /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && xattr_len == sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) rc = -ENODATA; @@ -394,6 +481,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, rc = xattr_len; } } +#endif /* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) { @@ -417,11 +505,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: if (ima_appraise_req_evm && xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && !found_digest) goto out; +#else + case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: +#endif break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ @@ -429,6 +521,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, break; fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * If the digest-nometadata mode is selected, allow access * without metadata check. EVM will eventually create an HMAC @@ -446,6 +539,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest)) break; } +#endif cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: @@ -458,6 +552,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((iint->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) && status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -466,10 +561,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); goto out; } +#endif if (xattr_value) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause, found_digest); +#else + rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, + &cause); +#endif /* * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't @@ -609,6 +710,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -624,7 +726,35 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, } return result; } +#else +int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, + const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xvalue = xattr_value; + int digsig = 0; + int result; + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); + if (result == 1) { + if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) + return -EINVAL; + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { + digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); +#endif + } + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; + } + return result; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -638,10 +768,12 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); - if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; @@ -652,12 +784,28 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) } return result; } +#else +int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) +{ + int result; + result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); + if (result == 1) + result = 0; + } + return result; +} +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); - if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) + if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); } +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index f1bc3e201bd8..4ceee381d58b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -21,11 +21,15 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/file.h> +#endif #include <linux/ctype.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex); @@ -36,9 +40,11 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; static struct dentry *violations; static struct dentry *ima_policy; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct dentry *digests_count; static struct dentry *digest_list_data; static struct dentry *digest_list_data_del; +#endif bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) @@ -52,6 +58,7 @@ __setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup); static int valid_policy = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -63,19 +70,54 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, val = &ima_htable.violations; else if (filp->f_path.dentry == runtime_measurements_count) val = &ima_htable.len; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (filp->f_path.dentry == digests_count) val = &ima_digests_htable.len; -#endif len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); } +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) +{ + char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */ + ssize_t len; + len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static const struct file_operations ima_htable_value_ops = { .read = ima_show_htable_value, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations); +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = { + .read = ima_show_htable_violations, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len); + +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { + .read = ima_show_measurements_count, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) @@ -275,6 +317,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) { void *data = NULL; @@ -320,7 +363,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); } else if (dentry == digest_list_data || dentry == digest_list_data_del) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Only check size when adding digest lists */ if (dentry == digest_list_data && size > ima_digest_db_max_size - ima_digest_db_size) { @@ -328,7 +370,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = -ENOMEM; break; } -#endif /* * Disable usage of digest lists if not measured * or appraised. @@ -343,12 +384,10 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) if (rc < 0) break; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (dentry == digest_list_data) pr_debug("digest imported, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); else if (dentry == digest_list_data_del) pr_debug("digest deleted, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); -#endif size -= rc; } @@ -461,6 +500,104 @@ static enum ima_fs_flags ima_get_dentry_flag(struct dentry *dentry) return flag; } +#else +static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) +{ + void *data = NULL; + char *datap; + size_t size; + int rc, pathlen = strlen(path); + + char *p; + + /* remove \n */ + datap = path; + strsep(&datap, "\n"); + + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL, + READING_POLICY); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); + return rc; + } + size = rc; + rc = 0; + + datap = data; + while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) { + pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p); + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); + if (rc < 0) + break; + size -= rc; + } + + vfree(data); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + else if (size) + return -EINVAL; + else + return pathlen; +} + +static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t result; + + if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) + datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1; + + /* No partial writes. */ + result = -EINVAL; + if (*ppos != 0) + goto out; + + data = memdup_user_nul(buf, datalen); + if (IS_ERR(data)) { + result = PTR_ERR(data); + goto out; + } + + result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex); + if (result < 0) + goto out_free; + + if (data[0] == '/') { + result = ima_read_policy(data); + } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n"); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", "signed policy required", + 1, 0); + result = -EACCES; + } else { + result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); +out_free: + kfree(data); +out: + if (result < 0) + valid_policy = 0; + + return result; +} + +static struct dentry *ima_dir; +static struct dentry *ima_symlink; +static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; +static struct dentry *violations; +static struct dentry *ima_policy; + +enum ima_fs_flags { + IMA_FS_BUSY, +}; +#endif static unsigned long ima_fs_flags; @@ -473,6 +610,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * ima_open_data_upload: sequentialize access to the data upload interface */ @@ -568,6 +706,79 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { .release = ima_release_data_upload, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +/* + * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + */ +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + return -EACCES; +#else + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + return -EACCES; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); +#endif + } + if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) + return -EBUSY; + return 0; +} + +/* + * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules. + * + * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now + * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, + * assuming a valid policy. + */ +static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + + if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + return seq_release(inode, file); + + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + cause = "failed"; + valid_policy = 0; + } + + pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); + + if (!valid_policy) { + ima_delete_rules(); + valid_policy = 1; + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + return 0; + } + + ima_update_policy(); +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + ima_policy = NULL; +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { + .open = ima_open_policy, + .write = ima_write_policy, + .read = seq_read, + .release = ima_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +#endif int __init ima_fs_init(void) { @@ -594,6 +805,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST runtime_measurements_count = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, @@ -613,7 +825,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST digests_count = securityfs_create_file("digests_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_value_ops); @@ -631,12 +842,34 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) &ima_data_upload_ops); if (IS_ERR(digest_list_data_del)) goto out; +#else + runtime_measurements_count = + securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measurements_count_ops); + if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) + goto out; + + violations = + securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); + if (IS_ERR(violations)) + goto out; + + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, + ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measure_policy_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + goto out; + #endif return 0; out: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST securityfs_remove(digest_list_data_del); securityfs_remove(digest_list_data); securityfs_remove(digests_count); +#endif securityfs_remove(ima_policy); securityfs_remove(violations); securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 913d6b879b0b..da47d366a98c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -84,9 +84,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, + boot_aggregate_name, + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) { ima_free_template_entry(entry); audit_cause = "store_entry"; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 999d5904cce0..fc1af21b3ad8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; @@ -38,12 +40,14 @@ int ima_appraise; int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Actions (measure/appraisal) for which digest lists can be used */ int ima_digest_list_actions; /* PCR used for digest list measurements */ int ima_digest_list_pcr = -1; /* Flag to include standard measurement if digest list PCR is specified */ bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; +#endif static int hash_setup_done; @@ -156,6 +160,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { @@ -209,6 +214,7 @@ static int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, ret = 0; return ret; } +#endif static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -268,7 +274,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *found_digest; +#endif struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; struct modsig *modsig = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; @@ -398,28 +406,42 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) pathname = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; found_digest = ima_lookup_digest(iint->ima_hash->digest, hash_algo, COMPACT_FILE); +#endif if (action & IMA_MEASURE) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_MEASURE)); +#else + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, + xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, + template_desc); +#endif if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); if (rc != -EPERM) { inode_lock(inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_APPRAISE)); +#else + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, + pathname, xattr_value, + xattr_len, modsig); +#endif inode_unlock(inode); } if (!rc) @@ -568,15 +590,23 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc; +#endif security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) ima_check_measured_appraised(file); return rc; +#else + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -739,7 +769,9 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST [READING_DIGEST_LIST] = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK +#endif }; /** @@ -941,7 +973,11 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr, NULL); +#else + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); +#endif if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "store_entry"; ima_free_template_entry(entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 274f4c7c99f4..3e14b55ecf0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif /* flags definitions */ #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 @@ -35,7 +37,9 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_PARSER 0x0800 +#endif #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -58,7 +62,11 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB, EXEC_TCB }; +#else +enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; +#endif enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY }; @@ -145,11 +153,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = MEASURE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_measure_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = MEASURE, .flags = IMA_PARSER +#endif }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { @@ -181,12 +191,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #endif }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct ima_rule_entry appraise_exec_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = APPRAISE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +#endif static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS @@ -216,6 +228,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = APPRAISE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; @@ -223,6 +236,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_appraise_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = APPRAISE, .flags = IMA_PARSER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED +#endif }; /* An array of architecture specific rules */ @@ -246,8 +260,10 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable __initdata; +#endif static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) @@ -259,14 +275,18 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) continue; if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = EXEC_TCB; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_immutable") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable = true; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) @@ -569,9 +589,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner)) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((rule->flags & IMA_PARSER) && !ima_current_is_parser()) return false; +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; @@ -752,19 +774,27 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (func == DIGEST_LIST_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#else +static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, + enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#endif { int i = 0; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy == EXEC_TCB) { if (entries == dont_measure_rules) if ((entries[i].flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && @@ -792,6 +822,7 @@ static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, (entries[i].flags & IMA_FUNC) && entries[i].func == BPRM_CHECK) entries[i].flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); @@ -879,8 +910,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EXEC_TCB: fallthrough; +#endif case DEFAULT_TCB: add_rules(default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), @@ -889,8 +922,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy) add_rules(&ima_parser_measure_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif /* * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement @@ -909,7 +944,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_secure_boot) +#endif add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); @@ -929,11 +968,16 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) +#endif add_rules(default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(appraise_exec_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(appraise_exec_rules), @@ -942,6 +986,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(&ima_parser_appraise_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -1002,7 +1047,11 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST Opt_parser, Opt_err +#else + Opt_err +#endif }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -1039,7 +1088,9 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {Opt_parser, "parser"}, +#endif {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1134,9 +1185,14 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->action != APPRAISE && entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + if (entry->action != APPRAISE && + entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; /* @@ -1162,13 +1218,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case POST_SETATTR: case FIRMWARE_CHECK: case POLICY_CHECK: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case DIGEST_LIST_CHECK: +#endif if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED | IMA_PARSER)) +#else + IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1180,8 +1242,12 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1338,8 +1404,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "DIGEST_LIST_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) @@ -1526,8 +1594,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "meta_immutable") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; break; @@ -1546,8 +1616,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr) || entry->pcr == ima_digest_list_pcr) +#else + if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) +#endif result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; @@ -1574,10 +1648,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) &(template_desc->fields), &(template_desc->num_fields)); entry->template = template_desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case Opt_parser: audit_log_format(ab, "parser "); entry->flags |= IMA_PARSER; +#endif break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); @@ -1849,8 +1925,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_PARSER) seq_puts(m, "parser "); +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { @@ -1893,8 +1971,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST) seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist "); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=meta_immutable "); +#endif if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 77e6819e8db8..d9cf29e286a9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/hash_info.h> +#endif /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 @@ -40,7 +43,9 @@ #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED 0x80000000 +#endif #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) @@ -72,7 +77,9 @@ #define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 #define IMA_DIGSIG 3 #define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_DIGEST_LIST 5 +#endif enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -80,7 +87,9 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST, +#endif IMA_XATTR_LAST }; @@ -92,7 +101,11 @@ struct evm_ima_xattr_data { /* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */ struct evm_xattr { struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#endif } __packed; #define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 @@ -144,6 +157,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum compact_types { COMPACT_KEY, COMPACT_PARSER, COMPACT_FILE, COMPACT_METADATA, COMPACT__LAST }; enum compact_modifiers { COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE, COMPACT_MOD__LAST }; @@ -162,7 +176,6 @@ static inline bool ima_digest_is_immutable(struct ima_digest *digest) return (digest->modifiers & (1 << COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE)); } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *ima_lookup_digest(u8 *digest, enum hash_algo algo, enum compact_types type); struct ima_digest *ima_digest_allow(struct ima_digest *digest, int action); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5678d4e334fb..11c859a9b8ed 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1362,7 +1362,9 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); +#endif evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/14] zram: Support multiple compression streams
by Jinjiang Tu 17 Aug '23

17 Aug '23

Support multiple compression streams. Alexey Romanov (1): zram: add size class equals check into recompression Andy Shevchenko (1): lib/cmdline: Export next_arg() for being used in modules Ming Lei (1): zram: fix race between zram_reset_device() and disksize_store() Sergey Senozhatsky (11): zram: preparation for multi-zcomp support zram: add recompression algorithm sysfs knob zram: factor out WB and non-WB zram read functions zram: introduce recompress sysfs knob zram: add recompress flag to read_block_state() zram: clarify writeback_store() comment zram: remove redundant checks from zram_recompress() zram: add algo parameter support to zram_recompress() documentation: add zram recompression documentation zram: add incompressible writeback zram: add incompressible flag to read_block_state() Documentation/admin-guide/blockdev/zram.rst | 98 +++- drivers/block/zram/Kconfig | 9 + drivers/block/zram/zcomp.c | 6 +- drivers/block/zram/zcomp.h | 2 +- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.c | 594 +++++++++++++++++--- drivers/block/zram/zram_drv.h | 22 +- include/linux/zsmalloc.h | 2 + lib/cmdline.c | 1 + mm/zsmalloc.c | 21 + 9 files changed, 682 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 15

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arm64: enable THP_SWAP for arm64
by Jinjiang Tu 17 Aug '23

17 Aug '23

From: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc1 commit d0637c505f8a1d8c4088642f1f3e9e3b22da14f6 category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TVRF CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… ------------------------------------------- THP_SWAP has been proven to improve the swap throughput significantly on x86_64 according to commit bd4c82c22c367e ("mm, THP, swap: delay splitting THP after swapped out"). As long as arm64 uses 4K page size, it is quite similar with x86_64 by having 2MB PMD THP. THP_SWAP is architecture-independent, thus, enabling it on arm64 will benefit arm64 as well. A corner case is that MTE has an assumption that only base pages can be swapped. We won't enable THP_SWAP for ARM64 hardware with MTE support until MTE is reworked to coexist with THP_SWAP. A micro-benchmark is written to measure thp swapout throughput as below, unsigned long long tv_to_ms(struct timeval tv) { return tv.tv_sec * 1000 + tv.tv_usec / 1000; } main() { struct timeval tv_b, tv_e;; #define SIZE 400*1024*1024 volatile void *p = mmap(NULL, SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (!p) { perror("fail to get memory"); exit(-1); } madvise(p, SIZE, MADV_HUGEPAGE); memset(p, 0x11, SIZE); /* write to get mem */ gettimeofday(&tv_b, NULL); madvise(p, SIZE, MADV_PAGEOUT); gettimeofday(&tv_e, NULL); printf("swp out bandwidth: %ld bytes/ms\n", SIZE/(tv_to_ms(tv_e) - tv_to_ms(tv_b))); } Testing is done on rk3568 64bit Quad Core Cortex-A55 platform - ROCK 3A. thp swp throughput w/o patch: 2734bytes/ms (mean of 10 tests) thp swp throughput w/ patch: 3331bytes/ms (mean of 10 tests) Cc: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang(a)intel.com> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan(a)kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd(a)google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange(a)redhat.com> Cc: Steven Price <steven.price(a)arm.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual(a)arm.com> Signed-off-by: Barry Song <v-songbaohua(a)oppo.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220720093737.133375-1-21cnbao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: arch/arm64/Kconfig include/linux/huge_mm.h mm/swap_slots.c Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 ++++++ include/linux/huge_mm.h | 12 ++++++++++++ mm/swap_slots.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index 16620146c49a..05302e1d8e19 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_WANT_HUGETLB_PAGE_OPTIMIZE_VMEMMAP select ARCH_WANT_LD_ORPHAN_WARN select ARCH_WANT_RESERVE_CRASH_KERNEL if KEXEC_CORE + select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP if ARM64_4K_PAGES select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL select ARM_AMBA select ARM_ARCH_TIMER diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h index ab2443900f4e..f2843785f2ec 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ __flush_tlb_range(vma, addr, end, PUD_SIZE, false, 1) #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ +static inline bool arch_thp_swp_supported(void) +{ + return !system_supports_mte(); +} +#define arch_thp_swp_supported arch_thp_swp_supported + /* * Outside of a few very special situations (e.g. hibernation), we always * use broadcast TLB invalidation instructions, therefore a spurious page diff --git a/include/linux/huge_mm.h b/include/linux/huge_mm.h index 176457145bcf..b993ae44111c 100644 --- a/include/linux/huge_mm.h +++ b/include/linux/huge_mm.h @@ -499,4 +499,16 @@ static inline unsigned long thp_size(struct page *page) return PAGE_SIZE << thp_order(page); } +/* + * archs that select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP but don't support THP_SWP due to + * limitations in the implementation like arm64 MTE can override this to + * false + */ +#ifndef arch_thp_swp_supported +static inline bool arch_thp_swp_supported(void) +{ + return true; +} +#endif + #endif /* _LINUX_HUGE_MM_H */ diff --git a/mm/swap_slots.c b/mm/swap_slots.c index fbb9888a0469..b7958ca276c2 100644 --- a/mm/swap_slots.c +++ b/mm/swap_slots.c @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ swp_entry_t get_swap_page(struct page *page) goto out; if (PageTransHuge(page)) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_THP_SWAP)) + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_THP_SWAP) && arch_thp_swp_supported()) get_swap_pages(1, &entry, HPAGE_PMD_NR, type); goto out; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] Add macros to isolate the IMA digest list
by Zhou Shuiqing 16 Aug '23

16 Aug '23

Isolate the IMA digest list code by using macros. Signed-off-by: Zhou Shuiqing <zhoushuiqing2(a)huawei.com> --- fs/xattr.c | 4 + include/linux/ima.h | 8 + security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 4 + security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 2 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 38 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 146 +++++++++++++ security/integrity/iint.c | 4 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 80 ++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 39 ++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 128 ++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 247 +++++++++++++++++++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 8 + security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 80 +++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 8 + security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h | 2 + security/integrity/integrity.h | 15 +- security/security.c | 2 + 19 files changed, 840 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c index 149b8cf5f99f..c31266a83391 100644 --- a/fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/xattr.c @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ #include <linux/namei.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/ima.h> +#endif #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/fsnotify.h> @@ -475,7 +477,9 @@ __vfs_removexattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (!error) { fsnotify_xattr(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); +#endif evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name); } diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index f7a088b2579e..713c6f9696cb 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -144,13 +144,17 @@ extern bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void); extern void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry); extern int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len); +#endif extern int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name); +#endif #else static inline bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { @@ -170,12 +174,14 @@ static inline int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { } +#endif static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) @@ -183,10 +189,12 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { } +#endif #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c index 92dc64755e53..72941f9b1b99 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c @@ -9,7 +9,9 @@ #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/ratelimit.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/verification.h> +#endif #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> @@ -55,6 +57,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) key = request_key(&key_type_asymmetric, name, NULL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (IS_ERR(key)) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY keyring = VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING; @@ -63,6 +66,7 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid) #endif key = search_trusted_key(keyring, &key_type_asymmetric, name); } +#endif if (IS_ERR(key)) { if (keyring) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index ca7ed2e532dc..f8b1627708a1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -32,7 +32,9 @@ struct xattr_list { }; extern int evm_initialized; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo; +#endif #define EVM_ATTR_FSUUID 0x0001 diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 7c36dbb96d24..fa8147c2294e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -33,7 +33,11 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex); static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum hash_algo evm_hash_algo __ro_after_init = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#else +static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)"; +#endif /** * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel @@ -74,11 +78,13 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo) long rc; const char *algo; struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm; - char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + char evm_hmac[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; snprintf(evm_hmac, sizeof(evm_hmac), "hmac(%s)", CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); +#endif if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { @@ -156,8 +162,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable * signatures */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) { +#else + if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { +#endif hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; } @@ -174,8 +184,12 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); } @@ -288,8 +302,12 @@ static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) return 0; return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG || xattr_data->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif rc = 1; else rc = 0; @@ -321,15 +339,23 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (rc) return -EPERM; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST data.hdr.algo = evm_hash_algo; +#else + data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#endif rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &data); if (rc == 0) { data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, &data.hdr.xattr.data[1], +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1, 0); +#else + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0); +#endif } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) { rc = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM); } @@ -341,7 +367,11 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, { struct shash_desc *desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, evm_hash_algo); +#else + desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1); +#endif if (IS_ERR(desc)) { pr_info("init_desc failed\n"); return PTR_ERR(desc); @@ -353,9 +383,15 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Get the key from the TPM for the HMAC */ +#else +/* + * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC + */ +#endif int evm_init_key(void) { struct key *evm_key; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index cddfc0e43a80..fe767feb722d 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -18,7 +18,9 @@ #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <linux/evm.h> #include <linux/magic.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> +#endif #include <crypto/hash.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> @@ -28,8 +30,12 @@ int evm_initialized; static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "fail_immutable", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" +#else + "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" +#endif }; int evm_hmac_attrs; @@ -57,6 +63,7 @@ static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); static int evm_fixmode __ro_after_init; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) @@ -73,6 +80,18 @@ static int __init evm_set_param(char *str) return 1; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_param); +#else +static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) +{ + if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) + evm_fixmode = 1; + else + pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); + + return 0; +} +__setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); +#endif static void __init evm_init_config(void) { @@ -98,6 +117,7 @@ static bool evm_key_loaded(void) return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Ignoring INTEGRITY_NOLABEL/INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS is safe if no HMAC key * is loaded and the EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE initialization flag is set. @@ -115,8 +135,13 @@ static bool evm_ignore_error_safe(enum integrity_status evm_status) return true; } +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) +#else +static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) +#endif { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; @@ -133,8 +158,10 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, int *ima_present) continue; return error; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA)) *ima_present = 1; +#endif count++; } @@ -163,6 +190,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum integrity_status saved_evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; struct evm_digest digest; struct ima_digest *found_digest; @@ -172,6 +200,12 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, .version = 2, .hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA256 }; int rc, xattr_len, evm_immutable = 0, ima_present = 0; +#else + struct evm_digest digest; + struct inode *inode; + int rc, xattr_len; +#endif + if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; @@ -184,7 +218,11 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, if (rc <= 0) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; if (rc == -ENODATA) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry, &ima_present); +#else + rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); +#endif if (rc > 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; else if (rc == 0) @@ -192,6 +230,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* IMA added a fake xattr, set also EVM fake xattr */ if (!ima_present && xattr_name && !strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) && @@ -206,6 +245,9 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, goto out; saved_evm_status = evm_status; +#else + goto out; +#endif } xattr_len = rc; @@ -213,6 +255,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_len != hash_digest_size[evm_hash_algo] + 1) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; @@ -231,6 +274,25 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_immutable = 1; fallthrough; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: +#else + if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_xattr)) { + evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_len, &digest); + if (rc) + break; + rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->data, digest.digest, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + if (rc) + rc = -EINVAL; + break; + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: +#endif /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */ if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -262,6 +324,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, } } break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: /* At this point, we cannot determine whether metadata are * immutable or not. However, it is safe to return the @@ -302,11 +365,13 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } break; +#endif default: rc = -EINVAL; break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (rc && xattr_data == (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) { evm_status = saved_evm_status; } else if (rc) { @@ -315,10 +380,17 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, evm_status = evm_immutable ? INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE : INTEGRITY_FAIL; } +#else + if (rc) + evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ? + INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL; +#endif out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_data != (struct evm_ima_xattr_data *)&evm_fake_xattr) +#endif kfree(xattr_data); return evm_status; } @@ -397,6 +469,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * evm_xattr_acl_change - check if passed ACL changes the inode mode * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry @@ -468,6 +541,7 @@ static int evm_xattr_change(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } +#endif /* * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute @@ -519,6 +593,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, -EPERM, 0); } out: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (evm_ignore_error_safe(evm_status)) return 0; @@ -532,6 +607,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_xattr_change(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len)) return 0; +#endif if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), @@ -569,8 +645,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST) +#else + xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) +#endif return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -605,6 +685,7 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /** * evm_status_revalidate - report whether EVM status re-validation is necessary * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name @@ -629,6 +710,7 @@ bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) return true; } +#endif /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes @@ -646,13 +728,20 @@ bool evm_status_revalidate(const char *xattr_name) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) +#else + if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) + && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) +#endif return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; +#endif evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } @@ -669,17 +758,24 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) +#else + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) +#endif return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM)) return; +#endif evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); @@ -692,6 +788,7 @@ static int evm_attr_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) return 1; } +#endif /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute @@ -714,6 +811,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Writing attrs is safe for portable signatures, as portable signatures * are immutable and can never be updated. @@ -727,6 +825,11 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && !evm_attr_change(dentry, attr)) return 0; +#else + if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || + (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) + return 0; +#endif integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", @@ -747,15 +850,21 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!evm_status_revalidate(NULL)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); +#else + if (!evm_key_loaded()) + return; +#endif if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value */ @@ -787,6 +896,38 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } +#else +/* + * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm + */ +int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, + const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, + struct xattr *evm_xattr) +{ + struct evm_xattr *xattr_data; + int rc; + + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + return 0; + + xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); + if (!xattr_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + xattr_data->data.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; + rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; + evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); + evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; + return 0; +out: + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; +} +#endif EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 @@ -802,6 +943,7 @@ void __init evm_load_x509(void) static int __init init_evm(void) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int error, i; struct list_head *pos, *q; @@ -809,6 +951,10 @@ static int __init init_evm(void) CONFIG_EVM_DEFAULT_HASH); if (i >= 0) evm_hash_algo = i; +#else + int error; + struct list_head *pos, *q; +#endif evm_init_config(); diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 8953ac6412c3..df994202ac0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -209,10 +209,14 @@ void __init integrity_load_keys(void) { ima_load_x509(); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509)) evm_load_x509(); ima_load_digest_lists(); +#else + evm_load_x509(); +#endif } static int __init integrity_fs_init(void) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 46afb6bef45b..e512a17b09dd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -53,11 +53,11 @@ extern int ima_hash_algo_idx __ro_after_init; extern int ima_extra_slots __ro_after_init; extern int ima_appraise; extern struct tpm_chip *ima_tpm_chip; +extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_list_pcr; extern bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; -extern const char boot_aggregate_name[]; extern int ima_digest_list_actions; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST extern int ima_digest_db_max_size __ro_after_init; extern int ima_digest_db_size; #endif @@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) return (digest[0] | digest[1] << 8) % IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define __ima_hooks(hook) \ hook(NONE, none) \ hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ @@ -205,6 +206,23 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ hook(DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, digest_list) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) +#else +#define __ima_hooks(hook) \ + hook(NONE, none) \ + hook(FILE_CHECK, file) \ + hook(MMAP_CHECK, mmap) \ + hook(BPRM_CHECK, bprm) \ + hook(CREDS_CHECK, creds) \ + hook(POST_SETATTR, post_setattr) \ + hook(MODULE_CHECK, module) \ + hook(FIRMWARE_CHECK, firmware) \ + hook(KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, kexec_kernel) \ + hook(KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, kexec_initramfs) \ + hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ + hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ + hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(MAX_CHECK, none) +#endif #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, #define __ima_stringify(arg) (#arg) @@ -264,12 +282,20 @@ int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum hash_algo algo, struct modsig *modsig); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#endif void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *keyring); @@ -278,9 +304,15 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_template_entry **entry, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest); +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, + struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr); +#endif void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry); const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); @@ -308,21 +340,41 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v); #define IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE 0x10 #define IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY 0x20 #define IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC 0x40 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST 0x80 +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest); +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig); +#endif + int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file); enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, enum ima_hooks func); + +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len); +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value); +#endif + #else static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr) @@ -330,6 +382,7 @@ static inline int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return 0; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, @@ -338,6 +391,15 @@ static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static inline int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, + const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, + const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } @@ -360,6 +422,20 @@ static inline enum integrity_status ima_get_cache_status(struct integrity_iint_c return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static inline enum hash_algo +ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) +{ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +static inline int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 6ecaf6834844..1b8d3696d873 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -99,15 +99,23 @@ int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, * * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename, int pcr, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, + int violation, struct inode *inode, + const unsigned char *filename, int pcr) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error"; char *template_name = entry->template_desc->name; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *duplicated_entry = NULL; +#endif int result; if (!violation) { @@ -121,6 +129,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_plus_standard_pcr && !digest) { duplicated_entry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*entry) + entry->template_desc->num_fields * @@ -130,9 +139,11 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, } else if (!ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { pcr = ima_digest_list_pcr; } +#endif entry->pcr = pcr; result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result) { kfree(duplicated_entry); } else if (duplicated_entry) { @@ -141,6 +152,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, if (result < 0) kfree(duplicated_entry); } +#endif return result; } @@ -173,8 +185,13 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, result = -ENOMEM; goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, + filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: @@ -315,18 +332,30 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Must be called with iint->mutex held. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc, struct ima_digest *digest) +#else +void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, + struct ima_template_desc *template_desc) +#endif { static const char op[] = "add_template_measure"; static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM"; int result = -ENOMEM; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL; +#else + struct ima_template_entry *entry; +#endif struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .file = file, .filename = filename, @@ -344,10 +373,12 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr) && !modsig) return; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (digest && !ima_plus_standard_pcr && ima_digest_list_pcr >= 0) { result = -EEXIST; goto out; } +#endif result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); if (result < 0) { @@ -356,14 +387,22 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr, digest); out: +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); +#endif if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result < 0 && entry) +#else + if (result < 0) +#endif ima_free_template_entry(entry); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 956fb0f4c006..e5e071fa8565 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -15,9 +15,11 @@ #include <keys/system_keyring.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" static bool ima_appraise_req_evm __ro_after_init; +#endif static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM @@ -45,16 +47,18 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str) ima_appraise = appraisal_state; } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (strcmp(str, "enforce-evm") == 0 || strcmp(str, "log-evm") == 0) ima_appraise_req_evm = true; +#endif return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); -static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +static bool ima_appraise_no_metadata __ro_after_init; static int __init appraise_digest_list_setup(char *str) { if (!strncmp(str, "digest", 6)) { @@ -108,9 +112,11 @@ static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, } else { offset = 0; iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (test_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags)) iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.type = EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif iint->ima_hash->xattr.ng.algo = algo; } rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, @@ -189,6 +195,60 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } } +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST +enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len) +{ + struct signature_v2_hdr *sig; + enum hash_algo ret; + + if (!xattr_value || xattr_len < 2) + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; + + switch (xattr_value->type) { + case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + sig = (typeof(sig))xattr_value; + if (sig->version != 2 || xattr_len <= sizeof(*sig)) + return ima_hash_algo; + return sig->hash_algo; + break; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: + /* first byte contains algorithm id */ + ret = xattr_value->data[0]; + if (ret < HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return ret; + break; + case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: + /* this is for backward compatibility */ + if (xattr_len == 21) { + unsigned int zero = 0; + if (!memcmp(&xattr_value->data[16], &zero, 4)) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + } else if (xattr_len == 17) + return HASH_ALGO_MD5; + break; + } + + /* return default hash algo */ + return ima_hash_algo; +} + +int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data **xattr_value) +{ + ssize_t ret; + + ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, (char **)xattr_value, + 0, GFP_NOFS); + if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) + ret = 0; + return ret; +} +#endif + /* * xattr_verify - verify xattr digest or signature * @@ -196,18 +256,27 @@ static void ima_cache_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, + enum integrity_status *status, const char **cause) +#endif { int rc = -EINVAL, hash_start = 0; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (found_digest && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS && *status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); +#endif switch (xattr_value->type) { +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST: set_bit(IMA_DIGEST_LIST, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -217,22 +286,27 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, break; } fallthrough; +#endif case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG: /* first byte contains algorithm id */ hash_start = 1; fallthrough; case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (*status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE && (!found_digest || !ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest))) { +#endif if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) { *cause = "IMA-signature-required"; *status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST } else { set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } +#endif if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) /* @@ -352,26 +426,39 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, * * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, struct ima_digest *found_digest) +#else +int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, + struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, + struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, + int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig) +#endif { static const char op[] = "appraise_data"; const char *cause = "unknown"; struct dentry *dentry = file_dentry(file); struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); enum integrity_status status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int rc = xattr_len, rc_evm; char _buf[sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data) + 1 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + int rc = xattr_len; +#endif bool try_modsig = iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED && modsig; /* If not appraising a modsig, we need an xattr. */ if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) && !try_modsig) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && xattr_len == sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) rc = -ENODATA; @@ -394,6 +481,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, rc = xattr_len; } } +#endif /* If reading the xattr failed and there's no modsig, error out. */ if (rc <= 0 && !try_modsig) { @@ -417,11 +505,15 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, switch (status) { case INTEGRITY_PASS: case INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: if (ima_appraise_req_evm && xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && !found_digest) goto out; +#else + case INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN: +#endif break; case INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS: /* No EVM protected xattrs. */ /* It's fine not to have xattrs when using a modsig. */ @@ -429,6 +521,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, break; fallthrough; case INTEGRITY_NOLABEL: /* No security.evm xattr. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * If the digest-nometadata mode is selected, allow access * without metadata check. EVM will eventually create an HMAC @@ -446,11 +539,14 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, ima_digest_is_immutable(found_digest)) break; } +#endif cause = "missing-HMAC"; goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case INTEGRITY_FAIL_IMMUTABLE: set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); fallthrough; +#endif case INTEGRITY_FAIL: /* Invalid HMAC/signature. */ cause = "invalid-HMAC"; goto out; @@ -458,6 +554,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, WARN_ONCE(true, "Unexpected integrity status %d\n", status); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((iint->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) && status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) { status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; @@ -466,10 +563,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); goto out; } +#endif if (xattr_value) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, &cause, found_digest); +#else + rc = xattr_verify(func, iint, xattr_value, xattr_len, &status, + &cause); +#endif /* * If we have a modsig and either no imasig or the imasig's key isn't @@ -503,6 +606,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * Permit new files with file/EVM portable signatures, but * without data. @@ -511,6 +615,13 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) { status = INTEGRITY_PASS; } +#else + /* Permit new files with file signatures, but without data. */ + if (inode->i_size == 0 && iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE && + xattr_value && xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) { + status = INTEGRITY_PASS; + } +#endif integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, op, cause, rc, 0); @@ -567,6 +678,10 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) return; action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + if (!action) + __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); +#endif iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); @@ -620,11 +735,16 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (result == 1) { if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), + xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); +#endif result = 0; } return result; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { @@ -641,6 +761,7 @@ void ima_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig); } +#endif int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { @@ -648,11 +769,15 @@ int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); if (result == 1) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); +#endif result = 0; } return result; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { int result; @@ -661,3 +786,4 @@ void ima_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) if (result == 1 || evm_status_revalidate(xattr_name)) ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), 0); } +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index f1bc3e201bd8..4ceee381d58b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -21,11 +21,15 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/file.h> +#endif #include <linux/ctype.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_write_mutex); @@ -36,9 +40,11 @@ static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; static struct dentry *violations; static struct dentry *ima_policy; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct dentry *digests_count; static struct dentry *digest_list_data; static struct dentry *digest_list_data_del; +#endif bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) @@ -52,6 +58,7 @@ __setup("ima_canonical_fmt", default_canonical_fmt_setup); static int valid_policy = 1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { @@ -63,19 +70,54 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, val = &ima_htable.violations; else if (filp->f_path.dentry == runtime_measurements_count) val = &ima_htable.len; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (filp->f_path.dentry == digests_count) val = &ima_digests_htable.len; -#endif len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); } +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count, + loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val) +{ + char tmpbuf[32]; /* greater than largest 'long' string value */ + ssize_t len; + len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf), "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val)); + return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len); +} +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static const struct file_operations ima_htable_value_ops = { .read = ima_show_htable_value, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations); +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = { + .read = ima_show_htable_violations, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, + char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) +{ + return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len); + +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { + .read = ima_show_measurements_count, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; +#endif /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) @@ -275,6 +317,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = { .release = seq_release, }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) { void *data = NULL; @@ -320,7 +363,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); } else if (dentry == digest_list_data || dentry == digest_list_data_del) { -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Only check size when adding digest lists */ if (dentry == digest_list_data && size > ima_digest_db_max_size - ima_digest_db_size) { @@ -328,7 +370,6 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) rc = -ENOMEM; break; } -#endif /* * Disable usage of digest lists if not measured * or appraised. @@ -343,12 +384,10 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_file(char *path, struct dentry *dentry) if (rc < 0) break; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (dentry == digest_list_data) pr_debug("digest imported, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); else if (dentry == digest_list_data_del) pr_debug("digest deleted, current DB size: %d\n", ima_digest_db_size); -#endif size -= rc; } @@ -461,6 +500,104 @@ static enum ima_fs_flags ima_get_dentry_flag(struct dentry *dentry) return flag; } +#else +static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path) +{ + void *data = NULL; + char *datap; + size_t size; + int rc, pathlen = strlen(path); + + char *p; + + /* remove \n */ + datap = path; + strsep(&datap, "\n"); + + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, 0, &data, INT_MAX, NULL, + READING_POLICY); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); + return rc; + } + size = rc; + rc = 0; + + datap = data; + while (size > 0 && (p = strsep(&datap, "\n"))) { + pr_debug("rule: %s\n", p); + rc = ima_parse_add_rule(p); + if (rc < 0) + break; + size -= rc; + } + + vfree(data); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + else if (size) + return -EINVAL; + else + return pathlen; +} + +static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, + size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char *data; + ssize_t result; + + if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE) + datalen = PAGE_SIZE - 1; + + /* No partial writes. */ + result = -EINVAL; + if (*ppos != 0) + goto out; + + data = memdup_user_nul(buf, datalen); + if (IS_ERR(data)) { + result = PTR_ERR(data); + goto out; + } + + result = mutex_lock_interruptible(&ima_write_mutex); + if (result < 0) + goto out_free; + + if (data[0] == '/') { + result = ima_read_policy(data); + } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n"); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", "signed policy required", + 1, 0); + result = -EACCES; + } else { + result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); + } + mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex); +out_free: + kfree(data); +out: + if (result < 0) + valid_policy = 0; + + return result; +} + +static struct dentry *ima_dir; +static struct dentry *ima_symlink; +static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements; +static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count; +static struct dentry *violations; +static struct dentry *ima_policy; + +enum ima_fs_flags { + IMA_FS_BUSY, +}; +#endif static unsigned long ima_fs_flags; @@ -473,6 +610,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { }; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * ima_open_data_upload: sequentialize access to the data upload interface */ @@ -568,6 +706,79 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_data_upload_ops = { .release = ima_release_data_upload, .llseek = generic_file_llseek, }; +#else +/* + * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file + */ +static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { +#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY + return -EACCES; +#else + if ((filp->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY) + return -EACCES; + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return seq_open(filp, &ima_policy_seqops); +#endif + } + if (test_and_set_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags)) + return -EBUSY; + return 0; +} + +/* + * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules. + * + * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now + * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file, + * assuming a valid policy. + */ +static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) +{ + const char *cause = valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; + + if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) + return seq_release(inode, file); + + if (valid_policy && ima_check_policy() < 0) { + cause = "failed"; + valid_policy = 0; + } + + pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, + "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); + + if (!valid_policy) { + ima_delete_rules(); + valid_policy = 1; + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); + return 0; + } + + ima_update_policy(); +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + securityfs_remove(ima_policy); + ima_policy = NULL; +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) + clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) + inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { + .open = ima_open_policy, + .write = ima_write_policy, + .read = seq_read, + .release = ima_release_policy, + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, +}; + +#endif int __init ima_fs_init(void) { @@ -594,6 +805,7 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) goto out; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST runtime_measurements_count = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, @@ -613,7 +825,6 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) goto out; -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST digests_count = securityfs_create_file("digests_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_value_ops); @@ -631,12 +842,34 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void) &ima_data_upload_ops); if (IS_ERR(digest_list_data_del)) goto out; +#else + runtime_measurements_count = + securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", + S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measurements_count_ops); + if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) + goto out; + + violations = + securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, + ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); + if (IS_ERR(violations)) + goto out; + + ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, + ima_dir, NULL, + &ima_measure_policy_ops); + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + goto out; + #endif return 0; out: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST securityfs_remove(digest_list_data_del); securityfs_remove(digest_list_data); securityfs_remove(digests_count); +#endif securityfs_remove(ima_policy); securityfs_remove(violations); securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 913d6b879b0b..085e8a049f51 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -84,9 +84,15 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) goto err_out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, NULL); +#else + result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, + boot_aggregate_name, + CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX); +#endif if (result < 0) { ima_free_template_entry(entry); audit_cause = "store_entry"; @@ -107,8 +113,10 @@ void __init ima_load_x509(void) ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags; integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* load also EVM key to avoid appraisal */ evm_load_x509(); +#endif ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 999d5904cce0..c4121330a647 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -28,7 +28,9 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; @@ -38,12 +40,14 @@ int ima_appraise; int ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* Actions (measure/appraisal) for which digest lists can be used */ int ima_digest_list_actions; /* PCR used for digest list measurements */ int ima_digest_list_pcr = -1; /* Flag to include standard measurement if digest list PCR is specified */ bool ima_plus_standard_pcr; +#endif static int hash_setup_done; @@ -156,6 +160,7 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, "invalid_pcr", "open_writers"); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static enum hash_algo ima_get_hash_algo(struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len) { @@ -209,6 +214,7 @@ static int ima_read_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, ret = 0; return ret; } +#endif static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) @@ -268,7 +274,9 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, const char *pathname = NULL; int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *found_digest; +#endif struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; struct modsig *modsig = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; @@ -398,28 +406,42 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (!pathname || strlen(pathname) > IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX) pathname = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; found_digest = ima_lookup_digest(iint->ima_hash->digest, hash_algo, COMPACT_FILE); +#endif if (action & IMA_MEASURE) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, template_desc, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_MEASURE)); +#else + ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, + xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr, + template_desc); +#endif if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr); if (rc != -EPERM) { inode_lock(inode); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, ima_digest_allow(found_digest, IMA_APPRAISE)); +#else + rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, + pathname, xattr_value, + xattr_len, modsig); +#endif inode_unlock(inode); } if (!rc) @@ -568,15 +590,21 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) { u32 secid; - int rc; security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST + int rc; rc = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); if (ima_current_is_parser() && !rc) ima_check_measured_appraised(file); return rc; +#else + return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0, + mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | + MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK); +#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check); @@ -739,7 +767,9 @@ const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = { [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK, [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST [READING_DIGEST_LIST] = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK +#endif }; /** @@ -941,7 +971,11 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr, NULL); +#else + ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr); +#endif if (ret < 0) { audit_cause = "store_entry"; ima_free_template_entry(entry); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 274f4c7c99f4..3e14b55ecf0f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include "ima.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include "ima_digest_list.h" +#endif /* flags definitions */ #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001 @@ -35,7 +37,9 @@ #define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200 #define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_PARSER 0x0800 +#endif #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -58,7 +62,11 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE, LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB, EXEC_TCB }; +#else +enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB }; +#endif enum policy_rule_list { IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY = 1, IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY }; @@ -145,11 +153,13 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, {.action = MEASURE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = MEASURE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC}, }; static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_measure_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = MEASURE, .flags = IMA_PARSER +#endif }; static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { @@ -181,12 +191,14 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #endif }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static struct ima_rule_entry appraise_exec_rules[] __ro_after_init = { {.action = APPRAISE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +#endif static struct ima_rule_entry build_appraise_rules[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_REQUIRE_MODULE_SIGS @@ -216,6 +228,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, {.action = APPRAISE, .func = POLICY_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {.action = APPRAISE, .func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; @@ -223,6 +236,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { static struct ima_rule_entry ima_parser_appraise_rule __ro_after_init = { .action = APPRAISE, .flags = IMA_PARSER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED +#endif }; /* An array of architecture specific rules */ @@ -246,8 +260,10 @@ static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str) __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup); static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb __initdata; static bool ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable __initdata; +#endif static bool ima_use_secure_boot __initdata; static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs __ro_after_init; static int __init policy_setup(char *str) @@ -259,14 +275,18 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) continue; if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if ((strcmp(p, "exec_tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = EXEC_TCB; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_tcb") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_exec_immutable") == 0) ima_use_appraise_exec_immutable = true; +#endif else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) @@ -569,9 +589,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !rule->fowner_op(inode->i_uid, rule->fowner)) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if ((rule->flags & IMA_PARSER) && !ima_current_is_parser()) return false; +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { int rc = 0; u32 osid; @@ -752,19 +774,27 @@ static int ima_appraise_flag(enum ima_hooks func) return IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY; else if (func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (func == DIGEST_LIST_CHECK) return IMA_APPRAISE_DIGEST_LIST; +#endif return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#else +static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, + enum policy_rule_list policy_rule) +#endif { int i = 0; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { struct ima_rule_entry *entry; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy == EXEC_TCB) { if (entries == dont_measure_rules) if ((entries[i].flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && @@ -792,6 +822,7 @@ static void __init add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count, (entries[i].flags & IMA_FUNC) && entries[i].func == BPRM_CHECK) entries[i].flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif if (policy_rule & IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) list_add_tail(&entries[i].list, &ima_default_rules); @@ -879,8 +910,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); break; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case EXEC_TCB: fallthrough; +#endif case DEFAULT_TCB: add_rules(default_measurement_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules), @@ -889,8 +922,10 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_policy) add_rules(&ima_parser_measure_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif /* * Based on runtime secure boot flags, insert arch specific measurement @@ -909,7 +944,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) * Insert the builtin "secure_boot" policy rules requiring file * signatures, prior to other appraise rules. */ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_secure_boot) +#endif add_rules(secure_boot_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(secure_boot_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); @@ -929,11 +968,16 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY | IMA_CUSTOM_POLICY); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) +#else + if (ima_use_appraise_tcb) +#endif add_rules(default_appraise_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(appraise_exec_rules, ARRAY_SIZE(appraise_exec_rules), @@ -942,6 +986,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void) if (ima_use_secure_boot || ima_use_appraise_tcb || ima_use_appraise_exec_tcb) add_rules(&ima_parser_appraise_rule, 1, IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +#endif ima_update_policy_flag(); } @@ -1002,7 +1047,11 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST Opt_parser, Opt_err +#else + Opt_err +#endif }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -1039,7 +1088,9 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST {Opt_parser, "parser"}, +#endif {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -1134,9 +1185,14 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->action != MEASURE && entry->flags & IMA_PCR) return false; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->action != APPRAISE && entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + if (entry->action != APPRAISE && + entry->flags & (IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; /* @@ -1162,13 +1218,19 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case POST_SETATTR: case FIRMWARE_CHECK: case POLICY_CHECK: +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST case DIGEST_LIST_CHECK: +#endif if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_FSMAGIC | IMA_UID | IMA_FOWNER | IMA_FSUUID | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED | IMA_PARSER)) +#else + IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1180,8 +1242,12 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID | IMA_PCR | IMA_FSNAME | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED | +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST | IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED)) +#else + IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST)) +#endif return false; break; @@ -1338,8 +1404,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = KEY_CHECK; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "DIGEST_LIST_CHECK") == 0) entry->func = DIGEST_LIST_CHECK; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) @@ -1526,8 +1594,10 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig|modsig") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED | IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "meta_immutable") == 0) entry->flags |= IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED; +#endif else result = -EINVAL; break; @@ -1546,8 +1616,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr) || entry->pcr == ima_digest_list_pcr) +#else + if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) +#endif result = -EINVAL; else entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; @@ -1574,10 +1648,12 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) &(template_desc->fields), &(template_desc->num_fields)); entry->template = template_desc; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST break; case Opt_parser: audit_log_format(ab, "parser "); entry->flags |= IMA_PARSER; +#endif break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); @@ -1849,8 +1925,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_PARSER) seq_puts(m, "parser "); +#endif for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { @@ -1893,8 +1971,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } if (entry->flags & IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST) seq_puts(m, "appraise_flag=check_blacklist "); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST if (entry->flags & IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED) seq_puts(m, "appraise_type=meta_immutable "); +#endif if (entry->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) seq_puts(m, "permit_directio "); rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 6f126dbd2b39..a40098347f81 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = { {.field_id = "d-modsig", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_modsig_init, .field_show = ima_show_template_digest_ng}, {.field_id = "modsig", .field_init = ima_eventmodsig_init, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, {.field_id = "evmsig", .field_init = ima_eventevmsig_init, +#endif .field_show = ima_show_template_sig}, }; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 90040fac150b..7308ee587314 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ */ #include "ima_template_lib.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/xattr.h> +#endif static bool ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(u8 algo) { @@ -439,7 +441,11 @@ int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value; if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST return ima_eventevmsig_init(event_data, field_data); +#else + return 0; +#endif return ima_write_template_field_data(xattr_value, event_data->xattr_len, DATA_FMT_HEX, field_data); @@ -486,6 +492,7 @@ int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, field_data); } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST /* * ima_eventevmsig_init - include the EVM portable signature as part of the * template data @@ -514,3 +521,4 @@ int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } +#endif diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h index f4b2a2056d1d..5313a8a22e45 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.h @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ int ima_eventbuf_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); int ima_eventmodsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST int ima_eventevmsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data); +#endif #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */ diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 77e6819e8db8..d9cf29e286a9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -14,10 +14,13 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #include <linux/hash_info.h> +#endif /* iint action cache flags */ #define IMA_MEASURE 0x00000001 @@ -40,7 +43,9 @@ #define IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS 0x10000000 #define IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED 0x20000000 #define IMA_CHECK_BLACKLIST 0x40000000 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_META_IMMUTABLE_REQUIRED 0x80000000 +#endif #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) @@ -72,7 +77,9 @@ #define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 #define IMA_DIGSIG 3 #define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST #define IMA_DIGEST_LIST 5 +#endif enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, @@ -80,7 +87,9 @@ enum evm_ima_xattr_type { EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_LIST, +#endif IMA_XATTR_LAST }; @@ -92,7 +101,11 @@ struct evm_ima_xattr_data { /* Only used in the EVM HMAC code. */ struct evm_xattr { struct evm_ima_xattr_data data; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST u8 digest[SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#else + u8 digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; +#endif } __packed; #define IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE 64 @@ -144,6 +157,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct ima_digest_data *ima_hash; }; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST enum compact_types { COMPACT_KEY, COMPACT_PARSER, COMPACT_FILE, COMPACT_METADATA, COMPACT__LAST }; enum compact_modifiers { COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE, COMPACT_MOD__LAST }; @@ -162,7 +176,6 @@ static inline bool ima_digest_is_immutable(struct ima_digest *digest) return (digest->modifiers & (1 << COMPACT_MOD_IMMUTABLE)); } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST struct ima_digest *ima_lookup_digest(u8 *digest, enum hash_algo algo, enum compact_types type); struct ima_digest *ima_digest_allow(struct ima_digest *digest, int action); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 5678d4e334fb..11c859a9b8ed 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -1362,7 +1362,9 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return; call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_LIST ima_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); +#endif evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } -- 2.33.0

3 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] exfat: check if filename entries exceeds max filename length
by ZhaoLong Wang 16 Aug '23

16 Aug '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.190 commit 381f7df0f3c3bd7dceb3e2b2b64c2f6247e2ac19 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7TLII CVE: CVE-2023-4273 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit d42334578eba1390859012ebb91e1e556d51db49 ] exfat_extract_uni_name copies characters from a given file name entry into the 'uniname' variable. This variable is actually defined on the stack of the exfat_readdir() function. According to the definition of the 'exfat_uni_name' type, the file name should be limited 255 characters (+ null teminator space), but the exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() function can write more characters because there is no check if filename entries exceeds max filename length. This patch add the check not to copy filename characters when exceeding max filename length. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Cc: Yuezhang Mo <Yuezhang.Mo(a)sony.com> Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: ZhaoLong Wang <wangzhaolong1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/exfat/dir.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/exfat/dir.c b/fs/exfat/dir.c index dedbc55cd48f..0d736bf97146 100644 --- a/fs/exfat/dir.c +++ b/fs/exfat/dir.c @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static void exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry(struct super_block *sb, { int i; struct exfat_entry_set_cache *es; + unsigned int uni_len = 0, len; es = exfat_get_dentry_set(sb, p_dir, entry, ES_ALL_ENTRIES); if (!es) @@ -51,7 +52,10 @@ static void exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry(struct super_block *sb, if (exfat_get_entry_type(ep) != TYPE_EXTEND) break; - exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, uniname); + len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, uniname); + uni_len += len; + if (len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN || uni_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) + break; uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; } @@ -1026,7 +1030,8 @@ int exfat_find_dir_entry(struct super_block *sb, struct exfat_inode_info *ei, if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) { unsigned short entry_uniname[16], unichar; - if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME) { + if (step != DIRENT_STEP_NAME || + name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH) { step = DIRENT_STEP_FILE; continue; } -- 2.34.3

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] README: Remove out-of-date contribution guide
by Wei Li 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7THI2 -------------------------------- The latest contribution guide is archived at https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel-docs and https://gitee.com/openeuler/community/tree/master/sig/Kernel Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> --- README | 226 --------------------------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 226 deletions(-) diff --git a/README b/README index 21b2e09d62db..2c927ccbd970 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,229 +1,3 @@ -# How to Contribute -------- - -- [How to Contribute](#How to Contribute) - - \- [Sign the CLA](#Sign the CLA) - - \- [Steps of submitting patches](#Steps of submitting patches) - - \- [Use the unified patch format](#Use the unified patch format) - - \- [Define the patch format](#Define the patch format) - - \- [Examples](#Examples) - - \- [Email client - Thunderbird settings](#Email client - Thunderbird settings) - -- [Linux kernel](#Linux kernel) - -### Sign the CLA - -------- - -Before making any contributions to openEuler, sign the CLA first. - -Address: [https://openeuler.org/en/cla.html](https://openeuler.org/en/cla.html) - -### Steps of submitting patches -------- - -**Step 1** Compile and test your patches. - -**Step 2** Generate patches. - -Your patches should be generated based on the latest openEuler branch using git-format-patch. If your patches are in a patchset, it is better to use the **--cover-letter** option to describe what the patchset does. - -Use **scripts/checkpatch.pl** to ensure that no coding style issue exists. - -In addition, ensure that your patches comply with the unified openEuler patch format described below. - -**Step 3** Send your patches to the openEuler mailing list. - -To do so, run the following command: - - `git send-email *.patch -to="kernel(a)openeuler.org" --suppress-cc=all` - -*NOTE*: Add **--suppress-cc=all** if you use git-send-email; otherwise, the email will be copied to all people in the upstream community and mailing lists. - -For details about how to send patches using git-send-email, see [https://git-scm.com/docs/git-send-email](https://git-scm.com/docs/git-send-…. - -**Step 4** Mark "v1, v2, v3 ..." in your patch subject if you have multiple versions to send out. - -Use the **--subject-prefix="PATCH v2"** option to add the v2 tag to the patchset. - - `git format-patch --subject-prefix="PATCH v2" -1` - -Subject examples: - - Subject: [PATCH v2 01/27] fork: fix some -Wmissing-prototypes warnings - - Subject: [PATCH v3] ext2: improve scalability of bitmap searching - -**Step 5** Upstream your kernel patches to the kernel community (recommended). openEuler will synchronize with the kernel master in a timely manner. - -**Step 6** Sign your work - the Developer’s Certificate of Origin. - - Similar to the upstream kernel community, you also need to sign your patch. - - For details, see [https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/submitting-patches.html](htt…. - - The sign-off is a simple line at the end of the explanation of the patch, which certifies that you wrote it or otherwise have the right to pass it on as an open source patch. The rules are pretty simple. You can certify as below: - - Developer’s Certificate of Origin 1.1 - - ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ - - By making a contribution to this project, I certify that: - - (a) The contribution was created in whole or in part by me and I have the right to submit it under the open source license indicated in the file; - - (b) The contribution is based upon previous work that, to the best of my knowledge, is covered under an appropriate open source license and I have the right under that license to submit that work with modifications, whether created in whole or in part by me, under the same open source license (unless I am permitted to submit under a different license), as indicated in the file; - - (c) The contribution was provided directly to me by some other person who certified (a), (b) or (c) and I have not modified it. - - (d) I understand and agree that this project and the contribution are public and that a record of the contribution (including all personal information I submit with it, including my sign-off) is maintained indefinitely and may be redistributed consistent with this project or the open source license(s) involved. - -Then you add a line saying: - -Signed-off-by: Random J Developer <random(a)developer.example.org> - -Use your real name (sorry, no pseudonyms or anonymous contributions). - -### Use the unified patch format -------- - -Reasons: - -1. Long term maintainability - - openEuler will merge massive patches. If all patches are merged by casual - - changelog formats without a unified format, the git logs will be messy, and - - then it is hard to figure out the original patches. - -2. Kernel upgrade - - We definitely will upgrade our openEuler kernel in someday, so strict patch management - - will alleviate the pain to migrate patches during big upgrades. - -3. Easy for script parsing - - Keyword highlighting is necessary for script parsing. - -### Define the patch format -------- - -[M] stands for "mandatory". - -[O] stands for "option". - -$category can be: bug preparation, bugfix, perf, feature, doc, other... - -If category is feature, we need to add a feature name as below: - -```cpp -category: feature -feature: YYY (the feature name) -``` - -If the patch is related to CVE or bugzilla, we need to add the corresponding tag as below (In general, it should include at least one of the following): - -```cpp -CVE: $cve-id -bugzilla: $bug-id -``` - -Additional changelog should include at least one of the following: - -1. Why we should apply this patch - -2. What real problems in the product does this patch resolved - -3. How could we reproduce this bug or how to test - -4. Other useful information for help to understand this patch or problem - -The detailed information is very useful for migrating a patch to another kernel branch. - -Example for mainline patch: - -```cpp -mainline inclusion [M] -from $mainline-version [M] -commit $id [M] -category: $category [M] -bugzilla: $bug-id [O] -CVE: $cve-id [O] - -additional changelog [O] - --------------------------------- - -original changelog -Signed-off-by: $yourname <$yourname(a)huawei.com> [M] -($mainline-version could be mainline-3.5, mainline-3.6, etc...) -``` - -### Examples -------- - -```cpp -mainline inclusion -from mainline-4.10 -commit 0becc0ae5b42828785b589f686725ff5bc3b9b25 -category: bugfix -bugzilla: 3004 -CVE: N/A - -The patch fixes a BUG_ON in the product: Injecting a single bit ECC error to the memory before system boot using hardware inject tools will cause a large amount of CMCI during system booting . -[ 1.146580] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged -[ 1.152908] ------------[ cut here ]------------ -[ 1.157751] kernel BUG at kernel/timer.c:951! -[ 1.162321] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP - -------------------------------------------------- - -original changelog - -<original S-O-B> -Signed-off-by: Zhang San <zhangsan(a)huawei.com> -Tested-by: Li Si <lisi(a)huawei.com> -``` - -### Email client - Thunderbird settings -------- - -If you are a new developer in the kernel community, it is highly recommended that you use the Thunderbird mail client. - -1. Thunderbird Installation - - Obtain the English version of Thunderbird from [http://www.mozilla.org/]( http://www.mozilla.org/) and install it on your system. - - Download URL: https://www.thunderbird.net/en-US/thunderbird/all/ - -2. Settings - - 2.1 Use the plain text format instead of the HTML format. - - Choose **Options > Account Settings > Composition & Addressing**, and do **NOT** select Compose message in HTML format. - - 2.2 Editor settings - - **Tools > Options> Advanced > Config editor** - - \- To bring up the Thunderbird's registry editor, set **mailnews.send_plaintext_flowed** to **false**. - - \- Disable HTML Format: Set **mail.identity.id1.compose_html** to **false**. - - \- Enable UTF-8: Set **prefs.converted-to-utf8** to **true**. - - \- View messages in UTF-8: Set **mailnews.view_default_charset** to **UTF-8**. - - \- Set **mailnews.wraplength** to **9999** to avoid auto-wrap. - Linux kernel ============ -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2 0/2] tun/tap: fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076 New CVE is CVE-2023-4194. Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] nvme-pci: clear the prp2 field when not used
by Yong Hu 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

From: Lei Rao <lei.rao(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.160 commit 74b139c63f0775cf79266e9d9546c62b73fb3385 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a56ea6147facce4ac1fc38675455f9733d96232b ] If the prp2 field is not filled in nvme_setup_prp_simple(), the prp2 field is garbage data. According to nvme spec, the prp2 is reserved if the data transfer does not cross a memory page boundary, so clear it to zero if it is not used. Signed-off-by: Lei Rao <lei.rao(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index c30ab2cf2533..8965ea20f5ef 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -817,6 +817,8 @@ static blk_status_t nvme_setup_prp_simple(struct nvme_dev *dev, cmnd->dptr.prp1 = cpu_to_le64(iod->first_dma); if (bv->bv_len > first_prp_len) cmnd->dptr.prp2 = cpu_to_le64(iod->first_dma + first_prp_len); + else + cmnd->dptr.prp2 = 0; return BLK_STS_OK; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix DMA direction of unmapping integrity data
by Yong Hu 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

From: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit f4ff3798123585c9c7dd48ab7ef169fb505e0774 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b8f6446b6853768cb99e7c201bddce69ca60c15e ] DMA direction should be taken in dma_unmap_page() for unmapping integrity data. Fix this DMA direction, and reported in Guangwu's test. Reported-by: Guangwu Zhang <guazhang(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 4aedb705437f ("nvme-pci: split metadata handling from nvme_map_data / nvme_unmap_data") Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index f1ac50c7a1d6..c3739b895d0d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -968,7 +968,8 @@ static void nvme_pci_complete_rq(struct request *req) if (blk_integrity_rq(req)) dma_unmap_page(dev->dev, iod->meta_dma, - rq_integrity_vec(req)->bv_len, rq_data_dir(req)); + rq_integrity_vec(req)->bv_len, rq_dma_dir(req)); + if (blk_rq_nr_phys_segments(req)) nvme_unmap_data(dev, req); nvme_complete_rq(req); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] mm/pagealloc: sysctl: change watermark_scale_factor max limit to 30%
by wujiangtao 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc1 commit 39c65a94cd9661532be150e88f8b02f4a6844a35 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T82I CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… Upstream commit 39c65a94cd96 change watermark_scale_factor max limit to 30%, but we don't backport it. The current limit of watermark_scale_factor is 10%. As described in the patch, the limit of watermark_scale_factor may need to be increased in some scenarios to reduce application performance fluctuations due to direct recycling. -------------------------------- For embedded systems with low total memory, having to run applications with relatively large memory requirements, 10% max limitation for watermark_scale_factor poses an issue of triggering direct reclaim every time such application is started. This results in slow application startup times and bad end-user experience. By increasing watermark_scale_factor max limit we allow vendors more flexibility to choose the right level of kswapd aggressiveness for their device and workload requirements. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211124193604.2758863-1-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel(a)tuxforce.de> Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope(a)iki.fi> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin(a)google.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> Cc: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Fengfei Xi <xi.fengfei(a)h3c.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 2 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst index a84bef7aa864..06500c423592 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ how much memory needs to be free before kswapd goes back to sleep. The unit is in fractions of 10,000. The default value of 10 means the distances between watermarks are 0.1% of the available memory in the -node/system. The maximum value is 1000, or 10% of memory. +node/system. The maximum value is 3000, or 30% of memory. A high rate of threads entering direct reclaim (allocstall) or kswapd going to sleep prematurely (kswapd_low_wmark_hit_quickly) can indicate diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index d290ba2d8fee..fd82beb9a743 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX; static int one_hundred = 100; static int two_hundred = 200; static int one_thousand = 1000; +static int three_thousand = 3000; #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK static int ten_thousand = 10000; #endif @@ -2983,7 +2984,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = watermark_scale_factor_sysctl_handler, .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, - .extra2 = &one_thousand, + .extra2 = &three_thousand, }, { .procname = "percpu_pagelist_fraction", -- 2.27.0

2 1

[PATCH v4 openEuler-23.09 00/25] backport etmem feature from OLK-5.10
by liubo 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

This patch set is used to backport etmem feature patches to version 23.09. etmem is a tiered memory extension technology that uses DRAM+memory compression/high-performance storage media to form tiered memory storage. Memory data is tiered, and cold data is migrated from memory media to high-performance storage media to release memory space and reduce memory costs. v3 -> v4 - fix the commit message format error v2 -> v3 - fix the build problem in riscv64 arch. v1 -> v2 - some cleanup fix Kemeng Shi (11): etmem: add ioctl for mm idle scan etmem: x86: support scan hugetlb of vm etmem_scan: x86: support scan 4 level ept under 5 level host page table etmem scan: fix memleak in vm_idle_read etmem: fix concurrent access to export file operations etmem: fix potential UAF when walk ept page table etmem_scan: release CPU after scan walk_step size etmem_scan: add pte_hole callback acpi/numa: memorize node type from SRAT table hugepage: add sysctl for hugepage alloc and mig x86: hugepage: use nt copy hugepage to AEP in x86 liubo (14): memig: add memig-scan feature to openEuler memig: add memig-swap feature to openEuler memig: fix compile error when CONFIG_NUMA is turned off etmem: Modify the memig feature name to etmem move ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig and add architecture dependency etmem: etmem scan module Replace WARN_ONCE() with debug_printk for "nothing read" add ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig config: enable CONFIG_ETMEM by default etmem: add CONFIG_ETMEM macro definition for etmem feature etmem: add original kernel swap enabled options etmem: add swapcache reclaim to etmem etmem: Add a scan flag to support specified page swap-out etmem: fix the div 0 problem in swapcache reclaim process etmem: fix some problem during backport etmem patches arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 7 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c | 107 ++ arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S | 73 ++ drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c | 5 + fs/proc/Makefile | 2 + fs/proc/base.c | 8 + fs/proc/etmem_scan.c | 1383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/proc/etmem_scan.h | 149 +++ fs/proc/etmem_swap.c | 282 +++++ fs/proc/internal.h | 4 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 194 ++++ include/linux/highmem.h | 17 + include/linux/hugetlb.h | 6 + include/linux/list.h | 17 + include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 18 +- include/linux/numa.h | 12 + include/linux/swap.h | 38 + include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 3 + kernel/sysctl.c | 20 + mm/Kconfig | 25 + mm/huge_memory.c | 1 + mm/hugetlb.c | 7 +- mm/internal.h | 1 - mm/madvise.c | 17 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 13 + mm/pagewalk.c | 1 + mm/swap_state.c | 37 + mm/util.c | 11 +- mm/vmscan.c | 390 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 6 + 34 files changed, 2852 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.h create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_swap.c -- 2.27.0

2 26

[PATCH v3 openEuler-23.09 00/25] backport etmem feature from OLK-5.10
by liubo 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

This patch set is used to backport etmem feature patches to version 23.09. etmem is a tiered memory extension technology that uses DRAM+memory compression/high-performance storage media to form tiered memory storage. Memory data is tiered, and cold data is migrated from memory media to high-performance storage media to release memory space and reduce memory costs. v2 -> v3 - fix the build problem in riscv64 arch. v1 -> v2 - some cleanup fix Kemeng Shi (11): etmem: add ioctl for mm idle scan etmem: x86: support scan hugetlb of vm etmem_scan: x86: support scan 4 level ept under 5 level host page table etmem scan: fix memleak in vm_idle_read etmem: fix concurrent access to export file operations etmem: fix potential UAF when walk ept page table etmem_scan: release CPU after scan walk_step size etmem_scan: add pte_hole callback acpi/numa: memorize node type from SRAT table hugepage: add sysctl for hugepage alloc and mig x86: hugepage: use nt copy hugepage to AEP in x86 liubo (14): memig: add memig-scan feature to openEuler memig: add memig-swap feature to openEuler memig: fix compile error when CONFIG_NUMA is turned off etmem: Modify the memig feature name to etmem move ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig and add architecture dependency etmem: etmem scan module Replace WARN_ONCE() with debug_printk for "nothing read" add ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig config: enable CONFIG_ETMEM by default etmem: add CONFIG_ETMEM macro definition for etmem feature etmem: add original kernel swap enabled options etmem: add swapcache reclaim to etmem etmem: Add a scan flag to support specified page swap-out etmem: fix the div 0 problem in swapcache reclaim process etmem: fix some problem during backport etmem patches arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 7 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c | 107 ++ arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S | 73 ++ drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c | 5 + fs/proc/Makefile | 2 + fs/proc/base.c | 8 + fs/proc/etmem_scan.c | 1383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/proc/etmem_scan.h | 149 +++ fs/proc/etmem_swap.c | 282 +++++ fs/proc/internal.h | 4 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 194 ++++ include/linux/highmem.h | 17 + include/linux/hugetlb.h | 6 + include/linux/list.h | 17 + include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 18 +- include/linux/numa.h | 12 + include/linux/swap.h | 38 + include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 3 + kernel/sysctl.c | 20 + mm/Kconfig | 25 + mm/huge_memory.c | 1 + mm/hugetlb.c | 7 +- mm/internal.h | 1 - mm/madvise.c | 17 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 13 + mm/pagewalk.c | 1 + mm/swap_state.c | 37 + mm/util.c | 11 +- mm/vmscan.c | 390 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 6 + 34 files changed, 2852 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.h create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_swap.c -- 2.27.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/5] workqueue: Make flush_workqueue() also watch flush_work()
by Zeng Heng 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

Lai Jiangshan (5): workqueue: Rename "delayed" (delayed by active management) to "inactive" workqueue: Change arguement of pwq_dec_nr_in_flight() workqueue: Change the code of calculating work_flags in insert_wq_barrier() workqueue: Mark barrier work with WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE workqueue: Assign a color to barrier work items include/linux/workqueue.h | 4 +- kernel/workqueue.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- kernel/workqueue_internal.h | 3 +- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 5

[PATCH 0/5] workqueue: Make flush_workqueue() also watch flush_work()
by Zeng Heng 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

Lai Jiangshan (5): workqueue: Rename "delayed" (delayed by active management) to "inactive" workqueue: Change arguement of pwq_dec_nr_in_flight() workqueue: Change the code of calculating work_flags in insert_wq_barrier() workqueue: Mark barrier work with WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE workqueue: Assign a color to barrier work items include/linux/workqueue.h | 4 +- kernel/workqueue.c | 135 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- kernel/workqueue_internal.h | 3 +- 3 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 5

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1] mm/pagealloc: sysctl: change watermark_scale_factor max limit to 30%
by wujiangtao 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

From surenb <surenb(a)google.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17-rc1 commit 39c65a94cd9661532be150e88f8b02f4a6844a35 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T82I CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… Upstream commit 39c65a94cd9661532be150e88f8b02f4a6844a35 change watermark_scale_factor max limit to 30%, but we don't backport it. The current limit of watermark_scale_factor is 10%. As described in the patch, the limit of watermark_scale_factor may need to be increased in some scenarios to reduce application performance fluctuations due to direct recycling -------------------------------- For embedded systems with low total memory, having to run applications with relatively large memory requirements, 10% max limitation for watermark_scale_factor poses an issue of triggering direct reclaim every time such application is started. This results in slow application startup times and bad end-user experience. By increasing watermark_scale_factor max limit we allow vendors more flexibility to choose the right level of kswapd aggressiveness for their device and workload requirements. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211124193604.2758863-1-surenb@google.com Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb(a)google.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)suse.com> Cc: Lukas Middendorf <kernel(a)tuxforce.de> Cc: Antti Palosaari <crope(a)iki.fi> Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof(a)kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org> Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin(a)google.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen(a)linux.intel.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman(a)techsingularity.net> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet(a)lwn.net> Cc: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Fengfei Xi <xi.fengfei(a)h3c.com> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst | 2 +- kernel/sysctl.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst index a84bef7aa864..06500c423592 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/vm.rst @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ how much memory needs to be free before kswapd goes back to sleep. The unit is in fractions of 10,000. The default value of 10 means the distances between watermarks are 0.1% of the available memory in the -node/system. The maximum value is 1000, or 10% of memory. +node/system. The maximum value is 3000, or 30% of memory. A high rate of threads entering direct reclaim (allocstall) or kswapd going to sleep prematurely (kswapd_low_wmark_hit_quickly) can indicate diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index d290ba2d8fee..fd82beb9a743 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX; static int one_hundred = 100; static int two_hundred = 200; static int one_thousand = 1000; +static int three_thousand = 3000; #ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK static int ten_thousand = 10000; #endif @@ -2983,7 +2984,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = watermark_scale_factor_sysctl_handler, .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, - .extra2 = &one_thousand, + .extra2 = &three_thousand, }, { .procname = "percpu_pagelist_fraction", -- 2.27.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] bonding: Fix incorrect deletion of ETH_P_8021AD protocol vid from slaves
by Ziyang Xuan 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc6 commit 01f4fd27087078c90a0e22860d1dfa2cd0510791 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T6MN CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- BUG_ON(!vlan_info) is triggered in unregister_vlan_dev() with following testcase: # ip netns add ns1 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add bond0 type bond mode 0 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add bond_slave_1 type veth peer veth2 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link set bond_slave_1 master bond0 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add link bond_slave_1 name vlan10 type vlan id 10 protocol 802.1ad # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add link bond0 name bond0_vlan10 type vlan id 10 protocol 802.1ad # ip netns exec ns1 ip link set bond_slave_1 nomaster # ip netns del ns1 The logical analysis of the problem is as follows: 1. create ETH_P_8021AD protocol vlan10 for bond_slave_1: register_vlan_dev() vlan_vid_add() vlan_info_alloc() __vlan_vid_add() // add [ETH_P_8021AD, 10] vid to bond_slave_1 2. create ETH_P_8021AD protocol bond0_vlan10 for bond0: register_vlan_dev() vlan_vid_add() __vlan_vid_add() vlan_add_rx_filter_info() if (!vlan_hw_filter_capable(dev, proto)) // condition established because bond0 without NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_FILTER return 0; if (netif_device_present(dev)) return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid(dev, proto, vid); // will be never called // The slaves of bond0 will not refer to the [ETH_P_8021AD, 10] vid. 3. detach bond_slave_1 from bond0: __bond_release_one() vlan_vids_del_by_dev() list_for_each_entry(vid_info, &vlan_info->vid_list, list) vlan_vid_del(dev, vid_info->proto, vid_info->vid); // bond_slave_1 [ETH_P_8021AD, 10] vid will be deleted. // bond_slave_1->vlan_info will be assigned NULL. 4. delete vlan10 during delete ns1: default_device_exit_batch() dev->rtnl_link_ops->dellink() // unregister_vlan_dev() for vlan10 vlan_info = rtnl_dereference(real_dev->vlan_info); // real_dev of vlan10 is bond_slave_1 BUG_ON(!vlan_info); // bond_slave_1->vlan_info is NULL now, bug is triggered!!! Add S-VLAN tag related features support to bond driver. So the bond driver will always propagate the VLAN info to its slaves. Fixes: 8ad227ff89a7 ("net: vlan: add 802.1ad support") Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)idosch.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230802114320.4156068-1-william.xuanziyang@huawe… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index 9bf010e88da7..be0c4d655cf9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -5313,7 +5313,9 @@ void bond_setup(struct net_device *bond_dev) bond_dev->hw_features = BOND_VLAN_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX | - NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER; + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER | + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_RX | + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_FILTER; bond_dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_ENCAP_ALL | NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4; #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_OFFLOAD -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] bonding: Fix incorrect deletion of ETH_P_8021AD protocol vid from slaves
by Ziyang Xuan 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc6 commit 01f4fd27087078c90a0e22860d1dfa2cd0510791 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T6MN CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- BUG_ON(!vlan_info) is triggered in unregister_vlan_dev() with following testcase: # ip netns add ns1 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add bond0 type bond mode 0 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add bond_slave_1 type veth peer veth2 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link set bond_slave_1 master bond0 # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add link bond_slave_1 name vlan10 type vlan id 10 protocol 802.1ad # ip netns exec ns1 ip link add link bond0 name bond0_vlan10 type vlan id 10 protocol 802.1ad # ip netns exec ns1 ip link set bond_slave_1 nomaster # ip netns del ns1 The logical analysis of the problem is as follows: 1. create ETH_P_8021AD protocol vlan10 for bond_slave_1: register_vlan_dev() vlan_vid_add() vlan_info_alloc() __vlan_vid_add() // add [ETH_P_8021AD, 10] vid to bond_slave_1 2. create ETH_P_8021AD protocol bond0_vlan10 for bond0: register_vlan_dev() vlan_vid_add() __vlan_vid_add() vlan_add_rx_filter_info() if (!vlan_hw_filter_capable(dev, proto)) // condition established because bond0 without NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_FILTER return 0; if (netif_device_present(dev)) return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_vlan_rx_add_vid(dev, proto, vid); // will be never called // The slaves of bond0 will not refer to the [ETH_P_8021AD, 10] vid. 3. detach bond_slave_1 from bond0: __bond_release_one() vlan_vids_del_by_dev() list_for_each_entry(vid_info, &vlan_info->vid_list, list) vlan_vid_del(dev, vid_info->proto, vid_info->vid); // bond_slave_1 [ETH_P_8021AD, 10] vid will be deleted. // bond_slave_1->vlan_info will be assigned NULL. 4. delete vlan10 during delete ns1: default_device_exit_batch() dev->rtnl_link_ops->dellink() // unregister_vlan_dev() for vlan10 vlan_info = rtnl_dereference(real_dev->vlan_info); // real_dev of vlan10 is bond_slave_1 BUG_ON(!vlan_info); // bond_slave_1->vlan_info is NULL now, bug is triggered!!! Add S-VLAN tag related features support to bond driver. So the bond driver will always propagate the VLAN info to its slaves. Fixes: 8ad227ff89a7 ("net: vlan: add 802.1ad support") Suggested-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)idosch.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)nvidia.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230802114320.4156068-1-william.xuanziyang@huawe… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c index fe28cbec4a4c..99c792fab45a 100644 --- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c @@ -4452,7 +4452,9 @@ void bond_setup(struct net_device *bond_dev) bond_dev->hw_features = BOND_VLAN_FEATURES | NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_RX | - NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER; + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER | + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_RX | + NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_FILTER; bond_dev->hw_features |= NETIF_F_GSO_ENCAP_ALL | NETIF_F_GSO_UDP_L4; bond_dev->features |= bond_dev->hw_features; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xen/netback: Fix buffer overrun triggered by unusual packet
by Zhengchao Shao 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

From: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall(a)citrix.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.189 commit f9167a2d6b943f30743de6ff8163d1981c34f9a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189119 CVE: CVE-2023-34319 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 upstream. It is possible that a guest can send a packet that contains a head + 18 slots and yet has a len <= XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN. This causes nr_slots to underflow in xenvif_get_requests() which then causes the subsequent loop's termination condition to be wrong, causing a buffer overrun of queue->tx_map_ops. Rework the code to account for the extra frag_overflow slots. This is CVE-2023-34319 / XSA-432. Fixes: ad7f402ae4f4 ("xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area") Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall(a)citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul(a)xen.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index f9373a88cf37..24b4f73fb336 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops; struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first; - nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1; + nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + frag_overflow + 1; copy_count(skb) = 0; @@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } } - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; - shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) { + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS; + shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, @@ -462,12 +462,12 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, txp++; } - if (frag_overflow) { + if (nr_slots > 0) { shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb); frags = shinfo->frags; - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < frag_overflow; + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; @@ -478,6 +478,11 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; + } else if (nskb) { + /* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed + * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above. + */ + kfree_skb(nskb); } (*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH] xen/netback: Fix buffer overrun triggered by unusual packet
by Zhengchao Shao 15 Aug '23

15 Aug '23

From: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall(a)citrix.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.189 commit f9167a2d6b943f30743de6ff8163d1981c34f9a9 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189119 CVE: CVE-2023-34319 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 upstream. It is possible that a guest can send a packet that contains a head + 18 slots and yet has a len <= XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN. This causes nr_slots to underflow in xenvif_get_requests() which then causes the subsequent loop's termination condition to be wrong, causing a buffer overrun of queue->tx_map_ops. Rework the code to account for the extra frag_overflow slots. This is CVE-2023-34319 / XSA-432. Fixes: ad7f402ae4f4 ("xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area") Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall(a)citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul(a)xen.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index f9373a88cf37..24b4f73fb336 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops; struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first; - nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1; + nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + frag_overflow + 1; copy_count(skb) = 0; @@ -448,8 +448,8 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } } - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; - shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) { + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS; + shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, @@ -462,12 +462,12 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, txp++; } - if (frag_overflow) { + if (nr_slots > 0) { shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb); frags = shinfo->frags; - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < frag_overflow; + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; @@ -478,6 +478,11 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; + } else if (nskb) { + /* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed + * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above. + */ + kfree_skb(nskb); } (*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] xen/netback: Fix buffer overrun triggered by unusual packet
by Zhengchao Shao 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall(a)citrix.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.290 commit 11e6919ae028b5de1fc48007354ea07069561b31 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RQ63 CVE: CVE-2023-34319 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 534fc31d09b706a16d83533e16b5dc855caf7576 upstream. It is possible that a guest can send a packet that contains a head + 18 slots and yet has a len <= XEN_NETBACK_TX_COPY_LEN. This causes nr_slots to underflow in xenvif_get_requests() which then causes the subsequent loop's termination condition to be wrong, causing a buffer overrun of queue->tx_map_ops. Rework the code to account for the extra frag_overflow slots. This is CVE-2023-34319 / XSA-432. Fixes: ad7f402ae4f4 ("xen/netback: Ensure protocol headers don't fall in the non-linear area") Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall(a)citrix.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul(a)xen.org> Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross(a)suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c index 649049df922f..103f2c09d785 100644 --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, struct gnttab_map_grant_ref *gop = queue->tx_map_ops + *map_ops; struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp = first; - nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + 1; + nr_slots = shinfo->nr_frags + frag_overflow + 1; copy_count(skb) = 0; @@ -439,8 +439,8 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } } - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; - shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++) { + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; nr_slots > 0 && shinfo->nr_frags < MAX_SKB_FRAGS; + shinfo->nr_frags++, gop++, nr_slots--) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; xenvif_tx_create_map_op(queue, pending_idx, txp, @@ -453,12 +453,12 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, txp++; } - if (frag_overflow) { + if (nr_slots > 0) { shinfo = skb_shinfo(nskb); frags = shinfo->frags; - for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < frag_overflow; + for (shinfo->nr_frags = 0; shinfo->nr_frags < nr_slots; shinfo->nr_frags++, txp++, gop++) { index = pending_index(queue->pending_cons++); pending_idx = queue->pending_ring[index]; @@ -469,6 +469,11 @@ static void xenvif_get_requests(struct xenvif_queue *queue, } skb_shinfo(skb)->frag_list = nskb; + } else if (nskb) { + /* A frag_list skb was allocated but it is no longer needed + * because enough slots were converted to copy ops above. + */ + kfree_skb(nskb); } (*copy_ops) = cop - queue->tx_copy_ops; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS, v2 0/2] tun/tap: fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076 New CVE is CVE-2023-4194. Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 2

[PATCH v2 openEuler-23.09 00/25] backport etmem feature from OLK-5.10
by liubo 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

This patch set is used to backport etmem feature patches to version 23.09. etmem is a tiered memory extension technology that uses DRAM+memory compression/high-performance storage media to form tiered memory storage. Memory data is tiered, and cold data is migrated from memory media to high-performance storage media to release memory space and reduce memory costs. v1 -> v2 - some cleanup fix Kemeng Shi (11): etmem: add ioctl for mm idle scan etmem: x86: support scan hugetlb of vm etmem_scan: x86: support scan 4 level ept under 5 level host page table etmem scan: fix memleak in vm_idle_read etmem: fix concurrent access to export file operations etmem: fix potential UAF when walk ept page table etmem_scan: release CPU after scan walk_step size etmem_scan: add pte_hole callback acpi/numa: memorize node type from SRAT table hugepage: add sysctl for hugepage alloc and mig x86: hugepage: use nt copy hugepage to AEP in x86 liubo (14): memig: add memig-scan feature to openEuler memig: add memig-swap feature to openEuler memig: fix compile error when CONFIG_NUMA is turned off etmem: Modify the memig feature name to etmem move ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig and add architecture dependency etmem: etmem scan module Replace WARN_ONCE() with debug_printk for "nothing read" add ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig config: enable CONFIG_ETMEM by default etmem: add CONFIG_ETMEM macro definition for etmem feature etmem: add original kernel swap enabled options etmem: add swapcache reclaim to etmem etmem: Add a scan flag to support specified page swap-out etmem: fix the div 0 problem in swapcache reclaim process etmem: fix some problem during backport etmem patches arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 7 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c | 107 ++ arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S | 73 ++ drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c | 5 + fs/proc/Makefile | 2 + fs/proc/base.c | 8 + fs/proc/etmem_scan.c | 1383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/proc/etmem_scan.h | 149 +++ fs/proc/etmem_swap.c | 282 +++++ fs/proc/internal.h | 4 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 194 ++++ include/linux/highmem.h | 17 + include/linux/hugetlb.h | 6 + include/linux/list.h | 17 + include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 18 +- include/linux/numa.h | 12 + include/linux/swap.h | 38 + include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 3 + kernel/sysctl.c | 20 + mm/Kconfig | 25 + mm/huge_memory.c | 1 + mm/hugetlb.c | 7 +- mm/internal.h | 1 - mm/madvise.c | 17 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 13 + mm/pagewalk.c | 1 + mm/swap_state.c | 37 + mm/util.c | 11 +- mm/vmscan.c | 390 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 6 + 34 files changed, 2852 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.h create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_swap.c -- 2.27.0

2 26

[PATCH OLK-5.10, v2 0/2] tun/tap: fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076 New CVE is CVE-2023-4194. Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request
by Zhong Jinghua 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.121 commit eb947403518ea3d93f6d89264bb1f5416bb0c7d0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T0US CVE: CVE-2023-3866 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------- commit 5005bcb4219156f1bf7587b185080ec1da08518e upstream. This patch validate session id and tree id in compound request. If first operation in the compound is SMB2 ECHO request, ksmbd bypass session and tree validation. So work->sess and work->tcon could be NULL. If secound request in the compound access work->sess or tcon, It cause NULL pointer dereferecing error. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-21165 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhong Jinghua <zhongjinghua(a)huawei.com> --- v2: add CVE message. fs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/server.c b/fs/ksmbd/server.c index 18feeb780965..e39d31921cd9 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/server.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/server.c @@ -185,24 +185,31 @@ static void __handle_ksmbd_work(struct ksmbd_work *work, goto send; } - if (conn->ops->check_user_session) { - rc = conn->ops->check_user_session(work); - if (rc < 0) { - command = conn->ops->get_cmd_val(work); - conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, - STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED); - goto send; - } else if (rc > 0) { - rc = conn->ops->get_ksmbd_tcon(work); + do { + if (conn->ops->check_user_session) { + rc = conn->ops->check_user_session(work); if (rc < 0) { - conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, - STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED); + if (rc == -EINVAL) + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + else + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED); goto send; + } else if (rc > 0) { + rc = conn->ops->get_ksmbd_tcon(work); + if (rc < 0) { + if (rc == -EINVAL) + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + else + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED); + goto send; + } } } - } - do { rc = __process_request(work, conn, &command); if (rc == SERVER_HANDLER_ABORT) break; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 996319fbbb92..2bdcfeffe969 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ int smb2_get_ksmbd_tcon(struct ksmbd_work *work) unsigned int cmd = le16_to_cpu(req_hdr->Command); int tree_id; - work->tcon = NULL; if (cmd == SMB2_TREE_CONNECT_HE || cmd == SMB2_CANCEL_HE || cmd == SMB2_LOGOFF_HE) { @@ -104,10 +103,28 @@ int smb2_get_ksmbd_tcon(struct ksmbd_work *work) } tree_id = le32_to_cpu(req_hdr->Id.SyncId.TreeId); + + /* + * If request is not the first in Compound request, + * Just validate tree id in header with work->tcon->id. + */ + if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { + if (!work->tcon) { + pr_err("The first operation in the compound does not have tcon\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (work->tcon->id != tree_id) { + pr_err("tree id(%u) is different with id(%u) in first operation\n", + tree_id, work->tcon->id); + return -EINVAL; + } + return 1; + } + work->tcon = ksmbd_tree_conn_lookup(work->sess, tree_id); if (!work->tcon) { pr_err("Invalid tid %d\n", tree_id); - return -EINVAL; + return -ENOENT; } return 1; @@ -564,7 +581,6 @@ int smb2_check_user_session(struct ksmbd_work *work) unsigned int cmd = conn->ops->get_cmd_val(work); unsigned long long sess_id; - work->sess = NULL; /* * SMB2_ECHO, SMB2_NEGOTIATE, SMB2_SESSION_SETUP command do not * require a session id, so no need to validate user session's for @@ -575,15 +591,33 @@ int smb2_check_user_session(struct ksmbd_work *work) return 0; if (!ksmbd_conn_good(conn)) - return -EINVAL; + return -EIO; sess_id = le64_to_cpu(req_hdr->SessionId); + + /* + * If request is not the first in Compound request, + * Just validate session id in header with work->sess->id. + */ + if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { + if (!work->sess) { + pr_err("The first operation in the compound does not have sess\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (work->sess->id != sess_id) { + pr_err("session id(%llu) is different with the first operation(%lld)\n", + sess_id, work->sess->id); + return -EINVAL; + } + return 1; + } + /* Check for validity of user session */ work->sess = ksmbd_session_lookup_all(conn, sess_id); if (work->sess) return 1; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Invalid user session, Uid %llu\n", sess_id); - return -EINVAL; + return -ENOENT; } static void destroy_previous_session(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS, v2 0/2] fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076. New CVE is CVE-2023-4194 Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] tun/tap: fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076 New CVE is CVE-2023-4194. Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: validate session id and tree id in the compound request
by Zhong Jinghua 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.15.121 commit eb947403518ea3d93f6d89264bb1f5416bb0c7d0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7T0US CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------- commit 5005bcb4219156f1bf7587b185080ec1da08518e upstream. This patch validate session id and tree id in compound request. If first operation in the compound is SMB2 ECHO request, ksmbd bypass session and tree validation. So work->sess and work->tcon could be NULL. If secound request in the compound access work->sess or tcon, It cause NULL pointer dereferecing error. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-21165 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhong Jinghua <zhongjinghua(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/server.c b/fs/ksmbd/server.c index 18feeb780965..e39d31921cd9 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/server.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/server.c @@ -185,24 +185,31 @@ static void __handle_ksmbd_work(struct ksmbd_work *work, goto send; } - if (conn->ops->check_user_session) { - rc = conn->ops->check_user_session(work); - if (rc < 0) { - command = conn->ops->get_cmd_val(work); - conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, - STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED); - goto send; - } else if (rc > 0) { - rc = conn->ops->get_ksmbd_tcon(work); + do { + if (conn->ops->check_user_session) { + rc = conn->ops->check_user_session(work); if (rc < 0) { - conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, - STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED); + if (rc == -EINVAL) + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + else + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_USER_SESSION_DELETED); goto send; + } else if (rc > 0) { + rc = conn->ops->get_ksmbd_tcon(work); + if (rc < 0) { + if (rc == -EINVAL) + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER); + else + conn->ops->set_rsp_status(work, + STATUS_NETWORK_NAME_DELETED); + goto send; + } } } - } - do { rc = __process_request(work, conn, &command); if (rc == SERVER_HANDLER_ABORT) break; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 996319fbbb92..2bdcfeffe969 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ int smb2_get_ksmbd_tcon(struct ksmbd_work *work) unsigned int cmd = le16_to_cpu(req_hdr->Command); int tree_id; - work->tcon = NULL; if (cmd == SMB2_TREE_CONNECT_HE || cmd == SMB2_CANCEL_HE || cmd == SMB2_LOGOFF_HE) { @@ -104,10 +103,28 @@ int smb2_get_ksmbd_tcon(struct ksmbd_work *work) } tree_id = le32_to_cpu(req_hdr->Id.SyncId.TreeId); + + /* + * If request is not the first in Compound request, + * Just validate tree id in header with work->tcon->id. + */ + if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { + if (!work->tcon) { + pr_err("The first operation in the compound does not have tcon\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (work->tcon->id != tree_id) { + pr_err("tree id(%u) is different with id(%u) in first operation\n", + tree_id, work->tcon->id); + return -EINVAL; + } + return 1; + } + work->tcon = ksmbd_tree_conn_lookup(work->sess, tree_id); if (!work->tcon) { pr_err("Invalid tid %d\n", tree_id); - return -EINVAL; + return -ENOENT; } return 1; @@ -564,7 +581,6 @@ int smb2_check_user_session(struct ksmbd_work *work) unsigned int cmd = conn->ops->get_cmd_val(work); unsigned long long sess_id; - work->sess = NULL; /* * SMB2_ECHO, SMB2_NEGOTIATE, SMB2_SESSION_SETUP command do not * require a session id, so no need to validate user session's for @@ -575,15 +591,33 @@ int smb2_check_user_session(struct ksmbd_work *work) return 0; if (!ksmbd_conn_good(conn)) - return -EINVAL; + return -EIO; sess_id = le64_to_cpu(req_hdr->SessionId); + + /* + * If request is not the first in Compound request, + * Just validate session id in header with work->sess->id. + */ + if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) { + if (!work->sess) { + pr_err("The first operation in the compound does not have sess\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (work->sess->id != sess_id) { + pr_err("session id(%llu) is different with the first operation(%lld)\n", + sess_id, work->sess->id); + return -EINVAL; + } + return 1; + } + /* Check for validity of user session */ work->sess = ksmbd_session_lookup_all(conn, sess_id); if (work->sess) return 1; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Invalid user session, Uid %llu\n", sess_id); - return -EINVAL; + return -ENOENT; } static void destroy_previous_session(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v1] Input: cyttsp4_core - change del_timer_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync()
by Yang Jihong 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc1 commit dbe836576f12743a7d2d170ad4ad4fd324c4d47a category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QE3F CVE: CVE-2023-4134 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The watchdog_timer can schedule tx_timeout_task and watchdog_work can also arm watchdog_timer. The process is shown below: ----------- timer schedules work ------------ cyttsp4_watchdog_timer() //timer handler schedule_work(&cd->watchdog_work) ----------- work arms timer ------------ cyttsp4_watchdog_work() //workqueue callback function cyttsp4_start_wd_timer() mod_timer(&cd->watchdog_timer, ...) Although del_timer_sync() and cancel_work_sync() are called in cyttsp4_remove(), the timer and workqueue could still be rearmed. As a result, the possible use after free bugs could happen. The process is shown below: (cleanup routine) | (timer and workqueue routine) cyttsp4_remove() | cyttsp4_watchdog_timer() //timer cyttsp4_stop_wd_timer() | schedule_work() del_timer_sync() | | cyttsp4_watchdog_work() //worker | cyttsp4_start_wd_timer() | mod_timer() cancel_work_sync() | | cyttsp4_watchdog_timer() //timer | schedule_work() del_timer_sync() | kfree(cd) //FREE | | cyttsp4_watchdog_work() // reschedule! | cd-> //USE This patch changes del_timer_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(), which could prevent rearming of the timer from the workqueue. Fixes: 17fb1563d69b ("Input: cyttsp4 - add core driver for Cypress TMA4XX touchscreen devices") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230421082919.8471-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/input/touchscreen/cyttsp4_core.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/cyttsp4_core.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/cyttsp4_core.c index 02a73d9a4def..23da4e1974cc 100644 --- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/cyttsp4_core.c +++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/cyttsp4_core.c @@ -1249,9 +1249,8 @@ static void cyttsp4_stop_wd_timer(struct cyttsp4 *cd) * Ensure we wait until the watchdog timer * running on a different CPU finishes */ - del_timer_sync(&cd->watchdog_timer); + timer_shutdown_sync(&cd->watchdog_timer); cancel_work_sync(&cd->watchdog_work); - del_timer_sync(&cd->watchdog_timer); } static void cyttsp4_watchdog_timer(struct timer_list *t) -- 2.30.GIT

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in smb2_write
by Li Lingfeng 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc6 commit 5fe7f7b78290638806211046a99f031ff26164e1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7ST5T CVE: CVE-2023-3865 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- ksmbd_smb2_check_message doesn't validate hdr->NextCommand. If ->NextCommand is bigger than Offset + Length of smb2 write, It will allow oversized smb2 write length. It will cause OOB read in smb2_write. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-21164 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflict: fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c index 62e90b229ad7..58c61482be19 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2misc.c @@ -356,9 +356,16 @@ int ksmbd_smb2_check_message(struct ksmbd_work *work) int command; __u32 clc_len; /* calculated length */ __u32 len = get_rfc1002_len(work->request_buf); + __u32 next_cmd = le32_to_cpu(hdr->NextCommand); - if (le32_to_cpu(hdr->NextCommand) > 0) - len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->NextCommand); + if ((u64)work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off + next_cmd > len) { + pr_err("next command(%u) offset exceeds smb msg size\n", + next_cmd); + return 1; + } + + if (next_cmd > 0) + len = next_cmd; else if (work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off) len -= work->next_smb2_rcv_hdr_off; -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] cxgb4: fix use after free bugs caused by circular dependency problem
by Zhengchao Shao 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc1 commit e50b9b9e8610d47b7c22529443e45a16b1ea3a15 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QE3L CVE: CVE-2023-4133 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The flower_stats_timer can schedule flower_stats_work and flower_stats_work can also arm the flower_stats_timer. The process is shown below: ----------- timer schedules work ------------ ch_flower_stats_cb() //timer handler schedule_work(&adap->flower_stats_work); ----------- work arms timer ------------ ch_flower_stats_handler() //workqueue callback function mod_timer(&adap->flower_stats_timer, ...); When the cxgb4 device is detaching, the timer and workqueue could still be rearmed. The process is shown below: (cleanup routine) | (timer and workqueue routine) remove_one() | free_some_resources() | ch_flower_stats_cb() //timer cxgb4_cleanup_tc_flower() | schedule_work() del_timer_sync() | | ch_flower_stats_handler() //workqueue | mod_timer() cancel_work_sync() | kfree(adapter) //FREE | ch_flower_stats_cb() //timer | adap->flower_stats_work //USE This patch changes del_timer_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(), which could prevent rearming of the timer from the workqueue. Fixes: e0f911c81e93 ("cxgb4: fetch stats for offloaded tc flower flows") Signed-off-by: Duoming Zhou <duoming(a)zju.edu.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230415081227.7463-1-duoming@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_tc_flower.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_tc_flower.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_tc_flower.c index dd9be229819a..d3541159487d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_tc_flower.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_tc_flower.c @@ -1135,7 +1135,7 @@ void cxgb4_cleanup_tc_flower(struct adapter *adap) return; if (adap->flower_stats_timer.function) - del_timer_sync(&adap->flower_stats_timer); + timer_shutdown_sync(&adap->flower_stats_timer); cancel_work_sync(&adap->flower_stats_work); rhashtable_destroy(&adap->flower_tbl); adap->tc_flower_initialized = false; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] tun/tap: fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076 New CVE is CVE-2023-4194. Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: fix out of bounds read in smb2_sess_setup
by Li Nan 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc1 commit 98422bdd4cb3ca4d08844046f6507d7ec2c2b8d8 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189112, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SVRC CVE: CVE-2023-3867 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ksmbd does not consider the case of that smb2 session setup is in compound request. If this is the second payload of the compound, OOB read issue occurs while processing the first payload in the smb2_sess_setup(). Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-21355 Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 996319fbbb92..1cdf19e777c1 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -1296,9 +1296,8 @@ static int decode_negotiation_token(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, static int ntlm_negotiate(struct ksmbd_work *work, struct negotiate_message *negblob, - size_t negblob_len) + size_t negblob_len, struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp) { - struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = smb2_get_msg(work->response_buf); struct challenge_message *chgblob; unsigned char *spnego_blob = NULL; u16 spnego_blob_len; @@ -1403,10 +1402,10 @@ static struct ksmbd_user *session_user(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, return user; } -static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work) +static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work, + struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req, + struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp) { - struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req = smb2_get_msg(work->request_buf); - struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = smb2_get_msg(work->response_buf); struct ksmbd_conn *conn = work->conn; struct ksmbd_session *sess = work->sess; struct channel *chann = NULL; @@ -1539,10 +1538,10 @@ static int ntlm_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work) } #ifdef CONFIG_SMB_SERVER_KERBEROS5 -static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work) +static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work, + struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req, + struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp) { - struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req = smb2_get_msg(work->request_buf); - struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = smb2_get_msg(work->response_buf); struct ksmbd_conn *conn = work->conn; struct ksmbd_session *sess = work->sess; char *in_blob, *out_blob; @@ -1619,7 +1618,9 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work) return 0; } #else -static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work) +static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work, + struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req, + struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp) { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } @@ -1628,8 +1629,8 @@ static int krb5_authenticate(struct ksmbd_work *work) int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *work) { struct ksmbd_conn *conn = work->conn; - struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req = smb2_get_msg(work->request_buf); - struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp = smb2_get_msg(work->response_buf); + struct smb2_sess_setup_req *req; + struct smb2_sess_setup_rsp *rsp; struct ksmbd_session *sess; struct negotiate_message *negblob; unsigned int negblob_len, negblob_off; @@ -1637,6 +1638,8 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *work) ksmbd_debug(SMB, "Received request for session setup\n"); + WORK_BUFFERS(work, req, rsp); + rsp->StructureSize = cpu_to_le16(9); rsp->SessionFlags = 0; rsp->SecurityBufferOffset = cpu_to_le16(72); @@ -1753,7 +1756,7 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *work) if (conn->preferred_auth_mech & (KSMBD_AUTH_KRB5 | KSMBD_AUTH_MSKRB5)) { - rc = krb5_authenticate(work); + rc = krb5_authenticate(work, req, rsp); if (rc) { rc = -EINVAL; goto out_err; @@ -1767,7 +1770,7 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *work) sess->Preauth_HashValue = NULL; } else if (conn->preferred_auth_mech == KSMBD_AUTH_NTLMSSP) { if (negblob->MessageType == NtLmNegotiate) { - rc = ntlm_negotiate(work, negblob, negblob_len); + rc = ntlm_negotiate(work, negblob, negblob_len, rsp); if (rc) goto out_err; rsp->hdr.Status = @@ -1780,7 +1783,7 @@ int smb2_sess_setup(struct ksmbd_work *work) le16_to_cpu(rsp->SecurityBufferLength) - 1); } else if (negblob->MessageType == NtLmAuthenticate) { - rc = ntlm_authenticate(work); + rc = ntlm_authenticate(work, req, rsp); if (rc) goto out_err; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arm64/mpam: mark partid non-exclusive if self-owned
by Yu Liao 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

From: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7SVKK -------------------------------- MPAM manages RMID in a matrix using PARTID as columns and PMG as rows. ------------row----------------------> | | RMID 0 1 2 3 ... 255 | 256 257 258 259 ... 511 | 512 513 514 515 ... 767 v 768 769 770 771 ... 1023 Each time mon_groups is created, a new PARTID will be consumed until all PARTID are exhausted and PMG still has remaining. As a result, RMID greater than 255 cannot be used. mon_groups in the same resource group should reuse PARTID to avoid rmid waste. Fix it by adding 'exclusive' parameter to rmid_remap_bmp_find_step_entry() 1) Allocate non-exclusive rmid for rmid_alloc() 2) Allocate exclusive rmid when 'partid = old_reqpartid' for resctrl_group_rmid_write(). Otherwise, allocate non-exclusive rmid. Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c index 4a1e376ec497..bb241d8071d7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c @@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ static int is_rmid_remap_bmp_full(unsigned long *bmp) bitmap_full(bmp, rmid_remap_matrix.rows)); } -static int rmid_remap_bmp_find_step_entry(int partid) +static int rmid_remap_bmp_find_step_entry(int partid, bool exclusive) { int x, y; unsigned long **bmp; @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ static int rmid_remap_bmp_find_step_entry(int partid) /* step entry should be non-occupied and aligned */ bmp = __rmid_remap_bmp(partid); if (bmp) - return (is_rmid_remap_bmp_occ(*bmp) || + return ((exclusive && is_rmid_remap_bmp_occ(*bmp)) || !__step_align(partid)) ? -ENOSPC : partid; for_each_rmid_transform_point_from(bmp, x, y, 0) { @@ -1024,7 +1024,7 @@ static int rmid_to_partid_pmg(int rmid, int *partid, int *pmg) return 0; } -static int __rmid_alloc(int partid, int pmg) +static int __rmid_alloc(int partid, int pmg, bool exclusive) { int x, y, step, ret, rmid; bool checkpmg = false; @@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ static int __rmid_alloc(int partid, int pmg) checkpmg = true; /* traverse from first non-occupied and step-aligned entry */ - ret = rmid_remap_bmp_find_step_entry(partid); + ret = rmid_remap_bmp_find_step_entry(partid, exclusive); if (ret < 0) goto out; partid = ret; @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static int __rmid_alloc(int partid, int pmg) int rmid_alloc(int partid) { - return __rmid_alloc(partid, -1); + return __rmid_alloc(partid, -1, false); } void rmid_free(int rmid) @@ -1914,6 +1914,7 @@ static ssize_t resctrl_group_rmid_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp; int ret = 0; int partid; + bool exclusive; int pmg; int rmid; int old_rmid; @@ -1954,15 +1955,16 @@ static ssize_t resctrl_group_rmid_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, goto unlock; } - ret = __rmid_alloc(partid, pmg); + old_rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid; + old_reqpartid = rdtgrp->closid.reqpartid; + + exclusive = (partid == old_reqpartid) ? false : true; + ret = __rmid_alloc(partid, pmg, exclusive); if (ret < 0) { rdt_last_cmd_puts("set rmid failed\n"); goto unlock; } - old_rmid = rdtgrp->mon.rmid; - old_reqpartid = rdtgrp->closid.reqpartid; - /* * we use intpartid as group control, use reqpartid for config * synchronization and monitor, only update the reqpartid -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 v2 0/7] sched: Support dynamic affinity in scheduler
by Hui Tang 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

This pathchset support dynamic affinity feature. Dynamic affinity set preferred cpus for task. When the utilization of taskgroup's preferred cpu is low, task only run in cpus preferred to enhance cpu resource locality and reduce interference between task cgroups, otherwise task can burst preferred cpus to use external cpu within cpus allowed. v1 -> v2 - some cleanup fix Hui Tang (1): sched: Add cmdline for dynamic affinity tanghui (6): sched: Introduce dynamic affinity for cfs scheduler cpuset: Introduce new interface for scheduler dynamic affinity sched: Adjust wakeup cpu range according CPU util dynamicly sched: Adjust cpu allowed in load balance dynamicly sched: Add statistics for scheduler dynamic affinity config: enable CONFIG_QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY by default arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + fs/proc/base.c | 73 +++++++++++ include/linux/sched.h | 22 ++++ include/linux/sched/sysctl.h | 3 + init/Kconfig | 10 ++ init/init_task.c | 3 + kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/fork.c | 16 +++ kernel/sched/core.c | 98 +++++++++++++++ kernel/sched/debug.c | 6 + kernel/sched/fair.c | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 11 ++ 13 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.17.1

2 8

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] fix CVE-2023-4128 in OLK510
by Liu Jian 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

fix CVE-2023-4128 in OLK510 valis (3): net/sched: cls_u32: No longer copy tcf_result on update to avoid use-after-free net/sched: cls_fw: No longer copy tcf_result on update to avoid use-after-free net/sched: cls_route: No longer copy tcf_result on update to avoid use-after-free net/sched/cls_fw.c | 1 - net/sched/cls_route.c | 1 - net/sched/cls_u32.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 3 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] tun/tap: fix CVE-2023-4194
by Dong Chenchen 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

The original patches fixing CVE-2023-1076 are incorrect. The patches in this series are supposed to "re-fix" CVE-2023-1076 New CVE is CVE-2023-4194. Laszlo Ersek (2): net: tun_chr_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() net: tap_open(): set sk_uid from current_fsuid() drivers/net/tap.c | 2 +- drivers/net/tun.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

1 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] fix CVE-2023-4128
by Liu Jian 14 Aug '23

14 Aug '23

fix CVE-2023-4128 in openEuler1.0 valis (3): net/sched: cls_u32: No longer copy tcf_result on update to avoid use-after-free net/sched: cls_route: No longer copy tcf_result on update to avoid use-after-free net/sched: cls_fw: No longer copy tcf_result on update to avoid use-after-free net/sched/cls_fw.c | 1 - net/sched/cls_route.c | 1 - net/sched/cls_u32.c | 1 - 3 files changed, 3 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v4 00/15] add support for timer_shutdown() api
by Yu Liao 11 Aug '23

11 Aug '23

timer_shutdown_sync() function is useful for final teardown of an infrastructure where the timer is subject to a circular dependency problem. A common pattern for this is a timer and a workqueue where the timer can schedule work and work can arm the timer. On shutdown the workqueue must be destroyed and the timer must be prevented from rearming. Unless the code has conditionals like 'if (mything->in_shutdown)' to prevent that there is no way to get this correct with timer_delete_sync(). timer_shutdown_sync() is solving the problem. The correct ordering of calls in this case is: timer_shutdown_sync(&mything->timer); workqueue_destroy(&mything->workqueue); After this 'mything' can be safely freed. Steven Rostedt (Google) (3): ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/sp804: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function Thomas Gleixner (10): timers: Get rid of del_singleshot_timer_sync() timers: Replace BUG_ON()s timers: Update kernel-doc for various functions timers: Use del_timer_sync() even on UP timers: Rename del_timer_sync() to timer_delete_sync() timers: Rename del_timer() to timer_delete() timers: Silently ignore timers with a NULL function timers: Split [try_to_]del_timer[_sync]() to prepare for shutdown mode timers: Add shutdown mechanism to the internal functions timers: Provide timer_shutdown[_sync]() Yu Liao (2): sw64: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function timers: Keep del_timer[_sync]() exported arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 +- arch/sw_64/kernel/timer.c | 8 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 4 +- drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 12 +- drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c | 6 +- drivers/misc/sgi-xp/xpc_partition.c | 2 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c | 4 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/prism2usb.c | 6 +- include/linux/timer.h | 15 +- kernel/time/timer.c | 449 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 16

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v3 00/15] add support for timer_shutdown() api
by Yu Liao 11 Aug '23

11 Aug '23

timer_shutdown_sync() function is useful for final teardown of an infrastructure where the timer is subject to a circular dependency problem. A common pattern for this is a timer and a workqueue where the timer can schedule work and work can arm the timer. On shutdown the workqueue must be destroyed and the timer must be prevented from rearming. Unless the code has conditionals like 'if (mything->in_shutdown)' to prevent that there is no way to get this correct with timer_delete_sync(). timer_shutdown_sync() is solving the problem. The correct ordering of calls in this case is: timer_shutdown_sync(&mything->timer); workqueue_destroy(&mything->workqueue); After this 'mything' can be safely freed. Steven Rostedt (Google) (3): ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/sp804: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function Thomas Gleixner (10): timers: Get rid of del_singleshot_timer_sync() timers: Replace BUG_ON()s timers: Update kernel-doc for various functions timers: Use del_timer_sync() even on UP timers: Rename del_timer_sync() to timer_delete_sync() timers: Rename del_timer() to timer_delete() timers: Silently ignore timers with a NULL function timers: Split [try_to_]del_timer[_sync]() to prepare for shutdown mode timers: Add shutdown mechanism to the internal functions timers: Provide timer_shutdown[_sync]() Yu Liao (2): sw64: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function timers: Keep del_timer[_sync]() exported arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 +- arch/sw_64/kernel/timer.c | 8 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 4 +- drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 12 +- drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c | 6 +- drivers/misc/sgi-xp/xpc_partition.c | 2 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c | 4 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/prism2usb.c | 6 +- include/linux/timer.h | 15 +- kernel/time/timer.c | 449 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 386 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 16

[PATCH v2 OLK-5.10 00/13] add support for timer_shutdown() api
by Yu Liao 11 Aug '23

11 Aug '23

timer_shutdown_sync() function is useful for final teardown of an infrastructure where the timer is subject to a circular dependency problem. A common pattern for this is a timer and a workqueue where the timer can schedule work and work can arm the timer. On shutdown the workqueue must be destroyed and the timer must be prevented from rearming. Unless the code has conditionals like 'if (mything->in_shutdown)' to prevent that there is no way to get this correct with timer_delete_sync(). timer_shutdown_sync() is solving the problem. The correct ordering of calls in this case is: timer_shutdown_sync(&mything->timer); workqueue_destroy(&mything->workqueue); After this 'mything' can be safely freed. Steven Rostedt (Google) (2): clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/sp804: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function Thomas Gleixner (10): timers: Get rid of del_singleshot_timer_sync() timers: Replace BUG_ON()s timers: Update kernel-doc for various functions timers: Use del_timer_sync() even on UP timers: Rename del_timer_sync() to timer_delete_sync() timers: Rename del_timer() to timer_delete() timers: Silently ignore timers with a NULL function timers: Split [try_to_]del_timer[_sync]() to prepare for shutdown mode timers: Add shutdown mechanism to the internal functions timers: Provide timer_shutdown[_sync]() Yu Liao (1): timers: Keep del_timer[_sync]() exported drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 4 +- drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 12 +- drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c | 6 +- drivers/misc/sgi-xp/xpc_partition.c | 2 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c | 4 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/prism2usb.c | 6 +- include/linux/timer.h | 15 +- kernel/time/timer.c | 449 ++++++++++++++++++++------ net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 378 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 14

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/17] add support for timer_shutdown() api
by Yu Liao 11 Aug '23

11 Aug '23

timer_shutdown_sync() function is useful for final teardown of an infrastructure where the timer is subject to a circular dependency problem. A common pattern for this is a timer and a workqueue where the timer can schedule work and work can arm the timer. On shutdown the workqueue must be destroyed and the timer must be prevented from rearming. Unless the code has conditionals like 'if (mything->in_shutdown)' to prevent that there is no way to get this correct with timer_delete_sync(). timer_shutdown_sync() is solving the problem. The correct ordering of calls in this case is: timer_shutdown_sync(&mything->timer); workqueue_destroy(&mything->workqueue); After this 'mything' can be safely freed. Steven Rostedt (Google) (4): ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function clocksource/drivers/sp804: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function timers: Update the documentation to reflect on the new timer_shutdown() API Thomas Gleixner (12): Documentation: Remove bogus claim about del_timer_sync() timers: Get rid of del_singleshot_timer_sync() timers: Replace BUG_ON()s timers: Update kernel-doc for various functions timers: Use del_timer_sync() even on UP timers: Rename del_timer_sync() to timer_delete_sync() timers: Rename del_timer() to timer_delete() Documentation: Replace del_timer/del_timer_sync() timers: Silently ignore timers with a NULL function timers: Split [try_to_]del_timer[_sync]() to prepare for shutdown mode timers: Add shutdown mechanism to the internal functions timers: Provide timer_shutdown[_sync]() Yu Liao (1): timers: Keep del_timer[_sync]() exported .../RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst | 2 +- Documentation/core-api/local_ops.rst | 2 +- Documentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst | 17 +- Documentation/timers/hrtimers.rst | 2 +- .../it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst | 14 +- .../translations/zh_CN/core-api/local_ops.rst | 196 ++++++++ arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev-common.c | 4 +- drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 12 +- drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c | 6 +- drivers/misc/sgi-xp/xpc_partition.c | 2 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/hfa384x_usb.c | 4 +- drivers/staging/wlan-ng/prism2usb.c | 6 +- include/linux/timer.h | 15 +- kernel/time/timer.c | 449 ++++++++++++++---- net/sunrpc/xprt.c | 2 +- 16 files changed, 597 insertions(+), 144 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/local_ops.rst -- 2.25.1

1 17

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Cmdline for ARMv8 Pointer Authentication
by GONG, Ruiqi 11 Aug '23

11 Aug '23

GONG, Ruiqi (1): arm64: add cmdline to control ptrauth feature at boot Srinivas Ramana (1): arm64: Defer enabling pointer authentication on boot core arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h | 10 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 4 -- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nf_tables: disallow rule addition to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID
by Lu Wei 10 Aug '23

10 Aug '23

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc4 commit 0ebc1064e4874d5987722a2ddbc18f94aa53b211 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QG0U CVE: CVE-2023-4147 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Bail out with EOPNOTSUPP when adding rule to bound chain via NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID. The following warning splat is shown when adding a rule to a deleted bound chain: WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 13692 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2013 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] CPU: 2 PID: 13692 Comm: chain-bound-rul Not tainted 6.1.39 #1 RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x1f7/0x210 [nf_tables] Fixes: d0e2c7de92c7 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add NFT_CHAIN_BINDING") Reported-by: Kevin Rich <kevinrich1337(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c index b7c915bcdcf2..3b2275b151a2 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c @@ -3255,8 +3255,6 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, NL_SET_BAD_ATTR(extack, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN]); return PTR_ERR(chain); } - if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; } else if (nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID]) { chain = nft_chain_lookup_byid(net, table, nla[NFTA_RULE_CHAIN_ID], @@ -3269,6 +3267,9 @@ static int nf_tables_newrule(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk, return -EINVAL; } + if (nft_chain_is_bound(chain)) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (nla[NFTA_RULE_HANDLE]) { handle = be64_to_cpu(nla_get_be64(nla[NFTA_RULE_HANDLE])); rule = __nft_rule_lookup(chain, handle); -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params
by Zhengchao Shao 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

From: Lin Ma <linma(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc3 commit 00374d9b6d9f932802b55181be9831aa948e5b7c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7NYWN CVE: CVE-2023-3772 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. Fixes: d8647b79c3b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Conflicts: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 87932f6ad9d7..73600b9d42dd 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs, struct nlattr *et = attrs[XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH]; struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH]; - if (re) { + if (re && x->replay_esn && x->preplay_esn) { struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn; replay_esn = nla_data(re); memcpy(x->replay_esn, replay_esn, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params
by Zhengchao Shao 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

From: Lin Ma <linma(a)zju.edu.cn> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc3 commit 00374d9b6d9f932802b55181be9831aa948e5b7c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7NYWN CVE: CVE-2023-3772 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. Fixes: d8647b79c3b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma(a)zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert(a)secunet.com> Conflicts: net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 4a307106f98f..138f71c67969 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static void xfrm_update_ae_params(struct xfrm_state *x, struct nlattr **attrs, struct nlattr *et = attrs[XFRMA_ETIMER_THRESH]; struct nlattr *rt = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_THRESH]; - if (re) { + if (re && x->replay_esn && x->preplay_esn) { struct xfrm_replay_state_esn *replay_esn; replay_esn = nla_data(re); memcpy(x->replay_esn, replay_esn, -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] Backport cgroup: fix missing cpus_read_{lock,unlock}() in cgroup_transfer_tasks()
by Cai Xinchen 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

Backport cgroup: fix missing cpus_read_{lock,unlock}() in cgroup_transfer_tasks() and cgroup: Use cgroup_attach_{lock,unlock}() from cgroup_attach_task_all() Qi Zheng (1): cgroup: fix missing cpus_read_{lock,unlock}() in cgroup_transfer_tasks() Tetsuo Handa (1): cgroup: Use cgroup_attach_{lock,unlock}() from cgroup_attach_task_all() kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h | 2 ++ kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 10 ++++------ kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/25] backport etmem feature from OLK-5.10
by liubo 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

Kemeng Shi (11): etmem: add ioctl for mm idle scan etmem: x86: support scan hugetlb of vm etmem_scan: x86: support scan 4 level ept under 5 level host page table etmem scan: fix memleak in vm_idle_read etmem: fix concurrent access to export file operations etmem: fix potential UAF when walk ept page table etmem_scan: release CPU after scan walk_step size etmem_scan: add pte_hole callback acpi/numa: memorize node type from SRAT table hugepage: add sysctl for hugepage alloc and mig x86: hugepage: use nt copy hugepage to AEP in x86 liubo (14): memig: add memig-scan feature to openEuler memig: add memig-swap feature to openEuler memig: fix compile error when CONFIG_NUMA is turned off etmem: Modify the memig feature name to etmem move ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig and add architecture dependency etmem: etmem scan module Replace WARN_ONCE() with debug_printk for "nothing read" add ETMEM feature CONFIG to mm/Kconfig config: enable CONFIG_ETMEM by default etmem: add CONFIG_ETMEM macro definition for etmem feature etmem: add original kernel swap enabled options etmem: add swapcache reclaim to etmem etmem: Add a scan flag to support specified page swap-out etmem: fix the div 0 problem in swapcache reclaim process etmem: fix some problem during backport etmem patches arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/page_64.h | 7 + arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c | 107 ++ arch/x86/lib/copy_page_64.S | 73 ++ drivers/acpi/numa/srat.c | 5 + fs/proc/Makefile | 2 + fs/proc/base.c | 8 + fs/proc/etmem_scan.c | 1383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/proc/etmem_scan.h | 149 +++ fs/proc/etmem_swap.c | 282 +++++ fs/proc/internal.h | 4 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 194 ++++ include/linux/highmem.h | 17 + include/linux/hugetlb.h | 6 + include/linux/list.h | 17 + include/linux/mm.h | 4 + include/linux/mm_types.h | 18 +- include/linux/numa.h | 12 + include/linux/swap.h | 38 + include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 3 + kernel/sysctl.c | 20 + mm/Kconfig | 25 + mm/huge_memory.c | 1 + mm/hugetlb.c | 7 +- mm/internal.h | 1 - mm/madvise.c | 17 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 13 + mm/pagewalk.c | 1 + mm/swap_state.c | 37 + mm/util.c | 11 +- mm/vmscan.c | 390 +++++++ virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 6 + 34 files changed, 2852 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/lib/copy_highpages.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.c create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_scan.h create mode 100644 fs/proc/etmem_swap.c -- 2.33.0

2 26

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v3 0/4] Mainline bugfix patches backport 5.10
by Guo Mengqi 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

Andy Shevchenko (1): lib/cmdline: fix get_option() for strings starting with hyphen Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Saravana Kannan (1): driver core: Update device link status properly for device_bind_driver() Sumera Priyadarsini (1): bus: arm-integrator-lm: Add of_node_put() before return statement drivers/base/base.h | 1 + drivers/base/core.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 4 +++- drivers/bus/arm-integrator-lm.c | 1 + lib/cmdline.c | 8 +++++++- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 1/2] cgroup: Use cgroup_attach_{lock,unlock}() from cgroup_attach_task_all()
by Cai Xinchen 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.1-rc1 commit 075b593f54f0f3883532cb750081cae6917bc8fe category: cleanup bugzilla: 189018, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RPDX Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- No behavior changes; preparing for potential locking changes in future. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel(a)I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by:Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha(a)quicinc.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h | 2 ++ kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 6 ++---- kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h index 3f116765bb00..6fc71b98209e 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-internal.h @@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ int cgroup_migrate(struct task_struct *leader, bool threadgroup, int cgroup_attach_task(struct cgroup *dst_cgrp, struct task_struct *leader, bool threadgroup); +void cgroup_attach_lock(bool lock_threadgroup); +void cgroup_attach_unlock(bool lock_threadgroup); struct task_struct *cgroup_procs_write_start(char *buf, bool threadgroup, bool *locked) __acquires(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c index 647d0891cff6..d7e2d232acc4 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -57,8 +57,7 @@ int cgroup_attach_task_all(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *tsk) int retval = 0; mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); - cpus_read_lock(); - percpu_down_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); + cgroup_attach_lock(true); for_each_root(root) { struct cgroup *from_cgrp; @@ -73,8 +72,7 @@ int cgroup_attach_task_all(struct task_struct *from, struct task_struct *tsk) if (retval) break; } - percpu_up_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); - cpus_read_unlock(); + cgroup_attach_unlock(true); mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); return retval; diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c index d0a4a1c4c38d..2bc5bae49d20 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c @@ -2367,7 +2367,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(task_cgroup_path); * write-locking cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem. This allows ->attach() to assume that * CPU hotplug is disabled on entry. */ -static void cgroup_attach_lock(bool lock_threadgroup) +void cgroup_attach_lock(bool lock_threadgroup) { cpus_read_lock(); if (lock_threadgroup) @@ -2378,7 +2378,7 @@ static void cgroup_attach_lock(bool lock_threadgroup) * cgroup_attach_unlock - Undo cgroup_attach_lock() * @lock_threadgroup: whether to up_write cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem */ -static void cgroup_attach_unlock(bool lock_threadgroup) +void cgroup_attach_unlock(bool lock_threadgroup) { if (lock_threadgroup) percpu_up_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); -- 2.17.1

2 2

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] cgroup: fix missing cpus_read_{lock,unlock}() in cgroup_transfer_tasks()
by Cai Xinchen 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

From: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc6 commit ab1de7ead871ebe6d12a774c3c25de0388cde082 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RPDX CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?i… -------------------------------- The commit 4f7e7236435c ("cgroup: Fix threadgroup_rwsem <-> cpus_read_lock() deadlock") fixed the deadlock between cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem and cpus_read_lock() by introducing cgroup_attach_{lock,unlock}() and removing cpus_read_{lock,unlock}() from cpuset_attach(). But cgroup_transfer_tasks() was missed and not handled, which will cause th following warning: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 589 at kernel/cpu.c:526 lockdep_assert_cpus_held+0x32/0x40 CPU: 0 PID: 589 Comm: kworker/1:4 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-next-20230517 #50 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cpuset_hotplug_workfn RIP: 0010:lockdep_assert_cpus_held+0x32/0x40 <...> Call Trace: <TASK> cpuset_attach+0x40/0x240 cgroup_migrate_execute+0x452/0x5e0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x40 cgroup_transfer_tasks+0x1f3/0x360 ? find_held_lock+0x32/0x90 ? cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0xc81/0xed0 cpuset_hotplug_workfn+0xcb1/0xed0 ? process_one_work+0x248/0x5b0 process_one_work+0x2b9/0x5b0 worker_thread+0x56/0x3b0 ? process_one_work+0x5b0/0x5b0 kthread+0xf1/0x120 ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> So just use the cgroup_attach_{lock,unlock}() helper to fix it. Reported-by: Zhao Gongyi <zhaogongyi(a)bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com> Acked-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> Fixes: 05c7b7a92cc8 ("cgroup/cpuset: Fix a race between cpuset_attach() and cpu hotplug") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org # v5.17+ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> conflicts: kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c index 8bd36f2143eb..2e3748b1a333 100644 --- a/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c +++ b/kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int cgroup_transfer_tasks(struct cgroup *to, struct cgroup *from) mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex); - percpu_down_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); + cgroup_attach_lock(); /* all tasks in @from are being moved, all csets are source */ spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock); @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ int cgroup_transfer_tasks(struct cgroup *to, struct cgroup *from) } while (task && !ret); out_err: cgroup_migrate_finish(&mgctx); - percpu_up_write(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem); + cgroup_attach_unlock(); mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex); return ret; } -- 2.17.1

2 1

openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会
by openEuler conference 09 Aug '23

09 Aug '23

您好！ Kernel SIG 邀请您参加 2023-08-11 14:00 召开的Zoom会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中欢迎大家积极申报议题（新增议题可直接回复邮件，或直接录入会议看板）会议链接：https://us06web.zoom.us/j/86358182582?pwd=YTRkUmFhb1pSYmFaV1FVUlkwWUZoUT09 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 温馨提醒：建议接入会议后修改参会人的姓名，也可以使用您在gitee.com的ID 更多资讯尽在：https://openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! openEuler Kernel SIG invites you to attend the Zoom conference(auto recording) will be held at 2023-08-11 14:00, The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG双周例会, Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中欢迎大家积极申报议题（新增议题可直接回复邮件，或直接录入会议看板） You can join the meeting at https://us06web.zoom.us/j/86358182582?pwd=YTRkUmFhb1pSYmFaV1FVUlkwWUZoUT09. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings. Note: You are advised to change the participant name after joining the conference or use your ID at gitee.com. More information: https://openeuler.org/en/

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3 0/8] add support for timer_shutdown
by Yu Liao 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

*** BLURB HERE *** Steven Rostedt (Google) (3): [Backport] ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function [Backport] clocksource/drivers/arm_arch_timer: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function [Backport] clocksource/drivers/sp804: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function Thomas Gleixner (5): [Backport] timers: Replace BUG_ON()s [Backport] timers: Silently ignore timers with a NULL function [Backport] timers: Split [try_to_]del_timer[_sync]() to prepare for shutdown mode [Backport] timers: Add shutdown mechanism to the internal functions [Backport] timers: Provide timer_shutdown[_sync]() arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 +- drivers/clocksource/arm_arch_timer.c | 12 +- drivers/clocksource/timer-sp804.c | 6 +- include/linux/timer.h | 2 + kernel/time/timer.c | 326 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- 5 files changed, 284 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 9

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3 1/8] ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function
by Yu Liao 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 80b55772d41d8afec68dbc4ff0368a9fe5d1f390 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R8WG Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A new "shutdown" timer state is being added to the generic timer code. One of the functions to change the timer into the state is called "timer_shutdown()". This means that there can not be other functions called "timer_shutdown()" as the timer code owns the "timer_*" name space. Rename timer_shutdown() to spear_timer_shutdown() to avoid this conflict. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221106212701.822440504@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221105060155.228348078@goodmis.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221110064146.810953418@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123201624.513863211@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c b/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c index 289e036c9c30..57ff0787bad3 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void __init spear_clocksource_init(void) 200, 16, clocksource_mmio_readw_up); } -static inline void timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) +static inline void spear_timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) { u16 val = readw(gpt_base + CR(CLKEVT)); @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline void timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) static int spear_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) { - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); return 0; } @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int spear_set_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *evt) u16 val; /* stop the timer */ - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); val = readw(gpt_base + CR(CLKEVT)); val |= CTRL_ONE_SHOT; @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int spear_set_periodic(struct clock_event_device *evt) u16 val; /* stop the timer */ - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); period = clk_get_rate(gpt_clk) / HZ; period >>= CTRL_PRESCALER16; -- 2.33.0

2 8

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2 1/8] ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function
by Yu Liao 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 80b55772d41d8afec68dbc4ff0368a9fe5d1f390 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R8WG Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A new "shutdown" timer state is being added to the generic timer code. One of the functions to change the timer into the state is called "timer_shutdown()". This means that there can not be other functions called "timer_shutdown()" as the timer code owns the "timer_*" name space. Rename timer_shutdown() to spear_timer_shutdown() to avoid this conflict. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221106212701.822440504@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221105060155.228348078@goodmis.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221110064146.810953418@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123201624.513863211@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c b/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c index 289e036c9c30..57ff0787bad3 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void __init spear_clocksource_init(void) 200, 16, clocksource_mmio_readw_up); } -static inline void timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) +static inline void spear_timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) { u16 val = readw(gpt_base + CR(CLKEVT)); @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline void timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) static int spear_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) { - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); return 0; } @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int spear_set_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *evt) u16 val; /* stop the timer */ - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); val = readw(gpt_base + CR(CLKEVT)); val |= CTRL_ONE_SHOT; @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int spear_set_periodic(struct clock_event_device *evt) u16 val; /* stop the timer */ - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); period = clk_get_rate(gpt_clk) / HZ; period >>= CTRL_PRESCALER16; -- 2.33.0

2 8

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/8] [Backport] ARM: spear: Do not use timer namespace for timer_shutdown() function
by Yu Liao 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.2-rc1 commit 80b55772d41d8afec68dbc4ff0368a9fe5d1f390 bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R8WG Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- A new "shutdown" timer state is being added to the generic timer code. One of the functions to change the timer into the state is called "timer_shutdown()". This means that there can not be other functions called "timer_shutdown()" as the timer code owns the "timer_*" name space. Rename timer_shutdown() to spear_timer_shutdown() to avoid this conflict. Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Anna-Maria Behnsen <anna-maria(a)linutronix.de> Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)arndb.de> Acked-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar(a)linaro.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221106212701.822440504@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221105060155.228348078@goodmis.org/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221110064146.810953418@goodmis.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221123201624.513863211@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Yu Liao <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c b/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c index 289e036c9c30..57ff0787bad3 100644 --- a/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c +++ b/arch/arm/mach-spear/time.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void __init spear_clocksource_init(void) 200, 16, clocksource_mmio_readw_up); } -static inline void timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) +static inline void spear_timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) { u16 val = readw(gpt_base + CR(CLKEVT)); @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static inline void timer_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) static int spear_shutdown(struct clock_event_device *evt) { - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); return 0; } @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static int spear_set_oneshot(struct clock_event_device *evt) u16 val; /* stop the timer */ - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); val = readw(gpt_base + CR(CLKEVT)); val |= CTRL_ONE_SHOT; @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static int spear_set_periodic(struct clock_event_device *evt) u16 val; /* stop the timer */ - timer_shutdown(evt); + spear_timer_shutdown(evt); period = clk_get_rate(gpt_clk) / HZ; period >>= CTRL_PRESCALER16; -- 2.33.0

2 8

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix DMA direction of unmapping integrity data
by Yong Hu 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit cc512539c44f173c2a5fc967e4feb0043bc5773d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b8f6446b6853768cb99e7c201bddce69ca60c15e ] DMA direction should be taken in dma_unmap_page() for unmapping integrity data. Fix this DMA direction, and reported in Guangwu's test. Reported-by: Guangwu Zhang <guazhang(a)redhat.com> Fixes: 4aedb705437f ("nvme-pci: split metadata handling from nvme_map_data / nvme_unmap_data") Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index f1ac50c7a1d6..c3739b895d0d 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -968,7 +968,8 @@ static void nvme_pci_complete_rq(struct request *req) if (blk_integrity_rq(req)) dma_unmap_page(dev->dev, iod->meta_dma, - rq_integrity_vec(req)->bv_len, rq_data_dir(req)); + rq_integrity_vec(req)->bv_len, rq_dma_dir(req)); + if (blk_rq_nr_phys_segments(req)) nvme_unmap_data(dev, req); nvme_complete_rq(req); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] x86/cpu/amd: Add a Zenbleed fix
by Wang ShaoBo 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <bp(a)alien8.de> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.289 commit cfef7bbf0dca27209ea5d82d7060d4fc2c0d72ea category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7RC8S CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- Upstream commit: 522b1d69219d8f083173819fde04f994aa051a98 Add a fix for the Zen2 VZEROUPPER data corruption bug where under certain circumstances executing VZEROUPPER can cause register corruption or leak data. The optimal fix is through microcode but in the case the proper microcode revision has not been applied, enable a fallback fix using a chicken bit. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 + 5 files changed, 66 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h index 91a06cef50c1b..3e398751b73cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode.h @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <linux/earlycpio.h> #include <linux/initrd.h> +#include <asm/microcode_amd.h> struct ucode_patch { struct list_head plist; diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h index 5c524d4f71cd7..bdecac3ae8c3b 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/microcode_amd.h @@ -48,11 +48,13 @@ extern void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int family); extern void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family); extern int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family); void reload_ucode_amd(void); +extern void amd_check_microcode(void); #else static inline void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int family) {} static inline void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int family) {} static inline int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int family) { return -EINVAL; } void reload_ucode_amd(void) {} +static inline void amd_check_microcode(void) {} #endif #endif /* _ASM_X86_MICROCODE_AMD_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h index 779b653f65461..4431a376282ad 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h @@ -404,6 +404,7 @@ #define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS 0xc0010141 #define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG 0xc0011020 #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022 +#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT 9 #define MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 0xc001102a #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL 0xc0011030 #define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHLINAD 0xc0011031 diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index 254bd1c35e528..4d69686c2380f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static const int amd_erratum_383[]; static const int amd_erratum_400[]; +static const int amd_zenbleed[]; static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum); /* @@ -901,6 +902,47 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) } } +static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void) +{ + u32 good_rev = 0; + + switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { + case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break; + case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break; + case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break; + case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break; + case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break; + + default: + return false; + break; + } + + if (boot_cpu_data.microcode < good_rev) + return false; + + return true; +} + +static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed)) + return; + + if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) + return; + + if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AVX)) + return; + + if (!cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode()) { + pr_notice_once("Zenbleed: please update your microcode for the most optimal fix\n"); + msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT); + } else { + msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT); + } +} + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { early_init_amd(c); @@ -995,6 +1037,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS); check_null_seg_clears_base(c); + + zenbleed_check(c); } #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 @@ -1122,6 +1166,10 @@ static const int amd_erratum_400[] = static const int amd_erratum_383[] = AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(3, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xf)); +static const int amd_zenbleed[] = + AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf), + AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf)); static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum) { @@ -1172,3 +1220,15 @@ void set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, int dr) break; } } + +static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused) +{ + struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id()); + + zenbleed_check(c); +} + +void amd_check_microcode(void) +{ + on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1); +} diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index ee8df42c5e1f2..2abc1b53f9314 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -2152,6 +2152,8 @@ void microcode_check(void) perf_check_microcode(); + amd_check_microcode(); + /* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */ info.cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] Revert "arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online"
by Wang ShaoBo 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 189067, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PN0A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- BUG 'sleeping function called from invalid context' reported when setup MPAM driver, it was blamed to 0f4acaeb21a72 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online"), which reported a 'Bad PC' BUG, but missing the right conclusion, finally disabling irqs before calling cpuhp_setup_state() may only affect the probability of reproduction. The reason why triggerring 'Bad PC' BUG report is because mpam_enable() is __init type function, and may schedule out after calling __cpuhp_setup_state()->__might_sleep(), so the space of mpam_enable() might be freed after scheduling back. As we have changed mpam_enable() to non-init type function, we can revert commit 0f4acaeb21a72 directly, to solve these both two problems. Fixes: 0f4acaeb21a72 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c index adf4bc034a51f..b77cea2673c0a 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c @@ -596,11 +596,9 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) pr_err("Failed to setup/init resctrl\n"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - local_irq_disable(); mpam_cpuhp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "mpam:online", mpam_cpu_online, mpam_cpu_offline); - local_irq_enable(); if (mpam_cpuhp_state <= 0) pr_err("Failed to re-register 'dyn' cpuhp callbacks"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_cpuhp_lock); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH 4.19 1/6] dm thin metadata: check fail_io before using data_sm
by Yongqiang Liu 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc8 commit cb65b282c9640c27d3129e2e04b711ce1b352838 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7FIUX CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ---------------------------------------- Must check pmd->fail_io before using pmd->data_sm since pmd->data_sm may be destroyed by other processes. P1(kworker) P2(message) do_worker process_prepared process_prepared_discard_passdown_pt2 dm_pool_dec_data_range pool_message commit dm_pool_commit_metadata ↓ // commit failed metadata_operation_failed abort_transaction dm_pool_abort_metadata __open_or_format_metadata ↓ dm_sm_disk_open ↓ // open failed // pmd->data_sm is NULL dm_sm_dec_blocks ↓ // try to access pmd->data_sm --> UAF As shown above, if dm_pool_commit_metadata() and dm_pool_abort_metadata() fail in pool_message process, kworker may trigger UAF. Fixes: be500ed721a6 ("dm space maps: improve performance with inc/dec on ranges of blocks") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c index e37f468cdbf0..bd9466dc9400 100644 --- a/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c +++ b/drivers/md/dm-thin-metadata.c @@ -1711,13 +1711,15 @@ int dm_thin_remove_range(struct dm_thin_device *td, int dm_pool_block_is_shared(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd, dm_block_t b, bool *result) { - int r; + int r = -EINVAL; uint32_t ref_count; down_read(&pmd->root_lock); - r = dm_sm_get_count(pmd->data_sm, b, &ref_count); - if (!r) - *result = (ref_count > 1); + if (!pmd->fail_io) { + r = dm_sm_get_count(pmd->data_sm, b, &ref_count); + if (!r) + *result = (ref_count > 1); + } up_read(&pmd->root_lock); return r; @@ -1728,10 +1730,14 @@ int dm_pool_inc_data_range(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd, dm_block_t b, dm_block_ int r = 0; down_write(&pmd->root_lock); - for (; b != e; b++) { - r = dm_sm_inc_block(pmd->data_sm, b); - if (r) - break; + if (!pmd->fail_io) { + for (; b != e; b++) { + r = dm_sm_inc_block(pmd->data_sm, b); + if (r) + break; + } + } else { + r = -EINVAL; } up_write(&pmd->root_lock); @@ -1743,10 +1749,14 @@ int dm_pool_dec_data_range(struct dm_pool_metadata *pmd, dm_block_t b, dm_block_ int r = 0; down_write(&pmd->root_lock); - for (; b != e; b++) { - r = dm_sm_dec_block(pmd->data_sm, b); - if (r) - break; + if (!pmd->fail_io) { + for (; b != e; b++) { + r = dm_sm_dec_block(pmd->data_sm, b); + if (r) + break; + } + } else { + r = -EINVAL; } up_write(&pmd->root_lock); -- 2.25.1

1 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size
by Yong Hu 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit dfb6d54893d544151e7f480bc44cfe7823f5ad23 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit c89a529e823d51dd23c7ec0c047c7a454a428541 ] Convert the max size to bytes to match the units of the divisor that calculates the worst-case number of PRP entries. The result is used to determine how many PRP Lists are required. The code was previously rounding this to 1 list, but we can require 2 in the worst case. In that scenario, the driver would corrupt memory beyond the size provided by the mempool. While unlikely to occur (you'd need a 4MB in exactly 127 phys segments on a queue that doesn't support SGLs), this memory corruption has been observed by kfence. Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Fixes: 943e942e6266f ("nvme-pci: limit max IO size and segments to avoid high order allocations") Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index 510ce0c145c7..ef2fcd0ed914 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db, */ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void) { - unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_KB_SZ + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE, - NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE; + unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v4 0/3] Mainline bugfix patches backport 4.19
by Guo Mengqi 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Suravee Suthikulpanit (2): iommu/amd: Use cmpxchg_double() when updating 128-bit IRTE iommu/amd: Restore IRTE.RemapEn bit after programming IRTE drivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] evm: add sm3 config for EVM
by Zhou Shuiqing 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R99G CVE: NA ------------------------------- Add sm3 algo config for EVM hash algorithm Signed-off-by: Zhou Shuiqing <zhoushuiqing2(a)huawei.com> --- security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig index 844f2686cce7..b9a6eb651acf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/evm/Kconfig @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ choice config EVM_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 bool "WP512" depends on CRYPTO_WP512=y + + config EVM_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 + bool "SM3" + depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y endchoice config EVM_DEFAULT_HASH @@ -44,6 +48,7 @@ config EVM_DEFAULT_HASH default "sha256" if EVM_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 default "sha512" if EVM_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 default "wp512" if EVM_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 + default "sm3" if EVM_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 config EVM_ATTR_FSUUID bool "FSUUID (version 2)" -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] uacce: delete the pointer address printing
by Weili Qian 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

From: Kai Ye <yekai13(a)huawei.com> driver inclusion category: cleanup bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R6TQ CVE: NA ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Deleted the kernel pointer address printing by the security check. Signed-off-by: Kai Ye <yekai13(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: JiangShui Yang <yangjiangshui(a)h-partners.com> --- drivers/misc/uacce/uacce.c | 24 +++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/misc/uacce/uacce.c b/drivers/misc/uacce/uacce.c index 6d2961676a54..21a4f5892aff 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/uacce/uacce.c +++ b/drivers/misc/uacce/uacce.c @@ -177,10 +177,8 @@ static long uacce_get_ss_dma(struct uacce_queue *q, void __user *arg) size = slice[slice_idx].size; if (!size) { max_idx = slice[0].total_num - 1; - dev_err(&uacce->dev, "%luth ss region[0x%lx, %lu] no exist, range[[0](0x%llx, %llu) -> [%u](0x%llx, %llu)]\n", - slice_idx, dma, size, - slice[0].dma, slice[0].size, max_idx, - slice[max_idx].dma, slice[max_idx].size); + dev_err(&uacce->dev, "%luth ss region[size = %lu] no exist, range[[0](size = %llu) -> [%u](size = %llu)]\n", + slice_idx, size, slice[0].size, max_idx, slice[max_idx].size); ret = -ENODEV; goto param_check; } @@ -209,9 +207,7 @@ static void uacce_free_dma_buffers(struct uacce_queue *q) return; while (i < qfr->dma_list[0].total_num) { WARN_ON(!qfr->dma_list[i].size || !qfr->dma_list[i].dma); - dev_dbg(pdev, "free dma qfr (kaddr=%lx, dma=%llx)\n", - (unsigned long)(uintptr_t)qfr->dma_list[i].kaddr, - qfr->dma_list[i].dma); + dev_dbg(pdev, "free dma qfr (index = %d)\n", i); dma_free_coherent(pdev, qfr->dma_list[i].size, qfr->dma_list[i].kaddr, qfr->dma_list[i].dma); @@ -550,8 +546,8 @@ static int uacce_alloc_dma_buffers(struct uacce_queue *q, PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK, &slice[i].dma, GFP_KERNEL); if (!slice[i].kaddr) { - dev_err(pdev, "Get dma slice(sz=%lu,dma=0x%llx) fail!\n", - size, slice[i].dma); + dev_err(pdev, "get dma slice(sz = %lu,slice num = %d) fail!\n", + size, i); slice[0].total_num = i; uacce_free_dma_buffers(q); return -ENOMEM; @@ -594,8 +590,8 @@ static int uacce_mmap_dma_buffers(struct uacce_queue *q, slice[i].dma, slice[i].size); if (ret) { - dev_err(pdev, "dma mmap fail(dma=0x%llx,size=0x%llx)!\n", - slice[i].dma, slice[i].size); + dev_err(pdev, "dma mmap fail(dma index = %d, size = %llu)!\n", + i, slice[i].size); goto DMA_MMAP_FAIL; } @@ -846,10 +842,11 @@ static ssize_t dev_state_show(struct device *dev, static ssize_t node_id_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - struct uacce_device *uacce = to_uacce_device(dev); int node_id = -1; #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + struct uacce_device *uacce = to_uacce_device(dev); + node_id = uacce->parent->numa_node; #endif return sysfs_emit(buf, "%d\n", node_id); @@ -858,10 +855,11 @@ static ssize_t node_id_show(struct device *dev, static ssize_t numa_distance_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { - struct uacce_device *uacce = to_uacce_device(dev); int distance = 0; #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA + struct uacce_device *uacce = to_uacce_device(dev); + distance = node_distance(uacce->parent->numa_node, cpu_to_node(smp_processor_id())); #endif -- 2.30.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm/ksm: Remove the ksm_merge_any status
by Longlong Xia 08 Aug '23

08 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R48G ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Remove the ksm_merge_any status, as the ksm status of processes within the same cgroup may not be consistent, since the prctl interface can also change the ksm status of a process. Therefore, the ksm_merge_any status may not always represent the ksm status of all processes within a cgroup. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Longlong Xia <xialonglong1(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/memcontrol.h | 4 ---- mm/memcontrol.c | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/memcontrol.h b/include/linux/memcontrol.h index 16b3666393f2..0219e670a436 100644 --- a/include/linux/memcontrol.h +++ b/include/linux/memcontrol.h @@ -402,11 +402,7 @@ struct mem_cgroup { KABI_RESERVE(3) KABI_RESERVE(4) #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_KSM - KABI_USE(5, bool ksm_merge_any) -#else KABI_RESERVE(5) -#endif #if defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_HUGETLB) && defined(CONFIG_ARM64) KABI_USE(6, struct dhugetlb_pool *hpool) #else diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 5082d0664adf..c32010692a1b 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -5724,9 +5724,6 @@ static int memcg_set_ksm_for_tasks(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, bool enable) struct css_task_iter it; int ret = 0; - if (enable == READ_ONCE(memcg->ksm_merge_any)) - return 0; - css_task_iter_start(&memcg->css, CSS_TASK_ITER_PROCS, &it); while (!ret && (task = css_task_iter_next(&it))) { if (__task_is_dying(task)) @@ -5781,7 +5778,6 @@ static int memory_ksm_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } css_task_iter_end(&it); - seq_printf(m, "merge any state: %d\n", READ_ONCE(memcg->ksm_merge_any)); seq_printf(m, "merge any tasks: %u\n", tasks); seq_printf(m, "ksm_rmap_items %lu\n", ksm_rmap_items); seq_printf(m, "ksm_merging_pages %lu\n", ksm_merging_pages); @@ -5808,8 +5804,6 @@ static ssize_t memory_ksm_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf, if (err) return err; - WRITE_ONCE(memcg->ksm_merge_any, enable); - return nbytes; } #endif /* CONFIG_KSM */ @@ -6374,9 +6368,6 @@ mem_cgroup_css_alloc(struct cgroup_subsys_state *parent_css) if (parent != root_mem_cgroup) memory_cgrp_subsys.broken_hierarchy = true; } -#ifdef CONFIG_KSM - memcg->ksm_merge_any = false; -#endif /* The following stuff does not apply to the root */ if (!parent) { root_mem_cgroup = memcg; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v3 0/4] Mainline bugfix patches backport 4.19
by Guo Mengqi 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Saravana Kannan (1): driver core: Update device link status properly for device_bind_driver() Suravee Suthikulpanit (2): iommu/amd: Use cmpxchg_double() when updating 128-bit IRTE iommu/amd: Restore IRTE.RemapEn bit after programming IRTE drivers/base/base.h | 1 + drivers/base/core.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 4 +++- drivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 19 ++++++++++++++---- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 18 +++++++++++++++-- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v3 0/4] Mainline bugfix patches backport 5.10
by Guo Mengqi 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Andy Shevchenko (1): lib/cmdline: fix get_option() for strings starting with hyphen Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Saravana Kannan (1): driver core: Update device link status properly for device_bind_driver() Sumera Priyadarsini (1): bus: arm-integrator-lm: Add of_node_put() before return statement drivers/base/base.h | 1 + drivers/base/core.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 4 +++- drivers/bus/arm-integrator-lm.c | 1 + lib/cmdline.c | 8 +++++++- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

1 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] Mainilne bugfix patches backport
by Guo Mengqi 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Andy Shevchenko (1): lib/cmdline: fix get_option() for strings starting with hyphen Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Saravana Kannan (1): driver core: Update device link status properly for device_bind_driver() Sumera Priyadarsini (1): bus: arm-integrator-lm: Add of_node_put() before return statement drivers/base/base.h | 1 + drivers/base/core.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 4 +++- drivers/bus/arm-integrator-lm.c | 1 + lib/cmdline.c | 8 +++++++- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 5

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/4] Mainline bugfix patches backport
by Guo Mengqi 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Saravana Kannan (1): driver core: Update device link status properly for device_bind_driver() Suravee Suthikulpanit (2): iommu/amd: Use cmpxchg_double() when updating 128-bit IRTE iommu/amd: Restore IRTE.RemapEn bit after programming IRTE drivers/base/base.h | 1 + drivers/base/core.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 4 +++- drivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 19 ++++++++++++++---- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 18 +++++++++++++++-- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 5

[openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/5] workqueue: Rename "delayed" (delayed by active management) to "inactive"
by Zeng Heng 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit f97a4a1a3f8769e3452885967955e21c88f3f263 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LRJF DTS: DTS2023072811781 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- There are two kinds of "delayed" work items in workqueue subsystem. One is for timer-delayed work items which are visible to workqueue users. The other kind is for work items delayed by active management which can not be directly visible to workqueue users. We mixed the word "delayed" for both kinds and caused somewhat ambiguity. This patch renames the later one (delayed by active management) to "inactive", because it is used for workqueue active management and most of its related symbols are named with "active" or "activate". All "delayed" and "DELAYED" are carefully checked and renamed one by one to avoid accidentally changing the name of the other kind for timer-delayed. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> conflict: kernel/workqueue.c Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/workqueue.h | 4 +-- kernel/workqueue.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/workqueue.h b/include/linux/workqueue.h index 6f2b042fc44c..3ac0fa0c822d 100644 --- a/include/linux/workqueue.h +++ b/include/linux/workqueue.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ void delayed_work_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t); enum { WORK_STRUCT_PENDING_BIT = 0, /* work item is pending execution */ - WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT = 1, /* work item is delayed */ + WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT= 1, /* work item is inactive */ WORK_STRUCT_PWQ_BIT = 2, /* data points to pwq */ WORK_STRUCT_LINKED_BIT = 3, /* next work is linked to this one */ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ enum { WORK_STRUCT_COLOR_BITS = 4, WORK_STRUCT_PENDING = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_PENDING_BIT, - WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT, + WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT, WORK_STRUCT_PWQ = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_PWQ_BIT, WORK_STRUCT_LINKED = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_LINKED_BIT, #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c index 04b558a267ae..fe3c4a292909 100644 --- a/kernel/workqueue.c +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ struct pool_workqueue { /* L: nr of in_flight works */ int nr_active; /* L: nr of active works */ int max_active; /* L: max active works */ - struct list_head delayed_works; /* L: delayed works */ + struct list_head inactive_works; /* L: inactive works */ struct list_head pwqs_node; /* WR: node on wq->pwqs */ struct list_head mayday_node; /* MD: node on wq->maydays */ @@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ static void put_pwq_unlocked(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) } } -static void pwq_activate_delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) +static void pwq_activate_inactive_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct pool_workqueue *pwq = get_work_pwq(work); @@ -1113,16 +1113,16 @@ static void pwq_activate_delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) if (list_empty(&pwq->pool->worklist)) pwq->pool->watchdog_ts = jiffies; move_linked_works(work, &pwq->pool->worklist, NULL); - __clear_bit(WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT, work_data_bits(work)); + __clear_bit(WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT, work_data_bits(work)); pwq->nr_active++; } -static void pwq_activate_first_delayed(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) +static void pwq_activate_first_inactive(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) { - struct work_struct *work = list_first_entry(&pwq->delayed_works, + struct work_struct *work = list_first_entry(&pwq->inactive_works, struct work_struct, entry); - pwq_activate_delayed_work(work); + pwq_activate_inactive_work(work); } /** @@ -1145,10 +1145,10 @@ static void pwq_dec_nr_in_flight(struct pool_workqueue *pwq, int color) pwq->nr_in_flight[color]--; pwq->nr_active--; - if (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { - /* one down, submit a delayed one */ + if (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { + /* one down, submit an inactive one */ if (pwq->nr_active < pwq->max_active) - pwq_activate_first_delayed(pwq); + pwq_activate_first_inactive(pwq); } /* is flush in progress and are we at the flushing tip? */ @@ -1246,14 +1246,14 @@ static int try_to_grab_pending(struct work_struct *work, bool is_dwork, debug_work_deactivate(work); /* - * A delayed work item cannot be grabbed directly because + * An inactive work item cannot be grabbed directly because * it might have linked NO_COLOR work items which, if left - * on the delayed_list, will confuse pwq->nr_active + * on the inactive_works list, will confuse pwq->nr_active * management later on and cause stall. Make sure the work * item is activated before grabbing. */ - if (*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED) - pwq_activate_delayed_work(work); + if (*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE) + pwq_activate_inactive_work(work); list_del_init(&work->entry); pwq_dec_nr_in_flight(pwq, get_work_color(work)); @@ -1451,8 +1451,8 @@ static void __queue_work(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq, if (list_empty(worklist)) pwq->pool->watchdog_ts = jiffies; } else { - work_flags |= WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED; - worklist = &pwq->delayed_works; + work_flags |= WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE; + worklist = &pwq->inactive_works; } debug_work_activate(work); @@ -2496,7 +2496,7 @@ static int rescuer_thread(void *__rescuer) /* * The above execution of rescued work items could * have created more to rescue through - * pwq_activate_first_delayed() or chained + * pwq_activate_first_inactive() or chained * queueing. Let's put @pwq back on mayday list so * that such back-to-back work items, which may be * being used to relieve memory pressure, don't @@ -2922,7 +2922,7 @@ void drain_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq) bool drained; spin_lock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock); - drained = !pwq->nr_active && list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works); + drained = !pwq->nr_active && list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works); spin_unlock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock); if (drained) @@ -3703,7 +3703,7 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(struct work_struct *work) * @pwq: target pool_workqueue * * If @pwq isn't freezing, set @pwq->max_active to the associated - * workqueue's saved_max_active and activate delayed work items + * workqueue's saved_max_active and activate inactive work items * accordingly. If @pwq is freezing, clear @pwq->max_active to zero. */ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) @@ -3732,9 +3732,9 @@ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) pwq->max_active = wq->saved_max_active; - while (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works) && + while (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works) && pwq->nr_active < pwq->max_active) { - pwq_activate_first_delayed(pwq); + pwq_activate_first_inactive(pwq); kick = true; } @@ -3765,7 +3765,7 @@ static void init_pwq(struct pool_workqueue *pwq, struct workqueue_struct *wq, pwq->wq = wq; pwq->flush_color = -1; pwq->refcnt = 1; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->delayed_works); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->inactive_works); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->pwqs_node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->mayday_node); INIT_WORK(&pwq->unbound_release_work, pwq_unbound_release_workfn); @@ -4386,7 +4386,7 @@ void destroy_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq) if (WARN_ON((pwq != wq->dfl_pwq) && (pwq->refcnt > 1)) || WARN_ON(pwq->nr_active) || - WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works))) { + WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works))) { mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex); show_workqueue_state(); return; @@ -4527,7 +4527,7 @@ bool workqueue_congested(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq) else pwq = unbound_pwq_by_node(wq, cpu_to_node(cpu)); - ret = !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works); + ret = !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works); rcu_read_unlock_sched(); return ret; @@ -4722,11 +4722,11 @@ static void show_pwq(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) pr_cont("\n"); } - if (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { + if (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { bool comma = false; - pr_info(" delayed:"); - list_for_each_entry(work, &pwq->delayed_works, entry) { + pr_info(" inactive:"); + list_for_each_entry(work, &pwq->inactive_works, entry) { pr_cont_work(comma, work); comma = !(*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_LINKED); } @@ -4756,7 +4756,7 @@ void show_workqueue_state(void) bool idle = true; for_each_pwq(pwq, wq) { - if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { + if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { idle = false; break; } @@ -4768,7 +4768,7 @@ void show_workqueue_state(void) for_each_pwq(pwq, wq) { spin_lock_irqsave(&pwq->pool->lock, flags); - if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) + if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) show_pwq(pwq); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pwq->pool->lock, flags); /* @@ -5143,7 +5143,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(work_on_cpu_safe); * freeze_workqueues_begin - begin freezing workqueues * * Start freezing workqueues. After this function returns, all freezable - * workqueues will queue new works to their delayed_works list instead of + * workqueues will queue new works to their inactive_works list instead of * pool->worklist. * * CONTEXT: -- 2.25.1

1 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/4] Mainline bugfix patches backport
by Guo Mengqi 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Backported 4 bugfix patches from mainline. Huang Shijie (1): lib/genalloc.c: change return type to unsigned long for bitmap_set_ll Saravana Kannan (1): driver core: Update device link status properly for device_bind_driver() Suravee Suthikulpanit (2): iommu/amd: Use cmpxchg_double() when updating 128-bit IRTE iommu/amd: Restore IRTE.RemapEn bit after programming IRTE drivers/base/base.h | 1 + drivers/base/core.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/base/dd.c | 4 +++- drivers/iommu/Kconfig | 2 +- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu.c | 19 ++++++++++++++---- drivers/iommu/amd_iommu_init.c | 18 +++++++++++++++-- lib/genalloc.c | 3 ++- 7 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: fix improper element removal
by Lu Wei 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit 3a91099ecd59a42d1632fcb152bf7222f268ea2b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7P3TK CVE: CVE-2023-4004 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 87b5a5c209405cb6b57424cdfa226a6dbd349232 ] end key should be equal to start unless NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END is present. Its possible to add elements that only have a start key ("{ 1.0.0.0 . 2.0.0.0 }") without an internval end. Insertion treats this via: if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END)) end = (const u8 *)nft_set_ext_key_end(ext)->data; else end = start; but removal side always uses nft_set_ext_key_end(). This is wrong and leads to garbage remaining in the set after removal next lookup/insert attempt will give: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pipapo_get+0x8eb/0xb90 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100d50586 by task nft-pipapo_uaf_/1399 Call Trace: kasan_report+0x105/0x140 pipapo_get+0x8eb/0xb90 nft_pipapo_insert+0x1dc/0x1710 nf_tables_newsetelem+0x31f5/0x4e00 .. Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges") Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c index 30cf0673d6c1..4781cdb63431 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c @@ -1904,7 +1904,11 @@ static void nft_pipapo_remove(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, int i, start, rules_fx; match_start = data; - match_end = (const u8 *)nft_set_ext_key_end(&e->ext)->data; + + if (nft_set_ext_exists(&e->ext, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END)) + match_end = (const u8 *)nft_set_ext_key_end(&e->ext)->data; + else + match_end = data; start = first_rule; rules_fx = rules_f0; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix page size checks
by Yong Hu 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit cc512539c44f173c2a5fc967e4feb0043bc5773d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 841734234a28fd5cd0889b84bd4d93a0988fa11e ] The size allocated out of the dma pool is at most NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE, which may be smaller than the PAGE_SIZE. Fixes: c61b82c7b7134 ("nvme-pci: fix PRP pool size") Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index ef2fcd0ed914..f1ac50c7a1d6 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #define SQ_SIZE(q) ((q)->q_depth << (q)->sqes) #define CQ_SIZE(q) ((q)->q_depth * sizeof(struct nvme_completion)) -#define SGES_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc)) +#define SGES_PER_PAGE (NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc)) /* * These can be higher, but we need to ensure that any command doesn't @@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void) { unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE; unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); - return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8); + return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE - 8); } /* @@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void) static int nvme_pci_npages_sgl(void) { return DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_SEGS * sizeof(struct nvme_sgl_desc), - PAGE_SIZE); + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); } static size_t nvme_pci_iod_alloc_size(void) @@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ static void nvme_pci_sgl_set_seg(struct nvme_sgl_desc *sge, sge->length = cpu_to_le32(entries * sizeof(*sge)); sge->type = NVME_SGL_FMT_LAST_SEG_DESC << 4; } else { - sge->length = cpu_to_le32(PAGE_SIZE); + sge->length = cpu_to_le32(NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); sge->type = NVME_SGL_FMT_SEG_DESC << 4; } } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix mempool alloc size
by Yong Hu 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit dfb6d54893d544151e7f480bc44cfe7823f5ad23 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… [ Upstream commit c89a529e823d51dd23c7ec0c047c7a454a428541 ] Convert the max size to bytes to match the units of the divisor that calculates the worst-case number of PRP entries. The result is used to determine how many PRP Lists are required. The code was previously rounding this to 1 list, but we can require 2 in the worst case. In that scenario, the driver would corrupt memory beyond the size provided by the mempool. While unlikely to occur (you'd need a 4MB in exactly 127 phys segments on a queue that doesn't support SGLs), this memory corruption has been observed by kfence. Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Fixes: 943e942e6266f ("nvme-pci: limit max IO size and segments to avoid high order allocations") Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Reviewed-by: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k(a)samsung.com> Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index 510ce0c145c7..ef2fcd0ed914 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -372,8 +372,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db, */ static int nvme_pci_npages_prp(void) { - unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(NVME_MAX_KB_SZ + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE, - NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned max_bytes = (NVME_MAX_KB_SZ * 1024) + NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE; + unsigned nprps = DIV_ROUND_UP(max_bytes, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE); return DIV_ROUND_UP(8 * nprps, PAGE_SIZE - 8); } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix doorbell buffer value endianness
by Yong Hu 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen(a)samsung.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit f5d8738fbe33e71959b5a69221ecf515032d3fc7 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?h=… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b5f96cb719d8ba220b565ddd3ba4ac0d8bcfb130 ] When using shadow doorbells, the event index and the doorbell values are written to host memory. Prior to this patch, the values written would erroneously be written in host endianness. This causes trouble on big-endian platforms. Fix this by adding missing endian conversions. This issue was noticed by Guenter while testing various big-endian platforms under QEMU[1]. A similar fix required for hw/nvme in QEMU is up for review as well[2]. [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20221209110022.GA3396194@roeck-us.net/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/20221212114409.34972-4-its@irrelevant.dk/ Fixes: f9f38e33389c ("nvme: improve performance for virtual NVMe devices") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Klaus Jensen <k.jensen(a)samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 25 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index 72fe56857cb0..510ce0c145c7 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -139,9 +139,9 @@ struct nvme_dev { mempool_t *iod_mempool; /* shadow doorbell buffer support: */ - u32 *dbbuf_dbs; + __le32 *dbbuf_dbs; dma_addr_t dbbuf_dbs_dma_addr; - u32 *dbbuf_eis; + __le32 *dbbuf_eis; dma_addr_t dbbuf_eis_dma_addr; /* host memory buffer support: */ @@ -209,10 +209,10 @@ struct nvme_queue { #define NVMEQ_SQ_CMB 1 #define NVMEQ_DELETE_ERROR 2 #define NVMEQ_POLLED 3 - u32 *dbbuf_sq_db; - u32 *dbbuf_cq_db; - u32 *dbbuf_sq_ei; - u32 *dbbuf_cq_ei; + __le32 *dbbuf_sq_db; + __le32 *dbbuf_cq_db; + __le32 *dbbuf_sq_ei; + __le32 *dbbuf_cq_ei; struct completion delete_done; }; @@ -334,11 +334,11 @@ static inline int nvme_dbbuf_need_event(u16 event_idx, u16 new_idx, u16 old) } /* Update dbbuf and return true if an MMIO is required */ -static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db, - volatile u32 *dbbuf_ei) +static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, __le32 *dbbuf_db, + volatile __le32 *dbbuf_ei) { if (dbbuf_db) { - u16 old_value; + u16 old_value, event_idx; /* * Ensure that the queue is written before updating @@ -346,8 +346,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db, */ wmb(); - old_value = *dbbuf_db; - *dbbuf_db = value; + old_value = le32_to_cpu(*dbbuf_db); + *dbbuf_db = cpu_to_le32(value); /* * Ensure that the doorbell is updated before reading the event @@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ static bool nvme_dbbuf_update_and_check_event(u16 value, u32 *dbbuf_db, */ mb(); - if (!nvme_dbbuf_need_event(*dbbuf_ei, value, old_value)) + event_idx = le32_to_cpu(*dbbuf_ei); + if (!nvme_dbbuf_need_event(event_idx, value, old_value)) return false; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: fix improper element removal
by Lu Wei 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit 3a91099ecd59a42d1632fcb152bf7222f268ea2b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7P3TK CVE: CVE-2023-4004 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 87b5a5c209405cb6b57424cdfa226a6dbd349232 ] end key should be equal to start unless NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END is present. Its possible to add elements that only have a start key ("{ 1.0.0.0 . 2.0.0.0 }") without an internval end. Insertion treats this via: if (nft_set_ext_exists(ext, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END)) end = (const u8 *)nft_set_ext_key_end(ext)->data; else end = start; but removal side always uses nft_set_ext_key_end(). This is wrong and leads to garbage remaining in the set after removal next lookup/insert attempt will give: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pipapo_get+0x8eb/0xb90 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100d50586 by task nft-pipapo_uaf_/1399 Call Trace: kasan_report+0x105/0x140 pipapo_get+0x8eb/0xb90 nft_pipapo_insert+0x1dc/0x1710 nf_tables_newsetelem+0x31f5/0x4e00 .. Fixes: 3c4287f62044 ("nf_tables: Add set type for arbitrary concatenation of ranges") Reported-by: lonial con <kongln9170(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c index 30cf0673d6c1..4781cdb63431 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c @@ -1904,7 +1904,11 @@ static void nft_pipapo_remove(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set, int i, start, rules_fx; match_start = data; - match_end = (const u8 *)nft_set_ext_key_end(&e->ext)->data; + + if (nft_set_ext_exists(&e->ext, NFT_SET_EXT_KEY_END)) + match_end = (const u8 *)nft_set_ext_key_end(&e->ext)->data; + else + match_end = data; start = first_rule; rules_fx = rules_f0; -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] sched: disable sched_autogroup by default
by Jialin Zhang 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: performance bugzilla: 32059, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I65DOZ CVE: NA -------------------------------- This option optimizes the scheduler for common desktop workloads by automatically creating and populating task groups. This separation of workloads isolates aggressive CPU burners (like build jobs) from desktop applications. Task group autogeneration is currently based upon task session. We do not need this for mostly server workloads, so just disable by default. If you need this feature really, just enable it by sysctl: sysctl -w kernel.sched_autogroup_enabled=1 Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/autogroup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/autogroup.c b/kernel/sched/autogroup.c index 2d4ff5353ded..640d4019deac 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/autogroup.c +++ b/kernel/sched/autogroup.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ #include <linux/nospec.h> #include "sched.h" -unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_sched_autogroup_enabled = 1; +unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_sched_autogroup_enabled; static struct autogroup autogroup_default; static atomic_t autogroup_seq_nr; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tty: fix pid memleak in disassociate_ctty()
by Yi Yang 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LEZX -------------------------------- There is memleak in alloc_pid: ------------------------------ unreferenced object 0xffff88810c181940 (size 224): comm "sshd", pid 8191, jiffies 4294946950 (age 524.570s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de .............N.. ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........ backtrace: [<ffffffff814774e6>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5c6/0x9b0 [<ffffffff81177342>] alloc_pid+0x72/0x570 [<ffffffff81140ac4>] copy_process+0x1374/0x2470 [<ffffffff81141d77>] kernel_clone+0xb7/0x900 [<ffffffff81142645>] __se_sys_clone+0x85/0xb0 [<ffffffff8114269b>] __x64_sys_clone+0x2b/0x30 [<ffffffff83965a72>] do_syscall_64+0x32/0x80 [<ffffffff83a00085>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 The pid memleak is triggered by the following race: task[sshd] task[bash] ----------------------- ----------------------- do_exit(); disassociate_ctty(); spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); put_pid(current->signal->tty_old_pgrp); current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = NULL; tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty); //tty is not NULL spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); tty_vhangup(); tty_lock(tty); ... tty_signal_session_leader(); spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); ... p->signal->tty_old_pgrp = get_pid(tty->pgrp); // tty_old_pgrp reassign spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); ... tty_unlock(tty); if (tty) { tty_lock(tty); ... put_pid(tty->pgrp); tty->pgrp = NULL;// It's too late ... tty_unlock(tty); } in task[bash], tty_old_pgrp is released by disassociate_ctty(), then it's reassigned by tty_signal_session_leader() in task[sshd], cause memleak. fix the memleak by add put_pid() in disassociate_ctty() after tty_old_pgrp is reassigned. Fixes: c8bcd9c5be24 ("tty: Fix ->session locking") Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c b/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c index aa6d0537b379..56c791c81b4f 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c @@ -308,6 +308,18 @@ void disassociate_ctty(int on_exit) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags); tty_unlock(tty); tty_kref_put(tty); + + /* + * Race with tty_signal_session_leader(), current->signal + * ->tty_old_pgrp may be reassigned, put_pid() again to ensure + * the pid does not leak memory. + */ + if (on_exit) { + spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); + put_pid(current->signal->tty_old_pgrp); + current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = NULL; + spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); + } } /* Now clear signal->tty under the lock */ -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: fix timeout request state check
by Yong Hu 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit 5f10f7efe0fc97c0ee2112a1032914f6fb2f940c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R4BC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1c5842085851f786eba24a39ecd02650ad892064 ] Polling the completion can progress the request state to IDLE, either inline with the completion, or through softirq. Either way, the state may not be COMPLETED, so don't check for that. We only care if the state isn't IN_FLIGHT. This is fixing an issue where the driver aborts an IO that we just completed. Seeing the "aborting" message instead of "polled" is very misleading as to where the timeout problem resides. Fixes: bf392a5dc02a9b ("nvme-pci: Remove tag from process cq") Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index 8965ea20f5ef..72fe56857cb0 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -1291,7 +1291,7 @@ static enum blk_eh_timer_return nvme_timeout(struct request *req, bool reserved) else nvme_poll_irqdisable(nvmeq); - if (blk_mq_request_completed(req)) { + if (blk_mq_rq_state(req) != MQ_RQ_IN_FLIGHT) { dev_warn(dev->ctrl.device, "I/O %d QID %d timeout, completion polled\n", req->tag, nvmeq->qid); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 0/8] arm64: Add framework to turn an IPI as NMI
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

arm64: Add framework to turn an IPI as NMI Sumit Garg (7): arm64: Add framework to turn IPI as NMI irqchip/gic-v3: Enable support for SGIs to act as NMIs arm64: smp: Assign and setup an IPI as NMI nmi: backtrace: Allow runtime arch specific override arm64: ipi_nmi: Add support for NMI backtrace kgdb: Expose default CPUs roundup fallback mechanism arm64: kgdb: Roundup cpus using IPI as NMI Xiongfeng Wang (1): arm64: ipi_nmi: fix compile error when CONFIG_KGDB is disabled arch/arm/include/asm/irq.h | 2 +- arch/arm/kernel/smp.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/irq.h | 6 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/nmi.h | 17 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/ipi_nmi.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/kgdb.c | 18 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 +++ arch/mips/include/asm/irq.h | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 3 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nmi.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/irq_64.h | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/irq.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c | 3 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 29 ++++++++--- include/linux/kgdb.h | 12 +++++ include/linux/nmi.h | 12 ++--- kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 8 ++- 20 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/nmi.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ipi_nmi.c -- 2.34.1

2 9

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] tty: fix pid memleak in disassociate_ctty()
by Yi Yang 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PBYJ -------------------------------- There is memleak in alloc_pid: ------------------------------ unreferenced object 0xffff88810c181940 (size 224): comm "sshd", pid 8191, jiffies 4294946950 (age 524.570s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de .............N.. ff ff ff ff 6b 6b 6b 6b ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ....kkkk........ backtrace: [<ffffffff814774e6>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x5c6/0x9b0 [<ffffffff81177342>] alloc_pid+0x72/0x570 [<ffffffff81140ac4>] copy_process+0x1374/0x2470 [<ffffffff81141d77>] kernel_clone+0xb7/0x900 [<ffffffff81142645>] __se_sys_clone+0x85/0xb0 [<ffffffff8114269b>] __x64_sys_clone+0x2b/0x30 [<ffffffff83965a72>] do_syscall_64+0x32/0x80 [<ffffffff83a00085>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xc6 The pid memleak is triggered by the following race: task[sshd] task[bash] ----------------------- ----------------------- do_exit(); disassociate_ctty(); spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); put_pid(current->signal->tty_old_pgrp); current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = NULL; tty = tty_kref_get(current->signal->tty); //tty is not NULL spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); tty_vhangup(); tty_lock(tty); ... tty_signal_session_leader(); spin_lock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); ... p->signal->tty_old_pgrp = get_pid(tty->pgrp); // tty_old_pgrp reassign spin_unlock_irq(&p->sighand->siglock); ... tty_unlock(tty); if (tty) { tty_lock(tty); ... put_pid(tty->pgrp); tty->pgrp = NULL;// It's too late ... tty_unlock(tty); } in task[bash], tty_old_pgrp is released by disassociate_ctty(), then it's reassigned by tty_signal_session_leader() in task[sshd], cause memleak. fix the memleak by add put_pid() in disassociate_ctty() after tty_old_pgrp is reassigned. Fixes: c8bcd9c5be24 ("tty: Fix ->session locking") Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c b/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c index ffcab80ba77d..e04360de3757 100644 --- a/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_jobctrl.c @@ -308,6 +308,18 @@ void disassociate_ctty(int on_exit) spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tty->ctrl_lock, flags); tty_unlock(tty); tty_kref_put(tty); + + /* + * Race with tty_signal_session_leader(), current->signal + * ->tty_old_pgrp may be reassigned, put_pid() again to ensure + * the pid does not leak memory. + */ + if (on_exit) { + spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); + put_pid(current->signal->tty_old_pgrp); + current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = NULL; + spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock); + } } /* Now clear signal->tty under the lock */ -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 0/8] arm64: Add framework to turn an IPI as NMI
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

arm64: Add framework to turn an IPI as NMI Sumit Garg (7): arm64: Add framework to turn IPI as NMI irqchip/gic-v3: Enable support for SGIs to act as NMIs arm64: smp: Assign and setup an IPI as NMI nmi: backtrace: Allow runtime arch specific override arm64: ipi_nmi: Add support for NMI backtrace kgdb: Expose default CPUs roundup fallback mechanism arm64: kgdb: Roundup cpus using IPI as NMI Xiongfeng Wang (1): arm64: ipi_nmi: fix compile error when CONFIG_KGDB is disabled arch/arm/include/asm/irq.h | 2 +- arch/arm/kernel/smp.c | 3 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/irq.h | 6 +++ arch/arm64/include/asm/nmi.h | 17 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/ipi_nmi.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/kgdb.c | 18 +++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/smp.c | 8 +++ arch/mips/include/asm/irq.h | 2 +- arch/mips/kernel/process.c | 3 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nmi.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/stacktrace.c | 3 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/irq_64.h | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/process_64.c | 4 +- arch/x86/include/asm/irq.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/apic/hw_nmi.c | 3 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 29 ++++++++--- include/linux/kgdb.h | 12 +++++ include/linux/nmi.h | 12 ++--- kernel/debug/debug_core.c | 8 ++- 20 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/nmi.h create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ipi_nmi.c -- 2.34.1

2 9

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] can: bcm: Fix UAF in bcm_proc_show()
by Dong Chenchen 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc1 commit 55c3b96074f3f9b0aee19bf93cd71af7516582bb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R1N4 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888155846230 by task cat/7862 CPU: 1 PID: 7862 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-00153-gc8746099c197 #230 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xd5/0x150 print_report+0xc1/0x5e0 kasan_report+0xba/0xf0 bcm_proc_show+0x969/0xa80 seq_read_iter+0x4f6/0x1260 seq_read+0x165/0x210 proc_reg_read+0x227/0x300 vfs_read+0x1d5/0x8d0 ksys_read+0x11e/0x240 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Allocated by task 7846: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x9e/0xa0 bcm_sendmsg+0x264b/0x44e0 sock_sendmsg+0xda/0x180 ____sys_sendmsg+0x735/0x920 ___sys_sendmsg+0x11d/0x1b0 __sys_sendmsg+0xfa/0x1d0 do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd Freed by task 7846: kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 ____kasan_slab_free+0x161/0x1c0 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x119/0x220 __kmem_cache_free+0xb4/0x2e0 rcu_core+0x809/0x1bd0 bcm_op is freed before procfs entry be removed in bcm_release(), this lead to bcm_proc_show() may read the freed bcm_op. Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan(a)hartkopp.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230715092543.15548-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl(a)pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/can/bcm.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c index f0af3861c959..a78d4ddd615a 100644 --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -1506,6 +1506,12 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) lock_sock(sk); +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_FS) + /* remove procfs entry */ + if (net->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) + remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, net->can.bcmproc_dir); +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->tx_ops, list) bcm_remove_op(op); @@ -1541,12 +1547,6 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock) list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list) bcm_remove_op(op); -#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_FS) - /* remove procfs entry */ - if (net->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) - remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, net->can.bcmproc_dir); -#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ - /* remove device reference */ if (bo->bound) { bo->bound = 0; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] Revert "arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online"
by Wang ShaoBo 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 189067, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PN0A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- BUG 'sleeping function called from invalid context' reported when setup MPAM driver, it was blamed to bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online"), which reported a 'Bad PC' BUG, but missing the right conclusion, finally disabling irqs before calling cpuhp_setup_state() may only affect the probability of reproduction. The reason why triggerring 'Bad PC' BUG report is because mpam_enable() is __init type function, and may schedule out after calling __cpuhp_setup_state()->__might_sleep(), so the space of mpam_enable() might be freed after scheduling back. As we have changed mpam_enable() to non-init type function, we can revert commit bc9e3f9895ef2 directly, to solve these both two problems. Fixes: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c index c59f7f09308dc..bb88db115a86c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c @@ -596,11 +596,9 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) pr_err("Failed to setup/init resctrl\n"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - local_irq_disable(); mpam_cpuhp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "mpam:online", mpam_cpu_online, mpam_cpu_offline); - local_irq_enable(); if (mpam_cpuhp_state <= 0) pr_err("Failed to re-register 'dyn' cpuhp callbacks"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_cpuhp_lock); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

2 3

【开发过程疑问】
by Hu, Yong 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

问题描述： x86服务器上安装openEuler 22.03-LTS官方发布的ISO后运行oech测试，kabi及system测试通过。而基于openEuler官方gitee仓库中的openEuler-22.03-LTS分支升级kernel镜像后，运行oech测试中kabi测试失败。我们的疑问： 1. 为什么使用官方代码升级kernel后oech测试中的kabi测试会失败？ 2. oech中kabi测试项的测试原理是什么？ 3. 如何定位和解决kabi测试失败的问题？期待社区的回复和解答谢谢！

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] x86/apic: Fix kernel panic when booting with intremap=off and x2apic_phys
by Lin Yujun 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

From: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava <dheerajkumar.srivastava(a)amd.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.288 commit 6f639f6ad1796d291f5e0ea4bd5a47968c9c1f81 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7R0M9 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 85d38d5810e285d5aec7fb5283107d1da70c12a9 ] When booting with "intremap=off" and "x2apic_phys" on the kernel command line, the physical x2APIC driver ends up being used even when x2APIC mode is disabled ("intremap=off" disables x2APIC mode). This happens because the first compound condition check in x2apic_phys_probe() is false due to x2apic_mode == 0 and so the following one returns true after default_acpi_madt_oem_check() having already selected the physical x2APIC driver. This results in the following panic: kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c:2409! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.4.0-rc2-ver4.1rc2 #2 Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6515/07PXPY, BIOS 2.3.6 07/06/2021 RIP: 0010:setup_IO_APIC+0x9c/0xaf0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? native_read_msr apic_intr_mode_init x86_late_time_init start_kernel x86_64_start_reservations x86_64_start_kernel secondary_startup_64_no_verify </TASK> which is: setup_IO_APIC: apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "ENABLING IO-APIC IRQs\n"); for_each_ioapic(ioapic) BUG_ON(mp_irqdomain_create(ioapic)); Return 0 to denote that x2APIC has not been enabled when probing the physical x2APIC driver. [ bp: Massage commit message heavily. ] Fixes: 9ebd680bd029 ("x86, apic: Use probe routines to simplify apic selection") Signed-off-by: Dheeraj Kumar Srivastava <dheerajkumar.srivastava(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde(a)amd.com> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx(a)linutronix.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230616212236.1389-1-dheerajkumar.srivastava@amd… Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lin Yujun <linyujun809(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c index b5cf9e7b3830..78790c4bfdeb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_phys.c @@ -94,7 +94,10 @@ static void init_x2apic_ldr(void) static int x2apic_phys_probe(void) { - if (x2apic_mode && (x2apic_phys || x2apic_fadt_phys())) + if (!x2apic_mode) + return 0; + + if (x2apic_phys || x2apic_fadt_phys()) return 1; return apic == &apic_x2apic_phys; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10 PATCH] vfio-pci: Match specific devices with vendor id and device id
by Kunkun Jiang 07 Aug '23

07 Aug '23

virt inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QPGW CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------------------------ In probe_vendor_drivers, all registered vendor drivers are traversed. This is not a good idea. If a vendor driver is not implemented well enough, it may cause the system to panic. Use the vendor id and device id to select a proper driver. In the previous device registration logic, since the live migration operation ops of the three accelerator devices is the same. Therefore, only one driver entity will be registered. As a result, only the first sec will be loaded successfully, while hpre and zip cannot be loaded. The acc live migration driver needs to be adapted. Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kunkun Jiang <jiangkunkun(a)huawei.com> --- .../crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c | 10 +++++++++- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 12 +++++++++--- include/linux/vfio.h | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c index e4164aed173e..7360536b5c6c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c @@ -1739,6 +1739,8 @@ static void acc_vf_remove(void *vendor_data) static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops sec_vf_mig_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hisi_sec2", + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_HUAWEI_SEC_VF, .probe = acc_vf_probe, .remove = acc_vf_remove, .device_ops = &acc_vf_device_ops_node, @@ -1747,6 +1749,8 @@ static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops sec_vf_mig_ops = { static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops hpre_vf_mig_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hisi_hpre", + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_HUAWEI_HPRE_VF, .probe = acc_vf_probe, .remove = acc_vf_remove, .device_ops = &acc_vf_device_ops_node, @@ -1755,6 +1759,8 @@ static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops hpre_vf_mig_ops = { static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops zip_vf_mig_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hisi_zip", + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_HUAWEI_ZIP_VF, .probe = acc_vf_probe, .remove = acc_vf_remove, .device_ops = &acc_vf_device_ops_node, @@ -1773,7 +1779,9 @@ static int __init acc_vf_module_init(void) static void __exit acc_vf_module_exit(void) { - vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&acc_vf_device_ops_node); + vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&sec_vf_mig_ops); + vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&hpre_vf_mig_ops); + vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&zip_vf_mig_ops); }; module_init(acc_vf_module_init); module_exit(acc_vf_module_exit); diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c index 6d7ae4e3b983..8eaaa06b97b8 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c @@ -2077,6 +2077,10 @@ static int probe_vendor_drivers(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) list_for_each_entry(driver, &vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_list, next) { void *data; + if (vdev->pdev->vendor != driver->ops->vendor || + vdev->pdev->device != driver->ops->device) + continue; + if (!try_module_get(driver->ops->owner)) continue; @@ -2604,7 +2608,8 @@ int __vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops) /* Check for duplicates */ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_list, next) { - if (tmp->ops->device_ops == ops->device_ops) { + if (tmp->ops->vendor == ops->vendor && + tmp->ops->device == ops->device) { mutex_unlock(&vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_lock); kfree(driver); return -EINVAL; @@ -2622,14 +2627,15 @@ int __vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver); -void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_device_ops *device_ops) +void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops) { struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver *driver, *tmp; mutex_lock(&vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(driver, tmp, &vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_list, next) { - if (driver->ops->device_ops == device_ops) { + if (driver->ops->vendor == ops->vendor && + driver->ops->device == ops->device) { list_del(&driver->next); mutex_unlock(&vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_lock); kfree(driver); diff --git a/include/linux/vfio.h b/include/linux/vfio.h index 9a2217f13753..f516784e0356 100644 --- a/include/linux/vfio.h +++ b/include/linux/vfio.h @@ -253,12 +253,15 @@ extern int vfio_pci_set_vendor_regions(void *device_data, struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops { char *name; struct module *owner; + /* Used to match device */ + unsigned short vendor; + unsigned short device; void *(*probe)(struct pci_dev *pdev); void (*remove)(void *vendor_data); struct vfio_device_ops *device_ops; }; int __vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops); -void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_device_ops *device_ops); +void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops); #define vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(__name, __probe, __remove, \ __device_ops) \ -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm: disable kernelcore=mirror when no mirror memory
by Wupeng Ma 06 Aug '23

06 Aug '23

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> maillist inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QV2C CVE: NA Reference: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230802072328.2107981-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com -------------------------------- For system with kernelcore=mirror enabled while no mirrored memory is reported by efi. This could lead to kernel OOM during startup since all memory beside zone DMA are in the movable zone and this prevents the kernel to use it. Zone DMA/DMA32 initialization is independent of mirrored memory and their max pfn is set in zone_sizes_init(). Since kernel can fallback to zone DMA/DMA32 if there is no memory in zone Normal, these zones are seen as mirrored memory no mather their memory attributes are. To solve this problem, disable kernelcore=mirror when there is no real mirrored memory exists. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230802072328.2107981-1-mawupeng1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Suggested-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Cc: Levi Yun <ppbuk5246(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/mm.h | 1 + mm/memblock.c | 5 +++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index 58d7a59b5b65..34400f909335 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -2493,6 +2493,7 @@ extern void get_pfn_range_for_nid(unsigned int nid, extern unsigned long find_min_pfn_with_active_regions(void); extern bool mirrored_kernelcore; +extern bool memblock_has_mirror(void); #ifndef CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES static inline int early_pfn_to_nid(unsigned long pfn) diff --git a/mm/memblock.c b/mm/memblock.c index b7744ae2ce3d..94008ef55a82 100644 --- a/mm/memblock.c +++ b/mm/memblock.c @@ -161,6 +161,11 @@ static int memblock_can_resize __initdata_memblock; static int memblock_memory_in_slab __initdata_memblock = 0; static int memblock_reserved_in_slab __initdata_memblock = 0; +bool __init_memblock memblock_has_mirror(void) +{ + return system_has_some_mirror; +} + static enum memblock_flags __init_memblock choose_memblock_flags(void) { return system_has_some_mirror ? MEMBLOCK_MIRROR : MEMBLOCK_NONE; diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 12da70f39e0c..d797bbac809d 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -7741,6 +7741,11 @@ static void __init find_zone_movable_pfns_for_nodes(void) bool has_unmirrored_mem = false; unsigned long mirrored_sz = 0; + if (!memblock_has_mirror()) { + pr_warn("The system has no mirror memory, ignore kernelcore=mirror.\n"); + goto out; + } + for_each_mem_region(r) { if (memblock_is_mirror(r)) { mirrored_sz += r->size; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 05 Aug '23

05 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

1 2

[openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] media: usb: siano: Fix CVE-2023-4132
by Ruan Jinjie 05 Aug '23

05 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-4132 fix commits. Duoming Zhou (2): media: usb: siano: Fix use after free bugs caused by do_submit_urb media: usb: siano: Fix warning due to null work_func_t function pointer drivers/media/usb/siano/smsusb.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) -- 2.34.1

1 2

[PATCH v2 openEuler-23.09 00/46]ima: Add IMA digest lists extension
by Zhou Shuiqing 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

This patchset supports IMA digest lists for the kernel. v2: -remove unused variable in ima_main.c David Howells (4): PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) PGPLIB: Basic packet parser KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob Mimi Zohar (1): initramfs: add file metadata Roberto Sassu (34): initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!! gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata init: Add kernel option to force usage of tmpfs for rootfs ima: Add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status ima: Allow choice of file hash algorithm for measurement and audit ima: Generalize ima_read_policy() ima: Generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit ima: Generalize policy file operations ima: Use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data ima: Add parser of compact digest list ima: Prevent usage of digest lists not measured or appraised ima: Introduce new securityfs files ima: Introduce new hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK ima: Load all digest lists from a directory at boot time ima: Add support for measurement with digest lists ima: Add support for appraisal with digest lists evm: Add support for digest lists of metadata ima: Add meta_immutable appraisal type ima: Introduce exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_immutable policy ima: Add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt mpi: introduce mpi_key_length() rsa: add parser of raw format KEYS: PGP data parser KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring() certs: Introduce search_trusted_key() ima: Search key in the built-in keyrings ima: Allow direct upload of digest lists to securityfs ima: Add parser keyword to the policy evm: Extend evm= with x509. allow_metadata_writes and complete values ima: Execute parser to upload digest lists not recognizable by the kernel evm: Propagate choice of HMAC algorithm in evm_crypto.c config: add digest list options for arm64 and x86 Zhang Tianxing (5): ima: fix a memory leak in ima_del_digest_data_entry ima: Add max size for IMA digest database ima: don't allow control characters in policy path ima: fix CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_DB_MEGABYTES in openeuler_defconfig ima: fix db size overflow and Kconfig issues Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded" shenxiangwei (1): ima: bugfix for digest lists importing Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 4 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 +- Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt | 259 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 11 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 31 +- certs/Kconfig | 7 + certs/Makefile | 7 + certs/system_certificates.S | 18 + certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 25 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 10 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c | 281 +++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h | 23 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 383 +++++++++++++++ crypto/rsa.c | 14 +- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 69 +++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 6 + include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/mpi.h | 2 + include/linux/pgp.h | 220 +++++++++ include/linux/pgplib.h | 48 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 4 + init/do_mounts.c | 11 +- init/initramfs.c | 138 +++++- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 32 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 24 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 103 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 49 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 117 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 465 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 54 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 294 ++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 124 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 116 ++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 47 +- usr/Kconfig | 8 + usr/Makefile | 4 +- usr/gen_init_cpio.c | 136 ++++- usr/gen_initramfs.sh | 7 +- 50 files changed, 3299 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h -- 2.33.0

2 47

[OLK-5.10 PATCH] vfio-pci: Match specific devices with vendor id and device id
by Kunkun Jiang 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

virt inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QPGW CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------------------------ In probe_vendor_drivers, all registered vendor drivers are traversed. This is not a good idea. If a vendor driver is not implemented well enough, it may cause the system to panic. Use the vendor id and device id to select a proper driver. In the previous device registration logic, since the live migration operation ops of the three accelerator devices is the same. Therefore, only one driver entity will be registered. As a result, only the first sec will be loaded successfully, while hpre and zip cannot be loaded. The acc live migration driver needs to be adapted. Signed-off-by: Longfang Liu <liulongfang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Kunkun Jiang <jiangkunkun(a)huawei.com> --- .../crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c | 10 +++++++++- drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c | 12 +++++++++--- include/linux/vfio.h | 5 ++++- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c index e4164aed173e..7360536b5c6c 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c +++ b/drivers/crypto/hisilicon/migration/acc_vf_migration.c @@ -1739,6 +1739,8 @@ static void acc_vf_remove(void *vendor_data) static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops sec_vf_mig_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hisi_sec2", + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_HUAWEI_SEC_VF, .probe = acc_vf_probe, .remove = acc_vf_remove, .device_ops = &acc_vf_device_ops_node, @@ -1747,6 +1749,8 @@ static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops sec_vf_mig_ops = { static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops hpre_vf_mig_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hisi_hpre", + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_HUAWEI_HPRE_VF, .probe = acc_vf_probe, .remove = acc_vf_remove, .device_ops = &acc_vf_device_ops_node, @@ -1755,6 +1759,8 @@ static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops hpre_vf_mig_ops = { static struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops zip_vf_mig_ops = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, .name = "hisi_zip", + .vendor = PCI_VENDOR_ID_HUAWEI, + .device = PCI_DEVICE_ID_HUAWEI_ZIP_VF, .probe = acc_vf_probe, .remove = acc_vf_remove, .device_ops = &acc_vf_device_ops_node, @@ -1773,7 +1779,9 @@ static int __init acc_vf_module_init(void) static void __exit acc_vf_module_exit(void) { - vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&acc_vf_device_ops_node); + vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&sec_vf_mig_ops); + vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&hpre_vf_mig_ops); + vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(&zip_vf_mig_ops); }; module_init(acc_vf_module_init); module_exit(acc_vf_module_exit); diff --git a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c index 6d7ae4e3b983..8eaaa06b97b8 100644 --- a/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c +++ b/drivers/vfio/pci/vfio_pci.c @@ -2077,6 +2077,10 @@ static int probe_vendor_drivers(struct vfio_pci_device *vdev) list_for_each_entry(driver, &vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_list, next) { void *data; + if (vdev->pdev->vendor != driver->ops->vendor || + vdev->pdev->device != driver->ops->device) + continue; + if (!try_module_get(driver->ops->owner)) continue; @@ -2604,7 +2608,8 @@ int __vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops) /* Check for duplicates */ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_list, next) { - if (tmp->ops->device_ops == ops->device_ops) { + if (tmp->ops->vendor == ops->vendor && + tmp->ops->device == ops->device) { mutex_unlock(&vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_lock); kfree(driver); return -EINVAL; @@ -2622,14 +2627,15 @@ int __vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver); -void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_device_ops *device_ops) +void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops) { struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver *driver, *tmp; mutex_lock(&vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_lock); list_for_each_entry_safe(driver, tmp, &vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_list, next) { - if (driver->ops->device_ops == device_ops) { + if (driver->ops->vendor == ops->vendor && + driver->ops->device == ops->device) { list_del(&driver->next); mutex_unlock(&vfio_pci.vendor_drivers_lock); kfree(driver); diff --git a/include/linux/vfio.h b/include/linux/vfio.h index 9a2217f13753..f516784e0356 100644 --- a/include/linux/vfio.h +++ b/include/linux/vfio.h @@ -253,12 +253,15 @@ extern int vfio_pci_set_vendor_regions(void *device_data, struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops { char *name; struct module *owner; + /* Used to match device */ + unsigned short vendor; + unsigned short device; void *(*probe)(struct pci_dev *pdev); void (*remove)(void *vendor_data); struct vfio_device_ops *device_ops; }; int __vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops); -void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_device_ops *device_ops); +void vfio_pci_unregister_vendor_driver(struct vfio_pci_vendor_driver_ops *ops); #define vfio_pci_register_vendor_driver(__name, __probe, __remove, \ __device_ops) \ -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/46]ima: Add IMA digest lists extension
by Zhou Shuiqing 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

This patchset supports IMA digest lists for the kernel. David Howells (4): PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) PGPLIB: Basic packet parser KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob Mimi Zohar (1): initramfs: add file metadata Roberto Sassu (34): initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!! gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata init: Add kernel option to force usage of tmpfs for rootfs ima: Add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status ima: Allow choice of file hash algorithm for measurement and audit ima: Generalize ima_read_policy() ima: Generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit ima: Generalize policy file operations ima: Use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data ima: Add parser of compact digest list ima: Prevent usage of digest lists not measured or appraised ima: Introduce new securityfs files ima: Introduce new hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK ima: Load all digest lists from a directory at boot time ima: Add support for measurement with digest lists ima: Add support for appraisal with digest lists evm: Add support for digest lists of metadata ima: Add meta_immutable appraisal type ima: Introduce exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_immutable policy ima: Add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt mpi: introduce mpi_key_length() rsa: add parser of raw format KEYS: PGP data parser KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring() certs: Introduce search_trusted_key() ima: Search key in the built-in keyrings ima: Allow direct upload of digest lists to securityfs ima: Add parser keyword to the policy evm: Extend evm= with x509. allow_metadata_writes and complete values ima: Execute parser to upload digest lists not recognizable by the kernel evm: Propagate choice of HMAC algorithm in evm_crypto.c config: add digest list options for arm64 and x86 Zhang Tianxing (5): ima: fix a memory leak in ima_del_digest_data_entry ima: Add max size for IMA digest database ima: don't allow control characters in policy path ima: fix CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_DB_MEGABYTES in openeuler_defconfig ima: fix db size overflow and Kconfig issues Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded" shenxiangwei (1): ima: bugfix for digest lists importing Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 4 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 +- Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt | 259 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 11 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 31 +- certs/Kconfig | 7 + certs/Makefile | 7 + certs/system_certificates.S | 18 + certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 25 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 10 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c | 281 +++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h | 23 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 383 +++++++++++++++ crypto/rsa.c | 14 +- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 69 +++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 6 + include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/mpi.h | 2 + include/linux/pgp.h | 220 +++++++++ include/linux/pgplib.h | 48 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 4 + init/do_mounts.c | 11 +- init/initramfs.c | 138 +++++- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 32 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 24 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 103 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 49 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 117 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 465 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 54 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 294 ++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 126 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 116 ++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 47 +- usr/Kconfig | 8 + usr/Makefile | 4 +- usr/gen_init_cpio.c | 136 ++++- usr/gen_initramfs.sh | 7 +- 50 files changed, 3301 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h -- 2.33.0

2 47

[OLK-5.10] RDMA/hns: Fix missing dealloc_dfx_cnt() during device unregister
by Chengchang Tang 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PDHP --------------------------------------------------------------- The function hns_roce_dealloc_dfx_cnt() was omitted while uploading "RDMA/hns: Add dfx cnt stats". This patch fixes it. Fixes: d5a4ca75e7ca ("RDMA/hns: Add dfx cnt stats") Signed-off-by: Chengchang Tang <tangchengchang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c index 8c706050f475..a9f28db6145e 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_main.c @@ -1500,6 +1500,7 @@ void hns_roce_exit(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev, bool bond_cleanup) hns_roce_cmd_cleanup(hr_dev); if (hr_dev->hw->cmq_exit) hr_dev->hw->cmq_exit(hr_dev); + hns_roce_dealloc_dfx_cnt(hr_dev); } MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL"); -- 2.30.0

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] nvme-pci: set min_align_mask before calculating max_hw_sectors
by Yong Hu 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

From: Rishabh Bhatnagar <risbhat(a)amazon.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.150 commit 303436e301ba72021c3894c7a44bcfc1dcf17122 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6D0XA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 61ce339f19fabbc3e51237148a7ef6f2270e44fa upstream. If swiotlb is force enabled dma_max_mapping_size ends up calling swiotlb_max_mapping_size which takes into account the min align mask for the device. Set the min align mask for nvme driver before calling dma_max_mapping_size while calculating max hw sectors. Signed-off-by: Rishabh Bhatnagar <risbhat(a)amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index c09ee462b048..4e65685765f0 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -2624,6 +2624,8 @@ static void nvme_reset_work(struct work_struct *work) if (result) goto out_unlock; + dma_set_min_align_mask(dev->dev, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE - 1); + /* * Limit the max command size to prevent iod->sg allocations going * over a single page. @@ -2636,7 +2638,6 @@ static void nvme_reset_work(struct work_struct *work) * Don't limit the IOMMU merged segment size. */ dma_set_max_seg_size(dev->dev, 0xffffffff); - dma_set_min_align_mask(dev->dev, NVME_CTRL_PAGE_SIZE - 1); mutex_unlock(&dev->shutdown_lock); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/45] ima: Add IMA digest lists extension
by Zhou Shuiqing 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

This patchset supports IMA digest lists for the kernel. David Howells (4): PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) PGPLIB: Basic packet parser KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob Mimi Zohar (1): initramfs: add file metadata Roberto Sassu (33): initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!! gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata init: Add kernel option to force usage of tmpfs for rootfs ima: Add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status ima: Allow choice of file hash algorithm for measurement and audit ima: Generalize ima_read_policy() ima: Generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit ima: Generalize policy file operations ima: Use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data ima: Add parser of compact digest list ima: Prevent usage of digest lists not measured or appraised ima: Introduce new securityfs files ima: Introduce new hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK ima: Load all digest lists from a directory at boot time ima: Add support for measurement with digest lists ima: Add support for appraisal with digest lists evm: Add support for digest lists of metadata ima: Add meta_immutable appraisal type ima: Introduce exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_immutable policy mpi: introduce mpi_key_length() rsa: add parser of raw format KEYS: PGP data parser KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring() certs: Introduce search_trusted_key() ima: Search key in the built-in keyrings ima: Allow direct upload of digest lists to securityfs ima: Add parser keyword to the policy evm: Extend evm= with x509. allow_metadata_writes and complete values ima: Execute parser to upload digest lists not recognizable by the kernel evm: Propagate choice of HMAC algorithm in evm_crypto.c config: add digest list options for arm64 and x86 Zhang Tianxing (5): ima: fix a memory leak in ima_del_digest_data_entry ima: Add max size for IMA digest database ima: don't allow control characters in policy path ima: fix CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_DB_MEGABYTES in openeuler_defconfig ima: fix db size overflow and Kconfig issues Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded" shenxiangwei (1): ima: bugfix for digest lists importing Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 4 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 +- arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 11 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 31 +- certs/Kconfig | 7 + certs/Makefile | 7 + certs/system_certificates.S | 18 + certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 25 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 10 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c | 281 +++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h | 23 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 383 +++++++++++++++ crypto/rsa.c | 14 +- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 69 +++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 6 + include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/mpi.h | 2 + include/linux/pgp.h | 220 +++++++++ include/linux/pgplib.h | 48 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 4 + init/do_mounts.c | 11 +- init/initramfs.c | 138 +++++- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 32 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 24 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 103 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 49 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 117 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 465 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 54 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 294 ++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 126 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 116 ++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 47 +- usr/Kconfig | 8 + usr/Makefile | 4 +- usr/gen_init_cpio.c | 136 ++++- usr/gen_initramfs.sh | 7 +- 49 files changed, 3042 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h -- 2.33.0

2 46

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/46]ima: Add IMA digest lists feature
by Zhou Shuiqing 04 Aug '23

04 Aug '23

This patchset supports IMA digest lists for the kernel. David Howells (4): PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) PGPLIB: Basic packet parser KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob Mimi Zohar (1): initramfs: add file metadata Roberto Sassu (34): initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!! gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata init: Add kernel option to force usage of tmpfs for rootfs ima: Add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status ima: Allow choice of file hash algorithm for measurement and audit ima: Generalize ima_read_policy() ima: Generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit ima: Generalize policy file operations ima: Use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data ima: Add parser of compact digest list ima: Prevent usage of digest lists not measured or appraised ima: Introduce new securityfs files ima: Introduce new hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK ima: Load all digest lists from a directory at boot time ima: Add support for measurement with digest lists ima: Add support for appraisal with digest lists evm: Add support for digest lists of metadata ima: Add meta_immutable appraisal type ima: Introduce exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_immutable policy ima: Add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt mpi: introduce mpi_key_length() rsa: add parser of raw format KEYS: PGP data parser KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring() certs: Introduce search_trusted_key() ima: Search key in the built-in keyrings ima: Allow direct upload of digest lists to securityfs ima: Add parser keyword to the policy evm: Extend evm= with x509. allow_metadata_writes and complete values ima: Execute parser to upload digest lists not recognizable by the kernel evm: Propagate choice of HMAC algorithm in evm_crypto.c config: add digest list options for arm64 and x86 Zhang Tianxing (5): ima: fix a memory leak in ima_del_digest_data_entry ima: Add max size for IMA digest database ima: don't allow control characters in policy path ima: fix CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_DB_MEGABYTES in openeuler_defconfig ima: fix db size overflow and Kconfig issues Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded" shenxiangwei (1): ima: bugfix for digest lists importing Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 4 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 +- Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt | 259 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 11 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 31 +- certs/Kconfig | 7 + certs/Makefile | 7 + certs/system_certificates.S | 18 + certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 25 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 10 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c | 281 +++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h | 23 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 383 +++++++++++++++ crypto/rsa.c | 14 +- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 69 +++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 6 + include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/mpi.h | 2 + include/linux/pgp.h | 220 +++++++++ include/linux/pgplib.h | 48 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 4 + init/do_mounts.c | 11 +- init/initramfs.c | 138 +++++- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 32 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 24 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 103 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 49 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 117 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 465 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 54 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 294 ++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 126 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 116 ++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 47 +- usr/Kconfig | 8 + usr/Makefile | 4 +- usr/gen_init_cpio.c | 136 ++++- usr/gen_initramfs.sh | 7 +- 50 files changed, 3301 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h -- 2.33.0

2 47

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] blk-mq: Improve performance of non-mq IO schedulers with multiple HW queues
by Lei Chen 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

From: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.12-rc2 commit b6e68ee82585f2ee890b0a897a6aacbf49a467bb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7QFJD?from=project-issue CVE: NA Upstream commit 5d05426e2d5fd7df8af fixes a bug introduced by this patch, but it does not need to be backported. This patch was merged in mainline-v5.12-rc1-dontuse at first, thus I denote it comes from mainline-v5.12-rc2. -------------------------------- Currently when non-mq aware IO scheduler (BFQ, mq-deadline) is used for a queue with multiple HW queues, the performance it rather bad. The problem is that these IO schedulers use queue-wide locking and their dispatch function does not respect the hctx it is passed in and returns any request it finds appropriate. Thus locality of request access is broken and dispatch from multiple CPUs just contends on IO scheduler locks. For these IO schedulers there's little point in dispatching from multiple CPUs. Instead dispatch always only from a single CPU to limit contention. Below is a comparison of dbench runs on XFS filesystem where the storage is a raid card with 64 HW queues and to it attached a single rotating disk. BFQ is used as IO scheduler: clients MQ SQ MQ-Patched Amean 1 39.12 (0.00%) 43.29 * -10.67%* 36.09 * 7.74%* Amean 2 128.58 (0.00%) 101.30 * 21.22%* 96.14 * 25.23%* Amean 4 577.42 (0.00%) 494.47 * 14.37%* 508.49 * 11.94%* Amean 8 610.95 (0.00%) 363.86 * 40.44%* 362.12 * 40.73%* Amean 16 391.78 (0.00%) 261.49 * 33.25%* 282.94 * 27.78%* Amean 32 324.64 (0.00%) 267.71 * 17.54%* 233.00 * 28.23%* Amean 64 295.04 (0.00%) 253.02 * 14.24%* 242.37 * 17.85%* Amean 512 10281.61 (0.00%) 10211.16 * 0.69%* 10447.53 * -1.61%* Numbers are times so lower is better. MQ is stock 5.10-rc6 kernel. SQ is the same kernel with megaraid_sas.host_tagset_enable=0 so that the card advertises just a single HW queue. MQ-Patched is a kernel with this patch applied. You can see multiple hardware queues heavily hurt performance in combination with BFQ. The patch restores the performance. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe(a)kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen(a)smartx.com> --- block/blk-mq.c | 63 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- block/kyber-iosched.c | 1 + include/linux/elevator.h | 4 +++ 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c index 96debbe63ad2..2b0f0a9f40d9 100644 --- a/block/blk-mq.c +++ b/block/blk-mq.c @@ -1521,17 +1521,62 @@ bool blk_mq_run_hw_queue(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, bool async) return false; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_mq_run_hw_queue); +/* + * Is the request queue handled by an IO scheduler that does not respect + * hardware queues when dispatching? + */ +static bool blk_mq_has_sqsched(struct request_queue *q) +{ + struct elevator_queue *e = q->elevator; -void blk_mq_run_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q, bool async) + if (e && e->type->ops.mq.dispatch_request && + !(e->type->elevator_features & ELEVATOR_F_MQ_AWARE)) + return true; + return false; +} + +/* + * Return prefered queue to dispatch from (if any) for non-mq aware IO + * scheduler. + */ +static struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *blk_mq_get_sq_hctx(struct request_queue *q) { struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx; + + /* + * If the IO scheduler does not respect hardware queues when + * dispatching, we just don't bother with multiple HW queues and + * dispatch from hctx for the current CPU since running multiple queues + * just causes lock contention inside the scheduler and pointless cache + * bouncing. + */ + hctx = blk_mq_map_queue(q, raw_smp_processor_id()); + if (!blk_mq_hctx_stopped(hctx)) + return hctx; + return NULL; +} + + +void blk_mq_run_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q, bool async) +{ + struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, *sq_hctx; int i; + sq_hctx = NULL; + if (blk_mq_has_sqsched(q)) + sq_hctx = blk_mq_get_sq_hctx(q); queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i) { if (blk_mq_hctx_stopped(hctx)) continue; - blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, async); + /* + * Dispatch from this hctx either if there's no hctx preferred + * by IO scheduler or if it has requests that bypass the + * scheduler. + */ + if (!sq_hctx || sq_hctx == hctx || + !list_empty_careful(&hctx->dispatch)) + blk_mq_run_hw_queue(hctx, async); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_mq_run_hw_queues); @@ -1543,9 +1588,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_mq_run_hw_queues); */ void blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q, unsigned long msecs) { - struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx; + struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, *sq_hctx; int i; + sq_hctx = NULL; + if (blk_mq_has_sqsched(q)) + sq_hctx = blk_mq_get_sq_hctx(q); queue_for_each_hw_ctx(q, hctx, i) { if (blk_mq_hctx_stopped(hctx)) continue; @@ -1559,7 +1607,14 @@ void blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues(struct request_queue *q, unsigned long msecs) if (delayed_work_pending(&hctx->run_work)) continue; - blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue(hctx, msecs); + /* + * Dispatch from this hctx either if there's no hctx preferred + * by IO scheduler or if it has requests that bypass the + * scheduler. + */ + if (!sq_hctx || sq_hctx == hctx || + !list_empty_careful(&hctx->dispatch)) + blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue(hctx, msecs); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queues); diff --git a/block/kyber-iosched.c b/block/kyber-iosched.c index d8f3cb1bffa6..bc0376c338ff 100644 --- a/block/kyber-iosched.c +++ b/block/kyber-iosched.c @@ -972,6 +972,7 @@ static struct elevator_type kyber_sched = { #endif .elevator_attrs = kyber_sched_attrs, .elevator_name = "kyber", + .elevator_features = ELEVATOR_F_MQ_AWARE, .elevator_owner = THIS_MODULE, }; diff --git a/include/linux/elevator.h b/include/linux/elevator.h index 663ce1780c5d..70c3c1fd5cf0 100644 --- a/include/linux/elevator.h +++ b/include/linux/elevator.h @@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ struct elevator_type size_t icq_align; /* ditto */ struct elv_fs_entry *elevator_attrs; char elevator_name[ELV_NAME_MAX]; + unsigned int elevator_features; const char *elevator_alias; struct module *elevator_owner; bool uses_mq; @@ -276,6 +277,9 @@ enum { #define rq_entry_fifo(ptr) list_entry((ptr), struct request, queuelist) #define rq_fifo_clear(rq) list_del_init(&(rq)->queuelist) +/* Supports scheduling on multiple hardware queues */ +#define ELEVATOR_F_MQ_AWARE (1U << 1) + #else /* CONFIG_BLOCK */ static inline void load_default_elevator_module(void) { } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/5] workqueue: Rename "delayed" (delayed by active management) to "inactive"
by Zeng Heng 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit f97a4a1a3f8769e3452885967955e21c88f3f263 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LRJF DTS: DTS2023072811781 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- There are two kinds of "delayed" work items in workqueue subsystem. One is for timer-delayed work items which are visible to workqueue users. The other kind is for work items delayed by active management which can not be directly visible to workqueue users. We mixed the word "delayed" for both kinds and caused somewhat ambiguity. This patch renames the later one (delayed by active management) to "inactive", because it is used for workqueue active management and most of its related symbols are named with "active" or "activate". All "delayed" and "DELAYED" are carefully checked and renamed one by one to avoid accidentally changing the name of the other kind for timer-delayed. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> conflict: kernel/workqueue.c Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/workqueue.h | 4 +-- kernel/workqueue.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/workqueue.h b/include/linux/workqueue.h index 6f2b042fc44c..3ac0fa0c822d 100644 --- a/include/linux/workqueue.h +++ b/include/linux/workqueue.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ void delayed_work_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t); enum { WORK_STRUCT_PENDING_BIT = 0, /* work item is pending execution */ - WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT = 1, /* work item is delayed */ + WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT= 1, /* work item is inactive */ WORK_STRUCT_PWQ_BIT = 2, /* data points to pwq */ WORK_STRUCT_LINKED_BIT = 3, /* next work is linked to this one */ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ enum { WORK_STRUCT_COLOR_BITS = 4, WORK_STRUCT_PENDING = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_PENDING_BIT, - WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT, + WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT, WORK_STRUCT_PWQ = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_PWQ_BIT, WORK_STRUCT_LINKED = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_LINKED_BIT, #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c index 04b558a267ae..fe3c4a292909 100644 --- a/kernel/workqueue.c +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ struct pool_workqueue { /* L: nr of in_flight works */ int nr_active; /* L: nr of active works */ int max_active; /* L: max active works */ - struct list_head delayed_works; /* L: delayed works */ + struct list_head inactive_works; /* L: inactive works */ struct list_head pwqs_node; /* WR: node on wq->pwqs */ struct list_head mayday_node; /* MD: node on wq->maydays */ @@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ static void put_pwq_unlocked(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) } } -static void pwq_activate_delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) +static void pwq_activate_inactive_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct pool_workqueue *pwq = get_work_pwq(work); @@ -1113,16 +1113,16 @@ static void pwq_activate_delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) if (list_empty(&pwq->pool->worklist)) pwq->pool->watchdog_ts = jiffies; move_linked_works(work, &pwq->pool->worklist, NULL); - __clear_bit(WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT, work_data_bits(work)); + __clear_bit(WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT, work_data_bits(work)); pwq->nr_active++; } -static void pwq_activate_first_delayed(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) +static void pwq_activate_first_inactive(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) { - struct work_struct *work = list_first_entry(&pwq->delayed_works, + struct work_struct *work = list_first_entry(&pwq->inactive_works, struct work_struct, entry); - pwq_activate_delayed_work(work); + pwq_activate_inactive_work(work); } /** @@ -1145,10 +1145,10 @@ static void pwq_dec_nr_in_flight(struct pool_workqueue *pwq, int color) pwq->nr_in_flight[color]--; pwq->nr_active--; - if (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { - /* one down, submit a delayed one */ + if (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { + /* one down, submit an inactive one */ if (pwq->nr_active < pwq->max_active) - pwq_activate_first_delayed(pwq); + pwq_activate_first_inactive(pwq); } /* is flush in progress and are we at the flushing tip? */ @@ -1246,14 +1246,14 @@ static int try_to_grab_pending(struct work_struct *work, bool is_dwork, debug_work_deactivate(work); /* - * A delayed work item cannot be grabbed directly because + * An inactive work item cannot be grabbed directly because * it might have linked NO_COLOR work items which, if left - * on the delayed_list, will confuse pwq->nr_active + * on the inactive_works list, will confuse pwq->nr_active * management later on and cause stall. Make sure the work * item is activated before grabbing. */ - if (*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED) - pwq_activate_delayed_work(work); + if (*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE) + pwq_activate_inactive_work(work); list_del_init(&work->entry); pwq_dec_nr_in_flight(pwq, get_work_color(work)); @@ -1451,8 +1451,8 @@ static void __queue_work(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq, if (list_empty(worklist)) pwq->pool->watchdog_ts = jiffies; } else { - work_flags |= WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED; - worklist = &pwq->delayed_works; + work_flags |= WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE; + worklist = &pwq->inactive_works; } debug_work_activate(work); @@ -2496,7 +2496,7 @@ static int rescuer_thread(void *__rescuer) /* * The above execution of rescued work items could * have created more to rescue through - * pwq_activate_first_delayed() or chained + * pwq_activate_first_inactive() or chained * queueing. Let's put @pwq back on mayday list so * that such back-to-back work items, which may be * being used to relieve memory pressure, don't @@ -2922,7 +2922,7 @@ void drain_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq) bool drained; spin_lock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock); - drained = !pwq->nr_active && list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works); + drained = !pwq->nr_active && list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works); spin_unlock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock); if (drained) @@ -3703,7 +3703,7 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(struct work_struct *work) * @pwq: target pool_workqueue * * If @pwq isn't freezing, set @pwq->max_active to the associated - * workqueue's saved_max_active and activate delayed work items + * workqueue's saved_max_active and activate inactive work items * accordingly. If @pwq is freezing, clear @pwq->max_active to zero. */ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) @@ -3732,9 +3732,9 @@ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) pwq->max_active = wq->saved_max_active; - while (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works) && + while (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works) && pwq->nr_active < pwq->max_active) { - pwq_activate_first_delayed(pwq); + pwq_activate_first_inactive(pwq); kick = true; } @@ -3765,7 +3765,7 @@ static void init_pwq(struct pool_workqueue *pwq, struct workqueue_struct *wq, pwq->wq = wq; pwq->flush_color = -1; pwq->refcnt = 1; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->delayed_works); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->inactive_works); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->pwqs_node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->mayday_node); INIT_WORK(&pwq->unbound_release_work, pwq_unbound_release_workfn); @@ -4386,7 +4386,7 @@ void destroy_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq) if (WARN_ON((pwq != wq->dfl_pwq) && (pwq->refcnt > 1)) || WARN_ON(pwq->nr_active) || - WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works))) { + WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works))) { mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex); show_workqueue_state(); return; @@ -4527,7 +4527,7 @@ bool workqueue_congested(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq) else pwq = unbound_pwq_by_node(wq, cpu_to_node(cpu)); - ret = !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works); + ret = !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works); rcu_read_unlock_sched(); return ret; @@ -4722,11 +4722,11 @@ static void show_pwq(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) pr_cont("\n"); } - if (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { + if (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { bool comma = false; - pr_info(" delayed:"); - list_for_each_entry(work, &pwq->delayed_works, entry) { + pr_info(" inactive:"); + list_for_each_entry(work, &pwq->inactive_works, entry) { pr_cont_work(comma, work); comma = !(*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_LINKED); } @@ -4756,7 +4756,7 @@ void show_workqueue_state(void) bool idle = true; for_each_pwq(pwq, wq) { - if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { + if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { idle = false; break; } @@ -4768,7 +4768,7 @@ void show_workqueue_state(void) for_each_pwq(pwq, wq) { spin_lock_irqsave(&pwq->pool->lock, flags); - if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) + if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) show_pwq(pwq); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pwq->pool->lock, flags); /* @@ -5143,7 +5143,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(work_on_cpu_safe); * freeze_workqueues_begin - begin freezing workqueues * * Start freezing workqueues. After this function returns, all freezable - * workqueues will queue new works to their delayed_works list instead of + * workqueues will queue new works to their inactive_works list instead of * pool->worklist. * * CONTEXT: -- 2.25.1

1 4

[PATCH OLK-5.10] Revert "arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online"
by Wang ShaoBo 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PN0A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- BUG reported when setuping MPAM driver: [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:49 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 593, name: kworker/72:1 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] CPU: 72 PID: 593 Comm: kworker/72:1 Not tainted 5.10.0-03467-g02e1abb0f821-dirty #1 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDDA, BIOS 1.79 08/21/2021 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 9ae2dc86231d0b23cd114b5ed4089cac17566b0f' [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Workqueue: events mpam_enable [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Load PGP public keys [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Call trace: [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] show_stack+0x20/0x30 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] dump_stack+0x11c/0x174 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] ___might_sleep+0x15c/0x1a0 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] __might_sleep+0x7c/0x100 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] cpus_read_lock+0x3c/0x110 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] __cpuhp_setup_state+0x3c/0x80 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] mpam_enable+0x148/0x3a4 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] process_one_work+0x3cc/0x984 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] worker_thread+0x2b0/0x71c [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kthread+0x1e0/0x220 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector initialized (mem pool available: 11650) [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kmemleak: Automatic memory scanning thread started [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] cryptd: max_cpu_qlen set to 1000 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Key type encrypted registered [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] AppArmor: AppArmor sha1 policy hashing enabled [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:db Patch: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") reported a 'Bad PC' BUG, but missing the conclusion, disabling irqs before calling cpuhp_setup_state() may only affect the probability of reproduction. The reason why triggerring 'Bad PC' BUG report is because mpam_enable() is __init type function, and may schedule out after calling __cpuhp_setup_state() ->__might_sleep(), so the space of mpam_enable() might be released after scheduling back. As we have changed mpam_enable() to non-init type function, so we can revert commit bc9e3f9895ef257b76601291d99c87c13c7c31df, to solve these both two problems. Fixes: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c index c59f7f09308dc..bb88db115a86c 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c @@ -596,11 +596,9 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) pr_err("Failed to setup/init resctrl\n"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - local_irq_disable(); mpam_cpuhp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "mpam:online", mpam_cpu_online, mpam_cpu_offline); - local_irq_enable(); if (mpam_cpuhp_state <= 0) pr_err("Failed to re-register 'dyn' cpuhp callbacks"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_cpuhp_lock); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/5] workqueue: Rename "delayed" (delayed by active management) to "inactive"
by Zeng Heng 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

From: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.15-rc1 commit f97a4a1a3f8769e3452885967955e21c88f3f263 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LRJF Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- There are two kinds of "delayed" work items in workqueue subsystem. One is for timer-delayed work items which are visible to workqueue users. The other kind is for work items delayed by active management which can not be directly visible to workqueue users. We mixed the word "delayed" for both kinds and caused somewhat ambiguity. This patch renames the later one (delayed by active management) to "inactive", because it is used for workqueue active management and most of its related symbols are named with "active" or "activate". All "delayed" and "DELAYED" are carefully checked and renamed one by one to avoid accidentally changing the name of the other kind for timer-delayed. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs(a)linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj(a)kernel.org> conflict: kernel/workqueue.c Signed-off-by: Zeng Heng <zengheng4(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/workqueue.h | 4 +-- kernel/workqueue.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/workqueue.h b/include/linux/workqueue.h index 6f2b042fc44c..3ac0fa0c822d 100644 --- a/include/linux/workqueue.h +++ b/include/linux/workqueue.h @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ void delayed_work_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t); enum { WORK_STRUCT_PENDING_BIT = 0, /* work item is pending execution */ - WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT = 1, /* work item is delayed */ + WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT= 1, /* work item is inactive */ WORK_STRUCT_PWQ_BIT = 2, /* data points to pwq */ WORK_STRUCT_LINKED_BIT = 3, /* next work is linked to this one */ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ enum { WORK_STRUCT_COLOR_BITS = 4, WORK_STRUCT_PENDING = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_PENDING_BIT, - WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT, + WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT, WORK_STRUCT_PWQ = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_PWQ_BIT, WORK_STRUCT_LINKED = 1 << WORK_STRUCT_LINKED_BIT, #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS_WORK diff --git a/kernel/workqueue.c b/kernel/workqueue.c index 04b558a267ae..fe3c4a292909 100644 --- a/kernel/workqueue.c +++ b/kernel/workqueue.c @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ struct pool_workqueue { /* L: nr of in_flight works */ int nr_active; /* L: nr of active works */ int max_active; /* L: max active works */ - struct list_head delayed_works; /* L: delayed works */ + struct list_head inactive_works; /* L: inactive works */ struct list_head pwqs_node; /* WR: node on wq->pwqs */ struct list_head mayday_node; /* MD: node on wq->maydays */ @@ -1105,7 +1105,7 @@ static void put_pwq_unlocked(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) } } -static void pwq_activate_delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) +static void pwq_activate_inactive_work(struct work_struct *work) { struct pool_workqueue *pwq = get_work_pwq(work); @@ -1113,16 +1113,16 @@ static void pwq_activate_delayed_work(struct work_struct *work) if (list_empty(&pwq->pool->worklist)) pwq->pool->watchdog_ts = jiffies; move_linked_works(work, &pwq->pool->worklist, NULL); - __clear_bit(WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED_BIT, work_data_bits(work)); + __clear_bit(WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE_BIT, work_data_bits(work)); pwq->nr_active++; } -static void pwq_activate_first_delayed(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) +static void pwq_activate_first_inactive(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) { - struct work_struct *work = list_first_entry(&pwq->delayed_works, + struct work_struct *work = list_first_entry(&pwq->inactive_works, struct work_struct, entry); - pwq_activate_delayed_work(work); + pwq_activate_inactive_work(work); } /** @@ -1145,10 +1145,10 @@ static void pwq_dec_nr_in_flight(struct pool_workqueue *pwq, int color) pwq->nr_in_flight[color]--; pwq->nr_active--; - if (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { - /* one down, submit a delayed one */ + if (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { + /* one down, submit an inactive one */ if (pwq->nr_active < pwq->max_active) - pwq_activate_first_delayed(pwq); + pwq_activate_first_inactive(pwq); } /* is flush in progress and are we at the flushing tip? */ @@ -1246,14 +1246,14 @@ static int try_to_grab_pending(struct work_struct *work, bool is_dwork, debug_work_deactivate(work); /* - * A delayed work item cannot be grabbed directly because + * An inactive work item cannot be grabbed directly because * it might have linked NO_COLOR work items which, if left - * on the delayed_list, will confuse pwq->nr_active + * on the inactive_works list, will confuse pwq->nr_active * management later on and cause stall. Make sure the work * item is activated before grabbing. */ - if (*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED) - pwq_activate_delayed_work(work); + if (*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE) + pwq_activate_inactive_work(work); list_del_init(&work->entry); pwq_dec_nr_in_flight(pwq, get_work_color(work)); @@ -1451,8 +1451,8 @@ static void __queue_work(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq, if (list_empty(worklist)) pwq->pool->watchdog_ts = jiffies; } else { - work_flags |= WORK_STRUCT_DELAYED; - worklist = &pwq->delayed_works; + work_flags |= WORK_STRUCT_INACTIVE; + worklist = &pwq->inactive_works; } debug_work_activate(work); @@ -2496,7 +2496,7 @@ static int rescuer_thread(void *__rescuer) /* * The above execution of rescued work items could * have created more to rescue through - * pwq_activate_first_delayed() or chained + * pwq_activate_first_inactive() or chained * queueing. Let's put @pwq back on mayday list so * that such back-to-back work items, which may be * being used to relieve memory pressure, don't @@ -2922,7 +2922,7 @@ void drain_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq) bool drained; spin_lock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock); - drained = !pwq->nr_active && list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works); + drained = !pwq->nr_active && list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works); spin_unlock_irq(&pwq->pool->lock); if (drained) @@ -3703,7 +3703,7 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(struct work_struct *work) * @pwq: target pool_workqueue * * If @pwq isn't freezing, set @pwq->max_active to the associated - * workqueue's saved_max_active and activate delayed work items + * workqueue's saved_max_active and activate inactive work items * accordingly. If @pwq is freezing, clear @pwq->max_active to zero. */ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) @@ -3732,9 +3732,9 @@ static void pwq_adjust_max_active(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) pwq->max_active = wq->saved_max_active; - while (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works) && + while (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works) && pwq->nr_active < pwq->max_active) { - pwq_activate_first_delayed(pwq); + pwq_activate_first_inactive(pwq); kick = true; } @@ -3765,7 +3765,7 @@ static void init_pwq(struct pool_workqueue *pwq, struct workqueue_struct *wq, pwq->wq = wq; pwq->flush_color = -1; pwq->refcnt = 1; - INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->delayed_works); + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->inactive_works); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->pwqs_node); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&pwq->mayday_node); INIT_WORK(&pwq->unbound_release_work, pwq_unbound_release_workfn); @@ -4386,7 +4386,7 @@ void destroy_workqueue(struct workqueue_struct *wq) if (WARN_ON((pwq != wq->dfl_pwq) && (pwq->refcnt > 1)) || WARN_ON(pwq->nr_active) || - WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works))) { + WARN_ON(!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works))) { mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex); show_workqueue_state(); return; @@ -4527,7 +4527,7 @@ bool workqueue_congested(int cpu, struct workqueue_struct *wq) else pwq = unbound_pwq_by_node(wq, cpu_to_node(cpu)); - ret = !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works); + ret = !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works); rcu_read_unlock_sched(); return ret; @@ -4722,11 +4722,11 @@ static void show_pwq(struct pool_workqueue *pwq) pr_cont("\n"); } - if (!list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { + if (!list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { bool comma = false; - pr_info(" delayed:"); - list_for_each_entry(work, &pwq->delayed_works, entry) { + pr_info(" inactive:"); + list_for_each_entry(work, &pwq->inactive_works, entry) { pr_cont_work(comma, work); comma = !(*work_data_bits(work) & WORK_STRUCT_LINKED); } @@ -4756,7 +4756,7 @@ void show_workqueue_state(void) bool idle = true; for_each_pwq(pwq, wq) { - if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) { + if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) { idle = false; break; } @@ -4768,7 +4768,7 @@ void show_workqueue_state(void) for_each_pwq(pwq, wq) { spin_lock_irqsave(&pwq->pool->lock, flags); - if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->delayed_works)) + if (pwq->nr_active || !list_empty(&pwq->inactive_works)) show_pwq(pwq); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pwq->pool->lock, flags); /* @@ -5143,7 +5143,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(work_on_cpu_safe); * freeze_workqueues_begin - begin freezing workqueues * * Start freezing workqueues. After this function returns, all freezable - * workqueues will queue new works to their delayed_works list instead of + * workqueues will queue new works to their inactive_works list instead of * pool->worklist. * * CONTEXT: -- 2.25.1

1 4

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] nvme-pci: clear the prp2 field when not used
by Yong Hu 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

From: Lei Rao <lei.rao(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit 74b139c63f0775cf79266e9d9546c62b73fb3385 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a56ea6147facce4ac1fc38675455f9733d96232b ] If the prp2 field is not filled in nvme_setup_prp_simple(), the prp2 field is garbage data. According to nvme spec, the prp2 is reserved if the data transfer does not cross a memory page boundary, so clear it to zero if it is not used. Signed-off-by: Lei Rao <lei.rao(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index c09ee462b048..fbbbfdea076a 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -817,6 +817,8 @@ static blk_status_t nvme_setup_prp_simple(struct nvme_dev *dev, cmnd->dptr.prp1 = cpu_to_le64(iod->first_dma); if (bv->bv_len > first_prp_len) cmnd->dptr.prp2 = cpu_to_le64(iod->first_dma + first_prp_len); + else + cmnd->dptr.prp2 = 0; return BLK_STS_OK; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nvme-pci: clear the prp2 field when not used
by Yong Hu 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

From: Lei Rao <lei.rao(a)intel.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.188 commit 74b139c63f0775cf79266e9d9546c62b73fb3385 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PZZC CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a56ea6147facce4ac1fc38675455f9733d96232b ] If the prp2 field is not filled in nvme_setup_prp_simple(), the prp2 field is garbage data. According to nvme spec, the prp2 is reserved if the data transfer does not cross a memory page boundary, so clear it to zero if it is not used. Signed-off-by: Lei Rao <lei.rao(a)intel.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch(a)lst.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yong Hu <yong.hu(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c index c30ab2cf2533..8965ea20f5ef 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/host/pci.c @@ -817,6 +817,8 @@ static blk_status_t nvme_setup_prp_simple(struct nvme_dev *dev, cmnd->dptr.prp1 = cpu_to_le64(iod->first_dma); if (bv->bv_len > first_prp_len) cmnd->dptr.prp2 = cpu_to_le64(iod->first_dma + first_prp_len); + else + cmnd->dptr.prp2 = 0; return BLK_STS_OK; } -- 2.33.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched: Add feature 'UTIL_TASKGROUP' for dynamic affinity
by Hui Tang 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I526XC -------------------------------- If the feature enabled, util_avg of bottom-level tg is used, otherwise, util_avg of rq's cfs_rq is used. Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- kernel/sched/features.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index 5c8b48150862..f6068f1c28bc 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -7097,6 +7097,17 @@ static inline bool prefer_cpus_valid(struct task_struct *p) cpumask_subset(p->prefer_cpus, p->cpus_ptr); } +static inline unsigned long taskgroup_cpu_util(struct task_group *tg, + int cpu) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED + if (tg->se[cpu] && sched_feat(DA_UTIL_TASKGROUP)) + return tg->se[cpu]->avg.util_avg; +#endif + + return cpu_util(cpu); +} + /* * set_task_select_cpus: select the cpu range for task * @p: the task whose available cpu range will to set @@ -7127,13 +7138,11 @@ static void set_task_select_cpus(struct task_struct *p, int *idlest_cpu, rcu_read_lock(); tg = task_group(p); for_each_cpu(cpu, p->prefer_cpus) { - if (unlikely(!tg->se[cpu])) - continue; - if (idlest_cpu && available_idle_cpu(cpu)) { *idlest_cpu = cpu; } else if (idlest_cpu) { - spare = (long)(capacity_of(cpu) - tg->se[cpu]->avg.util_avg); + spare = (long)(capacity_of(cpu) - + taskgroup_cpu_util(tg, cpu)); if (spare > min_util) { min_util = spare; *idlest_cpu = cpu; @@ -7148,7 +7157,7 @@ static void set_task_select_cpus(struct task_struct *p, int *idlest_cpu, return; } - util_avg_sum += tg->se[cpu]->avg.util_avg; + util_avg_sum += taskgroup_cpu_util(tg, cpu); tg_capacity += capacity_of(cpu); } rcu_read_unlock(); diff --git a/kernel/sched/features.h b/kernel/sched/features.h index fef48f5be2fa..76fade025c4b 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/features.h +++ b/kernel/sched/features.h @@ -106,3 +106,10 @@ SCHED_FEAT(UTIL_EST_FASTUP, true) SCHED_FEAT(ALT_PERIOD, true) SCHED_FEAT(BASE_SLICE, true) + +#ifdef CONFIG_QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY +/* + * Use util_avg of bottom-Level taskgroup + */ +SCHED_FEAT(DA_UTIL_TASKGROUP, true) +#endif -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] can: raw: fix receiver memory leak
by Ziyang Xuan 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

Backport can/raw receiver memory leak fix commits. Eric Dumazet (1): can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release() Ziyang Xuan (1): can: raw: fix receiver memory leak net/can/raw.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2 0/2] Fix host zero page refcount overflow caused by kvm
by Lei Chen 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

v2: 1. using full commit id instead of abbrevation 2. fix wrong mainline tag Sean Christopherson (1): KVM: Don't set Accessed/Dirty bits for ZERO_PAGE Zhuang Yanying (1): KVM: fix overflow of zero page refcount with ksm running virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH] coresight: etm4x: Don't bother the user with nonessential log message
by Tian Tao 03 Aug '23

03 Aug '23

Each cpu will print the following log when initializing ETM "coresight etm1: CPU1: etm v4.5 initialized", if there are a lot of cpus, e.g. 128. there will be a screen full of this log. replace dev_info with dev_dbg prints only when needed. Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6(a)hisilicon.com> --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c index 7e307022303a..7b51e8594fd5 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c @@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ static int etm4_add_coresight_dev(struct etm4_init_arg *init_arg) etmdrvdata[drvdata->cpu] = drvdata; - dev_info(&drvdata->csdev->dev, "CPU%d: %s v%d.%d initialized\n", + dev_dbg(&drvdata->csdev->dev, "CPU%d: %s v%d.%d initialized\n", drvdata->cpu, type_name, major, minor); if (boot_enable) { -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH] coresight: etm4x: Don't bother the user with nonessential log message
by Tian Tao 02 Aug '23

02 Aug '23

Each cpu will print the following log when initializing ETM "coresight etm1: CPU1: etm v4.5 initialized", if there are a lot of cpus, e.g. 128. there will be a screen full of this log. replace dev_dbg with dev _printf prints only when needed. Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6(a)hisilicon.com> --- drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c index 7e307022303a..7b51e8594fd5 100644 --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c @@ -2033,7 +2033,7 @@ static int etm4_add_coresight_dev(struct etm4_init_arg *init_arg) etmdrvdata[drvdata->cpu] = drvdata; - dev_info(&drvdata->csdev->dev, "CPU%d: %s v%d.%d initialized\n", + dev_dbg(&drvdata->csdev->dev, "CPU%d: %s v%d.%d initialized\n", drvdata->cpu, type_name, major, minor); if (boot_enable) { -- 2.33.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] arm64/mpam: avoid hot-plug mpam_cpu_online() twice in mpam_enable()
by Wang ShaoBo 02 Aug '23

02 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PN0A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- BUG reported when setuping MPAM driver: [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:49 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 593, name: kworker/72:1 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] CPU: 72 PID: 593 Comm: kworker/72:1 Not tainted 5.10.0-03467-g02e1abb0f821-dirty #1 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDDA, BIOS 1.79 08/21/2021 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 9ae2dc86231d0b23cd114b5ed4089cac17566b0f' [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Workqueue: events mpam_enable [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Load PGP public keys [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Call trace: [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] show_stack+0x20/0x30 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] dump_stack+0x11c/0x174 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] ___might_sleep+0x15c/0x1a0 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] __might_sleep+0x7c/0x100 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] cpus_read_lock+0x3c/0x110 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] __cpuhp_setup_state+0x3c/0x80 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] mpam_enable+0x148/0x3a4 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] process_one_work+0x3cc/0x984 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] worker_thread+0x2b0/0x71c [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kthread+0x1e0/0x220 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector initialized (mem pool available: 11650) [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kmemleak: Automatic memory scanning thread started [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] cryptd: max_cpu_qlen set to 1000 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Key type encrypted registered [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] AppArmor: AppArmor sha1 policy hashing enabled [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:db Patch: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") has reported the 'Bad PC' BUG, concurrently calling cpuhp_remove_state() and cpuhp_setup_state() in mpam_enable is dangerous as we share the same state-=>mpam_cpuhp_state, which may be changed after the interrupt returns, Patch bc9e3f9895ef2 disable irqs but it didn't completely solve this problem, and trigger this BUG report, we can use lockless atomic_fetch_inc() function to avoid hot-plug mpam_cpu_online() twice in mpam_enable() instead. Fixes: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c index adf4bc034a51f..9ff8947a2ddf7 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c @@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ static void mpam_disable_irqs(void) static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) { int err; + static atomic_t once; unsigned long flags; struct mpam_device *dev; bool all_devices_probed = true; @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) } mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - if (!all_devices_probed) + if (!all_devices_probed || atomic_fetch_inc(&once)) return; mutex_lock(&mpam_devices_lock); @@ -596,11 +597,9 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) pr_err("Failed to setup/init resctrl\n"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - local_irq_disable(); mpam_cpuhp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "mpam:online", mpam_cpu_online, mpam_cpu_offline); - local_irq_enable(); if (mpam_cpuhp_state <= 0) pr_err("Failed to re-register 'dyn' cpuhp callbacks"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_cpuhp_lock); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/4] fix three CVEs by backport mainline patchs
by ZhaoLong Wang 02 Aug '23

02 Aug '23

mainline patch f5c779b7ddbda("ksmbd: fix racy issue from session setup and logoff") It fixes three CVEs: CVE-2023-32250 CVE-2023-32252 CVE-2023-32257 In order to successfully apply the patch, we chose to incorporate the related pre-installed bugfix patch. Colin Ian King (1): ksmbd: Fix spelling mistake "excceed" -> "exceeded" Dawei Li (1): ksmbd: Implements sess->ksmbd_chann_list as xarray Namjae Jeon (2): ksmbd: limit pdu length size according to connection status ksmbd: fix racy issue from session setup and logoff fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 27 +++++++--- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 39 ++++++++------ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 62 +++++++++------------ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.h | 4 +- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 3 +- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h | 5 +- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 2 +- 8 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

2 5

[OLK-5.10 0/4] fix three CVEs by backport mainline patchs
by ZhaoLong Wang 02 Aug '23

02 Aug '23

mainline patch f5c779b7ddbda("ksmbd: fix racy issue from session setup and logoff") It fixes three CVEs: CVE-2023-32250 CVE-2023-32252 CVE-2023-32257 In order to successfully apply the patch, we chose to incorporate the related pre-installed bugfix patch. Colin Ian King (1): ksmbd: Fix spelling mistake "excceed" -> "exceeded" Dawei Li (1): ksmbd: Implements sess->ksmbd_chann_list as xarray Namjae Jeon (2): ksmbd: limit pdu length size according to connection status ksmbd: fix racy issue from session setup and logoff fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 27 +++++++--- fs/ksmbd/connection.h | 39 ++++++++------ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.c | 62 +++++++++------------ fs/ksmbd/mgmt/user_session.h | 4 +- fs/ksmbd/server.c | 3 +- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++------------------ fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h | 5 +- fs/ksmbd/transport_tcp.c | 2 +- 8 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-) -- 2.34.3

1 4

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/2] Fix host zero page refcount overflow caused by kvm
by Lei Chen 02 Aug '23

02 Aug '23

Sean Christopherson (1): KVM: Don't set Accessed/Dirty bits for ZERO_PAGE Zhuang Yanying (1): KVM: fix overflow of zero page refcount with ksm running virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 3

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 00/46]ima: Add IMA digest lists feature
by Zhou Shuiqing 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

This patchset supports IMA digest lists for the kernel. David Howells (4): PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) PGPLIB: Basic packet parser KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob Mimi Zohar (1): initramfs: add file metadata Roberto Sassu (34): initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!! gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata init: Add kernel option to force usage of tmpfs for rootfs ima: Add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status ima: Allow choice of file hash algorithm for measurement and audit ima: Generalize ima_read_policy() ima: Generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit ima: Generalize policy file operations ima: Use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data ima: Add parser of compact digest list ima: Prevent usage of digest lists not measured or appraised ima: Introduce new securityfs files ima: Introduce new hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK ima: Load all digest lists from a directory at boot time ima: Add support for measurement with digest lists ima: Add support for appraisal with digest lists evm: Add support for digest lists of metadata ima: Add meta_immutable appraisal type ima: Introduce exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_immutable policy ima: Add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt mpi: introduce mpi_key_length() rsa: add parser of raw format KEYS: PGP data parser KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring() certs: Introduce search_trusted_key() ima: Search key in the built-in keyrings ima: Allow direct upload of digest lists to securityfs ima: Add parser keyword to the policy evm: Extend evm= with x509. allow_metadata_writes and complete values ima: Execute parser to upload digest lists not recognizable by the kernel evm: Propagate choice of HMAC algorithm in evm_crypto.c config: add digest list options for arm64 and x86 Zhang Tianxing (5): ima: fix a memory leak in ima_del_digest_data_entry ima: Add max size for IMA digest database ima: don't allow control characters in policy path ima: fix CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_DB_MEGABYTES in openeuler_defconfig ima: fix db size overflow and Kconfig issues Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded" shenxiangwei (1): ima: bugfix for digest lists importing Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 4 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 +- Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt | 259 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 11 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 31 +- certs/Kconfig | 7 + certs/Makefile | 7 + certs/system_certificates.S | 18 + certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 25 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 10 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c | 281 +++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h | 23 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 383 +++++++++++++++ crypto/rsa.c | 14 +- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 69 +++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 6 + include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/mpi.h | 2 + include/linux/pgp.h | 220 +++++++++ include/linux/pgplib.h | 48 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 4 + init/do_mounts.c | 11 +- init/initramfs.c | 138 +++++- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 32 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 24 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 103 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 49 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 117 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 465 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 54 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 294 ++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 126 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 116 ++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 47 +- usr/Kconfig | 8 + usr/Makefile | 4 +- usr/gen_init_cpio.c | 136 ++++- usr/gen_initramfs.sh | 7 +- 50 files changed, 3301 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h -- 2.33.0

2 51

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arm64/mpam: implement CPU_PM notifier
by Wang ShaoBo 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PP9I -------------------------------- When a CPU is suspended (either through suspend-to-RAM or CPUidle), The content of MPAM context registers can be lost, as PARTID and PMG is reserved already in this-cpu variable pqr_state, so restore it on power-up process. Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_internal.h | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c index 66d787f134c0e..06e8afadd149e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #include <linux/of.h> #include <linux/of_platform.h> #include <linux/of_address.h> +#include <linux/cpu_pm.h> #include "mpam_resource.h" #include "mpam_device.h" @@ -532,6 +533,30 @@ static void mpam_disable_irqs(void) } } +static struct notifier_block mpam_notifier_block; +static int cpu_pm_mpam_notify(struct notifier_block *b, + unsigned long cmd, void *v) +{ + switch (cmd) { + case CPU_PM_ENTER: + break; + case CPU_PM_EXIT: + case CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED: + mpam_restore_context(); + break; + default: + return NOTIFY_DONE; + } + + return NOTIFY_OK; +} + +static int cpu_pm_mpam_register(void) +{ + mpam_notifier_block.notifier_call = cpu_pm_mpam_notify; + return cpu_pm_register_notifier(&mpam_notifier_block); +} + /* * Enable mpam once all devices have been probed. * Scheduled by mpam_discovery_complete() once all devices have been created. @@ -603,6 +628,8 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) if (mpam_cpuhp_state <= 0) pr_err("Failed to re-register 'dyn' cpuhp callbacks"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_cpuhp_lock); + + cpu_pm_mpam_register(); } static void mpam_failed(struct work_struct *work) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_internal.h b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_internal.h index 7b84ea54975aa..1ba355988b2c4 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_internal.h +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_internal.h @@ -342,4 +342,6 @@ int rmid_mon_ptrs_init(u32 nr_rmids); struct resctrl_resource * mpam_resctrl_get_resource(enum resctrl_resource_level level); +void mpam_restore_context(void); + #endif diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c index 4a1e376ec4970..af5b52c3ad417 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_resctrl.c @@ -2272,6 +2272,16 @@ void __mpam_sched_in(void) } } +void mpam_restore_context(void) +{ + struct intel_pqr_state *state = this_cpu_ptr(&pqr_state); + + state->cur_rmid = 0; + state->cur_closid = 0; + + mpam_sched_in(); +} + static void mpam_update_from_resctrl_cfg(struct mpam_resctrl_res *res, u32 resctrl_cfg, enum rdt_event_id evt, -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched: Fix build error if !FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
by Hui Tang 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PNAF ------------------------------- Fix build error if !FAIR_GROUP_SCHED && QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY. Fixes: 229f5c1f3868 ("sched: Introduce dynamic affinity for cfs scheduler") Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- init/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 31fff350a288..6369a34357b6 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig @@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ endif #CGROUP_SCHED config QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY bool "qos dynamic affinity" - depends on CPUSETS + depends on CPUSETS && FAIR_GROUP_SCHED default n help This feature lets you allocate preferred cpus to taskgroup. If enabled, -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched: Fix build error for dynamic_affinity_enable()
by Hui Tang 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PNAF ------------------------------- Fix build error if defined(!CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL) && defined(CONFIG_QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY). Fixes: d8f77f894df3 ("sched: fix performance degradation on lmbench") Signed-off-by: Hui Tang <tanghui20(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/fair.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c index 003ebd244d31..5c8b48150862 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c @@ -7070,8 +7070,6 @@ static int find_energy_efficient_cpu(struct task_struct *p, int prev_cpu) } #ifdef CONFIG_QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY - -#ifdef CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(__dynamic_affinity_used); static __always_inline bool dynamic_affinity_used(void) @@ -7084,13 +7082,6 @@ void dynamic_affinity_enable(void) static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&__dynamic_affinity_used); } -#else /* CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL */ -static __always_inline bool dynamic_affinity_used(void) -{ - return true; -} -#endif - /* * Low utilization threshold for CPU * -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] arm64/mpam: avoid hot-plug mpam_cpu_online() twice in mpam_enable()
by Wang ShaoBo 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7PN0A CVE: NA ------------------------------------------------- BUG reported when setuping MPAM driver: [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:49 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 128, non_block: 0, pid: 593, name: kworker/72:1 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] CPU: 72 PID: 593 Comm: kworker/72:1 Not tainted 5.10.0-03467-g02e1abb0f821-dirty #1 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDDA, BIOS 1.79 08/21/2021 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Loaded X.509 cert 'Build time autogenerated kernel key: 9ae2dc86231d0b23cd114b5ed4089cac17566b0f' [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Workqueue: events mpam_enable [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Load PGP public keys [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Call trace: [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x30c [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] show_stack+0x20/0x30 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] dump_stack+0x11c/0x174 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] ___might_sleep+0x15c/0x1a0 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] __might_sleep+0x7c/0x100 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] cpus_read_lock+0x3c/0x110 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] __cpuhp_setup_state+0x3c/0x80 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] mpam_enable+0x148/0x3a4 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] process_one_work+0x3cc/0x984 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] worker_thread+0x2b0/0x71c [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kthread+0x1e0/0x220 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kmemleak: Kernel memory leak detector initialized (mem pool available: 11650) [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] kmemleak: Automatic memory scanning thread started [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] cryptd: max_cpu_qlen set to 1000 [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] Key type encrypted registered [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] AppArmor: AppArmor sha1 policy hashing enabled [Thu Jul 27 12:15:54 2023] integrity: Loading X.509 certificate: UEFI:db Patch: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") disable irqs when hot-plug mpam_cpu_online() callback twice in occasional situation re-enter mpam_enable() function concurrently after probing all mpam devices success, this is not safe as cpuhp_setup_state() calls sleeping function, we can use lockless atomic_fetch_inc() function to avoid hot-plug mpam_cpu_online() twice in mpam_enable() instead. Fixes: bc9e3f9895ef2 ("arm64/mpam: Fix mpam corrupt when cpu online") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c index c59f7f09308dc..66d787f134c0e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_device.c @@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ static void mpam_disable_irqs(void) static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) { int err; + static atomic_t once; unsigned long flags; struct mpam_device *dev; bool all_devices_probed = true; @@ -557,7 +558,7 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) } mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - if (!all_devices_probed) + if (!all_devices_probed || atomic_fetch_inc(&once)) return; mutex_lock(&mpam_devices_lock); @@ -596,11 +597,9 @@ static void mpam_enable(struct work_struct *work) pr_err("Failed to setup/init resctrl\n"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_devices_lock); - local_irq_disable(); mpam_cpuhp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "mpam:online", mpam_cpu_online, mpam_cpu_offline); - local_irq_enable(); if (mpam_cpuhp_state <= 0) pr_err("Failed to re-register 'dyn' cpuhp callbacks"); mutex_unlock(&mpam_cpuhp_lock); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] can: raw: fix receiver memory leak
by Ziyang Xuan 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

Backport can/raw receiver memory leak fix commits. Eric Dumazet (1): can: raw: fix lockdep issue in raw_release() Ziyang Xuan (1): can: raw: fix receiver memory leak net/can/raw.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] CVE-2023-38430
by Li Nan 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

Li Nan (1): ksmbd: define SMB2_COMPRESSION_TRANSFORM_ID in fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h Namjae Jeon (1): ksmbd: validate smb request protocol id fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.h | 1 + fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 5 +++-- fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) -- 2.39.2

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2 0/2] net: nfc: Fix CVE-2023-3863
by Ziyang Xuan 01 Aug '23

01 Aug '23

Backport CVE-2023-3863 fix commits. v2: - Resend the patchset. Krzysztof Kozlowski (1): nfc: llcp: simplify llcp_sock_connect() error paths Lin Ma (1): net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by nfc_llcp_find_local net/nfc/llcp.h | 1 - net/nfc/llcp_commands.c | 12 +++++++--- net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/nfc/llcp_sock.c | 21 ++++++++++-------- net/nfc/netlink.c | 20 ++++++++++++----- net/nfc/nfc.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH v2 openEuler-23.09 00/46] ima: add IMA digest lists extension
by Zhou Shuiqing 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

Sync patched for IMA digest lists extension -Based on the kernel code of version 6.x v2: -Add patch0 to provide cover information for patch set. David Howells (4): PGPLIB: PGP definitions (RFC 4880) PGPLIB: Basic packet parser KEYS: Provide PGP key description autogeneration KEYS: Provide a function to load keys from a PGP keyring blob Mimi Zohar (1): initramfs: add file metadata Roberto Sassu (34): initramfs: read metadata from special file METADATA!!! gen_init_cpio: add support for file metadata init: Add kernel option to force usage of tmpfs for rootfs ima: Add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status ima: Allow choice of file hash algorithm for measurement and audit ima: Generalize ima_read_policy() ima: Generalize ima_write_policy() and raise uploaded data size limit ima: Generalize policy file operations ima: Use ima_show_htable_value to show violations and hash table data ima: Add parser of compact digest list ima: Prevent usage of digest lists not measured or appraised ima: Introduce new securityfs files ima: Introduce new hook DIGEST_LIST_CHECK ima: Load all digest lists from a directory at boot time ima: Add support for measurement with digest lists ima: Add support for appraisal with digest lists evm: Add support for digest lists of metadata ima: Add meta_immutable appraisal type ima: Introduce exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_tcb policy ima: Introduce appraise_exec_immutable policy ima: Add Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt mpi: introduce mpi_key_length() rsa: add parser of raw format KEYS: PGP data parser KEYS: Introduce load_pgp_public_keyring() certs: Introduce search_trusted_key() ima: Search key in the built-in keyrings ima: Allow direct upload of digest lists to securityfs ima: Add parser keyword to the policy evm: Extend evm= with x509. allow_metadata_writes and complete values ima: Execute parser to upload digest lists not recognizable by the kernel evm: Propagate choice of HMAC algorithm in evm_crypto.c config: add digest list options for arm64 and x86 Zhang Tianxing (5): ima: fix a memory leak in ima_del_digest_data_entry ima: Add max size for IMA digest database ima: don't allow control characters in policy path ima: fix CONFIG_IMA_DIGEST_DB_MEGABYTES in openeuler_defconfig ima: fix db size overflow and Kconfig issues Zheng Zengkai (1): Revert "evm: Refuse EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES only if an HMAC key is loaded" shenxiangwei (1): ima: bugfix for digest lists importing Documentation/ABI/testing/evm | 4 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 49 +- Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt | 259 ++++++++++ arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 11 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 31 +- certs/Kconfig | 7 + certs/Makefile | 7 + certs/system_certificates.S | 18 + certs/system_keyring.c | 44 ++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 25 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 10 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c | 281 +++++++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h | 23 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c | 119 +++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c | 383 +++++++++++++++ crypto/rsa.c | 14 +- crypto/rsa_helper.c | 69 +++ include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 6 + include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 + include/linux/kernel_read_file.h | 1 + include/linux/mpi.h | 2 + include/linux/pgp.h | 220 +++++++++ include/linux/pgplib.h | 48 ++ include/linux/verification.h | 4 + init/do_mounts.c | 11 +- init/initramfs.c | 138 +++++- lib/mpi/mpicoder.c | 33 +- security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 + security/integrity/evm/Kconfig | 32 ++ security/integrity/evm/evm.h | 1 + security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c | 24 +- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 103 +++- security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c | 2 +- security/integrity/iint.c | 2 + security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 49 ++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 39 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 42 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 117 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c | 465 ++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h | 54 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 294 ++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 128 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 116 ++++- security/integrity/integrity.h | 47 +- usr/Kconfig | 8 + usr/Makefile | 4 +- usr/gen_init_cpio.c | 136 ++++- usr/gen_initramfs.sh | 7 +- 50 files changed, 3302 insertions(+), 219 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/security/IMA-digest-lists.txt create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_library.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_parser.h create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_preload.c create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pgp_public_key.c create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgp.h create mode 100644 include/linux/pgplib.h create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_digest_list.h -- 2.33.0

1 46

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in deassemble_neg_contexts()
by Li Lingfeng 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc6 commit f1a411873c85b642f13b01f21b534c2bab81fc1b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LU2Q CVE: CVE-2023-38427 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/f… -------------------------------- The check in the beginning is `clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context) <= len_of_ctxts`, but in the end of loop, `len_of_ctxts` will subtract `((clen + 7) & ~0x7) + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)`, which causes integer underflow when clen does the 8 alignment. We should use `(clen + 7) & ~0x7` in the check to avoid underflow from happening. Then there are some variables that need to be declared unsigned instead of signed. [ 11.671070] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610 [ 11.671533] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888005e86cf2 by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 11.673383] Call Trace: [ 11.673541] <TASK> [ 11.673679] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 [ 11.673913] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 11.674671] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 11.675171] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 [ 11.675412] smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610 [ 11.676217] ksmbd_smb_negotiate_common+0x526/0x770 [ 11.676795] handle_ksmbd_work+0x274/0x810 ... Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflict: fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 18e176fcddf0..c357b2127774 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -978,13 +978,13 @@ static void decode_sign_cap_ctxt(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, static __le32 deassemble_neg_contexts(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct smb2_negotiate_req *req, - int len_of_smb) + unsigned int len_of_smb) { /* +4 is to account for the RFC1001 len field */ struct smb2_neg_context *pctx = (struct smb2_neg_context *)req; int i = 0, len_of_ctxts; - int offset = le32_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextOffset); - int neg_ctxt_cnt = le16_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextCount); + unsigned int offset = le32_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextOffset); + unsigned int neg_ctxt_cnt = le16_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextCount); __le32 status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "decoding %d negotiate contexts\n", neg_ctxt_cnt); @@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ static __le32 deassemble_neg_contexts(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, if (len_of_ctxts == 0) break; - if (len_of_ctxts < sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)) + if (len_of_ctxts < (int)sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)) break; pctx = (struct smb2_neg_context *)((char *)pctx + offset); @@ -1053,9 +1053,8 @@ static __le32 deassemble_neg_contexts(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, } /* offsets must be 8 byte aligned */ - clen = (clen + 7) & ~0x7; - offset = clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context); - len_of_ctxts -= clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context); + offset = (clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context) + 7) & ~0x7; + len_of_ctxts -= offset; } return status; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 01/46] initramfs: add file metadata
by Zhou Shuiqing 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> hulk inclusion category: feature feature: IMA Digest Lists extension bugzilla: 46797 ------------------------------------------------- This patch adds metadata to a file from a supplied buffer. The buffer might contains multiple metadata records. The format of each record is: <metadata len (ASCII, 8 chars)><version><type><metadata> For now, only the TYPE_XATTR metadata type is supported. The specific format of this metadata type is: <xattr #N name>\0<xattr #N value> [kamensky: fixed restoring of xattrs for symbolic links by using sys_lsetxattr() instead of sys_setxattr()] [sassu: removed state management, kept only do_setxattrs(), added support for generic file metadata, replaced sys_lsetxattr() with vfs_setxattr(), added check for entry_size, added check for hdr->c_size, replaced strlen() with strnlen(); moved do_setxattrs() before do_name()] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Victor Kamensky <kamensky(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Taras Kondratiuk <takondra(a)cisco.com> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tianxing Zhang <zhangtianxing3(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zhou Shuiqing<zhoushuiqing2(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/initramfs.h | 21 ++++++++++ init/initramfs.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/initramfs.h diff --git a/include/linux/initramfs.h b/include/linux/initramfs.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2f8cee441236 --- /dev/null +++ b/include/linux/initramfs.h @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * include/linux/initramfs.h + * + * Include file for file metadata in the initial ram disk. + */ +#ifndef _LINUX_INITRAMFS_H +#define _LINUX_INITRAMFS_H + +#define METADATA_FILENAME "METADATA!!!" + +enum metadata_types { TYPE_NONE, TYPE_XATTR, TYPE__LAST }; + +struct metadata_hdr { + char c_size[8]; /* total size including c_size field */ + char c_version; /* header version */ + char c_type; /* metadata type */ + char c_metadata[]; /* metadata */ +} __packed; + +#endif /*LINUX_INITRAMFS_H*/ diff --git a/init/initramfs.c b/init/initramfs.c index e7a01c2ccd1b..3b272c56a987 100644 --- a/init/initramfs.c +++ b/init/initramfs.c @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ #include <linux/memblock.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/namei.h> +#include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/initramfs.h> #include <linux/init_syscalls.h> #include <linux/task_work.h> #include <linux/umh.h> @@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ static __initdata time64_t mtime; static __initdata unsigned long ino, major, minor, nlink; static __initdata umode_t mode; -static __initdata unsigned long body_len, name_len; +static __initdata unsigned long body_len, name_len, metadata_len; static __initdata uid_t uid; static __initdata gid_t gid; static __initdata unsigned rdev; @@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ static void __init read_into(char *buf, unsigned size, enum state next) } } -static __initdata char *header_buf, *symlink_buf, *name_buf; +static __initdata char *header_buf, *symlink_buf, *name_buf, *metadata_buf; static int __init do_start(void) { @@ -351,6 +353,88 @@ static int __init maybe_link(void) return 0; } +static int __init do_setxattrs(char *pathname, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + struct path path; + char *xattr_name, *xattr_value; + uint32_t xattr_name_size, xattr_value_size; + int ret; + + xattr_name = buf; + xattr_name_size = strnlen(xattr_name, size); + if (xattr_name_size == size) { + error("malformed xattrs"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + xattr_value = xattr_name + xattr_name_size + 1; + xattr_value_size = buf + size - xattr_value; + + ret = kern_path(pathname, 0, &path); + if (!ret) { + ret = vfs_setxattr(&nop_mnt_idmap, path.dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, + xattr_value_size, 0); + + path_put(&path); + } + + pr_debug("%s: %s size: %u val: %s (ret: %d)\n", pathname, + xattr_name, xattr_value_size, xattr_value, ret); + + return ret; +} + +static int __init __maybe_unused do_parse_metadata(char *pathname) +{ + char *buf = metadata_buf; + char *bufend = metadata_buf + metadata_len; + struct metadata_hdr *hdr; + char str[sizeof(hdr->c_size) + 1]; + uint32_t entry_size; + + if (!metadata_len) + return 0; + + str[sizeof(hdr->c_size)] = 0; + + while (buf < bufend) { + int ret; + + if (buf + sizeof(*hdr) > bufend) { + error("malformed metadata"); + break; + } + + hdr = (struct metadata_hdr *)buf; + if (hdr->c_version != 1) { + pr_debug("Unsupported header version\n"); + break; + } + + memcpy(str, hdr->c_size, sizeof(hdr->c_size)); + ret = kstrtou32(str, 16, &entry_size); + if (ret || buf + entry_size > bufend || + entry_size < sizeof(*hdr)) { + error("malformed xattrs"); + break; + } + + switch (hdr->c_type) { + case TYPE_XATTR: + do_setxattrs(pathname, buf + sizeof(*hdr), + entry_size - sizeof(*hdr)); + break; + default: + pr_debug("Unsupported metadata type\n"); + break; + } + + buf += entry_size; + } + + return 0; +} + static __initdata struct file *wfile; static __initdata loff_t wfile_pos; -- 2.33.0

2 46

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/4] net: nfc: Fix CVE-2023-3863
by Ziyang Xuan 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

Backport CVE-2023-3863 fix commits. Aditya Pakki (1): nfc: Fix to check for kmemdup failure Krzysztof Kozlowski (2): nfc: llcp: nullify llcp_sock->dev on connect() error paths nfc: llcp: simplify llcp_sock_connect() error paths Lin Ma (1): net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by nfc_llcp_find_local net/nfc/llcp.h | 1 - net/nfc/llcp_commands.c | 12 +++++++--- net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/nfc/llcp_sock.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++---------- net/nfc/netlink.c | 20 ++++++++++++----- net/nfc/nfc.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 5

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/sched: cls_u32: Fix reference counter leak leading to overflow
by Lu Wei 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.185 commit af6eaa57986e82d7efd81984ee607927c6de61e4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N2 CVE: CVE-2023-3609 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 04c55383fa5689357bcdd2c8036725a55ed632bc ] In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), u32_set_parms() will immediately return without decrementing the recently incremented reference counter. If this happens enough times, the counter will rollover and the reference freed, leading to a double free which can be used to do 'bad things'. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the reference counter is incremented. Also save any meaningful return values to be applied to the return data at the appropriate point in time. This issue was caught with KASAN. Fixes: 705c7091262d ("net: sched: cls_u32: no need to call tcf_exts_change for newly allocated struct") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index da042bc8b239..1ac8ff445a6d 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -716,12 +716,18 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct nlattr *est, bool ovr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { - int err; + int err, ifindex = -1; err = tcf_exts_validate(net, tp, tb, est, &n->exts, ovr, true, extack); if (err < 0) return err; + if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { + ifindex = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); + if (ifindex < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (tb[TCA_U32_LINK]) { u32 handle = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_U32_LINK]); struct tc_u_hnode *ht_down = NULL, *ht_old; @@ -756,13 +762,9 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, tcf_bind_filter(tp, &n->res, base); } - if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { - int ret; - ret = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - n->ifindex = ret; - } + if (ifindex >= 0) + n->ifindex = ifindex; + return 0; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] ksmbd: fix global-out-of-bounds in smb2_find_context_vals
by Long Li 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

From: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc2 commit 02f76c401d17e409ed45bf7887148fcc22c93c85 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LU2N CVE: CVE-2023-38426 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Add tag_len argument in smb2_find_context_vals() to avoid out-of-bound read when create_context's name_len is larger than tag length. [ 7.995411] ================================================================== [ 7.995866] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x83/0xa0 [ 7.996248] Read of size 8 at addr ffffffff8258d940 by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 7.998191] Call Trace: [ 7.998358] <TASK> [ 7.998503] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 [ 7.998743] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 7.999458] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 7.999895] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 [ 8.000152] memcmp+0x83/0xa0 [ 8.000347] smb2_find_context_vals+0xf7/0x1e0 [ 8.000635] smb2_open+0x1df2/0x43a0 [ 8.006398] handle_ksmbd_work+0x274/0x810 [ 8.006666] process_one_work+0x419/0x760 [ 8.006922] worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0 [ 8.007429] kthread+0x160/0x190 [ 8.007946] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 8.008181] </TASK> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Long Li <leo.lilong(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/oplock.c | 5 +++-- fs/ksmbd/oplock.h | 2 +- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 14 +++++++------- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c b/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c index 3721fd44a43a..fc5b2137002f 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/oplock.c @@ -1449,11 +1449,12 @@ struct lease_ctx_info *parse_lease_state(void *open_req) * smb2_find_context_vals() - find a particular context info in open request * @open_req: buffer containing smb2 file open(create) request * @tag: context name to search for + * @tag_len: the length of tag * * Return: pointer to requested context, NULL if @str context not found * or error pointer if name length is invalid. */ -struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag) +struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag, int tag_len) { struct create_context *cc; unsigned int next = 0; @@ -1492,7 +1493,7 @@ struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); name = (char *)cc + name_off; - if (memcmp(name, tag, name_len) == 0) + if (name_len == tag_len && !memcmp(name, tag, name_len)) return cc; remain_len -= next; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/oplock.h b/fs/ksmbd/oplock.h index 0cf7a2b5bbc0..e1ba363b412a 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/oplock.h +++ b/fs/ksmbd/oplock.h @@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ void create_durable_v2_rsp_buf(char *cc, struct ksmbd_file *fp); void create_mxac_rsp_buf(char *cc, int maximal_access); void create_disk_id_rsp_buf(char *cc, __u64 file_id, __u64 vol_id); void create_posix_rsp_buf(char *cc, struct ksmbd_file *fp); -struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *str); +struct create_context *smb2_find_context_vals(void *open_req, const char *tag, int tag_len); struct oplock_info *lookup_lease_in_table(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, char *lease_key); int find_same_lease_key(struct ksmbd_session *sess, struct ksmbd_inode *ci, diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 18e176fcddf0..d8b47cacb356 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -2453,7 +2453,7 @@ static int smb2_create_sd_buffer(struct ksmbd_work *work, return -ENOENT; /* Parse SD BUFFER create contexts */ - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_SD_BUFFER); + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_SD_BUFFER, 4); if (!context) return -ENOENT; else if (IS_ERR(context)) @@ -2649,7 +2649,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) if (req->CreateContextsOffset) { /* Parse non-durable handle create contexts */ - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_EA_BUFFER); + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_EA_BUFFER, 4); if (IS_ERR(context)) { rc = PTR_ERR(context); goto err_out1; @@ -2669,7 +2669,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) } context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_REQUEST); + SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_REQUEST, 4); if (IS_ERR(context)) { rc = PTR_ERR(context); goto err_out1; @@ -2680,7 +2680,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) } context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TIMEWARP_REQUEST); + SMB2_CREATE_TIMEWARP_REQUEST, 4); if (IS_ERR(context)) { rc = PTR_ERR(context); goto err_out1; @@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) if (tcon->posix_extensions) { context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX); + SMB2_CREATE_TAG_POSIX, 16); if (IS_ERR(context)) { rc = PTR_ERR(context); goto err_out1; @@ -3084,7 +3084,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) struct create_alloc_size_req *az_req; az_req = (struct create_alloc_size_req *)smb2_find_context_vals(req, - SMB2_CREATE_ALLOCATION_SIZE); + SMB2_CREATE_ALLOCATION_SIZE, 4); if (IS_ERR(az_req)) { rc = PTR_ERR(az_req); goto err_out; @@ -3111,7 +3111,7 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) err); } - context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_ON_DISK_ID); + context = smb2_find_context_vals(req, SMB2_CREATE_QUERY_ON_DISK_ID, 4); if (IS_ERR(context)) { rc = PTR_ERR(context); goto err_out; -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] psi: fix compile error for psi cgroupv1 when CONFIG_CGROUP=n
by Lu Jialin 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7OOZR ------------------------------- When CONFIG_CGROUP=n ,the compile error is: In file included from kernel/sched/core.c:13: kernel/sched/sched.h:2679:22: error: array type has incomplete element type ‘struct cftype’ extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files[]; ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ the reason is then CONFIG_CGROUP=n, struct cftype is not defined. We also find that, cgroup_v1_psi_files is used only in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c and kernel/sched/cpuacct.c. Therefore, move extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files to kernel/sched/cpuacct.c.This also solved the compile error, because, then CONFIG_CGROUP=n, CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=n, the kernel/sched/cpuacct.c is not compiled, which will solve the compile error. Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/cpuacct.c | 1 + kernel/sched/sched.h | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c b/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c index 5c00d3dcee8d..28ed182b6801 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c +++ b/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c @@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ static int __init setup_psi_v1(char *str) } __setup("psi_v1=", setup_psi_v1); +extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files[]; static int __init cgroup_v1_psi_init(void) { if (!psi_v1_enable) diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index 95ae9ac553fc..50f1a11ac2fd 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -2977,10 +2977,6 @@ unsigned long scale_irq_capacity(unsigned long util, unsigned long irq, unsigned } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_PSI -extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files[]; -#endif - #if defined(CONFIG_ENERGY_MODEL) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_SCHEDUTIL) #define perf_domain_span(pd) (to_cpumask(((pd)->em_pd->cpus))) -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tracing: Fix warning in trace_buffered_event_disable()
by Zheng Yejian 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc4 commit dea499781a1150d285c62b26659f62fb00824fce category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7P78X Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Warning happened in trace_buffered_event_disable() at WARN_ON_ONCE(!trace_buffered_event_ref) Call Trace: ? __warn+0xa5/0x1b0 ? trace_buffered_event_disable+0x189/0x1b0 __ftrace_event_enable_disable+0x19e/0x3e0 free_probe_data+0x3b/0xa0 unregister_ftrace_function_probe_func+0x6b8/0x800 event_enable_func+0x2f0/0x3d0 ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x12d/0x1b0 ftrace_filter_write+0xe6/0x140 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x6f0 [...] The cause of the warning is in __ftrace_event_enable_disable(), trace_buffered_event_enable() was called once while trace_buffered_event_disable() was called twice. Reproduction script show as below, for analysis, see the comments: ``` #!/bin/bash cd /sys/kernel/tracing/ # 1. Register a 'disable_event' command, then: # 1) SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was set; # 2) trace_buffered_event_enable() was called first time; echo 'cmdline_proc_show:disable_event:initcall:initcall_finish' > \ set_ftrace_filter # 2. Enable the event registered, then: # 1) SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was cleared; # 2) trace_buffered_event_disable() was called first time; echo 1 > events/initcall/initcall_finish/enable # 3. Try to call into cmdline_proc_show(), then SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was # set again!!! cat /proc/cmdline # 4. Unregister the 'disable_event' command, then: # 1) SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was cleared again; # 2) trace_buffered_event_disable() was called second time!!! echo '!cmdline_proc_show:disable_event:initcall:initcall_finish' > \ set_ftrace_filter ``` To fix it, IIUC, we can change to call trace_buffered_event_enable() at fist time soft-mode enabled, and call trace_buffered_event_disable() at last time soft-mode disabled. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230726095804.920457-1-zhengyej… Cc: <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c index f0dede12b238..d2ca0ca0943b 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c @@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, { struct trace_event_call *call = file->event_call; struct trace_array *tr = file->tr; - unsigned long file_flags = file->flags; int ret = 0; int disable; @@ -392,6 +391,8 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, break; disable = file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED; clear_bit(EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_MODE_BIT, &file->flags); + /* Disable use of trace_buffered_event */ + trace_buffered_event_disable(); } else disable = !(file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_MODE); @@ -430,6 +431,8 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, if (atomic_inc_return(&file->sm_ref) > 1) break; set_bit(EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_MODE_BIT, &file->flags); + /* Enable use of trace_buffered_event */ + trace_buffered_event_enable(); } if (!(file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_ENABLED)) { @@ -469,15 +472,6 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, break; } - /* Enable or disable use of trace_buffered_event */ - if ((file_flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED) != - (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED)) { - if (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED) - trace_buffered_event_enable(); - else - trace_buffered_event_disable(); - } - return ret; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] tracing: Fix warning in trace_buffered_event_disable()
by Zheng Yejian 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc4 commit dea499781a1150d285c62b26659f62fb00824fce category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7P78X CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Warning happened in trace_buffered_event_disable() at WARN_ON_ONCE(!trace_buffered_event_ref) Call Trace: ? __warn+0xa5/0x1b0 ? trace_buffered_event_disable+0x189/0x1b0 __ftrace_event_enable_disable+0x19e/0x3e0 free_probe_data+0x3b/0xa0 unregister_ftrace_function_probe_func+0x6b8/0x800 event_enable_func+0x2f0/0x3d0 ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x12d/0x1b0 ftrace_filter_write+0xe6/0x140 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x6f0 [...] The cause of the warning is in __ftrace_event_enable_disable(), trace_buffered_event_enable() was called once while trace_buffered_event_disable() was called twice. Reproduction script show as below, for analysis, see the comments: ``` #!/bin/bash cd /sys/kernel/tracing/ # 1. Register a 'disable_event' command, then: # 1) SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was set; # 2) trace_buffered_event_enable() was called first time; echo 'cmdline_proc_show:disable_event:initcall:initcall_finish' > \ set_ftrace_filter # 2. Enable the event registered, then: # 1) SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was cleared; # 2) trace_buffered_event_disable() was called first time; echo 1 > events/initcall/initcall_finish/enable # 3. Try to call into cmdline_proc_show(), then SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was # set again!!! cat /proc/cmdline # 4. Unregister the 'disable_event' command, then: # 1) SOFT_DISABLED_BIT was cleared again; # 2) trace_buffered_event_disable() was called second time!!! echo '!cmdline_proc_show:disable_event:initcall:initcall_finish' > \ set_ftrace_filter ``` To fix it, IIUC, we can change to call trace_buffered_event_enable() at fist time soft-mode enabled, and call trace_buffered_event_disable() at last time soft-mode disabled. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-trace-kernel/20230726095804.920457-1-zhengyej… Cc: <mhiramat(a)kernel.org> Fixes: 0fc1b09ff1ff ("tracing: Use temp buffer when filtering events") Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Zheng Yejian <zhengyejian1(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/trace/trace_events.c | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c index 531e6e8f765b..a000adbbe64f 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_events.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events.c @@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, { struct trace_event_call *call = file->event_call; struct trace_array *tr = file->tr; - unsigned long file_flags = file->flags; int ret = 0; int disable; @@ -395,6 +394,8 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, break; disable = file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED; clear_bit(EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_MODE_BIT, &file->flags); + /* Disable use of trace_buffered_event */ + trace_buffered_event_disable(); } else disable = !(file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_MODE); @@ -433,6 +434,8 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, if (atomic_inc_return(&file->sm_ref) > 1) break; set_bit(EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_MODE_BIT, &file->flags); + /* Enable use of trace_buffered_event */ + trace_buffered_event_enable(); } if (!(file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_ENABLED)) { @@ -472,15 +475,6 @@ static int __ftrace_event_enable_disable(struct trace_event_file *file, break; } - /* Enable or disable use of trace_buffered_event */ - if ((file_flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED) != - (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED)) { - if (file->flags & EVENT_FILE_FL_SOFT_DISABLED) - trace_buffered_event_enable(); - else - trace_buffered_event_disable(); - } - return ret; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[OLK-5.10] Perf: add wperf support
by Xiongfeng Wang 31 Jul '23

31 Jul '23

hulk inclusion category: feature bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7P697 Add wperf support for openeuler. This patch is from https://github.com/OSUSysLab/wPerf.git Signed-off-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/perf/Kconfig | 6 + drivers/perf/Makefile | 1 + drivers/perf/wperf.c | 2082 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 2089 insertions(+) create mode 100644 drivers/perf/wperf.c diff --git a/drivers/perf/Kconfig b/drivers/perf/Kconfig index 1e82ab01e75f..ae7b398ab6e0 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/perf/Kconfig @@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ config ARM_SPE_PMU Extension, which provides periodic sampling of operations in the CPU pipeline and reports this via the perf AUX interface. +config WPERF + tristate "Enable support for wPerf" + depends on ARM64 + help + Enable support for wPerf + source "drivers/perf/hisilicon/Kconfig" endmenu diff --git a/drivers/perf/Makefile b/drivers/perf/Makefile index 5365fd56f88f..5afa723fe2d7 100644 --- a/drivers/perf/Makefile +++ b/drivers/perf/Makefile @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_QCOM_L3_PMU) += qcom_l3_pmu.o obj-$(CONFIG_THUNDERX2_PMU) += thunderx2_pmu.o obj-$(CONFIG_XGENE_PMU) += xgene_pmu.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SPE_PMU) += arm_spe_pmu.o +obj-$(CONFIG_WPERF) += wperf.o diff --git a/drivers/perf/wperf.c b/drivers/perf/wperf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..33ba6ff3e2b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/perf/wperf.c @@ -0,0 +1,2082 @@ +#include <linux/init.h> +//#include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +//#include <linux/swap.h> /* for totalram_pages */ +#include <linux/kprobes.h> +//#include <linux/bootmem.h> +#include <linux/interrupt.h> + +#include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/file.h> +#include <linux/syscalls.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/list.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> // required for various structures related to files liked fops. +#include <linux/semaphore.h> +#include <linux/cdev.h> +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/futex.h> +#include <linux/stop_machine.h> +#include <linux/genhd.h> +#include <linux/uio.h> +#include <asm/uaccess.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> +#include "ioctl_perf.h" + +#define BMAXBYTE 500 +#define BSIZEBYTE (BMAXBYTE-50) +#define BMAX (BMAXBYTE * 1024 * 1024) +#define BSIZE (BSIZEBYTE * 1024 * 1024) + +static int Major; +volatile int tag = -1; +volatile int step = -1; + +struct task_struct *p = NULL; + +unsigned long pid = -1; +unsigned long gdbpid = -1; +int ret; + +struct task_struct *ptmp; +struct task_struct *ttmp; +struct task_struct *t; + +char *switch_result; +char *switch_result_bak; +char *switch_result_tmp; +char *futex_result; +char *futex_result_bak; +char *futex_result_tmp; +char *state_result; +char *state_result_bak; +char *state_result_tmp; + +char *wait_result; +char *wait_result_bak; +char *wait_result_tmp; + +//New Added for missing event solution +volatile int ipnum = 0; +volatile int fnum = 0; +volatile int wnum = 0; +long switch_pos = 0; +long state_pos = 0; +long futex_pos = 0; +long wait_pos = 0; +int state_total = 0; +int futex_total = 0; +long tmpip; + +//For softirq events +u64 stime[NR_CPUS]; + +spinlock_t switch_lock; +spinlock_t state_lock; +spinlock_t futex_lock; +spinlock_t wait_lock; + +struct wperf_struct *perf_struct; + +struct task_struct *(*fang_curr_task)(int); +int (*fang_get_futex_key)(u32 __user *, int, union futex_key *, int); +struct futex_hash_bucket *(*fang_hash_futex)(union futex_key *); +static const struct futex_q futex_q_init = { + /* list gets initialized in queue_me()*/ + .key = FUTEX_KEY_INIT, + .bitset = FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY +}; +int (*fang_futex_wait_setup)(u32 __user *, u32, unsigned int, struct futex_q *, struct futex_hash_bucket **); +long (fang_futex_wait_restart)(struct restart_block *); +//For kernel version larger than 4.8 +//#ifdef NEWKERNEL +//u64 (*local_clock)(void); +//#endif + +long firstsec, firstusec, lastsec, lastusec; + +//Fang newly added +volatile int softirq[NR_CPUS]; +volatile int softirq1[NR_CPUS]; +#define HARDIRQ_SIZE 900 +volatile short hardirq[NR_CPUS][HARDIRQ_SIZE+1]; +volatile short hardirq_pos[NR_CPUS]; +volatile int irq[NR_CPUS]; +volatile int target[PIDNUM]; +volatile int aiotag[NR_CPUS]; +#define NETSEND_SIZE 655350 +long netsend[NETSEND_SIZE+1]; +//long futextag[65535]; +//long futexsum[65535]; +//long futexstart[65535]; +struct fang_result spin_result[NR_CPUS]; + +//Only for test +//volatile short dump_check[100000]; +//volatile short dump_cpu_check[32]; + +volatile long futex_to = 0; +volatile long futex_noto = 0; + +//static long disk_work = 0; + +int dnum; +char dname[200][200]; +long disk_work[200]; + +/*static __inline__ unsigned long long tsc_now(void) +{ + unsigned hi, lo; + __asm__ __volatile__ ("rdtsc" : "=a"(lo), "=d"(hi)); + return ( (unsigned long long)lo)|( ((unsigned long long)hi)<<32 ); +}*/ + +inline u64 fang_clock(void) { + struct timespec64 now; + u64 ret = 0; + + //getnstimeofday64(&now); + //get_monotonic_boottime(&now); + + //ret = now.tv_sec*1000000000+now.tv_nsec; + + //ret = tsc_now(); + ret = ktime_get(); + //printk(KERN_INFO "current time = %lu\n", ret); + return ret; +} + +inline u64 wperfclock(void) { + //struct timespec64 now; + //u64 ret = 0; + + //getrawmonotonic(&now); + //ret = now.tv_sec*1000000000+now.tv_nsec; + + //return ret; + //return local_clock(); + return ktime_get(); +} + +//We'll check target ID & jbd thread & ksoftirq threads +int containOfPID(int core, int pid) { + int i = 0; + for (i = 0; i < PIDNUM; i++) { + if (target[i] == 0) break; + if (target[i] == pid) + return 1; + } + //if (target[0] == pid) { + // return 1; + //} + //if (target[1] == pid) { + // return 1; + //} + //if (target[2+core] == pid) { + // return 1; + //} + return 0; +} + +__visible __notrace_funcgraph int j___switch_to(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + //struct timeval start; + struct task_struct *prev_p = regs->regs[0]; + struct task_struct *next_p = regs->regs[1]; + struct fang_result fresult; + struct futex_result furesult; + char *chartmp; + int cpu = 0; + u64 ts; + + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if (containOfPID(cpu, prev_p->tgid)||containOfPID(cpu, next_p->tgid)) { + ts = fang_clock(); + fresult.type = 0; + fresult.ts = ts; + fresult.perfts = wperfclock(); + fresult.core = cpu; + fresult.pid1 = prev_p->pid; + fresult.pid2 = next_p->pid; + trace_printk("switch to prev %s next %s\n", prev_p->comm, next_p->comm); + + if (in_irq()) { + //fresult.irq = hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]]; + fresult.irq = HARDIRQ; + } + else if (in_serving_softirq()) { + fresult.irq = softirq[cpu]; + } + else { + fresult.irq = 0; + } + fresult.pid1state = prev_p->state; + fresult.pid2state = next_p->state; + + //if (prev_p->pid == 18183) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "pid1 = %d, pid2 = %d, pid1state = %d, pid2state = %d\n", prev_p->pid, next_p->pid, prev_p->state, next_p->state); + //} + + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(switch_result + switch_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fresult, sizeof(fresult)); + switch_pos+=sizeof(fresult); + if (switch_pos >= BSIZE) + pr_info("fresult exceed !!!!!!!!!\n"); + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + + //if (futextag[next_p->pid] == 1) { + // futexstart[next_p->pid] = ts; + // //printk(KERN_INFO "pid=%d, ts=%ld\n", next_p->pid, futexstart[prev_p->pid]); + //} + //if (futextag[prev_p->pid] == 1 && futexstart[prev_p->pid] > 0) { + // futexsum[prev_p->pid] += ts - futexstart[prev_p->pid]; + + // if (prev_p->state>0) { + // spin_lock(&state_lock); + // chartmp = (char *)(state_result + state_pos); + // furesult.pid = prev_p->pid; + // furesult.time = futexsum[prev_p->pid]; + // memcpy(chartmp, &furesult, sizeof(furesult)); + // state_pos+=sizeof(furesult); + // futexsum[prev_p->pid] = 0; + // futextag[prev_p->pid] = 0; + // futexstart[prev_p->pid] = 0; + // spin_unlock(&state_lock); + // } + //} + } + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +/* We need this jprobe by both steps + * First, we need to record the time entry in the first step. + * Second, we need to record the last state for GDB stack. + * */ + +static int j_try_to_wake_up(struct kprobe *kp, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct task_struct *p = regs->regs[0]; + unsigned int state = regs->regs[1]; + int wake_flags = regs->regs[2]; + char tmp[200]; + //struct timeval start; + struct fang_result fresult; + char *chartmp = NULL; + int cpu = 0; + int i = 0; + u64 ts; + + if (step == 1) { + //if (p->pid==p->tgid+8) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "Thread %d wakes up IO thread\n", current->pid); + // dump_stack(); + // if (aiotag[cpu] == 1) { + // aiotag = 0; + // printk(KERN_INFO "Thread %d is waken up by aio_complete\n", p->pid); + // } + //} + //if (p->tgid == target[1]) { + // if (in_serving_softirq()) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "It's in softirq context\n"); + // } + // else { + // printk(KERN_INFO "It's NOT in softirq context\n"); + // dump_stack(); + // printk(KERN_INFO "------------------------\n"); + // } + //} + //if (current->pid == 4145 && p->pid == 4144) dump_stack(); + //if (p->pid == 4145) dump_stack(); + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + //if (containOfPID(cpu, p->tgid) ) { + //if (current->pid == 2381) dump_stack(); + if (containOfPID(cpu, p->tgid)) { + // Check if in hardirq context + //if (in_irq() && hardirq_pos[cpu]<=0) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "[cpu %d][hardirq_pos = %d] hardirq missing, %d wakes up %d\n", cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu], current->pid, p->pid); + // dump_stack(); + //} + //else if (in_serving_softirq() && softirq1[cpu] == 0) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "softirq missing, %d wakes up %d\n", current->pid, p->pid); + // dump_stack(); + //} + + //if (current->pid == target[cpu+2] && p->pid == 376) { + // dump_stack(); + //} + + if ((p->state & state)) { + //if (current->pid != 0 && current->tgid != target[0] && p->pid == 1935) { + //printk(KERN_INFO "%d [parent %d] wakes up %d\n", current->pid, current->tgid, p->pid); + //} + //if (aiotag[cpu] == 1) { + // aiotag[p->pid] = 1; + // aiotag[cpu] = 0; + //} + + ts = fang_clock(); + + fresult.type = 1; + fresult.ts = ts; + fresult.perfts = wperfclock(); + fresult.core = cpu; + fresult.pid1 = current->pid; + fresult.pid2 = p->pid; + trace_printk("try to wakeup cur %s next %s\n", current->comm, p->comm); + if (in_irq()) { + fresult.irq = HARDIRQ; + //dump_check[p->pid] ++; + //if (dump_check[p->pid] == 10) { + // dump_cpu_check[cpu] = p->pid; + // dump_check[p->pid]=0; + //} + } + else if (in_serving_softirq()) { + fresult.irq = softirq[cpu]; + //if (softirq[cpu] == -2 && p->pid == 4145) dump_stack(); + } + else { + fresult.irq = 0; + // Added for futex Result + //futextag[p->pid] = 1; + } + + fresult.pid1state = current->state; + fresult.pid2state = p->state; + + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(switch_result + switch_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fresult, sizeof(fresult)); + switch_pos+=sizeof(fresult); + if (switch_pos >= BSIZE) + pr_info("fresult2 exceed !!!!!!!!!\n"); + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + } + } + } + +// return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_tasklet_hi_action(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = TASKLET_HI; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_run_timer_softirq(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = TIMER; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_net_tx_action(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = NET_TX; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_net_rx_action(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = NET_RX; + //if (cpu == 7) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "[%d]softirq[cpu] = %d\n", cpu, softirq[cpu]); + //} + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_blk_done_softirq(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = BLK_DONE; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_blk_iopoll_softirq(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = BLK_IOPOLL; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_tasklet_action(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = TASKLET; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_run_rebalance_domains(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = SCHED; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_run_hrtimer_softirq(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = HRTIMER; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +//rcu moved from softirq to kthread +static int j_rcu_process_callbacks(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct softirq_action *a = regs->regs[0]; + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = RCU; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +//void j_hrtimer_interrupt(void) { +int j_local_apic_timer_interrupt(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + int vector = 0; + if (step == 1) { + // Get information for do_IRQ + vector = APICTIMER; + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]] = vector; + hardirq_pos[cpu]+=1; + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer starts\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq[%d] = %d, hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]], cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; +} + +int j_do_IRQ(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + int vector = 0; + if (step == 1) { + // Get information for do_IRQ +// vector = ~regs->orig_ax; + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]] = vector; + hardirq_pos[cpu]+=1; + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer starts\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq[%d] = %d, hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]], cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +int j__handle_domain_irq(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + int vector = 0; + unsigned int hwirq = regs->regs[1]; + if (step == 1) { + // Get information for do_IRQ +// vector = ~regs->orig_ax; + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]] = hwirq; + hardirq_pos[cpu]+=1; + if (hardirq_pos[cpu] >= HARDIRQ_SIZE) + pr_info("hardirq pos overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer starts\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq[%d] = %d, hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]], cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +int j_do_handle_IPI(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + int vector = 0; + int ipinr = regs->regs[0]; + if (step == 1) { + // Get information for do_IRQ +// vector = ~regs->orig_ax; + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]] = ipinr; + hardirq_pos[cpu]+=1; + if (hardirq_pos[cpu] >= HARDIRQ_SIZE) + pr_info("hardirq pos overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer starts\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq[%d] = %d, hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]], cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_aio_complete(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + aiotag[cpu] = 1; + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static int j_wakeup_softirqd(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = KSOFTIRQ; + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp1 = { + .pre_handler = j___switch_to, + .symbol_name = "__switch_to", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp2 = { + .pre_handler = j_try_to_wake_up, + .symbol_name = "try_to_wake_up", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp3 = { + .pre_handler = j_tasklet_hi_action, + .symbol_name = "tasklet_hi_action", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp4 = { + .pre_handler = j_run_timer_softirq, + .symbol_name = "run_timer_softirq", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp5 = { + .pre_handler = j_net_tx_action, + .symbol_name = "net_tx_action", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp6 = { + .pre_handler = j_net_rx_action, + .symbol_name = "net_rx_action", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp7 = { + .pre_handler = j_blk_done_softirq, + .symbol_name = "blk_done_softirq", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp8 = { + .pre_handler = j_blk_iopoll_softirq, + .symbol_name = "irq_poll_softirq", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp9 = { + .pre_handler = j_tasklet_action, + .symbol_name = "tasklet_action", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp10 = { + .pre_handler = j_run_rebalance_domains, + .symbol_name = "run_rebalance_domains", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp11 = { + .pre_handler = j_run_hrtimer_softirq, + .symbol_name = "run_hrtimer_softirq", +}; + +static struct kprobe jp12 = { + .pre_handler = j_rcu_process_callbacks, + .symbol_name = "rcu_process_callbacks", +}; + +// For Local APIC Timer Interrupt +/*static struct kprobe jp13 = { + .pre_handler = j_local_apic_timer_interrupt, + .symbol_name = "local_apic_timer_interrupt", +}; + +// For HardIRQ +static struct kprobe jp14 = { + .pre_handler = j_do_IRQ, + .symbol_name = "do_IRQ", +};*/ + +static struct kprobe jp13 = { + .pre_handler = j__handle_domain_irq, + .symbol_name = "__handle_domain_irq", +}; + +// For HardIRQ +static struct kprobe jp14 = { + .pre_handler = j_do_handle_IPI, + .symbol_name = "do_handle_IPI", +}; +//static struct kprobe jp15 = { +// .pre_handler = j_aio_complete, +// .kp = { +// .symbol_name = "aio_complete", +// }, +//}; +// For ksoftirq waking up +//static struct kprobe jp15 = { +// .pre_handler = j_wakeup_softirqd, +// .kp = { +// .symbol_name = "wakeup_softirqd", +// }, +//}; + + +// Add it temporarily for do_softirq +static int j___do_softirq(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + u64 ts; + char *chartmp; + struct softirq_result sr; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + ts = fang_clock(); + spin_lock(&futex_lock); + stime[cpu] = ts; + spin_unlock(&futex_lock); + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp16 = { + .pre_handler = j___do_softirq, + .symbol_name = "__do_softirq", +}; + +int j_add_interrupt_randomness(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + int cpu = 0; + int vector = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + + hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]] = RANDOM; + hardirq_pos[cpu]+=1; + if (hardirq_pos[cpu] >= HARDIRQ_SIZE) + pr_info("hardirq pos overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer starts\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq[%d] = %d, hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq[cpu][hardirq_pos[cpu]], cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; +} + +// Special case for add_interrupt_randomness +static struct kprobe jp17 = { + .pre_handler = j_add_interrupt_randomness, + .symbol_name = "add_interrupt_randomness", +}; + + +inline int compareDisk(const char *dname_tmp) { + int i = 0; + for (; i < dnum; i++) { + if (strcmp(dname_tmp, dname[i]) == 0) { + return i; + } + } + return -1; +} + +#ifdef NEWKERNEL +static int j_part_round_stats(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + //return 0; + return 0; +} +#else +static void old_part_round_stats_single(struct hd_struct *part, unsigned long now) { + int inflight; + const char *dname_tmp = NULL; + struct device *ddev = NULL; + int pos = 0; + + ddev = part_to_dev(part); + dname_tmp = dev_name(ddev); + + pos = compareDisk(dname_tmp); + + if (pos >= 0) { + if (now == part->stamp) { + } + else { + inflight = part_in_flight(part); + if (inflight) { + disk_work[pos] += now - part->stamp; + } + } + } +} + +static void j_part_round_stats(int cpu, struct hd_struct *part) { + unsigned long now = jiffies; + + if (step == 1) { + if (part->partno) { + old_part_round_stats_single(&part_to_disk(part)->part0, now); + } + old_part_round_stats_single(part, now); + } + return 0; +} +#endif +/* +static void j_part_round_stats_single(int cpu, struct hd_struct *part, unsigned long now) { + int inflight; + const char *dname_tmp = NULL; + struct device *ddev = NULL; + int pos = 0; + + if (step == 1) { + ddev = part_to_dev(part); + dname_tmp = dev_name(ddev); + + pos = compareDisk(dname_tmp); + if (pos >= 0) { + if (now == part->stamp) { + } + else { + #ifndef NEWKERNEL + inflight = part_in_flight(part); + #endif + if (inflight) { + disk_work[pos] += now - part->stamp; + //spin_lock(&futex_lock); + //sr.type = 1; + //sr.stime = part->stamp; + //sr.etime = now; + //sr.core = cpu; + //chartmp = (char *)(futex_result + futex_pos); + //memcpy(chartmp, &sr, sizeof(sr)); + //futex_pos+=sizeof(sr); + //spin_unlock(&futex_lock); + } + } + } + } + return 0; +} +*/ +static struct kprobe jp18 = { + .pre_handler = j_part_round_stats, + .symbol_name = "part_round_stats", +}; + +static int j_futex_wait_queue_me(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct futex_hash_bucket *hb = regs->regs[0]; + struct futex_q *q = regs->regs[1]; + struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout = regs->regs[2]; + struct fang_uds fuds; + char *chartmp = NULL; + if (step == 1) { + if (current->tgid==target[0]) { + fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + fuds.pid = current->pid; + fuds.type = 1; + + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + } + //return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp19 = { + .pre_handler = j_futex_wait_queue_me, + .symbol_name = "futex_wait_queue_me", +}; + +static int j_journal_end_buffer_io_sync(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + printk(KERN_INFO "I/O sync is happended in softirq context? %s", in_serving_softirq()>0?"True":"False"); + return 0; + //return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp20 = { + .pre_handler = j_journal_end_buffer_io_sync, + .symbol_name = "journal_end_buffer_io_sync", +}; + +int j_wake_up_new_task(struct kprobe *kp, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct task_struct *p = regs->regs[0]; + if (step == 1) { + if (p->tgid == target[0]) { + u64 ts = fang_clock(); + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + struct fang_result fresult; + char *chartmp = NULL; + fresult.type = 2; + fresult.ts = ts; + fresult.perfts = wperfclock(); + fresult.core = cpu; + fresult.pid1 = current->pid; + fresult.pid2 = p->pid; + fresult.pid1state = current->state; + fresult.pid2state = p->state; + trace_printk("wake up new cur %s next %s\n", current->comm, p->comm); + + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(switch_result + switch_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fresult, sizeof(fresult)); + switch_pos+=sizeof(fresult); + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + + printk(KERN_INFO "[Create] Thread %d creates thread %d time %lld\n", current->pid, p->pid, ts); + trace_printk("create cur %s p %s\n", current->comm, p->comm); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp21 = { + .pre_handler = j_wake_up_new_task, + .symbol_name = "wake_up_new_task", +}; + +int j_do_exit(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + if (step == 1) { + if (current->tgid == target[0]) { + u64 ts = fang_clock(); + int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + char *chartmp = NULL; + struct fang_result fresult; + fresult.type = 3; + fresult.ts = ts; + fresult.perfts = wperfclock(); + fresult.core = cpu; + fresult.pid1 = current->pid; + fresult.pid2 = 0; + fresult.pid1state = current->state; + fresult.pid2state = 0; + + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(switch_result + switch_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fresult, sizeof(fresult)); + switch_pos+=sizeof(fresult); + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + + printk(KERN_INFO "[Finish] Thread %d finishes time %lld\n", current->pid, ts); + } + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp22 = { + .pre_handler = j_do_exit, + .symbol_name = "do_exit", +}; + +int j_tcp_sendmsg(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct sock *sk = regs->regs[0]; + struct msghdr *msg = regs->regs[1]; + if (step == 1) { + if (containOfPID(0, current->tgid)) { + if (current->pid >= NETSEND_SIZE) + pr_info("netsend overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + netsend[current->pid] += (&msg->msg_iter)->count; + } + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp26 = { + .pre_handler = j_tcp_sendmsg, + .symbol_name = "tcp_sendmsg", +}; + + +int j_udp_sendmsg(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct sock *sk = regs->regs[0]; + struct msghdr *msg = regs->regs[1]; + if (step == 1) { + if (containOfPID(0, current->tgid)) { + if (current->pid >= NETSEND_SIZE) + pr_info("netsend overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + netsend[current->pid] += (&msg->msg_iter)->count; + } + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp27 = { + .pre_handler = j_udp_sendmsg, + .symbol_name = "udp_sendmsg", +}; + +int j_tcp_sendpage(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct sock *sk = regs->regs[0]; + struct page *page = regs->regs[1]; + int offset = regs->regs[2]; + size_t size = regs->regs[3]; + if (step == 1) { + if (containOfPID(0, current->tgid)) { + if (current->pid >= NETSEND_SIZE) + pr_info("netsend overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + netsend[current->pid] += size; + } + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp28 = { + .pre_handler = j_tcp_sendpage, + .symbol_name = "tcp_sendpage", +}; + +int j_udp_sendpage(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct sock *sk = regs->regs[0]; + struct page *page = regs->regs[1]; + int offset = regs->regs[2]; + size_t size = regs->regs[3]; + if (step == 1) { + if (containOfPID(0, current->tgid)) { + if (current->tgid >= NETSEND_SIZE) + pr_info("netsend overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + netsend[current->pid] += size; + } + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp29 = { + .pre_handler = j_udp_sendpage, + .symbol_name = "udp_sendpage", +}; + + +int j_sock_sendmsg(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct socket *sock = regs->regs[0]; + struct msghdr *msg = regs->regs[1]; + //struct fang_uds fuds; + //char *chartmp = NULL; + if (step == 1) { + if (containOfPID(0, current->tgid)) { + if (current->pid >= NETSEND_SIZE) + pr_info("netsend overflow !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + netsend[current->pid] += (&msg->msg_iter)->count; + + //fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + //fuds.pid = current->pid; + //fuds.type = 2; + + //spin_lock(&wait_lock); + //chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + //memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + //wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + //spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp23 = { + .pre_handler = j_sock_sendmsg, + .symbol_name = "sock_sendmsg", +}; + +static long j_futex_wait_restart(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + if (step == 1) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Core %d Thread %d futex_wait_restart Time %llu\n", smp_processor_id(), current->pid, fang_clock()); + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +int j_do_futex(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { +// u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout, +// u32 __user *uaddr2, u32 val2, u32 val3) { +//static int j_futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset) { + struct fang_uds fuds; + char *chartmp = NULL; + if (step == 1) { + if (current->tgid==target[0]) { + fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + fuds.pid = current->pid; + fuds.type = 1; + + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + } + return 0; + return 0; +} + +static struct kprobe jp24 = { + //.pre_handler = j_futex_wake, + .pre_handler = j_do_futex, + .symbol_name = "do_futex", + //.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait_restart"), +}; + +static int j___lock_sock(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs) { + struct fang_uds fuds; + char *chartmp = NULL; + if (step == 1) { + if (current->tgid==target[0]) { + fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + fuds.pid = current->pid; + fuds.type = 3; + + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + } + return 0; +} +static struct kprobe jp25 = { + //.pre_handler = j_futex_wake, + .pre_handler = j___lock_sock, + .symbol_name = "__lock_sock", + //.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait_restart"), +}; + + + + +int open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + trace_printk("inside open\n"); + printk(KERN_INFO "Inside open %llu\n", fang_clock()); + return 0; +} + +int release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { + int i = 0; + printk (KERN_INFO "Inside close %llu\n", fang_clock()); + for (i = 0; i < dnum; i++) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Disk %s work time: %ld\n", dname[i], disk_work[i]); + } + for (i = 0; i < NETSEND_SIZE; i++) { + if (netsend[i] != 0) { + printk(KERN_INFO "Thread %d sends bytes: %ld\n",i, netsend[i]); + } + } + +// printk(KERN_INFO "futex with timeout: %ld\n", futex_to); +// printk(KERN_INFO "futex without timeout: %ld\n", futex_noto); + + return 0; +} + +static int tasklet_hi_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret3 = { + .handler = tasklet_hi_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "tasklet_hi_action", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int timer_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret4 = { + .handler = timer_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "run_timer_softirq", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int net_tx_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret5 = { + .handler = net_tx_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "net_tx_action", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int net_rx_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + //if (cpu == 7) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "[%d]softirq[cpu] = %d\n", cpu, softirq[cpu]); + //} + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret6 = { + .handler = net_rx_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "net_rx_action", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int blk_done_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret7 = { + .handler = blk_done_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "blk_done_softirq", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int blk_iopoll_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret8 = { + .handler = blk_iopoll_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "irq_poll_softirq", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int tasklet_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret9 = { + .handler = tasklet_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "tasklet_action", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int sched_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret10 = { + .handler = sched_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "run_rebalance_domains", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int hrtimer_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret11 = { + .handler = hrtimer_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "run_hrtimer_softirq", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int rcu_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret12 = { + .handler = rcu_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "rcu_process_callbacks", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int handle_domain_irq_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if (hardirq_pos[cpu] != 0) hardirq_pos[cpu]-=1; + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer ends\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret13 = { + .handler = handle_domain_irq_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "__handle_domain_irq", }, + //.maxactive = 1024, +}; + +static int do_handle_IPI_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if (hardirq_pos[cpu] != 0) hardirq_pos[cpu]-=1; + //printk(KERN_INFO "[%d] local_apic_timer ends\n", cpu); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hardirq_pos[%d] = %d\n", cpu, hardirq_pos[cpu]); + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret14 = { + .handler = do_handle_IPI_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "do_handle_IPI", }, + //.maxactive = 1024, +}; + +static int KSOFTIRQ_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + softirq[cpu] = 0; + } + return 0; +} + +//static struct kretprobe kret15 = { +// .handler = KSOFTIRQ_return, +// .maxactive = NR_CPUS, +// .kp = { .symbol_name = "wakeup_softirqd", }, +// //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +//}; + +static int SOFTIRQ_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + u64 ts; + char *chartmp; + struct softirq_result sr; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + ts = fang_clock(); + spin_lock(&futex_lock); + sr.type = 0; + sr.stime = stime[cpu]; + sr.etime = ts; + sr.core = cpu; + chartmp = (char *)(futex_result + futex_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &sr, sizeof(sr)); + futex_pos+=sizeof(sr); + spin_unlock(&futex_lock); + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret16 = { + .handler = SOFTIRQ_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "__do_softirq", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +// Special for random generator in do_IRQ +static int RANDOM_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if (hardirq_pos[cpu] != 0) hardirq_pos[cpu]-=1; + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret17 = { + .handler = RANDOM_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "add_interrupt_randomness", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int switch_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + int cpu = 0; + if (step == 1) { + cpu=smp_processor_id(); + //if (dump_cpu_check[cpu]>0) { + //printk(KERN_INFO "threadID = %d\n", dump_cpu_check[cpu]); + //dump_stack(); + //dump_cpu_check[cpu]=0; + //} + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret18 = { + .handler = switch_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "finish_task_switch", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +static int futex_wait_return(struct kretprobe_instance *ri, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + struct fang_uds fuds; + char *chartmp = NULL; + if (step == 1) { + //int retval = regs_return_value(regs); + //int cpu = smp_processor_id(); + if (current->tgid==target[0]) { + fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + fuds.pid = current->pid; + fuds.type = 4; + + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + + /* + if (containOfPID(cpu, current->tgid) && retval < 0) { + + //printk(KERN_INFO "Core %d Thread %d RetValue %d Time %llu\n", smp_processor_id(), current->pid, retval, fang_clock()); + fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + fuds.pid = current->pid; + fuds.type = (short)retval; + + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + */ + } + return 0; +} + +static struct kretprobe kret19 = { + .handler = futex_wait_return, + .maxactive = NR_CPUS, + .kp = { .symbol_name = "futex_wait", }, + //.maxactive = MAX_CPU_NR, +}; + +long ioctl_funcs(struct file *filp,unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) +{ + + unsigned long ret = 0; + int tres; + char tmp[200]; + char *chartmp = NULL; + //struct timeval start; + unsigned long start; + struct fang_uds fuds; + struct fang_spin_uds spin_uds; + struct uds_spin_res spin_res; + int i = 0, cpu = 0; + + switch(cmd) { + case IOCTL_ADDWAIT: + if (step == 1) { + fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + fuds.pid = current->pid; + fuds.type = (short)arg; + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(wait_result + wait_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &fuds, sizeof(fuds)); + wait_pos+=sizeof(fuds); + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + } + break; + case IOCTL_ADDUDS: + if (step == 1) { + spin_uds.ts = fang_clock(); + spin_uds.pid = current->pid; + copy_from_user(&spin_res, (void*)arg, 12); + spin_uds.lock = spin_res.addr; + spin_uds.type = spin_res.type; + //fuds.ts = fang_clock(); + //fuds.pid = current->pid; + //fuds.type = (short)arg; + spin_lock(&state_lock); + //chartmp = (char *)(state_result + state_pos); + chartmp = (char *)(state_result + state_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &spin_uds, sizeof(spin_uds)); + state_pos+=sizeof(spin_uds); + spin_unlock(&state_lock); + } + break; + case IOCTL_PID: + //printk(KERN_INFO "Setting PID = %d\n", (int)pid); + //for_each_process(p) { + // if (task_pid_nr(p)==pid) break; + //} + //target[0] = pid; + switch_pos = 0; + futex_pos = 0; + state_pos = 0; + wait_pos = 0; + + for (i=0;i<20;i++){ + disk_work[i] = 0; + } + + for (i=0; i<NETSEND_SIZE; i++) { + netsend[i] = 0; + //futextag[i] = 0; + //futexstart[i] = 0; + //futexsum[i] = 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < PIDNUM; i++) { + target[i] = 0; + } + + dnum = 0; + + futex_to = 0; + futex_noto = 0; + + readTarget(); + + step = 1; + break; + + case IOCTL_INIT: + step = -1; + break; + + case IOCTL_COPYSWITCH: + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + ret = switch_pos; + switch_pos = 0; + switch_result_tmp = switch_result; + switch_result = switch_result_bak; + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + switch_result_bak = switch_result_tmp; + tres = copy_to_user((void*)arg, switch_result_bak, ret); + break; + + case IOCTL_COPYWAIT: + spin_lock(&wait_lock); + ret = wait_pos; + wait_pos = 0; + wait_result_tmp = wait_result; + wait_result = wait_result_bak; + spin_unlock(&wait_lock); + wait_result_bak = wait_result_tmp; + tres = copy_to_user((void*)arg, wait_result_bak, ret); + break; + + case IOCTL_STATE_BEGIN: + sprintf(tmp, "Sample %d\n", state_total); + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(switch_result + switch_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, tmp, strlen(tmp)); + switch_pos+=strlen(tmp); + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + step = 2; + state_total++; + break; + + case IOCTL_STATE_END: + step = -1; + + if (switch_pos > BSIZE) { + ret = 1; + } + else { + ret = 0; + } + //ret = 1; + break; + case IOCTL_FUTEX: + spin_lock(&futex_lock); + tag = 0; + fnum = 0; + wnum = 0; + chartmp = (char *)(futex_result + futex_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, tmp, strlen(tmp)); + futex_pos+=strlen(tmp); + futex_total++; + spin_unlock(&futex_lock); + break; + + case IOCTL_JPROBE: + break; + + case IOCTL_UNJPROBE: + break; + case IOCTL_JSWITCH: + break; + case IOCTL_COPYSTATE: + spin_lock(&state_lock); + ret = state_pos; + state_pos = 0; + state_result_tmp = state_result; + state_result = state_result_bak; + spin_unlock(&state_lock); + state_result_bak = state_result_tmp; + tres = copy_to_user((void*)arg, state_result_bak, ret); + //printk(KERN_INFO "state_pos = %d\n", state_pos); + break; + case IOCTL_COPYFUTEX: + spin_lock(&futex_lock); + ret = futex_pos; + futex_pos = 0; + futex_result_tmp = futex_result; + futex_result = futex_result_bak; + spin_unlock(&futex_lock); + futex_result_bak = futex_result_tmp; + tres = copy_to_user((void*)arg, futex_result_bak, ret); + break; + case IOCTL_COPYBUFFER: + break; + case IOCTL_GETENTRY: + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + ret = copy_to_user((void*)arg, switch_result, switch_pos); + ret = switch_pos; + switch_pos = 0; + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + break; + case IOCTL_STEP1_BEGIN: + switch_pos = 0; + state_pos = 0; + futex_pos = 0; + wait_pos = 0; + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + t = p; + ptmp = p; + do { + start = ktime_get_ns(); + //do_gettimeofday(&start); + } while_each_thread(ptmp, t); + + printk(KERN_INFO "start time: sec = %ld usec = %ld\n", start/NSEC_PER_SEC, (start%NSEC_PER_SEC)/1000); + //step = 1; + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + break; + case IOCTL_STEP1_END: + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + start = ktime_get_ns(); + //do_gettimeofday(&start); + lastsec = start/NSEC_PER_SEC;//start.tv_sec; + lastusec = (start%NSEC_PER_SEC)/1000;//start.tv_usec; + printk(KERN_INFO "end time: sec = %ld usec = %ld\n", lastsec, lastusec); + step = -1; + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + break; + case IOCTL_USER_STACK: + //for_each_process(p) { + // if (task_pid_nr(p)==pid) break; + //} + //struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(p); + //printk(KERN_INFO "IP=%ld, BP=%ld\n", regs->ip, regs->bp); + //long currbp = regs->bp; + //int currpos = 0; + //while(currbp!=0 || currpos > 10) { + // copy_from_user(&currbp, currbp, 8); + // printk(KERN_INFO "Next BP = %ld", currbp); + //} + break; + case IOCTL_DNAME: + tres = copy_from_user(&dname[dnum], (void*)arg, 20); + printk(KERN_INFO "Monitored Disk: %s\n", dname[dnum]); + dnum++; + break; + case IOCTL_SPINLOCK: + cpu = smp_processor_id(); + spin_result[cpu].type = (short)arg; + spin_result[cpu].core = cpu; + spin_result[cpu].ts = fang_clock(); + spin_result[cpu].pid1 = current->pid; + spin_lock(&switch_lock); + chartmp = (char *)(switch_result + switch_pos); + memcpy(chartmp, &spin_result[cpu], sizeof(spin_result[cpu])); + switch_pos+=sizeof(spin_result[cpu]); + spin_unlock(&switch_lock); + break; + case IOCTL_TIME: + printk(KERN_INFO "now = %llu\n", ktime_get()); + break; + } + return ret; +} + +struct file_operations fops = { + open: open, + unlocked_ioctl: ioctl_funcs, + release: release +}; + +struct cdev *kernel_cdev; +dev_t dev_no, dev; + + +#include <asm/uaccess.h> +#include <asm/processor.h> + +//Fang added +int readTarget(void) { + //mm_segment_t fs; + struct file *filp = NULL; + char buf[10240] = { 0}; + int tmppos= 0; + int pidpos = 0; + char buftmp[64] = {0 }; + char* buftmp1; + int i = 0; + int ret; + + //fs = get_fs(); + //set_fs(KERNEL_DS); + trace_printk("in read target\n"); + + filp = filp_open("/tmp/target", O_RDONLY, 0); + if (filp==NULL) { + printk(KERN_ERR "Error: something wrong with the pid target file!\n"); + return -1; + } + //pr_info("filp %lx\n", filp); +#ifdef NEWKERNEL + ret = kernel_read(filp, buf, 10240, &filp->f_pos); + trace_printk("kernel read return %d\n", ret); + //kernel_read(filp, &filp->f_pos, buf, 10240); +#else + vfs_read(filp, buf, 10240, &filp->f_pos); +#endif + //filp->f_op->read(filp, buf, 1024, &filp->f_pos); + filp_close(filp,NULL); + //set_fs(fs); + //pr_info("buf %x\n", buf); + + i=0; + tmppos= 0; + + while(buf[i]) { + if (buf[i]=='\n') { + buftmp[tmppos]='\0'; + //printk(KERN_INFO "%d\n", simple_strtol(buftmp, &buftmp1, 10)); + target[pidpos] = simple_strtol(buftmp, &buftmp1, 10); + //trace_printk("target %d\n", target[pidpos]); + pidpos++; + tmppos = 0; + if (pidpos >= PIDNUM) + pr_info("pidpos exceed !!!!!!!!!\n"); + } + else { + buftmp[tmppos] = buf[i]; + tmppos++; + if (tmppos >= 64) { + pr_info("tmp pos exceedd!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + return 0; + } + } + i++; + if (i >= 10240) + pr_info("i exceed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!\n"); + } + return 0; +} + +int char_arr_init (void) { + int ret = 0; + int i = 0; + + for (i= 0;i<PIDNUM;i++) { + target[i] = 0; + } + + for (i= 0;i<NR_CPUS;i++) { + softirq[i] = 0; + hardirq_pos[i] = 0; + aiotag[i] = 0; + } + + for (i=0; i<NETSEND_SIZE; i++) { + netsend[i] = 0; + //futextag[i] = 0; + //futexstart[i] = 0; + //futexsum[i] = 0; + } + + readTarget(); + + //Check dname + //if (strcmp(dname, "") == 0) { + // printk(KERN_ERR "Error: no device name!\n"); + // return 1; + //} + //else { + // printk(KERN_INFO "Device name: %s\n", dname); + //} + //Init the file read + //fang_curr_task = (struct task_struct *(*)(int))0xffffffff870d0180; + //fang_curr_task = (struct task_struct *(*)(int))kallsyms_lookup_name("curr_task"); + //fang_get_futex_key = (int (*)(u32 __user *, int, union futex_key *, int))kallsyms_lookup_name("get_futex_key"); + //fang_hash_futex = (struct futex_hash_bucket *(*)(union futex_key *))kallsyms_lookup_name("hash_futex"); + //fang_futex_wait_setup = (int (*)(u32 __user *, u32, unsigned int, struct futex_q *, struct futex_hash_bucket **))kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait_setup"); + //fang_futex_wait_restart = (long (*)(struct restart_block *)kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait_restart"); + //For kernel version larger than 4.8 + //#ifdef NEWKERNEL + //local_clock = (u64 (*)(void))kallsyms_lookup_name("local_clock"); + //#endif + + //printk(KERN_INFO "curr_task = %lx\n", kallsyms_lookup_name("curr_task")); + //printk(KERN_INFO "get_futex_key = %lx\n", kallsyms_lookup_name("get_futex_key")); + //printk(KERN_INFO "hash_futex = %lx\n", kallsyms_lookup_name("hash_futex")); + //printk(KERN_INFO "futex_wait_setup = %lx\n", kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait_setup")); + + ret = alloc_chrdev_region(&dev, 0, 1, "wperf"); + if (ret) + pr_info("alloc chrdev failed\n"); + + kernel_cdev = cdev_alloc(); + kernel_cdev->ops = &fops; + kernel_cdev->owner = THIS_MODULE; + printk (" Inside init module\n"); + + ret = cdev_add( kernel_cdev,dev,1); + + if(ret < 0 ) + { + printk(KERN_INFO "Unable to allocate cdev"); + return ret; + } + + Major = MAJOR(dev); + //dev = MKDEV(Major,0); + printk (" The major number for your device is %d\n", Major); + + state_result = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + state_result_bak = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + futex_result = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + futex_result_bak = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + switch_result = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + switch_result_bak = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + + wait_result = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + wait_result_bak = (char*)vmalloc(BMAX*sizeof(char)); + + spin_lock_init(&switch_lock); + spin_lock_init(&state_lock); + spin_lock_init(&futex_lock); + spin_lock_init(&wait_lock); + + ret = register_kprobe(&jp1); + if (ret ) + printk(KERN_INFO "register_kprobe failed, returned %d\n", ret); + else + pr_info("register kprobe success\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp2); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_INFO "register_kprobe failed, returned %d\n", ret); + //return ret; + } + ret = register_kprobe(&jp3); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed1\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp4); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed2\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp5); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed3\n"); + if (register_kprobe(&jp6)) { + printk(KERN_INFO "register net_rx jprobe failed!\n"); + } + ret = register_kprobe(&jp7); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed4\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp8); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed5\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp9); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed6\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp10); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed7\n"); + //register_kprobe(&jp11); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp12); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe rcu_process_callbacks failed8\n"); + //if (register_kprobe(&jp13)) { + // printk(KERN_INFO "register apic jprobe failed!%d\n"); + //} + + //register_kprobe(&jp14); + //register_kprobe(&jp15); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp16); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed9\n"); + //register_kprobe(&jp17); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp18); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe part_round_stats failed0\n"); + //register_kprobe(&jp19); + //register_kprobe(&jp20); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp21); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed12\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp22); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed13\n"); + //register_kprobe(&jp23); + //jp24.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait_restart"), + //register_kprobe(&jp24); + //register_kprobe(&jp25); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp26); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed14\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp27); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed15\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp28); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed16\n"); + ret = register_kprobe(&jp29); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kprobe failed17\n"); + + + /*kret3.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("tasklet_hi_action"); + kret4.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("run_timer_softirq"); + kret5.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("net_tx_action"); + kret6.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("net_rx_action"); + kret7.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("blk_done_softirq"); + kret8.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("irq_poll_softirq"); + kret9.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("tasklet_action"); + kret10.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("run_rebalance_domains"); + kret11.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("run_hrtimer_softirq"); + kret12.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("rcu_process_callbacks"); + kret13.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("local_apic_timer_interrupt"); + kret14.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("do_IRQ"); +// kret15.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("wakeup_softirqd"); + kret16.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("__do_softirq"); + kret17.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("add_interrupt_randomness"); + //kret18.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("finish_task_switch"); + //kret19.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("futex_wait"); + //kret19.kp.addr = (kprobe_opcode_t *) kallsyms_lookup_name("__lock_sock"); +*/ + + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret3); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_INFO "register_kretprobe failed, returned %d\n", ret); + //return ret; + } else + pr_info("register kretprobe success\n"); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret4); + if (ret) { + printk(KERN_INFO "register_kretprobe2 failed, returned %d\n", ret); + //return ret; + } + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret5); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed1\n"); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret6); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed2\n"); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret7); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed3\n"); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret8); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed4\n"); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret9); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed5\n"); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret10); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed6\n"); + //register_kretprobe(&kret11); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret12); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe rcu_process_callbacks failed7\n"); + //register_kretprobe(&kret13); + //register_kretprobe(&kret14); + ret = register_kretprobe(&kret16); + if (ret) + pr_info("register kretprobe failed8\n"); + //register_kretprobe(&kret17); + //register_kretprobe(&kret18); + //register_kretprobe(&kret19); + + return 0; +} + +void char_arr_cleanup(void) { + //cdev_del(kernel_cdev); + + unregister_kprobe(&jp1); + + unregister_kprobe(&jp2); + unregister_kprobe(&jp3); + unregister_kprobe(&jp4); + unregister_kprobe(&jp5); + unregister_kprobe(&jp6); + unregister_kprobe(&jp7); + unregister_kprobe(&jp8); + unregister_kprobe(&jp9); + unregister_kprobe(&jp10); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp11); + unregister_kprobe(&jp12); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp13); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp14); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp15); + unregister_kprobe(&jp16); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp17); + unregister_kprobe(&jp18); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp19); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp20); + unregister_kprobe(&jp21); + unregister_kprobe(&jp22); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp23); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp24); + //unregister_kprobe(&jp25); + unregister_kprobe(&jp26); + unregister_kprobe(&jp27); + unregister_kprobe(&jp28); + unregister_kprobe(&jp29); + + + //unregister_kretprobe(&futex_return); + //unregister_kretprobe(&sleep_return); + //unregister_kretprobe(&signal_return); + //unregister_kretprobe(&aio_return); + + unregister_kretprobe(&kret3); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret4); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret5); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret6); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret7); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret8); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret9); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret10); + //unregister_kretprobe(&kret11); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret12); + //unregister_kretprobe(&kret13); + //unregister_kretprobe(&kret14); + unregister_kretprobe(&kret16); + //unregister_kretprobe(&kret17); + //unregister_kretprobe(&kret18); + //unregister_kretprobe(&kret19); + + /* nmissed > 0 suggests that maxactive was set too low. */ + //printk("Missed probing %d instances of %s\n", + // futex_return.nmissed, "do_futex return"); + + unregister_chrdev_region(MKDEV(Major, 0), 1); + cdev_del(kernel_cdev); + + vfree(switch_result); + vfree(switch_result_bak); + vfree(state_result); + vfree(state_result_bak); + vfree(futex_result); + vfree(futex_result_bak); + + vfree(wait_result); + vfree(wait_result_bak); + + printk(KERN_INFO " Inside cleanup_module\n"); +} +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +module_init(char_arr_init); +module_exit(char_arr_cleanup); -- 2.20.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: fix out-of-bound read in deassemble_neg_contexts()
by Li Lingfeng 29 Jul '23

29 Jul '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc6 commit f1a411873c85b642f13b01f21b534c2bab81fc1b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LU2Q CVE: CVE-2023-38427 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/f… -------------------------------- The check in the beginning is `clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context) <= len_of_ctxts`, but in the end of loop, `len_of_ctxts` will subtract `((clen + 7) & ~0x7) + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)`, which causes integer underflow when clen does the 8 alignment. We should use `(clen + 7) & ~0x7` in the check to avoid underflow from happening. Then there are some variables that need to be declared unsigned instead of signed. [ 11.671070] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610 [ 11.671533] Read of size 2 at addr ffff888005e86cf2 by task kworker/0:0/7 ... [ 11.673383] Call Trace: [ 11.673541] <TASK> [ 11.673679] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 [ 11.673913] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 11.674671] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 11.675171] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 [ 11.675412] smb2_handle_negotiate+0x799/0x1610 [ 11.676217] ksmbd_smb_negotiate_common+0x526/0x770 [ 11.676795] handle_ksmbd_work+0x274/0x810 ... Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Tested-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflict: fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c | 13 ++++++------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c index 18e176fcddf0..c357b2127774 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb2pdu.c @@ -978,13 +978,13 @@ static void decode_sign_cap_ctxt(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, static __le32 deassemble_neg_contexts(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, struct smb2_negotiate_req *req, - int len_of_smb) + unsigned int len_of_smb) { /* +4 is to account for the RFC1001 len field */ struct smb2_neg_context *pctx = (struct smb2_neg_context *)req; int i = 0, len_of_ctxts; - int offset = le32_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextOffset); - int neg_ctxt_cnt = le16_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextCount); + unsigned int offset = le32_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextOffset); + unsigned int neg_ctxt_cnt = le16_to_cpu(req->NegotiateContextCount); __le32 status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "decoding %d negotiate contexts\n", neg_ctxt_cnt); @@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ static __le32 deassemble_neg_contexts(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, if (len_of_ctxts == 0) break; - if (len_of_ctxts < sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)) + if (len_of_ctxts < (int)sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context)) break; pctx = (struct smb2_neg_context *)((char *)pctx + offset); @@ -1053,9 +1053,8 @@ static __le32 deassemble_neg_contexts(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, } /* offsets must be 8 byte aligned */ - clen = (clen + 7) & ~0x7; - offset = clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context); - len_of_ctxts -= clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context); + offset = (clen + sizeof(struct smb2_neg_context) + 7) & ~0x7; + len_of_ctxts -= offset; } return status; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/2] net: nfc: Fix CVE-2023-3863
by Ziyang Xuan 29 Jul '23

29 Jul '23

Backport CVE-2023-3863 fix commit. Krzysztof Kozlowski (1): nfc: llcp: simplify llcp_sock_connect() error paths Lin Ma (1): net: nfc: Fix use-after-free caused by nfc_llcp_find_local net/nfc/llcp.h | 1 - net/nfc/llcp_commands.c | 12 +++++++--- net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ net/nfc/llcp_sock.c | 21 ++++++++++-------- net/nfc/netlink.c | 20 ++++++++++++----- net/nfc/nfc.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/sched: cls_u32: Fix reference counter leak leading to overflow
by Lu Wei 29 Jul '23

29 Jul '23

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.185 commit af6eaa57986e82d7efd81984ee607927c6de61e4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N2 CVE: CVE-2023-3609 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 04c55383fa5689357bcdd2c8036725a55ed632bc ] In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), u32_set_parms() will immediately return without decrementing the recently incremented reference counter. If this happens enough times, the counter will rollover and the reference freed, leading to a double free which can be used to do 'bad things'. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the reference counter is incremented. Also save any meaningful return values to be applied to the return data at the appropriate point in time. This issue was caught with KASAN. Fixes: 705c7091262d ("net: sched: cls_u32: no need to call tcf_exts_change for newly allocated struct") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index da042bc8b239..1ac8ff445a6d 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -716,12 +716,18 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct nlattr *est, bool ovr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { - int err; + int err, ifindex = -1; err = tcf_exts_validate(net, tp, tb, est, &n->exts, ovr, true, extack); if (err < 0) return err; + if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { + ifindex = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); + if (ifindex < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } + if (tb[TCA_U32_LINK]) { u32 handle = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_U32_LINK]); struct tc_u_hnode *ht_down = NULL, *ht_old; @@ -756,13 +762,9 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, tcf_bind_filter(tp, &n->res, base); } - if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { - int ret; - ret = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - n->ifindex = ret; - } + if (ifindex >= 0) + n->ifindex = ifindex; + return 0; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/sched: cls_u32: Fix reference counter leak leading to overflow
by Lu Wei 28 Jul '23

28 Jul '23

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc7 commit 04c55383fa5689357bcdd2c8036725a55ed632bc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N2 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), u32_set_parms() will immediately return without decrementing the recently incremented reference counter. If this happens enough times, the counter will rollover and the reference freed, leading to a double free which can be used to do 'bad things'. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the reference counter is incremented. Also save any meaningful return values to be applied to the return data at the appropriate point in time. This issue was caught with KASAN. Fixes: 705c7091262d ("net: sched: cls_u32: no need to call tcf_exts_change for newly allocated struct") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> conflict: net/sched/cls_u32.c Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index 23d95db99121..9c92978c8684 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -778,11 +778,22 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { int err; +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND + int ifindex = -1; +#endif err = tcf_exts_validate(net, tp, tb, est, &n->exts, ovr, extack); if (err < 0) return err; +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND + if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { + ifindex = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); + if (ifindex < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } +#endif + if (tb[TCA_U32_LINK]) { u32 handle = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_U32_LINK]); struct tc_u_hnode *ht_down = NULL, *ht_old; @@ -814,13 +825,8 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, } #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND - if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { - int ret; - ret = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - n->ifindex = ret; - } + if (ifindex >= 0) + n->ifindex = ifindex; #endif return 0; } -- 2.34.1

2 1

[openEuler-1.0-LTS,v2] net/sched: cls_u32: Fix reference counter leak leading to overflow
by Lu Wei 28 Jul '23

28 Jul '23

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc7 commit 04c55383fa5689357bcdd2c8036725a55ed632bc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N2 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), u32_set_parms() will immediately return without decrementing the recently incremented reference counter. If this happens enough times, the counter will rollover and the reference freed, leading to a double free which can be used to do 'bad things'. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the reference counter is incremented. Also save any meaningful return values to be applied to the return data at the appropriate point in time. This issue was caught with KASAN. Fixes: 705c7091262d ("net: sched: cls_u32: no need to call tcf_exts_change for newly allocated struct") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> conflict: net/sched/cls_u32.c Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- V2: add macro separation for ifindex definition net/sched/cls_u32.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index 23d95db99121..9c92978c8684 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -778,11 +778,22 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { int err; +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND + int ifindex = -1; +#endif err = tcf_exts_validate(net, tp, tb, est, &n->exts, ovr, extack); if (err < 0) return err; +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND + if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { + ifindex = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); + if (ifindex < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } +#endif + if (tb[TCA_U32_LINK]) { u32 handle = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_U32_LINK]); struct tc_u_hnode *ht_down = NULL, *ht_old; @@ -814,13 +825,8 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, } #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND - if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { - int ret; - ret = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - n->ifindex = ret; - } + if (ifindex >= 0) + n->ifindex = ifindex; #endif return 0; } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/10] rcu: Add RCU stall diagnosis information
by Zhen Lei 28 Jul '23

28 Jul '23

In some extreme cases, such as the I/O pressure test, the CPU usage may be 100%, causing RCU stall. In this case, the printed information about current is not useful. Displays the number and usage of hard interrupts, soft interrupts, and context switches that are generated within half of the CPU stall timeout, can help us make a general judgment. In other cases, we can preliminarily determine whether an infinite loop occurs when local_irq, local_bh or preempt is disabled. Neeraj Upadhyay (1): rcu: Check and report missed fqs timer wakeup on RCU stall Paul E. McKenney (3): rcu: Prevent lockdep-RCU splats on lock acquisition/release rcu: For RCU grace-period kthread starvation, dump last CPU it ran on rcu: Do not NMI offline CPUs Zhen Lei (6): sched/debug: Try trigger_single_cpu_backtrace(cpu) in dump_cpu_task() sched/debug: Show the registers of 'current' in dump_cpu_task() sched: Add helper kstat_cpu_softirqs_sum() sched: Add helper nr_context_switches_cpu() rcu: Add RCU stall diagnosis information rcu: Align the output of RCU CPU stall warning messages Documentation/RCU/stallwarn.rst | 23 ++++- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++ include/linux/kernel_stat.h | 12 +++ kernel/rcu/Kconfig.debug | 13 +++ kernel/rcu/rcu.h | 1 + kernel/rcu/tree.c | 64 +++++++++++--- kernel/rcu/tree.h | 20 +++++ kernel/rcu/tree_stall.h | 86 +++++++++++++++++-- kernel/rcu/update.c | 2 + kernel/sched/core.c | 19 ++++ kernel/smp.c | 3 +- 11 files changed, 230 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 11

[PATCH OLK-5.10] psi: fix compile error for psi cgroupv1 when CONFIG_CGROUP=n
by Lu Jialin 28 Jul '23

28 Jul '23

Offering: HULK hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7OOZR ------------------------------- When CONFIG_CGROUP=n ,the compile error is: In file included from kernel/sched/core.c:13: kernel/sched/sched.h:2679:22: error: array type has incomplete element type ‘struct cftype’ extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files[]; ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ the reason is then CONFIG_CGROUP=n, struct cftype is not defined. We also find that, cgroup_v1_psi_files is used only in kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c and kernel/sched/cpuacct.c. Therefore, move extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files to kernel/sched/cpuacct.c.This also solved the compile error, because, then CONFIG_CGROUP=n, CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=n, the kernel/sched/cpuacct.c is not compiled, which will solve the compile error. Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/sched/cpuacct.c | 1 + kernel/sched/sched.h | 4 ---- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c b/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c index 5c00d3dcee8d..28ed182b6801 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c +++ b/kernel/sched/cpuacct.c @@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ static int __init setup_psi_v1(char *str) } __setup("psi_v1=", setup_psi_v1); +extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files[]; static int __init cgroup_v1_psi_init(void) { if (!psi_v1_enable) diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h index 95ae9ac553fc..50f1a11ac2fd 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/sched.h +++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h @@ -2977,10 +2977,6 @@ unsigned long scale_irq_capacity(unsigned long util, unsigned long irq, unsigned } #endif -#ifdef CONFIG_PSI -extern struct cftype cgroup_v1_psi_files[]; -#endif - #if defined(CONFIG_ENERGY_MODEL) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_SCHEDUTIL) #define perf_domain_span(pd) (to_cpumask(((pd)->em_pd->cpus))) -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/sched: cls_fw: Fix improper refcount update leads to use-after-free
by Dong Chenchen 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.187 commit 80e0e8d5f54397c5048fa2274144134dd9dc91b5 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189032,https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N3 CVE: CVE-2023-3776 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0323bce598eea038714f941ce2b22541c46d488f ] In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), fw_set_parms() will immediately return an error after incrementing or decrementing reference counter in tcf_bind_filter(). If attacker can control reference counter to zero and make reference freed, leading to use after free. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the TC_FW_CLASSID is handled. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela(a)mojatatu.com> Message-ID: <20230705161530.52003-1-ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/cls_fw.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_fw.c b/net/sched/cls_fw.c index ec945294626a..41f0898a5a56 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_fw.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_fw.c @@ -210,11 +210,6 @@ static int fw_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, if (err < 0) return err; - if (tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]) { - f->res.classid = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]); - tcf_bind_filter(tp, &f->res, base); - } - if (tb[TCA_FW_INDEV]) { int ret; ret = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_FW_INDEV], extack); @@ -231,6 +226,11 @@ static int fw_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, } else if (head->mask != 0xFFFFFFFF) return err; + if (tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]) { + f->res.classid = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]); + tcf_bind_filter(tp, &f->res, base); + } + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/sched: cls_fw: Fix improper refcount update leads to use-after-free
by Dong Chenchen 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4 commit 0323bce598eea038714f941ce2b22541c46d488f category: bugfix bugzilla: 189032, https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N3 CVE: CVE-2023-3776 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), fw_set_parms() will immediately return an error after incrementing or decrementing reference counter in tcf_bind_filter(). If attacker can control reference counter to zero and make reference freed, leading to use after free. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the TC_FW_CLASSID is handled. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: M A Ramdhan <ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela(a)mojatatu.com> Message-ID: <20230705161530.52003-1-ramdhan(a)starlabs.sg> Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflict: net/sched/cls_fw.c Signed-off-by: dongchenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/cls_fw.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_fw.c b/net/sched/cls_fw.c index 29eeeaf3ea44..0c21e58d52bf 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_fw.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_fw.c @@ -221,11 +221,6 @@ static int fw_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, if (err < 0) return err; - if (tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]) { - f->res.classid = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]); - tcf_bind_filter(tp, &f->res, base); - } - #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND if (tb[TCA_FW_INDEV]) { int ret; @@ -244,6 +239,11 @@ static int fw_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, } else if (head->mask != 0xFFFFFFFF) return err; + if (tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]) { + f->res.classid = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_FW_CLASSID]); + tcf_bind_filter(tp, &f->res, base); + } + return 0; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

关于oEEP-0006 kernel SIG的相关工作
by kai.liu 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

Hi 刘超，以下是我初步分析的工作分解，请帮忙提出意见，谢谢！ 1. Kernel config review a) 分析Fedora 38、openSUSE 15.5和Debian 12的内核配置文件，目标是达到与它们接近的50% =m比例。需分析清楚： i. 它们主要是哪些类型的驱动开启了，哪些未开启。 ii. 它们的策略是否一致。如不一致，openEuler应采用何种策略？ b) 按上一条决策对openEuler kconfig进行修改，并提交PR。 c) Kernel SIG maintainer对PR进行review，反馈意见，达成共识。 d) 提交TC确认，正式合入PR。 2. Kernel RPM拆包：将kernel二进制包拆分成3个，名字待定，参见TC仓PR#57。 a) 定义各子包的内核模块列表： i. min：含内核文件本身如vmlinuz，system.map，config，以及在虚拟化环境下启动和运行常见业务负载所必须的模块，如virtio，iptables，fs，以及少量虚拟化中常见模拟真实的硬件的驱动如LSI HBA，Intel e1000网卡等。 ii. base：包含对常见服务器硬件的驱动，如RAID卡，HBA卡，网卡。主要基于现在kernel包的模块列表。 iii. extras：新开启的模块，少量服务器相关的驱动放入基础包，其它PC/桌面/嵌入式等相关的模块放入扩展包。 b) 定义升级策略：当前kernel包应升级到新定义的base内核包。原因为： i. Base包的模块范围与原kernel包的最接近。 ii. Base包适用的服务器场景依然是openEuler的主流场景。 c) Spec文件重构。 i. 拆分包，根据上面定义的模块列表分别打包。 ii. 定义好依赖关系：extras依赖base，base依赖min。 iii. 根据升级策略，定义好Provides和Obsoletes，使得升级时可正常从原来的kernel包升级。以上1、2任务可以并行。2a、2b、2c又可以并行。1a和2a强相关，需紧密关联合作。刘恺 Email: kai.liu(a)xfusion.com<mailto:kai.liu@xfusion.com> | Mobile: 181 2600 8111

2 2

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: allocate one more byte for implied bcc[0]
by Li Nan 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc3 commit 443d61d1fa9faa60ef925513d83742902390100f category: bugfix bugzilla: 189030, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LU2I CVE: CVE-2023-38429 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?i… ---------------------------------------- ksmbd_smb2_check_message allows client to return one byte more, so we need to allocate additional memory in ksmbd_conn_handler_loop to avoid out-of-bound access. Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflict: fs/ksmbd/connection.c Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/connection.c b/fs/ksmbd/connection.c index 8e15ec9e8f43..9c4ca0bbd71e 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/connection.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/connection.c @@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ int ksmbd_conn_handler_loop(void *p) } /* 4 for rfc1002 length field */ - size = pdu_size + 4; + /* 1 for implied bcc[0] */ + size = pdu_size + 4 + 1; conn->request_buf = kvmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!conn->request_buf) continue; -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH V2 OLK-5.10 0/6] Sync patches for sharepool
by Zhang Zekun 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

Sync patches for sharepool - Fix some bugs in code - Add a new feature for sharepool v2: - Fix some errors in patch 1, missing some code because of using git format-patch wrongly. Chen Jun (1): mm/sharepool: Add mg_sp_alloc_nodemask Xu Qiang (5): mm/sharepool: Change data type of members in sp_spa_stat to atomic64. mm/sharepool: Delete SPG_FLAG_NON_DVPP. mm/sharepool: Add sp_group_sem protection. mm/sharepool: Delete total_num and total_size in sp_spa_stat mm/sharepool: Delete unused flag in sp_group. include/linux/hugetlb.h | 15 ++ include/linux/share_pool.h | 12 +- include/linux/share_pool_interface.h | 19 +++ mm/hugetlb.c | 30 +++- mm/mempolicy.c | 4 +- mm/share_pool.c | 222 ++++++++++++++------------- 6 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/linux/share_pool_interface.h -- 2.17.1

2 7

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] binder: fix UAF caused by faulty buffer cleanup
by Longlong Xia 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.182 commit 2218752325a98861dfb10f59a9b0270d6d4abe21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7L0Z9 CVE: CVE-2023-21255 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bdc1c5fac982845a58d28690cdb56db8c88a530d upstream. In binder_transaction_buffer_release() the 'failed_at' offset indicates the number of objects to clean up. However, this function was changed by commit 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds"), to release all the objects in the buffer when 'failed_at' is zero. This introduced an issue when a transaction buffer is released without any objects having been processed so far. In this case, 'failed_at' is indeed zero yet it is misinterpreted as releasing the entire buffer. This leads to use-after-free errors where nodes are incorrectly freed and subsequently accessed. Such is the case in the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff4faf037cfc58 by task poc/474 CPU: 6 PID: 474 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0-12570-g7df047b3f0aa #5 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 print_report+0xf8/0x5b8 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 binder_ioctl+0xd9c/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Allocated by task 474: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb8/0xbc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x5c binder_new_node+0x3c/0x3a4 binder_transaction+0x2b58/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Freed by task 475: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x154 __kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x2bc kfree+0x58/0x70 binder_dec_node_tmpref+0x178/0x1fc binder_transaction_buffer_release+0x430/0x628 binder_transaction+0x1954/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid these issues, let's always calculate the intended 'failed_at' offset beforehand. This is renamed and wrapped in a helper function to make it clear and convenient. Fixes: 32e9f56a96d8 ("binder: don't detect sender/target during buffer cleanup") Reported-by: Zi Fan Tan <zifantan(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505203020.4101154-1-cmllamas@google.com [cmllamas: resolve trivial conflict due to missing commit 9864bb4801331] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Longlong Xia <xialonglong1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: tong tiangen <tongtiangen(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index d73b0df55967..98c785ebfa5d 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2302,24 +2302,23 @@ static void binder_deferred_fd_close(int fd) static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_thread *thread, struct binder_buffer *buffer, - binder_size_t failed_at, + binder_size_t off_end_offset, bool is_failure) { int debug_id = buffer->debug_id; - binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset, off_end_offset; + binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset; binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION, "%d buffer release %d, size %zd-%zd, failed at %llx\n", proc->pid, buffer->debug_id, buffer->data_size, buffer->offsets_size, - (unsigned long long)failed_at); + (unsigned long long)off_end_offset); if (buffer->target_node) binder_dec_node(buffer->target_node, 1, 0); off_start_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); - off_end_offset = is_failure && failed_at ? failed_at : - off_start_offset + buffer->offsets_size; + for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) { struct binder_object_header *hdr; @@ -2479,6 +2478,21 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, } } +/* Clean up all the objects in the buffer */ +static inline void binder_release_entire_buffer(struct binder_proc *proc, + struct binder_thread *thread, + struct binder_buffer *buffer, + bool is_failure) +{ + binder_size_t off_end_offset; + + off_end_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); + off_end_offset += buffer->offsets_size; + + binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, + off_end_offset, is_failure); +} + static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp, struct binder_transaction *t, struct binder_thread *thread) @@ -3949,7 +3963,7 @@ binder_free_buf(struct binder_proc *proc, binder_node_inner_unlock(buf_node); } trace_binder_transaction_buffer_release(buffer); - binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, 0, is_failure); + binder_release_entire_buffer(proc, thread, buffer, is_failure); binder_alloc_free_buf(&proc->alloc, buffer); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm: memcontrol: fix cannot alloc the maximum memcg ID
by Lu Jialin 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit be740503ed03ea04ca362330baf082e6a38fe462 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7NXZ6?from=project-issue Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The idr_alloc() does not include @max ID. So in the current implementation, the maximum memcg ID is 65534 instead of 65535. It seems a bug. So fix this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220228122126.37293-15-songmuchun@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs(a)kernel.org> Cc: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> Cc: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david(a)fromorbit.com> Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kari Argillander <kari.argillander(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Conflict: mm/memcontrol.c Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index dfe0f1127153..5082d0664adf 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -6277,8 +6277,7 @@ static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_alloc(void) goto fail; memcg->id.id = idr_alloc(&mem_cgroup_idr, NULL, - 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX, - GFP_KERNEL); + 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (memcg->id.id < 0) { error = memcg->id.id; goto fail; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] binder: fix UAF caused by faulty buffer cleanup
by Longlong Xia 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.182 commit 2218752325a98861dfb10f59a9b0270d6d4abe21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7L0Z9 CVE: CVE-2023-21255 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bdc1c5fac982845a58d28690cdb56db8c88a530d upstream. In binder_transaction_buffer_release() the 'failed_at' offset indicates the number of objects to clean up. However, this function was changed by commit 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds"), to release all the objects in the buffer when 'failed_at' is zero. This introduced an issue when a transaction buffer is released without any objects having been processed so far. In this case, 'failed_at' is indeed zero yet it is misinterpreted as releasing the entire buffer. This leads to use-after-free errors where nodes are incorrectly freed and subsequently accessed. Such is the case in the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff4faf037cfc58 by task poc/474 CPU: 6 PID: 474 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0-12570-g7df047b3f0aa #5 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 print_report+0xf8/0x5b8 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 binder_ioctl+0xd9c/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Allocated by task 474: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb8/0xbc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x5c binder_new_node+0x3c/0x3a4 binder_transaction+0x2b58/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Freed by task 475: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x154 __kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x2bc kfree+0x58/0x70 binder_dec_node_tmpref+0x178/0x1fc binder_transaction_buffer_release+0x430/0x628 binder_transaction+0x1954/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid these issues, let's always calculate the intended 'failed_at' offset beforehand. This is renamed and wrapped in a helper function to make it clear and convenient. Fixes: 32e9f56a96d8 ("binder: don't detect sender/target during buffer cleanup") Reported-by: Zi Fan Tan <zifantan(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505203020.4101154-1-cmllamas@google.com [cmllamas: resolve trivial conflict due to missing commit 9864bb4801331] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Longlong Xia <xialonglong1(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index b403c7f063b0..dbae98f09658 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2267,24 +2267,23 @@ static void binder_deferred_fd_close(int fd) static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_thread *thread, struct binder_buffer *buffer, - binder_size_t failed_at, + binder_size_t off_end_offset, bool is_failure) { int debug_id = buffer->debug_id; - binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset, off_end_offset; + binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset; binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION, "%d buffer release %d, size %zd-%zd, failed at %llx\n", proc->pid, buffer->debug_id, buffer->data_size, buffer->offsets_size, - (unsigned long long)failed_at); + (unsigned long long)off_end_offset); if (buffer->target_node) binder_dec_node(buffer->target_node, 1, 0); off_start_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); - off_end_offset = is_failure && failed_at ? failed_at : - off_start_offset + buffer->offsets_size; + for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) { struct binder_object_header *hdr; @@ -2444,6 +2443,21 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, } } +/* Clean up all the objects in the buffer */ +static inline void binder_release_entire_buffer(struct binder_proc *proc, + struct binder_thread *thread, + struct binder_buffer *buffer, + bool is_failure) +{ + binder_size_t off_end_offset; + + off_end_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); + off_end_offset += buffer->offsets_size; + + binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, + off_end_offset, is_failure); +} + static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp, struct binder_transaction *t, struct binder_thread *thread) @@ -3926,7 +3940,7 @@ binder_free_buf(struct binder_proc *proc, binder_node_inner_unlock(buf_node); } trace_binder_transaction_buffer_release(buffer); - binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, 0, is_failure); + binder_release_entire_buffer(proc, thread, buffer, is_failure); binder_alloc_free_buf(&proc->alloc, buffer); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ksmbd: validate smb request protocol id
by Li Nan 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc6 commit 1c1bcf2d3ea061613119b534f57507c377df20f9 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189016, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7LU2S CVE: CVE-2023-38430 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit?i… ---------------------------------------- This patch add the validation for smb request protocol id. If it is not one of the four ids(SMB1_PROTO_NUMBER, SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER, SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM, SMB2_COMPRESSION_TRANSFORM_ID), don't allow processing the request. And this will fix the following KASAN warning also. [ 13.905265] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in init_smb2_rsp_hdr+0x1b9/0x1f0 [ 13.905900] Read of size 16 at addr ffff888005fd2f34 by task kworker/0:2/44 ... [ 13.908553] Call Trace: [ 13.908793] <TASK> [ 13.908995] dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x50 [ 13.909369] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 13.910870] kasan_report+0xae/0xe0 [ 13.911519] kasan_check_range+0x35/0x1b0 [ 13.911796] init_smb2_rsp_hdr+0x1b9/0x1f0 [ 13.912492] handle_ksmbd_work+0xe5/0x820 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Chih-Yen Chang <cc85nod(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench(a)microsoft.com> Conflict: fs/ksmbd/connection.c Signed-off-by: Li Nan <linan122(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ksmbd/connection.c | 5 +++-- fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/connection.c b/fs/ksmbd/connection.c index 8e15ec9e8f43..4e9ce05374a3 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/connection.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/connection.c @@ -315,8 +315,6 @@ int ksmbd_conn_handler_loop(void *p) continue; memcpy(conn->request_buf, hdr_buf, sizeof(hdr_buf)); - if (!ksmbd_smb_request(conn)) - break; /* * We already read 4 bytes to find out PDU size, now @@ -334,6 +332,9 @@ int ksmbd_conn_handler_loop(void *p) continue; } + if (!ksmbd_smb_request(conn)) + break; + if (!default_conn_ops.process_fn) { pr_err("No connection request callback\n"); break; diff --git a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c index 8ea2cdda0984..ff2e738ae7ac 100644 --- a/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c +++ b/fs/ksmbd/smb_common.c @@ -156,7 +156,19 @@ int ksmbd_verify_smb_message(struct ksmbd_work *work) */ bool ksmbd_smb_request(struct ksmbd_conn *conn) { - return conn->request_buf[0] == 0; + __le32 *proto = (__le32 *)smb2_get_msg(conn->request_buf); + + if (*proto == SMB2_COMPRESSION_TRANSFORM_ID) { + pr_err_ratelimited("smb2 compression not support yet"); + return false; + } + + if (*proto != SMB1_PROTO_NUMBER && + *proto != SMB2_PROTO_NUMBER && + *proto != SMB2_TRANSFORM_PROTO_NUM) + return false; + + return true; } static bool supported_protocol(int idx) -- 2.39.2

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2 0/6] Stop attempts to auxtrace mmap when not an auxtrace event
by Junhao He 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

The patches stop attempts to auxtrace mmap when it is not an auxtrace event e.g. when mmapping the CPUs on which only sideband is captured Adrian Hunter (6): libperf evlist: Remove ->idx() per_cpu parameter libperf evlist: Move ->idx() into mmap_per_evsel() libperf evlist: Add evsel as a parameter to ->idx() perf auxtrace: Record whether an auxtrace mmap is needed perf auxtrace: Add mmap_needed to auxtrace_mmap_params perf auxtrace: Remove auxtrace_mmap_params__set_idx() per_cpu parameter tools/lib/perf/evlist.c | 9 +++------ tools/lib/perf/include/internal/evlist.h | 3 ++- tools/perf/arch/arm/util/cs-etm.c | 1 + tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/arm-spe.c | 1 + tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/hisi-ptt.c | 1 + tools/perf/arch/s390/util/auxtrace.c | 1 + tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-bts.c | 1 + tools/perf/arch/x86/util/intel-pt.c | 1 + tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c | 13 ++++++++++--- tools/perf/util/auxtrace.h | 14 ++++++++++---- tools/perf/util/evlist.c | 6 ++++-- tools/perf/util/evsel.h | 1 + tools/perf/util/mmap.c | 4 ++-- 13 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) -- 2.33.0

2 7

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm: memcontrol: fix cannot alloc the maximum memcg ID
by Lu Jialin 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit be740503ed03ea04ca362330baf082e6a38fe462 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7NXZ6?from=project-issue Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The idr_alloc() does not include @max ID. So in the current implementation, the maximum memcg ID is 65534 instead of 65535. It seems a bug. So fix this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220228122126.37293-15-songmuchun@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs(a)kernel.org> Cc: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> Cc: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david(a)fromorbit.com> Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kari Argillander <kari.argillander(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 635cb8b65b86..65accea3a799 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -5763,8 +5763,7 @@ static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_alloc(void) return ERR_PTR(error); memcg->id.id = idr_alloc(&mem_cgroup_idr, NULL, - 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX, - GFP_KERNEL); + 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (memcg->id.id < 0) { error = memcg->id.id; goto fail; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[openEuler-1.0-LTS] net/sched: cls_u32: Fix reference counter leak leading to overflow
by Lu Wei 27 Jul '23

27 Jul '23

From: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.4-rc7 commit 04c55383fa5689357bcdd2c8036725a55ed632bc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3N2 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- In the event of a failure in tcf_change_indev(), u32_set_parms() will immediately return without decrementing the recently incremented reference counter. If this happens enough times, the counter will rollover and the reference freed, leading to a double free which can be used to do 'bad things'. In order to prevent this, move the point of possible failure above the point where the reference counter is incremented. Also save any meaningful return values to be applied to the return data at the appropriate point in time. This issue was caught with KASAN. Fixes: 705c7091262d ("net: sched: cls_u32: no need to call tcf_exts_change for newly allocated struct") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Acked-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> conflict: net/sched/cls_u32.c Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/cls_u32.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/cls_u32.c b/net/sched/cls_u32.c index 23d95db99121..45807e125401 100644 --- a/net/sched/cls_u32.c +++ b/net/sched/cls_u32.c @@ -777,12 +777,20 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, struct nlattr *est, bool ovr, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) { - int err; + int err, ifindex = -1; err = tcf_exts_validate(net, tp, tb, est, &n->exts, ovr, extack); if (err < 0) return err; +#ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND + if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { + ifindex = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); + if (ifindex < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } +#endif + if (tb[TCA_U32_LINK]) { u32 handle = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_U32_LINK]); struct tc_u_hnode *ht_down = NULL, *ht_old; @@ -814,13 +822,8 @@ static int u32_set_parms(struct net *net, struct tcf_proto *tp, } #ifdef CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND - if (tb[TCA_U32_INDEV]) { - int ret; - ret = tcf_change_indev(net, tb[TCA_U32_INDEV], extack); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - n->ifindex = ret; - } + if (ifindex >= 0) + n->ifindex = ifindex; #endif return 0; } -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-23.09 0/7] sched: Support dynamic affinity in scheduler
by Hui Tang 26 Jul '23

26 Jul '23

This pathchset support dynamic affinity feature. Dynamic affinity set preferred cpus for task. When the utilization of taskgroup's preferred cpu is low, task only run in cpus preferred to enhance cpu resource locality and reduce interference between task cgroups, otherwise task can burst preferred cpus to use external cpu within cpus allowed. Hui Tang (1): sched: Add cmdline for dynamic affinity tanghui (6): sched: Introduce dynamic affinity for cfs scheduler cpuset: Introduce new interface for scheduler dynamic affinity sched: Adjust wakeup cpu range according CPU util dynamicly sched: Adjust cpu allowed in load balance dynamicly sched: Add statistics for scheduler dynamic affinity config: enable CONFIG_QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY by default arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + fs/proc/base.c | 73 +++++++++++ include/linux/sched.h | 22 ++++ include/linux/sched/sysctl.h | 3 + init/Kconfig | 10 ++ init/init_task.c | 3 + kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/fork.c | 16 +++ kernel/sched/core.c | 98 +++++++++++++++ kernel/sched/debug.c | 6 + kernel/sched/fair.c | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 11 ++ 13 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.17.1

2 8

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS] binder: fix UAF caused by faulty buffer cleanup
by Longlong Xia 26 Jul '23

26 Jul '23

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.182 commit 2218752325a98861dfb10f59a9b0270d6d4abe21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7L0Z9 CVE: CVE-2023-21255 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bdc1c5fac982845a58d28690cdb56db8c88a530d upstream. In binder_transaction_buffer_release() the 'failed_at' offset indicates the number of objects to clean up. However, this function was changed by commit 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds"), to release all the objects in the buffer when 'failed_at' is zero. This introduced an issue when a transaction buffer is released without any objects having been processed so far. In this case, 'failed_at' is indeed zero yet it is misinterpreted as releasing the entire buffer. This leads to use-after-free errors where nodes are incorrectly freed and subsequently accessed. Such is the case in the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff4faf037cfc58 by task poc/474 CPU: 6 PID: 474 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0-12570-g7df047b3f0aa #5 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 print_report+0xf8/0x5b8 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 binder_ioctl+0xd9c/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Allocated by task 474: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb8/0xbc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x5c binder_new_node+0x3c/0x3a4 binder_transaction+0x2b58/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Freed by task 475: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x154 __kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x2bc kfree+0x58/0x70 binder_dec_node_tmpref+0x178/0x1fc binder_transaction_buffer_release+0x430/0x628 binder_transaction+0x1954/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid these issues, let's always calculate the intended 'failed_at' offset beforehand. This is renamed and wrapped in a helper function to make it clear and convenient. Fixes: 32e9f56a96d8 ("binder: don't detect sender/target during buffer cleanup") Reported-by: Zi Fan Tan <zifantan(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505203020.4101154-1-cmllamas@google.com [cmllamas: resolve trivial conflict due to missing commit 9864bb4801331] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Longlong Xia <xialonglong1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: tong tiangen <tongtiangen(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index d73b0df55967..98c785ebfa5d 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2302,24 +2302,23 @@ static void binder_deferred_fd_close(int fd) static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_thread *thread, struct binder_buffer *buffer, - binder_size_t failed_at, + binder_size_t off_end_offset, bool is_failure) { int debug_id = buffer->debug_id; - binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset, off_end_offset; + binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset; binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION, "%d buffer release %d, size %zd-%zd, failed at %llx\n", proc->pid, buffer->debug_id, buffer->data_size, buffer->offsets_size, - (unsigned long long)failed_at); + (unsigned long long)off_end_offset); if (buffer->target_node) binder_dec_node(buffer->target_node, 1, 0); off_start_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); - off_end_offset = is_failure && failed_at ? failed_at : - off_start_offset + buffer->offsets_size; + for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) { struct binder_object_header *hdr; @@ -2479,6 +2478,21 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, } } +/* Clean up all the objects in the buffer */ +static inline void binder_release_entire_buffer(struct binder_proc *proc, + struct binder_thread *thread, + struct binder_buffer *buffer, + bool is_failure) +{ + binder_size_t off_end_offset; + + off_end_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); + off_end_offset += buffer->offsets_size; + + binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, + off_end_offset, is_failure); +} + static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp, struct binder_transaction *t, struct binder_thread *thread) @@ -3949,7 +3963,7 @@ binder_free_buf(struct binder_proc *proc, binder_node_inner_unlock(buf_node); } trace_binder_transaction_buffer_release(buffer); - binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, 0, is_failure); + binder_release_entire_buffer(proc, thread, buffer, is_failure); binder_alloc_free_buf(&proc->alloc, buffer); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH 1/1] binder: fix UAF caused by faulty buffer cleanup
by Longlong Xia 26 Jul '23

26 Jul '23

From: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.182 commit 2218752325a98861dfb10f59a9b0270d6d4abe21 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7L0Z9 CVE: CVE-2023-21255 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bdc1c5fac982845a58d28690cdb56db8c88a530d upstream. In binder_transaction_buffer_release() the 'failed_at' offset indicates the number of objects to clean up. However, this function was changed by commit 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds"), to release all the objects in the buffer when 'failed_at' is zero. This introduced an issue when a transaction buffer is released without any objects having been processed so far. In this case, 'failed_at' is indeed zero yet it is misinterpreted as releasing the entire buffer. This leads to use-after-free errors where nodes are incorrectly freed and subsequently accessed. Such is the case in the following KASAN report: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 Read of size 8 at addr ffff4faf037cfc58 by task poc/474 CPU: 6 PID: 474 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.3.0-12570-g7df047b3f0aa #5 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec show_stack+0x18/0x24 dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x60 print_report+0xf8/0x5b8 kasan_report+0xb8/0xfc __asan_load8+0x9c/0xb8 binder_thread_read+0xc40/0x1f30 binder_ioctl+0xd9c/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Allocated by task 474: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x24/0x34 __kasan_kmalloc+0xb8/0xbc kmalloc_trace+0x48/0x5c binder_new_node+0x3c/0x3a4 binder_transaction+0x2b58/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] Freed by task 475: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 kasan_set_track+0x2c/0x40 kasan_save_free_info+0x38/0x5c __kasan_slab_free+0xe8/0x154 __kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x2bc kfree+0x58/0x70 binder_dec_node_tmpref+0x178/0x1fc binder_transaction_buffer_release+0x430/0x628 binder_transaction+0x1954/0x36f0 binder_thread_write+0x8e0/0x1b78 binder_ioctl+0x14a0/0x1768 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xd4/0x118 invoke_syscall+0x60/0x188 [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid these issues, let's always calculate the intended 'failed_at' offset beforehand. This is renamed and wrapped in a helper function to make it clear and convenient. Fixes: 32e9f56a96d8 ("binder: don't detect sender/target during buffer cleanup") Reported-by: Zi Fan Tan <zifantan(a)google.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Acked-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505203020.4101154-1-cmllamas@google.com [cmllamas: resolve trivial conflict due to missing commit 9864bb4801331] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wang Hai <wanghai38(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Longlong Xia <xialonglong1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: tong tiangen <tongtiangen(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Nanyong Sun <sunnanyong(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index d73b0df55967..98c785ebfa5d 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -2302,24 +2302,23 @@ static void binder_deferred_fd_close(int fd) static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, struct binder_thread *thread, struct binder_buffer *buffer, - binder_size_t failed_at, + binder_size_t off_end_offset, bool is_failure) { int debug_id = buffer->debug_id; - binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset, off_end_offset; + binder_size_t off_start_offset, buffer_offset; binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_TRANSACTION, "%d buffer release %d, size %zd-%zd, failed at %llx\n", proc->pid, buffer->debug_id, buffer->data_size, buffer->offsets_size, - (unsigned long long)failed_at); + (unsigned long long)off_end_offset); if (buffer->target_node) binder_dec_node(buffer->target_node, 1, 0); off_start_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); - off_end_offset = is_failure && failed_at ? failed_at : - off_start_offset + buffer->offsets_size; + for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset += sizeof(binder_size_t)) { struct binder_object_header *hdr; @@ -2479,6 +2478,21 @@ static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc, } } +/* Clean up all the objects in the buffer */ +static inline void binder_release_entire_buffer(struct binder_proc *proc, + struct binder_thread *thread, + struct binder_buffer *buffer, + bool is_failure) +{ + binder_size_t off_end_offset; + + off_end_offset = ALIGN(buffer->data_size, sizeof(void *)); + off_end_offset += buffer->offsets_size; + + binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, + off_end_offset, is_failure); +} + static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp, struct binder_transaction *t, struct binder_thread *thread) @@ -3949,7 +3963,7 @@ binder_free_buf(struct binder_proc *proc, binder_node_inner_unlock(buf_node); } trace_binder_transaction_buffer_release(buffer); - binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, thread, buffer, 0, is_failure); + binder_release_entire_buffer(proc, thread, buffer, is_failure); binder_alloc_free_buf(&proc->alloc, buffer); } -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH] Wayca: Add SAS features description doc
by Yihang Li 26 Jul '23

26 Jul '23

From: xiabing <xiabing12(a)h-partners.com> --- ...-Kunpeng-基础IO-SAS模块特性介绍.md | 389 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 389 insertions(+) create mode 100644 WayCa-Kunpeng-底软/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO-SAS模块特性介绍.md diff --git a/WayCa-Kunpeng-底软/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO-SAS模块特性介绍.md b/WayCa-Kunpeng-底软/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO-SAS模块特性介绍.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9e8cc2c --- /dev/null +++ b/WayCa-Kunpeng-底软/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO/Wayca-Kunpeng-基础IO-SAS模块特性介绍.md @@ -0,0 +1,389 @@ +# openEuler WayCa SIG 鲲鹏基础IO SAS模块介绍 +# 一、SAS驱动简介 +SAS驱动是适配920系列处理器SAS控制器的驱动模块。SAS（Serial Attached SCSI）即串行SCSI技术，一种磁盘连接技术。SAS控制器用于磁盘与内存之间进行交互。 + +## 源码获取路径 +- Linux kernel仓库：https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/ +- openEuler 仓库：https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git +- 源码路径：driver/scsi/hisi_sas + +## 功能描述 +对于鲲鹏920系列SAS模块，支持的特性如下： +- 兼容SAS3.0协议，同时向下兼容SAS2.0和SAS1.0 +-支持SSP/SMP/STP +-支持连接SATA盘（非AHCI方式） +-支持SATA协议定义的NCQ +-支持最多1024个设备 +-支持最多并发4096个IO +-支持宽端口（最多每个端口8个PHY）和窄端口模式 +-支持SAS链接速率12/6/3/1.5Gbit/s自协商， SATA链接速率6/3/1.5Gbit/s自协商 +-支持热插拔 +-支持SAS DIF +-支持SAS MSI中断模式及中断聚合 +-支持逻辑侧单个IO或整个盘的IO的abort +-支持错误以RAS方式上报 +-支持DFX +-支持BIST +-支持直连LED +-支持SAS runtime PM + +## 规格描述 + +本节主要描述用户可见、可感知的规格，以及规格描述、主线支持版本的列表 + +| 规格名称 | 规格描述 | 主线支持版本 | 备注 | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| 兼容SATA盘 | 非AHCI方式，可以直连SATA盘或expander连接SATA盘 | Linux Kernel 4.13 | 基本功能 | +| 支持SSP/SMP/STP | 支持直连或expander 连接SAS盘和SATA盘 | Linux Kernel 4.13 | 基本功能 | +| 支持最多1024个设备 | 支持最大设备数为1024个 | Linux Kernel 4.13 | 基本功能 | +| 支持最多4096个IO | 支持最多4096个IO | Linux Kernel 4.13 | 基本功能 | +| 支持DIF | 支持SAS DIF特性 | Linux Kernel 4.21 | - | +| 支持DIX | 支持SAS DIX特性 | Linux Kernel 5.1 | 依赖于DIF | +| 中断聚合 | 支持SAS MSI中断聚合 | Linux Kernel 4.21 | - | +| 支持错误以RAS方式上报 | 支持错误以RAS方式上报 | Linux Kernel 5.2 | - | +| 支持DFX | 以debugfs方式实现 | Linux Kernel 4.22 （Basic） Linux Kernel 5.5 (Enhance) | - | +| 支持BIST | 码流环回功能 | Linux Kernel 5.4 | - | +| 支持LED | 直连LED点灯 | Linux Kernel 4.18 | - | +| 支持SAS controller runtime PM | 支持SAS控制器的SAS controller runtime PM | Linux Kernel 4.16 | - | +## 内核config选项 +SAS驱动涉及的内核配置选项：CONFIG_SCSI_HISI_SAS和CONFIG_SCSI_HISI_SAS_PCI。对于鲲鹏920系列处理器使能，需要同时配置CONFIG_SCSI_HISI_SAS和CONFIG_SCSI_HISI_SAS_PCI。 +## 加载依赖 +模块编译后，会生成两个KO文件：hisi_sas_main.ko、hisi_sas_v3_hw.ko。先加载hisi_sas_main.ko，再加载hisi_sas_v3_hw.ko。 +## 模块参数 +SAS驱动模块当前包含四个模块参数，针对hisi_sas_main.ko的模块参数是：debugfs_enable、debugfs_dump_count，针对hisi_sas_v3_hw.ko的模块参数是：prot_mask、intr_conv。 + +| 模块参数 | 含义 | 默认值 | 设置 | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| debugfs_enable | 是否使能debugfs | 1 | debugfs_enable=1使能debugfs功能 debugfs_enable=0不使能debugfs功能 | +|debugfs_dump_count|debugfs dump次数设置|1|debugfs_dump_count = n (0<=n<=50)| +| prot_mask | DIF/DIX类型设置 | 0 | n: 设置DIF/DIX类型； 0: 不使能DIF/DIX | +| intr_conv | 是否使能中断聚合 | 0 | intr_conv =1使能中断聚合 intr_conv =0不使能中断聚合 | + + +# 二、特性详解 + +## 特性1：中断聚合 +- 特性介绍 + +上层的每个IO下发在底层驱动是通过DQ队列（即发送队列）发送给SAS控制器，IO完成后通过CQ队列返回。CQ队列的返回以中断方式触发。当IO产生比较频繁时，对应中断产生会很频繁，此时通过将部分中断一起上报可以提升性能。SAS驱动支持两种类型的中断聚合： + +1.中断聚合类型1： + +所有CQ队列（即CQ0-CQ15）的中断全部在CQ0上产生。 + +2.中断聚合类型2： + +在规定时间内对本队列产生的中断进行聚合，如果在规定时间内聚合到指定数量则产生一次中断，如果在规定时间内没有聚合到指定数量的中断，在规定时间达到时产生中断。 + +- 涉及代码与使能 + +| commitid | subject |openeuler OLK-5.10 enabled(Y/N) | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| 37359798ec44 |scsi: hisi_sas: Add support for interrupt coalescing for v3 hw | Y | +| c3566f9a617d |scsi: hisi_sas: Create separate host attributes per HBA | Y | +| 488cf558e3d7 |scsi: hisi_sas: Add support for interrupt converge for v3 hw | Y | + +- 示例 + +使能中断聚合类型1： + +默认不使能中断聚合类型1，用户可以通过模块参数使能。 +```cpp +insmod hisi_sas_v3_hw.ko intr_conv=1 +``` +使能中断聚合类型2（配置中断聚合时间和次数）： +```cpp +echo 8 > /sys/devices/pci0000:74/0000:74:02.0/host0/scsi_host/host0/intr_coal_count +//设置中断聚合次数为8次 +echo 1000 > /sys/devices/pci0000:74/0000:74:02.0/host0/scsi_host/host0/intr_coal_ticks +//设置中断聚合时间为1ms +``` +查看中断聚合状态： + +对于中断聚合类型1，可通过PCI设备SYSFS接口目录下intr_conv_v3_hw接口查询中断聚合类型1是否使能； +对于中断聚合类型2，输入的中断聚合时间和中断聚合次数，其中任意参数为0，则表示不使能中断聚合类型2。 + + + + +## 特性2：DIF/DIX功能 +- 特性介绍 + +为了保证从硬盘到控制器再到应用程序之间的数据完整性，Linux内核和存储厂商共同推出了DIF+DIX来保证从应用程序到磁盘之间的完整IO路径上的“端对端”数据保护。 + +DIF(Data Integrity Field)允许提供在主机适配器和磁盘之间交换额外的保护信息。DIX(Data Integrity Extension)提供应用程序到主机适配器之间的保护信息。在传输过程中在数据IO后追加一些额外的信息，来检查数据的完整性，这些额外信息即为完整性保护信息。对于磁盘，会在原来扇区大小（512字节或者4K字节）后增加8字节来存储扇区数据的保护信息。 + +用户可通过模块参数prot_mask决定DIF/DIX支持模式。通过sg_utils工具，可以查询SAS盘的DIF支持情况、格式化为支持的DIF格式或恢复为普通盘。 + + +- 涉及代码与使能 + +| commitid | subject |openeuler OLK-5.10 enabled(Y/N) | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| 6db831f4ef76 | scsi: hisi_sas: Make sg_tablesize consistent value | Y | +| 6e1b731b5352 | scsi: hisi_sas: Relocate some code to reduce complexity | Y | +| d6a9000b81be | scsi: hisi_sas: Add support for DIF feature for v2 hw | Y | +| b3cce125cb1e | scsi: hisi_sas: Add support for DIX feature for v3 hw | Y | + +- 示例 + +配置DIF/DIX支持模式 + +```c +insmod hisi_sas_v3_hw.ko prot_mask=0x70 +//支持DIX0/DIX1/DIX2/DIX3 +insmod hisi_sas_v3_hw.ko prot_mask=0x77 +//支持DIF1/DIF2/DIF3，支持DIX0/DIX1/DIX2/DIX3 +``` + +查询SAS盘对DIF的支持 +```c +sg_vpd --page=ei --long /dev/sdx |grep SPT +``` +格式化DIF SAS盘 +```c +sg_format --format --fmtpinfo=2 /dev/sdx //对于DIF1格式的盘 +sg_format --format --fmtpinfo=3 --pfu=1 /dev/sdx //对于DIF3格式的盘 +``` +恢复DIF盘为正常盘 +```c +sg_format -F -s 512 /dev/sdx +``` + +- 功能限制 + +EXT2文件系统由于其下发I/O数据存在并发性，导致数据与CRC之间不匹配，因此EXT2文件系统格式不支持DIF功能。 + + +## 特性3：debug调测功能 +- 特性介绍 + +debug调测功能为用户提供异常场景下自动或手动dump寄存器及部分IO数据的能力。SAS控制器驱动通过debugfs目录提供debug调测功能接口。其debugfs目录路径是：/sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas，在该目录下会生成以SAS控制器BDF号命名的子目录。 + +- dump功能 + +自动dump功能在SAS控制器出现严重错误时（如internal abort命令超时）触发。 +手动dump可以在debugfs目录中通过命令 echo 1 > trigger_dump 对debugfs信息进行手动dump，完成dump后会在/sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/BDF_number/dump目录下生成相应信息。 + +- debugfs dump接口展示 + +![debugfs dump接口展示](http://image.huawei.com/tiny-lts/v1/images/adb310517372e6815b81e1… +- FIFO功能 + +FIFO功能是在接收硬件发出的触发信号后，收集相应的链路信息，并通过debugfs接口呈现给用户。FIFO功能为每个PHY提供7个配置接口以及1个展示dump数据的接口。 + +| 接口名称 | 接口描述 | 接口配置 | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| signal_sel | 通过signal_sel可以选择一个指定的信号组 | b0000: 速率协商打包信号组 b0001: 12G tx train本端训练对端的调整方式，以及与HiLink的交互信号 b0010: 12G tx train对端训练本端的调整方式 b0011: sas_phy_ctrl_dfx0 b0100: sas_phy_ctrl_dfx1 b0101: sas_pcs_dfx0 other: 速率协商打包信号组 | +| dump_msk | 选择debug信号组需要dump的数据 | - | +| dump_mode | 配置信号触发后数据写入模式 | b001: 一直dump（无需配置trigger/ trigger_msk/trigger_mode接口） b010: 触发条件触发后，再dump32个数据就停止 b100: 触发条件触发后，不再dump | +| trigger_mode | 配置触发模式 | b001: 当cfg_dfx_trigger_msk对应的bit为1的debug信号发生跳变时触发（无需配置trigger接口） b010: 当debug信号等于cfg_dfx_trigger（cfg_dfx_trigger_msk对应的bit为1）时触发 b100: 当debug信号不等于cfg_dfx_trigger（cfg_dfx_trigger_msk对应的bit为1）时触发trigger | +| trigger | 通过trigger指定当前的信号组中触发信号的有效触发电平 | - | +| trigger_msk | 通过trigger_msk选择屏蔽一部分触发信号 | - | +| update_config | 更新接口配置 | b001:更新FIFO配置参数 | +| fifo_data | 展示根据用户配置dump的数据 | NA | + + +- 涉及代码与使能 + +| commitid | subject |openeuler OLK-5.10 enabled(Y/N) | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| cd96fe600cc4 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add trace FIFO debugfs support | Y | +| 35160421b63d | scsi: hisi_sas: Don't create debugfs dump folder twice | Y | +| d28ed83b7693 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add timestamp for a debugfs dump | Y | +| 35ea630b2bad | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for CQ | Y | +| 1b54c4db725d | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for DQ | Y | +| c61163981076 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for registers | Y | +| 1f66e1fd26bd | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for port | Y | +| e15f2e2dff5b | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for IOST | Y | +| 0161d55f23a1 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for ITCT | Y | +| b714dd8f36dc | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for IOST cache | Y | +| 357e4fc7a933 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs file structure for ITCT cache | Y | +| a70e33eae363 | scsi: hisi_sas: Allocate memory for multiple dumps of debugfs | Y | +| 905ab01faf5f | scsi: hisi_sas: Add module parameter for debugfs dump count | Y | +| 8f6432986e61 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add ability to have multiple debugfs dumps | Y | +| cabe7c10c97a | scsi: hisi_sas: Delete the debugfs folder of hisi_sas when the probe fails | Y | +| f873b66119f2 | scsi: hisi_sas: Record the phy down event in debugfs | Y | +| 26f84f9bc3ba | scsi: hisi_sas: Code style cleanup | Y | +| b601577df68a | scsi: hisi_sas: Add missing newlines | Y | +| ca06f2cd01d0 | scsi: hisi_sas: Make phy index variable name consistent | Y | +| caeddc0453b9 | scsi: hisi_sas: Do not modify upper fields of PROG_PHY_LINK_RATE reg | Y | +| 4b3a1f1feda6 | scsi: hisi_sas: Modify macro name for OOB phy linkrate | Y | +| 623a4b6d5c2a | scsi: hisi_sas: Move debugfs code to v3 hw driver | Y | +| 1dbe61bf7d76 | scsi: hisi_sas: Enable debugfs support by default | Y | +| ef63464bcf8f | scsi: hisi_sas: Create root and device debugfs directories | Y | +| eb1c2b72b769 | scsi: hisi_sas: Alloc debugfs snapshot buffer memory for all registers | Y | +| 49159a5e4175 | scsi: hisi_sas: Take debugfs snapshot for all regs | Y | +| caefac199676 | scsi: hisi_sas: Debugfs global register create file and add file operations | Y | +| 971afae7cf4f | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs CQ file and add file operations | Y | +| 148e379f60c5 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs DQ file and add file operations | Y | +| 1afb4b852479 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs IOST file and add file operations | Y | +| 5979f33b982d | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs ITCT file and add file operations | Y | +| 7c5e13636391 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add manual trigger for debugfs dump | Y | +| 61a6ebf3f584 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add debugfs for port registers | Y | +| bbe0a7b348b3 | scsi: hisi_sas: Snapshot HW cache of IOST and ITCT at debugfs | Y | +| b0b3e4290e28 | scsi: hisi_sas: Snapshot AXI and RAS register at debugfs | Y | +| 7105e68afaec | scsi: hisi_sas: add debugfs auto-trigger for internal abort time out | Y | +| 7ec7082c57ec | scsi: hisi_sas: Add hisi_sas_debugfs_alloc() to centralise allocation | Y | + +- 示例 + +```c +echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/fifo/0/signal_sel +//指定为速率协商打包信号组 +echo 0x7ff > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/fifo/0/dump_msk +//指定需要监测的BIT +echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/fifo/0/dump_mode +//指定数据写入模式为一直dump +echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/fifo/0/update_config +//更新接口配置 +echo 12.0 Gbit > /sys/class/sas_phy/phy-4:0/maximum_linkrate +//触发速率重新协商 +cat /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/fifo/0/fifo_data +//展示dump信息 +``` + +## 特性4：BIST功能 +- 特性介绍 + +鲲鹏920系列处理器SAS支持环回码流功能，此功能通过设置链接速率、码型、PHY ID、环回类型等参数让控制器产生对应的码流，从而通过产生的码流检验链路的质量以及控制器链路层和PHY层的逻辑速率的正确性。 + +- BIST功能接口展示 + +BIST功能依赖于debugfs，因此要使能BIST功能需要提前使能debugfs。在BIST使能后会生成如下文件。 +![图片说明](http://image.huawei.com/tiny-lts/v1/images/04fb39cd3444fde201f75bf7e35cb19a_767x814.png) + +对于SAS BIST，组网要求与正常SAS控制器使用不一样：除remote模式外，其它模式不连接任何设备；remote模式需外接SAS环回头。 + +- 涉及代码与使能 + +| commitid | subject |openeuler OLK-5.10 enabled(Y/N) | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +|97b151e75861|scsi: hisi_sas: Add BIST support for phy loopback|Y| +|65a3b8bd5694|scsi: hisi_sas: Set the BIST init value before enabling BIST|Y| +| 981cc23e741a | scsi: hisi_sas: Add BIST support for fixed code pattern | Y | +| 2c4d582322ff | scsi: hisi_sas: Add BIST support for phy FFE | Y | + +- 示例 +```c +echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/bist/phy_id +//设置需要检测的PHY为phy1 +echo 3.0 Gbit > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/bist/link_rate +//重新设置phy1的链路速率 +echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/bist/enable +//使能BIST +echo 0 > /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/bist/enable +//关闭BIST +cat /sys/kernel/debug/hisi_sas/0000:30:04.0/bist/cnt +//查看phy1的误码数量 +``` + +- 测试限制 + + 对于serdes方式，当前serdes工作模式并不是环回，会一直产生误码； + 对于码型为FIXED_DATA时, 不会有误码产生，不需要关注； + 可以通过误码注入，检查是否产生误码； + 由于协商速率要求，测试第一次需要将速率设置为大于等于3.0Gbit，后续可自由设置。 + + +## 特性5：runtime PM +- 特性介绍 + +SAS驱动支持SCSI设备的runtime PM。用户可以通过sysfs接口使能SCSI设备的runtime PM，并设置设备处于空闲状态达到用户指定时间N秒后，自动进入runtime PM状态，当用户给处于runtime PM状态的SCSI设备发送业务时，能够自动唤醒SCSI设备；当SCSI设备再次空闲N秒后自动进入runtime PM状态。 + +驱动支持SAS 控制器的runtime PM。用户可以通过sysfs接口使能SAS 控制器的runtime PM，当SAS 控制器连接的所有SCSI设备都进入runtime PM状态后，SAS 控制器会进入runtime PM状态；只要有一个SCSI设备不是runtime PM状态，SAS 控制器不会进入runtime PM状态。SAS 控制器进入runtime PM状态后，用户可对已进入runtime PM状态的SCSI设备下发业务，唤醒SCSI设备和SAS 控制器，当没有业务时SAS控制器和SCSI设备又会自动进入runtime PM状态。 + +- 用户接口及说明 + +| Runtime PM SYSFS用户接口 | 接口类型 | 含义及取值 | 默认值 | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| control | rw | 设置是否自动runtime PM auto: 允许设备runtime PM on: 不允许设备runtime PM | scsi设备:on scsi控制器:auto | +| runtime_status | r | 表示设备当前runtime状态 suspended: 进入suspended状态 active: 唤醒状态 suspending：正在suspending过程中 resuming: 正在唤醒过程中 unsupported: 不支持runtime PM | active | +| runtime_suspended_time | r | 设备处于suspended状态的时间 | NA | +| runtime_active_time | r | 设备处于active状态的时间 | NA | +| autosuspend_delay_ms | rw |若用户使能自动runtime PM，此项设置进入runtime PM状态前设备空闲的时间 -1: 一直不休眠 n: 设备空闲n秒后自动进入休眠| -1 | + +- 涉及代码与使能 + +驱动支持SCSI设备的runtime PM + +| commitid | subject |openeuler OLK-5.10 enabled(Y/N) | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| 6c459ea1542b | scsi: hisi_sas: Switch to new framework to support suspend and resume | Y | +| 65ff4aef7e9b | scsi: hisi_sas: Add controller runtime PM support for v3 hw | Y | +| e06596d5000c | scsi: hisi_sas: Add check for methods _PS0 and _PR0 | Y | +| 16fd4a7c5917 | scsi: hisi_sas: Add device link between SCSI devices and hisi_hba | Y | +| b14a37e011d8 | scsi: hisi_sas: Filter out new PHY up events during suspend | Y | +| 69f4ec1edb13 | scsi: hisi_sas: Recover PHY state according to the status before reset | Y | +| 027e508aea45 | scsi: hisi_sas_v3_hw: Don't use PCI helper functions | Y | +| 71c8f15e1dbc | scsi: hisi_sas_v3_hw: Remove extra function calls for runtime pm | Y | +| 17b5e4d14837 | scsi: hisi_sas_v3_hw: Drop PCI Wakeup calls from .resume | Y | +| 027e508aea45 | scsi: hisi_sas_v3_hw: Don't use PCI helper functions | Y | +| 71c8f15e1dbcd | scsi: hisi_sas_v3_hw: Remove extra function calls for runtime pm | Y | +| 17b5e4d14837 | scsi: hisi_sas_v3_hw: Drop PCI Wakeup calls from .resume | Y | + +驱动支持SAS 控制器的runtime PM + +| commitid | subject |openeuler OLK-5.10 enabled(Y/N) | +| ------------ | ------------ | ------------ | +| d6e366685981 | PM: runtime: Drop pm_runtime_clean_up_links() | Y | +| e0e398e20463 |PM: runtime: Drop runtime PM references to supplier on link removal| Y | +| 9226c504e364 |PM: runtime: Resume the device earlier in __device_release_driver()| Y | +| fbefe22811c3 |scsi: libsas: Don't always drain event workqueue for HA resume | Y | +| 6cc739087784 |scsi: Revert "scsi: hisi_sas: Filter out new PHY up events during suspend" | Y | +| 97f410093984 |scsi: hisi_sas: Add more logs for runtime suspend/resume | Y | +| 29e2bac87421 |scsi: hisi_sas: Fix some issues related to asd_sas_port->phy_list | Y | +| 6e1fcab00a23 |scsi: block: pm: Always set request queue runtime active in blk_post_runtime_resume() | Y | +| 42159d3c8d87 |scsi: libsas: Add spin_lock/unlock() to protect asd_sas_port->phy_list | Y | +| 133b688b2d03 |scsi: mvsas: Add spin_lock/unlock() to protect asd_sas_port->phy_list | Y | +| e31e18128eb9 |scsi: libsas: Insert PORTE_BROADCAST_RCVD event for resuming host | Y | +| 0da7ca4c4fd9 |scsi: libsas: Resume host while sending SMP I/Os | Y | +| 4ea775abbb5c |scsi: libsas: Add flag SAS_HA_RESUMING | Y | +| 1bc35475c6bf |scsi: libsas: Refactor sas_queue_deferred_work() | Y | +| bf19aea4607c |scsi: libsas: Defer works of new phys during suspend | Y | +| 307d9f49cce9 |scsi: libsas: Keep host active while processing events | Y | +| 36c6b7613ef1 |scsi: hisi_sas: Initialise devices in .slave_alloc callback | Y | +| 046ab7d0f594 |scsi: hisi_sas: Wait for phyup in hisi_sas_control_phy()|Y| + +- 示例 + +```c +SCSI设备设置进入runtime PM状态 +echo auto > /sys/devices/pci0000:b4/0000:b4:02.0/host6/port-6:0/end_device-6:0/target6:0:0/6:0:0:0/power/control +//使能SCSI设备自动runtime PM +echo 5000 > /sys/devices/pci0000:b4/0000:b4:02.0/host6/port-6:0/end_device-6:0/target6:0:0/6:0:0:0/power/autosuspend_delay_ms +//设置SCSI设备进入runtime PM状态前设备空闲的时间为5s + +SAS控制器设置进入runtime PM状态 +echo auto > /sys/devices/pci0000:b4/0000:b4:02.0/power/control +//使能SAS控制器自动runtime PM +echo 2000 > /sys/devices/pci0000:b4/0000:b4:02.0/power/autosuspend_delay_ms +//设置SAS控制器进入runtime PM状态前设备空闲的时间为2s + +``` + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + -- 2.30.0

1 0

openEuler Kernel SIG 双周例会
by openEuler conference 26 Jul '23

26 Jul '23

您好！ Kernel SIG 邀请您参加 2023-07-28 14:00 召开的Zoom会议(自动录制) 会议主题：openEuler Kernel SIG 双周例会会议内容： 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中欢迎大家积极申报议题（新增议题可直接回复邮件，或直接录入会议看板）会议链接：https://us06web.zoom.us/j/85789825222?pwd=bVcrNXVhVW9ObzVQWjVKdTlBNm14Zz09 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings 温馨提醒：建议接入会议后修改参会人的姓名，也可以使用您在gitee.com的ID 更多资讯尽在：https://openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! openEuler Kernel SIG invites you to attend the Zoom conference(auto recording) will be held at 2023-07-28 14:00, The subject of the conference is openEuler Kernel SIG 双周例会, Summary: 1. 进展update 2. 议题征集中欢迎大家积极申报议题（新增议题可直接回复邮件，或直接录入会议看板） You can join the meeting at https://us06web.zoom.us/j/85789825222?pwd=bVcrNXVhVW9ObzVQWjVKdTlBNm14Zz09. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/Kernel-meetings. Note: You are advised to change the participant name after joining the conference or use your ID at gitee.com. More information: https://openeuler.org/en/

2 1

[PATCH -next] of: unittest: fix null pointer dereferencing in of_unittest_find_node_by_name()
by Ruan Jinjie 26 Jul '23

26 Jul '23

when kmalloc() fail to allocate memory in kasprintf(), name or full_name will be NULL, strcmp() will cause null pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Ruan Jinjie <ruanjinjie(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/of/unittest.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/of/unittest.c b/drivers/of/unittest.c index a406a12eb208..e5b0eea8011c 100644 --- a/drivers/of/unittest.c +++ b/drivers/of/unittest.c @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static void __init of_unittest_find_node_by_name(void) np = of_find_node_by_path("/testcase-data"); name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%pOF", np); - unittest(np && !strcmp("/testcase-data", name), + unittest(np && name && !strcmp("/testcase-data", name), "find /testcase-data failed\n"); of_node_put(np); kfree(name); @@ -88,14 +88,14 @@ static void __init of_unittest_find_node_by_name(void) np = of_find_node_by_path("/testcase-data/phandle-tests/consumer-a"); name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%pOF", np); - unittest(np && !strcmp("/testcase-data/phandle-tests/consumer-a", name), + unittest(np && name && !strcmp("/testcase-data/phandle-tests/consumer-a", name), "find /testcase-data/phandle-tests/consumer-a failed\n"); of_node_put(np); kfree(name); np = of_find_node_by_path("testcase-alias"); name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%pOF", np); - unittest(np && !strcmp("/testcase-data", name), + unittest(np && name && !strcmp("/testcase-data", name), "find testcase-alias failed\n"); of_node_put(np); kfree(name); @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static void __init of_unittest_find_node_by_name(void) np = of_find_node_by_path("testcase-alias/phandle-tests/consumer-a"); name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%pOF", np); - unittest(np && !strcmp("/testcase-data/phandle-tests/consumer-a", name), + unittest(np && name && !strcmp("/testcase-data/phandle-tests/consumer-a", name), "find testcase-alias/phandle-tests/consumer-a failed\n"); of_node_put(np); kfree(name); @@ -1533,6 +1533,8 @@ static void attach_node_and_children(struct device_node *np) const char *full_name; full_name = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%pOF", np); + if (!full_name) + return; if (!strcmp(full_name, "/__local_fixups__") || !strcmp(full_name, "/__fixups__")) { -- 2.34.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] mm: memcontrol: fix cannot alloc the maximum memcg ID
by Lu Jialin 25 Jul '23

25 Jul '23

From: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.18-rc1 commit be740503ed03ea04ca362330baf082e6a38fe462 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7NXZ6?from=project-issue Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The idr_alloc() does not include @max ID. So in the current implementation, the maximum memcg ID is 65534 instead of 65535. It seems a bug. So fix this. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220228122126.37293-15-songmuchun@bytedance.com Signed-off-by: Muchun Song <songmuchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Alex Shi <alexs(a)kernel.org> Cc: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker(a)Netapp.com> Cc: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Cc: Dave Chinner <david(a)fromorbit.com> Cc: Fam Zheng <fam.zheng(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes(a)cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kari Argillander <kari.argillander(a)gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy(a)infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko(a)kernel.org> Cc: Qi Zheng <zhengqi.arch(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Roman Gushchin <roman.gushchin(a)linux.dev> Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb(a)google.com> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust(a)hammerspace.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev(a)gmail.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka(a)suse.cz> Cc: Wei Yang <richard.weiyang(a)gmail.com> Cc: Xiongchun Duan <duanxiongchun(a)bytedance.com> Cc: Yang Shi <shy828301(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memcontrol.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 635cb8b65b86..65accea3a799 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -5763,8 +5763,7 @@ static struct mem_cgroup *mem_cgroup_alloc(void) return ERR_PTR(error); memcg->id.id = idr_alloc(&mem_cgroup_idr, NULL, - 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX, - GFP_KERNEL); + 1, MEM_CGROUP_ID_MAX + 1, GFP_KERNEL); if (memcg->id.id < 0) { error = memcg->id.id; goto fail; -- 2.17.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.09 0/8] enable bonding XDP
by Zhengchao Shao 25 Jul '23

25 Jul '23

Currently, the 10G 82599 network adapter is used for the test on the Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 6138 CPU @ 2.00 GHz platform. The peer end uses the pktgen of the dpdk to send 64 bytes packets. The test performance is as follows: -----------------------| CPU |--| rxpck/s |--| txpck/s |---- without patch (1 dev): XDP_DROP: 1.00% 14.69Mpps XDP_TX: 2.20% 10.70Mpps 10.70Mpps XDP_DROP (RSS): 1.90% 10.13Mpps XDP_TX (RSS): 6.20% 10.09Mpps 10.09Mpps ----------------------- with patch, bond (1 dev): XDP_DROP: 1.00% 14.69Mpps XDP_TX: 2.10% 6.84Mpps 6.84Mpps XDP_DROP (RSS): 2.60% 12.57pps XDP_TX (RSS): 11.50% 12.49Mpps 12.49Mpps ----------------------- with patch, bond (2 devs): XDP_DROP: 1.90% 29.36Mpps XDP_TX: 3.90% 11.83Mpps 11.83Mpps XDP_DROP (RSS): 5.40% 25.00Mpps XDP_TX (RSS): 20.30% 19.10Mpps 19.10Mpps -------------------------------------------------------------- Jonathan Toppins (1): bonding: fix NULL deref in bond_rr_gen_slave_id Jussi Maki (5): net, bonding: Refactor bond_xmit_hash for use with xdp_buff net, core: Add support for XDP redirection to slave device net, bonding: Add XDP support to the bonding driver bonding: Fix negative jump label count on nested bonding net: bonding: Use per-cpu rr_tx_counter Moshe Tal (1): bonding: Fix extraction of ports from the packet headers Zhengchao Shao (1): net: fix kabi change in struct net_device_ops drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 457 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/filter.h | 13 +- include/linux/netdevice.h | 7 +- include/net/bonding.h | 3 +- net/core/dev.c | 13 +- net/core/filter.c | 25 ++ 6 files changed, 456 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) -- 2.34.1

2 9

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net/sched: sch_qfq: account for stab overhead in qfq_enqueue
by Zhengchao Shao 25 Jul '23

25 Jul '23

From: Pedro Tammela <pctammela(a)mojatatu.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.5-rc2 commit 3e337087c3b5805fe0b8a46ba622a962880b5d64 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I7N3MX CVE: CVE-2023-3611 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… --------------------------- Lion says: ------- In the QFQ scheduler a similar issue to CVE-2023-31436 persists. Consider the following code in net/sched/sch_qfq.c: static int qfq_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, struct sk_buff **to_free) { unsigned int len = qdisc_pkt_len(skb), gso_segs; // ... if (unlikely(cl->agg->lmax < len)) { pr_debug("qfq: increasing maxpkt from %u to %u for class %u", cl->agg->lmax, len, cl->common.classid); err = qfq_change_agg(sch, cl, cl->agg->class_weight, len); if (err) { cl->qstats.drops++; return qdisc_drop(skb, sch, to_free); } // ... } Similarly to CVE-2023-31436, "lmax" is increased without any bounds checks according to the packet length "len". Usually this would not impose a problem because packet sizes are naturally limited. This is however not the actual packet length, rather the "qdisc_pkt_len(skb)" which might apply size transformations according to "struct qdisc_size_table" as created by "qdisc_get_stab()" in net/sched/sch_api.c if the TCA_STAB option was set when modifying the qdisc. A user may choose virtually any size using such a table. As a result the same issue as in CVE-2023-31436 can occur, allowing heap out-of-bounds read / writes in the kmalloc-8192 cache. ------- We can create the issue with the following commands: tc qdisc add dev $DEV root handle 1: stab mtu 2048 tsize 512 mpu 0 \ overhead 999999999 linklayer ethernet qfq tc class add dev $DEV parent 1: classid 1:1 htb rate 6mbit burst 15k tc filter add dev $DEV parent 1: matchall classid 1:1 ping -I $DEV 1.1.1.2 This is caused by incorrectly assuming that qdisc_pkt_len() returns a length within the QFQ_MIN_LMAX < len < QFQ_MAX_LMAX. Fixes: 462dbc9101ac ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost") Reported-by: Lion <nnamrec(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs(a)mojatatu.com> Signed-off-by: Pedro Tammela <pctammela(a)mojatatu.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <simon.horman(a)corigine.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Conflicts: net/sched/sch_qfq.c Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_qfq.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c index cad7deacf60a..1aa9e71a1d76 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_qfq.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_qfq.c @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ #define QFQ_MTU_SHIFT 16 /* to support TSO/GSO */ #define QFQ_MIN_LMAX 512 /* see qfq_slot_insert */ +#define QFQ_MAX_LMAX (1UL << QFQ_MTU_SHIFT) #define QFQ_MAX_AGG_CLASSES 8 /* max num classes per aggregate allowed */ @@ -375,8 +376,13 @@ static int qfq_change_agg(struct Qdisc *sch, struct qfq_class *cl, u32 weight, u32 lmax) { struct qfq_sched *q = qdisc_priv(sch); - struct qfq_aggregate *new_agg = qfq_find_agg(q, lmax, weight); + struct qfq_aggregate *new_agg; + /* 'lmax' can range from [QFQ_MIN_LMAX, pktlen + stab overhead] */ + if (lmax > QFQ_MAX_LMAX) + return -EINVAL; + + new_agg = qfq_find_agg(q, lmax, weight); if (new_agg == NULL) { /* create new aggregate */ new_agg = kzalloc(sizeof(*new_agg), GFP_ATOMIC); if (new_agg == NULL) -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH] arm64/mpam: fix missing kfree domain's ctrl_val arrray
by Jialin Zhang 25 Jul '23

25 Jul '23

From: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 187154, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7M52S CVE: NA -------------------------------- Fix mpam memleak issue found by kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff204000d1d000 (size 128): comm "cpuhp/24", pid 132, jiffies 4294896121 (age 146328.256s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace: [<00000000dd76fed3>] __kmalloc+0x478/0x664 [<00000000e2fa4b32>] mpam_resctrl_setup_domain+0x290/0x5d0 [<0000000088adc589>] mpam_resctrl_cpu_online+0x14c/0x1d0 [<00000000b223bfaa>] mpam_cpu_online+0x1c8/0x2e4 [<000000004438534a>] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x1f4/0x11b0 [<0000000049ede841>] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x2b8/0x510 [<000000000d731c73>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x260/0x5a0 [<0000000093c61bad>] kthread+0x27c/0x350 [<00000000379f0572>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 There are two cases causing memleak: 1. When offline all cpus of a domain in mpam_resctrl_cpu_offline(), we only free domain's space but not the space of ctrl_val array. 2. When allocating ctrl_val array failed in mpam_resctrl_setup_domain(), the space of ctrl_val array may not be freed. Fixes: 88371f8b4c90 ("arm64/mpam: resctrl: Handle cpuhp and resctrl_dom allocation") Signed-off-by: Wang ShaoBo <bobo.shaobowang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jialin Zhang <zhangjialin11(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: liaoyu <liaoyu15(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_setup.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_setup.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_setup.c index f32ece505c78..a174ba62ba4e 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_setup.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mpam/mpam_setup.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int mpam_resctrl_setup_domain(unsigned int cpu, struct mpam_component *comp_iter, *comp; u32 num_partid; u32 **ctrlval_ptr; - enum resctrl_ctrl_type type; + enum resctrl_ctrl_type type, type_free; struct list_head *tmp; num_partid = mpam_sysprops_num_partid(); @@ -96,6 +96,12 @@ static int mpam_resctrl_setup_domain(unsigned int cpu, *ctrlval_ptr = kmalloc_array(num_partid, sizeof(**ctrlval_ptr), GFP_KERNEL); if (!*ctrlval_ptr) { + for_each_ctrl_type(type_free) { + if (type_free == type) + break; + ctrlval_ptr = &dom->resctrl_dom.ctrl_val[type_free]; + kfree(*ctrlval_ptr); + } kfree(dom); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -156,6 +162,8 @@ int mpam_resctrl_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu) struct rdt_domain *d; struct mpam_resctrl_res *res; struct mpam_resctrl_dom *dom; + u32 **ctrlval_ptr; + enum resctrl_ctrl_type type; for_each_supported_resctrl_exports(res) { d = resctrl_get_domain_from_cpu(cpu, &res->resctrl_res); @@ -171,6 +179,11 @@ int mpam_resctrl_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu) list_del(&d->list); dom = container_of(d, struct mpam_resctrl_dom, resctrl_dom); + for_each_ctrl_type(type) { + ctrlval_ptr = &dom->resctrl_dom.ctrl_val[type]; + kfree(*ctrlval_ptr); + } + kfree(dom); } -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-23.09 0/7] sched: Support dynamic affinity in scheduler
by Hui Tang 25 Jul '23

25 Jul '23

This pathchset support dynamic affinity feature. Dynamic affinity set preferred cpus for task. When the utilization of taskgroup's preferred cpu is low, task only run in cpus preferred to enhance cpu resource locality and reduce interference between task cgroups, otherwise task can burst preferred cpus to use external cpu within cpus allowed. Hui Tang (1): sched: Add cmdline for dynamic affinity tanghui (6): sched: Introduce dynamic affinity for cfs scheduler cpuset: Introduce new interface for scheduler dynamic affinity sched: Adjust wakeup cpu range according CPU util dynamicly sched: Adjust cpu allowed in load balance dynamicly sched: Add statistics for scheduler dynamic affinity config: enable CONFIG_QOS_SCHED_DYNAMIC_AFFINITY by default arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/x86/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + fs/proc/base.c | 73 +++++++++++ include/linux/sched.h | 22 ++++ include/linux/sched/sysctl.h | 3 + init/Kconfig | 10 ++ init/init_task.c | 3 + kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/fork.c | 16 +++ kernel/sched/core.c | 98 +++++++++++++++ kernel/sched/debug.c | 6 + kernel/sched/fair.c | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 11 ++ 13 files changed, 558 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.17.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/6] Sync patches for sharepool
by Zhang Zekun 25 Jul '23

25 Jul '23

Sync patches for sharepool - Fix some bugs in code - Add a new feature for sharepool Chen Jun (1): mm/sharepool: Add mg_sp_alloc_nodemask Xu Qiang (5): mm/sharepool: Change data type of members in sp_spa_stat to atomic64. mm/sharepool: Delete SPG_FLAG_NON_DVPP. mm/sharepool: Add sp_group_sem protection. mm/sharepool: Delete total_num and total_size in sp_spa_stat mm/sharepool: Delete unused flag in sp_group. mm/share_pool.c | 222 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 113 insertions(+), 109 deletions(-) -- 2.17.1

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