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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS V1] IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
by Yao Yiqi 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.148 commit dfa535c94406c03d3f0c869ef3ba5528e395737c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17033 CVE: CVE-2026-68425 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d2e52d610b9b09694261632340b801a421e0b0c5 ] Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send. The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment. That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state before the full TID and source address are checked against a real request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side insertion path even though the response would not match any send. For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state. This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects responses that have no corresponding request. Fixes: fa619a77046b ("[PATCH] IB: Add RMPP implementation") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3170ff3bc389a930bb1641f2caa394a0b2241579.178077490… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c index 218411282069..4b08915c60ae 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c @@ -1987,6 +1987,24 @@ void ib_mark_mad_done(struct ib_mad_send_wr_private *mad_send_wr) &mad_send_wr->mad_agent_priv->done_list); } +static bool is_kernel_rmpp_data_response(struct ib_mad_agent_private *agent, + struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_recv_wc) +{ + const struct ib_mad_hdr *mad_hdr = &mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad->mad_hdr; + struct ib_rmpp_mad *rmpp_mad; + + if (!ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(&agent->agent) || + !ib_response_mad(mad_hdr) || + !ib_is_mad_class_rmpp(mad_hdr->mgmt_class)) + return false; + + rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *)mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad; + + return (ib_get_rmpp_flags(&rmpp_mad->rmpp_hdr) & + IB_MGMT_RMPP_FLAG_ACTIVE) && + rmpp_mad->rmpp_hdr.rmpp_type == IB_MGMT_RMPP_TYPE_DATA; +} + static void ib_mad_complete_recv(struct ib_mad_agent_private *mad_agent_priv, struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_recv_wc) { @@ -2005,6 +2023,18 @@ static void ib_mad_complete_recv(struct ib_mad_agent_private *mad_agent_priv, } list_add(&mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.list, &mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list); + if (is_kernel_rmpp_data_response(mad_agent_priv, mad_recv_wc)) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&mad_agent_priv->lock, flags); + mad_send_wr = ib_find_send_mad(mad_agent_priv, mad_recv_wc); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mad_agent_priv->lock, flags); + + if (!mad_send_wr) { + ib_free_recv_mad(mad_recv_wc); + deref_mad_agent(mad_agent_priv); + return; + } + } + if (ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(&mad_agent_priv->agent)) { mad_recv_wc = ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc(mad_agent_priv, mad_recv_wc); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 V1] IB/mad: Drop unmatched RMPP responses before reassembly
by Yao Yiqi 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.148 commit dfa535c94406c03d3f0c869ef3ba5528e395737c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17033 CVE: CVE-2026-68425 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit d2e52d610b9b09694261632340b801a421e0b0c5 ] Kernel-handled RMPP receive processing starts reassembly for active DATA responses before the response is matched to an outstanding send. The normal match happens later, after ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc() has either assembled a complete message or consumed the segment. That ordering lets an unsolicited response that routes to a kernel RMPP agent by the high TID bits allocate or extend RMPP receive state before the full TID and source address are checked against a real request. A reordered burst can therefore reach the receive-side insertion path even though the response would not match any send. For kernel-handled RMPP DATA responses, require the existing ib_find_send_mad() match before entering RMPP reassembly. The matcher already checks the full TID, management class and source address/GID against the agent wait, backlog and in-flight send lists. If there is no match, drop the response without creating RMPP state. This leaves the RMPP window behavior unchanged and only rejects responses that have no corresponding request. Fixes: fa619a77046b ("[PATCH] IB: Add RMPP implementation") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5-5-xhigh Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3170ff3bc389a930bb1641f2caa394a0b2241579.178077490… Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leon(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yao Yiqi <yaoyiqi3(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c index 521c3d050be2..5c3bfed683d6 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/mad.c @@ -1788,6 +1788,24 @@ void ib_mark_mad_done(struct ib_mad_send_wr_private *mad_send_wr) &mad_send_wr->mad_agent_priv->done_list); } +static bool is_kernel_rmpp_data_response(struct ib_mad_agent_private *agent, + struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_recv_wc) +{ + const struct ib_mad_hdr *mad_hdr = &mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad->mad_hdr; + struct ib_rmpp_mad *rmpp_mad; + + if (!ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(&agent->agent) || + !ib_response_mad(mad_hdr) || + !ib_is_mad_class_rmpp(mad_hdr->mgmt_class)) + return false; + + rmpp_mad = (struct ib_rmpp_mad *)mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.mad; + + return (ib_get_rmpp_flags(&rmpp_mad->rmpp_hdr) & + IB_MGMT_RMPP_FLAG_ACTIVE) && + rmpp_mad->rmpp_hdr.rmpp_type == IB_MGMT_RMPP_TYPE_DATA; +} + static void ib_mad_complete_recv(struct ib_mad_agent_private *mad_agent_priv, struct ib_mad_recv_wc *mad_recv_wc) { @@ -1806,6 +1824,18 @@ static void ib_mad_complete_recv(struct ib_mad_agent_private *mad_agent_priv, } list_add(&mad_recv_wc->recv_buf.list, &mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list); + if (is_kernel_rmpp_data_response(mad_agent_priv, mad_recv_wc)) { + spin_lock_irqsave(&mad_agent_priv->lock, flags); + mad_send_wr = ib_find_send_mad(mad_agent_priv, mad_recv_wc); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&mad_agent_priv->lock, flags); + + if (!mad_send_wr) { + ib_free_recv_mad(mad_recv_wc); + deref_mad_agent(mad_agent_priv); + return; + } + } + if (ib_mad_kernel_rmpp_agent(&mad_agent_priv->agent)) { mad_recv_wc = ib_process_rmpp_recv_wc(mad_agent_priv, mad_recv_wc); -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/mlx5: Fix undefined shift of user RQ WQE size
by Chen Jinghuang 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Maher Sanalla <msanalla(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit d881d60223aac8fdc12b227d89c76e131e92a9cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18115 CVE: CVE-2026-74297 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- set_rq_size() computes the RQ WQE size as "1 << rq_wqe_shift" based on the user-provided rq_wqe_shift, which is only checked to be greater than 32, so shifts of 32 are still accepted. A shift of 31 also overflows a signed integer, leading to undefined behavior. Use check_shl_overflow() to compute the RQ WQE size and reject any invalid values. Fixes: e126ba97dba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260611-maher-sec-fixes-v1-1-cd8eb2542869@nvidi… Signed-off-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Edward Srouji <edwards(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c [a trival context conflict] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c index ef0f710587ad..ec1b3d8e16ce 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c @@ -260,12 +260,12 @@ static int set_rq_size(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_qp_cap *cap, } else { if (ucmd) { qp->rq.wqe_cnt = ucmd->rq_wqe_count; - if (ucmd->rq_wqe_shift > BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(ucmd->rq_wqe_shift)) - return -EINVAL; qp->rq.wqe_shift = ucmd->rq_wqe_shift; - if ((1 << qp->rq.wqe_shift) / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) < qp->wq_sig) + if (check_shl_overflow(1, qp->rq.wqe_shift, &wqe_size)) return -EINVAL; - qp->rq.max_gs = (1 << qp->rq.wqe_shift) / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) - qp->wq_sig; + if (wqe_size / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) < qp->wq_sig) + return -EINVAL; + qp->rq.max_gs = wqe_size / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) - qp->wq_sig; qp->rq.max_post = qp->rq.wqe_cnt; } else { wqe_size = qp->wq_sig ? sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_signature_seg) : 0; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/mlx5: Fix undefined shift of user RQ WQE size
by Chen Jinghuang 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Maher Sanalla <msanalla(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc1 commit d881d60223aac8fdc12b227d89c76e131e92a9cd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18115 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- set_rq_size() computes the RQ WQE size as "1 << rq_wqe_shift" based on the user-provided rq_wqe_shift, which is only checked to be greater than 32, so shifts of 32 are still accepted. A shift of 31 also overflows a signed integer, leading to undefined behavior. Use check_shl_overflow() to compute the RQ WQE size and reject any invalid values. Fixes: e126ba97dba9 ("mlx5: Add driver for Mellanox Connect-IB adapters") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260611-maher-sec-fixes-v1-1-cd8eb2542869@nvidi… Signed-off-by: Maher Sanalla <msanalla(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Edward Srouji <edwards(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c [a trival context conflict] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c index ef0f710587ad..818dedb69b1f 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/mlx5/qp.c @@ -260,12 +260,12 @@ static int set_rq_size(struct mlx5_ib_dev *dev, struct ib_qp_cap *cap, } else { if (ucmd) { qp->rq.wqe_cnt = ucmd->rq_wqe_count; - if (ucmd->rq_wqe_shift > BITS_PER_BYTE * sizeof(ucmd->rq_wqe_shift)) - return -EINVAL; qp->rq.wqe_shift = ucmd->rq_wqe_shift; - if ((1 << qp->rq.wqe_shift) / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) < qp->wq_sig) + if (check_shl_overflow(1, qp->rq.wqe_shift, &wqe_size)) return -EINVAL; - qp->rq.max_gs = (1 << qp->rq.wqe_shift) / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) - qp->wq_sig; + if (wqe_size / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) < wq_sig) + return -EINVAL; + qp->rq.max_gs = wqe_size / sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_data_seg) - qp->wq_sig; qp->rq.max_post = qp->rq.wqe_cnt; } else { wqe_size = qp->wq_sig ? sizeof(struct mlx5_wqe_signature_seg) : 0; -- 2.34.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] RDMA/rxe: Copy WQE to local buffer in non-SRQ receive path
by Chen Jinghuang 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Tristan Madani <tristmd(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc3 commit d6ab440240a04b8737ee4c7bb21af9182e451733 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17929 Reference: https://web.git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/comm… -------------------------------- For non-SRQ QPs, the responder reads WQE fields directly from the shared queue buffer mapped into userspace. This allows a malicious user to modify fields like num_sge or sge entries while the kernel is processing the WQE, leading to out-of-bounds reads in rxe_resp_check_length() and copy_data(). Introduce get_recv_wqe() that validates num_sge and copies the WQE to a kernel-local buffer before processing, matching the approach already used for SRQ WQEs in get_srq_wqe(). The srq_wqe buffer is reused since SRQ and non-SRQ paths are mutually exclusive per QP. Fixes: 8700e3e7c485 ("Soft RoCE driver") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/20260518215040.1598586-3-tristan@talencesecurity… Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani <tristan(a)talencesecurity.com> Reviewed-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu(a)linux.dev> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)nvidia.com> Conflicts: drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c [4.19 rxe_queue_head() takes a single argument (no QUEUE_TYPE_FROM_CLIENT) and the rxe_dbg_qp() debug macro does not exist in this tree; adapted to use queue_head(q) and pr_err().] Signed-off-by: Chen Jinghuang <chenjinghuang2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c index 9078cfd3b8bd..ad889e0b860a 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/sw/rxe/rxe_resp.c @@ -359,6 +359,29 @@ static enum resp_states get_srq_wqe(struct rxe_qp *qp) return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; } +static enum resp_states rxe_get_recv_wqe(struct rxe_qp *qp) +{ + struct rxe_queue *q = qp->rq.queue; + struct rxe_recv_wqe *wqe; + unsigned int num_sge; + size_t size; + + wqe = queue_head(q); + if (!wqe) + return RESPST_ERR_RNR; + + num_sge = wqe->dma.num_sge; + if (unlikely(num_sge > qp->rq.max_sge)) { + pr_err("QP#%d invalid num_sge in recv WQE\n", qp_num(qp)); + return RESPST_ERR_MALFORMED_WQE; + } + size = sizeof(*wqe) + num_sge * sizeof(struct rxe_sge); + memcpy(&qp->resp.srq_wqe, wqe, size); + + qp->resp.wqe = &qp->resp.srq_wqe.wqe; + return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; +} + static enum resp_states check_resource(struct rxe_qp *qp, struct rxe_pkt_info *pkt) { @@ -396,8 +419,7 @@ static enum resp_states check_resource(struct rxe_qp *qp, if (srq) return get_srq_wqe(qp); - qp->resp.wqe = queue_head(qp->rq.queue); - return (qp->resp.wqe) ? RESPST_CHK_LENGTH : RESPST_ERR_RNR; + return rxe_get_recv_wqe(qp); } return RESPST_CHK_LENGTH; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly
by JiangJieHua 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit fa8fca88714c3a4a74f972ed37328e2f0bbef9fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9803 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING counter is maintained by the kernel (vif_add/vif_delete), but inet_set_link_af() wrote it without any validation, allowing user space to set it to INT_MIN via RTM_NEWLINK + IFLA_INET_CONF. A following MRT_DEL_VIF then triggers a signed integer overflow in vif_delete(): UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in net/ipv4/ipmr.c:720 -2147483648 - 1 cannot be represented in type 'int' Backport of upstream commit fa8fca88714c ("ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly"), adapted for 4.19 which lacks NLA_REJECT and NLA_POLICY_RANGE. The upstream NLA_REJECT policy for MC_FORWARDING is equivalently implemented by an explicit check in inet_validate_link_af(). Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index 64f0fa0be370..70cbeacf8257 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -1796,6 +1796,9 @@ static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, if (cfgid <= 0 || cfgid > IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX) return -EINVAL; + + if (cfgid == IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING) + return -EINVAL; } } -- 2.33.8

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] ipv4: validate IPV4_DEVCONF attributes properly
by JiangJieHua 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.1-rc1 commit fa8fca88714c3a4a74f972ed37328e2f0bbef9fa category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/9803 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- As the IPV4_DEVCONF netlink attributes are not being validated, it is possible to use netlink to set read-only values like mc_forwarding. In addition, valid ranges are not being validated neither but that is less relevant as they aren't in sysctl. To avoid similar situations in the future, define a NLA policy for IPV4_DEVCONF attributes which are nested in IFLA_INET_CONF. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <fmancera(a)suse.de> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260312142637.5704-1-fmancera@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: JiangJieHua <jiangjiehua1(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv4/devinet.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/devinet.c b/net/ipv4/devinet.c index 9ac7d47..6cacc8cc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/devinet.c +++ b/net/ipv4/devinet.c @@ -1964,11 +1964,48 @@ static int inet_fill_link_af(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev, [IFLA_INET_CONF] = { .type = NLA_NESTED }, }; +static const struct nla_policy inet_devconf_policy[IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX + 1] = { + [IPV4_DEVCONF_FORWARDING] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_MC_FORWARDING] = { .type = NLA_REJECT }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROXY_ARP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SECURE_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SEND_REDIRECTS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SHARED_MEDIA] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_RP_FILTER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_SOURCE_ROUTE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_BOOTP_RELAY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_LOG_MARTIANS] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_TAG] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARPFILTER] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_MEDIUM_ID] = NLA_POLICY_MIN(NLA_S32, -1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_NOXFRM] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_NOPOLICY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_FORCE_IGMP_VERSION] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 3), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_ANNOUNCE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_IGNORE] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 8), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROMOTE_SECONDARIES] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_ACCEPT] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 2), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ARP_NOTIFY] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ACCEPT_LOCAL] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_SRC_VMARK] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_PROXY_ARP_PVLAN] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_ROUTE_LOCALNET] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_BC_FORWARDING] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGMPV2_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGMPV3_UNSOLICITED_REPORT_INTERVAL] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, + [IPV4_DEVCONF_IGNORE_ROUTES_WITH_LINKDOWN] = + NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_DROP_UNICAST_IN_L2_MULTICAST] = + NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), + [IPV4_DEVCONF_DROP_GRATUITOUS_ARP] = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U32, 0, 1), +}; + static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, const struct nlattr *nla) { - struct nlattr *a, *tb[IFLA_INET_MAX+1]; - int err, rem; + struct nlattr *tb[IFLA_INET_MAX + 1], *nested_tb[IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX + 1]; + int err; if (dev && !__in_dev_get_rcu(dev)) return -EAFNOSUPPORT; @@ -1979,15 +2016,12 @@ static int inet_validate_link_af(const struct net_device *dev, return err; if (tb[IFLA_INET_CONF]) { - nla_for_each_nested(a, tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], rem) { - int cfgid = nla_type(a); + err = nla_parse_nested(nested_tb, IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX, + tb[IFLA_INET_CONF], inet_devconf_policy, + NULL); - if (nla_len(a) < 4) - return -EINVAL; - - if (cfgid <= 0 || cfgid > IPV4_DEVCONF_MAX) - return -EINVAL; - } + if (err < 0) + return err; } return 0; -- 1.8.3.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_decrypt_done
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk(a)0sec.ai> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.260 commit 171d31245d11bf84836fad3b394cb465a4d008ec category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16132 CVE: CVE-2026-63801 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit bda3348872a2ef0d19f2df6aa8cb5025adce2f20 upstream. tipc_aead_decrypt() goes straight from tipc_bearer_hold(b) to crypto_aead_decrypt(req) without taking a reference on the netns, unlike the encrypt path. When crypto_aead_decrypt() is offloaded asynchronously (e.g. the SIMD aead wrapper queuing to cryptd), the cryptd worker runs tipc_aead_decrypt_done() later. If the bearer's netns is torn down in the meantime, cleanup_net() -> tipc_exit_net() -> tipc_crypto_stop() frees the per-netns tipc_crypto, and the completion then reads it: tipc_aead_decrypt_done() dereferences aead->crypto->stats and aead->crypto->net, and tipc_crypto_rcv_complete() dereferences aead->crypto->aead[] and the node table -- reading freed memory. Decoded KASAN splat (v7.1-rc7, CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + TIPC + TIPC_CRYPTO): BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881056258a8 by task kworker/u16:2/51 Workqueue: events_unbound Call Trace: tipc_aead_decrypt_done (net/tipc/crypto.c:999) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 169: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) tipc_crypto_start (net/tipc/crypto.c:1502) tipc_init_net (net/tipc/core.c:72) ops_init (net/core/net_namespace.c:137) setup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:446) copy_net_ns (net/core/net_namespace.c:579) create_new_namespaces (kernel/nsproxy.c:132) __x64_sys_unshare (kernel/fork.c:3316) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Freed by task 8: kfree (mm/slub.c:6566) tipc_exit_net (net/tipc/core.c:119) cleanup_net (net/core/net_namespace.c:704) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) This is the same class of bug that commit e279024617134 ("net/tipc: fix slab-use-after-free Read in tipc_aead_encrypt_done") fixed for the encrypt side. The encrypt path takes maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net) before crypto_aead_encrypt() and drops it with put_net() on the synchronous return paths and in tipc_aead_encrypt_done(); the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY return keeps the reference for the async callback to release. The decrypt path was left without the equivalent guard. Mirror the encrypt-side fix on the decrypt path: take a net reference before crypto_aead_decrypt() (failing with -ENODEV and the matching bearer put if it cannot be acquired), keep it across the -EINPROGRESS/-EBUSY async return, and drop it with put_net() on the synchronous success/error return and at the end of tipc_aead_decrypt_done(). Reproduced under KASAN on v7.1-rc7: a UDP bearer with a cluster key is flooded with crafted encrypted frames from an unknown peer (driving the cluster-key decrypt path) while the bearer's netns is repeatedly torn down. The completion must run asynchronously to outlive tipc_crypto_stop(); on x86 the stock aesni gcm(aes) now decrypts synchronously, so the async path was exercised via cryptd offload. The unguarded aead->crypto dereference in tipc_aead_decrypt_done() is the unpatched upstream path; tipc_aead_decrypt() still lacks maybe_get_net(aead->crypto->net), so the completion can outlive the free on any config where crypto_aead_decrypt() goes async. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai) Fixes: fc1b6d6de220 ("tipc: introduce TIPC encryption & authentication") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk <doruk(a)0sec.ai> Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <aleksander.lobakin(a)intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen(a)est.tech> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260617075818.37431-1-doruk@0sec.ai Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/tipc/crypto.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/tipc/crypto.c b/net/tipc/crypto.c index 86dbc4ddc1dc..5e8dd0693b8b 100644 --- a/net/tipc/crypto.c +++ b/net/tipc/crypto.c @@ -954,12 +954,20 @@ static int tipc_aead_decrypt(struct net *net, struct tipc_aead *aead, goto exit; } + /* Get net to avoid freed tipc_crypto when delete namespace */ + if (!maybe_get_net(net)) { + tipc_bearer_put(b); + rc = -ENODEV; + goto exit; + } + /* Now, do decrypt */ rc = crypto_aead_decrypt(req); if (rc == -EINPROGRESS || rc == -EBUSY) return rc; tipc_bearer_put(b); + put_net(net); exit: kfree(ctx); @@ -997,6 +1005,7 @@ static void tipc_aead_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err) } tipc_bearer_put(b); + put_net(net); } static inline int tipc_ehdr_size(struct tipc_ehdr *ehdr) -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Samuel Page <sam(a)bynar.io> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.261 commit 055663d21dc4336f67933ab26bef3c5934be6324 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16741 CVE: CVE-2026-64450 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 2b66974a1b6134a4bbc3bfed181f7418f688eb54 upstream. A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state. Fixes: d7626b5acff9 ("tipc: introduce Gap ACK blocks for broadcast link") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Samuel Page <sam(a)bynar.io> Reviewed-by: Tung Nguyen <tung.quang.nguyen(a)est.tech> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260625143815.1525412-1-sam@bynar.io Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/tipc/bcast.c | 22 ++++++++++++++-------- net/tipc/bcast.h | 2 +- net/tipc/node.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.c b/net/tipc/bcast.c index 593846d25214..631b98097dba 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bcast.c +++ b/net/tipc/bcast.c @@ -497,12 +497,13 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, */ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - struct sk_buff_head *retrq) + struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid) { struct sk_buff_head *inputq = &tipc_bc_base(net)->inputq; struct tipc_gap_ack_blks *ga; struct sk_buff_head xmitq; int rc = 0; + u16 glen; __skb_queue_head_init(&xmitq); @@ -510,13 +511,18 @@ int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, if (msg_type(hdr) != STATE_MSG) { tipc_link_bc_init_rcv(l, hdr); } else if (!msg_bc_ack_invalid(hdr)) { - tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false); - if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni) - retrq = &xmitq; - rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr), - msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq, - retrq); - rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq); + glen = tipc_get_gap_ack_blks(&ga, l, hdr, false); + if (glen > msg_data_sz(hdr)) { + /* Malformed Gap ACK blocks; caller drops the msg */ + *valid = false; + } else { + if (!sysctl_tipc_bc_retruni) + retrq = &xmitq; + rc = tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv(l, msg_bcast_ack(hdr), + msg_bc_gap(hdr), ga, &xmitq, + retrq); + rc |= tipc_link_bc_sync_rcv(l, hdr, &xmitq); + } } tipc_bcast_unlock(net); diff --git a/net/tipc/bcast.h b/net/tipc/bcast.h index 2d9352dc7b0e..55d17b5413e1 100644 --- a/net/tipc/bcast.h +++ b/net/tipc/bcast.h @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ void tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr); int tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(struct net *net, struct tipc_link *l, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - struct sk_buff_head *retrq); + struct sk_buff_head *retrq, bool *valid); int tipc_nl_add_bc_link(struct net *net, struct tipc_nl_msg *msg, struct tipc_link *bcl); int tipc_nl_bc_link_set(struct net *net, struct nlattr *attrs[]); diff --git a/net/tipc/node.c b/net/tipc/node.c index 5f6866407be5..8e52b2995817 100644 --- a/net/tipc/node.c +++ b/net/tipc/node.c @@ -1804,12 +1804,15 @@ static void tipc_node_mcast_rcv(struct tipc_node *n) } static void tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(struct tipc_node *n, struct tipc_msg *hdr, - int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq) + int bearer_id, struct sk_buff_head *xmitq, + bool *valid) { struct tipc_link *ucl; int rc; - rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq); + rc = tipc_bcast_sync_rcv(n->net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr, xmitq, valid); + if (!*valid) + return; if (rc & TIPC_LINK_DOWN_EVT) { tipc_node_reset_links(n); @@ -2111,12 +2114,18 @@ void tipc_rcv(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_bearer *b) /* Ensure broadcast reception is in synch with peer's send state */ if (unlikely(usr == LINK_PROTOCOL)) { + bool valid = true; + if (unlikely(skb_linearize(skb))) { tipc_node_put(n); goto discard; } hdr = buf_msg(skb); - tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq); + tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv(n, hdr, bearer_id, &xmitq, &valid); + if (!valid) { + tipc_node_put(n); + goto discard; + } } else if (unlikely(tipc_link_acked(n->bc_entry.link) != bc_ack)) { tipc_bcast_ack_rcv(net, n->bc_entry.link, hdr); } -- 2.43.0

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sctp: fix race between sctp_wait_for_connect and peeloff
by Jinjiang Tu 24 Aug '26

24 Aug '26

From: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.259 commit 0e0d5bc76fd4267a71334fcc8f1a5fbcf997845d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/16296 CVE: CVE-2026-63971 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f14fe6395a8b3d961a61e138ad7b36ba3626dd4e ] sctp_wait_for_connect() drops and re-acquires the socket lock while waiting for the association to reach ESTABLISHED state. During this window, another thread can peeloff the association to a new socket via getsockopt(SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF), changing asoc->base.sk. After re-acquiring the old socket lock, sctp_wait_for_connect() returns success without noticing the migration — the caller then accesses the association under the wrong lock in sctp_datamsg_from_user(). Add the same sk != asoc->base.sk check that sctp_wait_for_sndbuf() already has, returning an error if the association was migrated while we slept. Fixes: 668c9beb9020 ("sctp: implement assign_number for sctp_stream_interleave") Signed-off-by: Zhenghang Xiao <kipreyyy(a)gmail.com> Acked-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260527032411.60959-1-kipreyyy@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang(a)huawei.com> --- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 8a18aa451e47..0ee6c5616321 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -9099,6 +9099,8 @@ static int sctp_wait_for_connect(struct sctp_association *asoc, long *timeo_p) release_sock(sk); current_timeo = schedule_timeout(current_timeo); lock_sock(sk); + if (sk != asoc->base.sk) + goto do_error; *timeo_p = current_timeo; } -- 2.43.0

2 1