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[PATCH OLK-5.10] openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free
by Gu Bowen 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 239f26589a6926db28c436e14f28517581ef1385 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18852 CVE: CVE-2026-89488 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 403f96c32c9e24600093d7d0c61c17daeedca957 ] Packet processing uses CT limit state under RCU, while netns teardown frees that state under ovs_mutex. The CT limit pointer was neither removed from readers nor protected by a grace period, allowing packet processing to dereference the freed state. An unprivileged user can trigger this bug from a user and network namespace, causing a slab-use-after-free in ovs_ct_execute() when the netns is torn down. Publish the CT limit pointer through RCU, remove it before teardown, and wait for readers before freeing its contents. Keep ovs_mutex around individual CT limit updates, and use the RCU read-side lock while GET traverses the RCU-protected limit lists. Netns teardown detaches the RCU-protected CT limit state in the pernet .pre_exit callback while holding ovs_mutex. The pernet core guarantees an RCU grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks, so the .exit callback completes the teardown without adding any extra synchronization. The netlink command handlers do not need NULL checks because the userspace netlink socket holds an active reference to its network namespace while a request is processed. The per-netns exit path therefore cannot run concurrently with SET, DEL, or GET for that socket's namespace. Fixes: 11efd5cb04a1 ("openvswitch: Support conntrack zone limit") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega <vega(a)nebusec.ai> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1784711445.git.xuyuqiabc@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Nan Li <tonanli66(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nan Li <tonanli66(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/288fbd5459d92b9dd0dcc6faf625f04819161ff3.178728029… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> [ 7.0+ uses kmalloc_obj[s] while older versions use kmalloc[_array] 6.12+ doesn't have a 'family' argument in nf_conncount_init/destroy ] Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/openvswitch/conntrack.c net/openvswitch/datapath.h [Context conflicts.] Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- net/openvswitch/conntrack.h | 6 +- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 10 ++- net/openvswitch/datapath.h | 7 ++- 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 30f5e414018b..c52818a9f38d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -1156,10 +1156,14 @@ static int ovs_ct_check_limit(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); - const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; + const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info; u32 per_zone_limit, connections; u32 conncount_key; + ct_limit_info = rcu_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); + if (!ct_limit_info) + return 0; + conncount_key = info->zone.id; per_zone_limit = ct_limit_get(ct_limit_info, info->zone.id); @@ -1861,43 +1865,56 @@ static void __ovs_ct_free_action(struct ovs_conntrack_info *ct_info) #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) static int ovs_ct_limit_init(struct net *net, struct ovs_net *ovs_net) { + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info; int i, err; - ovs_net->ct_limit_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*ovs_net->ct_limit_info), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ovs_net->ct_limit_info) + info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) return -ENOMEM; - ovs_net->ct_limit_info->default_limit = OVS_CT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; - ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits = + info->default_limit = OVS_CT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; + info->limits = kmalloc_array(CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS, sizeof(struct hlist_head), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits) { - kfree(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); + if (!info->limits) { + kfree(info); return -ENOMEM; } for (i = 0; i < CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS; i++) - INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits[i]); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&info->limits[i]); - ovs_net->ct_limit_info->data = - nf_conncount_init(net, NFPROTO_INET, sizeof(u32)); + info->data = nf_conncount_init(net, NFPROTO_INET, sizeof(u32)); - if (IS_ERR(ovs_net->ct_limit_info->data)) { - err = PTR_ERR(ovs_net->ct_limit_info->data); - kfree(ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits); - kfree(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); + if (IS_ERR(info->data)) { + err = PTR_ERR(info->data); + kfree(info->limits); + kfree(info); pr_err("openvswitch: failed to init nf_conncount %d\n", err); return err; } + rcu_assign_pointer(ovs_net->ct_limit_info, info); return 0; } -static void ovs_ct_limit_exit(struct net *net, struct ovs_net *ovs_net) +static void *ovs_ct_limit_exit_start(struct ovs_net *ovs_net) +{ + return rcu_replace_pointer(ovs_net->ct_limit_info, NULL, + lockdep_ovsl_is_held()); +} + +/* The CT limit state must be detached by ovs_ct_limit_exit_start() and an + * RCU grace period must elapse before this function runs. The pernet core + * guarantees the grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks. + */ +static void ovs_ct_limit_exit_finish(struct net *net, void *data) { - const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; + const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info = data; int i; + if (!info) + return; + nf_conncount_destroy(net, NFPROTO_INET, info->data); for (i = 0; i < CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS; ++i) { struct hlist_head *head = &info->limits[i]; @@ -1905,7 +1922,7 @@ static void ovs_ct_limit_exit(struct net *net, struct ovs_net *ovs_net) struct hlist_node *next; hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ct_limit, next, head, hlist_node) - kfree_rcu(ct_limit, rcu); + kfree(ct_limit); } kfree(info->limits); kfree(info); @@ -1944,12 +1961,13 @@ static bool check_zone_id(int zone_id, u16 *pzone) return false; } -static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info) +static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct ovs_net *ovs_net, + struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit) { struct ovs_zone_limit *zone_limit; - int rem; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info; u16 zone; + int rem; rem = NLA_ALIGN(nla_len(nla_zone_limit)); zone_limit = (struct ovs_zone_limit *)nla_data(nla_zone_limit); @@ -1958,6 +1976,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, if (unlikely(zone_limit->zone_id == OVS_ZONE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_ZONE)) { ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); info->default_limit = zone_limit->limit; ovs_unlock(); } else if (unlikely(!check_zone_id( @@ -1974,6 +1993,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, ct_limit->limit = zone_limit->limit; ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); ct_limit_set(info, ct_limit); ovs_unlock(); } @@ -1988,12 +2008,13 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, return 0; } -static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info) +static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct ovs_net *ovs_net, + struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit) { struct ovs_zone_limit *zone_limit; - int rem; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info; u16 zone; + int rem; rem = NLA_ALIGN(nla_len(nla_zone_limit)); zone_limit = (struct ovs_zone_limit *)nla_data(nla_zone_limit); @@ -2002,6 +2023,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, if (unlikely(zone_limit->zone_id == OVS_ZONE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_ZONE)) { ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); info->default_limit = OVS_CT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; ovs_unlock(); } else if (unlikely(!check_zone_id( @@ -2009,6 +2031,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, OVS_NLERR(true, "zone id is out of range"); } else { ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); ct_limit_del(info, zone); ovs_unlock(); } @@ -2052,6 +2075,7 @@ static int __ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, return nla_put_nohdr(reply, sizeof(zone_limit), &zone_limit); } +/* Called with RCU read lock held. */ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info, @@ -2075,9 +2099,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, &zone))) { OVS_NLERR(true, "zone id is out of range"); } else { - rcu_read_lock(); limit = ct_limit_get(info, zone); - rcu_read_unlock(); err = __ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit( net, info->data, zone, limit, reply); @@ -2095,6 +2117,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, return 0; } +/* Called with RCU read lock held. */ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_all_zone_limit(struct net *net, struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info, struct sk_buff *reply) @@ -2107,19 +2130,16 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_all_zone_limit(struct net *net, if (err) return err; - rcu_read_lock(); for (i = 0; i < CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS; ++i) { head = &info->limits[i]; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(ct_limit, head, hlist_node) { err = __ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(net, info->data, ct_limit->zone, ct_limit->limit, reply); if (err) - goto exit_err; + return err; } } -exit_err: - rcu_read_unlock(); return err; } @@ -2129,7 +2149,6 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct sk_buff *reply; struct ovs_header *ovs_reply_header; struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(sock_net(skb->sk), ovs_net_id); - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; int err; reply = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_reply_start(info, OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_SET, @@ -2142,8 +2161,8 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto exit_err; } - err = ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT], - ct_limit_info); + err = ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(ovs_net, + a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT]); if (err) goto exit_err; @@ -2163,7 +2182,6 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct sk_buff *reply; struct ovs_header *ovs_reply_header; struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(sock_net(skb->sk), ovs_net_id); - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; int err; reply = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_reply_start(info, OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_DEL, @@ -2176,8 +2194,8 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto exit_err; } - err = ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT], - ct_limit_info); + err = ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(ovs_net, + a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT]); if (err) goto exit_err; @@ -2197,7 +2215,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct ovs_header *ovs_reply_header; struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info; int err; reply = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_reply_start(info, OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_GET, @@ -2211,18 +2229,19 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto exit_err; } + rcu_read_lock(); + ct_limit_info = rcu_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); if (a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT]) { err = ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit( net, a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT], ct_limit_info, reply); - if (err) - goto exit_err; } else { err = ovs_ct_limit_get_all_zone_limit(net, ct_limit_info, reply); - if (err) - goto exit_err; } + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (err) + goto exit_err; nla_nest_end(reply, nla_reply); genlmsg_end(reply, ovs_reply_header); @@ -2292,12 +2311,29 @@ int ovs_ct_init(struct net *net) #endif } -void ovs_ct_exit(struct net *net) +/* Must be called with ovs_mutex held. Detaches the RCU-protected + * ct_limit_info and stores it in ovs_net->ct_limit_exit_data for + * ovs_ct_exit_finish() to complete the teardown after an RCU grace period. + */ +void ovs_ct_exit_start(struct net *net __maybe_unused) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) + struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); + + ovs_net->ct_limit_exit_data = ovs_ct_limit_exit_start(ovs_net); +#endif +} + +/* Completes the CT limit teardown. The pernet core guarantees an RCU + * grace period between detaching the state in ovs_ct_exit_start() and + * this call, so no RCU readers remain. + */ +void ovs_ct_exit_finish(struct net *net) { struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) - ovs_ct_limit_exit(net, ovs_net); + ovs_ct_limit_exit_finish(net, ovs_net->ct_limit_exit_data); #endif if (ovs_net->xt_label) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h index 59dc32761b91..ad9081d7023d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h @@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ enum ovs_key_attr; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) int ovs_ct_init(struct net *); -void ovs_ct_exit(struct net *); +void ovs_ct_exit_start(struct net *net); +void ovs_ct_exit_finish(struct net *net); bool ovs_ct_verify(struct net *, enum ovs_key_attr attr); int ovs_ct_copy_action(struct net *, const struct nlattr *, const struct sw_flow_key *, struct sw_flow_actions **, @@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ void ovs_ct_free_action(const struct nlattr *a); static inline int ovs_ct_init(struct net *net) { return 0; } -static inline void ovs_ct_exit(struct net *net) { } +static inline void ovs_ct_exit_start(struct net *net) { } +static inline void ovs_ct_exit_finish(struct net *net) { } static inline bool ovs_ct_verify(struct net *net, int attr) { diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c index ec1e4af1dec0..34170c744cc3 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c @@ -2575,6 +2575,13 @@ static void __net_exit list_vports_from_net(struct net *net, struct net *dnet, } } +static void __net_exit ovs_pre_exit_net(struct net *dnet) +{ + ovs_lock(); + ovs_ct_exit_start(dnet); + ovs_unlock(); +} + static void __net_exit ovs_exit_net(struct net *dnet) { struct datapath *dp, *dp_next; @@ -2585,7 +2592,7 @@ static void __net_exit ovs_exit_net(struct net *dnet) ovs_lock(); - ovs_ct_exit(dnet); + ovs_ct_exit_finish(dnet); list_for_each_entry_safe(dp, dp_next, &ovs_net->dps, list_node) __dp_destroy(dp); @@ -2609,6 +2616,7 @@ static void __net_exit ovs_exit_net(struct net *dnet) static struct pernet_operations ovs_net_ops = { .init = ovs_init_net, + .pre_exit = ovs_pre_exit_net, .exit = ovs_exit_net, .id = &ovs_net_id, .size = sizeof(struct ovs_net), diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h index 62e7ad32f837..a796a60fea2f 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h @@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ struct dp_upcall_info { * struct ovs_net - Per net-namespace data for ovs. * @dps: List of datapaths to enable dumping them all out. * Protected by genl_mutex. + * @ct_limit_info: Hash table of conntrack zone connection limits. Protected + * by RCU; updates and teardown are serialized by ovs_mutex. May be NULL during + * netns teardown. + * @ct_limit_exit_data: CT limit state detached at .pre_exit, freed at .exit. */ struct ovs_net { struct list_head dps; struct work_struct dp_notify_work; struct delayed_work masks_rebalance; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info __rcu *ct_limit_info; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_exit_data; #endif /* Module reference for configuring conntrack. */ -- 2.43.0

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] openvswitch: Fix CT limit teardown use-after-free
by Gu Bowen 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc(a)gmail.com> [ Upstream commit 403f96c32c9e24600093d7d0c61c17daeedca957 ] Packet processing uses CT limit state under RCU, while netns teardown frees that state under ovs_mutex. The CT limit pointer was neither removed from readers nor protected by a grace period, allowing packet processing to dereference the freed state. An unprivileged user can trigger this bug from a user and network namespace, causing a slab-use-after-free in ovs_ct_execute() when the netns is torn down. Publish the CT limit pointer through RCU, remove it before teardown, and wait for readers before freeing its contents. Keep ovs_mutex around individual CT limit updates, and use the RCU read-side lock while GET traverses the RCU-protected limit lists. Netns teardown detaches the RCU-protected CT limit state in the pernet .pre_exit callback while holding ovs_mutex. The pernet core guarantees an RCU grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks, so the .exit callback completes the teardown without adding any extra synchronization. The netlink command handlers do not need NULL checks because the userspace netlink socket holds an active reference to its network namespace while a request is processed. The per-netns exit path therefore cannot run concurrently with SET, DEL, or GET for that socket's namespace. Fixes: 11efd5cb04a1 ("openvswitch: Support conntrack zone limit") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega <vega(a)nebusec.ai> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1784711445.git.xuyuqiabc@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Nan Li <tonanli66(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nan Li <tonanli66(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/288fbd5459d92b9dd0dcc6faf625f04819161ff3.178728029… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> [ 7.0+ uses kmalloc_obj[s] while older versions use kmalloc[_array] 6.12+ doesn't have a 'family' argument in nf_conncount_init/destroy ] Signed-off-by: Ilya Maximets <i.maximets(a)ovn.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gu Bowen <gubowen5(a)huawei.com> --- net/openvswitch/conntrack.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------- net/openvswitch/conntrack.h | 6 +- net/openvswitch/datapath.c | 10 ++- net/openvswitch/datapath.h | 7 ++- 4 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c index 30f5e414018b..c52818a9f38d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.c @@ -1156,10 +1156,14 @@ static int ovs_ct_check_limit(struct net *net, const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple) { struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); - const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; + const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info; u32 per_zone_limit, connections; u32 conncount_key; + ct_limit_info = rcu_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); + if (!ct_limit_info) + return 0; + conncount_key = info->zone.id; per_zone_limit = ct_limit_get(ct_limit_info, info->zone.id); @@ -1861,43 +1865,56 @@ static void __ovs_ct_free_action(struct ovs_conntrack_info *ct_info) #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) static int ovs_ct_limit_init(struct net *net, struct ovs_net *ovs_net) { + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info; int i, err; - ovs_net->ct_limit_info = kmalloc(sizeof(*ovs_net->ct_limit_info), - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ovs_net->ct_limit_info) + info = kmalloc(sizeof(*info), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!info) return -ENOMEM; - ovs_net->ct_limit_info->default_limit = OVS_CT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; - ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits = + info->default_limit = OVS_CT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; + info->limits = kmalloc_array(CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS, sizeof(struct hlist_head), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits) { - kfree(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); + if (!info->limits) { + kfree(info); return -ENOMEM; } for (i = 0; i < CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS; i++) - INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits[i]); + INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&info->limits[i]); - ovs_net->ct_limit_info->data = - nf_conncount_init(net, NFPROTO_INET, sizeof(u32)); + info->data = nf_conncount_init(net, NFPROTO_INET, sizeof(u32)); - if (IS_ERR(ovs_net->ct_limit_info->data)) { - err = PTR_ERR(ovs_net->ct_limit_info->data); - kfree(ovs_net->ct_limit_info->limits); - kfree(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); + if (IS_ERR(info->data)) { + err = PTR_ERR(info->data); + kfree(info->limits); + kfree(info); pr_err("openvswitch: failed to init nf_conncount %d\n", err); return err; } + rcu_assign_pointer(ovs_net->ct_limit_info, info); return 0; } -static void ovs_ct_limit_exit(struct net *net, struct ovs_net *ovs_net) +static void *ovs_ct_limit_exit_start(struct ovs_net *ovs_net) +{ + return rcu_replace_pointer(ovs_net->ct_limit_info, NULL, + lockdep_ovsl_is_held()); +} + +/* The CT limit state must be detached by ovs_ct_limit_exit_start() and an + * RCU grace period must elapse before this function runs. The pernet core + * guarantees the grace period between the .pre_exit and .exit callbacks. + */ +static void ovs_ct_limit_exit_finish(struct net *net, void *data) { - const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; + const struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info = data; int i; + if (!info) + return; + nf_conncount_destroy(net, NFPROTO_INET, info->data); for (i = 0; i < CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS; ++i) { struct hlist_head *head = &info->limits[i]; @@ -1905,7 +1922,7 @@ static void ovs_ct_limit_exit(struct net *net, struct ovs_net *ovs_net) struct hlist_node *next; hlist_for_each_entry_safe(ct_limit, next, head, hlist_node) - kfree_rcu(ct_limit, rcu); + kfree(ct_limit); } kfree(info->limits); kfree(info); @@ -1944,12 +1961,13 @@ static bool check_zone_id(int zone_id, u16 *pzone) return false; } -static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info) +static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct ovs_net *ovs_net, + struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit) { struct ovs_zone_limit *zone_limit; - int rem; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info; u16 zone; + int rem; rem = NLA_ALIGN(nla_len(nla_zone_limit)); zone_limit = (struct ovs_zone_limit *)nla_data(nla_zone_limit); @@ -1958,6 +1976,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, if (unlikely(zone_limit->zone_id == OVS_ZONE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_ZONE)) { ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); info->default_limit = zone_limit->limit; ovs_unlock(); } else if (unlikely(!check_zone_id( @@ -1974,6 +1993,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, ct_limit->limit = zone_limit->limit; ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); ct_limit_set(info, ct_limit); ovs_unlock(); } @@ -1988,12 +2008,13 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, return 0; } -static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info) +static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct ovs_net *ovs_net, + struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit) { struct ovs_zone_limit *zone_limit; - int rem; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info; u16 zone; + int rem; rem = NLA_ALIGN(nla_len(nla_zone_limit)); zone_limit = (struct ovs_zone_limit *)nla_data(nla_zone_limit); @@ -2002,6 +2023,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, if (unlikely(zone_limit->zone_id == OVS_ZONE_LIMIT_DEFAULT_ZONE)) { ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); info->default_limit = OVS_CT_LIMIT_DEFAULT; ovs_unlock(); } else if (unlikely(!check_zone_id( @@ -2009,6 +2031,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, OVS_NLERR(true, "zone id is out of range"); } else { ovs_lock(); + info = ovsl_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); ct_limit_del(info, zone); ovs_unlock(); } @@ -2052,6 +2075,7 @@ static int __ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, return nla_put_nohdr(reply, sizeof(zone_limit), &zone_limit); } +/* Called with RCU read lock held. */ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla_zone_limit, struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info, @@ -2075,9 +2099,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, &zone))) { OVS_NLERR(true, "zone id is out of range"); } else { - rcu_read_lock(); limit = ct_limit_get(info, zone); - rcu_read_unlock(); err = __ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit( net, info->data, zone, limit, reply); @@ -2095,6 +2117,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(struct net *net, return 0; } +/* Called with RCU read lock held. */ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_all_zone_limit(struct net *net, struct ovs_ct_limit_info *info, struct sk_buff *reply) @@ -2107,19 +2130,16 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_get_all_zone_limit(struct net *net, if (err) return err; - rcu_read_lock(); for (i = 0; i < CT_LIMIT_HASH_BUCKETS; ++i) { head = &info->limits[i]; hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(ct_limit, head, hlist_node) { err = __ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit(net, info->data, ct_limit->zone, ct_limit->limit, reply); if (err) - goto exit_err; + return err; } } -exit_err: - rcu_read_unlock(); return err; } @@ -2129,7 +2149,6 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct sk_buff *reply; struct ovs_header *ovs_reply_header; struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(sock_net(skb->sk), ovs_net_id); - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; int err; reply = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_reply_start(info, OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_SET, @@ -2142,8 +2161,8 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_set(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto exit_err; } - err = ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT], - ct_limit_info); + err = ovs_ct_limit_set_zone_limit(ovs_net, + a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT]); if (err) goto exit_err; @@ -2163,7 +2182,6 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct sk_buff *reply; struct ovs_header *ovs_reply_header; struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(sock_net(skb->sk), ovs_net_id); - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; int err; reply = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_reply_start(info, OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_DEL, @@ -2176,8 +2194,8 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_del(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto exit_err; } - err = ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT], - ct_limit_info); + err = ovs_ct_limit_del_zone_limit(ovs_net, + a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT]); if (err) goto exit_err; @@ -2197,7 +2215,7 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) struct ovs_header *ovs_reply_header; struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk); struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info = ovs_net->ct_limit_info; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info; int err; reply = ovs_ct_limit_cmd_reply_start(info, OVS_CT_LIMIT_CMD_GET, @@ -2211,18 +2229,19 @@ static int ovs_ct_limit_cmd_get(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) goto exit_err; } + rcu_read_lock(); + ct_limit_info = rcu_dereference(ovs_net->ct_limit_info); if (a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT]) { err = ovs_ct_limit_get_zone_limit( net, a[OVS_CT_LIMIT_ATTR_ZONE_LIMIT], ct_limit_info, reply); - if (err) - goto exit_err; } else { err = ovs_ct_limit_get_all_zone_limit(net, ct_limit_info, reply); - if (err) - goto exit_err; } + rcu_read_unlock(); + if (err) + goto exit_err; nla_nest_end(reply, nla_reply); genlmsg_end(reply, ovs_reply_header); @@ -2292,12 +2311,29 @@ int ovs_ct_init(struct net *net) #endif } -void ovs_ct_exit(struct net *net) +/* Must be called with ovs_mutex held. Detaches the RCU-protected + * ct_limit_info and stores it in ovs_net->ct_limit_exit_data for + * ovs_ct_exit_finish() to complete the teardown after an RCU grace period. + */ +void ovs_ct_exit_start(struct net *net __maybe_unused) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) + struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); + + ovs_net->ct_limit_exit_data = ovs_ct_limit_exit_start(ovs_net); +#endif +} + +/* Completes the CT limit teardown. The pernet core guarantees an RCU + * grace period between detaching the state in ovs_ct_exit_start() and + * this call, so no RCU readers remain. + */ +void ovs_ct_exit_finish(struct net *net) { struct ovs_net *ovs_net = net_generic(net, ovs_net_id); #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) - ovs_ct_limit_exit(net, ovs_net); + ovs_ct_limit_exit_finish(net, ovs_net->ct_limit_exit_data); #endif if (ovs_net->xt_label) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h index 59dc32761b91..ad9081d7023d 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/conntrack.h @@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ enum ovs_key_attr; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK) int ovs_ct_init(struct net *); -void ovs_ct_exit(struct net *); +void ovs_ct_exit_start(struct net *net); +void ovs_ct_exit_finish(struct net *net); bool ovs_ct_verify(struct net *, enum ovs_key_attr attr); int ovs_ct_copy_action(struct net *, const struct nlattr *, const struct sw_flow_key *, struct sw_flow_actions **, @@ -39,7 +40,8 @@ void ovs_ct_free_action(const struct nlattr *a); static inline int ovs_ct_init(struct net *net) { return 0; } -static inline void ovs_ct_exit(struct net *net) { } +static inline void ovs_ct_exit_start(struct net *net) { } +static inline void ovs_ct_exit_finish(struct net *net) { } static inline bool ovs_ct_verify(struct net *net, int attr) { diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c index ec1e4af1dec0..34170c744cc3 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.c @@ -2575,6 +2575,13 @@ static void __net_exit list_vports_from_net(struct net *net, struct net *dnet, } } +static void __net_exit ovs_pre_exit_net(struct net *dnet) +{ + ovs_lock(); + ovs_ct_exit_start(dnet); + ovs_unlock(); +} + static void __net_exit ovs_exit_net(struct net *dnet) { struct datapath *dp, *dp_next; @@ -2585,7 +2592,7 @@ static void __net_exit ovs_exit_net(struct net *dnet) ovs_lock(); - ovs_ct_exit(dnet); + ovs_ct_exit_finish(dnet); list_for_each_entry_safe(dp, dp_next, &ovs_net->dps, list_node) __dp_destroy(dp); @@ -2609,6 +2616,7 @@ static void __net_exit ovs_exit_net(struct net *dnet) static struct pernet_operations ovs_net_ops = { .init = ovs_init_net, + .pre_exit = ovs_pre_exit_net, .exit = ovs_exit_net, .id = &ovs_net_id, .size = sizeof(struct ovs_net), diff --git a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h index 62e7ad32f837..a796a60fea2f 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/datapath.h +++ b/net/openvswitch/datapath.h @@ -131,13 +131,18 @@ struct dp_upcall_info { * struct ovs_net - Per net-namespace data for ovs. * @dps: List of datapaths to enable dumping them all out. * Protected by genl_mutex. + * @ct_limit_info: Hash table of conntrack zone connection limits. Protected + * by RCU; updates and teardown are serialized by ovs_mutex. May be NULL during + * netns teardown. + * @ct_limit_exit_data: CT limit state detached at .pre_exit, freed at .exit. */ struct ovs_net { struct list_head dps; struct work_struct dp_notify_work; struct delayed_work masks_rebalance; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NETFILTER_CONNCOUNT) - struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_info; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info __rcu *ct_limit_info; + struct ovs_ct_limit_info *ct_limit_exit_data; #endif /* Module reference for configuring conntrack. */ -- 2.43.0

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: Reject dev-bound-only programs on other devices
by Pu Lehui 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.158 commit e57f04194361574493e3e6cf0b9e9c69e4ae9791 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/20235 CVE: CVE-2026-98382 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6db1ce73e9853f533eb7f413f14ba00f8ec6f80d ] __bpf_offload_dev_match() falls back to comparing offdev pointers after an exact netdev mismatch. Bound-only programs normally have NULL offdevs, so unrelated netdevs compare equal. A bound-only program on an offload-registered netdev can instead inherit a real offdev and match a sibling port. With CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN, a caller can use bpf(BPF_LINK_CREATE) with a different target ifindex to run metadata kfuncs specialized for the bound driver on the target driver's xdp_buff. Running a veth-bound program on tun reads beyond tun's bare stack xdp_buff as a veth_xdp_buff. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:veth_xdp_rx_timestamp (drivers/net/veth.c:1673) Call Trace: ... tun_build_skb (drivers/net/tun.c:1739) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1856) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2091) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Restrict non-offloaded programs to exact netdev matches and retain the shared-offdev fallback only for genuinely offloaded multi-port programs. Fixes: 2b3486bc2d23 ("bpf: Introduce device-bound XDP programs") Reported-by: <co+ac0a8c41de69121d(a)bugs.sh> Signed-off-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260917161335.1020405-2-bestswngs@gmail.com/ Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260920132303.4109240-3-bestswngs@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <pulehui(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/bpf/offload.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/offload.c b/kernel/bpf/offload.c index 60c82c328d42..3345de2da15d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/offload.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/offload.c @@ -696,6 +696,8 @@ static bool __bpf_offload_dev_match(struct bpf_prog *prog, return false; if (offload->netdev == netdev) return true; + if (!bpf_prog_is_offloaded(prog->aux)) + return false; ondev1 = bpf_offload_find_netdev(offload->netdev); ondev2 = bpf_offload_find_netdev(netdev); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] NFSD: Prevent lock owner use-after-free during client teardown
by Lu Jialin 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Chuck Lever <cel(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 42d7954b0a1907d4ef122aef94561952a033cdc3 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18929 CVE: CVE-2026-89662 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 5e2fa29d223a9a1e6a948e40b109d09081d1decd upstream. __destroy_client() releases a client's open owners, but a lock owner whose only reference is a blocked lock (nbl) stays on cl_ownerstr_hashtbl. client_has_state() does not count a bare owner, so DESTROY_CLIENTID can reach __destroy_client() with such owners present. __destroy_client() then walks the table, calling remove_blocked_locks() on each owner without a reference. Freeing a blocked lock drops the owner reference held via flc_owner. The per-net laundromat reaps blocked locks from nn->blocked_locks_lru independently of client state. The two paths share blocked_locks_lock only for the list splice, not the owner's lifetime. The laundromat therefore frees the owner as __destroy_client() dereferences it, a NULL dereference in remove_blocked_locks(). nfsd4_release_lockowner() holds a reference across the same call; __destroy_client() does not. Hold cl_lock across the walk, taking a reference and unhashing each owner, then drop it before remove_blocked_locks() and nfs4_put_stateowner(), which take blocked_locks_lock and cl_lock. Reported-by: Wolfgang Walter <linux(a)stwm.de> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/6eccafaaaa60651ef091257c3439c46b@stwm.de/ Fixes: 68ef3bc31664 ("nfsd: remove blocked locks on client teardown") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil(a)brown.name> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709-cel-v4-1-1d519d9be0cb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 7bfe0a6bc5fd..f1eef728f157 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -2197,14 +2197,24 @@ __destroy_client(struct nfs4_client *clp) release_openowner(oo); } for (i = 0; i < OWNER_HASH_SIZE; i++) { - struct nfs4_stateowner *so, *tmp; + struct nfs4_stateowner *so; - list_for_each_entry_safe(so, tmp, &clp->cl_ownerstr_hashtbl[i], - so_strhash) { + spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock); + while (!list_empty(&clp->cl_ownerstr_hashtbl[i])) { + so = list_first_entry(&clp->cl_ownerstr_hashtbl[i], + struct nfs4_stateowner, so_strhash); /* Should be no openowners at this point */ WARN_ON_ONCE(so->so_is_open_owner); + nfs4_get_stateowner(so); + unhash_lockowner_locked(lockowner(so)); + spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); + remove_blocked_locks(lockowner(so)); + nfs4_put_stateowner(so); + + spin_lock(&clp->cl_lock); } + spin_unlock(&clp->cl_lock); } nfsd4_return_all_client_layouts(clp); nfsd4_shutdown_copy(clp); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nfsd: initialize copy-notify stateid before publishing it
by Lu Jialin 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 863b6e995665472f2af5be2436a874ab6a9e5ac6 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18933 CVE: CVE-2026-89669 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 129643893b79f8a3c6b72045f933fbab5ee424ca upstream. nfsd4_copy_notify() finished initializing the cpntf state after nfs4_alloc_init_cpntf_state() had already linked it into the s2s_cp_stateids IDR and the parent's sc_cp_list, with cs_count == 1 (the membership reference) and none held for the caller. A racing OFFLOAD_CANCEL (crafted cl_id == nn->s2s_cp_cl_id plus the guessable so_id) could reach manage_cpntf_state() and free the entry, turning the caller's subsequent cpn_cnr_stateid read and cp_p_stateid/cp_p_clid writes into use-after-free. The owning clientid was also only recorded after publication, so it could not gate an ownership check in that window. Record cp_p_stateid and cp_p_clid inside nfs4_alloc_init_cpntf_state() before nfs4_init_cp_state() publishes the entry, and return it with an extra reference. The caller reads the stateid under that reference and drops it with nfs4_put_cpntf_state(); on a late error the laundromat reaps the entry. Fixes: 624322f1adc5 ("NFSD add COPY_NOTIFY operation") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-nfsd-testing-v3-4-a0ff7db6aa3e@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c [Context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 16 +++++++++------- fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index ecbde42093d5..5beabc0ced52 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1613,7 +1613,6 @@ nfsd4_copy_notify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id); struct nfs4_stid *stid; struct nfs4_cpntf_state *cps; - struct nfs4_client *clp = cstate->clp; status = nfs4_preprocess_stateid_op(rqstp, cstate, &cstate->current_fh, &cn->cpn_src_stateid, RD_STATE, NULL, @@ -1625,12 +1624,14 @@ nfsd4_copy_notify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, cn->cpn_nsec = 0; status = nfserrno(-ENOMEM); + /* + * The returned cps is published and fully initialized, and carries an + * extra reference for us; drop it once we are done with it. + */ cps = nfs4_alloc_init_cpntf_state(nn, stid); if (!cps) goto out; memcpy(&cn->cpn_cnr_stateid, &cps->cp_stateid.stid, sizeof(stateid_t)); - memcpy(&cps->cp_p_stateid, &stid->sc_stateid, sizeof(stateid_t)); - memcpy(&cps->cp_p_clid, &clp->cl_clientid, sizeof(clientid_t)); /* For now, only return one server address in cpn_src, the * address used by the client to connect to this server. @@ -1639,10 +1640,11 @@ nfsd4_copy_notify(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, status = nfsd4_set_netaddr((struct sockaddr *)&rqstp->rq_daddr, &cn->cpn_src.u.nl4_addr); WARN_ON_ONCE(status); - if (status) { - nfs4_put_cpntf_state(nn, cps); - goto out; - } + /* + * Drop our extra reference. The membership reference keeps the entry + * alive for a later inter-server READ, or until the laundromat reaps it. + */ + nfs4_put_cpntf_state(nn, cps); out: nfs4_put_stid(stid); return status; diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c index 7bfe0a6bc5fd..d930100afdd6 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c @@ -834,7 +834,15 @@ struct nfs4_cpntf_state *nfs4_alloc_init_cpntf_state(struct nfsd_net *nn, if (!cps) return NULL; cps->cpntf_time = ktime_get_boottime_seconds(); - refcount_set(&cps->cp_stateid.sc_count, 1); + /* + * Fully initialize the entry before nfs4_init_cp_state() publishes it, + * since a concurrent OFFLOAD_CANCEL could then free it. Take an extra + * reference for the caller (dropped with nfs4_put_cpntf_state()). + */ + memcpy(&cps->cp_p_stateid, &p_stid->sc_stateid, sizeof(stateid_t)); + memcpy(&cps->cp_p_clid, &p_stid->sc_client->cl_clientid, + sizeof(clientid_t)); + refcount_set(&cps->cp_stateid.sc_count, 2); if (!nfs4_init_cp_state(nn, &cps->cp_stateid, NFS4_COPYNOTIFY_STID)) goto out_free; spin_lock(&nn->s2s_cp_lock); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nfsd: gate nfs3 setacl by argp->mask
by Lu Jialin 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Chris Mason <clm(a)meta.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 453d7198a0ab07a12d46e0575861ac7b932da17e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18934 CVE: CVE-2026-89671 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- nfsd3_proc_setacl() calls set_posix_acl() unconditionally for both ACL_TYPE_ACCESS and ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, passing argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default verbatim. The NFSv3 ACL decoder only populates those pointers when the corresponding mask bit is set: nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() if (args->mask & NFS_ACL) decode into acl_access if (args->mask & NFS_DFACL) decode into acl_default /* otherwise the pointer stays NULL (pc_argzero) */ nfsd3_proc_setacl() set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp->acl_access) set_posix_acl(.., ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp->acl_default) set_posix_acl(idmap, dentry, type, NULL) is the VFS "remove this ACL type" operation. A NULL pointer that means "the client did not send this arm" is therefore indistinguishable from "the client asked to remove this ACL". A SETACL with mask=NFS_ACL silently drops the directory's default ACL; mask=0 drops both. The sibling nfsd3_proc_getacl() already consults argp->mask before touching each arm; mirror that in setacl. Fix by wrapping each set_posix_acl() call in the matching mask bit check and initializing error to 0 before inode_lock so that a request with neither bit set leaves the on-disk ACLs untouched and returns nfs_ok. The out_drop_lock path and the unconditional posix_acl_release() at out: are preserved; both NULL-tolerate the skipped arms. Fixes: a257cdd0e217 ("[PATCH] NFSD: Add server support for NFSv3 ACLs.") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7 Reported-by: Chris Mason <clm(a)meta.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm(a)meta.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260530-nfsd-fixes-v2-5-f27e8eb4d974@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c [Commit 453d7198a0ab wraps set_posix_acl() with argp->mask gates but calls it as set_posix_acl(&nop_mnt_idmap, fh->fh_dentry, type, acl). This tree predates the idmap conversion, so keep the old set_posix_acl(inode, type, acl) form while adding the same mask gates.] Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c index 80aa209fd046..fe864cba6282 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs3acl.c @@ -103,10 +103,15 @@ static __be32 nfsd3_proc_setacl(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) fh_lock(fh); - error = set_posix_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp->acl_access); - if (error) - goto out_drop_lock; - error = set_posix_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp->acl_default); + error = 0; + if (argp->mask & NFS_ACL) { + error = set_posix_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, argp->acl_access); + if (error) + goto out_drop_lock; + } + if (argp->mask & NFS_DFACL) { + error = set_posix_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, argp->acl_default); + } out_drop_lock: fh_unlock(fh); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nfsd: fix XDR length calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget
by Lu Jialin 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.270 commit 3a7fd224df0fbb42167eb1b77be45d72fe0b1098 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18937 CVE: CVE-2026-89674 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit f9868174af49d207fbaf0c5e055d088a983684af upstream. The XDR buffer size calculation in nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget() has multiple errors that can result in either an out-of-bounds write or leaking uninitialized kernel memory to the client: - fh_len doesn't account for XDR padding on the file handle data - uid and gid lengths use "8 + len" but xdr_encode_opaque() actually writes "4 + xdr_align_size(len)" bytes - ds_len omits the flags and stats_collect_hint fields (8 bytes), while len's header constant overestimates by 8 bytes -- these partially cancel but leave a net mismatch The worst case occurs with short strings (e.g. uid=0, gid=0 with an odd-sized file handle), where the function writes up to 5 bytes past the reserved XDR buffer. Conversely, when string lengths happen to be 4-byte aligned, the reservation is too large and stale buffer content is sent to the client. Fix this by breaking out every encoded field explicitly in the ds_len calculation, using xdr_align_size() for all variable-length opaque fields, and correcting the header constants. Fixes: 9b9960a0ca47 ("nfsd: Add a super simple flex file server") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: kres:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260528-pnfs-fixes-v1-1-8a1255ae2f16@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c b/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c index bb205328e043..920239dfdc25 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/flexfilelayoutxdr.c @@ -30,19 +30,24 @@ nfsd4_ff_encode_layoutget(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct ff_idmap uid; struct ff_idmap gid; - fh_len = 4 + fl->fh.size; + fh_len = 4 + xdr_align_size(fl->fh.size); uid.len = sprintf(uid.buf, "%u", from_kuid(&init_user_ns, fl->uid)); gid.len = sprintf(gid.buf, "%u", from_kgid(&init_user_ns, fl->gid)); - /* 8 + len for recording the length, name, and padding */ - ds_len = 20 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t) + 4 + fh_len + - 8 + uid.len + 8 + gid.len; + /* data server entry: deviceid + efficiency + stateid + fh list + + * user + group + flags + stats_collect_hint + */ + ds_len = 16 + 4 + 4 + sizeof(stateid_opaque_t) + 4 + fh_len + + 4 + xdr_align_size(uid.len) + + 4 + xdr_align_size(gid.len) + + 4 + 4; + /* mirror: ds_count + ds */ mirror_len = 4 + ds_len; - /* The layout segment */ - len = 20 + mirror_len; + /* stripe_unit + mirror_count + mirror */ + len = 12 + mirror_len; p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, sizeof(__be32) + len); if (!p) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] nfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown
by Lu Jialin 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 62c0f6eaf050bb9284c1f9cac6ed1770092e6b95 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18938 CVE: CVE-2026-89675 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- An async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller (OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the copy kthread: - find_async_copy() bumped copy->refcount but left the copy on clp->async_copies, so the reaper's cleanup_async_copy() could run release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the nfsd_file and freeing it early. - nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy->nf_dst, nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit as "kthread done, skip kthread_stop()", so a teardown caller ran release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF). - copy->copy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on return, so kthread_stop()'s get_task_struct() could touch a freed task_struct. - co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight. Fix the teardown lifetime as a whole: - find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init) under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy(). Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy(). - Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy's s2s_cp_stateids entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and manage_cpntf_state() to dereference. - Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy(); call wake_up_process() before list_add(). - Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller removes the copy from clp->async_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs exactly once. - Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free. - Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst). Fixes: e0639dc5805a ("NFSD introduce async copy feature") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ac0514f4d198 ("NFSD: Add a laundromat reaper for async copy state") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-nfsd-testing-v3-2-a0ff7db6aa3e@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c [partial backport of 62c0f6eaf050; adapted so copy_task is assigned only after the kthread_create() IS_ERR() check passes] Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index 546d2a0900ab..d103858a67f6 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1279,6 +1279,9 @@ static void nfs4_put_copy(struct nfsd4_copy *copy) if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&copy->refcount)) return; atomic_dec(&copy->cp_nn->pending_async_copies); + /* Drop the task_struct pinned in nfsd4_copy(); NULL on error paths. */ + if (copy->copy_task) + put_task_struct(copy->copy_task); kfree(copy->cp_src); kfree(copy); } @@ -1820,6 +1823,8 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, memcpy(&copy->fh, &cstate->current_fh.fh_handle, sizeof(struct knfsd_fh)); if (nfsd4_copy_is_async(copy)) { + struct task_struct *task; + async_copy = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfsd4_copy), GFP_KERNEL); if (!async_copy) goto out_err; @@ -1839,10 +1844,16 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, goto out_err; memcpy(&result->cb_stateid, &async_copy->cp_stateid.cs_stid, sizeof(result->cb_stateid)); - async_copy->copy_task = kthread_create(nfsd4_do_async_copy, - async_copy, "%s", "copy thread"); - if (IS_ERR(async_copy->copy_task)) + task = kthread_create(nfsd4_do_async_copy, async_copy, + "%s", "copy thread"); + if (IS_ERR(task)) goto out_err; + /* + * Pin the task_struct so kthread_stop() is safe even after + * this one-shot kthread exits. Released by nfs4_put_copy(). + */ + get_task_struct(task); + async_copy->copy_task = task; spin_lock(&async_copy->cp_clp->async_lock); list_add(&async_copy->copies, &async_copy->cp_clp->async_copies); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] nfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown
by Lu Jialin 10 Oct '26

10 Oct '26

From: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 62c0f6eaf050bb9284c1f9cac6ed1770092e6b95 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/18938 CVE: CVE-2026-89675 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------- An async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller (OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the copy kthread: - find_async_copy() bumped copy->refcount but left the copy on clp->async_copies, so the reaper's cleanup_async_copy() could run release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the nfsd_file and freeing it early. - nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy->nf_dst, nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit as "kthread done, skip kthread_stop()", so a teardown caller ran release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF). - copy->copy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on return, so kthread_stop()'s get_task_struct() could touch a freed task_struct. - co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight. Fix the teardown lifetime as a whole: - find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init) under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy(). Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy(). - Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy's s2s_cp_stateids entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and manage_cpntf_state() to dereference. - Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy(); call wake_up_process() before list_add(). - Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller removes the copy from clp->async_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs exactly once. - Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free. - Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst). Fixes: e0639dc5805a ("NFSD introduce async copy feature") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Fixes: ac0514f4d198 ("NFSD: Add a laundromat reaper for async copy state") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710-nfsd-testing-v3-2-a0ff7db6aa3e@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c [partial backport of 62c0f6eaf050; adapted so copy_task is assigned only after the kthread_create() IS_ERR() check passes] Signed-off-by: Lu Jialin <lujialin4(a)huawei.com> --- fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c index ecbde42093d5..9d1fc070beea 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c @@ -1114,6 +1114,9 @@ void nfs4_put_copy(struct nfsd4_copy *copy) { if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&copy->refcount)) return; + /* Drop the task_struct pinned in nfsd4_copy(); NULL on error paths. */ + if (copy->copy_task) + put_task_struct(copy->copy_task); atomic_dec(&copy->cp_nn->pending_async_copies); kfree(copy); } @@ -1525,6 +1528,7 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, sizeof(struct knfsd_fh)); if (!copy->cp_synchronous) { struct nfsd_net *nn = net_generic(SVC_NET(rqstp), nfsd_net_id); + struct task_struct *task; async_copy = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfsd4_copy), GFP_KERNEL); if (!async_copy) @@ -1541,10 +1545,16 @@ nfsd4_copy(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfsd4_compound_state *cstate, goto out_err; memcpy(&copy->cp_res.cb_stateid, &async_copy->cp_stateid.stid, sizeof(copy->cp_res.cb_stateid)); - async_copy->copy_task = kthread_create(nfsd4_do_async_copy, - async_copy, "%s", "copy thread"); - if (IS_ERR(async_copy->copy_task)) + task = kthread_create(nfsd4_do_async_copy, async_copy, + "%s", "copy thread"); + if (IS_ERR(task)) goto out_err; + /* + * Pin the task_struct so kthread_stop() is safe even after + * this one-shot kthread exits. Released by nfs4_put_copy(). + */ + get_task_struct(task); + async_copy->copy_task = task; spin_lock(&async_copy->cp_clp->async_lock); list_add(&async_copy->copies, &async_copy->cp_clp->async_copies); -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: widen NAT rewrite delta to s32 in sip_help_tcp()
by superdcc97＠163.com 09 Oct '26

09 Oct '26

From: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.2-rc6 commit db3d0e0e5d4bc5ab4fe445b9f413d1b486508ca5 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/17349 CVE: CVE-2026-74569 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- sip_help_tcp() stores the size change of each NAT-rewritten SIP message in s16 diff and accumulates it in s16 tdiff, but a single message can grow by more than S16_MAX while the packet stays under the 65535 enlarge_skb() limit: nf_nat_sip() rewrites every matching URI, and a long Contact list expands the message by tens of kilobytes. diff then wraps, and "datalen = datalen + diff - msglen" yields a huge unsigned datalen, so the next iteration's ct_sip_get_header() reads past the linearized skb tail. Widen diff, tdiff and the seq_adjust hook to s32. Both are bounded by the 65535 byte packet limit, and the seqadj core is already s32 (nf_ct_seqadj_set() takes s32), so no previously accepted input is rejected. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ct_sip_get_header (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:464) Read of size 1 at addr ffff888010800000 by task ksoftirqd/1/25 ct_sip_get_header (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:464) sip_help_tcp (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c:1694) nf_confirm (net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto.c:183) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) ip6_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:246) ip6_forward (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:690) ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6212) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6676) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7735) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7955) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) run_ksoftirqd (kernel/softirq.c:1076) ... Fixes: f5b321bd37fb ("netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: add TCP support") Reported-by: Weiming Shi <bestswngs(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/netfilter-devel/20260712234201.3213635-1-xmei5@asu… Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Xiang Mei <xmei5(a)asu.edu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c [context conflicts] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.h | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.h b/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.h index c7fc38807a33..833054fd491c 100644 --- a/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.h +++ b/include/linux/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.h @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ struct nf_nat_sip_hooks { unsigned int *datalen); void (*seq_adjust)(struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int protoff, s16 off); + unsigned int protoff, s32 off); unsigned int (*expect)(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c index c5817df62d79..e08ffc759e7d 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_sip.c @@ -1576,7 +1576,7 @@ static int sip_help_tcp(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, unsigned int matchoff, matchlen, clen; unsigned int msglen, origlen; const char *dptr, *end; - s16 diff, tdiff = 0; + s32 diff, tdiff = 0; int ret = NF_ACCEPT; bool term; diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c index 41dbf9726796..3ff5663e1b97 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_nat_sip.c @@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static unsigned int nf_nat_sip(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, } static void nf_nat_sip_seq_adjust(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int protoff, - s16 off) + s32 off) { enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; struct nf_conn *ct = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo); -- 2.43.0

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