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[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: IDLETIMER: Fix for possible ABBA deadlock
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Phil Sutter <phil(a)nwl.cc> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.67 commit 8c2c8445cda8f59c38dec7dc10509bcb23ae26a0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBJCF5 CVE: CVE-2024-54683 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit f36b01994d68ffc253c8296e2228dfe6e6431c03 ] Deletion of the last rule referencing a given idletimer may happen at the same time as a read of its file in sysfs: | ====================================================== | WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected | 6.12.0-rc7-01692-g5e9a28f41134-dirty #594 Not tainted | ------------------------------------------------------ | iptables/3303 is trying to acquire lock: | ffff8881057e04b8 (kn->active#48){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0x20 | | but task is already holding lock: | ffffffffa0249068 (list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: idletimer_tg_destroy_v] | | which lock already depends on the new lock. A simple reproducer is: | #!/bin/bash | | while true; do | iptables -A INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme" | iptables -D INPUT -i foo -j IDLETIMER --timeout 10 --label "testme" | done & | while true; do | cat /sys/class/xt_idletimer/timers/testme >/dev/null | done Avoid this by freeing list_mutex right after deleting the element from the list, then continuing with the teardown. Fixes: 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation") Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil(a)nwl.cc> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c index f8b25b6f5da7..9869ef3c2ab3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c @@ -409,21 +409,23 @@ static void idletimer_tg_destroy(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par) mutex_lock(&list_mutex); - if (--info->timer->refcnt == 0) { - pr_debug("deleting timer %s\n", info->label); - - list_del(&info->timer->entry); - timer_shutdown_sync(&info->timer->timer); - cancel_work_sync(&info->timer->work); - sysfs_remove_file(idletimer_tg_kobj, &info->timer->attr.attr); - kfree(info->timer->attr.attr.name); - kfree(info->timer); - } else { + if (--info->timer->refcnt > 0) { pr_debug("decreased refcnt of timer %s to %u\n", info->label, info->timer->refcnt); + mutex_unlock(&list_mutex); + return; } + pr_debug("deleting timer %s\n", info->label); + + list_del(&info->timer->entry); mutex_unlock(&list_mutex); + + timer_shutdown_sync(&info->timer->timer); + cancel_work_sync(&info->timer->work); + sysfs_remove_file(idletimer_tg_kobj, &info->timer->attr.attr); + kfree(info->timer->attr.attr.name); + kfree(info->timer); } static void idletimer_tg_destroy_v1(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par) @@ -434,25 +436,27 @@ static void idletimer_tg_destroy_v1(const struct xt_tgdtor_param *par) mutex_lock(&list_mutex); - if (--info->timer->refcnt == 0) { - pr_debug("deleting timer %s\n", info->label); - - list_del(&info->timer->entry); - if (info->timer->timer_type & XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM) { - alarm_cancel(&info->timer->alarm); - } else { - timer_shutdown_sync(&info->timer->timer); - } - cancel_work_sync(&info->timer->work); - sysfs_remove_file(idletimer_tg_kobj, &info->timer->attr.attr); - kfree(info->timer->attr.attr.name); - kfree(info->timer); - } else { + if (--info->timer->refcnt > 0) { pr_debug("decreased refcnt of timer %s to %u\n", info->label, info->timer->refcnt); + mutex_unlock(&list_mutex); + return; } + pr_debug("deleting timer %s\n", info->label); + + list_del(&info->timer->entry); mutex_unlock(&list_mutex); + + if (info->timer->timer_type & XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM) { + alarm_cancel(&info->timer->alarm); + } else { + timer_shutdown_sync(&info->timer->timer); + } + cancel_work_sync(&info->timer->work); + sysfs_remove_file(idletimer_tg_kobj, &info->timer->attr.attr); + kfree(info->timer->attr.attr.name); + kfree(info->timer); } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: conntrack: clamp maximum hashtable size to INT_MAX
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.72 commit d5807dd1328bbc86e059c5de80d1bbee9d58ca3d category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBIQQN CVE: CVE-2025-21648 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b541ba7d1f5a5b7b3e2e22dc9e40e18a7d6dbc13 ] Use INT_MAX as maximum size for the conntrack hashtable. Otherwise, it is possible to hit WARN_ON_ONCE in __kvmalloc_node_noprof() when resizing hashtable because __GFP_NOWARN is unset. See: 0708a0afe291 ("mm: Consider __GFP_NOWARN flag for oversized kvmalloc() calls") Note: hashtable resize is only possible from init_netns. Fixes: 9cc1c73ad666 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid integer overflow when resizing") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index e4ae2a08da6a..34ad5975fbf3 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -2568,12 +2568,15 @@ void *nf_ct_alloc_hashtable(unsigned int *sizep, int nulls) struct hlist_nulls_head *hash; unsigned int nr_slots, i; - if (*sizep > (UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) + if (*sizep > (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) return NULL; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head) != sizeof(struct hlist_head)); nr_slots = *sizep = roundup(*sizep, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head)); + if (nr_slots > (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) + return NULL; + hash = kvcalloc(nr_slots, sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head), GFP_KERNEL); if (hash && nulls) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ipv6: Fix soft lockups in fib6_select_path under high next hop churn
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Omid Ehtemam-Haghighi <omid.ehtemamhaghighi(a)menlosecurity.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc1 commit d9ccb18f83ea2bb654289b6ecf014fd267cc988b category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEDOT CVE: CVE-2024-56703 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Soft lockups have been observed on a cluster of Linux-based edge routers located in a highly dynamic environment. Using the `bird` service, these routers continuously update BGP-advertised routes due to frequently changing nexthop destinations, while also managing significant IPv6 traffic. The lockups occur during the traversal of the multipath circular linked-list in the `fib6_select_path` function, particularly while iterating through the siblings in the list. The issue typically arises when the nodes of the linked list are unexpectedly deleted concurrently on a different core—indicated by their 'next' and 'previous' elements pointing back to the node itself and their reference count dropping to zero. This results in an infinite loop, leading to a soft lockup that triggers a system panic via the watchdog timer. Apply RCU primitives in the problematic code sections to resolve the issue. Where necessary, update the references to fib6_siblings to annotate or use the RCU APIs. Include a test script that reproduces the issue. The script periodically updates the routing table while generating a heavy load of outgoing IPv6 traffic through multiple iperf3 clients. It consistently induces infinite soft lockups within a couple of minutes. Kernel log: 0 [ffffbd13003e8d30] machine_kexec at ffffffff8ceaf3eb 1 [ffffbd13003e8d90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8d0120e3 2 [ffffbd13003e8e58] panic at ffffffff8cef65d4 3 [ffffbd13003e8ed8] watchdog_timer_fn at ffffffff8d05cb03 4 [ffffbd13003e8f08] __hrtimer_run_queues at ffffffff8cfec62f 5 [ffffbd13003e8f70] hrtimer_interrupt at ffffffff8cfed756 6 [ffffbd13003e8fd0] __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8cea01af 7 [ffffbd13003e8ff0] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8df1b83d -- <IRQ stack> -- 8 [ffffbd13003d3708] asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt at ffffffff8e000ecb [exception RIP: fib6_select_path+299] RIP: ffffffff8ddafe7b RSP: ffffbd13003d37b8 RFLAGS: 00000287 RAX: ffff975850b43600 RBX: ffff975850b40200 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000003fffffff RSI: 0000000051d383e4 RDI: ffff975850b43618 RBP: ffffbd13003d3800 R8: 0000000000000000 R9: ffff975850b40200 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffbd13003d3830 R13: ffff975850b436a8 R14: ffff975850b43600 R15: 0000000000000007 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 9 [ffffbd13003d3808] ip6_pol_route at ffffffff8ddb030c 10 [ffffbd13003d3888] ip6_pol_route_input at ffffffff8ddb068c 11 [ffffbd13003d3898] fib6_rule_lookup at ffffffff8ddf02b5 12 [ffffbd13003d3928] ip6_route_input at ffffffff8ddb0f47 13 [ffffbd13003d3a18] ip6_rcv_finish_core.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd950d0 14 [ffffbd13003d3a30] ip6_list_rcv_finish.constprop.0 at ffffffff8dd96274 15 [ffffbd13003d3a98] ip6_sublist_rcv at ffffffff8dd96474 16 [ffffbd13003d3af8] ipv6_list_rcv at ffffffff8dd96615 17 [ffffbd13003d3b60] __netif_receive_skb_list_core at ffffffff8dc16fec 18 [ffffbd13003d3be0] netif_receive_skb_list_internal at ffffffff8dc176b3 19 [ffffbd13003d3c50] napi_gro_receive at ffffffff8dc565b9 20 [ffffbd13003d3c80] ice_receive_skb at ffffffffc087e4f5 [ice] 21 [ffffbd13003d3c90] ice_clean_rx_irq at ffffffffc0881b80 [ice] 22 [ffffbd13003d3d20] ice_napi_poll at ffffffffc088232f [ice] 23 [ffffbd13003d3d80] __napi_poll at ffffffff8dc18000 24 [ffffbd13003d3db8] net_rx_action at ffffffff8dc18581 25 [ffffbd13003d3e40] __do_softirq at ffffffff8df352e9 26 [ffffbd13003d3eb0] run_ksoftirqd at ffffffff8ceffe47 27 [ffffbd13003d3ec0] smpboot_thread_fn at ffffffff8cf36a30 28 [ffffbd13003d3ee8] kthread at ffffffff8cf2b39f 29 [ffffbd13003d3f28] ret_from_fork at ffffffff8ce5fa64 30 [ffffbd13003d3f50] ret_from_fork_asm at ffffffff8ce03cbb Fixes: 66f5d6ce53e6 ("ipv6: replace rwlock with rcu and spinlock in fib6_table") Reported-by: Adrian Oliver <kernel(a)aoliver.ca> Signed-off-by: Omid Ehtemam-Haghighi <omid.ehtemamhaghighi(a)menlosecurity.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah(a)kernel.org> Cc: Ido Schimmel <idosch(a)idosch.org> Cc: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Cc: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241106010236.1239299-1-omid.ehtemamhaghighi@menl… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ipv6/route.c tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile [commit cd9ebde125bf which not merged lead to conflict] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c | 8 +- net/ipv6/route.c | 45 ++- tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile | 1 + .../net/ipv6_route_update_soft_lockup.sh | 262 ++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 297 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/net/ipv6_route_update_soft_lockup.sh diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c index afa9073567dc..023ac39041a2 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c @@ -1179,8 +1179,8 @@ static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct fib6_info *rt, while (sibling) { if (sibling->fib6_metric == rt->fib6_metric && rt6_qualify_for_ecmp(sibling)) { - list_add_tail(&rt->fib6_siblings, - &sibling->fib6_siblings); + list_add_tail_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings, + &sibling->fib6_siblings); break; } sibling = rcu_dereference_protected(sibling->fib6_next, @@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@ static int fib6_add_rt2node(struct fib6_node *fn, struct fib6_info *rt, fib6_siblings) sibling->fib6_nsiblings--; rt->fib6_nsiblings = 0; - list_del_init(&rt->fib6_siblings); + list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings); rt6_multipath_rebalance(next_sibling); return err; } @@ -1954,7 +1954,7 @@ static void fib6_del_route(struct fib6_table *table, struct fib6_node *fn, &rt->fib6_siblings, fib6_siblings) sibling->fib6_nsiblings--; rt->fib6_nsiblings = 0; - list_del_init(&rt->fib6_siblings); + list_del_rcu(&rt->fib6_siblings); rt6_multipath_rebalance(next_sibling); } diff --git a/net/ipv6/route.c b/net/ipv6/route.c index fc5c53462025..c5cee40a658b 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/route.c +++ b/net/ipv6/route.c @@ -418,8 +418,8 @@ void fib6_select_path(const struct net *net, struct fib6_result *res, struct flowi6 *fl6, int oif, bool have_oif_match, const struct sk_buff *skb, int strict) { - struct fib6_info *sibling, *next_sibling; struct fib6_info *match = res->f6i; + struct fib6_info *sibling; if (!match->nh && (!match->fib6_nsiblings || have_oif_match)) goto out; @@ -445,8 +445,8 @@ void fib6_select_path(const struct net *net, struct fib6_result *res, if (fl6->mp_hash <= atomic_read(&match->fib6_nh->fib_nh_upper_bound)) goto out; - list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, next_sibling, &match->fib6_siblings, - fib6_siblings) { + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sibling, &match->fib6_siblings, + fib6_siblings) { const struct fib6_nh *nh = sibling->fib6_nh; int nh_upper_bound; @@ -5186,14 +5186,18 @@ static void ip6_route_mpath_notify(struct fib6_info *rt, * nexthop. Since sibling routes are always added at the end of * the list, find the first sibling of the last route appended */ + rcu_read_lock(); + if ((nlflags & NLM_F_APPEND) && rt_last && rt_last->fib6_nsiblings) { - rt = list_first_entry(&rt_last->fib6_siblings, - struct fib6_info, - fib6_siblings); + rt = list_first_or_null_rcu(&rt_last->fib6_siblings, + struct fib6_info, + fib6_siblings); } if (rt) inet6_rt_notify(RTM_NEWROUTE, rt, info, nlflags); + + rcu_read_unlock(); } static bool ip6_route_mpath_should_notify(const struct fib6_info *rt) @@ -5538,17 +5542,21 @@ static size_t rt6_nlmsg_size(struct fib6_info *f6i) nexthop_for_each_fib6_nh(f6i->nh, rt6_nh_nlmsg_size, &nexthop_len); } else { - struct fib6_info *sibling, *next_sibling; struct fib6_nh *nh = f6i->fib6_nh; + struct fib6_info *sibling; nexthop_len = 0; if (f6i->fib6_nsiblings) { rt6_nh_nlmsg_size(nh, &nexthop_len); - list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, next_sibling, - &f6i->fib6_siblings, fib6_siblings) { + rcu_read_lock(); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sibling, &f6i->fib6_siblings, + fib6_siblings) { rt6_nh_nlmsg_size(sibling->fib6_nh, &nexthop_len); } + + rcu_read_unlock(); } nexthop_len += lwtunnel_get_encap_size(nh->fib_nh_lws); } @@ -5712,7 +5720,7 @@ static int rt6_fill_node(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, lwtunnel_fill_encap(skb, dst->lwtstate, RTA_ENCAP, RTA_ENCAP_TYPE) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; } else if (rt->fib6_nsiblings) { - struct fib6_info *sibling, *next_sibling; + struct fib6_info *sibling; struct nlattr *mp; mp = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, RTA_MULTIPATH); @@ -5724,14 +5732,21 @@ static int rt6_fill_node(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, 0) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; - list_for_each_entry_safe(sibling, next_sibling, - &rt->fib6_siblings, fib6_siblings) { + rcu_read_lock(); + + list_for_each_entry_rcu(sibling, &rt->fib6_siblings, + fib6_siblings) { if (fib_add_nexthop(skb, &sibling->fib6_nh->nh_common, sibling->fib6_nh->fib_nh_weight, - AF_INET6, 0) < 0) + AF_INET6, 0) < 0) { + rcu_read_unlock(); + goto nla_put_failure; + } } + rcu_read_unlock(); + nla_nest_end(skb, mp); } else if (rt->nh) { if (nla_put_u32(skb, RTA_NH_ID, rt->nh->id)) @@ -6168,7 +6183,7 @@ void inet6_rt_notify(int event, struct fib6_info *rt, struct nl_info *info, err = -ENOBUFS; seq = info->nlh ? info->nlh->nlmsg_seq : 0; - skb = nlmsg_new(rt6_nlmsg_size(rt), gfp_any()); + skb = nlmsg_new(rt6_nlmsg_size(rt), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!skb) goto errout; @@ -6181,7 +6196,7 @@ void inet6_rt_notify(int event, struct fib6_info *rt, struct nl_info *info, goto errout; } rtnl_notify(skb, net, info->portid, RTNLGRP_IPV6_ROUTE, - info->nlh, gfp_any()); + info->nlh, GFP_ATOMIC); return; errout: if (err < 0) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile index f89dc5cd6111..ebe3f5874af7 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/Makefile @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ TEST_PROGS += bind_bhash.sh TEST_PROGS += ip_local_port_range.sh TEST_PROGS += rps_default_mask.sh TEST_PROGS += big_tcp.sh +TEST_PROGS += ipv6_route_update_soft_lockup.sh TEST_PROGS_EXTENDED := toeplitz_client.sh toeplitz.sh TEST_GEN_FILES = socket nettest TEST_GEN_FILES += psock_fanout psock_tpacket msg_zerocopy reuseport_addr_any diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/ipv6_route_update_soft_lockup.sh b/tools/testing/selftests/net/ipv6_route_update_soft_lockup.sh new file mode 100755 index 000000000000..a6b2b1f9c641 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/ipv6_route_update_soft_lockup.sh @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +# +# Testing for potential kernel soft lockup during IPv6 routing table +# refresh under heavy outgoing IPv6 traffic. If a kernel soft lockup +# occurs, a kernel panic will be triggered to prevent associated issues. +# +# +# Test Environment Layout +# +# ┌----------------┐ ┌----------------┐ +# | SOURCE_NS | | SINK_NS | +# | NAMESPACE | | NAMESPACE | +# |(iperf3 clients)| |(iperf3 servers)| +# | | | | +# | | | | +# | ┌-----------| nexthops |---------┐ | +# | |veth_source|<--------------------------------------->|veth_sink|<┐ | +# | └-----------|2001:0DB8:1::0:1/96 2001:0DB8:1::1:1/96 |---------┘ | | +# | | ^ 2001:0DB8:1::1:2/96 | | | +# | | . . | fwd | | +# | ┌---------┐ | . . | | | +# | | IPv6 | | . . | V | +# | | routing | | . 2001:0DB8:1::1:80/96| ┌-----┐ | +# | | table | | . | | lo | | +# | | nexthop | | . └--------┴-----┴-┘ +# | | update | | ............................> 2001:0DB8:2::1:1/128 +# | └-------- ┘ | +# └----------------┘ +# +# The test script sets up two network namespaces, source_ns and sink_ns, +# connected via a veth link. Within source_ns, it continuously updates the +# IPv6 routing table by flushing and inserting IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_COUNT nexthop +# IPs destined for SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR in sink_ns. This refresh occurs at a +# rate of 1/ROUTING_TABLE_REFRESH_PERIOD per second for TEST_DURATION seconds. +# +# Simultaneously, multiple iperf3 clients within source_ns generate heavy +# outgoing IPv6 traffic. Each client is assigned a unique port number starting +# at 5000 and incrementing sequentially. Each client targets a unique iperf3 +# server running in sink_ns, connected to the SINK_LOOPBACK_IFACE interface +# using the same port number. +# +# The number of iperf3 servers and clients is set to half of the total +# available cores on each machine. +# +# NOTE: We have tested this script on machines with various CPU specifications, +# ranging from lower to higher performance as listed below. The test script +# effectively triggered a kernel soft lockup on machines running an unpatched +# kernel in under a minute: +# +# - 1x Intel Xeon E-2278G 8-Core Processor @ 3.40GHz +# - 1x Intel Xeon E-2378G Processor 8-Core @ 2.80GHz +# - 1x AMD EPYC 7401P 24-Core Processor @ 2.00GHz +# - 1x AMD EPYC 7402P 24-Core Processor @ 2.80GHz +# - 2x Intel Xeon Gold 5120 14-Core Processor @ 2.20GHz +# - 1x Ampere Altra Q80-30 80-Core Processor @ 3.00GHz +# - 2x Intel Xeon Gold 5120 14-Core Processor @ 2.20GHz +# - 2x Intel Xeon Silver 4214 24-Core Processor @ 2.20GHz +# - 1x AMD EPYC 7502P 32-Core @ 2.50GHz +# - 1x Intel Xeon Gold 6314U 32-Core Processor @ 2.30GHz +# - 2x Intel Xeon Gold 6338 32-Core Processor @ 2.00GHz +# +# On less performant machines, you may need to increase the TEST_DURATION +# parameter to enhance the likelihood of encountering a race condition leading +# to a kernel soft lockup and avoid a false negative result. +# +# NOTE: The test may not produce the expected result in virtualized +# environments (e.g., qemu) due to differences in timing and CPU handling, +# which can affect the conditions needed to trigger a soft lockup. + +source lib.sh +source net_helper.sh + +TEST_DURATION=300 +ROUTING_TABLE_REFRESH_PERIOD=0.01 + +IPERF3_BITRATE="300m" + + +IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_COUNT="128" +IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_MASK="96" +IPV6_NEXTHOP_PREFIX="2001:0DB8:1" + + +SOURCE_TEST_IFACE="veth_source" +SOURCE_TEST_IP_ADDR="2001:0DB8:1::0:1/96" + +SINK_TEST_IFACE="veth_sink" +# ${SINK_TEST_IFACE} is populated with the following range of IPv6 addresses: +# 2001:0DB8:1::1:1 to 2001:0DB8:1::1:${IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_COUNT} +SINK_LOOPBACK_IFACE="lo" +SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_MASK="128" +SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR="2001:0DB8:2::1:1" + +nexthop_ip_list="" +termination_signal="" +kernel_softlokup_panic_prev_val="" + +terminate_ns_processes_by_pattern() { + local ns=$1 + local pattern=$2 + + for pid in $(ip netns pids ${ns}); do + [ -e /proc/$pid/cmdline ] && grep -qe "${pattern}" /proc/$pid/cmdline && kill -9 $pid + done +} + +cleanup() { + echo "info: cleaning up namespaces and terminating all processes within them..." + + + # Terminate iperf3 instances running in the source_ns. To avoid race + # conditions, first iterate over the PIDs and terminate those + # associated with the bash shells running the + # `while true; do iperf3 -c ...; done` loops. In a second iteration, + # terminate the individual `iperf3 -c ...` instances. + terminate_ns_processes_by_pattern ${source_ns} while + terminate_ns_processes_by_pattern ${source_ns} iperf3 + + # Repeat the same process for sink_ns + terminate_ns_processes_by_pattern ${sink_ns} while + terminate_ns_processes_by_pattern ${sink_ns} iperf3 + + # Check if any iperf3 instances are still running. This could happen + # if a core has entered an infinite loop and the timeout for detecting + # the soft lockup has not expired, but either the test interval has + # already elapsed or the test was terminated manually (e.g., with ^C) + for pid in $(ip netns pids ${source_ns}); do + if [ -e /proc/$pid/cmdline ] && grep -qe 'iperf3' /proc/$pid/cmdline; then + echo "FAIL: unable to terminate some iperf3 instances. Soft lockup is underway. A kernel panic is on the way!" + exit ${ksft_fail} + fi + done + + if [ "$termination_signal" == "SIGINT" ]; then + echo "SKIP: Termination due to ^C (SIGINT)" + elif [ "$termination_signal" == "SIGALRM" ]; then + echo "PASS: No kernel soft lockup occurred during this ${TEST_DURATION} second test" + fi + + cleanup_ns ${source_ns} ${sink_ns} + + sysctl -qw kernel.softlockup_panic=${kernel_softlokup_panic_prev_val} +} + +setup_prepare() { + setup_ns source_ns sink_ns + + ip -n ${source_ns} link add name ${SOURCE_TEST_IFACE} type veth peer name ${SINK_TEST_IFACE} netns ${sink_ns} + + # Setting up the Source namespace + ip -n ${source_ns} addr add ${SOURCE_TEST_IP_ADDR} dev ${SOURCE_TEST_IFACE} + ip -n ${source_ns} link set dev ${SOURCE_TEST_IFACE} qlen 10000 + ip -n ${source_ns} link set dev ${SOURCE_TEST_IFACE} up + ip netns exec ${source_ns} sysctl -qw net.ipv6.fib_multipath_hash_policy=1 + + # Setting up the Sink namespace + ip -n ${sink_ns} addr add ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR}/${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_MASK} dev ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IFACE} + ip -n ${sink_ns} link set dev ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IFACE} up + ip netns exec ${sink_ns} sysctl -qw net.ipv6.conf.${SINK_LOOPBACK_IFACE}.forwarding=1 + + ip -n ${sink_ns} link set ${SINK_TEST_IFACE} up + ip netns exec ${sink_ns} sysctl -qw net.ipv6.conf.${SINK_TEST_IFACE}.forwarding=1 + + + # Populate nexthop IPv6 addresses on the test interface in the sink_ns + echo "info: populating ${IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_COUNT} IPv6 addresses on the ${SINK_TEST_IFACE} interface ..." + for IP in $(seq 1 ${IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_COUNT}); do + ip -n ${sink_ns} addr add ${IPV6_NEXTHOP_PREFIX}::$(printf "1:%x" "${IP}")/${IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_MASK} dev ${SINK_TEST_IFACE}; + done + + # Preparing list of nexthops + for IP in $(seq 1 ${IPV6_NEXTHOP_ADDR_COUNT}); do + nexthop_ip_list=$nexthop_ip_list" nexthop via ${IPV6_NEXTHOP_PREFIX}::$(printf "1:%x" $IP) dev ${SOURCE_TEST_IFACE} weight 1" + done +} + + +test_soft_lockup_during_routing_table_refresh() { + # Start num_of_iperf_servers iperf3 servers in the sink_ns namespace, + # each listening on ports starting at 5001 and incrementing + # sequentially. Since iperf3 instances may terminate unexpectedly, a + # while loop is used to automatically restart them in such cases. + echo "info: starting ${num_of_iperf_servers} iperf3 servers in the sink_ns namespace ..." + for i in $(seq 1 ${num_of_iperf_servers}); do + cmd="iperf3 --bind ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR} -s -p $(printf '5%03d' ${i}) --rcv-timeout 200 &>/dev/null" + ip netns exec ${sink_ns} bash -c "while true; do ${cmd}; done &" &>/dev/null + done + + # Wait for the iperf3 servers to be ready + for i in $(seq ${num_of_iperf_servers}); do + port=$(printf '5%03d' ${i}); + wait_local_port_listen ${sink_ns} ${port} tcp + done + + # Continuously refresh the routing table in the background within + # the source_ns namespace + ip netns exec ${source_ns} bash -c " + while \$(ip netns list | grep -q ${source_ns}); do + ip -6 route add ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR}/${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_MASK} ${nexthop_ip_list}; + sleep ${ROUTING_TABLE_REFRESH_PERIOD}; + ip -6 route delete ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR}/${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_MASK}; + done &" + + # Start num_of_iperf_servers iperf3 clients in the source_ns namespace, + # each sending TCP traffic on sequential ports starting at 5001. + # Since iperf3 instances may terminate unexpectedly (e.g., if the route + # to the server is deleted in the background during a route refresh), a + # while loop is used to automatically restart them in such cases. + echo "info: starting ${num_of_iperf_servers} iperf3 clients in the source_ns namespace ..." + for i in $(seq 1 ${num_of_iperf_servers}); do + cmd="iperf3 -c ${SINK_LOOPBACK_IP_ADDR} -p $(printf '5%03d' ${i}) --length 64 --bitrate ${IPERF3_BITRATE} -t 0 --connect-timeout 150 &>/dev/null" + ip netns exec ${source_ns} bash -c "while true; do ${cmd}; done &" &>/dev/null + done + + echo "info: IPv6 routing table is being updated at the rate of $(echo "1/${ROUTING_TABLE_REFRESH_PERIOD}" | bc)/s for ${TEST_DURATION} seconds ..." + echo "info: A kernel soft lockup, if detected, results in a kernel panic!" + + wait +} + +# Make sure 'iperf3' is installed, skip the test otherwise +if [ ! -x "$(command -v "iperf3")" ]; then + echo "SKIP: 'iperf3' is not installed. Skipping the test." + exit ${ksft_skip} +fi + +# Determine the number of cores on the machine +num_of_iperf_servers=$(( $(nproc)/2 )) + +# Check if we are running on a multi-core machine, skip the test otherwise +if [ "${num_of_iperf_servers}" -eq 0 ]; then + echo "SKIP: This test is not valid on a single core machine!" + exit ${ksft_skip} +fi + +# Since the kernel soft lockup we're testing causes at least one core to enter +# an infinite loop, destabilizing the host and likely affecting subsequent +# tests, we trigger a kernel panic instead of reporting a failure and +# continuing +kernel_softlokup_panic_prev_val=$(sysctl -n kernel.softlockup_panic) +sysctl -qw kernel.softlockup_panic=1 + +handle_sigint() { + termination_signal="SIGINT" + cleanup + exit ${ksft_skip} +} + +handle_sigalrm() { + termination_signal="SIGALRM" + cleanup + exit ${ksft_pass} +} + +trap handle_sigint SIGINT +trap handle_sigalrm SIGALRM + +(sleep ${TEST_DURATION} && kill -s SIGALRM $$)& + +setup_prepare +test_soft_lockup_during_routing_table_refresh -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: Don't call cleanup on profile rollback failure
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu(a)nvidia.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc4 commit 4dbc1d1a9f39c3711ad2a40addca04d07d9ab5d0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB2SU8 CVE: CVE-2024-50146 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- When profile rollback fails in mlx5e_netdev_change_profile, the netdev profile var is left set to NULL. Avoid a crash when unloading the driver by not calling profile->cleanup in such a case. This was encountered while testing, with the original trigger that the wq rescuer thread creation got interrupted (presumably due to Ctrl+C-ing modprobe), which gets converted to ENOMEM (-12) by mlx5e_priv_init, the profile rollback also fails for the same reason (signal still active) so the profile is left as NULL, leading to a crash later in _mlx5e_remove. [ 732.473932] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: E-Switch: Unload vfs: mode(OFFLOADS), nvfs(2), necvfs(0), active vports(2) [ 734.525513] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR [ 734.557372] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 [ 734.559187] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: new profile init failed, -12 [ 734.560153] workqueue: Failed to create a rescuer kthread for wq "mlx5e": -EINTR [ 734.589378] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1: mlx5e_netdev_init_profile:6235:(pid 6086): mlx5e_priv_init failed, err=-12 [ 734.591136] mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 eth3: mlx5e_netdev_change_profile: failed to rollback to orig profile, -12 [ 745.537492] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [ 745.538222] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode <snipped> [ 745.551290] Call Trace: [ 745.551590] <TASK> [ 745.551866] ? __die+0x20/0x60 [ 745.552218] ? page_fault_oops+0x150/0x400 [ 745.555307] ? exc_page_fault+0x79/0x240 [ 745.555729] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 [ 745.556166] ? mlx5e_remove+0x6b/0xb0 [mlx5_core] [ 745.556698] auxiliary_bus_remove+0x18/0x30 [ 745.557134] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240 [ 745.557654] bus_remove_device+0xd7/0x140 [ 745.558075] device_del+0x15b/0x3c0 [ 745.558456] mlx5_rescan_drivers_locked.part.0+0xb1/0x2f0 [mlx5_core] [ 745.559112] mlx5_unregister_device+0x34/0x50 [mlx5_core] [ 745.559686] mlx5_uninit_one+0x46/0xf0 [mlx5_core] [ 745.560203] remove_one+0x4e/0xd0 [mlx5_core] [ 745.560694] pci_device_remove+0x39/0xa0 [ 745.561112] device_release_driver_internal+0x1df/0x240 [ 745.561631] driver_detach+0x47/0x90 [ 745.562022] bus_remove_driver+0x84/0x100 [ 745.562444] pci_unregister_driver+0x3b/0x90 [ 745.562890] mlx5_cleanup+0xc/0x1b [mlx5_core] [ 745.563415] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x14d/0x2f0 [ 745.563886] ? kmem_cache_free+0x1b0/0x460 [ 745.564313] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xe2/0x190 [ 745.564825] do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 [ 745.565223] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 [ 745.565725] RIP: 0033:0x7f1579b1288b Fixes: 3ef14e463f6e ("net/mlx5e: Separate between netdev objects and mlx5e profiles initialization") Signed-off-by: Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index bb5c41f0e8ba..dc6c62f20dac 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -6118,7 +6118,9 @@ static void mlx5e_remove(struct auxiliary_device *adev) mlx5e_dcbnl_delete_app(priv); unregister_netdev(priv->netdev); _mlx5e_suspend(adev, false); - priv->profile->cleanup(priv); + /* Avoid cleanup if profile rollback failed. */ + if (priv->profile) + priv->profile->cleanup(priv); mlx5e_destroy_netdev(priv); mlx5e_devlink_port_unregister(mlx5e_dev); mlx5e_destroy_devlink(mlx5e_dev); -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] ethtool: fail closed if we can't get max channel used in indirection tables
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.11-rc1 commit 2899d58462ba868287d6ff3acad3675e7adf934f category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IAUATO CVE: CVE-2024-46834 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Commit 0d1b7d6c9274 ("bnxt: fix crashes when reducing ring count with active RSS contexts") proves that allowing indirection table to contain channels with out of bounds IDs may lead to crashes. Currently the max channel check in the core gets skipped if driver can't fetch the indirection table or when we can't allocate memory. Both of those conditions should be extremely rare but if they do happen we should try to be safe and fail the channel change. Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240710174043.754664-2-kuba@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/ethtool/common.c [commit fb6e30a72539 pass a pointer to parameters to ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(), which not merged lead to conflict.] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ethtool/channels.c | 6 ++---- net/ethtool/common.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- net/ethtool/common.h | 2 +- net/ethtool/ioctl.c | 4 +--- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ethtool/channels.c b/net/ethtool/channels.c index 7b4bbd674bae..cee188da54f8 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/channels.c +++ b/net/ethtool/channels.c @@ -171,11 +171,9 @@ ethnl_set_channels(struct ethnl_req_info *req_info, struct genl_info *info) */ if (ethtool_get_max_rxnfc_channel(dev, &max_rxnfc_in_use)) max_rxnfc_in_use = 0; - if (!netif_is_rxfh_configured(dev) || - ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(dev, &max_rxfh_in_use)) - max_rxfh_in_use = 0; + max_rxfh_in_use = ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(dev); if (channels.combined_count + channels.rx_count <= max_rxfh_in_use) { - GENL_SET_ERR_MSG(info, "requested channel counts are too low for existing indirection table settings"); + GENL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT(info, "requested channel counts are too low for existing indirection table (%d)", max_rxfh_in_use); return -EINVAL; } if (channels.combined_count + channels.rx_count <= max_rxnfc_in_use) { diff --git a/net/ethtool/common.c b/net/ethtool/common.c index f5598c5f50de..450354315291 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/common.c +++ b/net/ethtool/common.c @@ -587,35 +587,39 @@ int ethtool_get_max_rxnfc_channel(struct net_device *dev, u64 *max) return err; } -int ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(struct net_device *dev, u32 *max) +u32 ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(struct net_device *dev) { - u32 dev_size, current_max = 0; + u32 dev_size, current_max; u32 *indir; int ret; + if (!netif_is_rxfh_configured(dev)) + return 0; + if (!dev->ethtool_ops->get_rxfh_indir_size || !dev->ethtool_ops->get_rxfh) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; dev_size = dev->ethtool_ops->get_rxfh_indir_size(dev); if (dev_size == 0) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + return 0; indir = kcalloc(dev_size, sizeof(indir[0]), GFP_USER); if (!indir) - return -ENOMEM; + return U32_MAX; ret = dev->ethtool_ops->get_rxfh(dev, indir, NULL, NULL); - if (ret) - goto out; + if (ret) { + current_max = U32_MAX; + goto out_free; + } + current_max = 0; while (dev_size--) current_max = max(current_max, indir[dev_size]); - *max = current_max; - -out: +out_free: kfree(indir); - return ret; + return current_max; } int ethtool_check_ops(const struct ethtool_ops *ops) diff --git a/net/ethtool/common.h b/net/ethtool/common.h index 28b8aaaf9bcb..b55705a9ad5a 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/common.h +++ b/net/ethtool/common.h @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int __ethtool_get_link(struct net_device *dev); bool convert_legacy_settings_to_link_ksettings( struct ethtool_link_ksettings *link_ksettings, const struct ethtool_cmd *legacy_settings); -int ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(struct net_device *dev, u32 *max); +u32 ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(struct net_device *dev); int ethtool_get_max_rxnfc_channel(struct net_device *dev, u64 *max); int __ethtool_get_ts_info(struct net_device *dev, struct ethtool_ts_info *info); diff --git a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c index 4486cbe2faf0..7bf015fad447 100644 --- a/net/ethtool/ioctl.c +++ b/net/ethtool/ioctl.c @@ -1847,9 +1847,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ethtool_set_channels(struct net_device *dev, * indirection table/rxnfc settings */ if (ethtool_get_max_rxnfc_channel(dev, &max_rxnfc_in_use)) max_rxnfc_in_use = 0; - if (!netif_is_rxfh_configured(dev) || - ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(dev, &max_rxfh_in_use)) - max_rxfh_in_use = 0; + max_rxfh_in_use = ethtool_get_max_rxfh_channel(dev); if (channels.combined_count + channels.rx_count <= max_t(u64, max_rxnfc_in_use, max_rxfh_in_use)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6 v2 0/2] net: Fix CVE-2024-56658
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

Fix CVE-2024-56658 Dong Chenchen (1): net: Fix kabi breakage in struct net Eric Dumazet (1): net: defer final 'struct net' free in netns dismantle include/net/net_namespace.h | 1 + net/core/net_namespace.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-5.10] ila: serialize calls to nf_register_net_hooks()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.233 commit d3017895e393536b234cf80a83fc463c08a28137 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBID33 CVE: CVE-2024-57900 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 260466b576bca0081a7d4acecc8e93687aa22d0e ] syzbot found a race in ila_add_mapping() [1] commit 031ae72825ce ("ila: call nf_unregister_net_hooks() sooner") attempted to fix a similar issue. Looking at the syzbot repro, we have concurrent ILA_CMD_ADD commands. Add a mutex to make sure at most one thread is calling nf_register_net_hooks(). [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __rhashtable_lookup.constprop.0+0x426/0x550 include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028f40008 by task dhcpcd/5501 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5501 Comm: dhcpcd Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:602 rht_key_hashfn include/linux/rhashtable.h:159 [inline] __rhashtable_lookup.constprop.0+0x426/0x550 include/linux/rhashtable.h:604 rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline] rhashtable_lookup_fast include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 [inline] ila_lookup_wildcards net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:127 [inline] ila_xlat_addr net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:652 [inline] ila_nf_input+0x1ee/0x620 net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c:185 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:154 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xbb/0x200 net/netfilter/core.c:626 nf_hook.constprop.0+0x42e/0x750 include/linux/netfilter.h:269 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:312 [inline] ipv6_rcv+0xa4/0x680 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1e0 net/core/dev.c:5672 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x160 net/core/dev.c:5785 process_backlog+0x443/0x15f0 net/core/dev.c:6117 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb7/0x550 net/core/dev.c:6883 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6952 [inline] net_rx_action+0xa94/0x1010 net/core/dev.c:7074 handle_softirqs+0x213/0x8f0 kernel/softirq.c:561 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:595 [inline] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:435 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu+0x109/0x170 kernel/softirq.c:662 irq_exit_rcu+0x9/0x30 kernel/softirq.c:678 instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 [inline] sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa4/0xc0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1049 Fixes: 7f00feaf1076 ("ila: Add generic ILA translation facility") Reported-by: syzbot+47e761d22ecf745f72b9(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/6772c9ae.050a0220.2f3838.04c7.GAE@google.com… Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Cc: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Cc: Tom Herbert <tom(a)herbertland.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241230162849.2795486-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c b/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c index 2e7a36a1ea0a..8483116dfa23 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ila/ila_xlat.c @@ -201,6 +201,8 @@ static const struct nf_hook_ops ila_nf_hook_ops[] = { }, }; +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ila_mutex); + static int ila_add_mapping(struct net *net, struct ila_xlat_params *xp) { struct ila_net *ilan = net_generic(net, ila_net_id); @@ -208,16 +210,20 @@ static int ila_add_mapping(struct net *net, struct ila_xlat_params *xp) spinlock_t *lock = ila_get_lock(ilan, xp->ip.locator_match); int err = 0, order; - if (!ilan->xlat.hooks_registered) { + if (!READ_ONCE(ilan->xlat.hooks_registered)) { /* We defer registering net hooks in the namespace until the * first mapping is added. */ - err = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ila_nf_hook_ops, - ARRAY_SIZE(ila_nf_hook_ops)); + mutex_lock(&ila_mutex); + if (!ilan->xlat.hooks_registered) { + err = nf_register_net_hooks(net, ila_nf_hook_ops, + ARRAY_SIZE(ila_nf_hook_ops)); + if (!err) + WRITE_ONCE(ilan->xlat.hooks_registered, true); + } + mutex_unlock(&ila_mutex); if (err) return err; - - ilan->xlat.hooks_registered = true; } ila = kzalloc(sizeof(*ila), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] sched: sch_cake: add bounds checks to host bulk flow fairness counts
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc7 commit 737d4d91d35b5f7fa5bb442651472277318b0bfd category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBIQOT CVE: CVE-2025-21647 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Even though we fixed a logic error in the commit cited below, syzbot still managed to trigger an underflow of the per-host bulk flow counters, leading to an out of bounds memory access. To avoid any such logic errors causing out of bounds memory accesses, this commit factors out all accesses to the per-host bulk flow counters to a series of helpers that perform bounds-checking before any increments and decrements. This also has the benefit of improving readability by moving the conditional checks for the flow mode into these helpers, instead of having them spread out throughout the code (which was the cause of the original logic error). As part of this change, the flow quantum calculation is consolidated into a helper function, which means that the dithering applied to the ost load scaling is now applied both in the DRR rotation and when a sparse flow's quantum is first initiated. The only user-visible effect of this is that the maximum packet size that can be sent while a flow stays sparse will now vary with +/- one byte in some cases. This should not make a noticeable difference in practice, and thus it's not worth complicating the code to preserve the old behaviour. Fixes: 546ea84d07e3 ("sched: sch_cake: fix bulk flow accounting logic for host fairness") Reported-by: syzbot+f63600d288bfb7057424(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Taht <dave.taht(a)gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107120105.70685-1-toke@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/sched/sch_cake.c [commit 7e3cf0843fe5 use get_random_{u8,u16}() in cake_dequeue, which not merged lead to conflicts] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_cake.c | 140 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_cake.c b/net/sched/sch_cake.c index 4ddb43a6644a..e0030c16143f 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_cake.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_cake.c @@ -643,6 +643,63 @@ static bool cake_ddst(int flow_mode) return (flow_mode & CAKE_FLOW_DUAL_DST) == CAKE_FLOW_DUAL_DST; } +static void cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_dsrc(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count)) + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count--; +} + +static void cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_dsrc(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count < CAKE_QUEUES)) + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count++; +} + +static void cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_ddst(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count)) + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; +} + +static void cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + if (likely(cake_ddst(flow_mode) && + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count < CAKE_QUEUES)) + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; +} + +static u16 cake_get_flow_quantum(struct cake_tin_data *q, + struct cake_flow *flow, + int flow_mode) +{ + u16 host_load = 1; + + if (cake_dsrc(flow_mode)) + host_load = max(host_load, + q->hosts[flow->srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count); + + if (cake_ddst(flow_mode)) + host_load = max(host_load, + q->hosts[flow->dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count); + + /* The get_random_u16() is a way to apply dithering to avoid + * accumulating roundoff errors + */ + return (q->flow_quantum * quantum_div[host_load] + + (prandom_u32() >> 16)) >> 16; +} + static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flow_mode, u16 flow_override, u16 host_override) { @@ -789,10 +846,8 @@ static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, allocate_dst = cake_ddst(flow_mode); if (q->flows[outer_hash + k].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) { - if (allocate_src) - q->hosts[q->flows[reduced_hash].srchost].srchost_bulk_flow_count--; - if (allocate_dst) - q->hosts[q->flows[reduced_hash].dsthost].dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; + cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[outer_hash + k], flow_mode); + cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[outer_hash + k], flow_mode); } found: /* reserve queue for future packets in same flow */ @@ -817,9 +872,10 @@ static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, q->hosts[outer_hash + k].srchost_tag = srchost_hash; found_src: srchost_idx = outer_hash + k; - if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) - q->hosts[srchost_idx].srchost_bulk_flow_count++; q->flows[reduced_hash].srchost = srchost_idx; + + if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) + cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[reduced_hash], flow_mode); } if (allocate_dst) { @@ -840,9 +896,10 @@ static u32 cake_hash(struct cake_tin_data *q, const struct sk_buff *skb, q->hosts[outer_hash + k].dsthost_tag = dsthost_hash; found_dst: dsthost_idx = outer_hash + k; - if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) - q->hosts[dsthost_idx].dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; q->flows[reduced_hash].dsthost = dsthost_idx; + + if (q->flows[reduced_hash].set == CAKE_SET_BULK) + cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(q, &q->flows[reduced_hash], flow_mode); } } @@ -1855,10 +1912,6 @@ static s32 cake_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, /* flowchain */ if (!flow->set || flow->set == CAKE_SET_DECAYING) { - struct cake_host *srchost = &b->hosts[flow->srchost]; - struct cake_host *dsthost = &b->hosts[flow->dsthost]; - u16 host_load = 1; - if (!flow->set) { list_add_tail(&flow->flowchain, &b->new_flows); } else { @@ -1868,18 +1921,8 @@ static s32 cake_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, flow->set = CAKE_SET_SPARSE; b->sparse_flow_count++; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count); - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count); - - flow->deficit = (b->flow_quantum * - quantum_div[host_load]) >> 16; + flow->deficit = cake_get_flow_quantum(b, flow, q->flow_mode); } else if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_SPARSE_WAIT) { - struct cake_host *srchost = &b->hosts[flow->srchost]; - struct cake_host *dsthost = &b->hosts[flow->dsthost]; - /* this flow was empty, accounted as a sparse flow, but actually * in the bulk rotation. */ @@ -1887,12 +1930,8 @@ static s32 cake_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, struct Qdisc *sch, b->sparse_flow_count--; b->bulk_flow_count++; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count++; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; - + cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); } if (q->buffer_used > q->buffer_max_used) @@ -1949,13 +1988,11 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) { struct cake_sched_data *q = qdisc_priv(sch); struct cake_tin_data *b = &q->tins[q->cur_tin]; - struct cake_host *srchost, *dsthost; ktime_t now = ktime_get(); struct cake_flow *flow; struct list_head *head; bool first_flow = true; struct sk_buff *skb; - u16 host_load; u64 delay; u32 len; @@ -2055,11 +2092,6 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) q->cur_flow = flow - b->flows; first_flow = false; - /* triple isolation (modified DRR++) */ - srchost = &b->hosts[flow->srchost]; - dsthost = &b->hosts[flow->dsthost]; - host_load = 1; - /* flow isolation (DRR++) */ if (flow->deficit <= 0) { /* Keep all flows with deficits out of the sparse and decaying @@ -2071,11 +2103,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) b->sparse_flow_count--; b->bulk_flow_count++; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count++; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count++; + cake_inc_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_inc_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); flow->set = CAKE_SET_BULK; } else { @@ -2087,19 +2116,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) } } - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count); - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - host_load = max(host_load, dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count); - - WARN_ON(host_load > CAKE_QUEUES); - - /* The shifted prandom_u32() is a way to apply dithering to - * avoid accumulating roundoff errors - */ - flow->deficit += (b->flow_quantum * quantum_div[host_load] + - (prandom_u32() >> 16)) >> 16; + flow->deficit += cake_get_flow_quantum(b, flow, q->flow_mode); list_move_tail(&flow->flowchain, &b->old_flows); goto retry; @@ -2123,11 +2140,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_BULK) { b->bulk_flow_count--; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count--; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; + cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); b->decaying_flow_count++; } else if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_SPARSE || @@ -2145,12 +2159,8 @@ static struct sk_buff *cake_dequeue(struct Qdisc *sch) else if (flow->set == CAKE_SET_BULK) { b->bulk_flow_count--; - if (cake_dsrc(q->flow_mode)) - srchost->srchost_bulk_flow_count--; - - if (cake_ddst(q->flow_mode)) - dsthost->dsthost_bulk_flow_count--; - + cake_dec_srchost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); + cake_dec_dsthost_bulk_flow_count(b, flow, q->flow_mode); } else b->decaying_flow_count--; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: conntrack: clamp maximum hashtable size to INT_MAX
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.13-rc7 commit b541ba7d1f5a5b7b3e2e22dc9e40e18a7d6dbc13 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBIQQN CVE: CVE-2025-21648 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Use INT_MAX as maximum size for the conntrack hashtable. Otherwise, it is possible to hit WARN_ON_ONCE in __kvmalloc_node_noprof() when resizing hashtable because __GFP_NOWARN is unset. See: 0708a0afe291 ("mm: Consider __GFP_NOWARN flag for oversized kvmalloc() calls") Note: hashtable resize is only possible from init_netns. Fixes: 9cc1c73ad666 ("netfilter: conntrack: avoid integer overflow when resizing") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c index f2634cda262c..9090d677ddfa 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.c @@ -2435,12 +2435,15 @@ void *nf_ct_alloc_hashtable(unsigned int *sizep, int nulls) struct hlist_nulls_head *hash; unsigned int nr_slots, i; - if (*sizep > (UINT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) + if (*sizep > (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) return NULL; BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head) != sizeof(struct hlist_head)); nr_slots = *sizep = roundup(*sizep, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head)); + if (nr_slots > (INT_MAX / sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head))) + return NULL; + hash = kvcalloc(nr_slots, sizeof(struct hlist_nulls_head), GFP_KERNEL); if (hash && nulls) -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] net: inet6: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in inet6_create()
by Dong Chenchen 15 Feb '25

15 Feb '25

From: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.231 commit 35360255ca30776dee34d9fa764cffa24d0a5f65 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IBEAPG CVE: CVE-2024-56600 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 9df99c395d0f55fb444ef39f4d6f194ca437d884 ] sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk pointer to the provided sock object. If inet6_create() fails later, the sk object is released, but the sock object retains the dangling sk pointer, which may cause use-after-free later. Clear the sock sk pointer on error. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat(a)cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu(a)amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241014153808.51894-8-ignat@cloudflare.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c index 3bd7e3a04229..bf23dbbf7536 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c @@ -259,31 +259,29 @@ static int inet6_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, */ inet->inet_sport = htons(inet->inet_num); err = sk->sk_prot->hash(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } if (sk->sk_prot->init) { err = sk->sk_prot->init(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } if (!kern) { err = BPF_CGROUP_RUN_PROG_INET_SOCK(sk); - if (err) { - sk_common_release(sk); - goto out; - } + if (err) + goto out_sk_release; } out: return err; out_rcu_unlock: rcu_read_unlock(); goto out; +out_sk_release: + sk_common_release(sk); + sock->sk = NULL; + goto out; } static int __inet6_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len, -- 2.25.1

2 1