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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Fix UAF when handle evt during iommu group removing
by Ding Hui 20 Apr '23

20 Apr '23

driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6WKM7 CVE: NA -------- A use-after-free issue like following: [ 2257.819189] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: EVTQ overflow detected -- events lost [ 2257.819197] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: event 0x10 received: [ 2257.819199] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x0000820000000010 [ 2257.819201] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x0000020000000000 [ 2257.819202] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x00000000dfea7218 [ 2257.819206] iommu: Removing device 0000:82:00.0 from group 49 [ 2257.819207] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x00000000dfea7000 [ 2257.819211] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: event 0x10 received: [ 2257.819212] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x0000820000000010 [ 2257.819214] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x0000020000000000 [ 2257.819215] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x00000000dfea722c [ 2257.819216] arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.4.auto: 0x00000000dfea7000 [ 2257.819218] ================================================================== [ 2257.819228] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in iommu_report_device_fault+0x520/0x5c0 [ 2257.819230] Read of size 8 at addr ffffa02c516c1320 by task irq/63-arm-smmu/483 [ 2257.819231] [ 2257.819235] CPU: 25 PID: 483 Comm: irq/63-arm-smmu Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 4.19.90-2205.3.0.0149.oe1.aarch64+debug #1 [ 2257.819236] Hardware name: Huawei S920S00/BC82AMDGK, BIOS 1.68 11/10/2020 [ 2257.819237] Call trace: [ 2257.819240] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x320 [ 2257.819242] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 2257.819246] dump_stack+0xdc/0x128 [ 2257.819251] print_address_description+0x68/0x278 [ 2257.819253] kasan_report+0x1e4/0x308 [ 2257.819254] __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x30/0x40 [ 2257.819257] iommu_report_device_fault+0x520/0x5c0 [ 2257.819260] arm_smmu_handle_evt+0x300/0x428 [ 2257.819261] arm_smmu_evtq_thread+0x27c/0x460 [ 2257.819264] irq_thread_fn+0x88/0x140 [ 2257.819266] irq_thread+0x190/0x318 [ 2257.819268] kthread+0x2a4/0x320 [ 2257.819270] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 [ 2257.819271] [ 2257.819273] Allocated by task 95166: [ 2257.819275] kasan_kmalloc+0xd0/0x178 [ 2257.819277] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x100/0x210 [ 2257.819279] iommu_group_add_device+0x254/0xe18 [ 2257.819280] iommu_group_get_for_dev+0x198/0x480 [ 2257.819282] arm_smmu_add_device+0x424/0x988 [ 2257.819284] iort_iommu_configure+0x33c/0x5b8 [ 2257.819287] acpi_dma_configure+0x9c/0xf8 [ 2257.819289] pci_dma_configure+0x124/0x158 [ 2257.819291] dma_configure+0x5c/0x80 [ 2257.819294] really_probe+0xcc/0x920 [ 2257.819296] driver_probe_device+0x224/0x308 [ 2257.819298] __device_attach_driver+0x154/0x260 [ 2257.819299] bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x178 [ 2257.819301] __device_attach+0x1bc/0x2a8 [ 2257.819302] device_attach+0x24/0x30 [ 2257.819304] pci_bus_add_device+0x7c/0xe8 [ 2257.819305] pci_bus_add_devices+0x70/0x168 [ 2257.819307] pci_bus_add_devices+0x114/0x168 [ 2257.819308] pci_rescan_bus+0x38/0x48 [ 2257.819310] bus_rescan_store+0xc4/0xe8 [ 2257.819312] bus_attr_store+0x70/0x98 [ 2257.819314] sysfs_kf_write+0x104/0x170 [ 2257.819316] kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x430 [ 2257.819319] __vfs_write+0x7c/0xe8 [ 2257.819320] vfs_write+0x12c/0x3d0 [ 2257.819321] ksys_write+0xd4/0x1d8 [ 2257.819322] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa0 [ 2257.819325] el0_svc_common+0xfc/0x278 [ 2257.819327] el0_svc_handler+0x50/0xc0 [ 2257.819329] el0_svc+0x8/0x1b0 [ 2257.819329] [ 2257.819330] Freed by task 95166: [ 2257.819332] __kasan_slab_free+0x114/0x200 [ 2257.819334] kasan_slab_free+0x10/0x18 [ 2257.819335] kfree+0x80/0x1f0 [ 2257.819337] iommu_group_remove_device+0x27c/0x560 [ 2257.819338] arm_smmu_remove_device+0xe8/0x190 [ 2257.819339] iommu_bus_notifier+0x134/0x248 [ 2257.819342] notifier_call_chain+0xb0/0x140 [ 2257.819343] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6c/0xd8 [ 2257.819344] device_del+0x578/0x940 [ 2257.819346] pci_remove_bus_device+0x114/0x290 [ 2257.819347] pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x2c/0x40 [ 2257.819349] remove_store+0xdc/0xe8 [ 2257.819352] dev_attr_store+0x60/0x80 [ 2257.819353] sysfs_kf_write+0x104/0x170 [ 2257.819354] kernfs_fop_write+0x23c/0x430 [ 2257.819355] __vfs_write+0x7c/0xe8 [ 2257.819357] vfs_write+0x12c/0x3d0 [ 2257.819358] ksys_write+0xd4/0x1d8 [ 2257.819359] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa0 [ 2257.819361] el0_svc_common+0xfc/0x278 [ 2257.819362] el0_svc_handler+0x50/0xc0 [ 2257.819364] el0_svc+0x8/0x1b0 [ 2257.819364] T0 T1 --------------------------------- --------------------------------- |- arm_smmu_evtq_thread |- arm_smmu_remove_device |- arm_smmu_handle_evt |- iommu_group_remove_device |- kfree(dev->iommu_param) |- arm_smmu_find_master |- iommu_report_device_fault |- arm_smmu_remove_master |- mutex_lock( \ &dev->iommu_param->lock) // UAF Reference upstream mainline commit 395ad89d11fd93f79a6b942e91fc409807a63c4b, move arm_smmu_remove_master() before iommu_group_remove_device(), and hold mutex to protect finding master and subsequent handling. Fixes: b525f0a6f9b0 ("iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Add stall support for platform devices") Signed-off-by: Ding Hui <dinghui(a)sangfor.com.cn> --- drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c | 15 ++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c index 3309ae6ebc0b..05cb92da6836 100644 --- a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c +++ b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c @@ -1742,7 +1742,8 @@ arm_smmu_find_master(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, u32 sid) struct arm_smmu_stream *stream; struct arm_smmu_master_data *master = NULL; - mutex_lock(&smmu->streams_mutex); + lockdep_assert_held(&smmu->streams_mutex); + node = smmu->streams.rb_node; while (node) { stream = rb_entry(node, struct arm_smmu_stream, node); @@ -1755,7 +1756,6 @@ arm_smmu_find_master(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, u32 sid) break; } } - mutex_unlock(&smmu->streams_mutex); return master; } @@ -1791,9 +1791,12 @@ static int arm_smmu_handle_evt(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, u64 *evt) if (evt[1] & EVTQ_1_S2) return -EFAULT; + mutex_lock(&smmu->streams_mutex); master = arm_smmu_find_master(smmu, sid); - if (!master) - return -EINVAL; + if (!master) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out_unlock; + } /* * The domain is valid until the fault returns, because detach() flushes @@ -1833,6 +1836,8 @@ static int arm_smmu_handle_evt(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, u64 *evt) arm_smmu_page_response(master->dev, &resp); } +out_unlock: + mutex_unlock(&smmu->streams_mutex); return ret; } @@ -2935,8 +2940,8 @@ static void arm_smmu_remove_device(struct device *dev) iopf_queue_remove_device(dev); if (master->ste.assigned) arm_smmu_detach_dev(dev); - iommu_group_remove_device(dev); arm_smmu_remove_master(smmu, master); + iommu_group_remove_device(dev); iommu_device_unlink(&smmu->iommu, dev); kfree(master); iommu_fwspec_free(dev); -- 2.17.1

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ODD2023-Kernel SIG 开放工作会议
by openEuler conference 19 Apr '23

19 Apr '23

您好！ Kernel SIG 邀请您参加 2023-04-21 16:00 召开的Zoom会议(自动录制) 会议主题：ODD2023-Kernel SIG 开放工作会议会议内容： 1. 华中大网安学院内核贡献团队组建经验分享 2. 互联网领域的挑战与技术 3. ext4文件系统问题（一致性、稳定性）的挖掘和定位 4. 可编程内核技术落地场景分享和未来畅想欢迎继续申报议题~ 会议链接：https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88277699752?pwd=VTB3ZjhFR1pKd0syc3NpMDVDcVRvZz09 会议纪要：https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/ODD2023_Kernel_SIG 温馨提醒：建议接入会议后修改参会人的姓名，也可以使用您在gitee.com的ID 更多资讯尽在：https://openeuler.org/zh/ Hello! openEuler Kernel SIG invites you to attend the Zoom conference(auto recording) will be held at 2023-04-21 16:00, The subject of the conference is ODD2023-Kernel SIG 开放工作会议, Summary: 1. 华中大网安学院内核贡献团队组建经验分享 2. 互联网领域的挑战与技术 3. ext4文件系统问题（一致性、稳定性）的挖掘和定位 4. 可编程内核技术落地场景分享和未来畅想欢迎继续申报议题~ You can join the meeting at https://us06web.zoom.us/j/88277699752?pwd=VTB3ZjhFR1pKd0syc3NpMDVDcVRvZz09. Add topics at https://etherpad.openeuler.org/p/ODD2023_Kernel_SIG. Note: You are advised to change the participant name after joining the conference or use your ID at gitee.com. More information: https://openeuler.org/en/

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一文解锁 → openEuler Developer Day 2023 游玩指南
by openEuler 19 Apr '23

19 Apr '23

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/2] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
by Yongqiang Liu 19 Apr '23

19 Apr '23

From: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.276 commit 10543fb3c9b019e45e2045f08f46fdf526add593 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6V7TU CVE: CVE-2023-1998 -------------------------------- commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream. When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed. The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which STIBP protects. Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter). [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS") Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo(a)kernelhacking.com> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiongfeng Wang <wangxiongfeng2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 836000481438..a7becbe9a890 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -973,14 +973,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1043,12 +1047,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -2084,7 +2095,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { -- 2.25.1

1 1

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS 00/26] Backport CVEs and bugfixes
by Jialin Zhang 18 Apr '23

18 Apr '23

Pull new CVEs: CVE-2023-1829 CVE-2022-36280 CVE-2022-1015 CVE-2023-1989 CVE-2023-30456 CVE-2023-1990 xfs bugfixes from Long Li and yangerkun

1 26

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP1 00/26] Backport CVEs and bugfixes
by Jialin Zhang 18 Apr '23

18 Apr '23

Pull new CVEs: CVE-2023-1829 CVE-2022-36280 CVE-2022-1015 CVE-2023-1989 CVE-2023-30456 CVE-2023-1990 xfs bugfixes from Long Li and yangerkun

1 26

[PATCH OLK-5.10 00/26] Backport CVEs and bugfixes
by Jialin Zhang 18 Apr '23

18 Apr '23

Pull new CVEs: CVE-2023-1829 CVE-2022-36280 CVE-2022-1015 CVE-2023-1989 CVE-2023-30456 CVE-2023-1990 xfs bugfixes from Long Li and yangerkun

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 000/370] Backport 5.10.150 LTS
by Jialin Zhang 18 Apr '23

18 Apr '23

Backport 5.10.150 LTS patches from upstream. Conflicts: Already merged(19): f039b43cbaea inet: fully convert sk->sk_rx_dst to RCU rules 45c33966759e mm: hugetlb: fix UAF in hugetlb_handle_userfault c378c479c517 io_uring/af_unix: defer registered files gc to io_uring release 67cbc8865a66 io_uring: correct pinned_vm accounting 904f881b5736 arm64: topology: fix possible overflow in amu_fie_setup() dbcca76435a6 HID: roccat: Fix use-after-free in roccat_read() 484400d433ca r8152: Rate limit overflow messages d88b88514ef2 crypto: hisilicon/zip - fix mismatch in get/set sgl_sge_nr 657de36c72f5 arm64: ftrace: fix module PLTs with mcount 29f50bcf0f8b net: mvpp2: fix mvpp2 debugfs leak 6cc0e2afc6a1 bnx2x: fix potential memory leak in bnx2x_tpa_stop() 2a1d03632085 mISDN: fix use-after-free bugs in l1oip timer handlers 0cf6c09dafee ring-buffer: Fix race between reset page and reading page fbb0e601bd51 ext4: ext4_read_bh_lock() should submit IO if the buffer isn't uptodate 483831ad0440 ext4: fix check for block being out of directory size f34ab9516276 ext4: fix null-ptr-deref in ext4_write_info e50472949604 fbdev: smscufx: Fix use-after-free in ufx_ops_open() 7d551b7d6114 block: fix inflight statistics of part0 6b7ae4a904a4 quota: Check next/prev free block number after reading from quota file Context conflict(1): c13d0d2f5a48 usb: host: xhci-plat: suspend and resume clocks Total patches: 389 - 19 = 370

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[PATCH OLK-5.10] x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
by Wei Li 18 Apr '23

18 Apr '23

From: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.173 commit abfed855f05863d292de2d0ebab4656791bab9c8 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6V7TU CVE: CVE-2023-1998 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 6921ed9049bc7457f66c1596c5b78aec0dae4a9d upstream. When plain IBRS is enabled (not enhanced IBRS), the logic in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() determines that STIBP is not needed. The IBRS bit implicitly protects against cross-thread branch target injection. However, with legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit is cleared on returning to userspace for performance reasons which leaves userspace threads vulnerable to cross-thread branch target injection against which STIBP protects. Exclude IBRS from the spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() check to allow for enabling STIBP (through seccomp/prctl() by default or always-on, if selected by spectre_v2_user kernel cmdline parameter). [ bp: Massage. ] Fixes: 7c693f54c873 ("x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS") Reported-by: José Oliveira <joseloliveira11(a)gmail.com> Reported-by: Rodrigo Branco <rodrigo(a)kernelhacking.com> Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp(a)alien8.de> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220120127.1975241-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230221184908.2349578-1-kpsingh@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 25f3fad210e0..0dd4f8a8d821 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1051,14 +1051,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1121,12 +1125,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -2220,7 +2231,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH v3] mm: oom: move memcg_print_bad_task() out of mem_cgroup_scan_tasks()
by Kang Chen 17 Apr '23

17 Apr '23

hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NYW4 CVE: NA -------------------------------- raw call flow: oom_kill_process -> mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(.., .., message) -> memcg_print_bad_task(message, ..) message is "const char*" type, and incorrectly cast to "oom_control*" type in memcg_print_bad_task. Fix it by moving memcg_print_bad_task out of mem_cgroup_scan_tasks and call it in select_bad_process and dump_tasks. Furthermore, use struct oom_control* directly and remove the useless parm `ret`. Signed-off-by: Kang Chen <void0red(a)hust.edu.cn> --- v3 -> v2: use type `struct oom_control *` directly and fix bugs v2 -> v1: remove parm `ret` and create a memcg_print_bad_task stub mm/memcontrol.c | 16 +++++++++------- mm/oom_kill.c | 14 ++++++++------ 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c index 635cb8b65b86..6b4f70d090d6 100644 --- a/mm/memcontrol.c +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c @@ -1214,9 +1214,6 @@ int mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(struct mem_cgroup *memcg, break; } } -#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_QOS - memcg_print_bad_task(arg, ret); -#endif return ret; } @@ -4004,14 +4001,12 @@ bool memcg_low_priority_scan_tasks(int (*fn)(struct task_struct *, void *), return oc->chosen ? true : false; } -void memcg_print_bad_task(void *arg, int ret) +void memcg_print_bad_task(struct oom_control *oc) { - struct oom_control *oc = arg; - if (!static_branch_likely(&memcg_qos_stat_key)) return; - if (!ret && oc->chosen) { + if (oc->chosen) { struct mem_cgroup *memcg; memcg = mem_cgroup_from_task(oc->chosen); @@ -4042,6 +4037,13 @@ int sysctl_memcg_qos_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, return ret; } + +#else + +void memcg_print_bad_task(struct oom_control *oc) +{ +} + #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c index 0f77eb4c6644..9d595265bbf5 100644 --- a/mm/oom_kill.c +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c @@ -408,9 +408,10 @@ static void select_bad_process(struct oom_control *oc) { oc->chosen_points = LONG_MIN; - if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) - mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, oom_evaluate_task, oc); - else { + if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) { + if (!mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, oom_evaluate_task, oc)) + memcg_print_bad_task(oc); + } else { struct task_struct *p; #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_QOS @@ -473,9 +474,10 @@ static void dump_tasks(struct oom_control *oc) pr_info("Tasks state (memory values in pages):\n"); pr_info("[ pid ] uid tgid total_vm rss pgtables_bytes swapents oom_score_adj name\n"); - if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) - mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, dump_task, oc); - else { + if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) { + if (!mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, dump_task, oc)) + memcg_print_bad_task(oc); + } else { struct task_struct *p; rcu_read_lock(); -- 2.34.1

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