- Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[openeuler:OLK-6.6 2753/2753] drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c:176:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer'
by kernel test robot 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

tree: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel.git OLK-6.6 head: 71bbca0322aee9dfe26f2a23ab54f5cfca1dd85c commit: 07a6747f952bd8a1ee87d6f5d74448c64fbb152e [2753/2753] i2c: zhaoxin: Add support for Zhaoxin I2C controller config: x86_64-buildonly-randconfig-001-20250827 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250827/202508271625.s6br6gQM-lkp@…) compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250827/202508271625.s6br6gQM-lkp@…) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202508271625.s6br6gQM-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): In file included from drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c:12: In file included from include/linux/i2c.h:19: In file included from include/linux/regulator/consumer.h:35: In file included from include/linux/suspend.h:5: In file included from include/linux/swap.h:9: In file included from include/linux/memcontrol.h:20: In file included from include/linux/mm.h:2235: include/linux/vmstat.h:522:36: warning: arithmetic between different enumeration types ('enum node_stat_item' and 'enum lru_list') [-Wenum-enum-conversion] 522 | return node_stat_name(NR_LRU_BASE + lru) + 3; // skip "nr_" | ~~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~ >> drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c:176:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 176 | int zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer(struct zxi2c *i2c, bool irq) | ^ drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c:176:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit 176 | int zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer(struct zxi2c *i2c, bool irq) | ^ | static >> drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c:314:5: warning: no previous prototype for function 'zxi2c_xfer' [-Wmissing-prototypes] 314 | int zxi2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[], int num) | ^ drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c:314:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit 314 | int zxi2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[], int num) | ^ | static 3 warnings generated. vim +/zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer +176 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-zhaoxin.c 174 175 /* 'irq == true' means in interrupt context */ > 176 int zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer(struct zxi2c *i2c, bool irq) 177 { 178 u16 i; 179 u8 tmp; 180 struct i2c_msg *msg = i2c->msg; 181 void __iomem *base = i2c->base; 182 bool read = !!(msg->flags & I2C_M_RD); 183 184 if (irq) { 185 /* get the received data */ 186 if (read) 187 for (i = 0; i < i2c->xfer_len; i++) 188 msg->buf[i2c->xfered_len + i] = ioread8(base + ZXI2C_REG_HRDR); 189 190 i2c->xfered_len += i2c->xfer_len; 191 if (i2c->xfered_len == msg->len) 192 return 1; 193 } 194 195 /* reset fifo buffer */ 196 tmp = ioread8(base + ZXI2C_REG_HCR); 197 iowrite8(tmp | ZXI2C_HCR_RST_FIFO, base + ZXI2C_REG_HCR); 198 199 /* set xfer len */ 200 i2c->xfer_len = min_t(u16, msg->len - i2c->xfered_len, ZXI2C_FIFO_SIZE); 201 if (read) { 202 iowrite8(i2c->xfer_len - 1, base + ZXI2C_REG_HRLR); 203 } else { 204 iowrite8(i2c->xfer_len - 1, base + ZXI2C_REG_HTLR); 205 /* set write data */ 206 for (i = 0; i < i2c->xfer_len; i++) 207 iowrite8(msg->buf[i2c->xfered_len + i], base + ZXI2C_REG_HTDR); 208 } 209 210 /* prepare to stop transmission */ 211 if (i2c->hrv && msg->len == (i2c->xfered_len + i2c->xfer_len)) { 212 tmp = ioread8(base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 213 tmp |= read ? ZXI2C_CR_RX_END : ZXI2C_CR_TX_END; 214 iowrite8(tmp, base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 215 } 216 217 if (irq) { 218 /* continue transmission */ 219 tmp = ioread8(base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 220 iowrite8(tmp |= ZXI2C_CR_CPU_RDY, base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 221 } else { 222 u16 tcr_val = i2c->tcr; 223 224 /* start transmission */ 225 tcr_val |= read ? ZXI2C_TCR_READ : 0; 226 writew(tcr_val | msg->addr, base + ZXI2C_REG_TCR); 227 } 228 229 return 0; 230 } 231 232 static irqreturn_t zxi2c_isr(int irq, void *data) 233 { 234 struct zxi2c *i2c = data; 235 void __iomem *base = i2c->base; 236 u8 status; 237 238 /* save the status and write-clear it */ 239 status = readw(base + ZXI2C_REG_ISR); 240 if (!status) 241 return IRQ_NONE; 242 243 writew(status, base + ZXI2C_REG_ISR); 244 245 i2c->ret = 0; 246 if (status & ZXI2C_ISR_NACK_ADDR) 247 i2c->ret = -EIO; 248 249 if (!i2c->ret) { 250 if (i2c->mode == ZXI2C_BYTE_MODE) 251 i2c->ret = zxi2c_irq_xfer(i2c); 252 else 253 i2c->ret = zxi2c_fifo_irq_xfer(i2c, true); 254 } 255 256 if (i2c->ret) 257 complete(&i2c->complete); 258 259 return IRQ_HANDLED; 260 } 261 262 static int zxi2c_write(struct zxi2c *i2c, struct i2c_msg *msg, int last) 263 { 264 u16 tcr_val = i2c->tcr; 265 void __iomem *base = i2c->base; 266 267 i2c->last = last; 268 269 writew(msg->buf[0] & 0xFF, base + ZXI2C_REG_CDR); 270 271 reinit_completion(&i2c->complete); 272 273 tcr_val |= msg->addr & 0x7f; 274 275 writew(tcr_val, base + ZXI2C_REG_TCR); 276 277 if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&i2c->complete, ZXI2C_TIMEOUT)) 278 return -ETIMEDOUT; 279 280 return i2c->ret; 281 } 282 283 static int zxi2c_read(struct zxi2c *i2c, struct i2c_msg *msg, bool first) 284 { 285 u16 val, tcr_val = i2c->tcr; 286 void __iomem *base = i2c->base; 287 288 val = readw(base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 289 val &= ~(ZXI2C_CR_TX_END | ZXI2C_CR_RX_END); 290 291 if (msg->len == 1) 292 val |= ZXI2C_CR_RX_END; 293 294 writew(val, base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 295 296 reinit_completion(&i2c->complete); 297 298 tcr_val |= ZXI2C_TCR_READ | (msg->addr & 0x7f); 299 300 writew(tcr_val, base + ZXI2C_REG_TCR); 301 302 if (!first) { 303 val = readw(base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 304 val |= ZXI2C_CR_CPU_RDY; 305 writew(val, base + ZXI2C_REG_CR); 306 } 307 308 if (!wait_for_completion_timeout(&i2c->complete, ZXI2C_TIMEOUT)) 309 return -ETIMEDOUT; 310 311 return i2c->ret; 312 } 313 > 314 int zxi2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[], int num) 315 { 316 struct i2c_msg *msg; 317 int i; 318 int ret = 0; 319 struct zxi2c *i2c = i2c_get_adapdata(adap); 320 321 i2c->mode = ZXI2C_BYTE_MODE; 322 for (i = 0; ret >= 0 && i < num; i++) { 323 i2c->msg = msg = &msgs[i]; 324 i2c->xfered_len = 0; 325 if (msg->len == 0) 326 return -EIO; 327 328 if (msg->flags & I2C_M_RD) 329 ret = zxi2c_read(i2c, msg, i == 0); 330 else 331 ret = zxi2c_write(i2c, msg, (i + 1) == num); 332 } 333 334 return (ret < 0) ? ret : i; 335 } 336 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

1 0

[PATCH OLK-6.6] page_pool: Fix use-after-free in page_pool_recycle_in_ring
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 271683bb2cf32e5126c592b5d5e6a756fa374fd9 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/ICUI9J Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… ------------------------------- syzbot reported a uaf in page_pool_recycle_in_ring: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_release+0x151/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5862 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880286045a0 by task syz.0.284/6943 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6943 Comm: syz.0.284 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-gdfa94ce54f41 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:489 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602 lock_release+0x151/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5862 __raw_spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:165 [inline] _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x1b/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:210 spin_unlock_bh include/linux/spinlock.h:396 [inline] ptr_ring_produce_bh include/linux/ptr_ring.h:164 [inline] page_pool_recycle_in_ring net/core/page_pool.c:707 [inline] page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x748/0xb00 net/core/page_pool.c:826 page_pool_put_netmem include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:323 [inline] page_pool_put_full_netmem include/net/page_pool/helpers.h:353 [inline] napi_pp_put_page+0x149/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1036 skb_pp_recycle net/core/skbuff.c:1047 [inline] skb_free_head net/core/skbuff.c:1094 [inline] skb_release_data+0x6c4/0x8a0 net/core/skbuff.c:1125 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1190 [inline] __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1204 [inline] sk_skb_reason_drop+0x1c9/0x380 net/core/skbuff.c:1242 kfree_skb_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:1263 [inline] __skb_queue_purge_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:3343 [inline] root cause is: page_pool_recycle_in_ring ptr_ring_produce spin_lock(&r->producer_lock); WRITE_ONCE(r->queue[r->producer++], ptr) //recycle last page to pool page_pool_release page_pool_scrub page_pool_empty_ring ptr_ring_consume page_pool_return_page //release all page __page_pool_destroy free_percpu(pool->recycle_stats); free(pool) //free spin_unlock(&r->producer_lock); //pool->ring uaf read recycle_stat_inc(pool, ring); page_pool can be free while page pool recycle the last page in ring. Add producer-lock barrier to page_pool_release to prevent the page pool from being free before all pages have been recycled. recycle_stat_inc() is empty when CONFIG_PAGE_POOL_STATS is not enabled, which will trigger Wempty-body build warning. Add definition for pool stat macro to fix warning. Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20250513083123.3514193-1-dongchenchen2@huawe… Fixes: ff7d6b27f894 ("page_pool: refurbish version of page_pool code") Reported-by: syzbot+204a4382fcb3311f3858(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=204a4382fcb3311f3858 Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke(a)redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mina Almasry <almasrymina(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250527114152.3119109-1-dongchenchen2@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: net/core/page_pool.c [commit 4dec64c52e24 and 7aee8429eedd are not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/page_pool.c | 27 ++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/page_pool.c b/net/core/page_pool.c index 2f2f63c8cf4b..cb7238043a33 100644 --- a/net/core/page_pool.c +++ b/net/core/page_pool.c @@ -140,9 +140,9 @@ u64 *page_pool_ethtool_stats_get(u64 *data, void *stats) EXPORT_SYMBOL(page_pool_ethtool_stats_get); #else -#define alloc_stat_inc(pool, __stat) -#define recycle_stat_inc(pool, __stat) -#define recycle_stat_add(pool, __stat, val) +#define alloc_stat_inc(...) do { } while (0) +#define recycle_stat_inc(...) do { } while (0) +#define recycle_stat_add(...) do { } while (0) #endif static bool page_pool_producer_lock(struct page_pool *pool) @@ -547,19 +547,16 @@ static void page_pool_return_page(struct page_pool *pool, struct page *page) static bool page_pool_recycle_in_ring(struct page_pool *pool, struct page *page) { - int ret; - /* BH protection not needed if current is softirq */ - if (in_softirq()) - ret = ptr_ring_produce(&pool->ring, page); - else - ret = ptr_ring_produce_bh(&pool->ring, page); + bool in_softirq, ret; - if (!ret) { + /* BH protection not needed if current is softirq */ + in_softirq = page_pool_producer_lock(pool); + ret = !__ptr_ring_produce(&pool->ring, page); + if (ret) recycle_stat_inc(pool, ring); - return true; - } + page_pool_producer_unlock(pool, in_softirq); - return false; + return ret; } /* Only allow direct recycling in special circumstances, into the @@ -848,10 +845,14 @@ static void page_pool_scrub(struct page_pool *pool) static int page_pool_release(struct page_pool *pool) { + bool in_softirq; int inflight; page_pool_scrub(pool); inflight = page_pool_inflight(pool); + /* Acquire producer lock to make sure producers have exited. */ + in_softirq = page_pool_producer_lock(pool); + page_pool_producer_unlock(pool, in_softirq); if (!inflight) page_pool_free(pool); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] bpf, sockmap: Fix CVE-2025-38154
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

Fix CVE-2025-38154 Jiayuan Chen (2): bpf, sockmap: fix duplicated data transmission bpf, sockmap: Avoid using sk_socket after free when sending net/core/skmsg.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: clamp maximum map bucket size to INT_MAX
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit b85e3367a5716ed3662a4fe266525190d2af76df category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICK4OD CVE: CVE-2025-38201 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- Otherwise, it is possible to hit WARN_ON_ONCE in __kvmalloc_node_noprof() when resizing hashtable because __GFP_NOWARN is unset. Similar to: b541ba7d1f5a ("netfilter: conntrack: clamp maximum hashtable size to INT_MAX") Reviewed-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Conflicts: net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c [commit 07ace0bbe03b and 9f439bd6ef4f are not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c index 4274831b6e67..ebd0f704c863 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c @@ -667,6 +667,11 @@ static int pipapo_resize(struct nft_pipapo_field *f, int old_rules, int rules) } mt: + if (rules > (INT_MAX / sizeof(*new_mt))) { + kvfree(new_lt); + return -ENOMEM; + } + new_mt = kvmalloc(rules * sizeof(*new_mt), GFP_KERNEL); if (!new_mt) { kvfree(new_lt); @@ -1359,6 +1364,9 @@ static struct nft_pipapo_match *pipapo_clone(struct nft_pipapo_match *old) src->bsize * sizeof(*dst->lt) * src->groups * NFT_PIPAPO_BUCKETS(src->bb)); + if (src->rules > (INT_MAX / sizeof(*src->mt))) + goto out_mt; + dst->mt = kvmalloc(src->rules * sizeof(*src->mt), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dst->mt) goto out_mt; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net: lan743x: fix potential out-of-bounds write in lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get()
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

From: Alexey Kodanev <aleksei.kodanev(a)bell-sw.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.95 commit 66bba1fd5bad548c03f7e42669a59f3f4d8211cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICK4NT CVE: CVE-2025-38183 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e353b0854d3a1a31cb061df8d022fbfea53a0f24 ] Before calling lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(), the 'channel' value is checked against the maximum value of PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS(8). This seems correct and aligns with the PTP interrupt status register (PTP_INT_STS) specifications. However, lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get() writes to ptp->extts[] with only LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS(4) elements, using channel as an index: lan743x_ptp_io_event_clock_get(..., u8 channel,...) { ... /* Update Local timestamp */ extts = &ptp->extts[channel]; extts->ts.tv_sec = sec; ... } To avoid an out-of-bounds write and utilize all the supported GPIO inputs, set LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS to 8. Detected using the static analysis tool - Svace. Fixes: 60942c397af6 ("net: lan743x: Add support for PTP-IO Event Input External Timestamp (extts)") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <aleksei.kodanev(a)bell-sw.com> Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller(a)intel.com> Acked-by: Rengarajan S <rengarajan.s(a)microchip.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250616113743.36284-1-aleksei.kodanev@bell-sw.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_ptp.h [commit b1de3c0df7ab is not backport] Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_ptp.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_ptp.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_ptp.h index e26d4eff7133..b7f2d425427d 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_ptp.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan743x_ptp.h @@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ */ #define LAN743X_PTP_N_EVENT_CHAN 2 #define LAN743X_PTP_N_PEROUT LAN743X_PTP_N_EVENT_CHAN -#define LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS 4 -#define LAN743X_PTP_N_PPS 0 #define PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS 8 +#define LAN743X_PTP_N_EXTTS PCI11X1X_PTP_IO_MAX_CHANNELS +#define LAN743X_PTP_N_PPS 0 struct lan743x_adapter; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6 0/2] net: xfrm: Fix CVE-2025-38097
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

Fix CVE-2025-38097 Dong Chenchen (1): net: xfrm: Fix kabi breakage of struct xfrm_state Sabrina Dubroca (1): espintcp: remove encap socket caching to avoid reference leak net/ipv4/esp4.c | 49 ++++--------------------------------------- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 49 ++++--------------------------------------- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 3 --- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

2 3

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.94 commit 2e36a81d388ec9c3f78b6223f7eda2088cd40adb category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICJT51 CVE: CVE-2025-38166 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 54a3ecaeeeae8176da8badbd7d72af1017032c39 ] [ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629! ...... [ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2172.945155] Call Trace: [ 2172.945299] <TASK> [ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90 [ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100 [ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110 [ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 [ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180 [ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840 [ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80 [ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70 [ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200 [ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270 [ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170 [ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270 [ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190 [ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0 [ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170 ...... After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase, e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data(). If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes, it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the actual size of msg_iter. ''' iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size); ''' The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations: 1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic. 2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter. Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?". Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the length meets the cork_bytes requirement. However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter' (but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed. So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of msg_iter. 3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs, the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached. Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling corking is written as: ''' line 1177 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) { if (ret == -ENOSPC) ret = 0; goto send_end; ''' So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation occurs. Fixes: fcb14cb1bdac ("new iov_iter flavour - ITER_UBUF") Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend(a)gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219052015.274405-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 6e30fe879d53..bf445a518883 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -1120,9 +1120,13 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, num_async++; else if (ret == -ENOMEM) goto wait_for_memory; - else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) + else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) { + if (msg_pl->cork_bytes) { + ret = 0; + goto send_end; + } goto rollback_iter; - else if (ret != -EAGAIN) + } else if (ret != -EAGAIN) goto send_end; } continue; -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] bpf, sockmap: Fix panic when calling skb_linearize
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

From: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.14 commit 5ca2e29f6834c64c0e5a9ccf1278c21fb49b827e category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICJT9B CVE: CVE-2025-38165 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The panic can be reproduced by executing the command: ./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress --rx-strp 100000 Then a kernel panic was captured: ''' [ 657.460555] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2178! [ 657.462680] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 657.463287] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog ... [ 657.469610] <TASK> [ 657.469738] ? die+0x36/0x90 [ 657.469916] ? do_trap+0x1d0/0x270 [ 657.470118] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40 [ 657.470376] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40 [ 657.470620] ? do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170 [ 657.470846] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40 [ 657.471092] ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40 [ 657.471335] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40 [ 657.471579] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2d/0x40 [ 657.471805] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 657.472052] ? pskb_expand_head+0xd1/0xf40 [ 657.472292] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40 [ 657.472540] ? lock_acquire+0x18f/0x4e0 [ 657.472766] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110 [ 657.472999] ? __pfx_pskb_expand_head+0x10/0x10 [ 657.473263] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x5b/0x470 [ 657.473537] ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10 [ 657.473826] __pskb_pull_tail+0xfd/0x1d20 [ 657.474062] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x90 [ 657.474707] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x3bf/0x510 [ 657.475392] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 [ 657.476010] sk_psock_backlog+0x5cf/0xd70 [ 657.476637] process_one_work+0x858/0x1a20 ''' The panic originates from the assertion BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb)) in skb_linearize(). A previous commit(see Fixes tag) introduced skb_get() to avoid race conditions between skb operations in the backlog and skb release in the recvmsg path. However, this caused the panic to always occur when skb_linearize is executed. The "--rx-strp 100000" parameter forces the RX path to use the strparser module which aggregates data until it reaches 100KB before calling sockmap logic. The 100KB payload exceeds MAX_MSG_FRAGS, triggering skb_linearize. To fix this issue, just move skb_get into sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue. ''' sk_psock_backlog: sk_psock_handle_skb skb_get(skb) <== we move it into 'sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue' sk_psock_skb_ingress____________ ↓ | | → sk_psock_skb_ingress_self | sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue sk_psock_verdict_apply_________________↑ skb_linearize ''' Note that for verdict_apply path, the skb_get operation is unnecessary so we add 'take_ref' param to control it's behavior. Fixes: a454d84ee20b ("bpf, sockmap: Fix skb refcnt race after locking changes") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen(a)linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250407142234.47591-4-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/core/skmsg.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/skmsg.c b/net/core/skmsg.c index 5e77b9344d66..1463117e4858 100644 --- a/net/core/skmsg.c +++ b/net/core/skmsg.c @@ -531,16 +531,22 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off, u32 len, struct sk_psock *psock, struct sock *sk, - struct sk_msg *msg) + struct sk_msg *msg, + bool take_ref) { int num_sge, copied; + /* skb_to_sgvec will fail when the total number of fragments in + * frag_list and frags exceeds MAX_MSG_FRAGS. For example, the + * caller may aggregate multiple skbs. + */ num_sge = skb_to_sgvec(skb, msg->sg.data, off, len); if (num_sge < 0) { /* skb linearize may fail with ENOMEM, but lets simply try again * later if this happens. Under memory pressure we don't want to * drop the skb. We need to linearize the skb so that the mapping * in skb_to_sgvec can not error. + * Note that skb_linearize requires the skb not to be shared. */ if (skb_linearize(skb)) return -EAGAIN; @@ -554,7 +560,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, msg->sg.start = 0; msg->sg.size = copied; msg->sg.end = num_sge; - msg->skb = skb; + msg->skb = take_ref ? skb_get(skb) : skb; sk_psock_queue_msg(psock, msg); sk_psock_data_ready(sk, psock); @@ -562,7 +568,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(struct sk_buff *skb, } static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, - u32 off, u32 len); + u32 off, u32 len, bool take_ref); static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off, u32 len) @@ -576,7 +582,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, * correctly. */ if (unlikely(skb->sk == sk)) - return sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(psock, skb, off, len); + return sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(psock, skb, off, len, true); msg = sk_psock_create_ingress_msg(sk, skb); if (!msg) return -EAGAIN; @@ -588,7 +594,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, * into user buffers. */ skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk); - err = sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb, off, len, psock, sk, msg); + err = sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb, off, len, psock, sk, msg, true); if (err < 0) kfree(msg); return err; @@ -599,7 +605,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, * because the skb is already accounted for here. */ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, - u32 off, u32 len) + u32 off, u32 len, bool take_ref) { struct sk_msg *msg = alloc_sk_msg(GFP_ATOMIC); struct sock *sk = psock->sk; @@ -608,7 +614,7 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb if (unlikely(!msg)) return -EAGAIN; skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk); - err = sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb, off, len, psock, sk, msg); + err = sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue(skb, off, len, psock, sk, msg, take_ref); if (err < 0) kfree(msg); return err; @@ -617,18 +623,13 @@ static int sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb static int sk_psock_handle_skb(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 off, u32 len, bool ingress) { - int err = 0; - if (!ingress) { if (!sock_writeable(psock->sk)) return -EAGAIN; return skb_send_sock(psock->sk, skb, off, len); } - skb_get(skb); - err = sk_psock_skb_ingress(psock, skb, off, len); - if (err < 0) - kfree_skb(skb); - return err; + + return sk_psock_skb_ingress(psock, skb, off, len); } static void sk_psock_skb_state(struct sk_psock *psock, @@ -1014,7 +1015,7 @@ static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb, off = stm->offset; len = stm->full_len; } - err = sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(psock, skb, off, len); + err = sk_psock_skb_ingress_self(psock, skb, off, len, false); } if (err < 0) { spin_lock_bh(&psock->ingress_lock); -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/sched: fix use-after-free in taprio_dev_notifier
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

From: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.95 commit 8c5713ce1ced75f9e9ed5c642ea3d2ba06ead69c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICIW71 CVE: CVE-2025-38087 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit b160766e26d4e2e2d6fe2294e0b02f92baefcec5 upstream. Since taprio’s taprio_dev_notifier() isn’t protected by an RCU read-side critical section, a race with advance_sched() can lead to a use-after-free. Adding rcu_read_lock() inside taprio_dev_notifier() prevents this. Fixes: fed87cc6718a ("net/sched: taprio: automatically calculate queueMaxSDU based on TC gate durations") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel(a)gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet(a)google.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aEzIYYxt0is9upYG@v4bel-B760M-AORUS-ELITE-AX Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- net/sched/sch_taprio.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c index 951a87909c29..d162e2dd8602 100644 --- a/net/sched/sch_taprio.c +++ b/net/sched/sch_taprio.c @@ -1338,13 +1338,15 @@ static int taprio_dev_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, stab = rtnl_dereference(q->root->stab); - oper = rtnl_dereference(q->oper_sched); + rcu_read_lock(); + oper = rcu_dereference(q->oper_sched); if (oper) taprio_update_queue_max_sdu(q, oper, stab); - admin = rtnl_dereference(q->admin_sched); + admin = rcu_dereference(q->admin_sched); if (admin) taprio_update_queue_max_sdu(q, admin, stab); + rcu_read_unlock(); break; } -- 2.25.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-6.6] net/mlx5e: Disable MACsec offload for uplink representor profile
by Dong Chenchen 27 Aug '25

27 Aug '25

From: Carolina Jubran <cjubran(a)nvidia.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.6.92 commit b48a47e137cedfd79655accaeeea6b296ad0b9e1 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/ICG8UH CVE: CVE-2025-38020 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 588431474eb7572e57a927fa8558c9ba2f8af143 ] MACsec offload is not supported in switchdev mode for uplink representors. When switching to the uplink representor profile, the MACsec offload feature must be cleared from the netdevice's features. If left enabled, attempts to add offloads result in a null pointer dereference, as the uplink representor does not support MACsec offload even though the feature bit remains set. Clear NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC in mlx5e_fix_uplink_rep_features(). Kernel log: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000f: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000078-0x000000000000007f] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 4714 Comm: ip Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4_for_upstream_debug_2025_03_02_17_35 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 Code: d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ad 15 00 00 8b 35 91 5c fe 03 85 f6 75 29 49 8d 7e 60 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 a6 15 00 00 4d 3b 76 60 0f 85 fd 0b 00 00 65 ff RSP: 0018:ffff888147a4f160 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 000000000000000f RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000078 RBP: ffff888147a4f2e0 R08: ffffffffa05d2c19 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000018 R15: ffff888152de0000 FS: 00007f855e27d800(0000) GS:ffff88881ee80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004e5768 CR3: 000000013ae7c005 CR4: 0000000000372eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? die_addr+0x3d/0xa0 ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x220 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? __mutex_lock+0x128/0x1dd0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0x1ae0/0x1ae0 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? macsec_upd_offload+0x145/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x400/0x400 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 ? kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x77/0x90 ? __kmalloc_noprof+0x249/0x6b0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0xb5/0x240 ? mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] mlx5e_macsec_add_secy+0xf9/0x700 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_macsec_add_rxsa+0x11a0/0x11a0 [mlx5_core] macsec_update_offload+0x26c/0x820 ? macsec_set_mac_address+0x4b0/0x4b0 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x284/0x400 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x47/0x50 macsec_upd_offload+0x2c8/0x380 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 ? __nla_parse+0x22/0x30 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x15e/0x240 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1cc/0x2a0 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.constprop.0+0x240/0x240 ? cap_capable+0xd4/0x330 genl_rcv_msg+0x3ea/0x670 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? lockdep_set_lock_cmp_fn+0x190/0x190 ? macsec_update_offload+0x820/0x820 netlink_rcv_skb+0x12b/0x390 ? genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x2a0/0x2a0 ? netlink_ack+0xd80/0xd80 ? rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0xf90/0xf90 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0xcd/0xac0 ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x155/0xac0 ? _copy_from_iter+0x1bb/0x12c0 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x440/0x700 ? netlink_attachskb+0x760/0x760 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 netlink_sendmsg+0x749/0xc10 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 ? __might_fault+0xbb/0x170 ? netlink_unicast+0x700/0x700 __sock_sendmsg+0xc5/0x190 ____sys_sendmsg+0x53f/0x760 ? import_iovec+0x7/0x10 ? kernel_sendmsg+0x30/0x30 ? __copy_msghdr+0x3c0/0x3c0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x90/0x90 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x28/0xa30 ___sys_sendmsg+0xeb/0x170 ? kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x40 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x110/0x110 ? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 ? lock_acquire+0x1c2/0x530 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x116/0x3b0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1da/0x3b0 ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680 ? __delete_object+0x21/0x50 __sys_sendmsg+0xf7/0x180 ? __sys_sendmsg_sock+0x20/0x20 ? kmem_cache_free+0x14c/0x4e0 ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f855e113367 Code: 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b9 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 89 54 24 1c 48 89 74 24 10 RSP: 002b:00007ffd15e90c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007f855e113367 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffd15e90cf0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007ffd15e90dbc R08: 0000000000000028 R09: 000000000045d100 R10: 00007f855e011dd8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000019 R13: 0000000067c6b785 R14: 00000000004a1e80 R15: 0000000000000000 </TASK> Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_ib mlx5_fwctl mlx5_dpll mlx5_core rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: mlx5_core] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Fixes: 8ff0ac5be144 ("net/mlx5: Add MACsec offload Tx command support") Signed-off-by: Carolina Jubran <cjubran(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Shahar Shitrit <shshitrit(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Dragos Tatulea <dtatulea(a)nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt(a)nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms(a)kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1746958552-561295-1-git-send-email-tariqt@nvidia.c… Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dong Chenchen <dongchenchen2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c index 723f776538ee..ec1b582cb9d5 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c @@ -4139,6 +4139,10 @@ static netdev_features_t mlx5e_fix_uplink_rep_features(struct net_device *netdev if (netdev->features & NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_FILTER) netdev_warn(netdev, "Disabling HW_VLAN CTAG FILTERING, not supported in switchdev mode\n"); + features &= ~NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC; + if (netdev->features & NETIF_F_HW_MACSEC) + netdev_warn(netdev, "Disabling HW MACsec offload, not supported in switchdev mode\n"); + return features; } -- 2.25.1

2 1