From: Radek Podgorny <radek@podgorny.cz> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.3-rc1 commit 7e1e4047200fd7519f9bdfe8a001437715e618b4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/19388 CVE: CVE-2026-90087 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=... -------------------------------- create_le_conn_complete() decides whether the failed connection is still pending by comparing it against hci_lookup_le_connect(), which returns the first LE connection in BT_CONNECT. That is the same connection only while at most one is pending. Two can be pending. Connections created on the passive scan path sit in BT_CONNECT with HCI_CONN_SCANNING set and are invisible to hci_lookup_le_connect() until hci_le_create_conn_sync() clears the flag when their command is issued, so the -EBUSY guard in hci_connect_le() does not prevent a second connection from being queued while the first is still on the scan path. Whenever two connections are in BT_CONNECT at once, the lookup may return one connection while create_le_conn_complete() is reporting the failure of the other; the early exit then drops the error and hci_conn_failed() never runs on the connection that failed. The controller also rejects a second HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN issued while another connection creation is still outstanding, per Core Spec Vol 4, Part E. The spec calls for Command Disallowed there; the bcm43438 observed here answers with an LMP/LL error code instead, which bt_to_errno() maps to the -EPROTO (-71) in the log below. The leaked connection stays in BT_CONNECT forever, and because hci_connect_le() refuses to dial while hci_lookup_le_connect() finds anything, every subsequent attempt to reach any peer fails with -EBUSY and no command reaches the controller at all. Seen on a bcm43438 with two BLE peers polled on the same interval (state 5 is BT_CONNECT; both handles are UNSET ones, allocated from the ida above HCI_CONN_HANDLE_MAX): Bluetooth: hci1: Opcode 0x2013 failed: -71 # hcitool con < LE 14:9C:EF:03:68:81 handle 3840 state 5 lm CENTRAL < LE C4:D3:6A:8C:B5:38 handle 3841 state 5 lm CENTRAL A btmon capture across the next ten minutes of connect attempts contains no HCI_OP_LE_CREATE_CONN at all; outgoing LE connections do not recover until the adapter is reset. With this change the same scenario fails the rejected connection cleanly and further connects to both peers go through. Ask about the connection itself instead of about the device. Fixes: c9f73a2178c1 ("Bluetooth: hci_conn: Fix hci_connect_le_sync") Signed-off-by: Radek Podgorny <radek@podgorny.cz> Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com> Co-authored-by: BackportAgent@deepseek-v4.1-flash Signed-off-by: Hulk Robot <hulkrobot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Tang Hui <tanghui20@huawei.com> --- net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c index 5c755a6c22f5c..a7616bf56dd29 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c @@ -7135,8 +7135,13 @@ static void create_le_conn_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, int err) goto unlock; } - /* Check if connection is still pending */ - if (conn != hci_lookup_le_connect(hdev)) + /* Check if this connection is still pending. + * + * hci_lookup_le_connect() returns only the first LE connection + * in BT_CONNECT, which is not necessarily this one when two are + * pending at once, so ask the connection itself. + */ + if (conn->state != BT_CONNECT) goto unlock; /* Flush to make sure we send create conn cancel command if needed */ -- 2.34.1