From: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v7.0-rc5 commit 0a3fe972a7cb1404f693d6f1711f32bc1d244b1c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://atomgit.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/14580 CVE: CVE-2026-43048 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?i... -------------------------------- The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution. The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report. Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org> [bentiss: changed the return value] Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org> Conflicts: drivers/hid/hid-core.c [cherry-pick applied cleanly without conflicts, but the patch context differs.] Signed-off-by: Liu Kai <liukai284@huawei.com> --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index c0446ee3d4a0..61b614072e05 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1576,9 +1576,10 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, rsize = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE; if (csize < rsize) { - dbg_hid("report %d is too short, (%d < %d)\n", report->id, - csize, rsize); - memset(cdata + csize, 0, rsize - csize); + hid_warn_ratelimited(hid, "Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %d)\n", + report->id, rsize, csize); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } if ((hid->claimed & HID_CLAIMED_HIDDEV) && hid->hiddev_report_event) -- 2.34.1