December 2021 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] net: hns3: fix the concurrency between functions reading debugfs
by Yang Yingliang 31 Dec '21

31 Dec '21

From: Yufeng Mo <moyufeng(a)huawei.com> driver inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4OSRU CVE: NA ---------------------------- [1298504.847848] Call trace: [1298504.847859] [<ffff000008089e14>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x23c [1298504.847865] [<ffff00000808a074>] show_stack+0x24/0x2c [1298504.847870] [<ffff0000088568a8>] dump_stack+0x84/0xa8 [1298504.847878] [<ffff0000082122fc>] bad_page+0xec/0x14c [1298504.847883] [<ffff000008219384>] free_pages_check_bad+0x90/0x9c [1298504.847888] [<ffff00000821307c>] __free_pages_ok+0x2b8/0x2ec [1298504.847894] [<ffff0000082153ec>] __free_pages+0x44/0x64 [1298504.847900] [<ffff000008288788>] kfree+0x198/0x1a0 [1298504.847905] [<ffff00000823432c>] kvfree+0x3c/0x58 [1298504.847937] [<ffff0000014fabf4>] hns3_dbg_read+0xf4/0x278 [hns3] [1298504.847944] [<ffff000008359550>] full_proxy_read+0x60/0x90 [1298504.847949] [<ffff0000082b22a4>] __vfs_read+0x58/0x178 [1298504.847952] [<ffff0000082b2454>] vfs_read+0x90/0x14c [1298504.847956] [<ffff0000082b2b70>] SyS_read+0x60/0xc0 When different functions reading the same debugfs node, it will cause double free problem, because different functions shared the same node buffer. This patch make different functions have their own buffer to fix the problem. Fixes: 319ba0a4d154 ("net: hns3: fix race condition in debugfs") Fixes: c91910efc03a ("net: hns3: refactor the debugfs process") Signed-off-by: Yufeng Mo <moyufeng(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yonglong Liu <liuyonglong(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jian Shen <shenjian15(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hnae3.h | 1 + .../net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.c | 15 +++++++++++---- .../net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.h | 1 - 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hnae3.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hnae3.h index 0d849c13f22f5..61b92430e56db 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hnae3.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hnae3.h @@ -765,6 +765,7 @@ struct hnae3_handle { u8 netdev_flags; struct dentry *hnae3_dbgfs; struct mutex dbgfs_lock; + char **dbgfs_buf; /* Network interface message level enabled bits */ u32 msg_enable; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.c index c68e5f3d0ba52..8dbbf597d8a2c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.c @@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static ssize_t hns3_dbg_read(struct file *filp, char __user *buffer, return ret; mutex_lock(&handle->dbgfs_lock); - save_buf = &hns3_dbg_cmd[index].buf; + save_buf = &handle->dbgfs_buf[index]; if (!test_bit(HNS3_NIC_STATE_INITED, &priv->state) || test_bit(HNS3_NIC_STATE_RESETTING, &priv->state)) { @@ -911,6 +911,13 @@ int hns3_dbg_init(struct hnae3_handle *handle) int ret; u32 i; + handle->dbgfs_buf = devm_kcalloc(&handle->pdev->dev, + ARRAY_SIZE(hns3_dbg_cmd), + sizeof(*handle->dbgfs_buf), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!handle->dbgfs_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + hns3_dbg_dentry[HNS3_DBG_DENTRY_COMMON].dentry = debugfs_create_dir(name, hns3_dbgfs_root); handle->hnae3_dbgfs = hns3_dbg_dentry[HNS3_DBG_DENTRY_COMMON].dentry; @@ -952,9 +959,9 @@ void hns3_dbg_uninit(struct hnae3_handle *handle) u32 i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(hns3_dbg_cmd); i++) - if (hns3_dbg_cmd[i].buf) { - kvfree(hns3_dbg_cmd[i].buf); - hns3_dbg_cmd[i].buf = NULL; + if (handle->dbgfs_buf[i]) { + kvfree(handle->dbgfs_buf[i]); + handle->dbgfs_buf[i] = NULL; } mutex_destroy(&handle->dbgfs_lock); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.h index ea65e5174ea98..902e16d99fb7c 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3_debugfs.h @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ struct hns3_dbg_cmd_info { enum hnae3_dbg_cmd cmd; enum hns3_dbg_dentry_type dentry; u32 buf_len; - char *buf; int (*init)(struct hnae3_handle *handle, unsigned int cmd); }; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS v2] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on last xattr entry in __f2fs_setxattr()
by Yang Yingliang 31 Dec '21

31 Dec '21

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17 commit 5598b24efaf4892741c798b425d543e4bed357a1 category: bugfix CVE: CVE-2021-45469 -------------------------------- As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215235 - Overview page fault in f2fs_setxattr() when mount and operate on corrupted image - Reproduce tested on kernel 5.16-rc3, 5.15.X under root 1. unzip tmp7.zip 2. ./single.sh f2fs 7 Sometimes need to run the script several times - Kernel dump loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072 F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7548c2ee BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe47bc7123f48 RIP: 0010:kfree+0x66/0x320 Call Trace: __f2fs_setxattr+0x2aa/0xc00 [f2fs] f2fs_setxattr+0xfa/0x480 [f2fs] __f2fs_set_acl+0x19b/0x330 [f2fs] __vfs_removexattr+0x52/0x70 __vfs_removexattr_locked+0xb1/0x140 vfs_removexattr+0x56/0x100 removexattr+0x57/0x80 path_removexattr+0xa3/0xc0 __x64_sys_removexattr+0x17/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The root cause is in __f2fs_setxattr(), we missed to do sanity check on last xattr entry, result in out-of-bound memory access during updating inconsistent xattr data of target inode. After the fix, it can detect such xattr inconsistency as below: F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (7) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 60676 F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 47736 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Conflicts: fs/f2fs/xattr.c [yyl: replace f2fs_err() with f2fs_msg(KERN_ERR)] Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: fang wei <fangwei1(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c index 90d0d305f6a36..1858c66d871d1 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c @@ -657,8 +657,17 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, } last = here; - while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last)) + while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last)) { + if ((void *)(last) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr || + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last) > last_base_addr) { + f2fs_msg(F2FS_I_SB(inode)->sb, KERN_ERR, "inode (%lu) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: %zu", + inode->i_ino, ENTRY_SIZE(last)); + set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK); + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto exit; + } last = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last); + } newsize = XATTR_ALIGN(sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_entry) + len + size); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 0/3] fixes CVE-2021-44733
by Yang Yingliang 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

patch #1 ~ #2 prepare for backporting fix patch patch #3 fix CVE-2021-44733 Jens Wiklander (3): tee: remove linked list of struct tee_shm tee: don't assign shm id for private shms tee: handle lookup of shm with reference count 0 drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 1 - drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 3 +- drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 196 ++++++++++++++------------------------ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 7 +- 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 130 deletions(-) -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on last xattr entry in __f2fs_setxattr()
by Yang Yingliang 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

From: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17 commit 5598b24efaf4892741c798b425d543e4bed357a1 category: bugfix CVE: CVE-2021-45469 -------------------------------- As Wenqing Liu reported in bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=215235 - Overview page fault in f2fs_setxattr() when mount and operate on corrupted image - Reproduce tested on kernel 5.16-rc3, 5.15.X under root 1. unzip tmp7.zip 2. ./single.sh f2fs 7 Sometimes need to run the script several times - Kernel dump loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072 F2FS-fs (loop0): Found nat_bits in checkpoint F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7548c2ee BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe47bc7123f48 RIP: 0010:kfree+0x66/0x320 Call Trace: __f2fs_setxattr+0x2aa/0xc00 [f2fs] f2fs_setxattr+0xfa/0x480 [f2fs] __f2fs_set_acl+0x19b/0x330 [f2fs] __vfs_removexattr+0x52/0x70 __vfs_removexattr_locked+0xb1/0x140 vfs_removexattr+0x56/0x100 removexattr+0x57/0x80 path_removexattr+0xa3/0xc0 __x64_sys_removexattr+0x17/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x37/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae The root cause is in __f2fs_setxattr(), we missed to do sanity check on last xattr entry, result in out-of-bound memory access during updating inconsistent xattr data of target inode. After the fix, it can detect such xattr inconsistency as below: F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (7) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 60676 F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has corrupted xattr F2FS-fs (loop11): inode (8) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: 47736 Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Wenqing Liu <wenqingliu0120(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c index 90d0d305f6a36..b55d0920e777c 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c @@ -657,8 +657,17 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, } last = here; - while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last)) + while (!IS_XATTR_LAST_ENTRY(last)) { + if ((void *)(last) + sizeof(__u32) > last_base_addr || + (void *)XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last) > last_base_addr) { + f2fs_err(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "inode (%lu) has invalid last xattr entry, entry_size: %zu", + inode->i_ino, ENTRY_SIZE(last)); + set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK); + error = -EFSCORRUPTED; + goto exit; + } last = XATTR_NEXT_ENTRY(last); + } newsize = XATTR_ALIGN(sizeof(struct f2fs_xattr_entry) + len + size); -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH] mwifiex: Fix skb_over_panic in mwifiex_usb_recv()
by Yang Yingliang 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

From: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.17 commit 04d80663f67ccef893061b49ec8a42ff7045ae84 category: bugfix CVE: CVE-2021-43976 -------------------------------- Currently, with an unknown recv_type, mwifiex_usb_recv just return -1 without restoring the skb. Next time mwifiex_usb_rx_complete is invoked with the same skb, calling skb_put causes skb_over_panic. The bug is triggerable with a compromised/malfunctioning usb device. After applying the patch, skb_over_panic no longer shows up with the same input. Attached is the panic report from fuzzing. skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:000000003bf1b5fa len:2048 put:4 head:00000000dd6a115b data:000000000a9445d8 tail:0x844 end:0x840 dev:<NULL> kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:109! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 198 Comm: in:imklog Not tainted 5.6.0 #60 RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x15f/0x161 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? mwifiex_usb_rx_complete+0x26b/0xfcd [mwifiex_usb] skb_put.cold+0x24/0x24 mwifiex_usb_rx_complete+0x26b/0xfcd [mwifiex_usb] __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x1e4/0x380 usb_giveback_urb_bh+0x241/0x4f0 ? __hrtimer_run_queues+0x316/0x740 ? __usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x380/0x380 tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x135/0x330 __do_softirq+0x18c/0x634 irq_exit+0x114/0x140 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xde/0x380 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 </IRQ> Reported-by: Brendan Dolan-Gavitt <brendandg(a)nyu.edu> Signed-off-by: Zekun Shen <bruceshenzk(a)gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo(a)codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YX4CqjfRcTa6bVL+@Zekuns-MBP-16.fios-router.home Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c index d445acc4786b7..22a42eb0cc0ac 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c @@ -130,7 +130,8 @@ static int mwifiex_usb_recv(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter, default: mwifiex_dbg(adapter, ERROR, "unknown recv_type %#x\n", recv_type); - return -1; + ret = -1; + goto exit_restore_skb; } break; case MWIFIEX_USB_EP_DATA: -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-5.10 01/87] kvm: SMM: fix losing SMI problem
by Zheng Zengkai 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

From: xulei <stone.xulei(a)huawei.com> virt inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4NP0K CVE: NA ------------------- fix losing SMI problem Signed-off-by: xulei <stone.xulei(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jingyi Wang <wangjingyi11(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wei Li <liwei391(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Zheng Zengkai <zhengzengkai(a)huawei.com> --- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index 12db47c8bd3f..e33414f36dba 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -4227,6 +4227,11 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { + if (is_smm(vcpu)) { + vcpu->arch.hflags &= ~HF_SMM_MASK; + vcpu->arch.smi_pending = 0; + } + kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_SMI, vcpu); return 0; -- 2.20.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] mm/page_alloc: Use cmdline to disable "place pages to tail"
by Yang Yingliang 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

From: Peng Liu <liupeng256(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4EG0R CVE: NA ----------------------------------------------- Add cmdline to disable "place pages to tail" when online memory. Signed-off-by: Peng Liu <liupeng256(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++++ mm/page_alloc.c | 27 ++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 425015359b5ce..420f7317aa6af 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -1254,6 +1254,15 @@ Warning: use of this parameter will taint the kernel and may cause unknown problems. + fpi_to_tail=off + [KNL] Place pages to front in __free_pages_core(). + This kernel start-up parameter can be just used as + "fpi_to_tail=off", which means memory is online to + the front of freelist. Dynamic open is not supportted, + in other words, "fpi_to_tail=on" will be ignored by + kernel. This is just an ugly solution for circumvention + for some latent bugs revealed by "place pages to tail". + ftrace=[tracer] [FTRACE] will set and start the specified tracer as early as possible in order to facilitate early diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c index 935435e03cdd4..4cad86f1e3a91 100644 --- a/mm/page_alloc.c +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c @@ -102,6 +102,17 @@ typedef int __bitwise fpi_t; */ #define FPI_TO_TAIL ((__force fpi_t)BIT(1)) +static bool fpi_to_tail = true; + +static int __init early_fpi_to_tail(char *str) +{ + if (str && !strcmp(str, "off")) + fpi_to_tail = false; + + return 0; +} +early_param("fpi_to_tail", early_fpi_to_tail); + /* prevent >1 _updater_ of zone percpu pageset ->high and ->batch fields */ static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcp_batch_high_lock); #define MIN_PERCPU_PAGELIST_FRACTION (8) @@ -1342,12 +1353,16 @@ void __free_pages_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order) } __ClearPageReserved(p); set_page_count(p, 0); - - /* - * Bypass PCP and place fresh pages right to the tail, primarily - * relevant for memory onlining. - */ - __free_pages_ok(page, order, FPI_TO_TAIL); + if (fpi_to_tail) { + /* + * Bypass PCP and place fresh pages right to the tail, primarily + * relevant for memory onlining. + */ + __free_pages_ok(page, order, FPI_TO_TAIL); + } else { + set_page_refcounted(page); + __free_pages(page, order); + } } #if defined(CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_EARLY_PFN_TO_NID) || \ -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH OLK-5.10 0/3] Add three modifications
by Yanling Song 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

Add three modifications. 1.RSS initialization process optimization 2.Attribute negotiation and optimization. 3.The reset command flags modification. Yanling Song (3): net/spnic:RSS initialization process optimization net/spnic:Attribute negotiation and optimization. net/spnic:The reset command flags modification. .../net/ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/hw/sphw_hw.h | 28 ++++----- .../ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/hw/sphw_hwdev.c | 9 ++- .../ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/hw/sphw_hwdev.h | 2 + .../net/ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/spnic_main.c | 22 +++---- .../ramaxel/spnic/spnic_mgmt_interface.h | 12 ---- .../ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/spnic_nic_cfg.c | 57 ++++++++++++------- .../ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/spnic_nic_cfg.h | 19 +------ .../ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/spnic_nic_dev.h | 2 + .../net/ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/spnic_rss.c | 16 +----- .../ethernet/ramaxel/spnic/spnic_rss_cfg.c | 57 ------------------- 10 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) -- 2.23.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] scsi: ufs: Correct the LUN used in eh_device_reset_handler() callback
by Yang Yingliang 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

From: Can Guo <cang(a)codeaurora.org> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.11-rc4 commit 35fc4cd34426c242ab015ef280853b7bff101f48 category: bugfix bugzilla: NA CVE: CVE-2021-39657 ----------------------------------------------- Users can initiate resets to specific SCSI device/target/host through IOCTL. When this happens, the SCSI cmd passed to eh_device/target/host _reset_handler() callbacks is initialized with a request whose tag is -1. In this case it is not right for eh_device_reset_handler() callback to count on the LUN get from hba->lrb[-1]. Fix it by getting LUN from the SCSI device associated with the SCSI cmd. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1609157080-26283-1-git-send-email-cang@codeaurora… Reviewed-by: Avri Altman <avri.altman(a)wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Stanley Chu <stanley.chu(a)mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Can Guo <cang(a)codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen(a)oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c | 11 ++++------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c index 3601e770da162..3d9bfa5207689 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c @@ -5752,19 +5752,16 @@ static int ufshcd_eh_device_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) { struct Scsi_Host *host; struct ufs_hba *hba; - unsigned int tag; u32 pos; int err; - u8 resp = 0xF; - struct ufshcd_lrb *lrbp; + u8 resp = 0xF, lun; unsigned long flags; host = cmd->device->host; hba = shost_priv(host); - tag = cmd->request->tag; - lrbp = &hba->lrb[tag]; - err = ufshcd_issue_tm_cmd(hba, lrbp->lun, 0, UFS_LOGICAL_RESET, &resp); + lun = ufshcd_scsi_to_upiu_lun(cmd->device->lun); + err = ufshcd_issue_tm_cmd(hba, lun, 0, UFS_LOGICAL_RESET, &resp); if (err || resp != UPIU_TASK_MANAGEMENT_FUNC_COMPL) { if (!err) err = resp; @@ -5773,7 +5770,7 @@ static int ufshcd_eh_device_reset_handler(struct scsi_cmnd *cmd) /* clear the commands that were pending for corresponding LUN */ for_each_set_bit(pos, &hba->outstanding_reqs, hba->nutrs) { - if (hba->lrb[pos].lun == lrbp->lun) { + if (hba->lrb[pos].lun == lun) { err = ufshcd_clear_cmd(hba, pos); if (err) break; -- 2.25.1

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: fix an use-after-free issue about data=journal writeback mode
by Yang Yingliang 30 Dec '21

30 Dec '21

From: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> hulk inclusion category: bugfix bugzilla: 185944, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I4OP92 CVE: NA --------------------------- Our syzkaller report an use-after-free issue that accessing the freed buffer_head on the writeback page in __ext4_journalled_writepage(). The problem is that if there was a truncate racing with the data=journalled writeback procedure, the writeback length could become zero and bget_one() refuse to get buffer_head's refcount, then the truncate procedure release buffer once we drop page lock, finally, the last ext4_walk_page_buffers() trigger the use-after-free problem. sync truncate ext4_sync_file() file_write_and_wait_range() ext4_setattr(0) inode->i_size = 0 ext4_writepage() len = 0 __ext4_journalled_writepage() page_bufs = page_buffers(page) ext4_walk_page_buffers(bget_one) <- does not get refcount do_invalidatepage() free_buffer_head() ext4_walk_page_buffers(page_bufs) <- trigger use-after-free After commit bdf96838aea6 ("ext4: fix race between truncate and __ext4_journalled_writepage()"), we have already handled the racing case, so the bget_one() and bput_one() are not needed. So this patch simply remove these hunk, and recheck the i_size to make it safe. Fixes: bdf96838aea6 ("ext4: fix race between truncate and __ext4_journalled_writepage()") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: yangerkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/inode.c | 35 ++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inode.c b/fs/ext4/inode.c index 6213816056cd6..e106a9317b429 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inode.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c @@ -1962,28 +1962,16 @@ int ext4_da_get_block_prep(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock, return 0; } -static int bget_one(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh) -{ - get_bh(bh); - return 0; -} - -static int bput_one(handle_t *handle, struct buffer_head *bh) -{ - put_bh(bh); - return 0; -} - static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, unsigned int len) { struct address_space *mapping = page->mapping; struct inode *inode = mapping->host; - struct buffer_head *page_bufs = NULL; handle_t *handle = NULL; int ret = 0, err = 0; int inline_data = ext4_has_inline_data(inode); struct buffer_head *inode_bh = NULL; + loff_t size; ClearPageChecked(page); @@ -1993,14 +1981,6 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, inode_bh = ext4_journalled_write_inline_data(inode, len, page); if (inode_bh == NULL) goto out; - } else { - page_bufs = page_buffers(page); - if (!page_bufs) { - BUG(); - goto out; - } - ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_bufs, 0, len, - NULL, bget_one); } /* * We need to release the page lock before we start the @@ -2021,7 +2001,8 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, lock_page(page); put_page(page); - if (page->mapping != mapping) { + size = i_size_read(inode); + if (page->mapping != mapping || page_offset(page) > size) { /* The page got truncated from under us */ ext4_journal_stop(handle); ret = 0; @@ -2031,6 +2012,13 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, if (inline_data) { ret = ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode); } else { + struct buffer_head *page_bufs = page_buffers(page); + + if (page->index == size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + len = size & ~PAGE_MASK; + else + len = PAGE_SIZE; + ret = ext4_walk_page_buffers(handle, page_bufs, 0, len, NULL, do_journal_get_write_access); @@ -2048,9 +2036,6 @@ static int __ext4_journalled_writepage(struct page *page, out: unlock_page(page); out_no_pagelock: - if (!inline_data && page_bufs) - ext4_walk_page_buffers(NULL, page_bufs, 0, len, - NULL, bput_one); brelse(inode_bh); return ret; } -- 2.25.1

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