June 2021 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

【Meeting Notice】openEuler kernel 技术分享第七期 & 双周例会 Time: 2021-06-25 14:00-18:00
by Meeting Book 25 Jun '21

25 Jun '21

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[PATCH kernel-4.19] ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_fill_super
by Yang Yingliang 24 Jun '21

24 Jun '21

From: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc5 commit afd09b617db3786b6ef3dc43e28fe728cfea84df category: bugfix bugzilla: 148443 CVE: NA ----------------------------------------------- Buffer head references must be released before calling kill_bdev(); otherwise the buffer head (and its page referenced by b_data) will not be freed by kill_bdev, and subsequently that bh will be leaked. If blocksizes differ, sb_set_blocksize() will kill current buffers and page cache by using kill_bdev(). And then super block will be reread again but using correct blocksize this time. sb_set_blocksize() didn't fully free superblock page and buffer head, and being busy, they were not freed and instead leaked. This can easily be reproduced by calling an infinite loop of: systemctl start <ext4_on_lvm>.mount, and systemctl stop <ext4_on_lvm>.mount ... since systemd creates a cgroup for each slice which it mounts, and the bh leak get amplified by a dying memory cgroup that also never gets freed, and memory consumption is much more easily noticed. Fixes: ce40733ce93d ("ext4: Check for return value from sb_set_blocksize") Fixes: ac27a0ec112a ("ext4: initial copy of files from ext3") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210521075533.95732-1-amakhalov@vmware.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov(a)vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: stable(a)kernel.org conflicts: fs/ext4/super.c Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/super.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index a964ed63601c6..f66bbe73d1a94 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -4179,14 +4179,20 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) } if (sb->s_blocksize != blocksize) { + /* + * bh must be released before kill_bdev(), otherwise + * it won't be freed and its page also. kill_bdev() + * is called by sb_set_blocksize(). + */ + brelse(bh); /* Validate the filesystem blocksize */ if (!sb_set_blocksize(sb, blocksize)) { ext4_msg(sb, KERN_ERR, "bad block size %d", blocksize); + bh = NULL; goto failed_mount; } - brelse(bh); logical_sb_block = sb_block * EXT4_MIN_BLOCK_SIZE; offset = do_div(logical_sb_block, blocksize); bh = ext4_sb_bread_unmovable(sb, logical_sb_block); @@ -4861,8 +4867,9 @@ static int ext4_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent) for (i = 0; i < EXT4_MAXQUOTAS; i++) kfree(sbi->s_qf_names[i]); #endif - ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi); + /* ext4_blkdev_remove() calls kill_bdev(), release bh before it. */ brelse(bh); + ext4_blkdev_remove(sbi); out_fail: sb->s_fs_info = NULL; kfree(sbi->s_blockgroup_lock); -- 2.25.1

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【Meeting Notice】openEuler kernel 技术分享第七期 & 双周例会 Time: 2021-06-25 14:00-18:00
by Meeting Book 24 Jun '21

24 Jun '21

2 1

快来看你是否上榜~！openEuler 任务打榜赛5月榜单出炉
by Marketing openEuler 24 Jun '21

24 Jun '21

经过一个月的角逐，openEuler 任务打榜赛5月榜单来啦。在这一个月的时间里，开发者参加任务打榜赛的热情高涨：总计有*38*人领取*118*道赛题，赛道交流群成员*70*个，这里 *提醒领取赛题但是还没有加群的小伙伴赶紧联系小助手加群*呀。好啦~，下面让我们看一下5月份有哪些开发者上榜吧！ gitee用户账号 gitee邮箱积分值解决issue/pr数量 li-kaiyuan66666 likaiyuan7(a)huawei.com 6 1 yanxiaobing2020 yanxiaobing(a)huawei.com 2 1 zhu-yuncheng zhuyuncheng(a)huawei.com 6 1 polite2anyone zhangyao05(a)outlook.com 10 2 yaozc701 yaozc7(a)chinaunicom.cn 18 2 恭喜以上开发者，请中奖的开发者联系小助手*领奖*。没有上榜的小伙伴不要灰心请再接再历，周榜、月榜前十名均有奖励，期待在榜单上早点见到你。让我们共同期待6月的榜单。 [image: image.png] 添加小助手微信回复“*任务打榜赛*”进入交流群 *了解更多* - 官网：https://openeuler.org/zh/interaction/hdc/2021-developer.html - 我要报名： https://competition.huaweicloud.com/information/1000041420/introduction - 我要做题： https://gitee.com/organizations/src-openeuler/issues?assignee_id=&author_id…

1 1

[PATCH openEuler-21.03] net: hns3: fix incorrect resp_msg issue
by moyu 23 Jun '21

23 Jun '21

From: Jiaran Zhang <zhangjiaran(a)huawei.com> table inclusion from stable-5.12.9 commit d207c1e8e3fb82aca5ffd14c33d0848b6b820efc bugzilla: https://bugzilla.openeuler.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205 CVE: NA -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a710b9ffbebaf713f7dbd4dbd9524907e5d66f33 ] In hclge_mbx_handler(), if there are two consecutive mailbox messages that requires resp_msg, the resp_msg is not cleared after processing the first message, which will cause the resp_msg data of second message incorrect. Fix it by clearing the resp_msg before processing every mailbox message. Fixes: bb5790b71bad ("net: hns3: refactor mailbox response scheme between PF and VF") Signed-off-by: Jiaran Zhang <zhangjiaran(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Huazhong Tan <tanhuazhong(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: moyu <xiahua.991116(a)qq.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c index 3ab6db2588d3..324d150d2b22 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c @@ -657,7 +657,6 @@ void hclge_mbx_handler(struct hclge_dev *hdev) unsigned int flag; int ret = 0; - memset(&resp_msg, 0, sizeof(resp_msg)); /* handle all the mailbox requests in the queue */ while (!hclge_cmd_crq_empty(&hdev->hw)) { if (test_bit(HCLGE_STATE_CMD_DISABLE, &hdev->state)) { @@ -685,6 +684,9 @@ void hclge_mbx_handler(struct hclge_dev *hdev) trace_hclge_pf_mbx_get(hdev, req); + /* clear the resp_msg before processing every mailbox message */ + memset(&resp_msg, 0, sizeof(resp_msg)); + switch (req->msg.code) { case HCLGE_MBX_MAP_RING_TO_VECTOR: ret = hclge_map_unmap_ring_to_vf_vector(vport, true, -- 2.23.0

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[PATCH openEuler-21.03] net: hns3: fix incorrect resp_msg issue table inclusion from stable-5.12.9 commit d207c1e8e3fb82aca5ffd14c33d0848b6b820efc bugzilla: https://bugzilla.openeuler.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205 CVE: NA
by moyu 23 Jun '21

23 Jun '21

From: Jiaran Zhang <zhangjiaran(a)huawei.com> -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit a710b9ffbebaf713f7dbd4dbd9524907e5d66f33 ] In hclge_mbx_handler(), if there are two consecutive mailbox messages that requires resp_msg, the resp_msg is not cleared after processing the first message, which will cause the resp_msg data of second message incorrect. Fix it by clearing the resp_msg before processing every mailbox message. Fixes: bb5790b71bad ("net: hns3: refactor mailbox response scheme between PF and VF") Signed-off-by: Jiaran Zhang <zhangjiaran(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Huazhong Tan <tanhuazhong(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: moyu <xiahua.991116(a)qq.com> --- drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c index 3ab6db2588d3..324d150d2b22 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/hisilicon/hns3/hns3pf/hclge_mbx.c @@ -657,7 +657,6 @@ void hclge_mbx_handler(struct hclge_dev *hdev) unsigned int flag; int ret = 0; - memset(&resp_msg, 0, sizeof(resp_msg)); /* handle all the mailbox requests in the queue */ while (!hclge_cmd_crq_empty(&hdev->hw)) { if (test_bit(HCLGE_STATE_CMD_DISABLE, &hdev->state)) { @@ -685,6 +684,9 @@ void hclge_mbx_handler(struct hclge_dev *hdev) trace_hclge_pf_mbx_get(hdev, req); + /* clear the resp_msg before processing every mailbox message */ + memset(&resp_msg, 0, sizeof(resp_msg)); + switch (req->msg.code) { case HCLGE_MBX_MAP_RING_TO_VECTOR: ret = hclge_map_unmap_ring_to_vf_vector(vport, true, -- 2.23.0

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[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] RDMA/ucma: Put a lock around every call to the rdma_cm layer
by Yang Yingliang 23 Jun '21

23 Jun '21

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> stable inclusion from linux-4.19.115 commit abc4ea7f1345398261295345fd9b30243e4f4f8e prepare for fixing CVE-2020-36385 -------------------------------- commit 7c11910783a1ea17e88777552ef146cace607b3c upstream. The rdma_cm must be used single threaded. This appears to be a bug in the design, as it does have lots of locking that seems like it should allow concurrency. However, when it is all said and done every single place that uses the cma_exch() scheme is broken, and all the unlocked reads from the ucma of the cm_id data are wrong too. syzkaller has been finding endless bugs related to this. Fixing this in any elegant way is some enormous amount of work. Take a very big hammer and put a mutex around everything to do with the ucma_context at the top of every syscall. Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200218210432.GA31966@ziepe.ca Reported-by: syzbot+adb15cf8c2798e4e0db4(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+e5579222b6a3edd96522(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+4b628fcc748474003457(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+29ee8f76017ce6cf03da(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6956235342b7317ec564(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+b358909d8d01556b790b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6b46b135602a3f3ac99e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8458d13b13562abf6b77(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+bd034f3fdc0402e942ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c92378b32760a4eef756(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+68b44a1597636e0b342c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c index 01d68ed46c1b6..2acc30c3d5b2d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ucma_context { struct ucma_file *file; struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; + struct mutex mutex; u64 uid; struct list_head list; @@ -215,6 +216,7 @@ static struct ucma_context *ucma_alloc_ctx(struct ucma_file *file) init_completion(&ctx->comp); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->mc_list); ctx->file = file; + mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); mutex_lock(&mut); ctx->id = idr_alloc(&ctx_idr, ctx, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -596,6 +598,7 @@ static int ucma_free_ctx(struct ucma_context *ctx) } events_reported = ctx->events_reported; + mutex_destroy(&ctx->mutex); kfree(ctx); return events_reported; } @@ -665,7 +668,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -688,7 +694,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -712,8 +720,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -738,8 +748,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_addr(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -759,7 +771,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_route(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_resolve_route(ctx->cm_id, cmd.timeout_ms); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -848,6 +862,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query_route(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp); addr = (struct sockaddr *) &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr; memcpy(&resp.src_addr, addr, addr->sa_family == AF_INET ? @@ -871,6 +886,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query_route(struct ucma_file *file, ucma_copy_iw_route(&resp, &ctx->cm_id->route); out: + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response), &resp, sizeof(resp))) ret = -EFAULT; @@ -1022,6 +1038,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); switch (cmd.option) { case RDMA_USER_CM_QUERY_ADDR: ret = ucma_query_addr(ctx, response, out_len); @@ -1036,6 +1053,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query(struct ucma_file *file, ret = -ENOSYS; break; } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; @@ -1076,7 +1094,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_connect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, return PTR_ERR(ctx); ucma_copy_conn_param(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param, &cmd.conn_param); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_connect(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1097,7 +1117,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_listen(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, ctx->backlog = cmd.backlog > 0 && cmd.backlog < max_backlog ? cmd.backlog : max_backlog; + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_listen(ctx->cm_id, ctx->backlog); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1120,13 +1142,17 @@ static ssize_t ucma_accept(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (cmd.conn_param.valid) { ucma_copy_conn_param(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param, &cmd.conn_param); mutex_lock(&file->mut); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = __rdma_accept(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param, NULL); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (!ret) ctx->uid = cmd.uid; mutex_unlock(&file->mut); - } else + } else { + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = __rdma_accept(ctx->cm_id, NULL, NULL); - + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + } ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1145,7 +1171,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_reject(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_reject(ctx->cm_id, cmd.private_data, cmd.private_data_len); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1164,7 +1192,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_disconnect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_disconnect(ctx->cm_id); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1195,7 +1225,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_init_qp_attr(struct ucma_file *file, resp.qp_attr_mask = 0; memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr); qp_attr.qp_state = cmd.qp_state; + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_init_qp_attr(ctx->cm_id, &qp_attr, &resp.qp_attr_mask); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1274,9 +1306,13 @@ static int ucma_set_ib_path(struct ucma_context *ctx, struct sa_path_rec opa; sa_convert_path_ib_to_opa(&opa, &sa_path); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_set_ib_path(ctx->cm_id, &opa); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); } else { + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_set_ib_path(ctx->cm_id, &sa_path); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); } if (ret) return ret; @@ -1309,7 +1345,9 @@ static int ucma_set_option_level(struct ucma_context *ctx, int level, switch (level) { case RDMA_OPTION_ID: + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = ucma_set_option_id(ctx, optname, optval, optlen); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); break; case RDMA_OPTION_IB: ret = ucma_set_option_ib(ctx, optname, optval, optlen); @@ -1369,8 +1407,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_notify(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); if (ctx->cm_id->device) ret = rdma_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type)cmd.event); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; @@ -1413,8 +1453,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file, mc->join_state = join_state; mc->uid = cmd->uid; memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr, join_state, mc); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (ret) goto err2; @@ -1518,7 +1560,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_leave_multicast(struct ucma_file *file, goto out; } + mutex_lock(&mc->ctx->mutex); rdma_leave_multicast(mc->ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr); + mutex_unlock(&mc->ctx->mutex); + mutex_lock(&mc->ctx->file->mut); ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc); list_del(&mc->list); -- 2.25.1

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【Meeting Notice】openEuler kernel 技术分享第七期 & 双周例会 Time: 2021-06-25 14:00-18:00
by Meeting Book 23 Jun '21

23 Jun '21

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS 1/4] RDMA/ucma: Put a lock around every call to the rdma_cm layer
by Yang Yingliang 23 Jun '21

23 Jun '21

From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> stable inclusion from linux-4.19.115 commit abc4ea7f1345398261295345fd9b30243e4f4f8e prepare for fixing CVE-2021-32078 -------------------------------- commit 7c11910783a1ea17e88777552ef146cace607b3c upstream. The rdma_cm must be used single threaded. This appears to be a bug in the design, as it does have lots of locking that seems like it should allow concurrency. However, when it is all said and done every single place that uses the cma_exch() scheme is broken, and all the unlocked reads from the ucma of the cm_id data are wrong too. syzkaller has been finding endless bugs related to this. Fixing this in any elegant way is some enormous amount of work. Take a very big hammer and put a mutex around everything to do with the ucma_context at the top of every syscall. Fixes: 75216638572f ("RDMA/cma: Export rdma cm interface to userspace") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200218210432.GA31966@ziepe.ca Reported-by: syzbot+adb15cf8c2798e4e0db4(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+e5579222b6a3edd96522(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+4b628fcc748474003457(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+29ee8f76017ce6cf03da(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6956235342b7317ec564(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+b358909d8d01556b790b(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+6b46b135602a3f3ac99e(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+8458d13b13562abf6b77(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+bd034f3fdc0402e942ed(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+c92378b32760a4eef756(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: syzbot+68b44a1597636e0b342c(a)syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg(a)mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c index 01d68ed46c1b6..2acc30c3d5b2d 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ struct ucma_context { struct ucma_file *file; struct rdma_cm_id *cm_id; + struct mutex mutex; u64 uid; struct list_head list; @@ -215,6 +216,7 @@ static struct ucma_context *ucma_alloc_ctx(struct ucma_file *file) init_completion(&ctx->comp); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ctx->mc_list); ctx->file = file; + mutex_init(&ctx->mutex); mutex_lock(&mut); ctx->id = idr_alloc(&ctx_idr, ctx, 0, 0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -596,6 +598,7 @@ static int ucma_free_ctx(struct ucma_context *ctx) } events_reported = ctx->events_reported; + mutex_destroy(&ctx->mutex); kfree(ctx); return events_reported; } @@ -665,7 +668,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind_ip(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -688,7 +694,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_bind(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_bind_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.addr); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -712,8 +720,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_ip(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -738,8 +748,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_addr(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_resolve_addr(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.src_addr, (struct sockaddr *) &cmd.dst_addr, cmd.timeout_ms); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -759,7 +771,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_resolve_route(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_resolve_route(ctx->cm_id, cmd.timeout_ms); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -848,6 +862,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query_route(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); memset(&resp, 0, sizeof resp); addr = (struct sockaddr *) &ctx->cm_id->route.addr.src_addr; memcpy(&resp.src_addr, addr, addr->sa_family == AF_INET ? @@ -871,6 +886,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query_route(struct ucma_file *file, ucma_copy_iw_route(&resp, &ctx->cm_id->route); out: + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd.response), &resp, sizeof(resp))) ret = -EFAULT; @@ -1022,6 +1038,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query(struct ucma_file *file, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); switch (cmd.option) { case RDMA_USER_CM_QUERY_ADDR: ret = ucma_query_addr(ctx, response, out_len); @@ -1036,6 +1053,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_query(struct ucma_file *file, ret = -ENOSYS; break; } + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; @@ -1076,7 +1094,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_connect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, return PTR_ERR(ctx); ucma_copy_conn_param(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param, &cmd.conn_param); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_connect(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1097,7 +1117,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_listen(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, ctx->backlog = cmd.backlog > 0 && cmd.backlog < max_backlog ? cmd.backlog : max_backlog; + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_listen(ctx->cm_id, ctx->backlog); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1120,13 +1142,17 @@ static ssize_t ucma_accept(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (cmd.conn_param.valid) { ucma_copy_conn_param(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param, &cmd.conn_param); mutex_lock(&file->mut); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = __rdma_accept(ctx->cm_id, &conn_param, NULL); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (!ret) ctx->uid = cmd.uid; mutex_unlock(&file->mut); - } else + } else { + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = __rdma_accept(ctx->cm_id, NULL, NULL); - + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + } ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1145,7 +1171,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_reject(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_reject(ctx->cm_id, cmd.private_data, cmd.private_data_len); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1164,7 +1192,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_disconnect(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_disconnect(ctx->cm_id); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; } @@ -1195,7 +1225,9 @@ static ssize_t ucma_init_qp_attr(struct ucma_file *file, resp.qp_attr_mask = 0; memset(&qp_attr, 0, sizeof qp_attr); qp_attr.qp_state = cmd.qp_state; + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_init_qp_attr(ctx->cm_id, &qp_attr, &resp.qp_attr_mask); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1274,9 +1306,13 @@ static int ucma_set_ib_path(struct ucma_context *ctx, struct sa_path_rec opa; sa_convert_path_ib_to_opa(&opa, &sa_path); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_set_ib_path(ctx->cm_id, &opa); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); } else { + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_set_ib_path(ctx->cm_id, &sa_path); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); } if (ret) return ret; @@ -1309,7 +1345,9 @@ static int ucma_set_option_level(struct ucma_context *ctx, int level, switch (level) { case RDMA_OPTION_ID: + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = ucma_set_option_id(ctx, optname, optval, optlen); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); break; case RDMA_OPTION_IB: ret = ucma_set_option_ib(ctx, optname, optval, optlen); @@ -1369,8 +1407,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_notify(struct ucma_file *file, const char __user *inbuf, if (IS_ERR(ctx)) return PTR_ERR(ctx); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); if (ctx->cm_id->device) ret = rdma_notify(ctx->cm_id, (enum ib_event_type)cmd.event); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); ucma_put_ctx(ctx); return ret; @@ -1413,8 +1453,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file, mc->join_state = join_state; mc->uid = cmd->uid; memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size); + mutex_lock(&ctx->mutex); ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr, join_state, mc); + mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); if (ret) goto err2; @@ -1518,7 +1560,10 @@ static ssize_t ucma_leave_multicast(struct ucma_file *file, goto out; } + mutex_lock(&mc->ctx->mutex); rdma_leave_multicast(mc->ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr); + mutex_unlock(&mc->ctx->mutex); + mutex_lock(&mc->ctx->file->mut); ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc); list_del(&mc->list); -- 2.25.1

1 3

[PATCH kernel-4.19] mm/memory-failure: make sure wait for page writeback in memory_failure
by Yang Yingliang 22 Jun '21

22 Jun '21

From: yangerkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-5.13-rc7 commit e8675d291ac007e1c636870db880f837a9ea112a category: bugfix bugzilla: 51807 CVE: NA --------------------------- Our syzkaller trigger the "BUG_ON(!list_empty(&inode->i_wb_list))" in clear_inode: kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:519! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: Process syz-executor.0 (pid: 249, stack limit = 0x00000000a12409d7) CPU: 1 PID: 249 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.95 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO) pc : clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 lr : clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 Call trace: clear_inode+0x280/0x2a8 ext4_clear_inode+0x38/0xe8 ext4_free_inode+0x130/0xc68 ext4_evict_inode+0xb20/0xcb8 evict+0x1a8/0x3c0 iput+0x344/0x460 do_unlinkat+0x260/0x410 __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x6c/0xc0 el0_svc_common+0xdc/0x3b0 el0_svc_handler+0xf8/0x160 el0_svc+0x10/0x218 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception A crash dump of this problem show that someone called __munlock_pagevec to clear page LRU without lock_page: do_mmap -> mmap_region -> do_munmap -> munlock_vma_pages_range -> __munlock_pagevec. As a result memory_failure will call identify_page_state without wait_on_page_writeback. And after truncate_error_page clear the mapping of this page. end_page_writeback won't call sb_clear_inode_writeback to clear inode->i_wb_list. That will trigger BUG_ON in clear_inode! Fix it by checking PageWriteback too to help determine should we skip wait_on_page_writeback. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210604084705.3729204-1-yangerkun@huawei.com Fixes: 0bc1f8b0682c ("hwpoison: fix the handling path of the victimized page frame that belong to non-LRU") Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> Acked-by: Naoya Horiguchi <naoya.horiguchi(a)nec.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack(a)suse.cz> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Cc: Oscar Salvador <osalvador(a)suse.de> Cc: Yu Kuai <yukuai3(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds(a)linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: yangerkun <yangerkun(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang(a)huawei.com> --- mm/memory-failure.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/mm/memory-failure.c b/mm/memory-failure.c index 6fc0695f70e7c..145262227bb08 100644 --- a/mm/memory-failure.c +++ b/mm/memory-failure.c @@ -1387,7 +1387,12 @@ int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags) return 0; } - if (!PageTransTail(p) && !PageLRU(p)) + /* + * __munlock_pagevec may clear a writeback page's LRU flag without + * page_lock. We need wait writeback completion for this page or it + * may trigger vfs BUG while evict inode. + */ + if (!PageTransTail(p) && !PageLRU(p) && !PageWriteback(p)) goto identify_page_state; /* -- 2.25.1

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