October 2023 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH v4 OLK-5.10 00/19] Introduce PBHA and PBHA bit0 to control the usage of HBM Cache precisely
by Wupeng Ma 16 Oct '23

16 Oct '23

From: Ma Wupeng <mawupeng1(a)huawei.com> Patch 1: move FDT init out of kaslr_early_init for future use. Patch 2 to 8: enable feature PBHA for arm64. Patch 9-18: Control the usage of HBM cache for kernel and task precisely. Patch 19: Enable feature PBHA for arm64 by default. Changelog since v3: - update desc for patch #15 Changelog since v2: - correct the error Documentation in patch #18 Changelog since v1: - fix kabi broken due to include files James Morse (7): KVM: arm64: Detect and enable PBHA for stage2 dt-bindings: Rename the description of cpu nodes cpu.yaml dt-bindings: arm: Add binding for Page Based Hardware Attributes arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA bits for stage1 arm64: mm: Add pgprot_pbha() to allow drivers to request PBHA values KVM: arm64: Configure PBHA bits for stage2 Documentation: arm64: Describe the support and expectations for PBHA Ma Wupeng (11): arm64: cpufeature: Enable PBHA for stage1 early via FDT arm64: mm: Detect and enable PBHA bit0 at early startup arm64: mm: Update kernel pte entries if pbha bit0 enabled arm64: mm: Show PBHA bit 59 as PBHA0 in ptdump arm64: mm: Introduce VM_PBHA_BIT0 to enable pbha bit0 for single vma arm64: mm: Set PBHA0 bit for VM_PBHA_BIT0 arm64: mm: Introduce procfs interface to update PBHA0 bit arm64: mm: Set flag VM_PBHA_BIT0 for global init task arm64: mm: Introduce prctl to control pbha behavior arm64: mm: Introduce kernel param pbha openeuler: configs: arm64: Enable PBHA by default Marc Zyngier (1): arm64: Extract early FDT mapping from kaslr_early_init() .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 + Documentation/arm64/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst | 85 +++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml | 537 ++++++++++++++++ .../devicetree/bindings/arm/cpus.yaml | 584 +++--------------- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 20 + arch/arm64/configs/openeuler_defconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 15 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 1 + arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_pgtable.h | 9 + arch/arm64/include/asm/mman.h | 10 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-hwdef.h | 6 + arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 26 + arch/arm64/include/asm/setup.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 258 ++++++++ arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/kernel/image-vars.h | 3 + arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c | 7 +- arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 15 + arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 15 +- arch/arm64/mm/hugetlbpage.c | 2 + arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 14 +- arch/arm64/mm/ptdump.c | 5 + .../firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub-helper.c | 3 + drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/fdt.c | 57 ++ drivers/soc/hisilicon/Makefile | 1 + drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c | 204 ++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 103 +++ fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/linux/mm.h | 8 +- include/linux/pbha.h | 66 ++ include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 2 + kernel/sys.c | 10 + mm/memory.c | 4 + mm/vmalloc.c | 5 + 38 files changed, 1579 insertions(+), 523 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/arm64/pbha.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu.yaml create mode 100644 drivers/soc/hisilicon/pbha.c create mode 100644 include/linux/pbha.h -- 2.25.1

2 20

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] ext4: fix rec_len verify error
by Baokun Li 16 Oct '23

16 Oct '23

From: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.296 commit 996f30b44369fa2d1fe62d30a14ef27e05b30448 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189039, https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I7OXK8 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 7fda67e8c3ab6069f75888f67958a6d30454a9f6 upstream. With the configuration PAGE_SIZE 64k and filesystem blocksize 64k, a problem occurred when more than 13 million files were directly created under a directory: EXT4-fs error (device xx): ext4_dx_csum_set:492: inode #xxxx: comm xxxxx: dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D. EXT4-fs error (device xx): ext4_dx_csum_verify:463: inode #xxxx: comm xxxxx: dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D. EXT4-fs error (device xx): dx_probe:856: inode #xxxx: block 8188: comm xxxxx: Directory index failed checksum When enough files are created, the fake_dirent->reclen will be 0xffff. it doesn't equal to the blocksize 65536, i.e. 0x10000. But it is not the same condition when blocksize equals to 4k. when enough files are created, the fake_dirent->reclen will be 0x1000. it equals to the blocksize 4k, i.e. 0x1000. The problem seems to be related to the limitation of the 16-bit field when the blocksize is set to 64k. To address this, helpers like ext4_rec_len_{from,to}_disk has already been introduced to complete the conversion between the encoded and the plain form of rec_len. So fix this one by using the helper, and all the other in this file too. Cc: stable(a)kernel.org Fixes: dbe89444042a ("ext4: Calculate and verify checksums for htree nodes") Suggested-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger(a)dilger.ca> Suggested-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger(a)dilger.ca> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong(a)kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230803060938.1929759-1-zhangshida@kylinos.cn Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso(a)mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Shida Zhang <zhangshida(a)kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1(a)huawei.com> --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index 972611b72195..c55e1b64c38b 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -336,17 +336,17 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_dirent_tail(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *de) { struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t; + int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb); #ifdef PARANOID struct ext4_dir_entry *d, *top; d = de; top = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)de) + - (EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail))); - while (d < top && d->rec_len) + (blocksize - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail))); + while (d < top && ext4_rec_len_from_disk(d->rec_len, blocksize)) d = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)d) + - le16_to_cpu(d->rec_len)); + ext4_rec_len_from_disk(d->rec_len, blocksize)); if (d != top) return NULL; @@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_dirent_tail(struct inode *inode, #endif if (t->det_reserved_zero1 || - le16_to_cpu(t->det_rec_len) != sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail) || + (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(t->det_rec_len, blocksize) != + sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)) || t->det_reserved_zero2 || t->det_reserved_ft != EXT4_FT_DIR_CSUM) return NULL; @@ -439,13 +440,14 @@ static struct dx_countlimit *get_dx_countlimit(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_dir_entry *dp; struct dx_root_info *root; int count_offset; + int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb); + unsigned int rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dirent->rec_len, blocksize); - if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb)) + if (rlen == blocksize) count_offset = 8; - else if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == 12) { + else if (rlen == 12) { dp = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)dirent) + 12); - if (le16_to_cpu(dp->rec_len) != - EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - 12) + if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dp->rec_len, blocksize) != blocksize - 12) return NULL; root = (struct dx_root_info *)(((void *)dp + 12)); if (root->reserved_zero || @@ -1258,6 +1260,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size; char *base = bh->b_data; struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo; + int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(dir->i_sb); if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb)) buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail); @@ -1271,11 +1274,12 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir, struct buffer_head *bh, map_tail--; map_tail->hash = h.hash; map_tail->offs = ((char *) de - base)>>2; - map_tail->size = le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len); + map_tail->size = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len, + blocksize); count++; cond_resched(); } - de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize); + de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize); } return count; } -- 2.31.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 69c5d284f67089b4750d28ff6ac6f52ec224b330 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 04a07b7392d47dea88b6bc00389655cf26c5ef46 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
by Lu Wei 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.6-rc1 commit 04a07b7392d47dea88b6bc00389655cf26c5ef46 category: bugfix bugzilla: 189278 CVE: CVE-2023-39192 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure. An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries. Add a checkentry function to validate the structure. This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408). Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Lu Wei <luwei32(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c index a95b50342dbb..58ba402bc0b0 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c @@ -95,11 +95,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par) return ret ^ data->invert; } +static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) +{ + const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo; + const struct xt_u32_test *ct; + unsigned int i; + + if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests)) + return -EINVAL; + + for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) { + ct = &data->tests[i]; + + if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) || + ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value)) + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = { .name = "u32", .revision = 0, .family = NFPROTO_UNSPEC, .match = u32_mt, + .checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry, .matchsize = sizeof(struct xt_u32), .me = THIS_MODULE, }; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count
by Zhengchao Shao 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.295 commit f25dbfadaf525d854597c16420dd753ca47b9396 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAQ CVE: CVE-2023-39193 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream. sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory information. Add the field validation in the checkentry function. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c index 2d2fa1d53ea6..05495d3f47b8 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c @@ -149,6 +149,8 @@ static int sctp_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { const struct xt_sctp_info *info = par->matchinfo; + if (info->flag_count > ARRAY_SIZE(info->flag_info)) + return -EINVAL; if (info->flags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) return -EINVAL; if (info->invflags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count
by Zhengchao Shao 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.195 commit 5541827d13cf19b905594eaee586527476efaa61 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I85CAQ CVE: CVE-2023-39193 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit e99476497687ef9e850748fe6d232264f30bc8f9 upstream. sctp_mt_check doesn't validate the flag_count field. An attacker can take advantage of that to trigger a OOB read and leak memory information. Add the field validation in the checkentry function. Fixes: 2e4e6a17af35 ("[NETFILTER] x_tables: Abstraction layer for {ip,ip6,arp}_tables") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo(a)netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c index 680015ba7cb6..d4bf089c9e3f 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/xt_sctp.c @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ static int sctp_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par) { const struct xt_sctp_info *info = par->matchinfo; + if (info->flag_count > ARRAY_SIZE(info->flag_info)) + return -EINVAL; if (info->flags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) return -EINVAL; if (info->invflags & ~XT_SCTP_VALID_FLAGS) -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH OLK-5.10] netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
by Liu Jian 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.195 commit 780f60dde29692c42091602fee9c25e9e391f3dc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I86MTP CVE: CVE-2023-39189 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit f4f8a7803119005e87b716874bec07c751efafec ] The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431 CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1 Call Trace: nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23 [..] Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields. Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match") Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c index 51e3953b414c..260a655def34 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c @@ -316,6 +316,14 @@ static int nfnl_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, f = nla_data(osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER]); + if (f->opt_num > ARRAY_SIZE(f->opt)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!memchr(f->genre, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->subtype, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->version, 0, MAXGENRELEN)) + return -EINVAL; + kf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nf_osf_finger), GFP_KERNEL); if (!kf) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.34.1

2 1

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: avoid OOB read
by Liu Jian 13 Oct '23

13 Oct '23

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v4.19.295 commit 40d427ffccf9e60bd7288ea3748c066404a35622 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I86MTP CVE: CVE-2023-39189 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… --------------------------- [ Upstream commit f4f8a7803119005e87b716874bec07c751efafec ] The opt_num field is controlled by user mode and is not currently validated inside the kernel. An attacker can take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read and potentially leak information. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88804bc64272 by task poc/6431 CPU: 1 PID: 6431 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.0.0-rc4 #1 Call Trace: nf_osf_match_one+0xbed/0xd10 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:88 nf_osf_find+0x186/0x2f0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c:281 nft_osf_eval+0x37f/0x590 net/netfilter/nft_osf.c:47 expr_call_ops_eval net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:214 nft_do_chain+0x2b0/0x1490 net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c:264 nft_do_chain_ipv4+0x17c/0x1f0 net/netfilter/nft_chain_filter.c:23 [..] Also add validation to genre, subtype and version fields. Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match") Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang(a)infosec.exchange> Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander(a)redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw(a)strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Liu Jian <liujian56(a)huawei.com> --- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c index 917f06110c82..46713818228c 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink_osf.c @@ -318,6 +318,14 @@ static int nfnl_osf_add_callback(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl, f = nla_data(osf_attrs[OSF_ATTR_FINGER]); + if (f->opt_num > ARRAY_SIZE(f->opt)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!memchr(f->genre, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->subtype, 0, MAXGENRELEN) || + !memchr(f->version, 0, MAXGENRELEN)) + return -EINVAL; + kf = kmalloc(sizeof(struct nf_osf_finger), GFP_KERNEL); if (!kf) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.34.1

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