April 2023 - Kernel - mailweb.openeuler.org

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] i2c: xgene-slimpro: Fix out-of-bounds bug in xgene_slimpro_i2c_xfer()
by Yongqiang Liu 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

From: Wei Chen <harperchen1110(a)gmail.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.3-rc4 commit 92fbb6d1296f81f41f65effd7f5f8c0f74943d15 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6XHPL CVE: CVE-2023-2194 -------------------------------- The data->block[0] variable comes from user and is a number between 0-255. Without proper check, the variable may be very large to cause an out-of-bounds when performing memcpy in slimpro_i2c_blkwr. Fix this bug by checking the value of writelen. Fixes: f6505fbabc42 ("i2c: add SLIMpro I2C device driver on APM X-Gene platform") Signed-off-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110(a)gmail.com> Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andi Shyti <andi.shyti(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wolfram Sang <wsa(a)kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-xgene-slimpro.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-xgene-slimpro.c b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-xgene-slimpro.c index a7ac746018ad..7a746f413535 100644 --- a/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-xgene-slimpro.c +++ b/drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-xgene-slimpro.c @@ -321,6 +321,9 @@ static int slimpro_i2c_blkwr(struct slimpro_i2c_dev *ctx, u32 chip, u32 msg[3]; int rc; + if (writelen > I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + memcpy(ctx->dma_buffer, data, writelen); paddr = dma_map_single(ctx->dev, ctx->dma_buffer, writelen, DMA_TO_DEVICE); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[openEuler-22.03-LTS] rxrpc: Fix race between conn bundle lookup and bundle removal [ZDI-CAN-15975]
by Wang Yufen 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

From: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.157 commit 3535c632e6d16c98f76e615da8dc0cb2750c66cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6VK2H CVE: CVE-2023-2006 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3bcd6c7eaa53b56c3f584da46a1f7652e759d0e5 ] After rxrpc_unbundle_conn() has removed a connection from a bundle, it checks to see if there are any conns with available channels and, if not, removes and attempts to destroy the bundle. Whilst it does check after grabbing client_bundles_lock that there are no connections attached, this races with rxrpc_look_up_bundle() retrieving the bundle, but not attaching a connection for the connection to be attached later. There is therefore a window in which the bundle can get destroyed before we manage to attach a new connection to it. Fix this by adding an "active" counter to struct rxrpc_bundle: (1) rxrpc_connect_call() obtains an active count by prepping/looking up a bundle and ditches it before returning. (2) If, during rxrpc_connect_call(), a connection is added to the bundle, this obtains an active count, which is held until the connection is discarded. (3) rxrpc_deactivate_bundle() is created to drop an active count on a bundle and destroy it when the active count reaches 0. The active count is checked inside client_bundles_lock() to prevent a race with rxrpc_look_up_bundle(). (4) rxrpc_unbundle_conn() then calls rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(). Fixes: 245500d853e9 ("rxrpc: Rewrite the client connection manager") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-15975 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne(a)auristor.com> cc: linux-afs(a)lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Conflicts: net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h net/rxrpc/conn_client.c Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 + net/rxrpc/conn_client.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index ccb6541..90ab125 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ enum rxrpc_conn_proto_state { struct rxrpc_bundle { struct rxrpc_conn_parameters params; atomic_t usage; + atomic_t active; /* Number of active users */ unsigned int debug_id; bool try_upgrade; /* True if the bundle is attempting upgrade */ bool alloc_conn; /* True if someone's getting a conn */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c index f5fb223..34430cc 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ DEFINE_IDR(rxrpc_client_conn_ids); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rxrpc_conn_id_lock); +static void rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle); + /* * Get a connection ID and epoch for a client connection from the global pool. * The connection struct pointer is then recorded in the idr radix tree. The @@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_bundle *rxrpc_alloc_bundle(struct rxrpc_conn_parameters *cp, bundle->params = *cp; rxrpc_get_peer(bundle->params.peer); atomic_set(&bundle->usage, 1); + atomic_set(&bundle->active, 1); spin_lock_init(&bundle->channel_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bundle->waiting_calls); } @@ -341,6 +344,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_bundle *rxrpc_look_up_bundle(struct rxrpc_conn_parameters *c rxrpc_free_bundle(candidate); found_bundle: rxrpc_get_bundle(bundle); + atomic_inc(&bundle->active); spin_unlock(&local->client_bundles_lock); _leave(" = %u [found]", bundle->debug_id); return bundle; @@ -438,6 +442,7 @@ static void rxrpc_add_conn_to_bundle(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle, gfp_t gfp) if (old) trace_rxrpc_client(old, -1, rxrpc_client_replace); candidate->bundle_shift = shift; + atomic_inc(&bundle->active); bundle->conns[i] = candidate; for (j = 0; j < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; j++) set_bit(shift + j, &bundle->avail_chans); @@ -728,6 +733,7 @@ int rxrpc_connect_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, smp_rmb(); out_put_bundle: + rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(bundle); rxrpc_put_bundle(bundle); out: _leave(" = %d", ret); @@ -903,9 +909,8 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_client_call(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle, struct rxrpc_call static void rxrpc_unbundle_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) { struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle = conn->bundle; - struct rxrpc_local *local = bundle->params.local; unsigned int bindex; - bool need_drop = false, need_put = false; + bool need_drop = false; int i; _enter("C=%x", conn->debug_id); @@ -924,15 +929,22 @@ static void rxrpc_unbundle_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) } spin_unlock(&bundle->channel_lock); - /* If there are no more connections, remove the bundle */ - if (!bundle->avail_chans) { - _debug("maybe unbundle"); - spin_lock(&local->client_bundles_lock); + if (need_drop) { + rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(bundle); + rxrpc_put_connection(conn); + } +} - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bundle->conns); i++) - if (bundle->conns[i]) - break; - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(bundle->conns) && !bundle->params.exclusive) { +/* + * Drop the active count on a bundle. + */ +static void rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle) +{ + struct rxrpc_local *local = bundle->params.local; + bool need_put = false; + + if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&bundle->active, &local->client_bundles_lock)) { + if (!bundle->params.exclusive) { _debug("erase bundle"); rb_erase(&bundle->local_node, &local->client_bundles); need_put = true; @@ -942,10 +954,6 @@ static void rxrpc_unbundle_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) if (need_put) rxrpc_put_bundle(bundle); } - - if (need_drop) - rxrpc_put_connection(conn); - _leave(""); } /* -- 1.8.3.1

1 0

[OLK-5.10] rxrpc: Fix race between conn bundle lookup and bundle removal [ZDI-CAN-15975]
by Wang Yufen 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

From: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.157 commit 3535c632e6d16c98f76e615da8dc0cb2750c66cc category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6VK2H CVE: CVE-2023-2006 Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 3bcd6c7eaa53b56c3f584da46a1f7652e759d0e5 ] After rxrpc_unbundle_conn() has removed a connection from a bundle, it checks to see if there are any conns with available channels and, if not, removes and attempts to destroy the bundle. Whilst it does check after grabbing client_bundles_lock that there are no connections attached, this races with rxrpc_look_up_bundle() retrieving the bundle, but not attaching a connection for the connection to be attached later. There is therefore a window in which the bundle can get destroyed before we manage to attach a new connection to it. Fix this by adding an "active" counter to struct rxrpc_bundle: (1) rxrpc_connect_call() obtains an active count by prepping/looking up a bundle and ditches it before returning. (2) If, during rxrpc_connect_call(), a connection is added to the bundle, this obtains an active count, which is held until the connection is discarded. (3) rxrpc_deactivate_bundle() is created to drop an active count on a bundle and destroy it when the active count reaches 0. The active count is checked inside client_bundles_lock() to prevent a race with rxrpc_look_up_bundle(). (4) rxrpc_unbundle_conn() then calls rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(). Fixes: 245500d853e9 ("rxrpc: Rewrite the client connection manager") Reported-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com # ZDI-CAN-15975 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells(a)redhat.com> Tested-by: zdi-disclosures(a)trendmicro.com cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne(a)auristor.com> cc: linux-afs(a)lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem(a)davemloft.net> Conflicts: net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h net/rxrpc/conn_client.c Signed-off-by: Wang Yufen <wangyufen(a)huawei.com> --- net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 1 + net/rxrpc/conn_client.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h index ccb6541..90ab125 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h @@ -392,6 +392,7 @@ enum rxrpc_conn_proto_state { struct rxrpc_bundle { struct rxrpc_conn_parameters params; atomic_t usage; + atomic_t active; /* Number of active users */ unsigned int debug_id; bool try_upgrade; /* True if the bundle is attempting upgrade */ bool alloc_conn; /* True if someone's getting a conn */ diff --git a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c index f5fb223..34430cc 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/conn_client.c @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ DEFINE_IDR(rxrpc_client_conn_ids); static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(rxrpc_conn_id_lock); +static void rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle); + /* * Get a connection ID and epoch for a client connection from the global pool. * The connection struct pointer is then recorded in the idr radix tree. The @@ -123,6 +125,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_bundle *rxrpc_alloc_bundle(struct rxrpc_conn_parameters *cp, bundle->params = *cp; rxrpc_get_peer(bundle->params.peer); atomic_set(&bundle->usage, 1); + atomic_set(&bundle->active, 1); spin_lock_init(&bundle->channel_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&bundle->waiting_calls); } @@ -341,6 +344,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_bundle *rxrpc_look_up_bundle(struct rxrpc_conn_parameters *c rxrpc_free_bundle(candidate); found_bundle: rxrpc_get_bundle(bundle); + atomic_inc(&bundle->active); spin_unlock(&local->client_bundles_lock); _leave(" = %u [found]", bundle->debug_id); return bundle; @@ -438,6 +442,7 @@ static void rxrpc_add_conn_to_bundle(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle, gfp_t gfp) if (old) trace_rxrpc_client(old, -1, rxrpc_client_replace); candidate->bundle_shift = shift; + atomic_inc(&bundle->active); bundle->conns[i] = candidate; for (j = 0; j < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; j++) set_bit(shift + j, &bundle->avail_chans); @@ -728,6 +733,7 @@ int rxrpc_connect_call(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, smp_rmb(); out_put_bundle: + rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(bundle); rxrpc_put_bundle(bundle); out: _leave(" = %d", ret); @@ -903,9 +909,8 @@ void rxrpc_disconnect_client_call(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle, struct rxrpc_call static void rxrpc_unbundle_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) { struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle = conn->bundle; - struct rxrpc_local *local = bundle->params.local; unsigned int bindex; - bool need_drop = false, need_put = false; + bool need_drop = false; int i; _enter("C=%x", conn->debug_id); @@ -924,15 +929,22 @@ static void rxrpc_unbundle_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) } spin_unlock(&bundle->channel_lock); - /* If there are no more connections, remove the bundle */ - if (!bundle->avail_chans) { - _debug("maybe unbundle"); - spin_lock(&local->client_bundles_lock); + if (need_drop) { + rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(bundle); + rxrpc_put_connection(conn); + } +} - for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bundle->conns); i++) - if (bundle->conns[i]) - break; - if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(bundle->conns) && !bundle->params.exclusive) { +/* + * Drop the active count on a bundle. + */ +static void rxrpc_deactivate_bundle(struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle) +{ + struct rxrpc_local *local = bundle->params.local; + bool need_put = false; + + if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&bundle->active, &local->client_bundles_lock)) { + if (!bundle->params.exclusive) { _debug("erase bundle"); rb_erase(&bundle->local_node, &local->client_bundles); need_put = true; @@ -942,10 +954,6 @@ static void rxrpc_unbundle_conn(struct rxrpc_connection *conn) if (need_put) rxrpc_put_bundle(bundle); } - - if (need_drop) - rxrpc_put_connection(conn); - _leave(""); } /* -- 1.8.3.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v2] KVM: nVMX: Inject #GP, not #UD, if "generic" VMXON CR0/CR4 check fails
by 任敏敏(联通集团联通数字科技有限公司本部) 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.163 commit 43dd254853aa274d356bb1d3ab01a8ca880b07b0 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6XQ34 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9cc409325ddd776f6fd6293d5ce93ce1248af6e4 upstream Inject #GP for if VMXON is attempting with a CR0/CR4 that fails the generic "is CRx valid" check, but passes the CR4.VMXE check, and do the generic checks _after_ handling the post-VMXON VM-Fail. The CR4.VMXE check, and all other #UD cases, are special pre-conditions that are enforced prior to pivoting on the current VMX mode, i.e. occur before interception if VMXON is attempted in VMX non-root mode. All other CR0/CR4 checks generate #GP and effectively have lower priority than the post-VMXON check. Per the SDM: IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ... THEN #UD; ELSIF not in VMX operation THEN IF (CPL > 0) or (in A20M mode) or (the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation) THEN #GP(0); ELSIF in VMX non-root operation THEN VMexit; ELSIF CPL > 0 THEN #GP(0); ELSE VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation"); FI; which, if re-written without ELSIF, yields: IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ... THEN #UD IF in VMX non-root operation THEN VMexit; IF CPL > 0 THEN #GP(0) IF in VMX operation THEN VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation"); IF (in A20M mode) or (the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation) THEN #GP(0); Note, KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits that occur in L2 to L1, i.e. there is no need to check the vCPU is not in VMX non-root mode. Add a comment to explain why unconditionally forwarding such exits is functionally correct. Reported-by: Eric Li <ercli(a)ucdavis.edu> Fixes: c7d855c2aff2 ("KVM: nVMX: Inject #UD if VMXON is attempted with incompatible CR0/CR4") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006001956.329314-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: rminmin <renmm6(a)chinaunicom.cn> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 9003b14d72ca..40225b770942 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -4899,24 +4899,35 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; /* - * Note, KVM cannot rely on hardware to perform the CR0/CR4 #UD checks - * that have higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode - * for VMXON), as KVM must load valid CR0/CR4 values into hardware while - * running the guest, i.e. KVM needs to check the _guest_ values. + * Manually check CR4.VMXE checks, KVM must force CR4.VMXE=1 to enter + * the guest and so cannot rely on hardware to perform the check, + * which has higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode + * for VMXON). * - * Rely on hardware for the other two pre-VM-Exit checks, !VM86 and - * !COMPATIBILITY modes. KVM may run the guest in VM86 to emulate Real - * Mode, but KVM will never take the guest out of those modes. + * Rely on hardware for the other pre-VM-Exit checks, CR0.PE=1, !VM86 + * and !COMPATIBILITY modes. For an unrestricted guest, KVM doesn't + * force any of the relevant guest state. For a restricted guest, KVM + * does force CR0.PE=1, but only to also force VM86 in order to emulate + * Real Mode, and so there's no need to check CR0.PE manually. */ - if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) || - !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) { + if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_VMXE)) { kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1; } /* - * CPL=0 and all other checks that are lower priority than VM-Exit must - * be checked manually. + * The CPL is checked for "not in VMX operation" and for "in VMX root", + * and has higher priority than the VM-Fail due to being post-VMXON, + * i.e. VMXON #GPs outside of VMX non-root if CPL!=0. In VMX non-root, + * VMXON causes VM-Exit and KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits + * from L2 to L1, i.e. there's no need to check for the vCPU being in + * VMX non-root. + * + * Forwarding the VM-Exit unconditionally, i.e. without performing the + * #UD checks (see above), is functionally ok because KVM doesn't allow + * L1 to run L2 without CR4.VMXE=0, and because KVM never modifies L2's + * CR0 or CR4, i.e. it's L2's responsibility to emulate #UDs that are + * missed by hardware due to shadowing CR0 and/or CR4. */ if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); @@ -4926,6 +4937,17 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (vmx->nested.vmxon) return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT_OPERATION); + /* + * Invalid CR0/CR4 generates #GP. These checks are performed if and + * only if the vCPU isn't already in VMX operation, i.e. effectively + * have lower priority than the VM-Fail above. + */ + if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) || + !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + if ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES) != VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); -- 2.33.0 Èç¹ûÄúŽíÎóœÓÊÕÁËžÃÓÊŒþ£¬ÇëÍš¹ýµç×ÓÓÊŒþÁ¢ŒŽÍšÖªÎÒÃÇ¡£Çë»ØžŽÓÊŒþµœ hqs-spmc@chinaunicom.cn£¬ŒŽ¿ÉÒÔÍË¶©ŽËÓÊŒþ¡£ÎÒÃÇœ«Á¢ŒŽœ«ÄúµÄÐÅÏ¢ŽÓÎÒÃÇµÄ·¢ËÍÄ¿ÂŒÖÐÉŸ³ý¡£ If you have received this email in error please notify us immediately by e-mail. Please reply to hqs-spmc(a)chinaunicom.cn ,you can unsubscribe from this mail. We will immediately remove your information from send catalogue of our.

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10] KVM: nVMX: Inject #GP, not #UD, if "generic" VMXON CR0/CR4 check fails
by 任敏敏(联通集团联通数字科技有限公司本部) 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> stable inclusion from stable-v6.2 commit 9cc409325ddd776f6fd6293d5ce93ce1248af6e4 category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6XQ34 CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id… -------------------------------- commit 9cc409325ddd776f6fd6293d5ce93ce1248af6e4 upstream Inject #GP for if VMXON is attempting with a CR0/CR4 that fails the generic "is CRx valid" check, but passes the CR4.VMXE check, and do the generic checks _after_ handling the post-VMXON VM-Fail. The CR4.VMXE check, and all other #UD cases, are special pre-conditions that are enforced prior to pivoting on the current VMX mode, i.e. occur before interception if VMXON is attempted in VMX non-root mode. All other CR0/CR4 checks generate #GP and effectively have lower priority than the post-VMXON check. Per the SDM: IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ... THEN #UD; ELSIF not in VMX operation THEN IF (CPL > 0) or (in A20M mode) or (the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation) THEN #GP(0); ELSIF in VMX non-root operation THEN VMexit; ELSIF CPL > 0 THEN #GP(0); ELSE VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation"); FI; which, if re-written without ELSIF, yields: IF (register operand) or (CR0.PE = 0) or (CR4.VMXE = 0) or ... THEN #UD IF in VMX non-root operation THEN VMexit; IF CPL > 0 THEN #GP(0) IF in VMX operation THEN VMfail("VMXON executed in VMX root operation"); IF (in A20M mode) or (the values of CR0 and CR4 are not supported in VMX operation) THEN #GP(0); Note, KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits that occur in L2 to L1, i.e. there is no need to check the vCPU is not in VMX non-root mode. Add a comment to explain why unconditionally forwarding such exits is functionally correct. Reported-by: Eric Li <ercli(a)ucdavis.edu> Fixes: c7d855c2aff2 ("KVM: nVMX: Inject #UD if VMXON is attempted with incompatible CR0/CR4") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc(a)google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221006001956.329314-1-seanjc@google.com Signed-off-by: rminmin <renmm6(a)chinaunicom.cn> --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c index 9003b14d72ca..40225b770942 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c @@ -4899,24 +4899,35 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) | FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX; /* - * Note, KVM cannot rely on hardware to perform the CR0/CR4 #UD checks - * that have higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode - * for VMXON), as KVM must load valid CR0/CR4 values into hardware while - * running the guest, i.e. KVM needs to check the _guest_ values. + * Manually check CR4.VMXE checks, KVM must force CR4.VMXE=1 to enter + * the guest and so cannot rely on hardware to perform the check, + * which has higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode + * for VMXON). * - * Rely on hardware for the other two pre-VM-Exit checks, !VM86 and - * !COMPATIBILITY modes. KVM may run the guest in VM86 to emulate Real - * Mode, but KVM will never take the guest out of those modes. + * Rely on hardware for the other pre-VM-Exit checks, CR0.PE=1, !VM86 + * and !COMPATIBILITY modes. For an unrestricted guest, KVM doesn't + * force any of the relevant guest state. For a restricted guest, KVM + * does force CR0.PE=1, but only to also force VM86 in order to emulate + * Real Mode, and so there's no need to check CR0.PE manually. */ - if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) || - !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) { + if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_VMXE)) { kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR); return 1; } /* - * CPL=0 and all other checks that are lower priority than VM-Exit must - * be checked manually. + * The CPL is checked for "not in VMX operation" and for "in VMX root", + * and has higher priority than the VM-Fail due to being post-VMXON, + * i.e. VMXON #GPs outside of VMX non-root if CPL!=0. In VMX non-root, + * VMXON causes VM-Exit and KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits + * from L2 to L1, i.e. there's no need to check for the vCPU being in + * VMX non-root. + * + * Forwarding the VM-Exit unconditionally, i.e. without performing the + * #UD checks (see above), is functionally ok because KVM doesn't allow + * L1 to run L2 without CR4.VMXE=0, and because KVM never modifies L2's + * CR0 or CR4, i.e. it's L2's responsibility to emulate #UDs that are + * missed by hardware due to shadowing CR0 and/or CR4. */ if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); @@ -4926,6 +4937,17 @@ static int handle_vmon(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) if (vmx->nested.vmxon) return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT_OPERATION); + /* + * Invalid CR0/CR4 generates #GP. These checks are performed if and + * only if the vCPU isn't already in VMX operation, i.e. effectively + * have lower priority than the VM-Fail above. + */ + if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) || + !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) { + kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); + return 1; + } + if ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES) != VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES) { kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0); -- 2.33.0 Èç¹ûÄúŽíÎóœÓÊÕÁËžÃÓÊŒþ£¬ÇëÍš¹ýµç×ÓÓÊŒþÁ¢ŒŽÍšÖªÎÒÃÇ¡£Çë»ØžŽÓÊŒþµœ hqs-spmc@chinaunicom.cn£¬ŒŽ¿ÉÒÔÍË¶©ŽËÓÊŒþ¡£ÎÒÃÇœ«Á¢ŒŽœ«ÄúµÄÐÅÏ¢ŽÓÎÒÃÇµÄ·¢ËÍÄ¿ÂŒÖÐÉŸ³ý¡£ If you have received this email in error please notify us immediately by e-mail. Please reply to hqs-spmc(a)chinaunicom.cn ,you can unsubscribe from this mail. We will immediately remove your information from send catalogue of our.

2 1

Re: [openEuler-22.03-LTS,v1,0/6] Add perf metricgroup support for HiSilicon hip08 platform
by patchwork bot 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

your patch has been converted to a pull request, pull request link is: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/609

1 0

[PATCH openEuler-22.03-LTS v1 0/6] Add perf metricgroup support for HiSilicon hip08 platform
by Wei Li 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

Add perf metricgroup support for HiSilicon hip08 platform, tested on Huawei D06 board. John Garry (6): perf metricgroup: Make find_metric() public with name change perf test: Handle metric reuse in pmu-events parsing test perf pmu: Add pmu_events_map__find() function to find the common PMU map for the system perf vendor events arm64: Add Hisi hip08 L1 metrics perf vendor events arm64: Add Hisi hip08 L2 metrics perf vendor events arm64: Add Hisi hip08 L3 metrics tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/Build | 1 + tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/pmu.c | 25 ++ .../arch/arm64/hisilicon/hip08/metrics.json | 233 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/perf/tests/pmu-events.c | 83 ++++++- tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c | 11 +- tools/perf/util/metricgroup.h | 3 +- tools/perf/util/pmu.c | 5 + tools/perf/util/pmu.h | 1 + tools/perf/util/s390-sample-raw.c | 4 +- 9 files changed, 356 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/pmu.c create mode 100644 tools/perf/pmu-events/arch/arm64/hisilicon/hip08/metrics.json -- 2.25.1

1 6

[PATCH openEuler-1.0-LTS] audit: fix a memleak caused by auditing load module
by Yongqiang Liu 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

From: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.2-rc1 commit 95e0b46fcebd7dbf6850dee96046e4c4ddc7f69c category: bugfix bugzilla: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6X2LV CVE: NA Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?… -------------------------------- module.name will be allocated unconditionally when auditing load module, and audit_log_start() can fail with other reasons, or audit_log_exit maybe not called, caused module.name is not freed so free module.name in audit_free_context and __audit_syscall_exit unreferenced object 0xffff88af90837d20 (size 8): comm "modprobe", pid 1036, jiffies 4294704867 (age 3069.138s) hex dump (first 8 bytes): 69 78 67 62 65 00 ff ff ixgbe... backtrace: [<0000000008da28fe>] __audit_log_kern_module+0x33/0x80 [<00000000c1491e61>] load_module+0x64f/0x3850 [<000000007fc9ae3f>] __do_sys_init_module+0x218/0x250 [<0000000000d4a478>] do_syscall_64+0x117/0x400 [<000000004924ded8>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [<000000007dc331dd>] 0xffffffffffffffff Fixes: ca86cad7380e3 ("audit: log module name on init_module") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yu <zhangyu31(a)baidu.com> Signed-off-by: Li RongQing <lirongqing(a)baidu.com> [PM: manual merge fixup in __audit_syscall_exit()] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> conflict: kernel/auditsc.c Signed-off-by: Yi Yang <yiyang13(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: cuigaosheng <cuigaosheng1(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: guozihua <guozihua(a)huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Weiyang <wangweiyang2(a)huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yongqiang Liu <liuyongqiang13(a)huawei.com> --- kernel/auditsc.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 1513873e23bd..57d30b75f7a2 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -881,6 +881,13 @@ static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) context->proctitle.len = 0; } +static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context) +{ + if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) { + kfree(context->module.name); + context->module.name = NULL; + } +} static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) { struct audit_names *n, *next; @@ -964,6 +971,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) { + audit_free_module(context); audit_free_names(context); unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); free_tree_refs(context); @@ -1281,7 +1289,6 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) audit_log_format(ab, "name="); if (context->module.name) { audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name); - kfree(context->module.name); } else audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); @@ -1583,6 +1590,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); + audit_free_module(context); audit_free_names(context); unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); audit_free_aux(context); -- 2.25.1

1 0

[PATCH OLK-5.10 v1 0/6] Add perf metricgroup support for HiSilicon hip08 platform
by Wei Li 23 Apr '23

23 Apr '23

Add perf metricgroup support for HiSilicon hip08 platform, tested on Huawei D06 board. John Garry (6): perf metricgroup: Make find_metric() public with name change perf test: Handle metric reuse in pmu-events parsing test perf pmu: Add pmu_events_map__find() function to find the common PMU map for the system perf vendor events arm64: Add Hisi hip08 L1 metrics perf vendor events arm64: Add Hisi hip08 L2 metrics perf vendor events arm64: Add Hisi hip08 L3 metrics tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/Build | 1 + tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/pmu.c | 25 ++ .../arch/arm64/hisilicon/hip08/metrics.json | 233 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/perf/tests/pmu-events.c | 83 ++++++- tools/perf/util/metricgroup.c | 11 +- tools/perf/util/metricgroup.h | 3 +- tools/perf/util/pmu.c | 5 + tools/perf/util/pmu.h | 1 + tools/perf/util/s390-sample-raw.c | 4 +- 9 files changed, 356 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/perf/arch/arm64/util/pmu.c create mode 100644 tools/perf/pmu-events/arch/arm64/hisilicon/hip08/metrics.json -- 2.25.1

2 7

Re: [PATCH v3] mm: oom: move memcg_print_bad_task() out of mem_cgroup_scan_tasks()
by Zheng Zengkai 22 Apr '23

22 Apr '23

在 2023/4/17 21:12, Kefeng Wang 写道: > + Zengkai > > Could you merge this patch? +zhangjialin Hi Kefeng and Kang Chen Is this patch same as the one in PR #582(https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/pulls/582) ? If so，let's tracking it via the gitee PR, Here are some notices about contribution to openEuler kernel: https://gitee.com/openeuler/kernel/issues/I6WKLA Thank you! > > On 2023/4/17 19:13, Kang Chen wrote: >> hulk inclusion >> category: bugfix >> bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/I6NYW4 >> CVE: NA >> >> -------------------------------- >> >> raw call flow: >> >> oom_kill_process >> -> mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(.., .., message) >> -> memcg_print_bad_task(message, ..) >> >> message is "const char*" type, and incorrectly cast to >> "oom_control*" type in memcg_print_bad_task. > > a blank line, > >> Fix it by moving memcg_print_bad_task out of mem_cgroup_scan_tasks >> and call it in select_bad_process and dump_tasks. Furthermore, >> use struct oom_control* directly and remove the useless parm `ret`. >> > > Reviewed-by: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang(a)huawei.com> > >> Signed-off-by: Kang Chen <void0red(a)hust.edu.cn> >> --- >> v3 -> v2: use type `struct oom_control *` directly and fix bugs >> v2 -> v1: remove parm `ret` and create a memcg_print_bad_task stub >> >> mm/memcontrol.c | 16 +++++++++------- >> mm/oom_kill.c | 14 ++++++++------ >> 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/mm/memcontrol.c b/mm/memcontrol.c >> index 635cb8b65b86..6b4f70d090d6 100644 >> --- a/mm/memcontrol.c >> +++ b/mm/memcontrol.c >> @@ -1214,9 +1214,6 @@ int mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(struct mem_cgroup >> *memcg, >> break; >> } >> } >> -#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_QOS >> - memcg_print_bad_task(arg, ret); >> -#endif >> return ret; >> } >> @@ -4004,14 +4001,12 @@ bool memcg_low_priority_scan_tasks(int >> (*fn)(struct task_struct *, void *), >> return oc->chosen ? true : false; >> } >> -void memcg_print_bad_task(void *arg, int ret) >> +void memcg_print_bad_task(struct oom_control *oc) >> { >> - struct oom_control *oc = arg; >> - >> if (!static_branch_likely(&memcg_qos_stat_key)) >> return; >> - if (!ret && oc->chosen) { >> + if (oc->chosen) { >> struct mem_cgroup *memcg; >> memcg = mem_cgroup_from_task(oc->chosen); >> @@ -4042,6 +4037,13 @@ int sysctl_memcg_qos_handler(struct ctl_table >> *table, int write, >> return ret; >> } >> + >> +#else >> + >> +void memcg_print_bad_task(struct oom_control *oc) >> +{ >> +} >> + >> #endif >> #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA >> diff --git a/mm/oom_kill.c b/mm/oom_kill.c >> index 0f77eb4c6644..9d595265bbf5 100644 >> --- a/mm/oom_kill.c >> +++ b/mm/oom_kill.c >> @@ -408,9 +408,10 @@ static void select_bad_process(struct >> oom_control *oc) >> { >> oc->chosen_points = LONG_MIN; >> - if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) >> - mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, oom_evaluate_task, oc); >> - else { >> + if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) { >> + if (!mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, oom_evaluate_task, oc)) >> + memcg_print_bad_task(oc); >> + } else { >> struct task_struct *p; >> #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG_QOS >> @@ -473,9 +474,10 @@ static void dump_tasks(struct oom_control *oc) >> pr_info("Tasks state (memory values in pages):\n"); >> pr_info("[ pid ] uid tgid total_vm rss pgtables_bytes >> swapents oom_score_adj name\n"); >> - if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) >> - mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, dump_task, oc); >> - else { >> + if (is_memcg_oom(oc)) { >> + if (!mem_cgroup_scan_tasks(oc->memcg, dump_task, oc)) >> + memcg_print_bad_task(oc); >> + } else { >> struct task_struct *p; >> rcu_read_lock(); > . >

3 2

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

Kernel April 2023