From: Zicheng Qu <quzicheng(a)huawei.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v6.6.60
commit 3dc0eda2cd5c653b162852ae5f0631bfe4ca5e95
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB37AV
CVE: CVE-2024-50232
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id…
-------------------------------------------------
commit efa353ae1b0541981bc96dbf2e586387d0392baa upstream.
In the ad7124_write_raw() function, parameter val can potentially
be zero. This may lead to a division by zero when DIV_ROUND_CLOSEST()
is called within ad7124_set_channel_odr(). The ad7124_write_raw()
function is invoked through the sequence: iio_write_channel_raw() ->
iio_write_channel_attribute() -> iio_channel_write(), with no checks
in place to ensure val is non-zero.
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 7b8d045e497a ("iio: adc: ad7124: allow more than 8 channels")
Signed-off-by: Zicheng Qu <quzicheng(a)huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Nuno Sa <nuno.sa(a)analog.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241022134330.574601-1-quzicheng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron(a)huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Yipeng Zou <zouyipeng(a)huawei.com>
---
drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c
index d2fe0269b6d3..34e06e2e51d6 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/ad7124.c
@@ -643,7 +643,7 @@ static int ad7124_write_raw(struct iio_dev *indio_dev,
switch (info) {
case IIO_CHAN_INFO_SAMP_FREQ:
- if (val2 != 0) {
+ if (val2 != 0 || val == 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
--
2.34.1
From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
stable inclusion
from stable-v5.10.228
commit 3728b4eb27910ffedd173018279a970705f2e03a
category: bugfix
bugzilla: https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/kernel/issues/IB2BX7
CVE: CVE-2024-50099
Reference: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
--------------------------------
commit acc450aa07099d071b18174c22a1119c57da8227 upstream.
The simulate_ldr_literal() and simulate_ldrsw_literal() functions are
unsafe to use for uprobes. Both functions were originally written for
use with kprobes, and access memory with plain C accesses. When uprobes
was added, these were reused unmodified even though they cannot safely
access user memory.
There are three key problems:
1) The plain C accesses do not have corresponding extable entries, and
thus if they encounter a fault the kernel will treat these as
unintentional accesses to user memory, resulting in a BUG() which
will kill the kernel thread, and likely lead to further issues (e.g.
lockup or panic()).
2) The plain C accesses are subject to HW PAN and SW PAN, and so when
either is in use, any attempt to simulate an access to user memory
will fault. Thus neither simulate_ldr_literal() nor
simulate_ldrsw_literal() can do anything useful when simulating a
user instruction on any system with HW PAN or SW PAN.
3) The plain C accesses are privileged, as they run in kernel context,
and in practice can access a small range of kernel virtual addresses.
The instructions they simulate have a range of +/-1MiB, and since the
simulated instructions must itself be a user instructions in the
TTBR0 address range, these can address the final 1MiB of the TTBR1
acddress range by wrapping downwards from an address in the first
1MiB of the TTBR0 address range.
In contemporary kernels the last 8MiB of TTBR1 address range is
reserved, and accesses to this will always fault, meaning this is no
worse than (1).
Historically, it was theoretically possible for the linear map or
vmemmap to spill into the final 8MiB of the TTBR1 address range, but
in practice this is extremely unlikely to occur as this would
require either:
* Having enough physical memory to fill the entire linear map all the
way to the final 1MiB of the TTBR1 address range.
* Getting unlucky with KASLR randomization of the linear map such
that the populated region happens to overlap with the last 1MiB of
the TTBR address range.
... and in either case if we were to spill into the final page there
would be larger problems as the final page would alias with error
pointers.
Practically speaking, (1) and (2) are the big issues. Given there have
been no reports of problems since the broken code was introduced, it
appears that no-one is relying on probing these instructions with
uprobes.
Avoid these issues by not allowing uprobes on LDR (literal) and LDRSW
(literal), limiting the use of simulate_ldr_literal() and
simulate_ldrsw_literal() to kprobes. Attempts to place uprobes on LDR
(literal) and LDRSW (literal) will be rejected as
arm_probe_decode_insn() will return INSN_REJECTED. In future we can
consider introducing working uprobes support for these instructions, but
this will require more significant work.
Fixes: 9842ceae9fa8 ("arm64: Add uprobe support")
Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland(a)arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas(a)arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241008155851.801546-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will(a)kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh(a)linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhongjin <chenzhongjin(a)huawei.com>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c | 16 +++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c
index 104101f633b10..492e50a6ddbfc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/probes/decode-insn.c
@@ -99,10 +99,6 @@ arm_probe_decode_insn(probe_opcode_t insn, struct arch_probe_insn *api)
aarch64_insn_is_blr(insn) ||
aarch64_insn_is_ret(insn)) {
api->handler = simulate_br_blr_ret;
- } else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldr_lit(insn)) {
- api->handler = simulate_ldr_literal;
- } else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldrsw_lit(insn)) {
- api->handler = simulate_ldrsw_literal;
} else {
/*
* Instruction cannot be stepped out-of-line and we don't
@@ -140,6 +136,17 @@ arm_kprobe_decode_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, struct arch_specific_insn *asi)
probe_opcode_t insn = le32_to_cpu(*addr);
probe_opcode_t *scan_end = NULL;
unsigned long size = 0, offset = 0;
+ struct arch_probe_insn *api = &asi->api;
+
+ if (aarch64_insn_is_ldr_lit(insn)) {
+ api->handler = simulate_ldr_literal;
+ decoded = INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
+ } else if (aarch64_insn_is_ldrsw_lit(insn)) {
+ api->handler = simulate_ldrsw_literal;
+ decoded = INSN_GOOD_NO_SLOT;
+ } else {
+ decoded = arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &asi->api);
+ }
/*
* If there's a symbol defined in front of and near enough to
@@ -157,7 +164,6 @@ arm_kprobe_decode_insn(kprobe_opcode_t *addr, struct arch_specific_insn *asi)
else
scan_end = addr - MAX_ATOMIC_CONTEXT_SIZE;
}
- decoded = arm_probe_decode_insn(insn, &asi->api);
if (decoded != INSN_REJECTED && scan_end)
if (is_probed_address_atomic(addr - 1, scan_end))
--
2.25.1